►
Description
Ten years after the attack on the Pentagon, five leaders who were in charge at the scene recall their initial reactions and responses to the tragedy, Panelists include former Arlington Fire Chief Ed Plaugher, former Assistant Fire Chief James Schwartz, FBI Special Agent Chris Combs and General James T. Jackson (ret.). The moderator is former Arlington County Manager Ron Carlee.
A
At
9:37
a.m.
on
Tuesday
September
11th
terrorist
flew
American
Airlines
flight
77
into
the
Pentagon
in
Arlington
Virginia,
all
53
passengers
and
six
crew
members
on
the
plane
died
along
with
a
hundred
and
twenty
five
people
in
the
Pentagon
70
civilians
and
55
military
service
personnel.
Many
others
were
injured
physically
and
psychologically
from
the
attack.
A
moving
memorial
is
now
open
to
the
public
on
the
grounds
of
the
Pentagon
honoring.
A
Still
there
are
many
untold
stories
the
instance
of
the
Pentagon
and
especially
in
New
York,
were
so
large
that
no
one
will
ever
know
everyone
who
contributed
positively
to
the
response
and
in
what
ways,
the
number
of
different
agencies,
organizations
and
corporations
that
support
of
the
efforts
will
never
be
completely
documented.
Today,
we
will
explore
only
part
of
the
story
at
the
Pentagon
ten
years
later.
This
is
the
story
of
the
senior
command
staff.
A
Now
they
will
be
the
first
to
tell
you
that
any
successful
emergency
response
relies
on
many
people
below
them
and
from
organizations
that
they
do
not
control,
in
fact,
some
that
they
do
not
even
know
about.
However,
however,
the
operational
command
staff
have
to
get
it
right,
because
if
they
don't,
you
cannot
get
the
most
and
the
best
from
other
people
at
the
Pentagon.
There
is
every
opportunity
for
command
to
get
it
wrong.
A
A
A
B
Well,
you
know
that
I
think
that
has
to
be
the
most
often
asked
question
in
the
wake
of
9/11
and
other
events
and
there's
not
a
simple
answer
to
it.
But
I
think
the
answer
has
to
start
with
the
idea
that
nobody's
in
charge
of
everything
you
have
to
follow
that
question
with
another
question
in
charge
of
what-
and
there
are
many
people
that
are
in
charge
of
many
elements
of
the
response.
B
The
key
is
to
figure
out
how
to
unify
that
response,
so
that
it's
coordinated
and
people
are
well
aware
of
how
to
complement
the
decisions,
the
respective
decisions
that
are
getting
made
in
various
locations
and
in
various
levels
of
the
response.
So
the
way
to
do
that
is
through
the
incident
command
system
and
by
unifying
senior
leaders
in
a
way
that
they
can
share
information
and
again
come
to
the
best
decisions
collectively.
B
At
the
same
time,
that
only
happens
if
we've
done
a
good
job
of
establishing
both
organizational
and
on
some
level
personal
relationships
in
advance
of
the
incident,
so
that
we
are
not
trying
to
figure
out
who
each
other
are
on
an
incident
and
trying
to
figure
out
what
each
agency
or
what
each
individual
brings
to
the
table.
So.
B
In
the
initial
stage
of
the
incident,
clearly,
the
most
the
highest
priority
was
life
safety,
so
my
focus
was
on
dealing
with
the
casualties
that
were
both
outside
of
the
building
and
those
that
were
still
trapped
in
the
building
gaining
control
of
the
fire
itself,
ensuring
that
there
weren't
additional
hazards
on
the
incident
scene
that
might
have
been
brought
by
the
terrorists
as
a
result
of
their
attack
so
bottom
line.
You
were
the
incident
commander.
B
C
There
always
has
to
be
somebody
who
basically
makes
sure
that
nothing
is
awry
and
that
all
the
key
elements
making
sure
that
the
appropriate
set
of
resources,
then
that
it
works
within
the
overall
regional
response
capability
that
had
been
worked
on
for
decades
in
the
Washington.
Metropolitan
Area
and
senior
leadership
has
to
play
that
role
as.
C
C
The
philosophy
that,
as
part
of
the
incident
command
system
and
is
one
of
the
fundamental
pieces,
is
that
you
have
to
have
trust
in
the
people
if
they
have
competent
people
in
the
appropriate
places
and
the
operations
chief
is
the
best
incident
commander
that
I
had
at
the
time
as
well
as
placed
him
and
and
the
other
individuals
being
placed
in
the
appropriate
roles.
So
in
other
words,
even
though
the
incident
commander
has
a
critical
aspect
of
the
sense
of
in
all
incidents,
they
still
have
to
rely
rely
upon
other
people.
C
So
if
you
send
the
message
that
you
don't
have
trust
and
confidence
in
your
employees,
then
the
incident
will
not
go
properly,
and
so
it
starts
at
the
top.
There
was
no
doubt
in
my
mind:
we
had
the
best
people
in
the
best
place,
doing
the
best
thing
that
they
possibly
do
it
that
day
at
that
incident,
but
they
needed
assistance
they
needed
help.
They
needed
an
overview.
How
big
it
was
this
incident.
C
How
complex
was
this
incident
that
we
knew
that
there
were
going
to
be
mass
amounts
of
additional
players
in
this
incident
and
that
the
incident
had
to
be
contained,
and
that
was
my
focus
right
then,
and
there
it
was
to
make
sure
that
we
got
the
incident
contained.
So
we
get
our
arms
around
the
incident.
C
While
we
were
focusing
Jim
and
all
of
his
key
leaders
were
focusing
on
doing
their
roles,
which
was
assessing
the
incident
applying
appropriate
resources
and
and
then
making
sure
that,
throughout
the
entire
process
that
we
didn't
injure
or
kill
any
additional
firefighters
that
we
protected
the
community
that
we
were
responsible
to
protect
and,
at
the
same
time,
make
sure
that
the
key
players,
and
because
it's
the
key
government
facility
that
key
players
were
laced
into
the
process.
So
this
is
all
about
continuing
the
relationships,
affirming
the
relationships
and
making
sure
that
it
all
flows
appropriately.
C
A
D
It
was
actually
pretty
easy.
We
went
with
the
people
who
had
the
best
capability
to
deal
with
the
problem
to
him,
and
that
was
the
fire
department.
Well,
the
military's
got
assets
and
we
had.
We
had
actually
some
fire
responders
down
there
at
at
the
Pentagon.
It
was
not
really
within
our
it
wasn't
within
our
capability
or
our
desire
to
command
a
thing
at
that
time.
So
we
went
with
the
pros
and
it
was
a
fairly
easy
decision
to
make
so.
