Cloud Native Computing Foundation Notary Project, 6 Jul 2020

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From YouTube: CNCF Notary Project 2020-07-06

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CNCF Notary Project 2020-07-06

A

Hey folks, whoops, hey folks,.

B

Hey Steve, hey.

A

Yo Mar thanks for joining.

B

What do you have a cool background like that, and why do I not have a cool well.

A

That's actually exactly why that cuz I'm trying to look at the same pictures all the time, so I get a bunch on from Discovery Park over here.

A

Like how come everybody's in the same room but I, don't see them so we're good. Let's try.

B

I didn't turn my video on yet because I'm, like you, know not feeling the the white.

A

So just remind you add your name to our adverts.

C

To installing zoom client locally, due to security reasons, so whenever I see like the fancy backgrounds, I always think, okay, well, there's somebody who's likely. If all of the reporting is true to have a lot of security holes, just waiting to be poked.

A

Oh wow trust, like you quite filled out the agenda.

D

Yeah sorry, the whole.

A

Offer to take the hour, didn't you it's just to read!

A

D

I mean be careful what you wish for.

A

Is right, are you gonna join you, or did he leave this to you to cover I.

D

Don't know I guess let me try in the meantime we'll give it to.

A

Do the two more minutes of the proverbial five.

D

Yeah I think I think we might as well get started to be honest. Okay, cool so should I just go ahead and start yeah, whereas.

A

Yours go for it thanks great.

D

Thanks thanks T hi hi everyone, so so, as some of you may know, I'm Trish, shank I used to work on top and in toto at NYU, another grad student and now I'm security, engineer data dog, where I also put some distance to use, among other things, and today, I want to talk to you about our experience with key management. With this tool we call signee, which I'll explain in a bit for what it is, what it does and what yeah what it's for so, and we do this with no 3v1.

D

So what is seen at first of all, let me share my screen. Nothing will be useful.

D

Okay, great. Presumably everyone can see my screen, please yell at me, if you don't great so great, so C NAB should pull the actual repo here so see.

D

Now it stands for cloud native application, bundles and it's a way to basically specify the entirety of your app, which can be made of many docker images, for example, and it's a way to tell tell the scene at run time such as Porter, for example, how to install your application in different settings, but in the same way so, for example, Google Cloud or Amazon and IBM, and so on and so forth.

D

Microsoft, let's not forget, so that's the high level idea, and the key thing you need to know for this stock is that there is basically a bundled or JSON file that specifies your application. So, for example, where do you get credentials from TLS certificates and port numbers and what what images to the invocation images will tell their on time?

D

How to install your application and then the rest of the rest of the images can can tell the runtime what your applications are made of example, you could have a DBE or you could have Kafka yeah yeah, you get the idea so and for the purposes of our talk, what we're gonna talk about is how we sign these bundles. So you can think of so imagers.

D

You can think of images as sitting on a lower layer than the bundle which referred to this images right, and you may really use docker content, trust to do sign and and and and verify these images now. The key idea is that you can reuse the same technology to sign and verify your bundles right and potentially you may not even need to sign your images anymore now.

D

Yet now you have one bundle to refer to all of them, and so, if you do it properly, you can get all of this all of the signing for different images for free in one place, and so the good news is that I'm very pleased to say after months of work, the CNF security spec, which basically talks about using tough within Toto, was finalized. Last week, it's one 1.0 0.0, ga so I'm very, very pleased about that. A hard work from Raju and Rawls and others.

D

So so that's C, NAB security, that's C, NAB in a nutshell, which tells you how to install your bundle in the cloud. Your application, a cloud native law and CNF security is a way to sign and verify your bundles and signee is the tool that is the reference implementation to see. Nab security. Does that make sense everyone please? Let me know if you have questions before you go further, you guys.

A

Have had some fun with your names, I saw you guys. Yes,.

D

A

Nee yeah exactly.

D

Mascot, which Caroline came up with it's the crab exactly and and signee is a great name for explaining to that that Radu came out of it. I can't take credit for that.

D

Let me go back to the agenda to remind myself right. Ok, so we've talked about what scene app is: we've talked about what scene obscure it is, and now we know what sign is great, so what we call our Minimum Viable Product, and if you care you can read the entire spec, but the basic idea is that you can see it's very similar to what docker content already does what we call the Minimum, Viable Product, basically uses notary to sign for a bundle. It's the same old security model.

D

You've seen before you have this four rules. We don't have to worry about all of them. The thing that matters, the most is the so-called targets rule that distributes the hashes for your bundle in this case, which in turn will distribute the hashes I should mention the reason you don't necessarily need to sign your images, we'll talk about good reasons for signing for it, but the the bundle of Jason would contain the hashes for the images on you great and some of you may be wondering hold on.

