►
Description
Bitcoin was truly revolutionary. It was revolutionary because it enforced rules about the transfer of assets without the use of a trusted third party. In other words, it enforced property rights in an entirely new way.
Features such as property rights and contract enforcement are typically bundled together under the term “Rule of Law.” If Bitcoin could enforce property rights for bitcoin, and general smart contract frameworks can enforce some types of arrangements, can blockchains provide rule of law? How do we define the rule of law? Are there aspects of the rule of law that blockchains excel at providing? Are there aspects that they fail to provide?
A
Okay,
well,
first,
thank
you
so
much
for
coming
and
thank
you
so
much
protocol
labs
for
hosting
and
helping
promote
the
event.
So
today,
I'm
going
to
talk
about
blockchains
as
a
solution,
but
not
in
the
typical
way
of
you
know,
watch
chains
can
solve
everything.
What
I
want
to
talk
about
today
is
kind
of
watching
her
by
role
block.
A
A
So
what
is
rule
of
law
in
his
book
code
is
law
Lawrence
Lessig.
He
talked
about
at
the
collapse
of
the
Berlin
Wall
in
the
early
90s.
There
was
this
influx
of
Americans
into
into
Central
and
Eastern
Europe,
saying
hey.
We
know
what
the
world
watt
is.
We're
gonna
tell
you
what
it
is,
and
here
here's
a
translated
copy
of
the
US
Constitution
and
this
oftentimes
didn't
work
right.
A
So
we've
seen
this
pattern
again
and
again,
and
so
two
experts
in
this
field,
Jillian,
Hadfield
and
Barry
one
guest-
they
saw
the
rule
of
law,
was
kind
of
under
theorized
right
people
would
talk
about
it,
but
they
would
just
find
the
throw
in
their
favorite
subject.
They
would
say:
well
the
rule
blog,
you
know,
that's
really:
democracy
or
the
rule
of
law.
A
That's
really
a
written
constitution,
that's
what
you
need,
and
so
what
they
decided
to
do
is
that
they
wrote
this
paper
called
the
micro
foundations
of
the
rule
of
law
and
they
decided
to
get
to
the
essentials
of
the
rule
of
law.
So
what
they
decided
was
that
the
rule
of
law
is
really
a
classification
institution.
A
So
what
it's
doing
is
that
it
takes
the
facts
to
the
cases,
input
right
and
then
it
does
a
classification
and
what
you
get
out
of
is
a
decision,
and
they
also
came
up
with
some
required
characteristics
for
what
a
good
classification
institution
would
have.
So
the
first
is
that
it
makes
decision-making
logic
publicly
available
right.
So,
if
you
want
to
know
if
your
future
action
is
going
to
be
lawful
or
unlawful,
you
need
be
able
to
replicate
the
same
logic
that
the
classification
institution
would
used.
A
The
second
is
that
it
resolves
ambiguity,
so
it
needs
to
be
clear
right.
Third,
its
stable
does
it
change
from
day
to
day?
Number
four
is
that
it
gives
predictable
results
for
novel
inputs,
so
we're
able
to
extrapolate
right
from
the
rules
that
we
have
and
apply
it
to
new
and
novel
inputs.
Number
five
is
that
it's
impersonal,
so
this
means
that
the
rule
plot
isn't
based
on
you
know
you
being
a
specific
person
or
of
a
specific
class.
A
It
really
applies
in
a
very
general
way
and
number
six
is
that
a
good
plastic
ation
institution
can
produce
new
rules
by
soliciting
information
from
users.
So
let's
say
that
we
have
a
new
technology,
let's
say
the
Internet
and
what
we
want
to
do.
What
a
good
classification
institution
would
do
is
talk
to
the
subject
matter:
experts
before
coming
up
with
new
rules
for
that
new
technology
right.
A
So
one
thing
that
Pat
field
and
Weinstein
sorry
wine
gas
point
out-
is
that
it's
a
mistake
to
presuppose
that
government
is
an
essential
feature
of
law
and
legal
order,
all
right.
So
when
they're
talking
about
the
classification
institution,
they
have
recognized
that
throughout
history,
the
classification
institution
that
feature
that
function
has
been
performed
by
things
other
than
governed.
So
one
taste
of
this
has
been
the
law
merchants
or
the
lex
market
Oriya,
and
that
was
in
medieval
times.
A
There
are
these
merchants
that
were
going
all
over
Europe
right
and
at
the
time
they
had,
they
had
church
courts
or
ecclesiastical
courts.
