Cloud Native Computing Foundation KubeCon + CloudNativeCon Europe 2022, 1 Jun 2022

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From YouTube: A Treasure Map of Hacking (and Defending) Kubernetes - Andrew Martin, ControlPlane

Description

Don’t miss out! Join us at our upcoming hybrid event: KubeCon + CloudNativeCon North America 2022 from October 24-28 in Detroit (and online!). Learn more at https://kubecon.io. The conference features presentations from developers and end users of Kubernetes, Prometheus, Envoy, and all of the other CNCF-hosted projects.

A Treasure Map of Hacking (and Defending) Kubernetes - Andrew Martin, ControlPlane

In this ultimate guide to threat-driven defence, we threat model Kubernetes and detail how to attack and defend your precious clusters from nefarious adversaries. This broad and detailed appraisal of end-to-end cluster security teaches you how to defend against a range of historical and current CVEs, misconfigurations, and advanced attacks: - See the historical relevance of CVEs and demonstrations of attacks against your containers, pods, supply chain, network, storage, policy, and wider organisation - Understand when to use next-generation runtimes like gVisor, firecracker, and Kata Containers - Delve into workload identity and advanced runtime hardening - Consider the trust boundaries in soft- and hard-multitenant systems to appraise and limit the effects of compromise - Learn to navigate the choppy waters of advanced Kubernetes security.

A

Okay, hello and welcome to that there's still space. Incidentally, there's probably another 20 seats. If you want to let a few more people in okay, we'll see how we go hello and welcome. Thank you very much for coming to this talk. This is one of the most packed rooms. I've ever delivered to really appreciate you attending when there's so many other high quality talks going on in this slot.

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Thank you. I will do my best to complete everything in 35 minutes, so I am andy. I'm ceo at control plane. We do cloud native security engineering, we're very heavily invested in training, the community work in tag security and everything to do with cncf, open, sf, open source very proud advocates.

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I have done various things. I've written a book which you will hear a little bit about today. uh There is a sans course involved. My excellent colleagues also participate in a lot of training and we'll see links to those things too, and this is my pre-eminent co-author, mr michael hassenblast solutions, architect at aws and together we wrote to the book hacking kubernetes.

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It is available as a free download, the first half as a pdf on the control plane website, and I will give you a whistle stop tour of what we have inside it. So what will we talk about today? Well, it's just a lot of demos and I will do my best to ensure they all work. I'm wired in the demo gods at least don't have the ethereal wi-fi to contend with so we'll start off.

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Looking at how the supply chain gets us into a cluster, we will look at what to do once we're inside a cluster, we'll demo a container breakouts by kernel exploitation in the dirty pipe, and we will look at how to take over a cloud account.

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There is so much prior art in this space. Thank you to everybody who has participated, open sourced, spoken written about these things. We stand on the shoulders of giants, and these are just a few of the luminaries who have inspired me and my colleagues to go on this journey.

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So what happens when kubernetes gets deployed? The security team, normally panic, and that's because somebody like captain hash jack, is all up in their clusters. Captain hashtag is our eight bit adversary, we're going to threat model and attack on these clusters. This is the person who we're terrified of in this instance, but this this talk is called a treasure map. Why is there a treasure map involved? Well, this is because, from the inside of a pod, this is what you might want to look at to try and break out.

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This is a guide to how we manually pen test pods, it's the microcosm of linux inside a container there's nothing here that is not publicly documented or well known, but helping to enumerate the ideas, as we think about exactly where we go from point to point in order to break out of a container looking for misconfiguration looking for vulnerabilities looking for anything that can allow us lateral movement or pivoting or a way to further our attack.

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Okay. So before we begin for any sensible system, we look to implement controls to defend against our attackers. Who are our attackers is the important question in this case. We will model with uh with captain hashtag.

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Why is this well? First of all, we want to understand what are their capabilities. What potentially could they do to us and, by extension, what are their intentions? Why would they want to do these things? This is a process of threat modelling. It is a personal passion and crusade of mine to ensure that threat, modeling becomes part of the infrastructure deployments process. We've seen this in application security, where it's a more established process.

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If this is of interest to you tag, security are doing a lot of work in this space when we tag security, uh when a project goes to graduation in the cncf, it undergoes an audit from tag security, and we look at the security processes.

