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From YouTube: Local Plan 11.12.19 Day 2 (2 of 4)
Description
We're developing a new Local Plan in line with the publication of the National Planning Policy Framework (2012), which will eventually replace the current Local Plan approved for development management purposes in 2005.
Our new Local Plan is currently in the process of Examination by Independent Planning Inspectors following Submission of the Local Plan to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government on 25 May 2018.
For more information visit https://www.york.gov.uk/LocalPlanExamination We're developing a new Local Plan in line with the publication of the National Planning Policy Framework (2012), which will eventually replace the current Local Plan approved for development management purposes in 2005.
Our new Local Plan is currently in the process of Examination by Independent Planning Inspectors following Submission of the Local Plan to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government on 25 May 2018.
For more information visit https://www.york.gov.uk/LocalPlanExamination
A
Okay,
it
is
now
11:20
and
so
I
resume
the
hearing.
The
way
things
are
going
at
present
are
not
quite
as
neatly
defined
as
I'd
intended.
Nonetheless,
I
think
that
we
are
covering
the
grounds
that
we
need
to
in
a
reasonably
orderly
fashion
and
so
I
think
I
intend
to
proceed
as
we
are
at
present.
Does
that
seem
sensible
to
you,
mr.
Alvin,
as
as.
A
A
B
B
She
has
selectively
quoted
from
the
framework,
and
we
ask
you
to
look
as
you
will
no
doubt
at
at
what
paragraphs
15
and
16
say,
but
the
the
directive
is
to
look
at
the
most
up-to-date
projections
and
then
to
adjust,
if
necessary,
but
the
mere
fact
there's
a
change
after
you've
taken
those
projections
doesn't
mean
that
they're
necessarily
material.
However,
as
I've
said
earlier,
we've
already
adjusted
for
that.
The
methodology
entirely
aligns
with
what
mr.
B
Our
uplift
is
63%
and
she
was
incorrect
in
saying
it
neatly,
aligned
with
the
standard
method,
my
colleagues
from
jail
heard
and
will
no
doubt
confirm
this,
but
the
standard
method
shot
through
up
seven
eight-nine
in
Guildford,
I'm
told
and
the
figure
that
mr.
Bohr
accepted
was
5/6,
which
was,
in
fact
a
reduction
from
the
figure
in
the
local
plan.
B
B
It
came
in
late
and
thought
I've
already
apologized
for
that,
but
can
I
just
direct
your
attention
in
the
Oxford
report
to
the
to
the
entirety
of
pages
19
and
20
and
page
21,
the
Oxford
report,
the
680
comes
from
the
old
forecast
period,
the
six
there's
a
6/10
from
the
new
forecast
period,
which
then
goes
to
660
now
on
page
21,
which
we've
already
referred
to,
so
that
660
doesn't
come
as
a
bolt
from
the
blue.
We'd
already
mentioned
it,
but
the
Oxford
economics
report
looks
at
the
other
figures,
such
as
the
breasts
data.
B
It
explains
why
the
past
trends
are
not
reliable
for
future
forecasts.
For
example,
this
strength
in
terms
of
the
wholesale
and
retail
sector
was
now
had
to
be
moderated
because
the
the
short-term
outlook
was
particularly
weak
and
if
you
look
at
page
21,
contrary
to
what
was
just
said,
Oxford
Economics
seek
to
align
future
sexual
trends
with
the
strategic
economic
plans
for
York,
and
it
sets
out
at
the
beginning
of
section
6.
The
scenario
go
update
the
detailed
assumptions
20%
higher
growth
than
the
baseline
with
professional
services,
but
10%
lower
with
wholesale
and
retail.
B
So
Oxford
Economics
have
been
assiduous
to
correct
forecasts
for
specific
circumstances
in
New
York.
This
is
a
York
specific
report,
so
the
idea
that
sensitivity
hasn't
been
applied
and
that
we've
not
been
looking
specifically
at
the
York
position
carefully
is
simply
incorrect.
The
whole
purpose
for
commissioning
the
update
was
to
make
sure
that
you
and
we
had
the
most
up
to
date.
Forecasts
available
having
regard
to
the
circumstances
of
this
city
can
I
then
hand
over
to
jail
herd
just
just
to
raise
the
few
points
of
detail.
C
C
Presumably
paragraph
2,
a
0
1
7
of
the
relevant
planning
practice
guidance,
not
gonna,
go
into
the
detail,
but
just
to
highlight
that
clearly
the
2019
January
2019
report
housing
need
update
report
cui
c9,
clearly
did
look
at
sensitivity,
testing
on
both
population
and
household
formation.
We
had
quite
some
discussion
of
the
house
of
formation
of
already,
but
just
to
highlight
paragraphs
two
point,
one
three
to
two
point:
one:
five
concluding
in
table.
Five
of
that
report
do
set
out
a
series
of
alternative
population-based
scenarios.
D
Just
returning
to
the
Oxford
Economics
people
should
distress
that,
as
we
stated
that
the
the
council
consistently
used
what
was
highlighted
as
scenario
to
what
was
seeing
within
this
updated
report.
As
specifically
scenario,
two
updated
and
as
I
mentioned
earlier,
that
shows
a
range,
depending
on
the
time
period
that
you
look
out
of
six
sixty
to
five
ten
jobs
per
annum
bullet
point
two
on
page
21
or
so
the
two
billet
points
on
page
21.
D
It
does
specifically
include
an
adjustment
for
25
plus
twenty
percent
higher
growth
than
the
baseline
projections
within
the
professional
services,
financial
and
insurance
and
information
communication
sector.
Now
that
adjustment
was
made
specifically
to
take
account
of
developments
such
as
York
Central.
So
it's
not
that
the
council
are
ignoring
the
growth
potential
of
that
particular
development.
In
fact,
they
are
embracing
it
and
that's
the
reason
why
I've
chosen
to
go
for
this
repro
failed
sectoral
growth
scenario,
the
the
actual
eft
itself.
D
It
was
also
drawn
to
your
attention
a
number
of
other
alternative,
DSS
job
density
braised
in
EPS
figures,
which
believe,
on
average,
should
a
growth
of
794
jobs
appear
annum.
We're
not
disputing
at
those
figures.
What
we
would
see
is
that
those
are
the
that
that
would
mean
adopting
a
trend
beast
forecast
rather
than
a
trend
based
level
of
growth,
rather
than
forecast,
as
we
suggested
within
our
representations
to
your
M
IQs
that
we
do
not
believe
that
the
trend
based
forecasts
are
more
robust
than
an
economic
forecasts.
D
Furthermore,
this
isn't
just
an
off-the-shelf
economic
forecast
as
a
forecast
which
is
being
led
with
local
intelligence
and
putting
into
that
and
as
a
result
has
taken
a
positive
step
of
increasing
needs
above
a
baseline
level
of
growth.
The
reason
why
we
don't
we
wouldn't
recommend
a
trend
based
forecast
over
a
an
intelligent,
locally,
intelligent
economic
forecasters
that
they're
very
susceptible
as
serenade
a
my
cues
about
the
that
the
trains
or
the
years
that
those
trends
are
drawn
from.
D
So,
for
example,
the
braised
ear
shows,
over
the
last
four
years
or
over
the
last
three
years,
I
grow
from
1,000
jobs,
but
within
that
period
that
masks
a
decline
of
2,000
jobs
and
1,000
jobs
one
year
and
a
jumper
5,000
jobs
and
the
other.
The
brace
data
is
really
reliant
on
the
quality
of
the
sole
fee
in
that
area,
and
we
can
see
and
other
areas
where
there
has
been
very
questionable.
D
Trade,
for
example,
take
into
account
the
HR
function
of
a
particular
business
where
that
moves
from
one
location
to
another.
I
can
to
give
you
an
example:
meta
grit,
newspapers,
HR
function
as
in
lever
pill
and,
as
a
result,
all
of
the
medical
news
paper.
Employees
are
said
to
be
located
in
Liverpool.
So
just
one
of
the
feelings
of
the
blaze
dia-
and
it's
really
just
a
fear
of
the
subway
based
nature
of
of
that
particular
document.
D
D
We
also
say
with
an
ordinal
port,
a
good
example
of
the
impact
of
the
years
that
you
you
use
to
draw
for
employment
trends
using
that
same
job,
job
density
estimates
on
a
linear
trend
as
well
see
another.
My
cues
from
2000
to
2017
actually
results
in
a
trend
of
about
520
jobs
per
annum.
So
again,
it's
quite
susceptible
to
whatever
years
that
you're
using
and
that's
why
we
don't
necessarily
wish
to
use
them.
Furthermore,
what's
happened
in
the
past
may
not
necessarily
be
happening
in
the
future.