They
had
they
could
go
to
awards
courts,
but
that
wouldn't
help
them
when
are
doing
very
complex
business
law,
and
they
were
doing
it,
maybe
in
another
country
or
outside
of
their
home
jurisdiction.
So
what
they
did
is
that
they
they
came
together
and
they
said
look.
We
have
this
really
complex
business
logic.
No
one
understands
what
we're
doing,
but
we
want
to
be
able
to
enforce
these
rules.
A
We
want
to
be
able
to
enforce
them,
no
matter
where
we
are
right.
So
what
they
did
was
a
form
of
private
law
and
they
are
able
to
make
these
agreements
with
each
other
such
that
if
they
had
a
dispute,
they
could
go
to
a
fellow
merchant
and
have
him
resolve
things
according
to
the
rules
that
they
had
agreed
upon.
So
there's
definitely
precedent
for
this,
so
as
changing
tracks
a
little
bit.
A
This
is
google's
deepmind
projects
and,
what's
interesting
about
it,
you
might
notice
that
these
things
are
acting
a
little
strangely
great,
like
this
guy
thinks
that
his
arms
are
doing
something,
but
what's
interesting
about
it.
Is
that
what
the
deep
mind
project
did
is
that
they
chose
not
to
encode
their
preconceived
notions
of
how
to
walk
or
run
or
climb,
and
instead
what
they
did
is
they
just
said?
They
just
gave
these
AI
agents
the
goal
just
to
move
forward
without
falling,
and,
as
you
can
see,
some
really
interesting.
A
So
we
can
do
the
same
thing
for
law
and
it
turns
out
that
this
is
an
analytical
approach
that
already
exists.
This
is
called
the
functional
approach
in
comparative
law
and
what
it
says
is
that
law
is
comparable
if
it
performs
the
same
functions,
and
that
is
if
it
solves
the
same
social
problems.
So
this
means
that
you
know
if
we're
trying
to
compare
law
between
two
different
time
periods
that
are
really
different.
A
If
we're
trying
to
compare
law
between
two
different
countries
that
have
really
different
systems,
what
we
can
use
as
the
tools
comparison
is
whether
it
solves
the
same
social
problems
and,
what's
being
compared,
can
include
organizations,
norms
and
practices
operating
outside
the
law.
So
just
give
two
examples
of
things
that
we
wouldn't
traditionally
see
as
law,
but
the
Act
or
perform
the
same
function
as
law.
So
this
does
the
law
speaker
in
Scandinavian
countries
in
around
like
the
year
1000.
A
So
like
Sweden
Iceland,
there
was
a
a
role
called
the
law
speaker
and
your
job
was
to
recite
the
law
at
these
large
gatherings.
So
you
would
recite
the
law
and
you
would
resolve
the
speech,
and
so
this
is
very
different
right
than
you
know
the
written
constitution
that
Americans
may
be
used
to-
or
you
know
the
Supreme
Court,
but
this
was
how
they
did
the
law
right.
A
Just
to
give
another
example:
in
the
California
Gold
Rush
times
they
had
to
figure
out
how
to
enforce
property
rights,
well,
basically
having
no
legal
system
right.
So
what
they
did.
It
was
that
they
said
you
know
what
let's
get
together
in
a
group,
so
each
jurisdiction
kind
of
had
their
own
meetings
and
they
decided
the
rules
like
how
big
can
your
claim
be,
how
you
mark
it
out
how
many
of
them
you
have?
How
do
you
resolve
disputes
things
like
you
know?
A
Maybe
you
just
round
up
the
first
five
people
that
you
can
find
and
that's
your
jury.
That's
you
know
to
your
dispute
or
maybe
there's
a
person
who
does
the
arbitration
and
so
I
really
love
this,
because
it
kind
of
shows
like
what
the
legal
system
was
at
the
time
for
that
place.
That's
this
part
at
the
end,
it
says
this
is
no
monkeytail,
but
I
will
assert
my
rights
at
the
point
of
a
six-shooter,
it's
legally
necessary.
A
So
I
kind
of
just
want
to
stress
that,
as
we
move
as
we
use
a
functional
approach
in
comparative
law,
we
move
kind
of
from
what
we're
used
to
wear.
You
know,
tradition
matters,
quite
a
quite
a
great
deal
where
it.
You
know
the
formalism
that
were
used
to
we're
going
to
find
ourselves
with
things
that
look
really
strange.