D

If it's a bundled or Jason, it's not a docker image. I know how to stick in docker images and then in OCI registries. How do you? How do you upload a bundled adjacent to do a registry, excellent question?

D

People like Radu and Sylvie and others at docker, came up with this nice? It's called Sina registry spec came up with a nice way of reusing, OCI artifacts, it's a it's. It's a little bit of a hack at the moment, but I believe it does use the standard way to push an arbitrary file and you just have specified a media type. So that's!

D

What's wherever that's what's happening right now, we use a tool called seen at the OCI to push the bundle adjacent to to a registry, so you can get bundles and images in the same place, which is nice very nice for your runtime, because you can reuse the same same same idea. Basically same machinery, great, and so the next thing we should talk about is okay. So that's the MVP, nothing we haven't seen before in the wool of docker. Let's talk about an extension to the MVP.

D

It looks slightly more complicated, but hopefully it's not too frightening. It's just complicated it's all of this. So what we're doing in this case is okay. So what are we trying to do here exactly? Why is this so complicated? What we're trying to do is stick in so call s-bahn metadata, and it could be anything maybe any tool you want to use graph es metadata, let's say or in todo. In this case, the key idea is that you want to provide additional sign metadata. That tells you how the bundle was produced.

D

You can think of it as a software supply chain right now. So in this case, what the NVE gives you is that okay, somebody may be a human or a machine sign the hash for a bundle, great. What it doesn't tell you is who produced the bundle? A bundle itself is a very complicated file.

D

It's got a lot of fields in a lot of information in it and you can't get fine-grained information such as who, maybe you want to know things like well, who produces the so-called invocation or installation image who produced this other image was a machine? Did a machine produce the entire file or the developers produce some parts of it? You don't get any information with the MVP at all.

D

So that's what the extension then weepy does, and the key idea here is that we use something called delegations before I go into before I, throw this word around without defining it. Let me let me quickly show what I mean, because I've noticed that sometimes we use this term defining work delegation is a very simple idea. It's that so, okay, so without delegations, what would happen? Normally you use the targets role, and this role has the power to a role is a manner of machine.

D

It doesn't matter that the idea is that what is the responsibility of a role right that that's what we mean by normally? This role would have the power to sign everything, any bundle, any image whatever you need, and that may not be desirable, particularly if you're, if a machine is signing a bundle, for example, right or or everything about a bundle. So what do you do is split the responsibility even further and that's what delegations? Let you do so imagine that this is the target role.

D

We call it projects here, but we call it a target role and the targets are old, says: hey, look, I'm, not gonna, sign anything, but if you're looking for Django packages, let's say good Alex and here's a key right. That's all I know about it. I don't sign anything, but a delegation is simply a mapping of public keys to what sort of images or bundles or whatever arbitrary artifacts. Actually you just specify the namespace that they are allowed to sign so great.

D

So now you know there on time knows: oh I'm, looking for Django I, better go dr. L, it's great and I've got her keys too, which is nice. That is part of the power delegations. Actually is the decentralization of key management.

D

Okay, great and this role can also change the keys any time right and so Alice can further delegate the power and say: hey, look yeah I do I am responsible for Django packages, but if you're looking for Django packages that end with peridot GZ, let's see for Linux go ask Bob about it and here's this key right. This is roughly make sense. So far, it's basically a splitting of trust for a fine grain yeah. It's a fine graining of trust management and system.

D

Okay. So what we're? And what we're hoping to do here is that notice that we've delegated things to a roll call target, slash releases and I'm, just gonna call it release this from now on, because the whole name doesn't roll off the tongue, as you can imagine, but releases is the traditional role that docker itself lets you use today. Actually what you can do with docker right now is say: okay, yeah I've got a targets role, but I'm gonna.

D

Let a machine sign everything, so I'm, gonna, delegate everything to the Machine and if the machine he ever gets compromised, I can use the targets role key. Instead of the root roll key, which is presumably more difficult to get to, it has more power than the targets key, so you want to use a more friendly key. Shall we say to revoke the Machine key? So that's one thing you can do with docker content trust already, but here we're doing something more complicated.

D

You don't need to know the whole details of the whole thing, but what we're basically trying to do is say this immutable rules about the software supply chain that should be signed by offline keys, and that's why it's green here. Ok, that guy directly signed some immutable rules of the pipeline. Shall we say that cannot be changed, and so what the machine can do is sign all the other metadata that is safe for a machine to sign, because, basically, if the machine misbehaves, we can check using this immutable rules that we have fixed here.

