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From YouTube: Deb Hersman NTSB Chair Visit Glenview June 8, 2011
Description
Deb Hersman NTSB Chair Visit Glenview
June 8, 2011
Taped by San Bruno Cable TV
A
We
welcome
the
the
leader
of
probably
the
most
powerful
investigative
body
that
we
have
on
a
federal
level
that
investigates
any
kind
of
transportation
accident,
and
this
is
a
transportation
accident
in
that
it
is
the
you
know,
flowing
of
of
gas
through
pipelines
about.
Eighty
percent
of
the
recommendations
made
by
the
ntsb
are
actually
embraced
by
regulators
or
utilities
or
airlines
after
their
reports
are
completed.
So
this
is
indeed
very
important.
They
are
totally
independent.
A
B
B
B
When
jackie
asked
me
to
come
to
visit
san
bruno,
it
was
a
great
opportunity
for
me
to
come
with
my
colleague
member
mark
rosekind
who's
here
with
me
today
and
mark's
family
actually
lives
here
in
the
san
francisco
area,
and
he
grew
up
not
far
from
here
and
so
as
as
a
board.
We
are
very
focused
on
this
accident
investigation
and
getting
our
report
completed.
B
We
have
a
number
of
parties
to
our
accident
investigation
and
of
those.
The
city
of
san
bruno
has
been
a
participant.
They
just
were
in
washington,
participating
in
a
technical
review
of
some
issues
last
week
and
we
have
had
excellent
support
from
the
mayor
from
the
city
manager
and
from
the
council
members.
They
have
been
thoroughly
engaged
in
this
process
and
attended
our
public
hearings,
and
so
I
can
tell
you
that
you
have
some
folks
who
are
very
plugged
in
here
representing
your
interests
in
washington
and
throughout
this
investigative
process.
B
B
Many
people
until
this
accident
probably
didn't
recognize
here
in
this
community
that
pipelines
are
a
form
of
transportation,
but
I
don't
need
to
tell
you
anything
about
the
tragedy
that
occurred
here
in
this
community.
You
all
know
about
that
all
too
well
what
the
ntsb's
role
is
is
to
find
out
what
happened
and
how
it
happened
and
to
make
recommendations
to
prevent
a
similar
accident
from
occurring
in
another
community.
B
I
I'm
very
pleased
to
say
that
we're
here
several
months
later
and
many
of
those
recommendations
are
being
implemented
by
pg
e
being
considered
by
cpuc
and
by
the
federal
regulators,
and
so
we
are
indeed
making
progress
with
this
accident
investigation
and
learning
things
and
changing
things.
So
this
type
of
event
won't
occur
again.
I'm
here
today
to
tell
you
that
we
are
issuing
three
additional
recommendations.
B
These
recommendations
came
out
of
our
public
hearing
that
we
held
in
march
and
they're
very
common
sense
and
straightforward
recommendations,
and
they
have
to
deal
with
emergency
responders.
I
know
that
the
chief
and
some
of
the
emergency
responders
are
here
today.
What
we
want
to
do
is
make
sure
that
they
have
information
before
an
accident
about
the
pipelines
that
operate
in
their
community
and
the
characteristics
of
those
pipelines.
B
That
event
is
occurring
and
to
let
the
911
operators
know
about
that.
We
want
to
make
sure
that
the
emergency
responders
and
the
operator
are
in
communication
with
each
other.
Immediately
after
an
event
occurs.
We
want
to
do
this,
so
the
emergency
responders
know
what
to
look
for.
They
know
what
product
might
be
there,
how
to
deal
with
it.
What
the
evacuation
area
might
need
to
be
how
long
it
might
take
to
shut
that
pipeline
down.
We
think
all
of
these
issues
are
very
important.
B
The
goal
for
our
agency
is
to
complete
this
report
as
soon
as
possible
and
we're
trying
to
complete
it
with
within
the
one
year
of
the
accident.
