►
Description
As part of the ongoing series of lectures sponsored by the Arlington Learning in Retirement Institute, Rufus Phillips, author of Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned, speaks about his years as a CIA case officer and a USAID official serving in Vietnam.
A
Good
afternoon
and
welcome
to
a
ALR
aia,
special
event,
in
this
case
the
lecture
of
y
vietnam,
ettus
arlequin,
Arling
al
RI
stance,
extra
for
arlington
learning
and
retirement
institute.
We
are
thankful
to
the
arlington
library
that
they
work
together
with
us
and
we
can
present
these
interesting
lectures.
A
Instead
of
giving
you
a
detailed
bio
of
the
author,
I
thought,
I
read
you
a
condensed
Converter
introduction
from
The
New
Yorker
from
October
2009,
but
George
pecker
Rufus
Phillips
was
a
young
CIA
officer
in
Saigon
in
the
1950s,
a
protege
of
the
Ling
and
legendary
Colonel
Edward
Lansdale.
Over
the
next
decade,
Phillips
became
that
rare
thing
in
American
policy,
foreign
policy,
an
expert
in
the
politics
of
another
country,
Philips,
got
to
know
South
Vietnamese
politicians
and
military
officers
better
than
any
other
American.
A
When
the
Saigon
government
started
to
collapse
in
6,
1963
Phillips
returned
to
Washington
and
though
he
was
far
down
the
bureaucratic
pecking
order
was
asked
to
brief
President
Kennedy
Phillips
was
one
of
the
few
officials
in
a
position
to
know
how
badly
the
war
was
going,
and
he
Anna
blithely
optimistic.
Marine
General
argued
it
out
in
front
of
Kennedy
in
a
scene
that
was
made
Philips
reputation
as
a
fearless
straight
talker
by
David
Halberstam
recorded
in
his
book
the
best
and
the
brightest.
A
A
couple
of
decades
ago,
Phillips
started
to
write
a
memoir,
but
he
put
it
aside
when
the
publisher
told
him
that
no
one
wanted
to
read
another
Vietnam
book.
The
wars
in
Iraq
in
Afghanistan
caused
him
to
take
it
up
again
and
into
2009
Philips
published.
Why
Vietnam
matters
you
can
find
copies
for
sale
for
$20
and
mr.
Phillips
will
sign
them,
and
also
please
now
help
me
welcome
mr.
Phillips.
B
B
I
was
a
young
second
lieutenant
detailed
to
a
special
CIA
mission
that
had
been
set
up
by
Colonel
Edward
G
Lansdale,
who
had
been
asked
by
the
President
President
Eisenhower
and
by
the
to
Dulles
brothers
to
go
out
and
do
what
you
can
to
South
Vietnam
the
Geneva
courts
had
just
occurred.
The
country
was
being
divided
into
two
parts:
the
French
and
the
Vietnamese
nationalist
forces
were
to
withdraw
from
the
north
and
the
Viet
Minh,
which
became
eventually
the
Vietcong
were
to
withdraw
from
the
South.
B
That
is
withdraw
their
regular
forces,
and
this
was
a
time
of
complete
turmoil.
In
Saigon
there
was
a
Vietnamese
Nationalist
government
under
bound
I
that
also
had
his
capital
in
North
Vietnam,
so
that
whole
government
had
to
come
south
and
there
was
no
government
in
the
South,
except
for
the
remnants
of
the
French
colonial
government,
and
so
in
effect,
Vietnam
was.
If
there
was
going
to
be
any
kind
of
independent,
South
Vietnam,
it
was
going
to
have
to
start
from
scratch.
B
B
He
found
that
first
of
all,
the
French,
wouldn't
let
him
use
the
the
presidential
palace.
Secondly,
his
palace
guard-
that
is
his
own
people,
who
were
the
people
who
are
supposed
to
be
guarding
him,
will
all
belong
to
a
paramilitary
force
called
the
benzoin
who
were
gangsters
and
who
had
bought
the
police
from
Bao,
Dai,
4,
rumored,
20
million
dollars
and
controlled
all
the
gambling
and
vice
in
Saigon,
and
that's
how
they
made
that
money.
B
And
so
you
had
a
completely
disorganized
and
dispirited
South
government
in
South,
Vietnam
such
as
it
was,
and
so
I
arrived
in
the
midst
of
this
and
without
knowing
much
about
South
Vietnam,
but
speaking,
some
French,
which
I
rapidly
got
up
to
speed,
so
I
could
communicate
in
the
enemies
actually
all
the
way
down
to.
In
some
cases,
the
village
chief
level
or
down
to
the
non
calm
level
in
the
Vietnamese
Army
spoke
spoke
French
as
well
as,
of
course
Vietnamese.
So
I
was
trying
to
figure
out
what
it
was.
B
I
was
supposed
to
be
doing
there
and
Colonel
Lansdale
sent
me
out
to
talk
to
the
Vietnamese
army
and
particularly
to
something
called
GI
which,
under
the
French
system,
was
responsible
for
troop
morale
and
also
for
psychological
warfare
and
I
got
to
know
them,
and
that
was
the
beginning
of
my
introduction
to
sort
of
South
Vietnamese
politics,
the
slides
I'm
going
to
show.
