►
From YouTube: CNCF SIG Security 2020-02-26
Description
CNCF SIG Security 2020-02-26
A
C
D
A
A
E
A
E
A
Okay,
that's
so
I
think,
most
just
quite
a
few
people
that
would
be
our
RSA
today.
So
I
don't
think
like
we
may
be
missing
some
of
the
regulars,
so
I'll
start
off
quickly
announcements
and
then
we
can.
We
can
jump
right
into
the.
The
presentation
seems
like
we
have
a
pretty
lengthy
one
so
again,
I'm
gonna
pace
in
the
document
over
here.
Please
sign
in
with
your
name
announcement
for
today.
Again,
if
you
haven't
checked
out
the
carne
de
sécurité
de
the
zero
Dave
and
add
a
zero,
a
redneck
coupon,
you
check
it
out.
A
B
Lead
chair
this
month,
and
so
so
yeah
so
sign
up.
If
you
are
willing
to
facilitate
a
meeting
processes
in
the
governance
there's
also,
we
hadn't
had
new
members
in
the
last
month
and
I.
Don't
think!
That's
actually
true
so
call
out
that
if
you've
been
attending
for
a
while
and
you're,
not
on
the
member
list,
PR
yourself
in
we
would
love
to
have
you
officially
join
us
yeah.
A
F
You're
able
to
burn
out
yeah
perfect
thanks
Brandon
and
thanks
Sarah.
Yes,
you
said
the
agenda
here,
given
the
time
that
we
have
available
is
to
provide
a
very
high-level
overview
of
both
spiffy
inspire
talk
about
whether
to
start.
How
did
we
get
to
where
it's
at
today?
What
has
been
the
work
throughout
that
time?
Where
are
we
going
looking
forward
and
wrap
up
with
the
summary
of
the
security
assessment
that
we
just
conducted
you
being
the
reviewer,
along
with
the
help
of
emily
fox
justin
compost
and
other
community
members?
F
That
said
just
to
set
the
stage
some
of
you
may
be
familiar
with
spiffy
inspire
given
they're
both
CFCF
projects,
the
goal
of
these
projects
and
the
catharsis
office
really
stems
from
providing
an
identity
framework
that
makes
it
easy
for
workloads
for
software
components
of
a
distributed
system
established
trust
given
and
untrusted
Network,
and
we're
going
to
we're
going
to
peel
into
that
blue
thread.
Look
into
what
does
that
actually
mean,
and
why
would
we
have
even
bothered
to
do
that
in
first
place,
the
products
were
first
accepted
and
the
CNCs
in
March
2018.
F
It
is
very
important
to
think
of
these
solely
as
authentication,
not
authorization.
It
certainly
helps
the
conversation.
Certainly,
people
start
associating
a
number
of
things.
One
a
preface
with
spiffy
is
not
authorization
authorization
as
out
of
the
scope
of
the
project.
It
does
provide
identities
that
can
be
surfaced
to
authorization
frameworks
to
interoperate
with
each
other.
One
great
example
of
another
CNCs
product
is
their
OPA
open
policy,
agent,
spiffy
and
nope.
Our
great
compliments
to
each
other
as
your
reason,
with
authorization,
authentication
and
frameworks
holistically.
F
F
The
community
got
together
as
a
whole
to
define
a
specification
to
tackle
the
problems
50s
after
and
the
problem
is
how
to
establish
trust
between
softer
components
of
complex
distributed
systems
over
untrusted
networks
systems
that
have
the
properties
of
cloud
native,
a
big
part
of
that
the
assumption
being
well,
a
team
or
an
organization
may
own
the
application.
They
may
not
necessarily
own
or
manage
the
infrastructure
that
that
is
running
on.
So
how
do
we
solve
that?
And
we
looked
around
for
technologies
that
existed
at
the
time?
F
Tls
being
one
of
those
strong
has
been
available
for
a
really
long
time,
widely
used
for
stablishing
trust
from
the
browser
to
a
server
across
the
internet
wherever
it
may
recite.
However,
we
did
not
see
a
lot
of
TLS
inside
of
the
datacenter,
and
why
would
that
be
not
because
it
doesn't
address
the
problem
but
getting
certificates
and
key
material
for
establishing
TLS?
F
F
One
of
the
first
things
is:
how
can
we
reason
about
automation
that
will
keep
the
promises
of
PKI,
but
at
high
velocity
and
very
large-scale
building
around
that
we
we
set
well
as
among
the
disabilities
specification,
we
need
to
define
a
number
of
things:
let's
define
what
doesn't
identity
look
like
and
you
can
refer
to
the
spiffy
dogs.
Look
like
that.
Is
your
eye.
4-Minute,
it's
human
readable.
It
is
custom
from
there
on
the
format
of
the
identity
document
that
proves
that
identity.