However,
I
want
to
tell
you:
this
is
a
very
complicated
and
very
technical
investigation
and
it's
much
more
important
to
us
to
get
this
investigation
done
thoroughly
and
to
get
it
done
right
than
to
get
it
done
by
an
artificial
date
certain
and
so
we're
working
very
hard.
It's
the
priority
for
our
agency
to
complete
this
investigation.
B
Above
all,
the
other
pipeline
investigations
that
we
have
ongoing,
and
so
my
commitment
to
congresswoman
speer,
to
the
mayor
and
to
the
community
is
that
we
will
continue
to
work
as
hard
as
we
can
to
identify
issues
and
to
complete
the
report
in
a
timely
manner.
You
you
will
be
notified
when
our
final
report
is
going
to
be
published
and
when
we
will
hold
our
board
meeting,
but
until
that
time
we
will
continue
to
communicate
and
share
information
with
the
media.
B
B
B
There
was
a
leak
on
line
132
about
nine
miles
south
of
this
site
and
that
leak
was
repaired
and
that
information
was
recently
shared
with
our
investigators
by
pg
e
the
end.
The
question
is:
how
serious
was
the
leak?
The
ntsb
is
still
collecting
information
about
that
we
have
information,
that's
been
provided
by
pg
e.
B
I
think
the
issue
of
concern
to
us
here
is
that
this
information
had
been
requested
at
the
beginning
of
the
investigation
to
understand
the
leak
history,
repairs
that
had
been
made,
the
type
of
pipe
that
was
on
this
line
and
that
information
was
recently
provided
to
our
investigators.
We
certainly
would
have
expected
to
see
that
earlier
in
this
process,.
D
B
E
Of
leak
was
this
in
the
sense
of
was
this
a
longitudinal
seam
leak,
or
was
it
a
girth
weld
leak?
I
mean
if
it's
a
longitudinal
seam
leak
that
would
be
indicating
that
they
knew
that
a
portion
of
this
line
was
indeed
had
seen
whether
it
was
segment
180.
I'm
just
wondering
is
the
key
issue
here
that
it
was
a
similar
type
of
leak
that,
as
opposed
to
what
happened
in
the
rupture.
B
The
question
is
about
the
details
of
the
type
of
leak
that
was
addressed
in
1988.
I
think
at
this
point
in
time.
What
I'm
going
to
be
sharing
with
you
is
that
there
was
a
record
that
they
had
a
leak
that
was
repaired
in
1988.
It
occurred
nine
miles
south
of
this
location.
Our
investigators
are
still
gathering
additional
information
on
the
leak.
This
information
was
just
provided
to
our
investigators
a
couple
of
weeks
ago.
How.
B
The
question
is:
is
how
problematic
is
this
information
being
relayed
at
this
late
date
to
our
investigators,
and
will
it
delay
the
publication
of
the
report?
This
information
was
provided
very
late
in
the
process
to
our
investigators.
We
would
have
expected
to
see
this
sooner.
What
concerns
us
is
not
that
this
information
is
brought
forward.
We
can
certainly
take
that
into
account
and
address
that
in
our
report.
What
we're
concerned
about
is
the
process
that
that
prevented
them
from
providing
this
information
to
us
sooner.
B
We
certainly
would
have
expected
to
see
this
information
earlier
in
the
process
we've
been
having
ongoing
meetings
and
communications
with
pg
e
over
the
last
10
months.
We
would
have
expected
this
information
to
come
forward
sooner.
This
does
go
back
to
the
issue
of
making
sure
that
pg
e
has
good
information
as
they're
conducting
their
risk
assessments.
B
E
B
We
have
a
very
astute
reporter
who
has
asked
the
question
of
how
many
recommendations
we
have.
I
explained
that
we
have
three
recommendations.
We
have
three
recommendations
and
there
are
two
issue
areas.
One
recommendation
is
going
to
pg
e
and
that
recommendation
deals
with
post
accident
notification
to
9-1-1.