You
will
illustrate
some
of
the
particular
episodes.
B
One
of
the
things
that
lancedale
did
for
them
was
even
when
he
met
him.
He
presented
him
with
sort
of
an
outline
of
the
kinds
of
problems
he
thought.
Jim
was
going
to
be
facing
in
some
possible
solutions
and
as
a
result
of
that,
a
bond
of
trust
began
to
grow
between
them
and
Jim
began
to
listen
to
lancedale
and
also
tell
him
what
was
really
on
his
mind.
B
B
B
These
guys
got
together
and
essentially
were
telling
him
that
he
had
no
control
that
he
had
to
agree
with
them
as
to
how
to
run
the
country,
and
the
first
thing
that
happened
was
he
had
started
planning
a
coup
against
him
and
so
a
couple
of
things
that
lancedale
did
to
help
head
off
the
coup.
One
was
that
there
was
a
radio
station
that
the
army
took
over
and
began
to
broadcast
anti
zim
statements
over
the
radio
and
the
guy
was
writing.
B
A
script
was
actually
a
Frenchman
who
was
also
the
stringer
for
UPI
and
I
chose
France
Presse.
So
he
would
write
these
broadcasts.
Then
he
would
pick
up
the
broadcasts
on
our
own
France
Presse
nu
P,
and
then
he
would
read
the
broadcast
back
over
the
the
radio.
Have
him
read?
It
was
really
one
of
the
greatest
one-man
psychological
warfare
crisis
I
ever
saw
anyway.
B
B
Anyway,
the
the
Hien
plot
did
not
succeed,
so
here
I
am
in
the
fall
of
1954
visiting
a
place
down
in
the
Vietnamese
Delta.
There's
some
press
people
along
including
this
fellow
here
I
think
works
for
a
John,
Ross
press
and
we're
going
into
an
area
that
had
just
been
turned
over
from
the
essentially
the
North
Vietnamese,
the
Viet
men
to
the
Vietnamese
nationalist
forces
just
to
see
what
was
going
on
there,
and
this
was
I,
think
in
September
October.
B
B
No,
what
we
did
working
with
the
Vietnamese
Army
was
to
retrain
them
in
how
to
deal
with
the
civilian
population.
We
took
a
group
over
to
the
Philippines
and
they
saw
how
president
mix
I
saw
and
the
defense
forces
there
had
actually
defeated
the
Communists
hooks
out
on
the
ground
by
simply
taking
popular
support
away
from
them
and
and
this
army
had
been
under
the
command
of
the
French
and
used
to
either
annoying
the
popular
stealing
their
chickens
or
engaging
in
the
abuse
of
the
population.
This
psychology
had
the
chief.
B
It
had
to
be
changed
if
they
were
going
to
go.
What,
in
into
what
you
see
here,
which
was
they
were
landing
in
central
Vietnam
to
take
over
one
of
these
areas
that
was
going
to
be
evacuated
by
the
Viet
Minh.
In
other
words,
they
were
evacuating
their
regular
troops,
and
so
they
landed
on
the
beach
here,
which
is
called
a
side
wing.
B
The
the
Viet
Minh
had
told
the
population
that
they
were
going
to
be
raped
and
robbed,
and
the
soldiers
behaved
so
well
that
you
started
to
get
a
much
more
friendly
reaction
from
people
as
they
began
marching
through
these
villages.
They
would
leave
health
units
behind.
You
can
see
somebody
here
that
seemed
to
be
happy.
One
of
the
things
I
pick
out,
however,
is
what
I
think
was
a
Viet
Minh
Kadri,
who
doesn't
look
happy
at
all
this
guy
in
at
the
end
of
this
operation.
B
This
is
me
on
the
Left
walking
down
a
street
in
Queen
Yun,
which
was
a
last
City
at
the
very
bottom
of
this
zone.
That
was
evacuated,
and
it's
only
notable
because
this
is
a
fellow
named
took
time
Dinh,
who
was
highly
excitable
and
in
a
rather
brash
fellow,
he
eventually
became
in
charge
of
the
security
in
the
Saigon
area
in
1963,
and
he
became
part
of
the
coup
plot
against
him,
which
of
course,
overthrew
cm
and
unfortunately
killed
him
at
that
time.
B
The
about
two
weeks
after
this
occupation
operation
was
completed,
Colonel
Kim,
who
was
in
charge,
who
is
here
driving
this
Jeep,
was
told
the
president
was
going
to
come
in
about
five
days
to
make
an
official
visit,
and
he
was
you
know.
This
was
really
a
problem
because
the
airfield
had
to
be
prepared.
He.
A
B
B
The
French
were
working
behind
the
benzoin
to
try
to
take
over
in,
kicked
him
out
and
take
over
the
government
in
South
Vietnam,
along
with
a
couple
others.