This
describing
a
workload
and
those
four
masks
we
initially
supported
x.509.
F
We
couldn't
just
leave
it
at
the
spec.
Obviously
quest
questions
arise
said
well
how
this
all
sounds
great.
How
can
I
put
this
to
practice
so
a
lot
of
ground
work
went
into
defining
the
tool
chain,
implementing
it
and
practice
which
is
aspire,
providing
a
reference,
implementation
software
components
that
people
could,
if
you're
running
to
Hernandez
at
the
time.
Are
you
running
any
other
x86
UNIX
based
system
that
you
can
start
to
implement
the
spec
right
now.
F
F
We
designed
the
system
for
it
to
be
extensible
and
to
support
future
use
cases,
but
at
the
same
time,
for
people
too
I
haven't
spend
much
time
talking
about
at
the
station
and
I
can
I
can
clarify
what
I
mean
by
that,
but
an
order
of
as
you're
describing
an
identity
that
is
assigned
to
be
assigned
to
a
system.
In
order
to
confer
it,
you
need
to
go
through
a
set
of
checks.
You
can
define
a
policy
and
say
if
this
system
is
about
this
tall
lives.
This
way
has
this
properties.
F
This
is
the
kernel
metadata
that
is
available.
This
is
what
the
orchestration
platform
knows
about
it.
This
is
the
metadata
we
get
of
CI
CD
provenance
tying
all
of
this,
and
then
those
checks
are
met.
Dmt
is
confirmed.
Obviously,
those
vary
from
environment
to
environment
and
there's
a
lot
of
different
properties
metadata
depending
to
the
different
cloud
providers
or
different
platforms.
You
may
be
the
point
inspire
own
too,
so
we
built
a
bunch
of
plugins
for
app
sure
Google
cloud
out
of
AWS.
The
community
contributed
a
big
part
of
it.
F
A
lot
of
work
went
into
integrating
spiffy
and
boy
and
utilizing
the
boy
SDS
interface,
one
of
the
want
one
of
the
motivations
for
that
a
lot
of
people
were
looking
at
the
SPECT
and
writing
their
own
apps
and
putting
in
libraries
teaching
spiffy
to
the
application,
but
as
they
were,
modernizing
traditional
after
or
things
that
I
had
already
been
containerized,
they
could
utilize
nboyer
as
a
proxy
to
deal
with
all
the
logic
and
just
delegate.
Spiffy
inspire
to
the
infrastructure
not
have
customized
much
of
that.
F
Having
having
addressed
for
inter
interrupt
rating
across
multiple
platforms,
multiple
environments
within
the
spy
around
the
spin
feet
grew
in
parallel.
At
the
same
time,
we
saw
adoption
and
break
embracing
of
the
spec
by
a
lot
of
different
open-source
products,
some
of
them
CN,
CF,
noteworthy
ones,
sto,
hash,
pork,
console
network
service,
mash
and
genetics
gray
matter.
The
list
is
not
limited
to
those.
F
Now
that
that
work
has
been
a
super
study
and
not
necessarily
anticipated,
we
knew
we
get
to
that
like
addressing
for
all
those
use
cases
that
have
alluded
thus
far
and
people
establishing
multiple
spire
environments
and
different
teams
implementing
it
turn
out
that
every
system
was
modeling
for
a
single
root
of
trust,
certainly,
the
need
to
authenticate
between
different
spire
implementations.
There
were
like
a
spiffy
implementations.
F
Have
you
an
sto
service
mask
that
may
need
to
communicate
to
an
inspired
bog
meant
for
a
separate
platform,
the
need
to
fatter
a
spire
to
spiffiest
50
dystrophy
arose,
and
that
is
at
a
very
basic
level.
How
can
a
system
validate
the
keys
of
a
foreign
system
I'll
start
on
a
different
word
of
trust
without
exchanging
private
key
material
solely
exchanging
their
their
public
keys?
F
That
is
something
we've
started
to
document
the
most
recent
Q
Khan
M
data
talked
with
a
gentleman
from
Google
about
study
federation
with
sto.
Please
check
that
out.
There's
a
lot
there's
a
wealth
of
information
there
on.
How
can
you
set
up
multiple
spire
domains
to
federated
with
each
other
and
in
the
same
time
and
people
coming
to
going
through
the
journey
of
reasoning
about
spiffy,
inspired
conceptually
to
adopting
the
technology,
embarking
on
rolling
it
out
to
production
and
and
having
soft
out
for
workload
the
workload
and
essentially
service
to
service?
F
It
also
came
up
the
desire
of
well.