D

I don't want to go into the details, but that's the high-level idea. The key takeaway here is that we can use delegation to safely split what a machine can or cannot sign. Does this make sense? So if human human developers always have the power to specify the most important things in the system and machine can only sign the least important bit, so even if someone breaks it, a machine, yeah you're, not you're, not gonna, lose sleep because he can eventually catch the machine.

D

Is there ok, and so that's the usefulness of delegation, sir great ah and I should talk about an example minimalist bomb again, I don't get into the details too much, but basically you can think of the pipeline is having two steps. You should really draw a nice picture for this, but basically this is a developer step where products are basically input and basically developers can sign everything under a bundle case all right. It's got all this metadata, so developers always have the ultimate power. Now.

D

What we're saying a machine can do is that a machine can add hashes about images to the bundle, but that is all it can do. That is the only s-bahn metadata that is allowed to produce and if it does something else funny, if it tries to change what developers produced, you can catch the machine misbehaving, which is a very powerful property to system. If you think about it, ok, so great, ok and sign is the reference. So ok, so and I promised some lessons. We learned when developing this reference implementation for scene app security.

D

What do we call funny? The first lesson is reusing he's darker already by default. Note 3 I should say by default already pushes the responsibility of the the so-called timestamp key to the server, which is great, and we simply added a very simple thing anyway say yep. You know, you know what the less keys we have to manage the better, so we're also pushing the snapshot key to the server in China. That's a very simple extension that we made. In fact, I ran through this problem with Phillips.

D

Today, I should mention Phillips research is writing their own tool called DCT no.3 admin, but he basically trying to do a lot the same thing but for docker content, trust they're, trying to make it simpler to use for the developers, so they were stuck at signing the snapshot. They were unaware that they had to sign the they had to provide the snapshot key password, and so that's one thing that I helped them so as of today morning.

D

This tool is also doing the same, not just sign that we basically pushed the time time and snapshot and you don't actually lose a lot of security. This way, this roles don't have the power to change by themselves, the hashes of images or buttons. So it's not unsafe to do and it increases usability a lot.

D

Another thing that we did for signee is that so doctor already reuses the the rookie right across images or repository, so something if you're, not unaware of if you're, not aware of, is that the the model that we have today with no 3v1 the docker content, trust v1? Is you basically have a separate, tough repository and we don't need to call it tough we'd be calling the metadata, basically a separate metadata, repository per image or per bundle or whatever artifact you care about uploading to the registry.

D

So this means that you have potentially have a lot of keys to manage, for example, the time time snapshot and we remove thinking about this by pushing both of these keys always to the to the registry.

D

Another thing we did is that we reuse the route and targets needs across the bosphorus, because if you are the same organization uploading all these different images to a registry, you really don't lose a lot of security by reusing the skiis. You you in fact increase usability. You don't have to manage so many keys anymore and we can split the if you're really concerned about security, you can you can have a different machine, signing key for every image. That's one thing you can do and we should give you an option right now.

D

We don't have it, but you can potentially do it: okay, great and so yeah. We need to one thing that I think we need to do is revisit the idea. Why no three needs right now. It does need it right and I, don't think it needs to be necessary. We don't need a separate metadata repository for OCI artifact.

D

It should we should think about trying to remove the burden of managing keys from end users and basically developers as much as possible, so they don't have to manage a separate root and vine stem and snapshot / / artifact. We really should do that. That is something we should think about, and lesson number two is using the power of delegations. I've discussed briefly.

D

What they are I talked about, how we plan to use them in our I, actually using them in signee right now, I should mention that notary Philips, basically also once to use delegations notary notary, actually has supports the full power of delegations behind the scenes.

D

It's just that the talker come on and Justin Carmack should feel free to correct me here, but as far as I've seen, it doesn't expose the full power of this delegation to the end-user and most basically gives you the target it's in the releases role, but that's it's in it's an either old model, but basically what people like Philips and finally want it's a way to let developers go on and then manage their own develop their their own delegations from there. So that's another lesson.

D

Let me let me show you a quick demo about what we've done so far. So I've got, let's hope things work then never work on live demos for some reason: carbonelli I'm, starting up the notary serving signer in my machine, I'm gonna show you what a typical signing and verification workflow looks like.

D

D

Okay, great and I know I've wrapped, so basically, I've got like a shortcut. A shortcut command here called signing sign and a very imaginative name, but basically I'm signing a test, bundle and I'm, pushing it to my local host registry here and I'm also note that I'm also adding in total metadata at the same time, I'm actually sticking it inside the tough targets metadata, which is a nice property of top, by the way, we're basically using tough as a trust, bootstrapping layer. You can think of it that way, we're transparently adding.