Second,
religious
sects
and
the
fact
that
Jim
had
resisted
this,
which
had
started
a
little
war
in
Saigon,
was
becoming
very
widely
known
to
the
population
and
one
of
the
things
that
I
appreciate
it.
I
think
a
number
of
us
appreciated
was
that
the
nationalism
of
the
Vietnamese
they
were
highly
nationalistic.
B
B
Now
this
culminated
in
a
referendum
against
Ballad
I,
who
had
been
supporting
the
the
benzoin
and
other
the
sect
forces
and
basically
was
under
the
influence
of
the
French,
and
so
a
referendum
was
called
by
ZM
against
him.
You
will
see
the
vote
totals
are
relative,
a
stern
amical
here
compared
this
as
iam.
This
is
Bao
Dai.
What
happened?
Was
they
just
overdid
it?
They?
They
took
a
lot
of
refugees
that
had
come
down
from
the
north.
Oh,
that
was
another
big
problem.
B
There
were
almost
a
million
refugees
coming
out
of
the
north
and
coming
south
and
they
had
to
be
reset.
So
it
wasn't
just
this
internal
problem
at
zi
man.
He
also
had
a
problem
what
to
do
with
these
refugees
anyway,
a
lot
of
them
were
bused
into
Saigon
and
they'd
never
been
registered
at
voters,
and
so
they
ran
up
the
vote.
But
the
truth
was
that,
if
had
been
a
completely
honest
vote,
Jim
would
have
won
by
at
least
80
percent,
because
the
Vietnamese
people
were
fed
up
with
bow
tie.
B
So
after
this
exercise,
I
stayed
on
in
Vietnam
and
I
worked
on
something
called
civic
action,
which
was
designed
to
get
civilian
teams
out
in
the
villages,
because
there
was
a
huge
vacuum
out
there
in
terms
of
any
kind
of
government
and
unfortunately,
two
things
happen.
One
was
that
we
could
not
get
the
regular
aid
mission
to
support
civic
action.
B
They
were
focused
on
development
in
the
cities
and
they
came
in
I
think
was
sort
of
a
standard
model
from
the
Marshall
Plan
of
how
you
you
assist
a
country
on
the
assumption
that
the
country
has
already
developed.
Well.
Of
course,
Vietnam
was
far
from
stable
and
far
from
being
developed.
The
other
thing
that
happened
was
that
the
Vietnamese
army,
through
these
actions
and
then
eventually
defeating
the
sexes
down
in
the
Delta,
were
responsible
for
territorial
security,
but
they
were
taken
out
of
that
role.
B
So
this
went
on
until
the
Kennedy
administration
came
in,
and
Kennedy
decided
that
the
situation
was
so
grave
that
he
needed
to
provide
the
Vietnamese
with
support,
both
militarily
and
economically
and
initially
the
military
advisors
and
we're
working
with
down
in
the
provinces,
and
we
had
military
advisors
for
some
of
the
larger
regular
vietnamese
army
units.
But
those
units
have
been
trained
and
formed
up
to
do
regular
warfare.
They
really
weren't
adapted
to
deal
with
an
insurgency.
So
the
war
was
really
been
fought
out.
B
The
provinces
and
there
was
no
civilian
side
to
what
was
in
became
called
counterinsurgency.
In
other
words,
there
was
no
economic
assistance,
no
social
systems,
the
you
saw
mission
had
103
people
in
it
and
only
3
people
outside
aasaiya.
So
what
happened?
Was
that
I
got
asked
by
the
Kennedy
administration
to
go
out
and
do
a
study
on
what
might
be
done?
B
I
was
by
that
time
in
private
business,
and
so
I
did
for
a
month
and
I
came
up
with
a
program
that
turned
you
some
upside
down
and
put
provincial
representatives
out
in
the
promise
and
decentralized
funding
out
the
province
to
the
point.
At
which
this
was
kind
of
a
joint
operation
between
our
civilian
provincial
representatives,
the
military
advisor
in
the
Vietnamese
promise
chief,
so
Vietnamese
sovereignty
over
the
program
was
retained
and
all
of
a
sudden
we
began
to
really
do
things
and
I'll
talk
about
that.
Now.
B
This
is
a
province
up
in
in
the
center
and
I'm
visiting,
and
the
the
province
chief
gets
me
involved
in
the
ceremony.
Where
he's
giving
out
some
carbines.
This
is
the
American
carbine
to
the
hamlet
militia.
The
hamlet
militia
were
people
who
were
recruited
locally
inside
a
hamlet
to
defend
their
hamlet
and
they
had
repel
a
a
Vietcong
incursion
into.
B
With
a
couple
of
shotguns
and
a
couple
of
grenades,
and
so
somebody
else
had
provided
with
some
better
weapons,
but
I
just
happened
to
be
there
and
the
reason
why
the
promise
chief
is
laughing
is
I
think
it's
obvious.
The
disparity
in
size
between
me
and
this
little
guy
here
who
wasn't
even
5
foot
tall.