A
D
Well,
first
of
all,
my
role
was
to
be
there
to
be
the
conduit
that
the
incident
commander
could
use
to
get
into
the
Pentagon,
and
so
I
became
the
point
of
contact
and
allowed
me
and
my
staff
to
work
with
the
right
people
inside
the
building,
because,
obviously
you
got
some
senior
governmental
officials
there
who
are
interested
they're
gonna,
want
to
know
information
and
they're
gonna
want
to
keep
track
of.
What's
going
on
and,
of
course,
the
other
our
desires
to
feed
them
that
information
without
it
becoming
a
burden.
A
E
We
look
at
terrorism
scenes.
We
really
break
it
into
three
phases.
A
lot
of
people
asked
me,
you
know.
How
is
this?
The
fire
chief
is
in
charge
of
a
major
terrorist
attack.
The
first
phase
of
any
terrorist
event
is
usually
a
life
safety
and,
as
everyone's
talked
about
the
only
organization
that
can
really
do
life
safety
and
rescue
is
the
fire
service.
E
So
in
phase
one
of
that
incident,
we
looked
at
the
fire
department
to
be
the
incident
commander
and
then
once
we
transition
from
phase
1
to
phase
2,
which
is
the
crime
scene
phase.
That's
when
the
FBI
is
the
incident
commander
and
then
once
we're
done
with
that
crime
scene,
we
turn
it
over
to
a
consequence
management
phase,
which
we
would
turn
it
over
to
FEMA
or
in
this
case,
because
it
was
a
DoD
facility.
We
turned
it
back
over
to
DoD
as
the
incident
command
now.
A
B
Let's,
let's
acknowledge
that
there
in
the
beginning
of
any
kind
of
crisis
of
this
magnitude.
There
is
chaos,
you
know
our
job.
You
know.
One
of
our
first
orders
of
business
is
to
try
and
bring
some
some
order
to
that
chaos.
So
the
the
chaos
is
part
of
the
you
know
the
early
stage
of
the
incident,
and
it's
through
our
you
know,
tried-and-true
practices
of
incident
command
which
the
FBI
had
practiced
with
us
many
times
before.
You
know.
B
One
of
those
stories
that
that
you
may
have
alluded
to
in
your
introductory
comments
that
gets
lost
is
that
we
had
a
major
exercise
in
the
Northern
Virginia
region,
the
Saturday
before
9/11,
that
all
of
the
fire
departments
in
the
region
and
the
FBI
all
participated
in.
It
was
a
major
chemical
exercise
that
we
did
out
in
Fairfax,
County
Virginia,
and
that
you
know
was
one
more
of
those
opportunities
for
us
to
not
only
get
to
know
each
other
but
figure
out
how
we're
gonna
interoperate
with
each
other
and
so
coming
together.
B
Three
days
later-
and
it
wasn't
just
you
know
that
exercise
that
did
this-
there
was
already
a
great
deal
of
understanding
about
how
we
were
going
to
work
together
on
this
kind
of
an
incident,
and
so
by
working
together.
You
see
you
know,
who's
got
strengths
and
who
has
capabilities
that
you
can
rely
on
to
again
bring
start
to
bring
order
to
some
of
that
chaos.
Yeah.
A
I
know
Chief
barber:
you
were
really
committed
to
building
an
organization
that
could
respond
to
a
terrorist,
but
you
never
had
a
terrorist
event.
In
fact,
Arlington
had
never
even
had
a
really
major
event
in
its
tire
history.
It
didn't
even
see
a
battle
in
the
Civil
War,
and
so
how
do
you
set
a
priority
to
spend
time
and
energy
on
something
that
has
never
happened
and
may
never
happen
again?.
C
It's
it's
always
in
the
competition
for
needs,
and
what's
going
on
within
your
organization's
that
you
just
have
to
stay
stalled,
you
just
have
to
always
continue
to
work
hard.
One
of
the
stalwart
moments
are
one
of
the
key
moments
and
history
of
Arlington.
From
my
perspective,
brand
new
fire
chief
Donovan
County
was
a
Tokyo
incident
that
occurred
in
94
with
a
sarin
gas
attack
which,
truly,
from
my
perspective,
told
us
that
we
needed
to
revisit
how
we
were
set
up
and
what
we
were
doing,
particularly
for
the
region
and
our
preparedness.
C
It
started
to
gain
momentum.
We
started
to
receive
federal
funding.
We
started
to
receive
federal
recognition.
We
were
making
progress
in
the
recognition
that
it
was
going
to
take
the
entire
region
to
manage
this
incident,
and
so
we
continued
in
that
one.
In
that
vein,
was
it
difficult
from
time
to
time
because
of
the
competing
needs
of
organizational
and
budget
requirements,
and
that's
where
I
think
absolutely
you
know?
C
Was
it
hard
to
get
staffed,
engaged
and
move
them
off
other
projects
and
and
that
sort
of
thing,
but
some
things
you
just
have
to
believe
in
some
things
you
have
to
realize
that
are
the
potential
is
that
great
I
also
realized
and
I
and
I
truly
think
every
fire
chief
out.
There
will
recognize
this
in
that,
in
that
the
real
job
of
a
fire
chief
is
to
assess
risk
and
make
sure
their
organization
is
aligned
to
meet
those
risk.
C
To
me,
it
was
very
obvious,
being
in
the
nation's
capital,
being
on
the
door
of
the
nation's
capital,
that
we
had
a
terrorist
problem
and
that
we
needed
to
be
prepared
for
it.
The
region
needed
to
be
prepared
for
it.
We
had
a
great
system
for
firefighting
and
the
Northern
Virginia.
We
we
don't
use
political
boundaries
to
determine
what
ends
and
what
type
of
fire
response
goes
to
a
community,
and
we
just
unfolded
that
throughout
the
entire
wars
in
the
metropolitan
region.
C
A
lot
of
it
was
built
upon
the
platform
of
the
air
Florida
crash
that
it
occurred
decades
earlier,
and
so
we
had
a
great
foundation
to
build
upon.
We
just
need
it
to
plug
and
play
a
terrorist
response
capability
on
it,
and
we
needed
to
exercise
it.
We
and
we
did
exercise
it
on
the
grounds
of
the
Pentagon.
So.
A
You
were
inspired
by
or
motivated
by,
the
attack
in
Tokyo
and
started
work
to
prepare
for
a
chemical
attack
which
we
didn't
have
we
had
a
plane
crash
and
we
spent
a
lot
of
time
since
then
preparing
for
terrorism,
your
fire
chief
now
you've
got
to
make
the
decisions
he
was
trying
to
make
then
about
priorities.
Are
we
spending
too
much
time
on
terrorism,
especially?
We
see
the
number
of
weather
events
that
we've
we've
had
since
9/11
mother
nature's
been
much
more
effective
than
terrorists
and
attacking
our
country.
Well,.
B
Yeah
I
think
each
community
has
to
assess
what
are
the
most
likely
risks.
What
are
the
most
likely
events
that
they
are
going
to
encounter
and
build
their
system
to
be
able
to
react
to
those
most
likely
events?