D

This is something that tough, in fact no tree, we want already. Let's you do this we're adding additional metadata, and this could be your a small metadata, we're saying here's the rules of the pipeline, and this is the way you catch up the machine with the haze. If your pipeline misbehaves and here all the s-bahn materials and here's a here's, a public key, you can use to verify the rules of the pipeline in the first place. That's what we're doing here you can see. We don't ask ask you to do worry about keys at all.

D

In fact, we're getting some key passwords from environment, environment variables we hadn't seen so it's basically treaties that you have to worry about the route, the targets and the releases role and as I mentioned before, we reuse these keys across reporters across artifacts for usability, and so verification will be the basically the same with much less information. Of course, we say what what bundle were interested in. You can see it stacked. Just like a docker image right. The two doesn't know any difference and we say but also verified in total metadata.

D

Now it actually bounced out here, which is not great, but this is actually a bug in our part, we're using a bad pipeline. That's not actually made for see that it's the test pipeline that we're using- and you really should have been doing this. But basically, if things just worked, it would have been a successful here and we're basically verifying that everything. The bundle was produced correctly.

D

Actually, we're actually working on a PR to fix this right now, but you can see with design the signing and verification processes to be as easy to use and as transparent as possible and for users not to think about all this low-level decisions, such as how do I manage my keys? We basically pick a sensible default, we're kind of apini that I guess that's the word for it, and if you want to do things differently, you can but the default is don't worry about it.

D

We think this will work for 80% of news lists yeah, and that's that's basically what I have to share in terms of demo and key ideas today key lessons. What I also want to say is that things that that Phillips wanted to talk about Marco, Frandsen, actually I, think from Philips research I got his name right are. They are very interested in no three. We do just like us at signee with C NAB security.

D

Both of us are working with extending no.3 v1. In the meantime, one thing that bored of us would like to see, in fact, if I don't have suffered from the same problem. This is something we should fix for no tree also is that there really should be abstract interfaces or API is for dealing with keys and where you read and write metadata from like we cannot assume a file system.

D

Well, cannot necessarily always assume a key value system and keys may be on disk or keys may be in Walt, or they could be in a hitch sense. We don't know, and we really should provide abstract interfaces to override all this and choose a particular back-end.

D

Another thing that both of us would like to see is very simple, one-click user interface for things like here on vacation right now, it's not clear how to do this, you might have to muck around with a command line, for example, but we would like to do is provide very convenient GUI, for example, to be able to do this. Something I should mention really quickly is that Phillips is looking for funding, so they were wondering where the CNC f can help here, but maybe that's not the right form. I just want to draw it out.

D

There I just wanted to say that basically, this interest from different communities such as seeing obscurity and Phillips to see some of this lessons that we have learned be incorporated into no 3v2. Another thing I want to mention before I stop talking is I, think it'll be very useful to have an EU and Asia friendly meeting time. Also I know it's difficult to find such a meeting time for everybody.

D

I think we should try, because I know that people like Harbor and Phillips and are all are interested, but they are unable to join anything right now. I think it'd be great if we could recruit them.

D

um That's it I'm, sorry, if I took more time than was planned for, but I hope that made some sort of sense and yeah. Let me know if you have questions.

A

That was great Chris run and for the time just because that's a quick one hit up we're experimenting with the OCI call and Wednesday's this week, actually with a different time which I'm forgetting what it is. But it was specifically to enable Europe and Asia.

B

Hey Sean, thanks for that this is Omar from AWS. I got a couple of questions. The first one is that these call-outs you just made on order ev2 like we, should ensure, let's say, for instance, that there's a abstract API for key management. We should make it easy from a GUI perspective. If you had a look at the scenarios dock on github and ensure that that's there or not there, that's.

D

A good question I remember: we sent we opened an issue about key management a long time ago. Let me pull it up, but that's a good question because I don't think of updated the scenarios documents in the meantime, let me try to pull up the the issue that we filed. The.

A

Key management, one is more of a I, think a requirement and it's an area where I think I'm not sure if we've written down well, but it's certainly a requirement. We're tracking a.

B

D

Aha there we go, there's here's something that Raju and I have had filed off a long time ago. I believe Justin Carmack commented a.

E

D

We did start a separate.

E

Dock for the management requirements that one just has like a bunch of questions at this point, we're gonna set up key management this week to kind of go over some of the additional use cases. I think these are all good for that duck.