D
D
That's
all
say
over
then
the
report,
but
to
summarize,
includes
low
consumer
confidence
uncertainty
around
bricks
at
a
national
level.
Oxford
Economics
are
actually
forecasting
the
weakest
economic
growth
since
2009.
They
do
recognize.
That
was
the
end
of
austerity
that
the
the
festival,
the
listening
of
the
fiscal
stance,
may
increase
jobs.
However,
that
walls
will
be
offset
by
deteriorating
export
and
battle
environment
as
a
result.
Bricks,
and
also
the
lack
of
the
lack
of
clarity
over
the
final
possession
offer,
and
and
and
because
of
that
look
there.
D
Companies
are
feeling
to
invest,
and
there
are
companies
until
that
assorted
other
reasons
why
you
would
see
a
slowing
rate
of
growth
from
historic
trends
as
a
rapidly
aging
population.
We're
also
expected
to
see
restricted
migration
prospects
and
then
within
New
York,
who
is
also
expected
to
contract.
So
there
are
those
locally
based
elements
as
well,
including
pure
consumer
demand,
which
is
taken
into
account
within
those
forecasts.
D
Well,
there
has
been
some
growth
over
the
last
ten
years.
That's
been
really
inconsistent.
In
actual
fact,
there's
only
been
growth
in
four
of
the
last
ten
years.
We
are
still
expecting
there
to
be
growth
and
York,
and
in
fact
we
are
take.
The
Oxford
Economics
forecast
are
relatively
positive.
The
average
projecting
are
forecasting
a
growth
rather
of
0.4
percent
per
annum,
which
has
double
the
rate
seen
over
the
last
ten
years.
So
in
any
indication
that
the
council
are
using
numbers
which
are
too
low
based
on
past
trends,
they
just
don't
think
as
realistic.
E
Thank
you,
sir
I
have
to
admit.
I've
got
a
little
lost
in
the
debate,
as
things
have
moved
on
and
the
agenda
has
shifted
a
little
bit,
but
I
would
like
to
try
and
just
go
back
in
in
sequence
to
some
of
the
matters
that
have
been
raised
and
and
go
through
points
relating
to
the
household
projections.
Again,
miss
Cooke
to
the
the
left
of
me
was
quite
right
in
taking
us
back
to
power.
15
of
the
PPG,
which
clearly
indicates
household
projections
produced
by
the
DC
LG
are
the
starting
point.
E
Now
we
very
much
know
that,
since
those
guidance
was
written
and
the
DC
LG
are
no
longer
custodians
of
that
data
that
has
passed
now.
Two
ons
and
despite
this,
the
council,
in
their
statement,
indicate
power
2.33
there.
That
matter
statement
that
these
new
projections
produced
by
ons
are
clearly
the
best
evidence
available.
E
I'll
come
back
to
our
point
that
we
made
earlier
so
that
we
just
don't
consider
them
to
be
credible
for
the
purposes
of
plan
making,
whilst
they
may
have
their
methodological
or
statistical
robustness.
From
the
point
of
awareness,
it's
it's.
How
they're
use
the
plan
making
that's
important
and
I
think
here
so
that
there's
a
certain
degree
of
robustness
concerns
that
we
would
draw
you
to
I've
mentioned
previously:
the
technical
consultation
on
national
planning
policy
and
guidance
in
2018,
and
while
mr.
Alvin
is
quite
right
that
this
does
relate
to
the
standard
method.
E
There
are
observations
within
that
report.
I
think
a
very
pertinent
for
us
to
look
at
here.
I
draw
again
your
attention
to
paragraph
27,
where
the
government
reflect
on
the
robustness
of
these
projections,
indicating
that,
whilst
the
government
generally
recommends
the
use
of
the
latest
data
and
producing
assessments
of
housing
need
in
this
case,
this
case
referred
to
2016.
There
have
been
substantial
changes
in
the
method
producing
the
projections
that
have
resulted
in
major
changes
for
the
distribution.
I.
Don't
think
this
is
something
we
can
really
ignore
because,
yes,.
A
B
A
And
that
is
that
the
government
has
said
what
it
has
said
about
the
2016
household
projections
and
said
that
they
shouldn't
be
used
in
relation
to
the
standard
method,
as
you
point
out.
But
what
it
has
not
said
is
that
they
shouldn't
be
used
in
relation
to
establishing
a
way
in
under
the
transitional
arrangements,
and
mr.
Elvin
said
earlier.
To
paraphrase,
they
could
have
done
that,
but
didn't
quite
quite
right,
sir
and
I
think
will
say
so.
I
spread.
My
question
to
you
is
what
am
I
to
make
of
that
in.
E
The
absence
of
what
has
not
been
said-
and
this
is
where
I
think
has
previously
made-
we
need
to
turn
to
what
has
happened
and,
as
the
council
would
have
it,
they
point
very
clearly
to
Guilford,
though
there
are
a
basket
of
other
other
decisions.
That
would
point
you
to
as
well.
I
don't
want
to
make
the
evidence
based
library,
overly
burdensome,
but
if
we
are
to
include
Guilford
within
the
ranks,
I
think
it's
also
necessary
to
consider
Wickham,
Moneta
and
bed
worth
has
been
previously
mentioned
and
also
yeah.
A
E
If
you
can
hear
me,
sir
now,
whilst
we
don't
disagree
with
the
principle
of
uplifts
per
se,
I
think
there's
a
the
case
in
point
here
that
the
uplift
that
has
been
made
is
very
clearly
only
being
made
to
certain
age
cohorts.
So
this
is
being
made
to
those
age
groups
25
to
44
and
whilst
generally
these
age
cohorts
are
those
that
have
seen
the
greatest
amount
of
suppression.
It
has
to
be
queried
whether
or
not
it's
a
suitable
mechanism
to
be
applied
a
la
carte
across
the
the
district
authority
area.
E
It's
noted
that
the
the
counselors
approach
to
return
back
to
2008
would
lead
to
a
more
significant
uplift
than
if
they
were
to
apply
the
24
without
adjustment.
But
inevitably
you
get
into
this
mich
match
of
of
running
parallel,
parallel
projections
against
each
other
and
it
becomes
a
little
messy
that
had
put
it
put
it
sort
of
bluntly.
E
The
approach
we
would
like
to
see
is
is:
is
that
similarity
between
using
the
2014
approach
to
the
population
projections
and
to
the
2014
household
projections
as
well
I
think
that's
a
more
credible
and
it's
a
more
consistent
approach
to
take
moving
further
to
the
point
of
employment,
we're
going
to
leave
market
signals,
I!
Think
for
now.
That's
a
topic.
Little
perhaps
come
on
to
next.
It's
it's
curious
to
note,
because
mention
has
already
been
referent
to
Guilford
as
a
notable
examination.
E
In
our
statement,
so
you'll
have
noted,
we've
looked
at
past
trends
as
a
viable
indicator
of
growth
and
it
does
appear
to
be
a
disconnect
between
what
the
council
have
seen
or
observed
in
past
growth
and
what
they're
producing
in
the
future-
and
indeed
have
you
turned
to
the
council's
latest
statement,
which
was
issued
last
night.
So
this
is
the
Oxford
Economics
report
see
why
C
29
figure
5
of
that
report.
E
Whilst
they
include
trends
such
as
natural
train,
so
they
account
for
the
the
ons
2016
population
projections
in
relation
to
fertility
and
mortality.
They
make
their
own
assumptions
in
terms
of
migration.
I'll.
Take
you
to
that
in
particular,
sir,
because
I
think
that's
important
to
note-
and
this
is
in
Chapter
three
of
that
very
same
statement.
E
So
I
apologize
chapter
four
on
page
13
and
whilst
that
indicates
that
the
births
and
death
rate
assumptions
are
pinning
these
underpinning.
These
forecasts
are
consistent,
they've
utilized
their
own
view
of
migration,
which
shows
a
sharper
slowdown
of
growth
and
has
been
observed.
So
you
have
this
difficulty,
sir,
where
you're
trying
to
summary
of
the
population
and
household
projections
with
a
forecast
that
makes
its
own
assumptions
of
population
growth
and-
and
you
know
the
output
of
that
process
is
going
to
be
a
more
diminished
position
than
when
we
start
with
our
view.
E
So,
and
we
can
come
back
to
this,
if
you
feel
it's
necessary,
is
that
it's
better
to
you,
use
unvarnished
past
trends
as
a
more
realistic
and
appropriate
approach
to
consider
the
future
growth
of
jobs
in
the
district
and
apply
that
as
part
of
the
modeling
process
to
household
and
population
growth,
I
think
I'll
leave
it
there,
so
I
think
we're
going
to
come
on
to
market
signals
and
fordable
housing
later
cuz.