Great.
A
So
when
it's
social
problems
are
we
actually
trying
to
solve
so
Anthony
Kremlin
is
a
contract
law
professor
at
Yale,
and
he
has
this
great
paper
called
contract
law
and
the
state
of
nature
and
what
he
tells
us
that
going
back
to
Hobbs
if
you're
in
the
state
of
nature,
there
are
two
problems
that
you
have.
The
first
is
vulnerability
of
possession,
so
by
that
he
means
that
there's
you
know
people
can
take
things
from
you
at
any
moment.
A
You
don't
have
enforcement
of
property
rights
and
the
second
problem
that
you
have
the
second
social
problem
that
you
need
to
solve
is
transactional
and
security.
So
this
means,
if
you're,
trying
to
make
an
exchange
with
someone
you're
trying
to
make
a
deal
with
someone.
It
may
be
that
they
act
opportunistically
and
they
may
cheat
you
or
run
away
with
both
of
the
goods
when
you're
trying
to
make
an
exchange
right.
So
traditionally.
A
A
So
the
other
thing
that
I
probably
need
to
define
before
we
get
further
is
on
chain
versus
off
chain
assets
so
buy
on
chain,
and
this
is
kind
of
a
fuzzy
distinction
but
buy
on
chain.
I
mean
that
the
blockchain
or
a
blockchain
is
the
sole
source
of
truth
of
ownership
or
access.
So
this
includes
things
like
crypto
currencies.
Digital
assets,
maybe
even
like
event,
tickets
on
a
blockchain
but
by
off
chain
I
mean
that
something
else
determines
ownership
or
access.
So
this
would
include
things
like
physical
objects.
A
Let's
say
that
the
the
source
of
truth
is
actually
government
records.
Things
like
that.
So
just
to
use
an
example,
let's
say
that
I
have
a
book
and
let's
say
that
I
record
on
a
blockchain
that
I
own
this
book.
Great
right.
But
let's
say
someone
steals
that
book
for
me
or
I
saw
it
to
someone
else
now.
You
know
what
is
the
source
of
truth?
Well,
probably
it's
possession,
whoever
possesses
that
book
is
probably
you
know
what
people
would
look
to
as
the
legal
owner
of
that
book.
A
Ok,
so
let's
look
at
a
simple
case.
So
let's
look
at
cryptocurrencies
and
let's
say
that
Alice
lists
a
it's.
An
account
based
system
and
Alice
has
10
tokens
and
she
wants
to
give
those
10
tokens
to
Bob.
So
our
old
state,
Alice's
Tim
Bob,
has
0.
It
goes
through
a
transition
function
now
Alice
has
0
and
Bob
has
PIN,
because
I
was
a
valid
transaction
right.
Very
simple,
ok,
but
what
happens
when
you
have
an
invalid
transaction?
A
So
let's
say
that
Bob
tries
to
take
10
tokens
from
Alice
without
her
consent
right
so
so
Alice
has
sin
tokens
Bob
has
zeros,
so
the
old
state
is
the
same,
but
in
this
case
the
input,
the
transaction
that's
happening.
That's
given
to
this
transition
function,
it's
invalid,
so
Bob
didn't
have
the
authority.
He
wasn't
able
to
sign
the
transaction
or
whatever
the
the
method
of
authority
is
to
do
this
transfer,
and
so
this
transaction
is
rejected
by
the
block
producers
or
minors
or
validators.
A
So
we've
actually
accomplished
something
really
huge
here.
What
we've
done
is
that
you
know
cryptocurrencies
enforce
property
rights
and
they
enforce
them
on
the
Internet
in
code
and
without
a
traditional
law.
This
is
very,
very
cool,
but
there's
not
very
much
that
you
can
do
with
crypto
currencies,
so
the
kind
of
property
rights
that
they
enforce.
Well,
it's
really
just
these
three.
You
have
the
right
to
use
it,
which
is
basically
to
hold
a
cryptocurrency.
You
have
the
right
to
exclude
others.
A
So
someone
can't
you
know
just
take
your
cryptocurrency
without
your
permission
and
you
have
the
power
of
transfer,
you
can
transfer
that
to
someone
else,
and
so
these
rights
come
from
this
paper
by
am
honoring,
who
kind
of
famously
came
up
with
the
idea
of
ownership
as
a
bundle
of
Rights.
So
there
are
I
think
about
eight
of
them.
Crypto
currencies
are
only
doing
about
three.