Certainly
you
know
in
the
Midwest
tornado
activity
is
most
prominent
in
the
southeast
hurricanes.
You
know,
as
we
start
the
new
hurricane
season
now,
our
most
prominent
and
in
many
of
the
urban
areas.
B
Terrorism
remains
somewhat
of
a
threat
now
how
to
measure
that
threat
I
think
is
less
material
than
trying
to
build
systems
that
are
adaptable,
and
that
can
deal
with
different
kinds
of
threats.
You
know
when
you,
when
you
talk
about
your
preparedness
activities,
what
you're
really
doing
is
building
baselines
of
capabilities
that
can
be
used
for
a
weather
event
or
for
a
large
fire
or
in
our
case
on
9/11,
for
an
act
of
terrorism,
so
I
think
in
you
know
the
term
all
hazards
is
used
a
lot.
B
C
We
knew
that
we
had
the
confidence
and
the
confidence
to
manage
that
type
of
a
large-scale
multi-discipline
regional
response,
because
we
had
built
that
confidence
and
confidence
throughout
the
entire
system.
That's
stalwart!
That
is
absolutely
a
fundamental
piece
of
what
every
community
needs
to
do,
and
you
do
that
one
day
at
a
time
you
do
that
every
incident
at
a
time
you
plug
out
and
use
the
incident
command
system.
Every
time
you
reinforce
those
fundamentals
and
principles
just
like
they
do
in
the
military.
They
don't
haphazardly,
do
a
small
skirmish.
C
B
Think
part
of
what
we're
talking
about
here
is
that
you're
institutionalizing
a
lot
of
these
behaviors.
You
know
when
we
started
when
we
started
after
the
Tokyo
attack.
You
know,
with
you
know,
building
new
capabilities.
We
had
an
awful
lot
of
people
who
didn't
get
it.
We
had
an
awful
lot
of
people
who
are
wondering
you
know:
I
came
into
this
business
to
crawl
down
smoky
hallways
or
take
care
of
sick
people,
transport
them
to
medical
care
facilities.
That
sort
of
thing
why?
Why
is
you
know?
B
Why
are
things
shifting
and
the
reason
they
were
shifting
was
because
you
know
we
evaluated
the
potential
for
these
new
and
emerging
threats
to
be
different
than
they
were
in
the
past,
and
so
you
know
these
building
of
relationships,
business
building
relationships?
Is
it
critically
important,
but
you've
got
to
institutionalize
this
because
you
know
when
the
general
turns
over
or
the
chief
retires,
or
you
know
somebody
from
the
FBI
moves
on
to
another
assignment.
The
organizations
have
to
be
able
to
still
function
in
the
same
way
that
you
know
the
the
original
leadership
intended.
A
A
E
E
First,
everything
is
a
local
event,
so
when
the
FBI
gets
to
a
scene,
whether
it's
six
minutes
into
it
like
we
did
on
9/11
or
it's
an
hour
into
it,
we
are
designed
to
fit
into
the
existing
unified
command
structure
that
the
locals
have
set
up
and
be
a
partner
in
that
again,
even
though
9/11
is
a
terrorism
event,
the
FBI
very
honestly
said
we
can't
lead
this
beginning
effort
because
we
don't
do
rescue
and
recovery.
So
we
turn
to
the
fire
department
to
say
how
can
we
measure
our
operations
you're
the
priority?
E
E
First
person,
everyone
should
know
in
the
FBI
at
an
operational
level,
is
the
WMD
coordinator,
the
MIS
weapons
of
mass
destruction
coordinator
that
individuals
job
his
function
in
life
is
to
affect
liaison
with
our
state
and
local
partners
for
terrorism
response
or
any
kind
of
response
where
the
FBI
is
going
to
a
scene
and
interfacing
with
with
state
and
local
partners.
That
is
your
operational
component
for
the
FBI,
so
that's
the
first
level
and
then
up
to
the
special
agent
charge.
The
si
si
were
the
chief.
E
The
county
manager
of
those
agencies
need
to
know
that
individual,
because
the
special
agent
in
charge
is,
is
really
that
first
federal
person
who
will
be
on
scene
who
can
command
the
federal
resources
and
request
additional
federal
resources
from
outside
of
that
region
to
come
in
and
it's
important
to
have
those
relationships,
as
the
general
said,
from
the
chief
to
the
special
agent
in
charge
through
the
operations
staff
to
that
WMD
coordinator.
Thank.
A
D
And
it's
happening
every
day,
the
you
aren't
gonna
go
to
any
single
military
installation
in
this
country
and
if
you
find
the
garrison
commander-
and
he
doesn't
know
who
the
people
outside
his
boundaries
are,
that
he's
going
to
interface
with
you
might
as
well
get
rid
of
them.
I
would
tell
you,
within
days
he's
going
to
be
making
those
links.
It's
very
early
in
his
assumption
of
the
duties
he's
going
to
be
taken,
downtown
and
introduced
to
the
right
people,
because
there's
a
variety
of
good
reasons
for
it.
You
know.
D
D
If
there's
a
problem,
the
fire
department
responds
and
helps
to
respond
at
Fort
Myer,
because
they
only
got
one
small
station
on
Fort
Myer
and
they
rehearse
that
periodically,
and
so
it's
it's
all
tied
to
knowing
how
to
deal
with
a
situation
on
the
ground.
At
least
in
the
the
broad
framework
of
it
there's
basics
to
every
incident
you
got
a
deploy,
you
got
to
assess,
you've
got
to
start
making
some
plans,
or
at
least
identify
some
plans.
A
About
some
of
your
personal
reactions,
if
I
may
you
know,
one
of
the
points
that
you've
made
to
me
general
is
that
your
professional
training
led
you
to
be
the
one
to
cause
these
events
to
attack
other
people
or
enemies,
and
in
this
case
our
enemy
attacked
us.
What
what
was
your
reaction
when
you
arrived
at
the
Pentagon
and
saw
your
headquarters
successfully
attacked
by
an
enemy?
Well,.
D
I,
don't
think
there
was
a
wasn't
this
immediately
rush
of
emotions,
or
anything
I
mean
it
was.
There
was
a
problem.
It
required
some
action
and
therefore
we
were
the
ones
to
do
this.
It
was
obvious
to
me
that
I
was
going
to
become
a
focal
point
for
the
military
response
so
again
as
I
rolled
into
the
Pentagon.
That
day,
first
thing
I
was
doing
is
as
I
just
mentioned.
I
was
assessing,
I
was
looking,
I
was
trying
to
get
a
feel
for
what
was
going
on.
D
It
was
obvious
to
me
that
they're
fighting
the
fire
sounds
like
that's
about
what
they
ought
to
be
doing,
and
so
we
connected
at
the
right
time
and
place
to
find
out
what
can
I
do
to
help
you,
because
it
looks
like
you're
doing
the
right
things
here
and
that's
when
we
started
talking
and
sharing
and
deciding
what
to
do
next
and
based
on
some
conversation,
we
started
bringing
assets
down,
so
it
really
I
mean
it's
almost
you're,
almost
operating
off
of
autopilot.