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What's it supposed to do what happens in the case of compromise, which makes it easier to deploy controls and I'll, give you a whistle stop tour of what that looks like if you're interested there is plenty of work going on and we're a very open and welcoming community plenty more on the website, so the adversarial matrix, if somebody's going to attack us, who are they, what do they want and how will they do it.

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So we start off with a casual vandal script. Kitty me as a younger version of myself, perhaps just interested to know what happens when you port, scan restricted ranges and find open, insecure things and may not be a malicious intent, but there may be malicious side effects from misunderstanding or general tinkering generally.

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We should not get pwned by somebody of this description, because if there is a public cve available for it or metasploits or another security tool, is able to run an automated scan and exploit it well, we should be doing that ourselves to ensure that no drive by attacker has easy access to our systems.

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We have motivated individuals, but, as we progress we're more concerned with insiders, a finger in the air guess is about every 40 000 employees for a major organization has at least one insider working for another organization, another nation state. Potentially things get worse when we look at cloud services, insiders, of course, because we have to trust something, we trust our operating systems. We trust the providers of the public certificates that we look at for our uh for our roots, difficult authorities for internet encryption, our tls, etc. We trust our hardware providers.

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We have to trust our cloud services providers to some extent and we've seen in cases like the capital one breach that inside information can lead to a more uh devastating impact for customers.

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But what we're actually caring about here in captain hashtag's case is the organized crime syndicate potentially state affiliated sponsored, but not directly linked these individuals or groups have very wide ranging capabilities. We've seen a lot of ransomware kick off in the last few years. Cyber insurance has become very expensive because these groups are talented, they're targeted, but they will use drive by attacks. So we do have the ability to raise the bar and ensure that we test our configuration and do not get pwned right so into demos.

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Very soon, attackers think in graphs defenders thinking lists. What does this mean? Well, a defender has to tick every single line on their checklist to make sure that there is no in the armor, no vulnerability, no open door in the castle, whereas an attacker just has to pivot through various things: they'd land somewhere, they observe the visible horizon and they go for the next thing. It doesn't work. The next thing. Maybe the third thing works.

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It's another foot forward into the system, so we have to be mindful that there is a different mindset from an attacking and defending perspective. This is where we get to attack trees. These give us a view of how we might pivot through a system and then, by extension, they give us an opportunity to cut the branches of the tree with specific controls that give us a visual representation of the security of our system or the supposed security of our system.

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This is one from the financial services user group. Again we do this for o'reilly. There's a lot of open source material around this. My excellent colleague, lewis, stellenperry, did a fabulous talk on this yesterday, strongly recommended to go back and watch. It was one of the most funny and insightful talks on threat, modeling, it's possible to give and it's a very strong recommend.

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So how do we do cloud native security threat models are great, but it's time to get our hands dirty.

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Let's rock and roll okay, so code to cloud attack patterns. This is from the kubernetes documentation. We begin with the code. This is where our business value is delivered. This is what developers change frequently. This is where remote code execution might occur. If we have a web facing sockets. If we have a web server with either serving some static code or serving some dynamic application, there is the opportunity for untrusted code to execute in the context of our process, we're running a process in a container. If we receive data from externally, that's not handled correctly.

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We get a remote code. Execution we've seen this in various different flavors log 4j, the log for shell attack classic remote code execution, passing a string executed in a context that was unexpected by the server security side effect. So the first thing we need to do is get a remote code execution. Now there is another way to do this, and that is the supply chain. We've heard so much about why the supply chain is dangerous, but let's exploit it quickly. So everything is software. Supply chain explained like five.

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When we produce software, someone else consumes it and we have a chain of producers and consumers.

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This means that an open source software developer is implicitly part of the supply chain of all of our software, but anything that they consume is also part of the consumer producer transitive difficult to reasonable dependency graph. So what we're looking at here is bob alice bob charlie production.

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If we can insert malicious code into the dependency graph of a supply chain, we can run our own code on someone else's hardware on someone else's kubernetes cluster. Very specifically, how do we attack? Well? We can do it in lots of different ways. We can get a source code, we can affect a supplier which is a very popular way of doing things recently, especially when we see things like octa. Another supply chain attack where, in that case, a help desk provider was the one compromised or we get into the runtime environment.

