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From YouTube: 5 Leaders Remember 9/11
Description
Former Arlington County Manager Ron Carlee hosts a roundtable discussion with former ACFD Chief Ed Plaugher, current ACFD Chief James Schwartz, Gen. James Jackson (Ret.), and FBI Special Agent Christopher Combs, all of whom were first responders to the terrorist attack ont he Pentagon on 9/11.
A
At
nine
thirty
seven
a.m.
on
tuesdays
at
timber
11
terrorist
flew
american
airlines
flight
77
into
the
pentagon
in
arlington,
virginia
all
53
passengers
and
six
crew
members
on
the
plane
died
along
with
125
people
in
the
pentagon,
70
civilians
and
55
military
service
personnel.
Many
others
were
injured
physically
and
psychologically
from
the
attack.
A
moving
memorial
is
now
open
to
the
public
on
the
grounds
of
the
Pentagon
honoring
all
people
affected
by
the
event.
Today
we
will
explore
only
part
of
the
story
at
the
Pentagon
ten
years
later.
A
B
Well,
you
know
that
I
think
that
has
to
be
the
most
often
asked
question
in
the
wake
of
911
and
other
events
and
there's
not
a
simple
answer
to
it.
But
I
think
the
answer
has
to
start
with
the
idea
that
nobody's
in
charge
of
everything
you
have
to
follow
that
question
with
another
question
in
charge
of
what-
and
there
are
many
people
that
are
in
charge
of
many
elements
of
the
response.
B
The
key
is
to
figure
out
how
to
unify
that
response,
so
that
it's
coordinated
and
people
are
well
aware
of
how
to
compliment
the
decisions,
the
the
respective
decisions
that
are
getting
made
in
various
locations
and
in
various
levels
of
the
response.
So
the
way
to
do
that
is
through
the
incident
command
system
and
by
unifying
senior
leaders
in
a
way
that
they
can
share
information
and
again
come
to
the
best
decisions
collectively.
B
At
the
same
time,
that
only
happens
if
we've
done
a
good
job
of
establishing
both
organizational
and
on
some
level
personal
relationships
in
advance
of
the
incident,
so
that
we
are
not
trying
to
figure
out
who
each
other
are
on
an
incident
and
trying
to
figure
out
what
each
agency
or
wait.
What
each
individual
brings
to
the
table.
C
That
as
part
of
the
incident
command
system
and
is
one
of
the
fundamental
pieces
is
that
you
have
to
have
trust
in
the
people
if
they
have
competent
people
in
the
appropriate
places
and
the
operations
chief
is
the
best
incident
commander
that
I
had
at
the
time
as
well
as
placed
him
and
and
the
other
individuals
being
placed
in
the
appropriate
roles.
So
in
other
words,
even
though
the
incident
commander
has
a
critical
aspect
of
this
incident
in
all
incidents,
they
still
have
to
rely
rely
upon
other
people.
C
So
if
you
send
the
message
that
you
don't
have
trust
and
confidence
in
your
employees,
then
the
incident
will
not
go
properly,
and
so
it
starts
at
the
top.
There
was
no
doubt
in
my
mind:
we
had
the
best
people
in
the
best
place,
doing
the
best
thing
that
they
possibly
do
it
that
day
at
that
incident,
but
they
needed
assistance
they
needed
help.
They
needed
an
overview.
How
big
it
was
this
incident?
How
complex
was
this
incident?
So
there
is
what
is
called
in
the
incident
command
system.
A
D
Pretty
easy,
we
went
with
the
people
who
had
the
best
capability
to
deal
with
the
problem
at
hand,
and
that
was
the
fire
department.
Well,
the
military's
got
assets
and
we
had.
We
had
actually
some
fire
responders
down
there
at
the
Pentagon.
It
was
not
really
within
our
it
wasn't
within
our
capability
or
our
desire
to
command
a
thing
at
that
time.
So
we
went
with
the
pros
and
it
was
a
fairly
easy
decision
to
make
so.
D
Of
all,
my
role
was
to
be
there
to
be
the
conduit
that
the
incident
commander
could
use
to
get
into
the
Pentagon,
and
so
I
became
the
point
of
contact
and
allowed
me
and
my
staff
to
work
with
the
right
people
inside
the
building,
because,
obviously
you
got
some
senior
governmental
officials
there
who
are
interested
they're
going
to
want
to
know
information
and
they're
going
to
want
to
keep
track.