B

Cool yeah, the basic call out is that while we're putting things online- and we have discussions and there's all these learnings that are coming from all of us right- different communities and different things that we've seen, that would be the place to dump our feedback for wonderful, better work. That's a PR! It's an amendment, however, so that when we go review that these are not lost right, that I was just wondering if we haven't done that we could or.

A

Yeah I mean I, think we've got this one captured here and this one's a little intertwined, because it's key management and tough as a like there's a separate one. We just want to make sure that every cloud provider and private instance of this registries and scenarios can actually use a specific, their specific key management solution right and then uh necessitates having.

B

An API in order to achieve that form specification perspective, fair.

A

B

That's what I'm.

A

Hoping Nia's and others will we'll work out the details there there's another layer on top of that, of how tough would go into that. So I think those are layers. Okay,.

D

That's a good point, yeah sure yeah.

A

D

How so someone should write this down? I agree: do you guys need the wallet here and where should we put this? There's.

A

A there's, probably more I'm, not sorted with the key management one per se. Cuz, yes, is gonna, hopefully drive more that to conclusion there is. There was just a separation between scenarios and requirements that I was trying.

A

We were trying to capture like, for instance, there was the scenario that talks around, not changing the tag and digest, for instance, and then you can in theory you say: that's our requirement as a requirement for key abstraction, key management abstraction so that when I'm, not as worried about because it's hot on the topic it's most of just getting it, you know getting the talk in there and I like I, said I, think Nia's talk will really culminate and what we need there.

A

So, if anything, I would say if you can work with the azan and what you guys have been doing. That would be good to have your thoughts in that were congruent. Sure.

A

So I was curious because from knowing a little bit about what you guys were doing with seen a band sandy and so forth, I was kind of just focused I. Guess I just wanted to put the question out there and is: were you focused on trying to enable scene AB in the existing infrastructure, because CNM is obviously a larger superset of things as opposed to or not opposed to, or as a beginning step towards the balance of public registries and private registries in air-gapped environments?

A

I was trying to get a sense of how you guys were thinking about that. ah That's.

D

A good question I mean yes, for us is basically non-negotiable. It is a constraints, a requirement that it has to work with existing infrastructure, which is why we went ahead and got start. So that's why, for example, is important to pushing bundles Assoc artifacts right. You want the same place to keep bundles and images. You don't want two different places for it, I mean, and ideally it would have been nice to have the metadata and the same places.

D

The registry, which is something which I believe is requirement for no 3v2, but it's not there and no tree v1 yeah. So because of this, so that's an excellent question about era gap. We thought about this and we basically prescribed two solutions. One is when you're pulling a bundle and you're verifying the signature on it and you push a copy of the bundle in your own private registry. You basically have two options. What are your options at this point?

D

You can't blindly copy the signatures because you basically don't own some of the keys, so there's at least two options for you. One is when you pull from a public registry. You verify the signatures, but you basically push it and you don't sign it in your own prior registry and you consider it a trusted zone. Basically, that's one option. The second option is, we say recited using your own keys, which is slightly more complicated, but it can be done and the idea is that we don't want to force people into any particular like PowerShell.

D

Do this at our shall be considered insecure, but we basically give you options and tell you what the pros and cons for so.

A

To be fair, I in and that's why I was asking it sounds like you were really trying to make sure you can get your new content types, C NAB's into existing infrastructure, and you were trying to get to those theories. But unfortunately, just because of what's existing that you kind of punted it.

D

Which issued immediate that issue? No.

A

No, the media type, it sounds like you've got and I'm curious. What you guys, where you guys will end up, but the the ability to move content between registries is just not something you were in, but it's just based on the current infrastructure that exists today that you have to kind of refine or or trust, there's really. There is no way to you.

A

You didn't magically find a solution to move the signatures and everything with okay, that's totally fair, like I just wanted to I. There's I think there was a I wanted to see what you guys had done to kind of see what progress you guys had made and I've actually curious about the shell scripts that you guys were outlining, but- and you guys have made great progress on how to do this and a large thing and there's a bunch of details on the canonical Jason I. Think you guys work through, but.

E

It's not like you've come up.

A

With the magic bullet- and we can just build everything that we like all the notary to stuff that we're targeting it's still very valid for what you're trying to get unblocked on. Yes,.

D

Yeah exactly especially delegations, which we found a notary, we one is actually powerful enough to do what we wanted to do right, but I don't think we can fundamentally solve the copying between registries. Metadata I mean on behalf of notary. We won because it basically you have to copy metadata between sequel databases or whatnot, and that's just something that we and it's a private API base for so Radu is here by the way. So he might want to add something to this hey.