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Oh wonderful, that's! uh Let's try that again.

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mmm I seem to have lost control of ah rat bags.

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Oh wonderful, everything's frozen, so this will be an interesting reboot. I will continue from my phone while I restart the machine.

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Okay, so just in time for the supply chain. So what we're going to see in this next demo is mpm the javascript registry. What we have there is many small decomposed packages java pushes this idea, because sorry javascript pushes this idea, because the decomposition of packages is supposed to be an easy way to build and reuse code.

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He says just going to reset this again. What this means is that we have, maybe you could get the slides off and we can try that way. What this means with npm is that we have a huge proliferation of open source packages. Now, specifically with the npm installed json the package json, we have the ability to do a pre-commit hook.

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That pre-commit hook allows us to execute code in this case. What that code will do is what that code will do is enumerate the contents of our local file system. When we're installing a package we are installing, with the permissions of the user, that is doing the execution. So in this case this will be me.

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And what that means is that the contents of my local file system are available. Wonderful.

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112., so the contents of the local file system are available for enumeration for anything that can execute in that environment. This is awfully good fun, uh so.

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Oh, that's not the right password for this machine.

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So what do I have in my local environment that would be of interest to an attacker? This would also be interesting. Okay, that's got the right configuration up. uh Those things include my ssh keys, my gpg keys, any aws or g cloud tokens I have if I'm using oauth or an odc.

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I get a session token that is also stored on my local file system.

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And that is what the demo will look like ever so shortly.

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And if we go into.

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That is in here.

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Okay, this looks like we might almost be there.

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Okay, so what we are about to see is.

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And npm supply chain attack. uh That's not it.

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Wowzers: okay: we are there so.

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All right, I think, maybe possibly this will work the demo gods man. I feel they crucified me this time all right. So what are we going to do? Let's have a look at the package.json package.json.

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Okay. Here we see our scripts pre-install exfil. The danger here, of course, is potentially exfiltration. Let's do an npm install of this package, I'm not hosting this on the public registry, of course, because it would be taken down what happens.

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uh What exactly happens there?

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Something is not on the registry. What have I done.

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Oh sorry install here, not I okay. Finally, so this is now executing my pre-commit hook. If I pull this down without reading the source code, we're essentially piping to bash- and at this point I've enumerated the contents of my local file system. These are ssh keys. I could install miners okay and, with this timing, I'm going to move on a little bit quickly. So what just happens I hear you ask?

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uh I want to go to.

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We pulled something from a public registry, we didn't read the source code before installing it and it was able to execute its own untrusted code in the context of our application.

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It must have been this slide, okay, so that was what I was explaining right. So we ran this backdoor open source package, pre-installed hooked, abuser's, privilege profit. So what could this actually look like with, uh with an end to end like running this remote code execution down at the bottom? Here we have the malicious code into a target library, so we're talking about npm here, but we can do this for any operating sorry, any application package once that gets built into developer code and is running in our kubernetes clusters.

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We can fire a reverse shell, a reverse shell busts outwards through a firewall. So, instead of me sshinging onto a server, the server ssh is onto an open port that I have on a public ip somewhere, and this is when captain hash jack in his nefarious sailboat there is able to get access to our systems.

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So how do we fix this? Well, we probably want to have 2fa on every type of token that we use plain text. Credentials, of course, are easily reusable.

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We see these attacks more against crypto wallets because, of course, that's easily fungible, I guess or transferable value and signing provides some value there. Okay, so now we'll move on to the supply chain- reverse shell.

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This is the concrete example of the previous version, so captain jack wants to put his code into our dependencies and we get those running in production.

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This is the reverse shell idea, so we start with uh attacking the victim's machine we're running code in their context that they do not expect. We get a reverse tcp connection, so this busts outwards from a firewall. This is also the log4j problem. Unless our firewalls are monitoring or are restricted, which is not always the case or difficult to do, then we can get to a potentially unknown external location. This is a tcp version of the attack, there's a dns version as well.

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Of course, there are other slightly more nefarious ways to do it, but it's very difficult to block so similar to previous. We will use this malicious, backdoor image in a public container registry that will be run inside our cluster, and this will then fire the reverse shell, where we connect courtesy of duffy, one of the sig honk luminers.