No
one
else
has
touched
it
yet.
Thank
you.
F
Thank
you,
sir
there's
been
a
lot
said
over
this
session
regarding
all
this
and
mr.
Elvin,
so
I'll
try
to
simplify
this
approach
by
saying
well,
the
MPS
says
we
should
just
use
the
most
up-to-date
and
that's
the
end
of
it.
But
it's
not
that
simple.
If
it
were
that
simple,
there
wouldn't
be
a
question
on
the
agenda.
If
it
were
that
simple,
we
wouldn't
be
hearing
about
these
other
elements
that
are
discussed.
The
framework
has
a
whole
host
of
policies
in
there.
F
For
this
to
be
found
sound,
it
has
to
be
positive
which
meets
those
four
needs
and
it
has
to
be
justified,
and
there
was
a
deliberate
change
in
that
justified
section
of
the
test
of
soundness
that
the
new
framework
says.
It
must
be
an
appropriate
strategy
where
the
one
that
we're
look
at
the
20
or
so
it
must
be
the
most
appropriate
strategy.
F
So
it
is
incumbent
upon
the
council
to
show
that
this
is
the
the
most
looking
forward
and
we
have
to
look
at
what's
appropriate
for
York
and
in
terms
of
the
2014
and
2016.
We
have
to
look
at
the
specifics.
York
hasn't
had
a
plan
for
a
long
long
time.
You
know
it's
been
a
long
way
to
get
to
this
position
there
in
today,
and
it
isn't
really
a
badge
of
honor
that
it
hasn't
had
one
since
the
50s.
F
It's
an
abject
failure
and
it's
not
just
enough
ministers
who
won,
but
it's
actually
a
fairly
for
the
people
who
live
here
and
that's
ultimately,
what
we're
talking
about.
I
think
it
was
mr.
Clark
Hurley
who
who
raised
the
point
that
isn't
just
a
paper
exercise
and
a
numbers
exercise
he's
looking
at
people
and
where
they
are
I'm
local
I
know
a
lot
of
local
people.
Not
many
of
them
live
here
anymore
and
and
the
affordability
is
a
massive
issue.
That's
come
a
point,
so
it's
incumbent
upon
us
all
to
get
this
right.
F
F
Sorry
so
in
many
circumstances
we
would
say
well
we
could
look
at
an
early
review
in
in
five
years,
but
in
reality
an
early
review
I,
don't
think
he's
an
appropriate
mechanism
on
the
housing
numbers
in
this
location.
I've
seen
other
plans
that
I've
been
involved
in
when
the
number
has
been
reduced
with
a
mechanism
for
an
early
review.
Leeds
was
an
example
that
would
go
back
and
look
at
it.
A
F
One
of
the
points
that
was
raised
by
the
council
was
to
do
with
migration,
and
he
said
that
the
2014
figures
didn't
take
into
account
the
most
up-to-date
figures
on
migration
and
with
our
responses,
we
had
an
addendum
that
was
submitted
with
it,
and
this
looked
at
migration
and
at
your
leisure
I
would
ask
you
to
look
at
Table
five
point.
So
it's
Table
four
point
two
which
actually
looks
at
the
actual
migration
over
the
last
10
year
period.
Apologies
to
Table
four
point
two
or
sites
in
the
the
supplementary
housing
need
evidence-based
review.
F
F
Talk
you
through
the
headlines.
That's
absolutely
fine
grateful,
although
sadly,
my
late
time
in
the
last
few
days
has
been
pretty
much
read
in
these
documents.
Apologies
if
I
confuse
you
with
me
and
so
in
here
about
seven
points
for
we
look
at
this,
so
the
the
2014
based
household
projections
had
met
in
migration
of
a
thousand
people
per
annum.
F
The
ten-year
actual
average
is
seventeen
hundred
people
per
annum,
and
only
one
of
the
last
10
years
has
experienced
net
in
migration
less
than
a
thousand,
which
is
in
the
2014,
the
most
official
2018
mid-year
population
estimates
show
netting
migration
of
1700
people,
therefore,
showing
that
even
the
2014
projections
are
slightly
under
estimating
that
and
then
in
terms
of
the
2016
based
projections,
which
we
were
told
it
taken
to
account
the
most
up-to-date
migration.
That
only
is
underpinned
by
a
figure
of
600
people
per
annum.
F
So
it's
400
people
per
annum,
less
than
the
2014
1,100
less
than
the
last
ten
years
average
an
1,100
people
less
than
the
2018
current
figures.
So,
on
that
basis,
I
can't
see
how
migration
could
be
used
by
the
council
to
say
that
that's
justification
for
using
2016
instead
of
2014
just
moving
on
servants
of
jobs.
F
We
have
this
new
document,
that's
included
in
from
servers
and
yes,
GL
Hearn
have
have
used
scenario
2,
which
has
been
identified
now.
It
was
mentioned
earlier
that,
in
our
work,
colleagues
of
mine
run
the
latest
evidence
through
the
same
scenarios
that
jail
Hearn
had
used
and
the
figure
that
they
gots
was
690.
F
Now
we
use
the
exact
same
methodology,
because
if
we
deviated
in
any
way
we'd
be
criticised
and
it
would
be
easy
to
challenge
so
we
kept
it
exactly
the
same
and
the
reason
why
it's
different
is
because
we
use
the
same
plan
period.
So
we
use
the
plan
period,
which
is
exactly
what
GL
Hearn
did
in
coming
up
with
a
650
figure.
What
this
document
does
is
actually
use
a
different
figure,
which
is
2017
20:38,
so
outdate
on
the
end,
but
takes
off
the
2014
to
2017
figure.
So
that
might
explain
why?
F
There's
a
discrepancy,
don't
ask
me
why?
Because
I
don't
know
the
ins
and
outs
of
it,
but
ultimately,
by
running
the
exact
same
figure,
we
got
so
that
the
690
in
terms
of
of
looking
at
it,
we
were
told
that
they're
looking
to
plan
positive
now
Table
five
point.
One
of
our
supplementary
document
also
looks
at
the
options
that
the
council
had
and
the
option
that
they
had
was
to
use
the
RAM,
which
again
many
of
these
use.
It
has
regional
details
in
their
scenario.
F
One
our
scenario:
two
are
the
simple
OE
baseline
and
the
one
that
the
council
chose
was
the
fourth
lowest.
There
was
only
one
which
provided
a
lower
jobs,
growth
figure
so
when
they
say
that
they're
looking
to
plan
positively
the
fourth
out
of
five
isn't
that
positive.
In
my
opinion,
there
were
other
options
that
they
could
have
done
and
they
could
have
looked
at
better
and
then
there
was
also
comment
about
why
we
shouldn't
be
using
trends.
F
Now
again,
we've
done
that
and
it's
included
in
our
statement,
and
you
will
see
that
the
trends
are
in
there
and
we
use
a
trough
to
trough
period
and
a
peak
to
peak
period.
Looking
at
low
points
to
low
points
and
high
points
over
appeared
from
1991
to
2016,
and
if
you
take
the
average
from
the
low
points,
the
trough
to
trough,
that's
actually
730
jobs
per
annum,
which
is
still
more
than
what
the
council
are
now
positively
planning
for
in
this
plan.
F
Taking
an
average
of
the
low
points
brings
you
out
730,
and
even
if
you
look
at
the
council's
own
evidence,
there
are
other
scenarios
that
they
could
have
chosen,
that
they
chose
not
so
which
to
me
shows
that
it
isn't
planning
as
positively
as
it
perhaps
could
have
done.
And
just
finally,
Guilford
has
been
mentioned.
It's
been
introduced
by
the
council.
I
won't
go
into
Aneesa.
The
one
thing
I
would
just
point
is
that
when,
when
I've
looked
at
that,
what
are
the
key
differences?
F
Is
it
talks
about
the
neighboring
authorities
and
the
neighboring
authorities
meeting
their
demands
and
having
higher
figures
and
I
think
this
comes
back
to
your
comment
earlier
on
the
mix-and-match
approach
that
the
difference
here
is
that
we've
got
Selby
as
a
neighboring
Authority
we've
got
Hambleton
as
a
neighboring
Authority.
Both
they
were
going
to
use
standard
methodology
both
which
will
use
the
2014
figures,
not
the
2016
figures
and
both
of
which
are
seeing
a
drop
in
their
housing
numbers.
F
So
how
is
Guilford
could
benefit
from
neighboring
authorities
having
higher
figures
that
isn't
the
case
in
York
and
I.
Think
it's
a
really
vital
thing
to
look
at
and
again
there's
a
link
to
those
2014
and
2016
figures
which
might
have
been
apologize.
I
wasn't
here.