If
we
get
all
of
this
from
spiffy,
can
we
extend
it
to
connect
to
other
types
of
systems
that
we
may
have
not
necessarily
built
ourselves,
but
we
consume
be
a
my
sequel
would
be
a
Postgres
name,
the
database
people
wanting
to
do
secure,
introduction
without
having
to
pre
share
any
key
material,
those
usernames
or
passwords.
Can
we
use
as
50
IDs,
to
directly
authenticate
to
a
database
and
from
there
on
as
well?
F
If
we're
able
to
do
that
shouldn't,
we
also
be
able
to
directly
off
okay,
not
a
workload
running
in
AWS
from
my
on
kind
of
environment
and
I.
Also
often
TK
to
AWS
directly
can
I
get
an
STS
token
an
exchange
of
my
s
bed
and
go
to
RDS
or
go
to
Aurora
or
any
other
cloud
service.
That
is
somewhat
of
a
recent
use
case.
F
The
database
not
know
being
OID
see,
but
as
an
extension
to
that,
you
could
also
be
talking
about,
like
secret
stores
here,
doing
secure
introduction
to
to
vault
as
another
example.
So
with
that
I
have
provide
a
very
spit
ball
run
through
of
spiffy
inspire,
taking
a
closer
look
at
the
governance
of
this
products,
as
I
mentioned.
This
word
cast
in
just
been
psyched
out
the
corporate
empty
Oh
that
we
work
for
and
is
steward
in
the
product.
F
As
part
of
preparing
for
the
assessment,
we
spend
a
lot
of
time
as
GI
best
practices,
making
sure
we
had
the
right
boss
factor
and
some
of
it
like
we,
we
had
to
adjust
and
adapt
ourselves
to
meet
those
things,
but
it
was
also
very
reassuring
that
the
way
would
structure
things
from
day.
One
allowed
us
to
to
pass
all
all
that
criteria,
not
much
to
like
spent
there
in
that
I've
shared
some
community
stats.
These
are
available
from
the
CMC
F
def
staff's
dashboards.
F
We
have
seeing
a
pretty
steady
mental
trend
for
every
single
one
of
these
number
of
contributors.
Number
of
contributions
increases
stars
been
increasing.
As
for
spire,
which
is
once
against
50
suspects,
spire
is
actual
implementation,
we
did
the
CI
AI
best
practices
for
spire
we're
currently
at
a
passing
as
a
recommendation
from
Brandon
Emily
and
Justin
we're
currently
pursuing
the
silver
batch.
That
is
the
next
level
up.
F
Where
are
we
going
forward,
based
on
where
we
find
us?
Today,
we
talked
about
solving
workload
workload.
We
have
solved
for
an
initial
set
of
use
cases,
often
providers
continuing
to
expand
the
list
of
plugins
different
platforms
supported
but,
and
until
very
recently
said,
like
well,
we've
been
doing,
we've
been
doing
a
lot
of
work,
the
our
guiding
principle,
as
has
always
been
the
community.
What
is
tough
of
mine
for
our
end
users
and
we
reassessed
on
well,
we
want
to.
F
We
want
to
make
sure
we
enabled
for
accessing
end
users
to
do
very
large
scale
production
rollouts,
we're
talking
today
in
the
scale
of
tens
of
hundreds
of
notes.
Aspirationally
people
are
wanting
to
get
to
hundreds
of
thousands
of
notes
and
the
short-term
so
around,
enabling
those
topologies.
We
have
some
work
to
keep
the
lights
on
and
address
some
technical
depth
of
not
just
supporting
x.509
and
nest
aspire
to
polities
when
you
have
change
to
spire
domains
to
also
support
barrier
tokens.
At
the
same
time,
the
api's
have
been
stable
for
a
while.
F
However,
there
is
the
assumption
today.
There
is
a
requirement
today
that
aspiring
has
shared
the
same
kernel
as
the
workload
with
the
advent
of
serverless
technologies.
That
is
a
little
bit
tricky
through
the
plugin,
an
agent
and
their
that,
alongside
some
other
motivations
we
are
through.
We
completed
the
the
sign
face
of
api
order
factors
for
Noack
and
registration
api's,
so
we
can
address
future
use
cases
such
as
eight
and
less
deployments
being
one
of
the
big
ones,
some
others.
E
Being
agentless
deployments
custom
code,
you
might
write
to
snap
into
an
Orchestrator
her
deployment
system,
for
instance
thinking
those
things
easier
to
do,
and
also
just
you
know,
we've
got
like
you
know
the
better
of
a
year
and
a
half
two
years
worth
of
organic
growth
on
the
current
server
every
five
years,
but
they've
suffice
for
the
time
being,
but
an
agent
that
just
involved
talking
to
the
server.
Perhaps
you
guys
are
a
little
bit
difficult
to
consume
on
the
backend,
so
that
could
have
been
a
little
bit
difficult
to
maintain
as
it
evolved
organically.