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We will also exploit a misconfiguration in there to if we run this bust out and route, the node that the container is running on because, as you can see, we're using host pid and privileged, and this is why it is bad. Okay,.

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A

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Right so in uh in classic uh british blue peter style here is one I prepared earlier.

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You may not believe me by judging by the previous talents all right. So what are we going to do? First of all, we're going to bounce through a public endpoint called ngrok. So what we're doing here is we're getting a free ip on the public internet with the ports at the bottom. Here we see it's probably a little large at the bottom. Here we see a log of what's going on and at the top here we are going to run, which version will be on.

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I guess definitely more recent um we're going to run this so we'll run a reverse shell.

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This is the location of the ip and the port that we're going to fly back to the deal with reverse shells is that bash contains a virtual dev, tcp endpoint, which is really easy to hook a shell to and get this reverse shell action. It's probably one of the worst decisions in the history of of computing and at this point we're just going to deploy something malicious. So this will look a little bit like cool.

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Maybe it is the other one then or possibly I've got it.

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That is actually.

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Mm-Hmm: okay: let's try the other version of this lines right there.

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Sweet so that worked. What we're seeing here is the reverse shell catcher boom. That's a great relief cheers.

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Okay, so what we've seen there is: we've deployed this malicious image with a poorly configured security context, and this is bounced through that public ip back to me, standing waiting for it and I've now got a connection into this shell, sorry into that pod. So at this point uh running his route, obviously that's a horrendous idea. Are we privileged? Well? What's the contents of dev, we can see everything so uh at this point we can escalate mount the host file system uh use an nscenter attack.

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uh Let's just have a look at that quickly, so ella center is the namespace enter. Everything in uh in linux terms is the namespace and we're gonna jump in, and at this point we can now see uh the contents of roots on the host, because we've mounted in he says.

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Yes, there we go so that's the host file system and we can also see the host process table. Wonderful, those are all things we should never be able to see from inside a container, but of course, because we've entered those host name spaces, we've broken the abstraction all right, let's keep on moving.

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So what did we just see.

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We saw that malicious image that was pushed into a public location was then used to run in production when it ran it fired that remote reverse shell back to a place that I controlled, and that gave me access to the pod from externally. At that point again, it's observing the visible horizon escalating continuing to see are there data stores? Is there private information? Are there keys?

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Are there quant algorithms that I can steal it's a bad day when someone has that initial foothold, the remote code execution inside your systems, because then more nefarious things can happen? Okay, so if that wasn't stressful enough, we will now try a kernel exploit it's not a container escape it's a process that wants to be free.

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Courtesy of another sick, honk, luminary, okay, so what is a container escape on a container? We're sharing a kernel, a virtual machine, bootstraps, the bios, it emulates, the full end-to-end bootstrap of a system, which is why it's slower.

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It's also a different security model, because it's using things like hardware, extensions and it traps instructions that go down to the cpu and handles them slightly differently, depending on context. It can be more secure. There have been escapes from everything and nothing is entirely secure.

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The compromise we make with a container is that, in order to run very quickly and to bin pack many containers onto one host, we start a process on a running kernel, so we're sharing a single kernel amongst all the processes on a host. This allows us to start very quickly, but it changes our security model and, as we see in this case, those host resources should be protected. They shouldn't be available. The point of containerization or virtualization is to abstract those away and not make them available.

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Now many people have said containers are not a security boundary. Well, many things are not a security boundary, but in real world practical use that is, unfortunately what we find ourselves with.

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So, while they're not a security boundary safe for maybe the very highest level of data classification, they can certainly be more secure than vms because we run a single process per container and then we have the opportunity to run granular fine-grained process restriction, controls, setcomp, app, armor, sd linux, our standard suite of capabilities that come with linux and the extended controls that come with linux.

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Instead of running everything in one monolithic, virtual machine, everything is down to use case and configuration micro vms provide an intermediate version of this, where we get some level of hardware abstraction, with a very fast boot up and still oci compliance.

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This is a list of recent container vulnerability escapes. It's been a busy year, courtesy of chris nova. Again, this is where the contention lies. The kernel is not a security boundary, but then really the cpu is not a security boundary. As we've seen, are we going to just decompose everything onto uh onto computers under people's desks like we used to do? No, we still have to move with the time, so there is some difference here.