What's
going
on
and
of
course,
the
other
our
desires
to
feed
them.
That
information
without
it
becoming
a
burden.
Chris.
A
E
We
look
at
terrorism
scenes.
We
really
break
it
into
three
phases.
A
lot
of
people
ask
me,
you
know
how
is
the
fire
chief
is
in
charge
of
a
major
terrorist
attack.
The
first
phase
of
any
terrorist
event
is
usually
a
life
safety
and,
as
everyone's
talked
about
the
only
organization
that
can
really
do
life
safety
and
rescue,
is
the
fire
service.
So
in
phase
1
of
that
incident,
we
look
to
the
fire
department
to
be
the
incident
commander
and
then
once
we
transition
from
phase
1
to
phase
two,
which
is
the
crime
scene
phase.
E
B
Beginning
of
any
kind
of
crisis
of
this
magnitude,
there
is
chaos,
you
know
our
job.
You
know,
one
of
our
first
orders
of
business
is
to
try
and
bring
some
some
order
to
that
chaos.
So
the
chaos
is
part
of
the
you
know
the
early
stage
of
the
incident,
and
it's
through
our
you
know,
tried-and-true
practices
of
incident
command,
which
the
FBI
practiced
with
us
many
times
before.
You
know.
B
One
of
those
stories
that
you
may
have
alluded
to
in
your
introductory
comments
that
gets
lost
is
that
we
had
a
major
exercise
in
the
Northern
Virginia
region,
the
Saturday,
before
nine
eleven,
that
all
of
the
fire
departments
in
the
region
and
the
FBI
all
participated
in.
It
was
a
major
chemical
exercise
that
we
did
out
in
Fairfax,
County,
Virginia,
and
so
by
working
together.
You
see
you
know,
who's
got
strengths
and
who
has
capabilities
that
you
can
rely
on
to
again
bring
star
to
bring
order
to
some
of
that
chaos.
So.
A
E
Think
the
best
way
to
prepare
or
through
going
to
field
exercises
or
tabletop
exercises
together.
So
as
Jim
talked
about
it's
not
the
first
time
your
organization
or
your
command
staff
has
interacted
with
the
other
agency.
It's
only
because
we
went
to
literally
hundreds
of
tabletop
exercises
or
field
exercises
that
when
we
get
to
911
at
the
Pentagon,
we
all
knew
each
other.
We
knew
the
capabilities
of
each
agency.
We
knew
the
roles
and
responsibilities.
So
when
you
have
these
discussions
as
to
who's
in
charge,
what
phase
are
we
in
that's
already
been
worked
through?
E
A
Problem
with
building
these
relationships
is
it
takes
a
lot
of
time.
I
mean
you've
got
you
got
to
put
some
effort
into
it,
and
so
I
know,
chief
library,
you
were
really
committed
to
building
an
organization
that
could
respond
to
a
terrorist,
but
you
never
had
a
terrorist
event.
In
fact,
Arlington
had
never
even
had
a
really
major
event
in
its
entire
history,
didn't
even
see
a
battle
in
the
Civil
War,
and
so
how
do
you
set
a
priority
to
spend
time
and
energy
on
something
that
has
never
happened
and
may
never
happen
again?
One.
C
Of
the
stalwart
moments
are
one
of
the
key
moments
in
history
of
Arlington.
From
my
perspective,
being
a
brand
new
fire
chief
Drummond
County
was
a
Tokyo
incident
that
occurred
in
94
with
a
sarin
gas
attack
which,
truly,
from
my
perspective,
told
us
that
we
needed
to
revisit
how
we
were
set
up
and
what
we
were
doing,
particularly
for
the
region
and
our
preparedness.
C
It
started
to
gain
momentum.
We
started
to
receive
federal
funding.
We
started
to
receive
federal
recognition.
The
real
job
of
a
fire
chief
is
to
assess
risk
and
make
sure
their
organization
is
aligned
to
meet
those
risk.
To
me,
it
was
very
obvious,
being
in
the
nation's
capital,
being
on
the
door
of
the
nation's
capital,
that
we
had
a
terrorist
problem.
A
And
we
spent
a
lot
of
times
since
I'm
preparing
for
terrorism,
your
fire
chief,
now
you've
got
to
make
the
decisions
he
was
trying
to
make
that
about
priorities.