When
you
move
in
there.
D
It's
off
of
prearranged
thoughts
and
patterns
that
you've
built
and-
and
you
know
the
way
you
decide
the
way
you
engage
and
you're
just
doing.
I
brought
some
staff
with
me
and,
of
course
they
moved
around
with
me
and
they
were,
you
know
offering
it
insights
and
assistance
and
communications
back
and
forth,
but
it
was
I
mean
it
was
pretty
hectic
time.
It
wasn't
several
hours
before
we
looked
at
our
watches
and
realized
what
time
of
day
it
was
but
I
mean
there
were
things
going
on
it
kept
us
busy
yeah.
D
Probably
I
remember
going
home
late
that
night
real
late
that
night,
but
you
know
again
making
sure
the
right
people
were
set
up
to
be
able
to
handle
things
that
night
and
as
it
turned
out
as
I,
was
going
home.
The
fire
reignited
in
the
building
and
there
was
another
recall
for
the
fire
engine
and
they
moved
down
there
and
of
course
they
were
able
to
deal
with
that
properly.
And
you
know
next
morning
we
reassessed
and
moved
on
from
there.
E
I
don't
know
if
it
was
personal,
but
we
understood
immediately
that
that
we
were
under
full
attack
and
and
even
for
us
it
was
bigger
than
the
three
sites.
We
also
had
the
hijack
airports,
which
for
us
was
a
sight.
So,
while
we're
at
the
Pentagon
with
hundreds
agents,
we
actually
set
up
another
command
at
Dulles
Airport,
where
the
hijacked
plane
took
off
from
we
had
a
hundred
agents
out
there
so
with
us.
We
very
quickly
had
to
break
it
down
into
different
components.
E
E
We
didn't
know
if
it
was
over.
In
fact,
we
were
receiving
immediate
intelligence
that
a
number
of
jumbo
jets
coming
across
from
Europe
accidentally
had
tripped
their
hijack
messages
to
tell
us
they
were
on
to
hijack
coming
in.
So
there
was
that
fog
of
battle
of
we
have
additional
planes
out
there
that
are
coming
in.
Where
are
there
more
attacks
planned?
What
is
the
next
step,
so
we
were
looking
in
many
different
directions
as
to
what
the
problem
was.
A
E
Can
distinctively
remember
standing
there
with
with
Jim
and
saying
you
know
this?
Is
it
this?
This
is
what
we've
been
training
for,
that
the
fight
is
here
in
somewhat
disbelief,
obviously,
with
the
size
and
scope
being
on
the
scene,
though,
we
didn't
have
a
full
view
of
what
had
happened.
We
knew
New
York
had
been
hit
with
two
planes.
I
personally
was
not
aware
of
the
collapse
of
those
towers
four
hours
into
that
day,
the
events
that
ended
up
happening
in
Shanksville.
E
E
There
was
a
lot
of
Intel
out
there
from
a
number
of
streams
that
that
talked
about
other
attacks
and
we
were
working
to
either
confirm
or
push
aside
that
Intel
is
not
accurate,
but
we
had
reports
that
the
State
Department
had
been
hit.
The
White
House
had
been
hit.
Luckily,
we
could
see
DC
from
where
we
were
so.
We
didn't
see
the
smoke.
We
pretty
much
felt
that
that
that
wasn't
true,
we
were
told
that
Cleveland
had
been
hit.
We
weren't
quite
sure
why
or
how
that
played
into
it.
E
So
you
definitely
had
that
fog,
a
battle
that
we
had
it
chased
down
to
provide
the
intelligence
to
the
partners.
Do
you
ever
stay?
Your
first
shift,
absolutely
I
think
everybody
did,
and
you
know
it's
hard.
Everybody
knows
you
need
to
go
home.
You
need
to
turn
command
over
I.
Think
the
perfect
shift.
E
Is
it
there's
a
dedicated
12-hour
shift
and
then
people
need
to
leave
to
rest
to
come
back
for
your
next
12-hour
shift,
it's
hard
to
do
it's
hard
to
have
people
leave
they
leave,
they
want
to
come
back,
they
want
to
be
in
the
fight
and
that's
one
thing
that
we've
tried
to
work
on.
Is
you
know
after
12
hours,
if
you
look
at
the
research
accidents,
go
up
your
your
cognitive
ability
goes
down,
so
you
really
want
to
try
to
push
people
out
after
12
hours,
but
it's
a
hard
task
to
manage.
Yeah.
B
You
know
you
just
and
the
way
that
you're
walled
off
from
everything
other
than
the
incident
I
think
just
calls
for
consideration.
To
spell
somebody
in
one
of
those
positions,
even
earlier
than
12
hours,
you
can
you
can,
then
you
know
get
into
a
rhythm
and
and
get
people
in
12-hour
shifts
after
a
little
while,
but
I
think
in
the
in
the
first
phase.
It's
it's
got
to
be
far
sooner.
Could.
B
You
know
today,
I
wouldn't
have
to
because
I've
got
good
operational
commanders
that
I
would
probably
have
to
be
influencing
I'd,
probably
be
the
one
making
those
decisions
telling
my
operational
commanders.
You
need
a
break,
but
hopefully,
with
you
know
the
experience
of
9/11
and
the
hindsight
of
these
years.
You
know-
perhaps
maybe
I'd
have
enough
wisdom
to
try
and
spell
them
in
that
way.
Can.
B
Know
I
don't
clearly
there
was
a
sense
of
awe,
but
I
think
it
was.
It
was
somewhat
tempered
by
the
fact
that
we
were
watching
the
images
in
New
York
evolved
before
it
happened
at
the
Pentagon
we
had,
you
know,
watched.
You
know
as
much
of
America
did
that
second
airplane
go
into
the
South
Tower,
which
for
us
confirmed
what
would
be
what
we
had
already
assumed
because
of
the
first
airplane,
and
that
was
that
these
were
intentional
acts.
B
This
was
an
act
of
terrorism,
so
I
think
you
know
there
was
maybe
a
momentary
sense
of
of
disbelief,
but
then,
as
the
general
said,
you're
going
to
work,
you
know
you've,
you
you've
got
a
marshal
all
of
your
energy.
You
know
towards
executing
the
tasks
that
need
to
be
done.
You
know
to
focus
on
life
safety
and
gain
control
of
this
fire
and-
and
you
know,
gather
the
situational
awareness.
B
C
It
was
pretty
remarkable
because
I'm,
a
pretty
emotional
guy
and
the
department
knows
that
and
and
but
at
the
same
time,
I
basically
didn't
know
I
had
the
ability
to
just
turn
them
off
and
just
went
to
work.