B
We
are
issuing
a
companion
recommendation
to
femsa
about
post-accident
notification
to
local
9-1-1,
about
leaks
in
a
community,
and
we
are
also
issuing
a
recommendation
to
fimsa
about
making
sure
that
emergency
responders
in
a
community
are
informed
about
the
type
of
pipe
and
the
characteristics
of
the
pipe
in
their
community,
and
this
has
to
do
with
notifying
them
before
an
accident.
And
so
we
have
three
recommendations:
one
to
pg
e
and
two
to
the
federal
regulator
femsa,
but
they're
in
two
separate
issue,
areas.
D
B
The
question
is
about
potential
regulatory
action
with
respect
to
pg
e's
failure
to
report
this
leak.
I
think
the
question
would
really
need
to
be
directed
to
cpuc.
The
ntsb
is
not
a
regulatory
authority.
We're
a
safety
investigator
we're
here
to
find
out
what
happened
in
this
accident
and
to
make
recommendations
to
prevent
it
from
happening
again.
We
don't
have
any
enforcement
authority
or
regulatory
authority.
D
B
But
the
fact
that
we
identified
in
this
accident
investigation
that
that
information
either
wasn't
being
relayed
or
wasn't
being
communicated
in
a
way
that
made
sense
for
people
and
help
them
to
respond
that
something
needs
to
be
done
and
the
same
way
with
calling
9-1-1
after
an
event
very
quickly.
After
the
leak
occurred
and
actually
the
rupture
occurred.
B
The
control
center,
the
pg
e
control
center
knew
that
they
had
a
problem
on
this
line.
They
had
a
significant
drop
of
pressure
in
pressure,
but
they
did
not
notify
the
local
9-1-1.
They
followed
procedures
that
they
had
established
about
sending
an
employee
out
to
verify
what
was
going
on
in
the
line.
B
But
in
this
case
we
had
off-duty
pg
e
employees,
who
were
getting
information
from
news
reports
to
know
that
they
had
a
catastrophic
problem
and
they
and
they
made
the
effort
to
actually
go,
get
the
tools
that
they
needed
to
shut
down
this
line.
We
want
to
make
sure
that
everybody
who's
in
this
chain
of
response
has
good
information
and
full
information
as
quickly
as.
C
C
If
you
want
even
to
the
ntsb
and
ask
them
to
pull
out
records
that
are
50
and
60
years
old,
that
they
would
have
a
hard
time
doing
that,
the
question
is:
what
do
you
do
going
forward
on
a
legislative
basis
to
make
sure
that
people
actually
have
these
records?
Keep
these
records
so
that
the
next
utility
isn't
going
to
a
year?
From
now
saying
it's
going
to
take
us
six
months
to
do?
A
This
was
a
painful
and
deadly
lesson
for
the
country
and,
as
ms
hersman
said,
recommendations
were
made
urgent
recommendations
were
made
in
january
by
the
ntsb
to
fimsa,
to
require
all
utilities
across
this
country
to
develop
their
record,
keeping
to
the
level
that
they
knew
precisely
what
is
under
the
ground
or
require
them
to
hydrostatically
test
it
so
that
these
lines
were
indeed
safe.
So
moving
forward,
fimsa
has
now
employed
that
requirement
and
utilities
across
the
country
are
being
held
to
that
standard.
C
Are
you
concerned,
though,
that
the
agencies
themselves
forget
pg
e
they're,
responsible,
they're,
going
to
pay
a
lot
of
money
and
all
of
that,
but
it
appears
as
though
the
agency
system
itself,
the
government
failed
in
its
role
to
such
a
degree
that
you
could
have
this
kind
of
thing
happen.
What
are
we
going
to
do
about?
What
are
we
going
to
do
about
themselves?
What
are
we
going
to
do
about
the
cpsc?
What
are
we
going
to
do
about
the
government's
role
in
this?
A
A
That
was
a
huge
mistake
by
the
congress
of
the
united
states
in
doing
that,
it
is
another
example
of
how
the
utilities-
in
this
case,
those
special
interests,
were
persuasive
to
congress.
To
do
something
that
I
think
in
hindsight
was
was
not
a
good
thing
to
do.
Having
said
that,
there
is
a
pipeline
safety
act
in
place.