Are
we
spending
too
much
time
on
terrorism,
especially,
we
see
the
number
of
weather
events
that
we've
we've
had
since
nine
eleven
mother
nature's
been
much
more
effective
than
terrorists
and
attacking
our
country.
Well,.
B
Yeah
I
think
each
community
has
to
assess
what
are
the
most
likely
risks.
What
are
the
most
likely
events
that
they
are
going
to
encounter
and
build
their
system
to
be
able
to
react
to
those
most
likely
events?
Certainly
you
know
in
the
Midwest
tornado
activity
is
most
prominent
in
the
southeast
hurricanes.
You
know,
as
we
start
the
new
hurricane
season
now,
our
most
prominent
and
in
many
of
the
urban
areas.
Terrorism
remains
somewhat
of
a
threat.
B
Now
how
to
measure
that
threat,
I
think,
is
less
material
than
trying
to
build
systems
that
are
adaptable
and
that
can
deal
with
different
kinds
of
threats.
You
know
when
you,
when
you
talk
about
your
preparedness
activities,
what
you're
really
doing
is
building
bass
lines
of
capabilities
that
can
be
used
for
a
weather
event
or
for
a
large
fire
or
in
our
case
on
911
or
an
act
of
terrorism,
so
I
think
in
you
know
the
term
All
Hazards
is
used
a
lot.
B
A
One
of
the
points
that
you've
made
too
many
general
is
that
your
professional
training
led
you
to
be
the
one
to
cause
these
events
to
attack.
Other
people
are
enemies,
and
in
this
case
our
enemy
attacked
us.
What?
What
was
your
reaction
when
you
arrived
at
the
Pentagon
and
saw
your
headquarters
successfully
attacked
by
an
enemy
I.
D
Mean
it's
almost
you're,
almost
operating
off
of
autopilot
when
you
move
in
there
it's
off
of
prearranged
thoughts
and
patterns
that
you've
built-
and
you
know
the
way
you
decide
the
way
you
engage
and
you're
just
doing.
I
brought
some
staff
with
me
and,
of
course
they
moved
around
with
me
and
they
were.
E
Don't
know
if
it
was
personal,
but
we
understood
immediately
that
that
we
were
under
full
attack
and
even
for
us,
it
was
bigger
than
the
three
sites.
We
also
had
the
hijack
airports
which
for
us
was
a
site.
So
while
we're
at
the
Pentagon
with
hundreds
agents,
we
actually
set
up
another
command
at
Dulles
Airport,
where
the
hijacked
plane
took
off
from
we
had
a
hundred
agents
out
there
so
with
us,
we
very
quickly
had
to
break
it
down
into
different
components.
E
E
We
didn't
know
if
it
was
over.
In
fact,
we
were
receiving
immediate
intelligence
that
a
number
of
jumbo
jets
coming
across
from
Europe
accidentally
had
tripped
their
hijack
messages
to
tell
us
they
were
unto
hijack
coming
in.
So
there
was
that
fog
of
battle
of
we
have
additional
planes
out
there
that
are
coming
in.
Where
are
there
more
attacks
planned?
What
is
the
next
step,
so
we
were
looking
in
many
different
directions
as
to
what
the
problem
was
so.
E
Can
distinctively
remember
standing
there
with
with
Jim
and
saying
you
know
this?
Is
it
this?
This
is
what
we've
been
training
for,
that
the
fight
is
here
in
somewhat
disbelief,
obviously,
with
the
size
and
scope
being
on
the
scene,
though,
we
didn't
have
a
full
view
of
what
had
happened.
We
knew
New
York
had
been
hit
with
two
planes.
I
personally
was
not
aware
of
the
collapse
of
those
towers
for
hours
into
that
day.
The
events
that
ended
up
happening
in
Shanksville.
E
E
There
was
a
lot
of
Intel
out
there
from
a
number
of
streams
that
talked
about
other
attacks
and
we
were
working
to
either
confirm
or
push
aside
that
intelli
is
not
accurate,
but
we
had
reports
that
the
State
Department
had
been
hit.
The
White
House
had
been
hit.
Luckily,
we
could
see
DC
from
where
we
were
so.
We
didn't
see
the
smoke
and
we
pretty
much
felt
that
that
that
wasn't
true,
we
were
told
that
Cleveland
had
been
hit.
We
weren't
quite
sure
why
or
how
that
played
into
it.
E
So
you
definitely
had
that
fog
of
battle
that
we
had
to
chase
down
to
provide
the
intelligence
to
the
partners.