You
know
commandeered
a
helicopter
from
the
park
police
made
sure
that
we
understood
the
complexity
of
the
incident
made.
Sure
we
understand
how
much
of
the
pentagon
6.6
million
square
feet
was
involved
in
this
incident.
Did
we
have
enough
assets
and
resources
that
we
I
mean
there's
24,000
25,000
people
depending
on?
C
Do
we
have
enough
EMS
assets
to
deal
with
the
consequences?
Was
it
laced
with
a
chemical
or
a
biological?
Was
all
those
things
to
work?
I
was
also
wearing
at
the
same
time,
the
county's
emergency
coordinator
hat
so
I
also
had
an
Emergency
Operations
Center,
which
had
a
guy
who
had
been
there
one
day
who
was
operating,
the
Emergency
Operations
Center
as
part
of
your
team
there,
and
so
I'm,
not
really
sure
I
had
room
for
emotions,
I'm,
really
known
and
now
I
think
about
it.
I
probably
didn't
have
a
room
for
emotions
and.
D
Was
some
thought
dummy
every
once
in
a
while?
You
had
a
brief
moment.
For
instance,
some
of
us
knew
people
who
were
in
that
building
and
so
you'd
have
these
flashes
periodically.
But
then
you'd
come
back
to
reality
and
you
couldn't
allow
yourself
to
go
down
that
road.
There
was
there'll
be
time
later
to
grieve
right
now.
The
mission
at
hand
is
to
get
this
area
fixed
and
get
it
under
control,
and
you
know
when
you're
working
with
guys
who
know
what
they're
doing
it's
not
hard,
you
kind
of
saddled
up
together
and
off.
D
A
A
Let
me
ask
you
to
talk
about
this.
A
little
bit.
We
focused
on
the
the
three
lead
agencies
that,
by
you
know,
statute
and
incident
really
had
command
responsibilities,
but
there
are
a
lot
of
other
agencies
involved.
Could
you
just
talk
a
little
bit
about
some
of
the
other
agencies
you
worked
with
and
and
the
importance
that
they
play
in
this
incident
and
any
large-scale
incident
of
this
magnitude?
Who,
who
are
some
of
the
other
critical
players
out
there?
Well.
B
So
you
know
a
lot
of
the
lost
stories
in
an
event
like
this
are
the
way
you
know
our
Parks
and
Recreation
Department
and
our
environmental
services
department
then
called
public
works.
Even
our
libraries,
you
know,
are
the
personnel
that
work
in
those
jobs
that
we
too
often
take
for
granted,
and
you
know
when
we're
talking
about
a
crisis
like
this.
That
really
fell
in
and
did
critical
work
to
support
those
of
us
that
I
would
say
we're
on
the
front
lines,
but
just
did
enormous
work.
That
was
extremely
important.
B
No,
they
don't
they
don't.
Think
of
that
at
all.
You
know
one
of
the
one
of
the
very
first
resource
requests
that
chief
plugger
urged
us
to
make
was
six
foot
chain-link
fence?
You
know
2,000
feet
of
it
so
that
we
could
create
a
physical
barrier
and
begin
to
control
access
to
the
incident
site.
Well,
you
know
where
do
you
get
that?
Where
does
that
come
from
and
it
was
our
Parks
and
Rec
Department
in
Arlington
that
had
access
to
that
as
a
resource
and
through
our
Emergency
Operations
Center
got
that
tasking
and
produced.
B
You
know
in
a
in
a
in
a
way
that
you
know
we
weren't
waiting
days
for
that
kind
of
critical
asset,
that
kind
of
critical
resource.
It
was
there
in
just
a
few
hours
and
was
assembled,
and
we
had
you
know
our
first
hard
barrier
that
enabled
us
to
control
access
to
a
crime
scene
and
to
one
obviously
that
had
still
a
lot
of
casualties
that
needed
to
be
dealt
with
military.
D
Inside
the
military
it
wasn't
too
difficult.
The
the
executive
agent
for
the
Pentagon
is
the
secretary
of
the
army
that
was
Tom
White
and,
as
I
recall,
we
bumped
into
each
other
fairly
early
on
that
day
and
I
was
informed.
Officially
that
I
was
gonna,
be
the
guy
of
course,
I'd
already
assumed
that
so
wasn't
a
big
super.
D
You
have
all
the
contacts
within
the
building,
the
different
services
and
different
offices,
and
so
forth
that
had
to
be
addressed
and
people
wanted
to
know
what
was
going
on
on
my
side.
I
think
one
of
the
one
of
the
organizations
we
dealt
with
routinely
was
the
Arlington
Police
Department.
They
they
were
all
over
to
place,
sealing
off
the
roads
for
us
and
allowing
the
right
people
access-
and
that
was
a
fourth
guy
who
a
fifth
guy
was
in
there
in
the
room
with
us,
usually
talking
to
us
about.
You
know
what
can
I
do?
D
D
So
it's
just
a
matter
of
balancing
your
time
and
coordinating
with
them,
but
the
oh,
the
other
organization,
I,
think
that
needs
to
be
mentioned
here.
The
actual
families
that
were
involved.
What
what
what
took
place
right
away
was
a
lot
of
confusion
and
people
basically
going
out
of
communication
links
with
their
families.
D
Families
heard
about
it
and
immediately
wanted
to
know
where
their
loved
ones
were
well.
No
one
knew
because
they
were
all
scattered.
They
were
all
gone
there
doing
things
that
many
of
them
were
out
helping
injured
people
until
we
got
enough
workers
down
there
to
replace
them,
and
then
there
was
a
lot
of
phone
calls
coming
in
from
around
the
country.
How
are
you
gonna
manage
that?
You
know
people
from
California
calling
about
you,
know
son,
who
was
working
in
the
Pentagon
and
the
families.
D
They
pushed
posted
it
out
on
a
wire
and
people
started
calling
and
they
ran
this
24
hours
a
day
with
multiple
wives,
all
the
senior
wives
participated
in
it
and
they
were
answering
all
sorts
of
strange
phone
calls
strange
being.
Has
anyone
seen
my
son
well
who's
your
son
and
trying
to
figure
out
now?
Where
was
that
person
was
he
assigned
to
the
Pentagon
all
they
knew
that
he
was
working
in
Washington.
D
A
Seems
to
be
one
of
the
pieces,
that's
easy
to
miss
when
you're
in
that
Operations
mode,
and
you
talk
about
being
really
focused
on
the
mission
and
not
being
emotional.
There
are
a
lot
of
other
people
out
there
that
are
being
very
emotional,
mostly
from
not
having
knowledge
but
where
the
loved
ones
are
exactly.
D
And
and
see
I
mean
Tim
mod
was
killed,
the
senior
ranking
guy,
who
everybody
knew
who
he
was.