E
F
And
and
working
on
that
for
common
release,
we
came
to
the
realization:
hey.
We
cannot
neglect
the
user
experience
fire
easier
to
consume
for
new
commerce
or
those
yet
to
be
initiated.
Let's
update
our
existing
client
libraries
and
also
expand
that
list.
Let's
put
a
lot
of
attention
and
to
documentation
and
integration
of
critical
use
cases
how
conceptually,
how
to's,
tutorials
and
completing
this
release
from
there
on.
We
can
start
to
look
deeper
into
the
stack
vertically
attesting
from
a
hardware
root
of
trust
or
contesting
throughout
the
software
development
lifecycle.
F
How
can
we
integrate
better
with
frameworks
like
encode?
Oh,
how
we
can
integrate
with
code
signing
technologies
like
no
very
tough?
Let's
keep
focusing
on
the
experience
and
make
sure
we're
not
being
complacent
or
overlooking
that.
Let's
make
sure
those
things
are
documented
understood.
We
can
have
interactive
tutorials
for
a
lot
of
these
things
looking
further
into
the
year
and
again
like
these
are
forward-looking
statements
make
the
the
work
that
we
do
with
the
reef
actors
enhanced
for
aid
in
this
workloads.
F
Once
we
have
binary
signing
TPM
signing
to
sign,
let's
implement
that
work,
leading
to
that
like
Ice,
Cube
relocation,
simplified
a
changes,
but
calling
out
big
is
here
I'm,
just
a
lot
of.
It
is
a
day
zero
day,
one
and
from
there
on.
Let's
do
a
lot
of
like
automation
that
keeps
the
promises
work
for
a
day
to
amazed
life
of
operators
easily
and
again,
like
the
goal
of
making
an
infrastructure
function
of
the
security,
as
opposed
to
something
developers
can
spend
a
lot
of
time
on
just
fulfilling
the
vision
of
the
project.
F
A
D
Hey
everyone-
this
is
sarah
in
here.
Can
you
elaborate?
You
share
any
one
example
where
traditionally,
this
is
some
of
the
credentials
have
been
passed
along
within
the
property
file
or
configuration
file.
Now,
with
this
fire
and
spiffy
spec,
and
with
your
ESP
ID
or
whatever
the
token
names.
This
is
how
the
new
design
and
the
new.
E
F
D
Yep,
okay,
thank
you.
Yeah
I
mean
I'll,
yeah
I
know
you
mentioned
about
the
secret
zero,
so
that
is
where
I
think
it
kind
of.
Becomes
it
like
a
catch-22
or
someone
has
to
create
it
and
someone
has
to
share
it
after
you
shared.
You
know
it's
just
out
of
your
control,
so
what
I
understood
is
initially
I.
Think
the
problem
statement
that
you
mention
is
you
have
you're
deploying
your
workload
in
a
untrusted
Network
right
English,
but
then
you
need
to
safeguard
your
workload.
So
that
is
the
reason
why
he
inspire.
E
E
G
E
E
F
Further,
how
do
we
don't
get
to
the
catch-22
this
business
policy
driven
like
spire
is
not
seating,
the
secret
serum
as
not
as
not
doing
the
the
provisioning
and
delivering
of
of
that
secret
zero
it
from
hey,
we're
only
automating
the
fairing
of
the
credential
that
we're
getting
from
somewhere.
It's
where
we're
changing
that
sequence
all
together
to
like
we
define
policy
that
has
to
be
a
test
that
against
and
it's
just
bootstrap.
F
F
And
there's
something
you
have
to
trust
that,
like
we
spend
a
lot
of
time
with
that
users
on
at
the
station
strategies,
identification
strategies.
Yes,
you
have
to
trust
something
and
what
is
that
II
trust,
but
don't
just
trust
one
thing.
So
another
analogy
is
multi-factor
authentication?
Well,
let's,
let's
get,
what
can
we
get
from
the
AWS
metadata
API?
What
comes
again
from
Cleveland?
What
can
we
go
from
the
Linux
kernel?
What
can
we
get
from
the
highway
and
you
can
compose
for
all
the
different
sources,
the
information
that's
being
relied
on.
H
This
is
my
name
and
Cattrall
in
here,
and
thanks
for
the
explanation,
but
I
just
wondering,
maybe
if
we
could
go
down
a
little
deeper
for
maybe
a
specific
example,
let's
say
that
you
had
a
workload
that
is
running
on
a
kubernetes
cluster
on
gke
that
wanted
to
talk
to
some
kind
of
a
database
that
is
running
on
RDS
or
aurora,
or
something
right.
So
now
the
points
of
integration
are:
is
there
like
a
spire
agent
running
on
every
node
as
a
daemon
set,
and
then
there
is
a
Federation.