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This is the view of namespaces. I won't go into this too much more, but suffice to say we are sharing a local network between our container workloads and a pod. The c groups mount and process name spaces should be individual, but then we get to share storage network and a couple of other things plenty more on this. In the book c groups v2 come with some better security features.

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They work in a different way to see groups, v1, they're really hyper complex, but provide a lot of utility, see v1, very escapable so on to dirty pipe. This is the cv that was dropped with about a week's notice, which is not much time for people to patch systems.

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It is a dirty page vulnerability, so that means it permits the injection of code into processed memory that is owned by roots, so an untrusted user can scribble some instructions, stick them into a piece of code. The root is going to run executable memory and root will run those things if the code that we stick in there is another reverse shell. Back to where we're sitting on the same box, we have root access to the box by virtue of this escape.

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It's got a specific nuance of foible, which is you can't write the first few bites. So what this exploit does? Courtesy of my friend and colleague, james cleverley, promise is exploit. The proc self exe attack writes a small piece of assembler to build assembly to build something smaller than 4k, which fires this reverse shell. Back, okay, let's break out of a container.

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So this is all virtual machine based, let's just oh sorry, one second.

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Let's get out of there.

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Okay, so, as you see, we will hmm okay. This is actually provisioning a vagrant box, so that might take one second, because uh this reverse shell concept is kind of fundamental to a lot of a lot of attacks, because it's really very useful.

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What we're doing is we start the container we open our socket waiting as the unprivileged user for root to connect back to our reverse shell, but instead of going across the internet, we're just using the primary network adapter of the host- and this is because, in this case, we're not firewalling the or we're not using okay, we're not preventing network traffic between the container network across the container bridge onto the primary adapter of the host.

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Sweet right, so what have we got here?

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uh First of all, let's check the kernel version, we're on a vulnerable kernel, excellent, let's go and have a look at what we've actually got in terms of code.

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We have uh the run c small dot, madam so, ultimately, here we are using the elf header and we'll ignore most of this. But what we care about here is this: is our good old, reverse shell, we're going to insert this base64 code into the run c binary on base64, and it looks like that uh two to five dev tcp and we've got that same reverse shell again and uh and with any luck off we go okay. So we have built the thing and now check who we are.

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We are vagrant an unprivileged user and let's run this okay, so we're now listening.

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We have executed and I will just check that it runs into me. Oh there we go wonderful, so we're now roots. So what's happened. There is by running this exploit and injecting this code. We've fired that reverse shell. Back and interestingly, it's dumped us into the file system location that the mount namespace was mounted from so, of course, on a container and the processes inside it have to exist on the host we're running on a shared kernel, but we paint this picture for the container.

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That says, you can only see what the colonel wants you to see in this case you're the only special process running on the host here. Now that we've broken out, we can see that the abstraction has been shattered and we dropped into the container the runtime location, where this image is, and we can see the contents of the uh of the image itself.

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What is the where? Perhaps?

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What is the upshot of this? Well at this point? We have got access to, for example, the cubelets, and we can we can root the whole system. So the idea here really is to use the container cloud native paradigm of constantly rebuilding having fast deployment pipelines and using our ci cd to ensure that we're always on the latest image. But this is a kernel vulnerability. So it's in the host system is the same thing.

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Our ami bakery or our vm golden image should have a well oiled pipeline so that we can ship patches as soon as they arrive in this case as quickly as is necessary. Okay, so we are now out on the host we've broken out of a container and we sat on the host file system. What do we want to do next? Attack? The cubelets here is a high-level view.

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We can see that various things from the node root are exposed into the the node user and by that we're talking about the workload that's running there. So what do we see? Well, we've got completed, runtime the storage, the orchestrator injected environment variables and the sequencing config maps. Now again, everything that's mounted into the container must exist on the host and one of those things is secrets.

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When secrets are pulled from the cube from the kubernetes api by the cubelet, the api will verify that the node is running the workload that is authorized to pull those secrets. You can't just enumerate everything as long as the node authorized plug-in is correctly configured, so in this case we are going to from the cubelet host. So we've routed the cubelet we'll enumerate the file system find out where the service accounts are and exploit the stolen service accounts.

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He says: let's get out of there.

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This is supposed to be set up beforehand. I apologize there. We go all right so.

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Let's make sure that everything is clean.