We
all
knew
him,
and
so
you
can
imagine
the
relationships
of
the
families
and
everybody's
starting
to
deal
with
this
so
and
I'm
sure
there
were
more
of
that,
but
so
it
became
a
very
personal
event
to
those
people
and-
and
they
were
one
very
willing
to
do
it.
But
again
it
isn't
a
very
pleasurable
kind
of
thing
to
do
that
stuff.
Well,.
E
I
think
the
biggest
help
to
us
as
the
FBI
was
FEMA
a
lot
of
people,
think
of
FEMA
purely
as
the
post,
hurricane
or
natural
disaster,
but
FEMA
brought
in
their
urban
search-and-rescue
teams
that
obviously
assisted
the
fire
department.
They
did
a
lot
of
work
with
our
evidence.
Teams
as
well
and
FEMA
really
helped
the
bureau
with
the
logistics
the
size
of
the
logistics
package.
E
One
of
the
issues
that
FBI
had
at
the
Pentagon
was
so
much
of
the
FBI
logistical
package
was
going
to
New
York
that
we
needed
some
assistance
that
our
scene
and
we
turned
to
FEMA
and
they
really
provided
expertise
that
we
don't
have
to
be
quite
honest
with
you
and
resources
to
help
us
do
our
job
at
the
Pentagon
and
supporting
our
efforts.
So
it
I,
don't
think
FEMA
gets
enough
positive
praise
and
they
were
indispensable.
You.
D
Know
rod
Jim
my
building
is
a
whole
lot
better
than
I
can,
but
there
were
search
and
rescue
elements
from
around
the
country
he
came
in.
There
was
a
civilian
response
that
came
in
and
overtook
the
south
parking
and
set
up
food
and
and
other
facilities.
There
I
didn't
find
out
till
about
day
four.
They
were
there,
but
someone
else
did
I
mean
they
were
they
were
getting
fed.
They
were,
they
were
providing
all
this
stuff
free
gratis
to
everybody
on
the
site,
so
the
response
stations.
D
Had
people
like
you
had
the
Salvation
Army
down
in
the
Red
Cross
down
there
they
were
giving
out.
It
was
a
very
warm
day
and
you
know
none
of
us
showed
up
with
gallons
of
water
and
they
were
provided
water
gatorade
and
things
like
that
to
keep
the
young
soldiers
were
out
there
working
out
in
the
Sun
all
day,
long
keep
them
hydrated,
so
they
didn't
go
down.
So
this
goes
on
and
on
I
don't
know,
I
can't
cover
everyone.
I
apologize
if
I've
left
anyone.
D
E
E
Was
great
the
only
Arlington
County
Police
Department,
who
had
a
rep
to
unified
command
the
whole
time
did
a
phenomenal
job.
You
know
one
with
their
evidence
teams
that
we
integrated
into
the
FBI
evidence
teams
and
then
setting
up
that
security
umbrella
around
the
incident
site.
Arlington
Police
and
the
Virginia
State
Police
did
a
fantastic
job
and
limiting
that
access
because,
as
Jim
said,
it's
a
crime
scene,
it
has
to
be
limited,
but
also
from
the
safety
perspective
of
secondary
attacks.
I
think
we've
all
trained.
Now
to
the
point.
B
Probably
a
good
time
to
to
talk
a
little
bit,
at
least
about
the
need
for
building
systems
that
acknowledge
regional
cooperation
that
that
certainly
community,
like
Arlington
for
an
event
like
this,
but
even
New,
York
City,
one
of
the
most
resource
rich
jurisdictions,
you
know
arguably
on
the
planet,
was
in
need
of
assistance
on
911.
Now,
of
course,
their
event
was
much
larger
than
than
the
Pentagon,
but
I
think
both
incidents
speak
to
the
need
for
developing
relationships.
B
You
know
across
jurisdictional
boundaries,
as
ed
mentioned
earlier.
You
know
this
whole
notion
in
Northern,
Virginia
of
essentially
eliminating
the
jurisdictional
boundaries
provides
for
the
most
effective
response
on
a
daily
basis.
We
get
services
to
those
in
need
faster
when
we
don't
worry
about.
You
know
whose
insignia
is
on
the
side
of
the
fire
truck
or
the
ambulance.
B
Well,
that
system,
which
was
in
existence,
then,
for
you,
know
25
years
on
9/11,
played
enormous
dividends,
because
we
could
call
on
jurisdictions
that
were
part
of
our
daily
operating
system
who
knew
exactly
how
to
fall
in
under
our
incident
management
system.
They
knew
our
standard
operating
procedures
because
they
use
the
same
ones.
Our
communications,
interoperability,
at
least
out
of
the
Northern
Virginia
units,
was
virtually
flawless.
B
A
9/11
Commission
described
the
response
of
the
Pentagon,
actually
didn't
discuss
it.
A
whole
lot,
there's
very
little
text
devoted
to
the
Pentagon
response
and
just
described
it
as
mainly
successful
for
most
of
the
reasons
we've
been
talking
about,
but
they
said
that
no
event
is
flawless,
so
you
know
what
what,
if
anything,
would
you
have
done
differently?
Yeah.
C
Yeah,
that's
always
a
very
tough
question
and
I
getting
asked
that
question
all
on.
It's
a
very
tough
question
for
me,
because
I
think
the
the
crews
and
the
individuals
and
all
of
the
partners
that
we
had
there
and
they
truly
were
partners
performed
extraordinarily,
and
so
anything
that
would
be
said
would
be
construed
to
be
somewhat
of
a
criticism
and
and
I
don't
want
anything.
I
say
to
become
a
criticism,
because
there
is
no
criticism
from
my
standpoint
for
any
of
those
partners.
C
C
I
mean
just
think
just
think
of
the
transportation
people
just
think
of
V
dot,
who's,
trying
to
get
traffic
to
and
from
up
and
down
395
and
on
the
interstates
through
66
that
have
to
know
what's
going
on
because
they're
part
of
the
process
for
solutions
and
you've
got
to
you've
got
to
work
that
and
in
the
Joint
Operations
Center.
Where
we
had
60
over
60
players,
they're
being
fed
information,
the
other
basis
that
has
to
be
proved
improved
and
seamless,
I
think
it's
a
great
place
for
new
technologies.
C
How
do
you
you
can't
ignore
the
medical
examiner
the
constitutionally
required
aspects
that
have
to
occur
when
a
deaths
occurred,
and
how
do
you
bring
those
into
the
process
and
how
do
you
make
it
all
work
seamlessly?
So
it's
communications.
It's
continued
to
hone
in
on
your
communications.
I
think
I
would
focus
more
on
that
in
the
future.
I.
A
D
D
Exactly
it's
been
institutionalized
and
been
helped
to
fund
with
some
some
joint
money
to
be
able
to
do
some
of
the
work
they
need
to
do.
We
went
out
and
we
put
money
aside
to
buy
new
communications
capabilities.