A
A
A
There
are,
there
have
already
been
regulations
imposed
and
put
in
place
by
fimsa
that
are
going
to
require
utilities
to
keep
better
records,
and
if
they
don't
have
the
records
to
hydrostatically
test
these
transmission
lines,
so
they
are
safe.
I
feel
very
strongly
that
anyone
who
lives
within
2000
feet
of
a
transmission
line
should
be
notified.
A
A
We
now
have
the
ntsb
that
is
recommending
that
that
kind
of
training
be
provided.
They've
now
conveyed
that
to
to
the
to
fimsa,
and
I'm
I'm
hopeful
that
fimsa
will
now
make
it
a
regulatory
requirement.
Moving
forward
automatic
and
remote
shut
off
valves
should
be
in
place
along
high
consequence
areas
throughout
this
country,
so
that
we
don't
have
a
tragedy
like
this
that
occurred
in
part
because
it
was
an
hour
and
a
half
virtually
before
it
was
turned
off.
Pg
e
again
is
taking
those
steps.
The
rest
of
the
country
has
to
do
that.
C
What's
to
say
that
the
national
highway
traffic
safety,
administration
or
fema
or
any
other
agency
in
the
federal
government,
confronted
with
the
same
budgetary
issue
as
everybody
else,
should
be
any
more
trusted
than
themselves
going
forward.
What
I'm
saying
is
this
is
not
an
endemic
problem
in
the
in
the
governments
of
both
state
and
federal.
C
A
A
We
don't
require
enough
record
keeping
of
that.
We
don't
require
that
it
be
made
public.
We
don't
impose
certain
protocols
that
be
put
in
place
to
address
that.
We've
got
a
lot
of
work
to
do
in
a
regulatory
fashion.
Now,
there's
always
a
balancing
between
a
regulatory
requirement
and
the
cost
of
doing
business,
and
you
know
those
interests
always
are
in
in
some
conflict,
but
was
it
not
for
the
ntsb
being
created
40
years
ago?
A
We
wouldn't
have
the
kind
of
diligence
going
on
right
now
to
investigate
this,
so
that
people
can
feel
very
confident
rebuilding
their
homes
in
this
community.
So
it
is.
It
is
the
number
one
function
of
government
to
protect
the
health
and
welfare
of
its
people,
and
we
have
to
continue
to
refine
how
we
do
it
and
make
sure
that
we're
demanding
the
most
out
of
our
regulatory
scheme
that
exists.
E
That
you
felt
they've
told
the
just
recently.
They
told
the
state
regulators
about
things
that
they've
discovered
about
rancho
cordova,
namely
that
two
of
their
inspectors
were
committing.
What
they
believed
were
numerous
indications
of
altered
documents.
Now
we
have
pg
e
just
now
admitting
that
eight
months
into
the
investigation
that
they'd
had
a
previous
leak
here,
you've
got,
it
seems
to
me
you've
got
a
pattern,
a
pg
e,
withholding
critical
information
if
they
don't
have
it
or
in
some
cases,
if
they
do
what's
your
belief
on
that,
based
on
what
you.
A
Know
well,
I'm
very
dismayed
to
find
that
at
this
late
date,
pg
e
is
providing
the
ntsb
with
what
is
really
critical
information.
This
is
information
on
the
specific
line
on
which
the
rupture
occurred.
It
is
only
nine
miles
away.
There's
a
there's,
a
part
of
me
that
feels
that
that
that
area
that
had
the
leak
should
be
excavated
and
we
should
look
at
it.
A
I
think
the
question
raised
about
the
fact
that
pg
e
stopped
the
replacement
of
pipe
300
yards
from
the
side
of
the
explosion
is
one
that
still
mystifies
me,
and
there
are
lots
of
questions.
One
thing
is
really
clear:
cpuc
has
the
responsibility
that
has
been
delegated
to
it
by
fimsa
to
be
the
watchdog
to
be
the
regulator,
it
is
admitted
that
it
has
been
remiss
in
doing
its
job.