Yes,
they
might
have
been
the
point
that
was
made
that
ultimately,
if
neighboring,
our
authorities,
such
as
Selby
in
York,
are
dropping
their
figures
because
they're
using
2014.
Surely
this
is
where
we
should
be
looking
to
increase
them
to
make
sure
the
overall
need
is
Matt's.
G
Thank
you.
I've
got
some
remarks
to
make
about
employment,
employment
needs
and
the
OE
paper
I
was
going
to
reserve
those
until
later.
If
we
were
taking,
if
we
were
going
through
sort
of
component
by
component
that
I'll
come
to
those.
You
know
in
a
minute,
because
we've
continued
to
talk
about
them.
I
just
want
to
step
back
to
the
to
the
use
of
those
16
projections,
which
is
kind
of
where
we
we
started,
and
the
council
said
that
there
were
parties
around
the
table
who
were
seeking
to
junk
and
the
16
projections.
G
That's
that's
not
what
we've
done.
It's
not
been
a
junking
exercise,
it's
an
objective
exercise
to
look
at
the
strengths
of
those
projections
and
where
they
might
not
be
a
sound
basis
for
a
demographic
projection
and
that's
those
concerns
the
issues
with
those
16
projections
are
in
our
evidence
and
at
some
length
in
the
evidence
of
others.
I
would
point
to
a
couple
of
issues
which
which
go
back
to
a
point
that
mr.
G
mccoggins
made
and
write
at
the
outset
of
the
discussion
that
we've
been
having,
which
is
that
they
had
looked
at
and
the
16
projections
and
had
some
concerns
about
birth
and
death
rates
and
and
migration.
What
they
do
and
in
in
in
justifying
the
use
of
the
16
projections.
Israel
on
very
short-term
trends.
What's
happened
very
recently
on
one
big
component
in
particularly
particular,
which
is
international
migration
and
so
well.
G
One
year's
worth
of
data
says
that
international
migration
has
fallen
substantially
and
therefore
that
and
further
lends
weight
to
our
view
that
the
16
population
projections
are
a
robust
basis
to
start
from
all
we
say,
and
others
say
if
you
look
at
the
long-term
trend
in
terms
of
international
migration,
and
if
you
look
at
what
has
happened
since
that
work
was
carried
out
in
later
data
international
migration
has
risen
again.
I
would
never
attach
any
weight
to
a
single
year's
worth
of
data
in
any
event
in
in
making
projections
of
this
kind.
G
But
those
international
migration
rates,
which
are
a
big
driver
of
the
change,
the
difference
between
the
14
and
the
16
population
projections,
is
that
the
the
view
of
the
14
projections
is
actually
a
lot
more
consistent
with
the
the
past
trend
in
New
York
than
the
the
international
migration
in
the
2016
projections.
That's
one
issue:
there
are
other
issues
that
people
have
raised
in
in
submissions
and
we
haven't
really
gone
to
in
in
discussing
the
the
preference
for
16
or
14
population
projections.
G
G
G
There
should
be
sufficient
land
available
to
meet
the
be
use
class
element
of
that
forecast
in
making
provision
for
employment
land.
Furthermore,
that
that
report
goes
on
to
say
that
neither
of
the
two
forecasts
the
OE
forecast
or
the
REM
forecast
are
necessarily
more
accurate
than
the
other.
It
says
that
a
number
of
times
in
that
report,
that's
the
council's.
The
council's
own
evidence
neither
is
more
accurate
than
the
other.
G
So
the
question
then
remains
well
what
why
was
806
not
taken
through
into
the
plan?
Why
should
it
not
be
a
reasonable
job
scenario
for
the
future
to
consider
the
council
has,
in
its
hearing
statement
then
suggested
that
the
there
were
its
concerns
about
the
health
and
social
care,
employment,
public
sector
employment
contained
in
that
REM
forecasts
and
were
not
seen
as
robust
and
that
the
the
OE
forecasts
should
be
preferred.
I
would
take
you
to
the
the
Oxford
Economic
paper
that
we
were
present
with
yesterday
into
Figure
14
and
in
Figure
14.
G
G
So
figure
14
we
have
a
Health
and
Social
Work
sector,
which
I
take
to
be
the
the
equivalent
sector
to
the
to
that
which
the
the
council
has
contested.
And
if
you
look
at
the
differences
between
what
he
was
saying
at
the
time
of
the
the
forecast,
the
2015
forecast
and
what
it's
saying
now,
it's
suggesting
that
growth
will
be
substantially
higher
in
that
sector.
G
So
my
my
my
view
is
that
the
806
figure
is
a
reasonable
view
of
future
employment
growth
based
on
the
council's
own
evidence.
It
appears
to
be,
it
appears
to
be
planning
employment,
land
policies
which
are
which
should
be
capable
of
meeting
that
level
of
growth,
yet
that
806
jobs
per
annum
figure
has
not
been
tested
in
terms
of
its
implications
for
for
housing
need,
if
it
were,
the
the
the
relevant
housing
need
figure
would
be
somewhat
higher
than
790
DPA.
G
Just
on
the
basis
of
the
of
a
simple
application
of
the
council's
assumptions,
I
suggest
that
it's
somewhere
between
somewhere
around
the
860
and
DPA
mark-
and
there
are
there-
are
other
reasons
why
I
don't
think
the
we
can
take
this
new
piece
of
evidence
as
ratifying
the
position
that
the
council's
taken-
and
this
has
been
touched
on
by
by
others
and
I-
won't
dwell
on
it.
But
we
see
nothing.
G
We
read
nothing
of
the
underlying
assumptions
that
Oxford
Economics
makes
and
in
its
evidence
about
about
the
working
age,
population,
labor,
force
rate
and
commuting,
and
we've
touched
on
population
already.
Oxford
economics
assumes
something
different
about
the
way
that
the
population
will
change
to
the
to
the
assumptions
that
the
council
makes
in
using
the
2016
population
projections.
G
Says
that
for
the
higher
of
the
two
scenarios
that
it
includes
in
in
the
new
report,
it
says
the
higher
level
of
jobs
growth
could
be
filled
by
by
commuters,
and
this
takes
me
back
to
a
point
I
made
yesterday
about
engagement
with
with
other
authorities,
if
the,
if
the,
if
Oxford
Economics
is
assuming
that
commuting
changes.
How
far
has
that
been
picked
over
by
the
by
the
council
in
its
its
its
neighboring
authorities,
in
particular
Selby?
G
So
just
a
couple
of
points
further
points
on
forecast
to
to
wrap
up
with
okay.
First
of
all,
the
the
planning
practice
guidance
is
is
very
clear.
It
suggests
that
and
forecast
and/or
past
trends
should
be
taken
into
account.
My
view
is
that
to
do
this
exercise
robustly,
you
should
take
both
of
those
things
into
into
account,
and
it's
evident
from
the
council's
evidence
that
it
hasn't
taken
past
trends
into
account
in
any
meaningful
way.
G
Secondly,
forecasts
really
should
give
a
sense
of
the
the
direction
of
the
overall
direction
of
travel.
They
are
prone
to
changing
substantially
between
releases
of
forecasts.
That
is
what
has
happened
here:
the
and,
if
I'm
reading
figure
figure,
14,
correct,
Klee,
Oxford
Economics
was
saying
jobs,
growth
that
around
nought
point
just
under
naught
point
five
percent
per
annum
between
2017
and
thirty-one
in
2015.
It's
now
saying
it's
around
naught
point
four
percent.
So
that's
that's
a
big!
That's
that's!
A
big
fall
in
the
projected
future
growth
rate.
A
I
J
Mister
good
I
always
have
of
you
to
speak
after
me.
I
will
be
quite
brief,
Ashley,
because
a
lot
of
what
I
was
gonna
cover
as
being
covered
by
mister
go
miss
mister
natka,
some
others
anyway.
I'll
summarize
what
I
was
going
to
say
into
some
fairly
high-level
points
on
that.
On
that
basis,
we've
made
quite
a
lot
of
the
transitional
arrangements
for
obvious
reasons.
Reading
the
transitional
arrangements.
However,
we
do
need
to
bear
in
mind
it
to
refer
to
the
framework
and
the
policies
they're
in
not
necessarily
the
guidance.
J
The
guidance
is
there
to
guide
a
decision
maker
in
terms
of
how
they
put
the
plan
together.
However,
we
are
aware
that
other
plans
came
forward
and
have
where
approved,
found
sound,
not
very
visually
following
the
PPG
as
we'll
set
out
I
won't
go
through
previous
examination.
Circus
I've
heard
your
comments
and
I
do
agree
with
them.
J
However,
we
must
also
bear
in
mind
that
there
are.
There
is
other
guidance.