We
now
have
a
van,
a
big
vehicle
that
will
roll
in
and
has
all
the
connectivity
to
plug
into
anybody
just
by
sitting
there
put
up
masts
whatever
and
can
start
bringing
in
comms
right
to
that
location.
So.
A
B
I
have
to
agree
that
communications
is
at
the
heart
of
this
I
mean
you
can
do
all
the
planning
that
you
know
the
pre-planning
and
even
the
exercising,
and
you
know,
building
these
systems
that
we've
been
talking
about.
But
if
you
get
on
the
incident
scene
and
you're
incapable
of
communicating
with
each
other-
and
you
know
again
with
people
oftentimes
outside
the
incident
scene,
I
mean
there
were
times
on
this
incident
scene
where
we
had
to
be
party
to
secure
communications
that
you
know
couldn't
be
shared
outside
traditional
means.
B
So
you
know
I,
think
some
of
these
capabilities
are
absolutely
essential
and
and
I
would
echo
that
when
you
need
them,
there
isn't
a
replacement
for
them.
There
isn't
and
there
isn't
an
alternative.
Now
you
know
have
we
you
know,
have
we
over
invested?
Have
we
missed
opportunities
to
share
some
of
these
resources?
Perhaps
I
mean
certainly
on
9/11,
the
Eyre
Fire
Department
did
not
have
that
kind
of
command,
pod
or
command
capability.
B
They
simply
knew
that
you
know
it
was
critical
to
supporting
you
know
the
overall
effort,
but
if
there
had
been
attack
at
the
CIA
or
Fort
Belvoir
well,
the
regional
system
would
have
provided
for
another
command
unit
that
would
have
taken
their
place
out
there
and
again,
that's
one
of
the
beauties
of
having
a
system
that
acknowledges
that
your
capabilities
don't
stop
at
a
political
boundary
at
a
jurisdictional
boundary
that
you
can
move
resources
up
to
fill
in
gaps
as
they
continue
to
occur.
A.
C
And
you
asked
the
question
about:
is
it
a
wise
investment
for
those
types
of
units?
Remember
it's
only
an
investment
and
the
investments
will
not
solve
the
problem.
It
is
cooperation.
It
is
making
sure
that
you've
built
your
proper
alliances.
It
is
making
sure
that
you
thoroughly
understand
who
needs
to
be
communicated
to
about
what
and
make
sure
that
all
those
processes
are
in
play,
the
the
having
the
the
physical
resources
to
do
that.
It's
critical,
absolutely
critical,
but
not
the
absolute
essential
piece
of
this
whole
thing.
It's
the
complete
package
of
communications
done.
E
E
E
Know
what
worries
me?
We
talk
about
investments
and
what's
a
wise
investment
and
what's
not,
we
spent
an
incredible
amount
of
money
and
and
training
effort
on
WMD
type
attacks
chembio,
and
what
concerns
me
is
we
haven't
focused
on
what
we're
hitting
every
day
and
that's
explosive
attacks
or
small-scale
tactical
attacks.
Like
you
see
in
a
Mumbai
type
situation,
all
training
is
good.
B
Well,
a
lot
of
things
you
know
can
contribute
to
staying
awake
at
night.
To
add
on
to
this
I
think
we're
I
still
think
we
can
invest
some
more
focus.
Some
more
is
on
building
resilient
communities.
I
think
you
know.
One
of
the
topics
we
haven't
talked
about
here
is
how
the
average
citizen
contributes
to
all
of
this,
to
link
it
to
one
of
your
other
questions
about
what
I,
what
I
have
done
differently.
B
I,
probably
would,
on
that
day,
I
probably
would
have
drove
a
little
bit
more
some
decisions
around
public
communication,
how
we,
how
we
reached
out
to
the
Arlington
community
and,
in
fact
the
entire
region,
to
inform
them
of
what
was
what's
going
on
now
9/11
at
the
Pentagon
was,
you
know
a
confined
event.
It
is
you
know,
we've
talked
about
it.
It's
a
military
installation!
B
You
know
security
was
actually
fairly
easy
to
gain
control
of,
at
least
as
compared
to
how
the
event
happened
somewhere
else
in
in
the
Arlington
community,
but
I
think
that,
where
we've
really
got
to
continue
to
focus
is
building,
you
know
our
systems
to
acknowledge
that
the
true
first
responders
are
going
to
be
the
average
citizen
on
the
street.
We're
going
to
be
the
first
to
arrive
at
an
incident
scene
and
and
if
it's
a
really
large-scale
incident.
B
If
it
is
truly
of
crisis
proportions,
then
we're
going
to
be
depending
on
a
lot
of
people
in
our
communities
to
fend
for
themselves
and
not
become
you
know,
over
demanding
of
scarce
resources
that
are
going
to
be
concentrated
at
the
heart
of
the
of
the
crisis
scene.
True,
first
responders
at
the
Pentagon
with
co-workers,
they
were
absolutely
were
the
the
real
heroes
of
that
day
were
the
people
that
will
go
to
the
Pentagon
every
single
day.
More
lives
were
saved
by
the
people
that
go
in
and
out
of
that
holding
as
their
daily
workplace.
B
Then
by
you,
know,
fire
and
and
police
that
showed
up
on
that
morning.
So
absolutely
and
the
you
know,
the
military
obviously
is
focused
on
that
kind
of
quick
response
and
react
reacting
to
a
crisis
like
that.
But
we've
got
to
get
average
citizens
to
take
some
responsibility
and
understand
that
they
have
a
role
in
this
enterprise.
Also,
the.
B
Effort
on
community
preparedness,
more
effort
on
building
strong
neighborhoods
that
can
look
after
each
other
in
the
middle
of
a
crisis
you
know,
and
that
crisis
doesn't
have
to
be
of
9/11
proportions.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
of
Katrina
like
proportions.
It
can
be.
You
know
three
feet
of
snow
that
falls
in
a
community
and
in
any
particular
neighborhood
in
a
place
like
Arlington.
There
is
somebody
that
you
know
depends
on
meals
on
wheels
to
get
their
daily
sustenance.
That
depends
on
their
prescriptions
to
be
delivered
by
the
pharmacy.
B
Well,
how
are
those
kinds
of
essential
goods
going
to
get
through?
You
know
to
the
elderly
person
that
lives
alone
if
her,
his
or
her
neighbors
are
not
looking
after
them,
if
they're
not
even
aware
that
she's
among
them
and
has
special
needs
during
a
crisis,
so
those
are
examples
of
I,
think
building
resilient
communities
and
the
more
we
can
get
our
average
citizens
to
acknowledge
that
they
have
a
role
and
for
that
matter,
government
leaders
to
also
acknowledge
that
they
need
to
engage
with
with
people
at
a
community
level.
B
A
E
D
Obviously,
for
many
of
us
it
was
our
first
physical
contact
with
terrorism
on
a
personal
level,
so
I'm
sure
that
had
some
impact
but
but
I,
don't
think
I.