Do
you
ever
stay?
Your
first
shift,
absolutely
I
think
everybody
did,
and
you
know
it's
hard.
Everybody
knows
you
need
to
go
home.
You
need
to
turn
command
over
I.
Think
the
perfect
shift
is.
It
is
a
dedicated
12-hour
shift
and
then
people
need
to
leave
to
rest
to
come
back
for
your
next
12
hour.
E
Shift,
it's
hard
to
do
it's
hard
to
have
people
leave
they
leave,
they
want
to
come
back,
they
want
to
be
in
the
fight
and
that's
one
thing
that
we've
tried
to
work
on.
Is
you
know
after
12
hours?
If
you
look
at
the
research
accidents
go
up,
your
cognitive
ability
goes
down,
so
you
really
want
to
try
to
push
people
out
after
12
hours,
but
it's
a
hard
task
to
manage
either.
B
You
know
you
just
and
the
way
that
you're
walled
off
from
everything
other
than
the
incident
I
think
just
calls
for
consideration.
To
spell
somebody
in
one
of
those
positions,
even
earlier
than
12
hours,
you
can
you
can,
then
you
know
get
into
a
rhythm
and
and
get
people
in
12-hour
shifts
after
a
little
while,
but
I
think
in
the
in
the
first
phase.
It's
it's
got
to
be
far
sooner.
Can.
B
Know
I
don't
clearly
there
was
a
sense
of
awe,
but
I
think
it
was.
It
was
somewhat
tempered
by
the
fact
that
we
were
watching
the
images
in
New
York
evolved
before
it
happened
at
the
Pentagon
we
had,
you
know,
watched.
You
know
as
much
of
America
did
that
second
airplane
go
into
the
South
Tower,
which
for
us
confirmed
what
would
be
what
we
had
already
assumed
because
of
the
first
airplane,
and
that
was
that
these
were
intentional
axis
was
an
act
of
terrorism.
B
So
I
think
you
know
there
was
maybe
a
momentary
sense
of
of
disbelief,
but
then,
as
the
general
said,
you're
going
to
work,
you
know
you've,
you
you've
got
a
marshal
all
of
your
energy.
You
know
towards
executing
the
tasks
that
need
to
be
done.
You
know
to
focus
on
life
safety
and
gain
control
of
this
fire
and-
and
you
know,
gather
the
situational
awareness.
If
you
are
going
to
be
overcome
by
emotion,
you're
going
to
be
far
less
effective
and
I,
don't
know
that
anybody,
certainly
in
a
leadership
team,
was
feeling
that
way.
What.
C
Actually,
I
I
think
it
was
a
couple
years
later
before
any
emotions
really
started
to
come
back
in
it.
It
was
pretty
remarkable
because
I'm,
a
pretty
emotional
guy
and
the
department
knows
that
and
and
but
at
the
same
time,
I
basically
didn't
know
I
had
the
ability
to
just
turn
them
off
and
just
went
to
work.
C
You
know
commandeered
a
helicopter
from
the
park
police
made
sure
that
we
understood
the
complexity
of
the
incident
made
sure
we
understand
how
much
of
the
Pentagon
6.6
million
square
feet
was
involved,
and
so
I'm
not
really
sure
I
had
room
for
emotions,
I'm,
really
known
and
now
I
think
about
it.
I
probably
didn't
have
a
room
for
emotions,
a.
D
Was
some
thought
I
me
every
once
in
a
while?
Well,
you
had
a
brief
moment.
For
instance,
some
of
us
knew
people
who
are
in
a
building,
and
so
you'd
have
these
flashes
periodically.
But
then
you'd
come
back
to
reality
and
you
couldn't
allow
yourself
to
go
down
that
road.
There
was
there'll
be
time
later
to
grieve
right
now.
The
mission
at
hand
is
to
get
this
area
fixed
and
get
it
under
control,
and
you
know
when
you're
working
with
guys
who
know
what
they're
doing
it's
not
hard,
you
kind
of
saddle
up
together
off.
A
911
Commission
described
the
response
of
the
Pentagon,
actually
didn't
discuss
it.
A
whole
lot,
there's
very
little
text
devoted
to
the
Pentagon
response
and
just
described
it
as
mainly
successful
for
most
of
the
reasons
we've
been
talking
about,
but
they
said
that
no
event
is
flawless,
so
you
know
what
what,
if
anything,
would
you
have
done
differently?