F

Everyone just got out of a conflict and couldn't get sooner. I'm not gonna, be sure what you've discussed so far. So if there's anything specific I can jump into I'd be happy to talk about it.

D

Yeah sorry I should provide the context. Steve was just asking us how we solved the issue of copying. Signatures between registries and I said.

F

D

Didn't and couldn't, if you like, the idea box, yeah.

F

And he was right about that. We just didn't we I did. If you recall, we had the conversation, mmm probably winter, about what access the scene happening. You're looking for energy v2, and that was probably the biggest item that we've had in there. We do have some guidance about for people who are really really interested in doing that, and it probably could be achieved with no 3v1, but as a spec and as a reference implementation.

F

We really wanted to stay away from that, because we I don't think it's a large enough use is for scene app security v1 that if they were, it was worth us doing that.

F

So the biggest thing that we were interested in- and we are looking for a new treaty to as well- is signing a representation of the object rather of of a manifest, which is the thing that allows us to move an object from registry to another or and not even to distribute objects using registries and still be able to verify a signature, because we are verifying a signature of the object itself rather than of a manifest generated by a registry that describes an object.

F

So hope we hope that we'll still be able to do that with no tree meet you as well.

A

I'm, trying to just exactly what you were just so you're. What was it your concern that you couldn't do with notary v2 or you just want to make sure that we capture.

F

A

F

Specifically, what the signature, when you sign that object, what that signature represents by foreseen a be made the explicit choice.

F

We signed a Content digest of the actual object of the actual artifact, rather than the actual content digest of the manifest right. The manifest is the representation of how an OCI registry stores an object right, whereas for C now we have a requirement that specifies that you can distribute the objects without a registry, so you don't actually have a manifest for you and you still want to validate a signature or even generate one.

F

So we want a miniature that, hopefully no tree v2 will make the choice of signing the actual object rather than manifest, which is the default in darker content. Trust.

A

The default is your phone in the manifest right.

F

A

No, it's a good point I. So why is it that you're not worried about what to sign the manifest? Why do you want to sign the content, because.

F

We have instances where do you distribute so.

A

You broke up, you have art, you have serious, we were trying to distribute artifacts without registries, is that we said yeah yeah.

F

Or you can have a mixed way of distributing half of your customers distributes registries, half of them distribute without, and you want to have a way of making sure that you can check the signature in the same way in a consistent way and.

A

You wouldn't necessarily just have the manifest available offline so that it still represents the collection.

F

Given that the manifest is generated only when you push to a registry or for simplicity, we can say that right. The manifest is how the registry represents your object, though we thought it was a clear choice to take the content digest of the actual artifact.

A

Okay, I'm I'm missing a little bit of a gap in there, but it's okay. We can follow up later, but I think the we definitely want to be able to have like. If you look at the scenarios, we talked about being assign an artifact before it's pushed to a registry, and then you subsequently push it to a registry. So, from a scenario perspective I think we've I'm, hoping we've captured that for you and to.

F

Be fair, the ecto change required to do this is minor right. So it's it's conceptual. It's a conceptual change, rather than a technical change and.

A

On the public and private registries, are you guys kind of been more focused on like how do I make a bundle, bundle CNF that IO collection of bundles or were you kind of thinking? Have you spent much time thinking about the the individual customer? That's building lots of bundles themselves for their own deployment and they're. You know they have automation, there's constantly building it's only in their environment, they're they're not trying to share necessarily outside of their company.

A

Have you thought about that? Those complexities.

F

Up so so far, I think the biggest use case has been yet has been the individual organization trying to build bundles for their own use case, not necessarily trying to distribute them publicly.

F

But that being said, I we there isn't necessarily something that's missing from allowing organizations to publicly distribute bundles because we're using distribution and notary there's they they can use it in exactly the same way. You would use docker content trucks right now. The changes that Prashant mentioned about delegations no.

A

That's good I was actually afraid you were focused more on the public and weren't dealing with the intricacies of private registries and the way companies move not move but work in private registries different than public registries and when I say public registries is a there's, a different surface area and challenge. When I'm trying to publish things for the world to consume versus on publishing things forth in my company. That does need off to connect to everything.

A

There is nothing, that's anonymous, so it I don't want to say it's the more complex area, but it's feeling more closer to some of the things we've been more tightly focused on a notary, 2o.

F

Requirements have been from from organizations trying to build in private registries and to be fair, the actual implementation still has a few things.

F

There are still a few things to be added to the actual implementation of signee, so we are still we keep adding to that, whereas the spec we just I think Chung mentioned that we finally managed to have a vote for the actual spec text. Last week,.