B
B
This
is
a
promise
down
in
the
Delta
and
there
are
Cambodian
villages
scattered
throughout
the
dela,
that
is
people
of
Cambodian,
that's
thrashing
not
just
yet
Amin,
and
here
they
armed
they're,
armed
all
with
French
rifles
and
a
couple
of
shotguns.
These
were
French
rifles
from
World,
War,
one
and
but
very
proud.
A
lot
of
them
only
had
machete
and
they
were
the
self-defense
force
for
that
village.
B
B
He
came
away
from
looking
at
this
whole
situation
soon.
Well,
it
isn't
organized
well
enough.
You
know
there
ought
to
be
one
organization,
that's
supporting
all
of
these
self-defense
elements
and
he
just
didn't
understand.
Vietnam
I
mean
that
was
not
going
to
happen.
It
might
happen
sometime
in
the
future,
but
the
notion
that
you
could
impose
a
hierarchical
structure
covering
everything
in
South
Vietnam,
with
some
notion
that
you
might
get
if
you
were
in
the
State
Department
or
in
the
Pentagon,
but
it
had
nothing
to
do
with
reality.
B
This
is
a
photograph
of
one
of
our
provincial
representative
and
right
here
and
he's
giving
some
medical
assistance
to
a
group
of
Multan
yard
refugees.
The
mountain
yards
are
different
people.
They
are
Indonesian
stock.
They
live
mainly
in
the
highlands
of
Vietnam
and
a
lot
of
them
had
fled
the
the
Vietcong
and
had
come
in
and
needed
assistance.
Now
he
was
not
a
trained
medical
person,
but
we
had
a
wonderful
guy
in
the
aid
mission
in
the
health
department
who
came
up.
B
There
showed
him
basic
first
aid
care
and
also
came
with
a
license
for
him
to
practice,
medicine
and
he'd
gotten
a
Vietnamese
the
issue,
so
he
wouldn't
get
into
trouble.
I
took
Earl
up
there
early
on
and
he
wanted
to
work
with
the
Moncton
yard
in
this
particular
province.
It
had
been
a
new
promise
has
just
been
created
and
there
were
no
living
quarters.
His
living
quarter
in
office
was
a
tent
and
he
ate
with
the
special
forces
unit
that
was
in
this
province
and
I
said.
B
So
the
only
danger
he
said
he
was
really
in
was
that
the
you
had
to
watch
out
for
crocodiles.
When
you
went
bathing
in
this
river,
the
only
and
the
only
complaint
he
has
was,
we
gave
everybody,
everybody
had
to
go
out
and
live
on
local
economy,
so
we
gave
them
a
per
diem.
I
think
it
was
about
$10
a
day
and
they
took
$4
of
that
away
from
him,
because
you
know
he
was
living
in
government
supplied
quarters.
B
Now
we
had
a
number
of
really
tremendous
programs,
and
one
of
them
was
the
school
program.
This
is
a
hamlet
school
being
constructed.
We
helped
supply
some
of
the
materials.
All
these
projects
were
self
help.
In
other
words,
the
people
had
to
supply
the
labor
and
do
the
work
and
therefore
would
wind
up
owning
the
school.
B
A
B
B
B
B
This
is
another
typical
project.
This
is
actually
an
irrigation
system
that
was
developed
for
this
village.
This
is
the
village
chief.
This
is
a
Chinese
technician
from
Taiwan
who
had
been
there
for
several
years.
They're
really
helpful
in
this.
Of
course.
Yes,
yours
truly
all
right.
Let's
go
man!
Okay,
now
that
sort
of
tells
you
the
story
of
the
6263
period.
There
was
another
thing
that
happened
and
I'll
talk
about
that
shortly,
which
was
we
got
off
to
a
good
start?
B
Counterinsurgency
was
working,
but
then
the
same
government
got
itself
into
big
difficulties
over
the
buddhist
affair,
and
this
became
a
huge
problem
and
in
in
November
1963
there
was
a
military
coup
which
we
supported
in.
We
did
not
support
jimson's
assassination,
but
he
was
assassinated
and
after
that
things
really
began
to
fall
apart.
B
The
the
next
picture
is
going
to
show
you,
the
guy
who
was
the
ambassador
at
the
time
Henry
Cabot,
Lodge
and
large,
supposedly
relied
on
me
for
information
and
I
thought.
Maybe
he
would
also
ask
me
about
something
about
the
background
of
the
people
that
were
involved
both
on
the
government
side
and
the
military
in
this
coup.
B
That
was
brewing,
so
he
invited
me
out
to
lunch
at
his
house
and
he
spent
two
hours
telling
me
how
he
had
been
the
person
who
selected
in
persuaded
Eisenhower
to
run
for
president
and
then
managed
his
campaign,
and
it
was
not
one
question
about
what
was
going
on
a
local
scene
and
he
had
already
decided
that
the
only
solution
was
to
get
rid
of
him
in
news.
So
therefore
we
should
film
it
a
coup.
So
I
show
him.