H
G
E
That
may
allow
them
to
expose
multiple
domain
sockets,
but
for
now
it's
just
one
and
then
we
inject
that
one
socket
into
all
the
containers
and
that
songket
is
unauthenticated.
So
when
one
of
these
pods
gets
this
socket
injected
and
the
tops
of
this
socket,
it
does
not
need
any
kind
of
secret
identity.
E
E
Policy
talking
about
before
we
teach
Speier
about
the
shape
of
your
workload
and
when
it
recognizes
this
workload
to
give
it
you
know,
identity,
Alice,
sort
of
speak.
So,
in
the
talks
to
this
it
talks
to
this
UNIX
domain
socket
and
it
says:
hey
Here
I
am
like
give
me
give
me
my
identity.
Speier
says:
okay,
we
figured
out
that
you're
Alice,
here's
a
job
that
proves
that
you're
Alice
yeah.
E
Okay,
now
is
the
part
where
Alice
can
take
this
job
and
pass
it
to
us
to
AWS.
So
we
talked
a
little
bit
about
Federation
before
Federation
is
a
way
that
50
trust
domains
can
exchange,
can
exchange
their
public
psyches
in
an
automated
fashion.
This
Federation
API
is
highly
aligned
with
oh
I
EC.
Oh
I
do
see
so
a
lot
of
MOOC
providers
are
compatible
with
this
thing.
E
G
H
G
H
E
Policy
is
about
the
workload,
so
you
would
say
hey.
You
need
to
know
right,
so
we'll
just
pry
it
out
we'll
say:
hey.
We
have
this
workload
called
Alice.
She
runs
in
this
namespace
and
with
this
service
account,
and
it
should
be
this
docker
image
ID
and
it
should
be
all
of
these
other
attributes.
You
can
kind
of
tied
together.
Let's
say
when.
I
I
I'm
mainly
just
wondering
you
know
a
lot
of
the
initial
description
there
from
the
previous
question
was
kind
of
talking
about
the
node
agent
and
authenticating
kind
of
at
the
node
level,
and
maybe
the
authentication
at
the
node
level
involves
metadata
pulled
out
of
upon
so
to
speak,
but
essentially
we're
still
trusting
the
node
to
tell
us
the
truth,
or
at
least
you
know,
and
that's
a
reasonable
assumption
or
we're
trusting
that
the
node
understands
the
workload
enough
or
I.
Don't
know
a
better
way
to
say
that,
but
I'm
I
guess
I'm
wondering.
I
Does
all
the
communication
happen
from
the
node
itself?
Does
the
pod
itself
reach
out
post?
Like
does
the
node
say?
Okay,
you
got
brown
eyes.
You
got
red
pants,
you're,
you're,
good,
node,
right,
you're,
Bob
and
then
individual
workloads
on
that
node
are
then
able
to
kind
of
add
on
to
that
in
series
and
say
you
know
you
have
image
ID
whatever
and
your
hash
of
your
code
bases
whatever.
I
Is
that
an
in
serious
thing
is
that
one
exchange
that
happens
at
the
node
level
and
mainly
the
thing
in
terms
of
like
service
mesh?
You
know
which
kind
of
operates
in
a
sidecar
fashion.
The
workloads
themselves
are
sort
of
can
be
completely
agnostic
from
the
node
or
at
least
that's
the
way
come
on
we're
running
things
now
so
I'm,
just
wondering
kind
of.
Where
does
the
exchange
happen
for
our
sort
of
sort
of
this
heuristic
profiling,
yeah
of
node
versus
workload,
am.
E
E
The
way
that
the
way
that
those
challenges
is
at
the
station's
work
is
that
when
the
agent
comes
up,
you
know
we
don't
rely
on
anything
like
that.
Agent
certainly
communicates
information
to
the
server
to
say
who
it
is,
but
the
server
has
all
sorts
of
checks
and
balances
that
it
goes
through
to
assert
that
that
is
true.
E
E
Know
if
you
have
a
new
compromised
or
an
agent
gets
owned,
or
something
like
this,
you
can't
just
you
can't
just
call
the
server
and
ask
for
any
arbitrary
things
like
this.
You
will
only
be
able
to
obtain
identities
that
the
server
says
these
are
the
worklist
they're
supposed
to
be
running
on
this
node
right
now,
so
it's
kind
of
like
a
two-level
process
and
I
hope
that
I'm
answering
your
question
here.
G
I
E
One
of
the
other
things
that
the
server
tells
each
other's
hey
here
on
the
workloads
that
you're
authorized
to
rock
and
here
the
shapes
of
those
workbooks
when
you
see
more
fun
with
this
shape
or
that
shape
here's
the
thing
that
you're
authorized
to
get
for
bringing
out
an
agent
that
pulls
down
that
list
and
then
attaches
on
everything
in
advance.