A

F

A

Question that and I want to make sure we have time for the one of the things that we've been discussing, and we need to put more focus time on. It is the the UX the experience for what the client should look like and when you guys had signee I was kind of like really excited to see what that CLI was, but I noticed, Trisha hunk, you were actually showing signing being called by a shell script, so I'm I'm curious ye and you still had to pass a bunch of parameters to it.

A

I'm curious what you guys found in the challenges and why you couldn't call signing directly. What would you do? What would you like to see? What would you like to do? What were the good and bad of how you wound up in that spot? Oh.

D

We could we really should call it directly. That is my bad I know. Rod is not too pleased about it, but that's really for local development purposes. It's it's really just a convenient wrapper for passing in a lot of default, boring parameters like the root certificate for the node tree server or port numbers, and so on, and things like that. These are things that you can easily write your own wrappers for it.

D

It was really really just for my basically what the shell script does is just fold a lot of boring parameters, design, that's it and is.

A

That, because of the limitations of like the notary, v1 stuff, that we've gotten registries like it or is it, do you think those are parameters that every user would need and we need to spend a lot more time.

A

Thinking like I'm hopeful that there's, like you, know, assignee or something you know docker signed, you know container jisan whatever or whatever these whatever the clients are, because we want to be able to enable multiple clients that it's literally like something space sign and you pass it some kind of reference to a key, because I'm gonna be careful to say the key is in a slurry local because it's part of our key management stuff, but it's very minimalistic on what the user has to provide and that parameters.

A

So as part of that, because you had a local instance of docker, the distribution running were yeah.

D

F

Of it, yes, because we we wanted to make sure that you can configure pretty much everything good configure when put into a distribution to a distribution as well as to a notary instance. And if you add all those parameters, there are quite a few. So first of all, I wanted to make sure we can satisfy every combination of of parameters and the shell script is just our way of not dealing with UX currently and just making sure everything works from UX onward.

F

But I totally agree that for user experience for the user experience, we definitely are interested in the in that discussion. I'm cook unclear as to how much a user should want or sheet meets, to configure before just signing some I.

D

Totally agree, it should be as so, for example, here's a simple thing that we ran into right, so Riley was testing that our to actually works across many many registries now actually with with docker content, trust support such as harbor, but there are things we ran into, for example, that we should improve default out of the box discovery, for example. So, for example, simple things like it's clear: the port number of the signing server, for example, simple things like that or the root certificate for there. This thing should be automatically discovered right. Thank you. Those.

A

Are good things that I don't if you want to write a couple of those notes, maybe that an issue or something like learnings from from seen a B or sign e or some cute name just cuz. It's fun that it's some kind of reminder in the issues for the notary project that we capture those. As we start doing, the you expert notary to.

F

Most of them should serve as a reminder for consistency in choosing defaults.

D

I'll make a note to myself that will document. Do someone want.

A

To leverage your pain, anybody else.

B

Nope not for me, I think we covered most of it great making sure that whatever the pain was documented or at least track, and then, if I, think good things in notary, we make sure we don't mess it and if there aren't.

D

Cool yeah, that's it from next. Really anyone has anyone anything else to discuss.

A

Yeah, please jump in I'm trying to leave white space with people to jump in with.

D

So, for example, I will say that privately someone DMD me just now and asked this question which I wish there that's publicly, because it's a great question, it's totally, not obvious at all. They were like. Why couldn't you just copy signatures? You know why not just trademark copy signatures from one registry to another great question. The thing is that those signatures.

D

Yes, there is a public API to copy the signatures right and you can get it over HTTP. That's not a problem, even though internally behind the scenes it could be in RAM, it could be in Moorea DB. It can be read as whatever you don't care about that. The point is this: the public endpoint to consume the metadata great and let's say you blindly copy the signatures and copied it in your private air gap registry, for example. Why is this not a great idea? Well, it will work temporarily.

D

The problem is that you don't own all of the signing keys needed to refresh signatures. The thing is this metadata expire for good reasons. You don't want to replay or freeze attacks, for example. So so that's that's really. The the biggest blocker right now.

A

So basically it's the the timestamp or the metadata info that you don't necessarily own, but you can't replicate that even after it's moved if it hasn't changed. Oh.

D

You can you can't copy it, you can fine, you don't have the keys to refresh it exactly, and so you need to periodically pull it from the public. And if you forget to do this, there goes your private deployment right, which is not great. No.

A

That's fair: we've talked about this and I've we've written a bit of this up is the kind of the movement like an air gap. Environment is an isolated environment that runs on its own either it's offline or it's got controlled, Network egress into it. The assumption is whether it be revoked keys like there is Const. There is an update interval that can go into that environment. It's just you've got to make sure that everything in that environment can operate without external access.