A
So
at
AG
work
we
decided.
Okay,
so
can
we
actually
express
more
sophisticated
property
rights?
So
what
we
chose
to
do
well,
how
many
people
here
are
familiar
with,
like
million
dollar
home
page
or
like
reddit's,
place,
okay
cool,
so
this
is
actually
an
experiment
on
reddit
called
place
the
image
here.
But
what
we
chose
to
do
at
a
gorrik
was
we
have
our
smart
contract
framework
right.
We
like
trying
to
create
transfer
protocol
or
ER
TP,
and
we
said:
can
we
actually
do
something
more
than
tokens?
We
do
something
that
actually
has
some
use.
A
We
do
more
sophisticated
property
rights,
so
what
about
the
right
to
buy
and
sell
pixels,
and
what
about
the
rights
to
color
those
pixels?
And
so
what
we
realized
was
that
this
is
actually
fulfilling
another
part
of
the
bundle
of
Rights
that
am
honoring
talks
about
and
that's
the
right
to
income,
and
so
it's
a
claim
to
the
financial
benefits
of
allowing
someone
else
to
use
something.
So
you
can,
you
can
still
retain
ownership,
but
you
can
allow
someone
else
to
use
it.
You
can
solve
that
use
and
you
can.
A
A
A
A
A
So
that's
transactional
insecurity
right.
There
is
a
moment
of
opportunism
and
the
guy
took
it,
and
so
the
question
is:
can
we
actually
can
we
do
the
safely
on
a
blockchain
and
it
turns
out
that
we
can
so?
Can
we
safely
exchange
item
X
for
item
Y?
We
can
if
we
use
a
smart
contract,
so
this
actually
takes
two
steps.
So
let's
say
at
the
start:
our
state
is
that
Alex
has
item.
X
bob
has
item
Y
and
they
choose
to
send
it
to
a
smart
contract.
A
So
they
each
Alice
sends
an
X
to
the
smart
contract.
Bob
sends
an
Y
to
the
smart
contract,
so
at
the
end
of
step,
one
our
state
is
that
the
smart
contract
itself
actually
has
ownership
of
x
and
y
in
step.
Two,
the
smart
contract
having
ownership
of
x
and
y
actually
does
the
dispersal
and
does
the
swap
only
when
it
has
both
items.
So
this
actually
solves.
You
know
it
seems
very
simple,
but
it's
actually
solving
something
huge.
A
A
So
some
of
you
may
be
saying
like
okay,
so
let's
get
this
straight,
so
this
only
works
for
on
chain
assets
right!
Okay,
that's
fair!
That's
true!
You
might
be
saying
like
well,
you
know
this
works
for
simultaneous
swaps,
but
what
about
promises
for
the
future?
Okay
can
I
make
a
credible
commitment
to
you,
but
I
can
promise
to
do
something
in
the
future.
And
can
you
rely
on
that
right?
Can
we
enforce
contracts
where
we're
actually
talking
about
future
actions,
not
simultaneous
swaps.
A
So
let's
talk
about
what
a
smart
contract
is,
so
we
define
a
smart
contract
as
a
contract
like
arrangement
expressed
in
code
where
the
behavior
of
the
program
enforces
the
terms
of
the
contract,
and
one
thing
that
I
think
is
really
revolutionary.
Is
that
code,
the
smart
contract
itself
can
own
digital
assets
in
the
system
right.
A
A
So
then
classification
is
basically
saying:
has
X
happened
or
not
right
and
applying
the
correct
rule
is
saying:
if
X
happens,
then
dy.
This
comes
from
a
great
talk
by
Professor,
Oliver,
goodness
called
ambiguity
and
legal
specification,
and
he
says
good
enough
says
that
humans
are
actually
much
better
than
machines
at
classification.
So
if
you
look
at,
let's
say
something:
that's
really
common
in
contract
law
for
tenants
whether
an
apartment
is
habitable.
If
you
look
at
that,
so
have
a
machine
be
able
to
make
that
determination
to
make
that
classification
you
would
have
to
you.
A
Would
have
to
measure
Plus
D
carbon
monoxide,
you
would
have
to
measure
whether
there's
mold,
you
would
have
to
measure
whether
you
know
how
long
the
you
know
whether
there's
fresh
water.
You
know
all
of
these
things,
but
if
you
had
a
human
inspector
go
into
that
apartment,
they
would
be
able
to
say
pretty
quickly
like
yes,
this
is
habitable
or
no
it's
not
so
so.