So
if
there's
an
outage,
just
serve
about
it
or
something
like
that
things,
kinda
continue
to
run.
F
Take
it
back
down
to
naturally
we
distinguish
the
two
stages,
the
first
being
known
at
the
station,
the
second
one
being
workload
at
the
station
and
those
are
those
are
separate,
but
obviously
yeah
I
want
to
know
two
tests.
We
say:
hey.
Here's
a
list
of
spiffy
IDs
and
select
receive,
should
look
out
for
that
that
are
available
to
you.
A
F
Do
want
to
share.
It
was
very
beneficial
for
us
to
go
through
the
formal
assessment
with
the
current
process
we
had
conducted
while
the
team
had
conducted
an
initial
assessment
two
years
ago,
Joe
centavos
Savin
a
few
other
folks.
So
this
is
the
second
go-round
that,
like
the
structure
definition,
it
was
super
easy
to
follow
and
just
level
of
attention.
We
got
from
the
reviewing
teeth
and
helped
us
like
identify
a
bunch
of
blind
spots.
We
had
yeah.
A
It's
a
pleasure
working
of
you
guys
as
well
so
yeah,
so,
let's
jump
into
it,
so
I've
created
a
PR
for
the
spy
assessment
branch,
and
so,
if
you
so
all
the
information
about
the
assessment
documents
over
here,
let
me
go
through
them
quickly.
So,
if
you
want
to
make
some
comments
on
the
self-assessment
or
the
summary
of
the
sessemann,
I
can
go
to
this
PR,
which
will
put
the
link
into
the
the
meeting
notes,
and
so
for
this
a
sense
assessment.
A
Let
me
go
through
quickly
what
the
summary
of
it
it
was
I,
think
the
yes,
the
self
assessment
that
was
brought
to
us
by
by
the
team
was
very,
very
comprehensive,
the
most
the
most
comprehensive
one
we
see
so
far.
It
was
a
really
long
and
I
think
this
was
partly
because
you
guys
have
been
to
the
process
with
Cheston
and
all
the
details
over
there.
So
I
think
it
was
really
smooth.
A
So
the
summary
of
this
we
had
the
security
assessment
and
these
kids.
The
background
summary
is
kind
of
like
what
we
just
talked
about,
and
the
recommendation
said
we
are
making
for
the
project
is
one:
they
have
a
lot
of
information
about
tread
modeling
materials
that
I
think
are
very
useful,
and
then
we
want
to
see
on
these
items
on
this
50
site.
A
One
of
the
other
recommendations
is
also
to
expand.
The
security
response
seemed
to
participants
also
outside
the
cycle,
and
the
last
one
which
under
SS
mentioned
just
now,
is
to
walk
to
us
the
sea-ice
of
a
batch
which
50
inspire
is
already
very
close
to
them
and,
at
the
same
time,
our
recommendations
to
the
CN
CF
is
because
beefy
inspire
is
a
security
centric
project
that
we
want
to
ensure
that
we
conduct
a
formal
reviews
or
audit
for
this
so
kind
of.
Like
the
you
know
whether
this
would
be
a
trip.
A
So
this
is
a
really
long
document.
It
talks
about
more
details
about
what
exactly
the
goals
is
uncles,
and
you
know
we
had
a
few
additions
to
this
to
kind
of
make
the
document
more
comprehensive,
more
readable
to
a
user.
So
there
are
all
definitions
here,
there's
a
use
case,
multiple
use
cases
talking
about
MTO
as
in
a
lot
of
detail,
so
this
document
is
meant
to
be
readable
to
the
general
security
user
and
I.
A
A
We
have
the
security
analysis
of
the
different
functions,
different
plugins
and
then
the
team
also
created
a
lot
of
details
on
the
different
types
of
tags,
and
also
they
have
this
matrix
over
here
which
really
talks
about
you
know,
while
I
did
all
the
different
attack
scenarios
and
what
the
risks
of
them
the
rid
here
doesn't
mean
it's
bad.
It
just
means
it's
highly
likely.
So
don't
be
two
of
them.
A
L
E
A
I
think
we
are
all
good.
The
only
outstanding
item
would
be
to
we
will
bring
this
up
to
the
TOC
and
ask
them
if
they
want
an
overview
of
the
security
assessment.
If
not,
we
will.
We
will
just
send
this
key
set
of
documents
to
the
TOC
yeah
yeah,
if
not
I,
think
this.
This
was
great
and
thank
you
for
bringing
us
450
inspire.
F
Recently
as
well,
without
making
any
assumptions
of
prior
knowledge
or
family
already
with
50
inspire,
so
for
those
who
are
not
familiar
with
the
project,
this
is,
if
you
read
through
this
very
much
an
introductory
guide,
it's
not
just
the
security
properties
or
the
modeling.