B
General
Kang
was
very
verbal,
spoke
excellent,
English
and
really
knew
how
to
flatter
the
Americans
and
so
launched.
This
thought
he
was
a
cat's
pajamas
and
later
actually,
this
photograph
taken
about
the
same
time
as
this
one.
Now
this
one
shows
McNamara
on
a
tour
with
general
Khan
raising
his
hand
in
saying
Vietnam
wound
em.
Well,
the
way
he
pronounced
it
it
to
the
Vietnamese.
It
sounded
like
ruptured
duck
lie
down.
B
But
that
wasn't
the
only
foolishness
of
it,
because
here
you
are
doing
this
out
in
various
locations
around
you,
South
Vietnam,
and
what
you're
obviously
saying
is
that
this
fall
here
is
our
puppet.
We
all
know-
and
you
know
that,
just
as
the
the
head
of
the
National
Liberation
Front
said
at
the
time
he
said,
we
didn't
need
to
make
any
propaganda
on
on
this
theme
that
the
South
Vietnamese
government
was
just
a
bunch
of
puppets.
All
we
had
to
do
was
show
this
photograph
and
they
did.
B
So
by
that
time,
I
was
back
in
private
business.
I
come
back
at
the
end
of
63,
because
my
father
died.
Kennedy
died
in
the
leanest,
they
all
went
back
out
in
65
at
the
request
of
of
large.
Why
in
the
world
Johnson
appointee
enlarged
again
is
a
mystery,
but
he
did
enlarge
wanted
help
with
what
was
called
pacification.
B
So
I
was
taking
about
a
month
off
my
business
to
do
this,
and
so
here
I
am
I'm
sitting
between
this
fellow
was
a
former
ambassador
to
the
u.s.
name
buoys
him.
But
at
the
time
he
was
a
close
personal
advisor
to
Prime
Minister
key.
This
follow
here.
One
one
lock
was
the
chief
staff
person
for
what
the
Vietnamese
had
done
is
sort
of
continue
the
strategic
Hamlet
program
under
another
name.
B
B
B
So
the
other
thing
I
did
was
I,
went
out
in
the
countryside
and
Here
I
am
in
this
boat,
with
Bert
friendly,
who
used
to
be
my
deputy
in
what
we
call
Rural
Affairs
in
6263,
along
with
the
military
advisor
and
we're
going
out
to
see
an
experimental
program
planning
soybeans
in
the
offseason
and
that
turned
out
to
triple
the
income
of
farmers
down
in
the
Delta
and
by
the
way
those
kinds
of
things
have
continued
to
this
present
day.
One
of
the
reasons
why
Vietnam
is
so.
B
B
This
fellow
named
Tom
swung
on
turned
out
to
be
the
top
North
Vietnamese
spy
in
south
vietnam,
and
I
went
to
talk
to
him
because
I
known
him
personally
for
a
long
time.
This
is
about
two
years
before
he
died
and
we
talked
over
a
lot
about
why
he
had
stayed
as
a
spy
for
the
north
and
I
think
there
were
two
things.
B
Then
he
went
back
and
he
became
a
stringer
and
then
a
reporter
for
Newsweek
and
other
other
US
publications
was
that
his
mother
refused
to
leave
South
Vietnam,
so
he
had
more
American
friends
than
he
did
Vietnamese,
but
I
think
that
there
was
no
way
that
he
could
have
changed
his
loyalties
if
he
wanted
to
without
something
not
only
happening
to
him
but
happening
to
his
mother.
So
I
think
that
was
part
of
his
motivation.
B
B
And
actually
Manning
the
polls
and
checking
on
the
results
and
all
the
run-up
to
that
and
Holbrook
had
arrived
on
one
of
his
periodic
visits
and
it
just
been
down
in
one
of
the
provinces,
and
so
we
were
chatting
about
that
and
what
he'd
seen?
And
he
told
me
that
what
worried
him
was.
We
seem
to
be
doing
too
much
ourselves
and
we
were
not
involving
the
Afghans
another,
and
that
is
something
that
we
have
been
trying
to
get
out
of,
but
is
a
rather
typical
of
the
American
approach
to
these
kinds
of
problems.
B
B
And,
of
course,
you
all
may
remember
that
he
died
late
in
not
last
year,
but
the
preceding
year
and
I
was
his
first
Boston
Sangha.
He
came
out
as
a
young
foreign
service
officer.
We
detailed
them
with
one
of
our
older
people
to
go
around
and
see
what
was
going
on
in
had
been
there.
Only
four
months,
I
sent
him
down
to
be
the
provincial
rep
in
the
province
and
a
difficult
one
at
that,
and
he
acquitted
himself
extremely
well,
but
he
never
forgot
that
experience.
B
He
said
it
was
a
similar
experience
of
his
life
because
it
made
him
an
action
kind
of
person.
I
can
do
kind
of
person.
He
felt
that
he
was
what
I
some
of
us
call
proactive.
In
other
words
he
wanted
to.