Yeah.
C
Yeah,
that's
always
a
very
tough,
a
question
and
I
getting
asked
a
question
a
lot.
It's
a
very
tough
question
for
me
because
I
think
the
the
crews
and
the
individuals
and
all
of
the
partners
that
we
had
there
and
they
truly
were
partners
performed
extraordinarily,
and
so
anything
that
would
be
said
would
be
construed
to
be
somewhat
of
a
criticism
and
and
I
don't
want
anything.
I
say
to
become
a
criticism,
because
there
is
no
criticism
from
my
standpoint
for
any
of
those
partners.
C
C
I
mean
just
think
just
think
of
the
transportation
people
just
think
of
e
dot,
who's,
trying
to
get
traffic
to
and
from
up
and
down
395
and
on
the
interstates
through
66
that
have
to
know
what's
going
on
because
they're
part
of
the
process
for
solutions
and
you've
got
to
you've
got
to
work
that
in
the
joint
operation
center.
Where
we
had
60
over
60
players,
they're
being
fed
information
on
a
daily
basis
that
has
to
be
proved
and
proved
and
seamless,
I,
think
it's
a
great
place
for
new
technologies.
D
Toe
tailing
on
what
edge
said
the
command
went
ahead
and
restructured
itself,
knowing
that
we
were
going
to
be
in
the
national
capital
region
come
you
know,
whatever
we're
going
to
be
here,
we're
an
asset
available.
Why
not
roll
us
under
NORTHCOM,
which
has
the
responsibility
for
the
military
for
the
northern
earth
for
the
continental
United
States?
We
went
in
presented
at
as
a
plan,
and
that
was
accepted,
and
so
the
now
basically.
D
Early,
exactly
it's
been
institutionalized
and
been
helped
to
fund
with
some
some
joint
money
to
be
able
to
do
some
of
the
work
they
need
to
do.
We
went
out
and
we
put
money
aside
to
buy
new
communications
capabilities.
We
now
have
a
van,
a
big
vehicle
that
will
roll
in
it
has
all
the
connectivity
to
plug
into
anybody
just
by
sitting
there
put
up
mass
and
whatever
and
can
start
bringing
in
comms
right
to
that
location.
So.
A
B
I
have
to
agree
that
if
you
get
on
the
incident
scene
and
you're
incapable
of
communicating
with
each
other-
and
you
know
again
with
people
oftentimes
outside
the
incident
scene-
I
mean
there
were
times
on
this
incident,
seeing
where
we
had
to
be
party
to
secure
communications
that
you
know
couldn't
be
shared
outside
traditional
means.
So
you
know
I,
think
some
of
these
capabilities
are
absolutely
essential
and
and
I
would
echo
that
when
you
need
them,
there
isn't
a
replacement
for
them.
There
isn't
and
there
isn't
an
alternative.
B
B
We
had
to
initially
use
our
police
departments,
and
when
that
was
less
than
adequate,
we
actually
were
afforded
the
opportunity
to
use
that
from
the
Fairfax
County
Police
Department,
but
harking
back
to
something
I
said
a
short
time
ago
that
came
as
a
result
of
these
regional
collaborative
relationships
that
had
really
matured
to
a
state
that
you
know
they
weren't
questioning.
Why
they
were
giving
up
a
fundamental
resource
that
they
had?
B
They
simply
knew
that
you
know
it
was
critical
to
supporting
you
know
the
overall
effort,
but
if
there
had
been
attacked
at
CIA
or
Fort
Belvoir
well,
the
regional
system
would
have
provided
for
another
command
unit
that
would
have
taken
their
place
out
there
and
again,
that's
one
of
the
beauties
of
having
a
system
that
acknowledges
that
your
capabilities
don't
stop
at
a
political
boundary
at
a
jurisdictional
boundary
that
you
can
move
resources
up
to
fill
in
gaps
as
they
continue
to
occur.
Did
your.
D
Obviously,
for
many
of
us
it
was
our
first
physical
contact
with
terrorism
on
personal
level,
so
I'm
sure
that
had
some
impact,
but
but
I
don't
think
I
think
the
the
military
experience
kind
of
prepares
you
for
this
kind
of
deal
and
we've
been
through
similar
events
and
deployments
unknown.
You
know
no
notice
kinds
of
things,
deaths
and
so
forth,
and
so
we
have
some
kind
of
a
capability
to
deal
with
that
internal.