A

So the idea that you can move key provocations into it, you can move additional new versions of things and new versions of the metadata is are all valid things, and if you, the interesting one that I can think of is the person that produces the original content. How often do they refresh does that meet the requirements of the entity?

A

That's consuming that content like if I'm going if I know I'm going offline for three months or, let's just say a month as I'm going across the notion that I'm not going to spend expensive connectivity pulling from a satellite, then I need to make sure that the content, I'm consuming, wasn't refreshing once a day and that's the assumption. So there's.

D

Exactly ideally, you shouldn't you shouldn't there shouldn't be this implicit requirement that should depend on refreshing at all. I agree. Okay, you could, if you want to do but shouldn't be required.

A

It's the disk, it's! How do you provide some disconnect between the producer of content and the consumer of content, because, while the consumer of content, we assume many of these companies, especially ones they really serve, concern- will have an additional signature they'll put on at a definition or verification that says: hey I've tested this for my environment. So not only does it have Tricia hunks key for what he produced that I consumed, but it's also got my you know rocket network or acne or whatever it is.

A

We were using their key, but the thing is that we want to know that, like it's still valid in my environment in our company, but we still need to know that.

A

The information that you've produced is still valid because we assume we kind of take the security model that we assumed at the time we've gotten the content. At that point, it's in a known state. A week later, the same content can turn out to be vulnerable because the vulnerability didn't find it wasn't discovered until after the thing was released.

A

So in that case, I still want to be able to go back and get something from from Trisha UNK that produced the original content. To know that hey, it was good last Monday, but now it turns out, we've discovered it's not good and I. Don't think you want a key revocation scenario and that one, because it's really it's anyway, we have to think about that. Yeah.

D

Exactly this can be done right, but really it's a question of how often can see a nuclear submarine surfaced to the air and refresh signatures right. So there will be some fundamental trade-offs, I think, but nothing impossible and.

A

That's the thing I want to remind like again: I wrote this somewhere is. We have been talking about the air gap scenarios like these really esoteric submarines and oil platforms and things that are like they're really important, but to a very small group of people that we could all punt the scenario, and at least you know, I can speak from a national perspective, but I know the Adobe s. Folks are doing the same.

A

Is we see our customers wanting air gapped environments for their standard workloads like they're, comfortable on Prem and one of the ways they're comfortable moving to the cloud? Is they can move into the cloud with an equivalent air gapped environment? So it's it's really. The average customer wants this. That's why we're all creating these private be netting capabilities, so customers can really lock down all external access, even in their pub. Even in you know our public clouds, so it's not. We should not treat it as an esoteric environment.

A

G

I think it's a really good point and I know that tough makes it easy to sort of replicate data in two disconnected environments, but I want to say that it's not too crazy and Notary v1.

G

Neither not that I've personally done this, but I think the only information you need in the air gapped environment is target's metadata and below the native delegations, and then you can either choose to assign really long-lived roots snapshot and timestamp or spin up your own time stamped and snapshotting server inside your gap with your own root snapshot and timestamp keys, and that gives you pretty y terrain wide array of choice and how you want to keep that up to date.

G

A

All right, well, thanks. Anybody else have any questions. We have a couple minutes left before people. People are already dropping, but.

A

All right for those didn't make the whole call will obviously have the recording- and this is great to see what you guys were able to get with what exists to some extent, you kind of validated some of the things that we're still working on. We still need to keep on working on because you still need them. So that's that's, really good feedback, so I do Trish monk. Thank you for you and your whole team.

D

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you for letting us present.

A

If you I, think you've already put them in the notes, but it make sure there's links, so we can kind of people can peruse around what you've got there. Oh.

D

Yeah there's more gory details in there.

A

You had quite a few quite them. Well, the agenda was big I'm assuming there's some links in there as well. So thank you for the detail and with that so I didn't I. Don't wanna ignore the request for a different time. Slot I want to see how the one goes for the OCI one we're doing this week.

A

We debated doing in an evening or in mourning, so this one is more of an evening call for the OCI Wednesday meeting and well I want to see how that goes, and then based on that, we could talk about.

A

You know what we want to do here, because it seems like Europe, China and India and the Americas it's really hard to get three four I've already lost count, so let's kind of figure out what works, and maybe we just need to do some kind of vote to misy like all right what continents do we really need to support for this call, so with that we'll wrap up for next week. Thank you. Everybody.

D

Sounds good. Thank you. Thank you. Everyone.

D