Other
missives
have
been
filed
from
government
since
that
period,
which
the
council
was
more
than
aware
of
at
the
time
of
putting
together
its
information
and
the
2016
population.
Household
projections
have
been
covered
quite
extensively,
but
those
principally
are
the
ones
I
was
referring
to
earlier
today.
I
think
it's
worth
making
the
point
again,
because
we
can
quite
easily
get
caught
up
in
the
PPG.
Is
there?
Therefore
we
must
follow
it,
slavishly
that
isn't
what
is
required
of
the
PPG?
J
Is
there
to
guide
a
decision-maker?
It's
not
there
to
be
policy.
Secondly,
there
is
a
practical
issue
to
bear
in
mind
if
we
were
to
slavishly
apply
the
council's
methodology.
If
we
refer
to
the
2019
MP
PF
and
something
you
referred
to
earlier,
regarding
para
33
of
that
it
does
say,
plans
should
be
updated
every
five
years.
J
It
seems
slightly
farcical
when
we
are
where
we
are.
The
third
point
I
was
going
to
make
was
on
economics
and
I
won't
go
over
the
issues
which
mr.
Gomez
has
probably
put
far
better
than
I
would
have
done
anyway,
it's
fair
to
say
that
it's
been
quite
difficult
to
catch
up
with
what
the
Oxford
economics
paper
says
because
of
the
lateness
of
its
review.
J
I
was
unfortunately
reading
through
it
that
early
this
morning
in
the
car
and
while
sat
at
this
desk,
it
is,
however
notable
and,
as
others
have
notice,
there
is
some
internal
inconsistencies.
By
applying
these
projections
to
what
the
council
has
done
in
terms
of
population,
there
are
internal
consistencies
in
terms
of
commuting
the
council,
through
various
issues.
After
using
past
trends
in
terms
of
peace,
a
slice
and
depends
what
dates
you
use
I
think
mr.
Knapp
has
covered
that
quite
well.
J
J
J
Now
that
may
be
just
simply
due
to
the
shortness
of
time,
I've
had
to
read
it
that
I'm
sure
you're
in
a
similar
position,
sir,
but
without
that
level
of
detail,
we
rely
very
much
upon
what
the
council
is
saying
and,
as
I've
already
said,
we've
found
some
problems
with
some
of
the
assumptions
anyway.
It
doesn't
leave
me
highly
satisfied
that
necessarily
were
taking
account
of
things
such
as
York
Central,.
A
I
Robinson,
thank
you
very
much,
sir.
Just
just
three
main
points.
If
I
may,
the
first
point
about
the
cows
and
completions,
sorry
to
kind
of
go
back
on
that
and
always
criticized
by
the
council
for
using
the
government's
figures
which
the
council
pride
in
themselves,
but
just
just
on
that
point
I
think
it's
really
important.
We
got
a
bit
of
clarity
on
that,
because
the
council
is
factoring
in
the
backlog
of
past
lands,
delivery
and
they've
added
on
32
dwellings,
annually,
I
think
which
is
about
412.
I
So
if
their
past
completions
are
incorrect,
then
presumably
that
figure
would
have
to
go
up
quite
substantially
and
now
they
claim
that
CLG
is
folded
on
this
issue
and
it's
gone
with
the
councillors
figures.
But
the
discrepancy
is
a
massive
I've
set
out
in
my
my
submissions
in
there
page
47
of
my
appendix,
where
we've
kind
of
looked
in
a
bit
of
detail
about
the
potential
discrepancies,
now
I
think
it's
to
do
with
the
student
accommodation.
How
they've
been
banked
mr.
button
made
a
very
good
point
earlier
about.
I
While
is
that
really
meeting
housing
need
in
there
in
York,
and
probably
argue
it
isn't
this
supose
be
a
discrepancy
in
terms
of
the
council
has
been
allowing
for
that,
and
but
even
there
there's
various
examples
where
it
seems.
They've
got
some
of
their
figures
incorrect
or
it
still
doesn't
explain
the
full
discrepancy
between
the
two
and
that
final
point
I
would
make.
Is
that
Zuma?
The
MH
CLG
was
aware
of
these
issues
earlier
this
year
when
it
produced
the
house
delivery
test
figures,
and
yet
they
chose
not
to
change
those.
I
So
for
2015-16
MHC
OG
said
the
net.
Completions
are
six
nine
one
for
York,
not
1121,
which
the
council
say
was
delivered.
Similarly,
in
2016-17,
they've
got
down
only
three
seven,
eight,
not
nine
hundred
and
seventy
seven.
So
they
must
have
been
able
to
take
the
points
that
the
councillor
made
on
board.
I
It
decided
not
to
do
that
and
I'd
say
the
point
that
it
didn't
go
back
for
the
full
eight
years,
but
they
could
still
have
heard
just
at
the
hands
of
the
retest
and
they
chose
not
to
do
so
and
that
will
have
an
impact
on
the
extent
of
the
backlog
that
should
be
factored
in.
That's
my
first
point.
The
second
point
is
the
use
of
the
2016
household
and
population
projections.
Now
others
have
made
the
slightly
cheeky
point.
I
Well,
the
PPG
says
the
house
of
projection
should
be
published
by
the
CLG
should
provide
the
starting
point
and
of
course,
that
would
be
2014
house
or
projection
is
not
2016
house
or
projections,
but
even
sentence
that
one
side
as
I
said
earlier.
If
we
are
used
in
2016
population
projections,
which
at
least
critique
those
and
provide
it
a
detailed
analysis
as
to
whether
they
represent
a
robust
data
source
going
forward
now,
we've
heard
from
the
the
council's
can
sort
of
a
Follette
done.
That
I
mean
I.
Respectfully.
I
Disagree
on
that
point
again,
if
I
could
draw
your
attention,
if
you
know,
if
you
have
it
to
hand,
but
the
representations
on
the
house,
it
matters
that
Litchfield's
put
in
and
we've
got
a
technical
appendix
and
on
page
20
of
that
we've
looked
at
particularly
net
international
migration,
which
has
raised
by
mr.
gomez
over
there.
I
The
discrepancies
is
huge
in
terms
of
the
past
trends
for
net
insertion
migration
and
what
the
2016
population
projections
suggest
will
be
the
case
going
forward
and
has
even
raised
by
GL
Hearn
in
their
own
nose
in
figure
four,
where
they
show
you
how
far
the
2016
base
that's
paid.
Nine
of
GL
hands
work
from
Johnny
2019,
which
shows
you
how
much
the
2016
based
projections
dip
in
terms
of
their
projections
going
to
ford
for
installation
migration.
I
Now,
in
our
evidence,
we've
taken
that
forward
another
year
and
because
we've
got
the
2018
Mike
and
mid-year
estimates
her.
Basically,
it
shows
us
that
on
average
last
ten
years,
net
in
slashed
migration
has
averaged
1143
annually
the
2016
population.
Rejection
z'
drops
this
to
an
average
of
five
hundred
eighty
seven
net.
So
it's
the
difference
of
over
five
hundred
and
fifty
every
year
going
forward,
and
you
can
see
on
our
chart
that
long-term
international
migration
is
almost
identical
to
the
figure
that's
incorporates
in
the
2014
population
projections.
I
Now
this
is
important
because
the
GL
Hearn
is
sought
to
model
that
as
part
of
their
alternative
scenarios
and
have
done
that
in
Table,
five
or
page
ten
of
their
room
of
their
has
lead
assessment
generally
2019,
so
that
analysis
that
they've
done
they've
done
it
to
sensitivities.
One
takes
to
2016
projections
and
factors
in
the
middie
estimates,
and
that
increases
the
change
of
population
by
about
four
hundred
and
thirty,
which
is
roughly
reflective
the
increase
in
the
major
estimates.
I
The
second
one
increases
the
the
ten-year
migration
and
that's
about
two
thousand
higher
we've
done
something
similar
in
our
evidence
after
say,
it's
a
much
higher
increase.
Table
three
in
my
hearing
statement
suggests
that
if
you
were
to
apply
the
long
term
migration
trends,
the
major
estimates
that
would
come
up
with
a
dwelling
pranam
need
of
about
690
dwellings
per
annum,
which
is
significantly
higher
I,
mean
it
wouldn't
make
here
as
well
as
that
children
don't
appear
to
have
taken
out
on.
I
They
haven't
translated
that
to
households
or
to
dwelling
requirements,
but
I'm
not
quite
sure
why?
If
you
would
have
an
extra
funder
people
coming
in
every
year,
where
you've
only
got
a
two
thousand
net
increase
of
population
over
twenty
five
years,
which
sorry
over
15
years,
which
seems
to
be
the
case
in
Table
five.
So
my
first
point
is:
you've
still
got
a
net
increase
of
two
thousand
people.