You
know
connection
to
this
and
be
able
to
to
make
it
work.
Did.
C
C
Impossible
to
say
that
you
could
have
gone
through
911,
particularly
performing
the
role
that
I
performed
without
being
affected
by
it.
I
mean
it's
just
it's:
it's
a
life-altering
community,
altering
life-altering
nation
altering
a
series
of
events
that
occurred,
so
we
all
were
affected
by
it
and
we
can't
paint
in
any
other
way.
Personally,
it
was
affected.
You
know,
I've
was
a
firm
believer
that
you
have
to
rely
upon
good
people
to
do
the
right
things
at
the
right
time
and
I.
Think
that
was
a
firm
that
day.
E
Think,
as
the
chief
said
911
has
to
affect,
you,
I
think
it.
It's
affected
me
personally
in
in
a
redoubling
of
my
effort
for
counterterrorism,
especially
on
the
FBI
side,
where
we
see
all
the
secret
cables
and
all
the
intelligence.
That's
out
there
that
I
think.
Thankfully,
the
American
public
doesn't
see
every
day
it
really
drives
at
home
as
to
what
we're
doing
and
why
we
have
to
work
so
hard.
You've.
B
Well,
I
think
it's
brought
a
lot
of
the
things
that
you
know
that
we
prepared
for
in
advance
of
911.
You
know
it
made
them
real,
so
there's
a
there's,
a
certain
satisfaction
that
we
were
on
the
right
track
and
that
we
built
some
effective
systems
and
capabilities
that
could
react
effectively
to
an
event
like
that.
I
guess.
It
also
taught
me
that
as
I
assume
the
position
of
chief
that
I'm
not,
I
don't-
have
the
real
luxury
of
trying
to
run
the
fire
department.
B
You
know
I
have
to
I,
have
to
lead
an
organization
where
I've
got
good
leaders
beneath
me.
Who
can
do
the
daily
work
of
running
the
organization
so
that
I
can
work
at
this
institutionalization
process
so
that
I
can
work
across
these
boundaries,
not
just
regional
boundaries,
jurisdictional
boundaries,
but
also
work
with
our
partners
in
law
enforcement,
our
partners
in
public
health,
our
partners
and
Emergency
Management
our
partners
in
the
nonprofit
world
who
all
contribute
to
this
this
enterprise.
So
you
know
beyond
going
through
the
experience.
B
You
know
the
shared
experience
that
others
here
went
through
it's
more
about.
You
know
how
do
I
focus
on
the
right
things
and
how
do
I
build
an
organization
that
will
sustain
these
efforts
after
I
leave?
You
know
whatever.
That
is
so
it's
I
guess
it's
made.
You
know
the
the
idea
is
that
we
were
contemplating
before
nine
eleven
more
real
in
a
way
that
I
don't
think
any
of
us
could
have
predicted
or
invited.
Certainly
you
know,
but
I'm
glad
we
did
that
work,
and
now
that
work
continues.
B
It
just
continues
on
a
new
level,
because
I
think
that
the
the
threat
is,
you
know
ever
more
realistic
than
perhaps
it
was
when
we
were
doing
that
planning
before
nine
eleven.
I
think
you
know,
if
anything
else,
it's
it.
It
is
about
understanding
that
my
role
is
to
serve
a
community
and
that
that
community
has
something
to
offer.
You.
E
B
In
this
enterprise
also-
and
we
ignore
that
you
know
really
at
our
own
peril,
because
sooner
or
later
we
are
going
to
face
another
incident.
You
know
whether
it's
as
large
scale
as
911
or
or
smaller,
we're
going
to,
depending
on
P,
depending
on
those
people
and-
and
you
know,
part
of
my
role-
is
to
engage
with
them
to
find
out
what
their
needs
are
and
also
sort
of
in
the
leadership
role
them
to
to
engage
with
each
other.
Thank.
A
You
thank
you
all
very
much
for
coming
together.
Jim
jaxton,
US
Army,
representing
Department
of
Defense
demand
Pentagon
chris
combs,
representing
the
FBI
at
plogger
and
Jim
Schwartz,
Arlington,
County,
Fire
and
Rescue
Department.
Thank
you
for
your
outstanding
response.
I'll
911.
Thank
you
for
what
you've
done
every
day
and
thank
you
for
a
career
in
public
service.