He
felt
that
if
you
got
into
position
that
state
you
were
there
to
accomplish
something,
and
that
was
very
typical
of
his
behavior.
B
First,
I
think
that
we
didn't
they'll
understand
what
kind
of
struggle
this
is
and
in
September
1963
I
happen
to
come
back
to
Washington,
because
my
my
father
was
ill
and
President
Kennedy
had
sent
out
two
individuals
to
try
to
ascertain
whether
the
Buddhist
crisis
was
affecting
how
the
war
was
being
conducted
and
they
came
back.
One
of
them
was
Joseph
Mendenhall,
State,
Department,
employee
and
the
other
was
Major
General
cruel
act
from
the
General
Staff
and
they
came
back
with
impressions
that
were
so
different.
B
That
Kennedy
asked
that
you
two
gentlemen,
go
to
the
same
country
and
then
I
was
thrust
forward
to
tell
the
president
in
about
15
minutes.
Everything
I
knew
about
Vietnam
and
I
tried
to
explain
the
situation,
I
think
in
different
terms
politically,
because
I
knew
all
the
actors
I
mean
I
actually
knew.
B
Never
forget
that,
while
I
was
talking
to
the
president
secretary
McNamara
was
sitting
beside
him
the
whole
time
and
you
shaking
his
head
like
this
and
I
just
kept
talking.
Well.
That
got
me
into
a
huge
argument,
of
course,
with
the
chairman
of
the
Joint
Chiefs
with
everybody
that
was
there,
and
particularly
with
with
McNamara
and
also
directly
with
Krulak.
B
But
I
tried
to
explain
that
I
thought
the
real
problem
was
new
and
somehow,
if
we
could
separate
knew
from
his
brother
Jim
that
the
situation
could
be
changed
and
there
was
one
guy
that
who
had
the
confidence
of
Brendon
cm.
That
I
thought
had
a
chance
of
doing
that,
and
that
was
general
Lansdale
and
I
recommend
the
president
send
him
out
there
well,
the
president
said
after
I
finished.
Thank
you
very
much,
particularly
for
your
recommendation
concerning
lancedale.
Well,
nothing
happened
and
it
was
mainly
bureaucratic
obstructionism
in
Washington.
B
B
So
let
me
so
the
lesson
there
was
that
if
you
want
to
understand
what's
happening
in
a
particular
country,
you
cannot
just
rely
on
the
higher
echelons
in
Washington.
You
really
need
to
have
somebody
come
in
from
the
field
and
give
you
information
directly,
and
you
know,
and
I
still
see
that
as
being
true
today.
B
So
he
was
making
this
chart
and
he
had
all
numerical
factors
on
it.
Weapons
seized
arms,
caches,
discovered,
Vietcong,
killed
and
so
forth
and
so
on,
and
so
he
wanted
lancedale's
observations
well
instead
said:
there's
something
missing
and
McNamara
said
what
and
lancedale
said
the
X
Factor.
What's
the
X
Factor
well,
the
X
Factor
is
what
are
the
people
think?
What
are
they
thinking
and
McNamara
jotted
that
down
and
then
dismissed
it
saying
well,
I'm.
B
You
know
there's
no
way
we
can
calculate
this
with
anyway,
numerically
and
so
that
whole
side
of
the
war
was
just
thrown
aside
and
it
became
basically
World
War
2
approach,
which
was
men
plus
money,
plus
materiel,
equals
victory
and,
of
course,
that
carried
on
under
under
President
Johnson.
So
what
came
out
of
that
was
to
me.
One
of
the
real
lessons
was
that
this
was
the
fundamentally
a
political
war
and
we
couldn't
win
it
ourselves.
Only
the
local
people
could
win
it.
B
The
whole
idea
was
to
kill
enough
yet
Cong,
so
they
would
quit,
and
that
was
not
going
to
be
possible
because
you
could
not
follow
a
strategy
of
attrition
against
them
because
they
didn't
care
how
many
people
their
people
got
killed.
But,
of
course
our
people
cared
about
how
many
of
our
people
got
killed,
and
this
was
the
basic
strategy
of
Westmoreland
after
we
put
the
troops
in,
but
it
was
even
the
strategy
that
some
of
the
higher
military
were
following
early
on
just
kind
of
a
continuum
of
a
sort
of
a
world
war.
B
Two
approach
to
these
things
so
that
protecting
population
has
to
come
first
long
before
even
for
self-protection
and
certainly
before
the
objective
to
killing
insurgents.
We
don't
you
never
win
these
wars
by
killing
insurgents.
We
didn't
understand.
South
Vietnamese
of
Vietnamese
nationalism.
I
talked
about
that
a
little
bit
before
we
consistently
sort
of
downgraded
the
importance
of
the
South
Vietnamese
and,
of
course,
once
we
got
our
forces
out
there
and
that
Westmoreland
we
ignored
them
until
nineteen
late
1968
early
1969
when
general
Abrams
took
over
and
he
changed
the
whole
approach
to
the
war.