My
second
point
is
that
it
looks
low
based
on
past
rain.
I
So
it's
lot
more
complicated
than
just
fetching
that
in,
but
it
did
to
seem
an
underestimation.
My
point
will
be
even
so
that
still
at
8.5
percent
higher
in
their
scenarios
and
jailed
homes
decided
not
to
take
that
forward.
Now.
I
would
have
thought
that
very
least
they
could
have
interpreted
that
and
said
well.
What
does
that
mean
for
household
growth?
I
What
does
that
mean
for
the
dwelling
requirements
and
have
that
as
a
valid
sensitivity
run
just
stopping
it
there
and
say,
while
it
looks
broadly
in
line
it
still
quite
significantly
higher
than
their
baseline
and
I
would
suggest
that
it
doesn't
seem
to
factor
in
fully
the
the
actual
increase
in
in
slash
moderation.
So
that's
my
points
on
on
the
migration.
I
would
say
as
well.
I
agree
actually
jail
home
on
the
the
headship
rates
and
they
need
to
accelerate
those
and
we've
done
that
in
our
evidence
as
well.
I
So
I
agree
with
that
point,
but
that's
really
addressing
one
point:
that's
not
trying
to
wrap
up
all
these
other
points,
that's
just
addressing
the
the
household
formation
rates.
The
final
point
I'd
like
to
make
goes
on
to
economic
growth.
Again,
I'd
I
concur
with
mr.
Gomez
I.
Wasn't
fortune
enough
to
have
a
paper
copy
this
last
night,
so
I
had
to
look
it
up
online
and
this
morning
I
would
kind
of
asked
if
we
could
perhaps
make
submissions
on
this
given
it
and
the
council
do
seem
to
be
reliance
on
this.
I
As
part
of
their
evidence,
even
if
it
is
to
validate
their
approach,
just
going
back
a
step
and
actually
commenting
on
what
that
is,
had
the
evidence,
that's
actually
before
us,
when
we
provide
we're
making
new
submissions
there,
a
number
of
concerns
that
that
we
had
in
particular
the
first
point
and
I,
think
it
was
mentioned
by
mr.
McColgan,
where
he
said,
while
modeling
the
forecasts
are
quite
susceptible
to
whichever
year
you
are
using
I,
think
it's
a
direct
quote
from
what
he
was
saying.
I
fully
agree
with
that.
I
I
The
job
growth
figure
nittany
ALR
relates
to
twenty
fourteen
to
twenty
thirty
one,
whereas
gel
Hearn
projects
that
over
completely
different
time
period,
twenty
seventeen
to
twenty
thirty
seven
and
said
well,
we're
still
gonna
keep
the
650
jobs
going
forward.
So,
as
mr.
McCullen
says,
the
job
focus
are
very
susceptible
to
whichever
year
you're,
using
which,
which
has
a
knock-on
effect.
I
B
Can
I
can
I
just
kick
off
before
handing
over
to
jail
herdin
with
a
couple
of
things,
there
seems
to
be
an
attempt
to
mischaracterize
our
approach
on
it.
I
know
you
know
what
it
is:
we're
not
suggesting
slavish
adherence
to
anything,
we're
just
drawing
attention
to
what
government
policy
says,
and
you
have
my
point
on
that
and
I
didn't
understand
the
point
that
was
made
by
mr.
B
good
about
the
PPG,
because
the
duty
under
Section
nineteen,
three
of
the
2004
act
is
to
have
regard
not
only
to
national
policy
but
to
advice
given
by
the
secretary
of
state
in
the
form
of
guidance.
So
it
covers
both
ppg
and
MPP
F.
So
I
don't
know
what
mr.
Goode
was
referring
to
there.
Secondly,
just
so
you'd
you
don't.
B
B
That's
the
November
ons
figures,
so
one
shouldn't
forget
that,
in
economic
terms,
the
figures
are
declining
second
day
you'll,
see
on
page
14
of
the
OE
report
that,
despite
the
trends
in
Yorkshire
and
Humber
in
the
region
as
a
whole,
where
there's
net
outward
migration,
York
is
still
expected
to
have
net
migration
and
that's
the
650.
And
if
you
want
to
see,
we've
had
a
lot
of
issues
about
past
trends
as
opposed
to
future
forecasts.
B
The
the
figures
that
MHC
LG
had
published
take
account
of
the
planning
monitoring
from
2017-18
onwards,
because
that's
those
the
returns
they
accept
to
know
the
accurate
ones
but
their
base.
Their
statistics
on
the
inaccurate
returns
prior
to
that
year,
which
they
accept
they've
accepted
the
latest
position,
but
they
their
statistics
units
just
say
they
will
not
retrospective
li'l
to
publish
data.
B
C
The
same
issues
come
up
time
and
time
again,
mr.
Austin
fell
said
there
were
substantial
changes
in
the
method
for
the
2016
based
house
or
projections.
I
think
just
to
be
clear.
There
were
substantial
changes
in
the
method
for
looking
at
converting
population
into
households.
There
was
no
change
in
method
within
the
population
projections,
there
was
merely
an
updating
of
information
to
take
account
of
more
recent
information
about
birth
rates,
death
rates
and
migration
profiles.
I
think
just
just
to
be
clear
because
you
know
back
to
points
made
earlier.
C
We
think
the
projection,
the
population
side
is
sound,
but
we
accept
the
household
conversion.
Side
is
not.
The
point
was
made
about
international
migration,
the
suggestion
being
that
those
2016
projections
show
a
much
lower
level
of
international
migration
than
the
past
trends
would
suggest
that
is
to
be
expected.
They
are.
They
are
following
our
own
asses,
not
no
projections.
C
At
the
time
of
the
2016
projections.
Ons
projected
long-term
international
migration
would
run
at
165
thousand
people
net
per
annum.
Against
the
backdrop
where
the
immediate
past
trends
have
been
around
260,000
mark,
so
all
the
work
we've
done
is
is
essentially
linking
to
the
national.
It's
not
a
national
trend.
Is
it's
a
projection,
but
the
national
the
pattern
that
ons
projects
going
forward
so
I
think
this
is
yeah.
We've
put
graphs
in.
C
In
the
update
reports
and
in
terms
of
international
migration,
that
would
be
figure
4
on
page
9,
yes
I,
you
know,
in
short,
I
would
expect
international
migration
to
fall
below
past
trends,
because
that
is
what
ons
is
projecting
at
a
national
level
and
what
it
projects
at
a
national
level.
It
filters
down
to
local
authorities,
essentially
the
method
that
ons
uses
it
has
its
national
projection,
which
it
publishes
normally
about
six
months
before
local
projections
and
for
international
migration.
C
It
typically
takes
international
migration
over
the
past
six
years
and
apportions
its
national
figure,
depending
on
different
levels
across
different
local
authorities.
So
I
I,
don't
you
know
I'd
have
to
say
yes,
it
is
clearly
the
case
that
that
the
projections
have
a
lower
level
of
international
migration
moving
forward
than
past
trends,
but
that
is
a
national
factor.
That
is
not
an
error
in
data
for
York.
That
is
what
we
would
expect.
C
That's
the
ONS
would
look
at
population
projections
at
a
national
level,
and
so
our
sensitivities,
effectually.
Take
these
sort
of
national
assumptions
make
adjustments.
So
in
fact
we
were
making
an
adjustment
to
the
to
the
share
of
migration.
So
if
we're
looking
at
a
ten
year
period,
we're
asking
the
question
well,
what
was
the
share
of
international
migration
to
York
in
that
10-year
period
compared
to
the
share
in
the
period
that
would
have
fed
into
the
into
the
projections
in
terms
of
the
final
point
was
made
about?
C
Why
didn't
we
take
a
slightly
higher
ten-year
migration
projection
through
into
household
numbers
and
housing
need?
The
simple
point
was
having
seen
the
numbers,
it
was
quite
clear
that
projections
linked
to
economic
growth
were
going
to
be
higher,
so
rather
than
put
something
that
was
going
to
be
essentially
overwritten
within
a
couple
of
pages
of
a
report
seemed
a
bit
unnecessary,
so
think,
there's
sufficient
information
in
there
to
show
that.
D
We
accept
that
different
periods
will
show
higher
or
lower
rates
of
growth,
and
that
can
be
seen
through
the
different
parties.
Assessment
of
trend
based
growth
should
point
out
that
in
table
10
of
the
Oxford
Economics
growth.
Sorry,
the
Oxford
Economics
outlook
2019
paper,
which
is
the
one
that
was
handed
out
last
night.
There's
a
there's,
a
few
good
examples
of
where
the
different
parties
and
their
stance
on
periods
will
impact
on
the
amount
of
growth
going
forward.