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That is how the sausage is made. Maybe I'll just finish it here.

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So in this case, we've already achieved an exploit of the host system, so, instead of reusing the same container, I'm just going to move into into the next system here and.

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Networking may be problematic we're getting there sweet, okay, we're there so.

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When I pen test systems, I drop in my own special set of uh tooling and that's where it is so. I've now got my my local, um my local shell. Configuration is now up in uh on this host, so I'm on a gke node I've routed the node, because we saw in the last attack that we can get out that way.

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So, let's just so all right, I'm root on the node we've had our reverse shell supply chain attack. We've attacked the kernel and broken out onto the host, so we're now on the kubler or the cubelet node. What can we do from here? Well, let's have a look at this alias.

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So what will this do? Okay, k secrets file system dump it looked invalid, cubelet pods everything for kubernetes, either volumes or projected volumes because bound service account tokens which are the new actually iterable way of attaching a claim to a service. Account token strongly recommended to use exist in these locations and then we'll have a look for things like namespace token or certs. Let's just have a look at what is in that directory that we're enumerating don't forget. We are the root user. The root user is omnipotent omniscient.

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They can do everything on the host because they must be able to debug turn things on and off as necessary, so we're exploiting something that is by design, but we're going under the covers. Let's see what's there, there are plenty of things, and it's not really that visible. So, let's try once more okay, so we can see that we've got lots of certificates and keys and all this kind of thing. But what are we actually looking for?

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Well, if we look for secrets that are mounted in that are not our back secrets, they are not service account tokens whoops. We have got potentially an undeployed thing.

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Let's just have a double check as to why that's not working.

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Okay, because the network went down at that point, okay, let's try that again. Okay, so we've got some aws keys that have magically appeared. Wonderful, thank you configuration okay. So what does this mean? This means that an operator, an automated operator or some process inside the cluster needs these keys. To do a thing. Maybe it's a special version of auto scaling. Maybe it's to run terraform, maybe it's to deploy us three buckets in an ad hoc fashion or some other uh crazy version of that. So what can we do with these?

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Well, potentially, we can escalate to the cloud accounts, so we're using those stolen service accounts, but in this case their service accounts for aws itself.

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Okay, so uh don't multi, multi-data classifications. This is my uh favorite view of cubelets.

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If we put data classification, if you put sensitive and unsensitive data on the same cluster, the unsensitive data will be less well secured in our threat model and if we can break out onto the host, we can potentially get access to the more sensitive data, so cloud account takeover. uh This is ultimately what happens. No uh operators were hurt in the making of this gif. What are we going to do we're going to exploit those stolen credentials?

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That's not the one! We want. Let's use this one okay, so we've got those credentials. What can we do with them? Let's get off those hosts, because we've now stolen them.

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Right we are going to phone. The aws account that those keys belong to, because why not? We've got access to them.

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Uh-Oh, this is a canary token. That means that the owner of this token has been notified. That this token, that was left like a honeypot in the cluster has been used. It should never be used because it's not a real token, but it's left there in order to tempt an attacker like captain hash jack, to enumerate and explore what it is all I've done. There is try and identify my caller identity. It's a simple call to understand.

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What's the name of this thing, could it give me further permissions instead of just brute forcing every permission set? I want to do a targeted check to see maybe it's s3 related. Maybe it's got ion permissions, but a canary token will go off like a christmas tree like an alarm bell. These are scattered across everything that I've ever touched.

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My infrastructure, my local machine, it's a way of making sure that, in the event of our preventative controls, failing or the things that we rely on and trust like the kernel like our cloud provider, if these things fail underneath us, we still have a detective element that allows us to understand that we've been breached.

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Okay, where am I okay? So what's next, there are lots and lots of different ways to be breached in a kubernetes system, from the application workloads all the way through the class configuration and deployment. Once again, this is where our pod attack map comes in handy by thinking about how we logically enumerate these things. We don't need to just run tooling, that's very loud and noisy. We can instead be more selective.

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Container security, tooling, will alarm or alert when unusual or um uh non-standard behavior. That's what I'm looking for uh it fires off so doing this in a more structured approach, is a more stealthy and silent way of doing it. This is what control plane do for a living if you're interested by these things do please come and talk to us and with that. Thank you very much for your attention.