B
So
we
didn't
understand
the
psychological
and
political
factors
in
as
as
general
Taylor
when
he
retired-
and
this
was
long
after
he
served
in
Vietnam-
also
said
we
didn't
understand
ourselves.
We
had
this
world
war,
two
mindset,
we
had
intellectually
brilliant
advisors,
but
we
had
no
understanding
of
the
revolutionary
nature
of
this
kind
of
guerrilla
warfare.
So
I
like
to
quote
Sam
Rayburn
on
this
one.
B
When
Johnson
was
vice
president,
he
told
Rayburn
how
much
he
was
impressed
by
the
brilliance
of
all
of
Kennedy's
advisors
in
obviously
they
you
know
they
deserve
to
be
listened
to.
They
were
so
brilliant
and
Rabin
said
well,
Sammy
I
mean
well
Lyndon.
He
said
I
just
wish.
One
of
them
had
run
for
sheriff
once.
B
B
Also
in
allied
with
this
I
think
is
we
have
to
change
a
kind
of
egocentric
attitude
that
we
have
to
a
lot
of
these
people
that
live
in
in
what
you
would
call
the
developing
world.
We
do
have
a
tendency
to
look
down
on
them
and
even
though
that
isn't
expressed
verbally
in
my
experience,
people
in
these
countries
read
you
and
they
read
attitudes
and
if
you're,
respectful
and
you're
there
to
really
help
them.
B
As
background
because
of
the
book
I'd
written
I
got
called
in
by
some
of
the
people
are
trying
to
figure
out
what
to
do
with
Afghanistan
in
particularly
a
group
that
General
Petraeus
had
assembled
in
late
2008
early
2009
to
come
up
with
an
assessment
of
Afghanistan
in
Pakistan
and
what
the
possibilities
were
and
I
spent
about
five
hours.
Talking
about
my
book,
this
group,
which
had
civilians
as
well
as
military,
had
people
from
the
from
the
UK.
B
B
There
was
the
Vietnamese
by
and
large,
were
more
literate
than
the
Afghans
and
by
getting
an
echo
here,
there
was
much
more
of
an
existing
government
structure
going
all
the
way
out
in
the
it's
just
easier,
maybe
I
understand
too
close
too
far
away.
There
was
an
existing
structure
government
structure
going
out
into
the
provinces
in
Vietnam,
even
though
it
didn't
function
very
well,
but
at
least
it
was
there.
So
there
was
greater
pool
of
talent,
certainly
in
Vietnam
than
existed
in
Afghanistan.
B
But
what
are
the
similarities?
Well,
one
of
the
things
that's
similar
is
the
basic
nature
of
the
struggle.
You
have
a
rural
base,
insurgency
in
in
the
case
of
Afghanistan,
with
a
religious
political
cause
in
in
Vietnam,
you
had
a
rule
based
insurgency
with
the
quasi-religious
which
was
coming
to
them
in
political
cause.
B
B
B
Another
thing
was
I:
draw
these
similarities
the
importance
of
what
the
local
people
think,
rather
than
some
concept
that
we
tend
to
bring
to
the
scene,
which
is
I,
call
objective
reality
we
think
in
terms
of
jerk
objective.
Reality
is
what
matters
and
these
people
in
Afghanistan.
The
same
thing
was
true.
B
B
The
problem
Afghanistan
was
that
we
went
for
seven
years
without
really
doing
much
anything
and
we
didn't
nobody
went
south.
No
security
forces
went
south
until
late
2005-2006
and
they
we
didn't
do
that.
We
turned
that
job
over
to
the
Canadians
who
were
ill-equipped
and
they
will
prepare
into
the
British
who
sent
a
paratrooper
down
there,
a
unit
down
there
and
decided
that
the
solution
was
to
kill
the
enough
Taliban.
Well,
then,
that
result
was
had
made
more
Taliban
than
it
eliminated
so
and
we
had
made
big
promises,
but
we
pulled
out
all
our
troops.
B
B
We
subcontracted
out
a
lot
of
the
training
two
of
the
police.
Certainly
we
also
subcontracted
out
the
construction
of
roads.
There
was
very
little
Afghan
participation
in
what
was
going
on
and
we
made
no
deliberate
effort
to
try
to
start
building
up
some
kind
of
Afghan
government
from
the
ground
up.
So
you
had
a
tremendous
vacuum
between
Kabul
in
the
rural
areas
into
which
the
Taliban
returned,
so
it
was
only
I
think
when
Obama
came
in
and
it
wasn't
the
initial
surge.
B
It
was
the
second
surge
we
sent
out
McChrystal,
who
unfortunately
ran
into
trouble,
but
he
was
a
good
person.
We
had
Petraeus.
Now
we've
got
another
marine
commanders,
quite
good
name
Allen,
but
we
left
in
charge.
Ambassador
Eikenberry
and
I
talked
to
him
he's
a
very
decent
guy,
but
unfortunately
he
sent
telegrams
back
to
Washington
got
released
to
the
press
in
which
he
was
calling
Karzai,
not
just
an
unreliable
partner,
but
in
terms
that
anybody
well,
it
was
car-sized.