D
Moving
on
in
the
next
paragraph,
it
says
overall
be
forecast
that
jobs
growth
will
be
at
while
average
0.4
percent
per
year
from
17
to
thought
to
eat
so
ox
for
the
economics
on
their
own
calculations
and,
admittedly,
that
ten-year
period
is
what
they
have
used
to
calculate.
A
zero
point:
two
percent
growth.
Therefore
we
have
to
use
past
trends.
Then
there
could
be
an
argument
that
an
actual
fact
a
lower
level
of
growth
as
possible.
That's
not
what
the
council's
are
saying.
That's
just
an
example
of
the
impact
of
the
Train
base
forecast.
D
D
The
reason
why
we
are
confident
that
the
bots
for
the
economic
possession
of
650
is
reasonable
is
that
the
regional
economic
model,
which
did
say
on
806
jobs,
peon
annum
figure
and
as
master
Gomez,
pointed
out
that
that
included
quite
high
growth
and
health
care.
But
in
actual
fact,
what
that
showed
was
that
growth
in
the
public
services,
not
just
healthcare,
so
we
accept
that
the
New
York's
for
the
economic
Thea
and
indeed
the
all
decks
Oxford
economic
data
assured
quite
significant
growth
in
health
care.
D
That's
really
just
linked
to
the
growing
and
aging
population,
which
is
something
that
we
accept
will
happen,
however,
much
more
widely
than
that.
It
was
the
public
services
sector
which
will
include
such
such
set
as
as
public
administration
and
defense,
and
that's
the
reason
why
the
council
rejected
that,
because,
frankly,
it
has
not
come
to
fruition
and
it's
unlikely
to
come
to
with
significant
increases
in
the
public
service
and
administration
administration
services.
D
Further
to
that,
the
rain
forecast
also
included
a
law
rate
of
growth
within
the
professional
and
other
services
to
the
Oxford
Economics
growth,
therefore,
that
much
more
closely
aligned
with
the
Combs
was
economic
strategy
and
increasing
higher
value
jobs.
So
it's
not
just
all
about
the
numbers.
It's
just
about
the
type
of
jobs
which
are
being
created
as
well,
and
that's
why
the
council
decided
to
go
worth
scenario
to
within
the
Oxford
economic
forecasts.
K
K
Also
said,
the
fundamental
difference
in
the
remm
that
was
sensitivity
tested
in
the
ELR
2017,
which
is
sd0
63.
Whilst
it
was
the
overall
growth,
was
higher
at
806
jobs
per
annum.
As
we've
said,
that
model
anticipated
a
greater
expansion
of
social
and
healthcare
jobs
where
the
areas
we've
said
was
more
consistent
size
for
public
service
jobs,
with
the
majority
of
the
growth
in
care
offset
by
the
decline
in
wider
public
service
jobs.
K
B
And
it
was,
it
was
also
pointed
out
that
Oh
suggested
that
the
OE
report
was
looking
at
an
increase
in
commuting
and
that's
not
actually
accurate.
If
you
look
at
the
last
paragraph
on
page
22,
above
figure
16,
it
says
net
commuting
into
York
the
resident
employment
rate
forecast
to
rise
the
slightly
faster
pace
in
that
scenario,
as
population
does
not
change.
This
can
suggest
that
the
jobs
will
be
filled
by
residents
and
commuters
rather
than
an
increase
in
migration.
I
doesn't
say
it
will.
K
Sorry,
yes,
just
in
relation
to
balance
in
land
requirements
in
terms
of
the
plan
is
obviously
trying
to
provide
sufficient
employment
land
to
meet
the
650
jobs
per
annum
figure.
That
was
in
the
Oxford
Economics
2015
worker,
said
Stefan
as
sensitivity
tested
in
the
2017
work
and
is
also
seeking
to
balance
that
by
providing
sufficient
housing
lund
to
meet
the
oin
requirement.
L
Thank
you,
sir.
Just
a
quick
point
when
this
may
cross
over
with
matters
later
on
the
agenda.
I
think
it's
worth
mentioning
it
here,
I
think
we
would
all
agree
that
it
is
important
to
establish
the
correct
household
requirement
as
a
figure
that
does
not
meet
the
five
of
the
housing
needs
of
the
district
and
they
counsel
them
as
employment
aspirations
will
not
result
in
a
permanent
Greenbelt,
and
we
are
here
today
or
during
these
sessions
to
establish
for
the
first
time
a
permanent
green
belt
in
this
regard.
L
I
know
that
if
the
plan
is
found
to
be
sound,
it
will
need
to
be
reviewed
within
five
years
and,
as
mr.
Goode
says,
potentially
sooner,
and
this
will
bring
him
to
play
the
standard
method
and
if
the
standard
method
is
employed
today
you
would
give
a
has
requirement
of
1070
dwellings
Planum.
This
figure
is
just
under
300
dwellings,
but
Anna
and
I'm
higher
than
the
has
a
requirement
imposed
by
the
Council
of
790.
L
The
Greenbelt
will
therefore
need
to
be
reviewed
early
and
it
cannot
be
said
to
be
permanent
in
the
context
of
the
MPP
F,
and
it
must
surely
cast
out,
sir,
on
the
soundness
of
the
counselors
approach
to
the
housing
requirement.
Put
forward,
that's
made
even
worse
by
the
fact
the
council
have
not
identified
any
safeguarded
land.
Thank
you,
sir.
H
Thank
you,
sir,
hopefully,
to
relatively
straight
observations.
I
may
respond
to
that
and
the
council's
answers,
then
I
guess
just
on
the
population
inputs
and
projections.
I
guess
a
few
years.
It's
a
question
to
the
council
really
that
clearly,
migration
is
an
important
factor
here.
We've
heard
that
the
council
has
satisfied
themselves
that
they
think
the
2016
population
jayson's
are
robust
and
preferred
I.
Just
my
observation
and
I
could
be
wrong
on
this.
H
The
thinking
around
the
2016
projection
of
being
appropriate
in
York
on
I
would
draw
your
attention
back
to
that
2016
addendum,
which,
at
the
time
of
paragraph
1.1,
to
highlight
that
there
was
a
belief
that
the
university
was
prospects
for
future
growth
was
weaker
than
in
the
previous
decade,
and
that
was
why
they
were
flagging
up
there.
The
2014
projections
might
be
a
little
high
on.
H
H
Clearly,
my
understanding
now
is
that
the
council
has
conceded
or
recognized
that
the
evidence
it
was
relying
on
these
realities
really
dated
in
terms
the
economic
forecast.
Hence
why
we
see
a
new
report
put
in
front
of
you
I'm
not
clear
as
to
exactly
how
and
why
Oxford
II
cannot
I
guess
the
parameters
that
Oxford
Economics
were
asked
to
look
at
the
evidence
base.
It
seems
to
be
I,
think
you've
heard
from
the
council
there
to
validate
or
check
that
the
650
is
is
right.
H
It's
not
clear
the
extent
to
which
and
I
think
it's
a
point
made
by
mr.
Robbins
earlier
that
this
has
actually
looked
at
a
refreshed
view
of
the
economic
context
of
York
and
particularly
plans
for
investment,
growth,
etc.
You've
just
heard
reference
to
the
fact
reassurance
that
it's
taken
into
account
York
Central
and
the
amount
coin
at
this
velocity
quickly
in
terms
of
this
paper.
H
But
the
reference
to
York
Central
is
above
figure,
7
I,
think
in
that
paper,
and
it
talks
about
the
fact
that
construction
that
it's
validating
the
fact
that
construction
jobs
are
modestly
forecast
to
grow,
I,
think
by
355
jobs,
and
he
then
says
well.
York
Central
could
lead
to
more
construction
jobs,
I.
Think
if
you
go
to
figure
16,
though,
in
that
paper.
H
There's
very
limited
change
in
if
any
in
terms
of
the
construction
sector,
their
forecasts,
so
it
seems
very
modest
change.
If
that's
the
impact
of
York,
central
and
I
think
I
would
just
come
in
again.
Is
that?
Has
the
council
satisfied
itself
that
Oxford
economics
were
given
the
parameters
of
the
brief
they
were
said?
M
Our
membership
regularly
telling
us
that
repeated
struggles
to
recruit
locally
and
increasingly
stuff
having
to
travel
further
in
order
to
to
work
in
York
and
find
jobs
and
and
also
that
space
is,
is
lucky
in
terms
of
employment
land
for
for
growth,
and
this
is
causing
some
of
our
members
to
choose
to
locate
elsewhere
or
to
constrain
their
growth
in
York.
So
I
think
what
we've
been
hearing.
From
our
point
of
view.
We
really
do
endorse
a
more
ambitious
strategy
for
York
and
I,
particularly
endorse
the
comments
that
mr.