There's
a
lot
of
background
concepts.
Information
use
cases
there
so
yeah
a
good
starting
point.
If
you're
interested
to
learn
more
yeah.
M
I'll
just
add
that
I
had
a
fun
time
doing
the
previous
one
and
I
do
want
to,
because
we're
also
congratulatory
I
do
want
to
throw
in
a
slight
not
really
all
the
things
for
us
to
think
about,
which
is
from
the
time
that
I
did.
The
original,
like
whatever
pre-assessment
thing,
would
ever
want
to
call
that
until
now,
there's
been
a
very
substantial
change
in
that
they
now
Federation
of
identity
across
different,
like
spire
servers
and
so
I.
Think,
a
question
for
us
to
think
about
is,
as
we
evolve
things
over
time.
M
M
E
Yeah
I
think
that's
a
great
point.
It's
you
know,
I'm
hoping
also
kind
of
you
know
some
thoughts
share
to
how
we
might
be
able
to
accomplish
that
I
think
that's
definitely
an
important
point
and
there
certainly
has
been
some
drifts.
Instead,
a
visual
assessment
was
done.
Knocked
down.
Assessment
was
a
very
long
time.
It
was
very
involved,
and
so
you
know
a
low
overhead
way
to
kind
of
keep
these
things
updated.
Very,
very
much.
The
appreciated,
yeah
making
sure
is
long.
Long
live
needs
to.
B
A
B
B
Before
Dan
is
Dan
Shaw
here,
Dan
Shaw-
it's
not
here-
so
yes,
he
is,
but
maybe
he's
not
on
so
Dan
and
I
were
gonna
stay
after
and
on.
Tuesday
is
the
TST
meeting
where
we
monthly
presents
stuff
from
sig.
So
we
have
some
graph
slides.
If
you
know
if
anybody
wants
to
join
a
small
group
right
like
I'm,
particularly
like
Brendan
Justin
Kappa,
like
whoever's
like
you
know,
in
some
kind
of
a
project
lead
role.
B
If
you
have
something
you
can
also
just
tell
us
in
slack,
but
if
anybody
wants
to
stay
on
and
we're
just
gonna
work
through
the
slides
a
little
bit
about
what
we're
going
to
present
on
Tuesday,
if
you
happen
to
be
free,
otherwise,
just
think
of
some
slack.
If
you
want
and
something
included
to
report
back
so.
O
M
M
Brandon
and
I
have
been
working
a
bit
on
the
landscape
thing
and
have
some
some
like
some
progress
and
updates
there
I
don't
know
what
else
I
mean
I
have
more
personal
things
that
I've
been
doing
like
with
the
notary,
v2
stuff
and
things,
but
I.
Don't
really
have
anything
else
to
reports
the
TSC
that
I
can
think
of.
Unless
there's
something
you
think
I
might
be
missing.
Oh
I.
N
N
B
M
B
J
B
N
C
B
A
A
B
C
B
C
B
A
B
A
B
A
A
B
A
B
J
J
B
N
B
A
B
A
B
Like,
for
example,
this
is
a
very
nice
thing
that,
like
Liz
pulled
together
after
there
was
like
a
whole
bunch
of
different
PRS
right,
which
sets
up
what
is
actually
happening
right
that
there's
this
sort
of
low
barrier
to
sandbox,
a
really
significant
barrier
to
incubation
and
then
incubation
to
graduation.
It
should
be
just
like
a
matter
of
the
project
growing
and
getting
better
and
checking
monkey.
B
You
know
like
it
shouldn't
be
really
so
it'd,
be
it's
a
big
barrier
just
because
there's
a
lot
of
work
to
do
not
because
we're
putting
a
barrier
in
front
of
the
project
right,
it's
a
maturity
thing
right,
so
it
should
be
a
natural
path
from
incubation
to
graduation,
and
so
the
key
thing
here
is
like
cloud
custodian,
I,
don't
even
remember
how
they
were
referred
to
us
exactly
I'm,
not
sure
that
they
were
I.
Think
somebody
told
them
to
go
talk
to
that.
B
Should
we
do
this
or
you
know,
should
we
finish
the
whole
assessment
review,
or
should
we
short-circuit
it
and
just
do
the
due
diligence
right,
you
know
just
become
a
member
of
the
cnc
at
first
and
then
come
back
to
this
right
and
a
big
how
I
answer
the
amount
of
work
that
is
to
get
to
just
get
into
the
CNC
F
without
the
assessment
depends
on
whether
they're
going
for
sandbox
or
incubation
and
that
information
isn't
present
anywhere
right.
So,
instead
of
asking
them
when
I
was
like.