Somebody
else
would
take
the
personal
offense
too.
So
there
was
such
a
gap
in
that.
B
Now
we
have
a
finally
have
I
think
a
functioning,
not
just
military,
but
political
advisory
team
in
in
in
Afghanistan
was
greenly
lane,
so
I've
sort
of
gone
through
what
I
thought
happened
in
this
interim
period
and
why
we
ran
into
such
a
large
set
of
problems.
I
might
also
say
in
regard
to
the
training
we
did
for
the
police.
B
A
B
B
We
were
going
to
have
to
continue
with
advisers,
special
forces,
logistical
and
air
support
and
that's
currently
being
negotiated.
We
will
have
to
continue
with
substantial
economic
support
beyond
2014.
Some
estimates
are
that,
for
the
period
beyond
2014,
an
annual
level
of
u.s.
economic
assistance
has
to
be
somewhere
around
10
billion
a
year,
and
that's
because
the
Afghan
economy
doesn't
generate
enough
revenue.
B
There
has
to
be
some
level
of
cooperation
with
Pakistan
in
hauling
support
for
the
Taliban
in
to
me,
one
of
the
potential
obstacles
is
whether
the
Afghans
will
have
sufficient
confidence
in
their
own
future
to
continue
resisting
the
Taliban
and
I
have
to
say
that
all
the
talk
about
withdrawal,
which
is
mainly
directed
at
the
US
audience,
has
not
helped
us
any
at
all
right
there,
because
it's
helped
to
create
an
era
of
uncertainty
and,
of
course,
that
gets
exaggerated
by
the
Taliban
by
saying.
Well,
what
that
means
is
they're
going
to
leave
tomorrow.
B
So
we
can
just
wait
them
out
and
I
do
think
that
the
administration,
whichever
administration
it
may
be,
will
have
to
do
a
better
job
of
explaining
the
war
and
the
American
public
will
have
to
come
to
come
to
understand
and
no
quick
fix
is
possible.
Now
I
realize
that
everybody
calls
this
the
longest
war
but
I
question
that
to
begin
with,
they
set
the
date
of
the
Vietnam
or
beginning
a
bit
late.
But
secondly,
if
you
haven't
seriously
fought
a
war,
does
that
count
in
my
mind?
It
doesn't
so
I
really
date.
B
The
fact
that
the
Muslim
Brotherhood
got
close
to
majority
in
Egypt
doesn't
mean
Islamic
extremism
at
all.
They
have
publicly
dedicated
themselves
to
non-violence
and
the
public
they
dedicated
themselves
to
working
through
democratic
institutions
in
besides,
Egypt
can't
survive
without
a
link
with
the
West.
B
So,
although
we
worry
about
that,
I
think
that
the
end
result
of
the
Arab
Spring
is
going
to
be
more
of
a
liberalization,
as
the
younger
people
take
over
who
are
dead,
set
on
an
objective
of
trying
to
rationalize
Islam
and
democracy
and
if
that
comes
off,
I
think
we're
basically
winning
the
struggle.
But
I
don't
like
to
see
any
help
being
given
by
what
may
happen
in
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan.
B
And
the
other
question
is
that
if
the
Taliban
think
that
we're
just
hell
bent
on
withdrawal
willy-nilly
I,
do
think
that
that
affects
the
question
of
whether
they're
going
to
negotiate
seriously
or
not.
For
some
political
space
in
Afghanistan
I
know
the
the
negotiations
are
just
beginning,
but
from
the
experience
that
we
went
through
in
Vietnam,
it
takes
two
sides
to
negotiate
and
the
North
Vietnamese
were
very
good
at
holding
out
and
making
sure
no
South,
Vietnamese
representation
ever
came
to
the
table
and
that's
going
to
be
the
critical
question
in
Afghanistan.
B
B
Karzai
is
a
less
than
reliable
ally
he's
all
over
the
place,
his
regime,
it's
much
too
corrupt,
but
I,
don't
think
we
can
blame
under
the
circumstances,
the
Afghan
people
for
that,
and
so
in
my
mind,
I
like
to
go
back
to
something
that
senator
Biden
said
boy
back
in
2002
when
he
visited
a
newly
Oakland
girls
school
in
Kabul,
and
this
girl
stood
up
and
sort
of
confronted
him
and
said
the
flowing
see
you
cannot
leave,
she
said
they
will
not.
Deny
me
learning
to
read.
B
I
will
read,
I
will
be
a
doctor
like
my
mother.
America
must
not
leave
in
2001
there
were
less
than
a
million
Afghans
in
school
all
boys.
Now
there
are
8
million
students
of
which
more
than
2
million
or
women
and
girls,
so
I
think
we
can
learn
something
here
between
the
similarities,
between
Afghanistan
and
Vietnam
and
for
me
at
least.
One
lesson
involves
remembering
what
happened
to
the
South
Vietnamese
people
after
they
saw
our
less
helicopter
way.