Humans
are
much
better
at
classification
than
computers
generally,
but
humans
are
pretty
terrible
at
rule
application
all
right,
so
humans
can
are
easily
corrupted
we're,
often
biased,
they're
misunderstandings.
A
A
lot
of
things
can
happen.
So
what
that
says
is
that
we
can
actually
have
the
best
of
both
worlds.
So
smart
contracts
can
ask
human
beings,
and
so
one
of
the
inputs
to
a
smart
contract
can
be
a
human
classifier,
so
the
human
classifier
can
say.
Yes,
this
is
habitable
or
no,
it's
not-
and
you
know
that's
what's
often
known
as
a
Oracle,
and
we
can
also
use
humans
in
dispute
resolution.
A
A
So
I
want
to
be
clear
that
this
is.
These
are
still
very
hard
problems
right.
The
Oracle
problem
is
still
a
very
hard
problem
to
solve,
because
not
only
are
you
trying
to
incentivize
human
beings
to
report
things
accurately
and
truthfully
you're
trying
to
do
so
in
a
censorship,
resistant
environment
and
that's
really
hard
so
I
think
we're
still
working
on
this,
but
it's
it's
not
insurmountable.
A
A
So,
let's
go
back
to
the
characteristics
of
a
good
classification
system,
so
number
one
is
the
decision-making
logic
publicly
available.
The
answer
to
this
is
definitely
yes,
so
for
something
to
even
be
something
that
can
be
executed
on
a
blockchain.
That
logic
needs
to
be
available
to
all
of
the
validators
who
are
doing
the
execution
to
be
able
to
come
up
with
the
same
solution.
So
this
definitely
has
to
be
available
to
everyone.
Number
two
resolve
ambiguity.
So
if
something
is
running
on
a
blockchain,
it
has
to
be
deterministic.
A
So
we
cannot
have
the
same
inputs,
giving
different
outputs
right.
We
have
to
get
the
same
output
for
it
to
be
deterministic,
so
it
does
resolve
ambiguity.
Number
three:
is
it
stable,
so
I
think
this
is
something
that
the
blockchain
ecosystem
really
struggles
with
at
this
point,
since
it's
pretty
much
in
its
infancy,
so
for
something
to
actually
act
as
the
robot
where
to
enforce
contract,
it
still
needs
to
be
around
stated.
You
know
in
then
in
the
next
day
right,
so
our
blockchain
is
really
stable.
Are
they
you
know?
A
Are
they
long-lived
enough
organisations
for
us
to
actually
enforce
these
things?
I
think
that
still
remains
to
be
seen
and
number
four.
Does
it
give
predictable
results
for
novel
inputs?
So
this
is
creative,
a
yes
and
no
so
in
code
we
can
say
we
can
cover
the
entire
universe
of
problem
of
possibilities,
right
we
can
say
if
X,
if
not
X,
and
that's
the
entire
universe
of
possibilities,
but
so
in
a
way
the
answer
is
yes,
but
it's
also
no
right.
A
So,
unlike
unlike
human
institutions,
we
can't
easily
extrapolate
from
the
rules
that
we
already
have
to
create
new
rules
right.
So
so
that's
something
that
is
a
limitation
of
code
that
runs
on
a
blockchain
number.
Five
isn't
impersonal,
I
would
say
the
answer
to
this
is
yes,
not
only
do
we
generally
not
care
what
type
of
person
you
know
is
involved
in
a
smart
contract?
We
also
don't
even
care.
If
it's,
you
know
a
machine
argument
B
right,
so
it's
definitely
possible
to
embed.
A
You
know
kyc
and
other
things
as
part
of
a
blockchain,
but
that's
act,
that's
adding
extra
effort,
so
it's
mostly
impersonal.
Number
six
cannot
produce
new
rules
by
soliciting
information
from
users.
I
think
this
is
something
that
remains
to
be
seen
so
an
individual
smart
contract
or
even
an
individual
blockchain,
it's
hard
to
change
right,
but
a
blockchain
ecosystem
as
a
whole.
We
might
see
that
people
are
moving
to
new
systems
or
maybe
they're
amending
the
block
change
that
they
have
to
try
to,
but
with
the
times
to
try
to
incorporate
new
rules.
A
So,
in
conclusion,
we
took
a
functional
approach.