Think
the
the
military
experience
prepares
you
for
this
kind
of
deal
and
there
we've
been
through
similar
events
and
deployments
unknown.
You
know
no
notice
kinds
of
things,
deaths
and
so
forth,
and
so
we
have
some
kind
of
a
capability
to
deal
with
that
internal.
You
know
connection
to
this
and
be
able
to
to
make
it
work
but
to
spin
off
on
your
earlier
question.
D
You
know
what
worries
me
the
most
much
of
what
was
already
said.
I
did,
oh
that
big
time
that,
but
the
one
thing
I
would
offer
up
would
be
complacency
bothers
me
as
we
get
further
away
as
things
change
as
lives.
Go
on
as
we
do
things
and
we
lose
track.
We
forget
the
bad
guys
only
got
to
get
right
once
we've
got
to
be
right
all
the
time,
otherwise
we're
into
reacting
and
we're
doing
consequence
management
which
we'd
rather
not
do
we'd
rather
be
in
the
preventative
mode
that
becomes
very
difficult.
D
So
all
the
way
from
senior
government
officials
all
the
way
down
into
the
communities
complacency
is
going
to
is
going
to
hurt
us
how
we
fix
that.
Take
strong
leadership,
people
who
are
willing
to
go
out
and
basically
make
the
case
and
spend
the
money
at
the
right
time
for
this
stuff,
do
the
training
and
participate
and
that's
gonna,
take
leadership.
It's
the
only
way
it's
going
to
get
solved.
A
C
C
Impossible
to
say
that
you
could
have
gone
through
9/11,
particularly
performing
the
role
that
I
performed
without
being
affected
by
it.
I
mean
it's
just
it's:
it's
a
life,
altering
community,
altering
life,
altering
nation
altering
of
events
that
occurred,
so
we
all
were
affected
by
it
and
we
can't
paint
in
any
other
way.
Personally,
it
was
the
fact
that
you
know.
I've
was
a
firm
believer
that
you
have
to
rely
upon
good
people
to
do
the
right
things
at
the
right
time
and
I.
Think
that
was
affirmed
that
day.
C
So
a
lot
of
my
beliefs
were
affirmed,
build
the
right
infrastructure,
have
faith
and
confidence
and
the
people
give
them
their
lead
and
let
them
perform,
and
they
will
amaze
you
they
will
amaze.
You
continuously
with
the
level
of
performance.
I
think
it
was
also
an
extraordinary
valuable
lesson
about
cooperation
and
making
sure
that
you
always
affirm
those
partners
that
you've
built
over
the
years
and
make
sure
that
the
systems
are
there
to
affirm
those
collaborations
and
those
partnerships.
We
live
as
regions.
C
We
live
in
regions
regional
entities
today
we
might
have
lived
based
upon
the
riverbank
years
ago,
but
we
don't
anymore.
We
now
live
in
the
United
States
based
upon
a
region.
Let's
make
sure
that
we
affirm
our
preparedness
on
a
regional
level
as
well.
If
we
do
that,
we
will
not
only
be
better
prepared,
but
we
will
be
smarter,
prepared.
A
E
I'm,
the
assistant
Special
Agent
in
Charge
for
counterterrorism
and
Special
Operations
at
the
Washington
field
office,
I
think,
as
the
chief
said
9/11
has
to
affect
you,
I
think
it
it's
affected
me
personally
and
in
a
redoubling
of
my
effort
for
counterterrorism,
especially
on
the
FBI
side,
where
we
see
all
the
secret
cables
and
all
the
the
intelligence.
That's
out
there
that
I
think.
Thankfully,
the
American
public
doesn't
see
every
day
it
really
drives
at
home
as
to
what
we're
doing
and
why
we
have
to
work
so
hard
and
we
do
work
hard
it.
E
It's
it's
an
incredible
cost
that
I
think
the
members
of
the
FBI
pay
on
their
family
by
the
amount
of
time
that
they
work
to
find
these
plots
before
they
occur
and
to
disrupt
them.
And
then,
in
the
response
you
know
we're
going
24
hours
a
day
to
all
the
communities
to
make
sure
that
events
that
happen
are
not
terrorist
related,
so
I
think
I've
redoubled.
My
effort
as
I
think
everybody
on
my
teams
has
done
and
it
showed
us
what
is
the
cost
of
not
being
vigilant?
B
Well,
I
think
it's
brought
a
lot
of
the
things
that
you
know
that
we
prepared
for
in
advance
of
9/11.
You
know
it
made
them
real,
so
there's
a
there's,
a
certain
satisfaction
that
we
were
on
the
right
track
and
that
we
built
some
effective
systems
and
capabilities
that
could
react
effectively
to
an
event
like
that.
I
guess.
It
also
taught
me
that,
as
I
assumed
the
position
of
chief
that
I'm
not
I,
don't
have
the
real
luxury
of
trying
to
run
the
fire
department.
B
You
know
I
have
to
I,
have
to
lead
an
organization
where
I've
got
good
leaders
beneath
me.
Who
can
do
the
daily
work
of
running
the
organization
so
that
I
can
work
at
this
institutionalization
process
so
that
I
can
work
across
these
boundaries,
not
just
regional
boundaries,
jurisdictional
boundaries,
but
also
work
with
our
partners
in
law
enforcement.
Our
partners
in
public
health
are
partners
and
Emergency
Management
our
partners
in
the
nonprofit
world
who
all
contribute
to
this
this
enterprise.
So
you
know
beyond
going
through
the
experience.
B
You
know
the
shared
experience
that
others
here
went
through
it's
more
about.
You
know
how
do
I
focus
on
the
right
things
and
how
do
I
build
an
organization
that
will
sustain
these
efforts
after
I
leave?
You
know
whatever
that
is
so
it's
I
guess
it's
made.
You
know
the
the
idea
is
that
we
were
contemplating
before
9/11
more
real
in
a
way
that
I
don't
think
any
of
us
could
have
predicted
or
invited.
Certainly
you
know,
but
I'm
glad
we
did
that
work,
and
now
that
work
continues.
B
Think
you
know,
if
anything
else,
it's
it.
It
is
about
understanding
that
my
role
is
to
serve
a
community
and
that
that
community
has
something
to
offer.
You
know
in
this
enterprise
also,
and
we
ignore
that
you
know
really
at
our
own
peril,
because
sooner
or
later
we
are
going
to
face
another
incident.
A
Thank
you
all
very
much
for
coming
together.
Jim
Jackson,
the
US
Army
representing
Department
of
Defense
Command,
the
Pentagon
Chris
comes
representing
the
FBI
that
plugger
and
Jim
Schwartz
Arlington
County,
Fire
and
Rescue
Department.
Thank
you
for
your
outstanding
response
on
9/11.
Thank
you
for
what
you've
done
every
day
and
for
your
careers
in
public
service.