M
N
A
N
You
very
much
the
I'll
be
brief,
but
mr.
Alvin
earlier
referred
to.
He
said
you
don't
listen
to
what
we're
saying,
because
we're
trying
to
ditch
I'm
paraphrasing
here
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
don't
listen
to
us
for
trying
to
ditch
the
transition
Arrangements
under
2016
projections,
we're
not
trying
to
diss
transitional
arrangements
at
all
were
simply
but
we're
saying,
they're
being
wrongly
used
and
wrongly
applied
and
in
terms
of
the
AE
all.
N
It
also
went
on
to
say
that
we're
trying
to
ditch
that
in
order
to
drive
up
the
numbers,
but
of
course
we're
trying
to
drive
up
the
numbers,
because
that's
exactly
what
national
policy
encourages
to
do.
I
mean
paragraph
47
of
the
MPP
F
at
2012
is
far
more
explicit
than
the
2019
MPP
F
to
boost
significantly
the
supply
of
of
housing.
There
now
infamous
party
paragraph
47
quote
that
is
it
almost
a
quote
in
every
in
every
housing
inquiry
you
dealt
with,
so
we
are
trying
to
meet
that
government
agenda.
N
So
it
seems
to
me,
on
the
one
hand,
you've
got
to
assess
its
technical
exercise
as
to
what
the
Hawaiian
should
be
and
based
on
the
information
very
interesting
information
you've
been
hearing
here
today,
but
then
you've
got
to
overlay
that,
with
the
overarching
policy
objective
of
the
government,
to
drive
up
housing
delivery
and
is
the
number
that's
been
arrived
at?
Is
it
achieving
that
overarching
national
government
objective
of
driving
up
housing
delivery,
particularly
in
an
area
which
is
all
parties
except
has
one
of
the
some
of
the
least
affordable
health?
N
So
I
would
simply
make
that
point
that
that
the
over
aren't
you
you,
you
arrive
at
a
figure,
but
you
it
is
it
actually
achieving
that
overarching
aim
and
I.
Think
the
balance
of
doubt
is
that
if,
if
there
is
any
doubt
that
it
is
too
low
and
that
the
figure
arriver
is
not
achieving
that
overarching
objective,
then
you
should
earn
the
soil
that
side
of
caution
and
look
at
the
higher
numbers.
A
A
N
Right:
okay!
Well
then,
that
case
I
would
like
to
just
draw
some
key
fritters
to
your
attention.
Very
briefly,
it's
already
been
raised,
but
using
the
council's
figures,
I
know,
there's
been
some
debate
about
the
government's
figures,
but
using
the
counsels
figures
straight
in
our
paper
and
stripping
out
student
completions
and
using
the
790
figure,
the
shortfall
since
2012
13
over
the
last
seven
years.
The
shortfall
is
1761
dwellings.
N
If
you
look
at
the
using
standard
method
figure
the
1070
requirement,
the
shortfall
is,
as
you
can
imagine,
much
higher
at
303.
If
you've
got
again
plot
applying
to
1070
figure
from
2012,
the
shortfall
is
3721
darlings,
which
would
mean
you
have
to
add
an
extra
two
hundred
thirty-two
dwellings
a
year.
The
deal
when
did
you
do
a
and
to
meet
that
shortfall,
so
I
think
they're,
quite
dramatic
additions
to
the
housing
requirement
compared
to
what
they
council,
as
in
its
paper.
My
final
point
on
education-
my
colleague,
mrs.
N
O'neill,
will
be
here
next
week
on
matter
three
and
we'll
deal
with
the
university's
plans,
but
I
can
tell
you
that
today
the
University
will
be
submitting
a
statement
of
common
ground
to
the
council
outlining
its
up,
updated
growth
projections
and
if
the
growth
projection.
If
the
higher
end
of
that
growth
projections
are
realized,
they
could
be
looking
at
an
extra
2,000
jobs
in
the
plan
period.
A
N
Sir
gate
is
being
submitted
today,
it's
a
statement
being
submitted
today,
and
it
will
outline
the
updated
growth
plans
for
the
University
of
York,
which,
at
the
upper
end,
if
the
growth
ambitions
are
realized
could
result
in
an
extra
2,000
jobs
compared
to
table
figure.
14
of
the
OE
paper,
which
looks
at
a
decline
of
jobs
in
the
education
sector.
N
A
O
Be
brief
just
to
return
to
a
point
I
made
before
and
we
have
been
supplied
by
updated
completion
figures
from
from
the
council
when
we
made
our
supplementary
submission,
and
the
point
I
made
earlier
was
the
the
rate
of
house
price
increase
and
therefore
unaffordability
in
York
has
still
run
at
50
percent
of
both
the
regional
average.
Even
though
they
output
and
completions
have
gone
up,
it
has
made
no
difference
to
the
rate
of
house
price
on
affordability.
O
In
your
number
point
number
one
and
two:
we
are
talking
about
employment
trends
entirely
in
terms
of
statistics,
two
trends
which
are
relevant
to
this
debate
and
particularly
to
what
we're
going
to
talk
about
this
afternoon.
There
are
23,000
jobs
in
New
York,
which
are
below
the
national
living
wage
and
between
2017
and
2018.
P
My
starting
point,
sir,
is
the
is
this
go
back
to
where
almost
started
this
morning?
Is
the
2016
base
against
the
2014
base
and
whether
there
has
been
some
implication
for
the
government
that
the
2016
base
are
unreliable
and
sir,
can
I?
Take
you
to
a
document
which
a
government
document
which
hasn't
identity
refer
to
up
to
now,
which
is
the
government
response,
the
technical
consultation
or
not
dates
to
national
planning
policy
and
guidance,
and
this
page
seven.
P
If
I
could
just
read
the
quote
to
you:
they
the
changes
to
underlying
assumptions
in
the
population
projections
and
methodological
improvements
to
household
in
projections.
I
emphasize
the
word.
This
is
the
government's
view.
The
improvements
had
led
to
significant
variations
in
housing
need
at
a
local
level,
something
that
needs
addressing
in
the
short
term.
For
the
avoidance
of
doubt,
the
government
is
clear
that
this
does
not
mean
that
he
doubts
the
methodological
basis
of
the
2016
based
household
projections.
P
P
So
we
then
come
to
the
questions
and
I
was
going
to
refer
to
the
2018
based
national
projections
because
they
tend
to
support
the
2016
based
figures
and,
of
course,
you'll.
Be
aware
that
those
figures
for
the
reasons
which
are
tier
Hearn
have
given.
You
will
eventually
end
up
in
sub-national
household
projections,
which
maybe
even
be
out
for
you
find
issue.
You
report,
sir
may
or
may
not
err,
but
the
importance
of
that
is
they
emphasize
the
trends
which
we
see
in
the
2016
based.
P
We
see
the
trend
towards
lower
longevity,
that
is
people
dying
earlier
than
previously
anticipated
in
the
2014
based
projections,
and
that
has
a
major
implication
for
the
same
reasons:
GL
/,
GL
Hearn
said
on
households,
number
of
households
at
the
end
of
the
plan
period
and
just
to
be
clear.
They
are
also
forecasting
lower
international
migration
compared
to
2014
based
projections.
P
We
say
so
that
the
what
they've
actually
done
is
their
decision
isn't
isn't
based
upon
local
factors
and
you've
heard
much
discussion
about
that.
I
won't
go
into
that
anymore.
Well,
we
we
say
that
what
they
in
effect
have
done
is
increase.
It
they've
increased
the
H
hours
to
provide
greater
affordability,
and
we
say
so
that
isn't
that
isn't
the
right
place
to
do
that
hit
the
right
place
to
do
that
is
through
the
market.
Signals
adjustment
and
to
have
both
in
the
same
calculation
is,
is,
in
effect,
double
counting.
P
Just
going
to
the
employment
led
figure,
I
would
emphasize
to
you
that
any
employment
projection
is
all
employment
projections,
wherever
whatever
their
source
are
notoriously
unreliable
and
is
you
shouldn't
be
basing
the
whole
of
the
oen
on
an
employment
on
an
employment
figure
and
the
dangers
are
doing
this
earlier.
I
think
are
quite
clear
if
you
look
at
our
DRS
s,
employment
projections,
so
I
got
the
right
wrong
note
to
that
and
the
RSS
employment
projections.
P
So
we
think
that
you
have
to
agree.
It
makes
a
there
should
be
a
degree
skepticism
about
any
any
figure,
and
so
in
relation
to
the
latest
paper.
I've
looked
at
this
obviously
I.
Don't
you
see
this
drew
in
the
hearing
session?
I
would
like
the
opportunity
to
go
away
and
look
at
it.
I've
got
questions
about
this.