We
looked
at
the
rule
of
law
as
a
classification
institution,
and
we
looked
at
the
social
problems
to
solve
vulnerability
of
possession
and
transactional
and
security,
and
what
we
found
was
that
for
on
chain
assets,
we
can
enforce
sophisticated
property
rights
and
solve
simple
transactional
and
security.
B
So
I
think
like
what
it
was
wondering
this,
something
probably
you
thought
about
is
like
it
can
be,
also
evolved:
the
concept
of
sovereignty
since,
like
a
political
feeling,
its
properties,
it's
all
about
who
tweeted
news,
feed
anything
that
was
high
up.
It
was
into
the
like
couple
decades
ago
like
in
order
to
be
that
money.
B
B
A
A
Issues,
okay,
cause
this
Alden
I
see.
So
so
if
we
had
something
okay,
so
let
me
try
to
repeat
your
question.
Let
me
know
if
I,
if
I've
gotten
it
so
it
sounds
like
you're
saying
you
know.
Let's
say
me,
we're
doing
these
things
now.
Let's
say
we
try
to
have
this
contract,
but
the
cryptography
that
we're
using
is
what
we're
using
right
now
and
let's
say
that
that
progresses
in
the
future,
but
we
have
our
agreement,
that's
built
on
this
system.
That's
a
really
good
question.
I!
A
Think
you
know
part
of
the
rule.
Wha
is
that
you
want
it
to
be
stable.
You
want
to
have
long,
lived,
almost
perpetual
organizations
right
to
actually
have
the
kind
of
stability
that
you
need
and
how
we
can
actually
upgrade
the
systems
that
we
have
and
maintain
the
invariance
maintain
the
you
know
the
binding
that
you
want
to
be
able
to
have
contract
enforcement.
B
A
Yeah
so
I
think
you
know
one
thing
that
we've
learned
from
some
of
the
Congressional
questions
that
we've
seen
is
that
it's
really
important
to
have
subject
matter:
experts
creating
your
laws
right,
the
Internet
is
a
series
of
tubes,
and
you
know
what
have
you
right
so
what
certain
organizations
have
been
doing
like
Claro's,
for
instance,
what
they've
been
doing
is
they
have
dispute
resolution,
but
they
have
if
see,
centralized
and
they
they
take
jurors.
A
Who
have
you
know
they're
they're,
they're
tokens
and
they
they
ensure
that
their
subject
matter,
experts
so
like
if
you
have
a
blockchain
dispute
that
will
get
kicked
out
to
a
Claro's
court
where
those
people
are
experts
in
you
know
the
particulars
of
that
sort
of
dispute,
and
so
they
and
they
have
different
courts
for
different
things.
So
it
may
be
that
you
know,
like
I,
think
one
of
their
courts
is
where,
if
you're
doing
like
freelancing
work
or
something
like
that,
it's
like
you
know,
did
you
actually
write
this.
A
Do
the
specification,
it's
that
sort
of
thing
and
that's
very
different
than
like
you
know.
Did
you
write
the
smart
contract
in
such
a
way
that
makes
it
secure?
Those
are
very
different
experts,
so
I
think
we'll
see
we'll
see,
dispute
resolutions,
systems
and
arbitration
systems
where
people
will
be
paid
for
their
expertise
and
similar
to
the
law
of
merchants.
It'll
actually
be
the
people
who
are
the
most
expert
in
those
areas
that
are
actually
determining.
You
know
whether
there
is
breach
of
contract
or
not.
A
Yeah
so
so
I
think
any
system
that
we
build
I
think
you're
you're,
absolutely
correct.
It
needs
to
be
cognizant
of
the
fact
that
human
beings
are
flawed
all
right,
so
public
choice,
economics
is
kind
of
a
field
that
has
recognized
this
to
the
greatest
extent
where
you
know
everything.
If
we're,
if
we're
saying
like
well,
you
know
what
people
are
bad,
so
we
need
to
control
them
well,
who's
in
charge
of
doing
that.
Well,
it's
people
and
they
are
also
still
bad
right.
A
So
people
are
experimenting
with
this,
but
mostly
because
of
the
censorship
resistance
requirements.
What
they've
kind
of
chosen
is
not
trying
to
reward
people
for
accuracy,
because
how
do
you
measure
accuracy
in
you
know
a
environment
where
everything
is
decentralized,
but
whether
what
you're
saying
is
the
same
as
what
everyone
else
has
day,
so
it's
kind
of
a
selling
point
coming
from
economics
model,
and
so
that
has
its
own
problems
right
in
its
ad.