B
Oh,
we
missed
a
point
in
the
process.
Please
file
this
github
issue
right.
Something
should
never
really
come
to
us
until
the
project
has
done
a
github
issue,
but
there's
all
these
projects
that
are
in
like
out
of
order
things
right
and
then
what
we
have
to
figure
out.
So
we
have
now
two
projects,
Dax
and
Camus,
who
have
been
referred
to
us
who
have
who
have
filed
this,
who
are
going
through
what
is
now
the
well-documented
sequence
of
things
to
become
a
sandbox
project,
and
so
we
have
to
be
like
okay.
A
B
So
there's
like
a
and
now
what
ended
up
in
the
document
is
that
actually,
the
cig
review
is
a
really
low
bar
it,
like
specifically
says
it's
a
very
lightweight
review
and
that
it
is
not
due
diligence.
So
this
was
a
it's
possibly
that
it
was
just
confusion
on
my
part,
but
it
was
certainly
not
written
down.
Clearly
they
are
decoupling.
So
now,
there's
in
the
incubation
phase,
they
do
they
have
this
due
diligence,
we're
what
they
wrote
down.
Is
the
TOC
may
delegate
that
to
the
six.
A
B
Guess
is
in
security,
they're,
always
gonna
delegate
it
to
us
right
like
no.
It's
gonna
be
like
yeah
I'm,
a
security
project
when
they
have
us
right,
but
it's
not
written
down
that
way
right.
So
what
we
could
do
is
like
you
know.
What
we
need
to
do
is
sort
of
figure
out.
Where
does
our
assessment
fit
in
here?
B
My
guess
is
it
fits
in
here
we're
not
gonna
like
ratify
anything
until
after
we
do
the
first
five
and
we
clarify
our
process,
and
we
know
how
long
it
takes
a
little
block,
but
we
should
come
up.
We
should
have
like
some,
like
theory
of
how
we
do
this,
but
right
now
we're
over
here
you're
in
the
process
right
where
the
sick
assessment,
this
the
TOC
has
defined
project
presents
the
sig,
and
this
is
for
any
sake
right.
We
can
tweak
it
and
say:
hey
you're,
doing
sick
security.
B
We
want
you
to
XYZ,
which
is
a
little
different
right.
That's
fine!
As
long
as
it's
sort
of
in
it
sort
of
in
the
spirit,
but
the
spirit
is
its
lightweight
right.
It's
not
due
diligence
and
I.
Also,
like
don't
want
to
get
into
the
situation
where
we
asked
this
project
link,
you
know
like
we
did
with
peek.
Look
here,
do
a
ton
of
work
now
the
TOC
is
gonna.
Reject
you,
yeah.
A
A
A
A
B
A
B
So
we
have
this
not
defined
process
right
for
how
do
we
do
this?
You
know
the
default
is
like
you
know,
shares
and
tech
leads.
You
know
we,
like
you
know,
take
you
know
just
do
whatever
and
then
the
there's
a
PR
here
for
not
there
there's
a
PR
for
a
template
so
that
a
bunch
of
the
chairs
of
the
other
SIG's
we're
like.
B
And
so
we
don't
want
it
like
I
think.
The
idea
is
that
whoever
does
this
this
is
this,
my
thinking
that
what
this
is
is
this
allows
us
to
potentially
delegate
this
to
somebody
in
the
sig
to
write
this
down
and
it's
sort
of
a
it's
a
little
bit
of
a
checklist.
Okay.
Well,
have
they
done
a
presentation
you
know
like
do?
We
know
do
like
a
quick
reference
to
all
the
things
so
that
we
can
say
like
okay,
we
looked
at
this.
We
understand
it
blah
blah
blah
and
so.
B
B
If
we
are
going
to
be
like
making
a
recommendation
to
the
TOC,
what
do
we
amongst
ourselves
want
to
have
looked
at
right,
so
that
check
it
so
that
we
can
delegate
this
to
a
sig
member
who
would
like
me,
like?
Oh
yeah,
go
meet
with
that
project
and
learn
all
about
it
and
write
something
up,
and
then
everybody
we
didn't
ask
questions
and
be
like
okay,
yeah
yeah.
Here's
something
about
this
project
that
makes
us
say
yay
or
nay
right
like
under
what
condition
would
we
say
yay
or
nay?
B
B
Right
so
like
these
cases
yeah,
this
is
where
I
think
we
should
take
advantage
of
this
being
NPR.
There's
like
a
bunch
of
this
information
is
information
in
the
proposal.
There's
information
in
the
due
diligence
later
there's
stuff
at
our
self-assessment,
like
it
might
be
good
to
do
like
you
should
have
been
a
being
you
like
we
should.
You
know
this
is
probably
a
different
breakout,
but,
like.