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From YouTube: DXgov Weekly Meeting [2020-12-30]
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I
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fixing
these
things
anyway.
Welcome
to
governance,
discussion
for
geek
style
for
december
30th
2020..
I
was
about
to
mess
that
up
to
go
over
the
agenda.
First,
the
beginning:
the
governance,
1.0,
stuff
governance,
gas
refunds,
the
deployment
just
happened,
and
then
our
proposal
roundup
and
then
revisiting
a
post
on
pausing
minting
from
the
bonding
curve,
and
then
that
relates,
I
think,
to
the
multi-call
installation
that
nico
has
been
working
on
and
then
just
touching
briefly
on,
where
we're
at
with
the
worker
comp
guidelines.
C
I
know
there's
been
some
some
developments
there
and
then
would
like
to
talk
briefly
about
dxd
snapshot
and
what
were
what
the
kind
of
planner
thinking
is
with
that
yeah
to
start
with
the
governance,
gas
refunds,
not
much
to
say,
except
for
this,
is
just
the
contract
is
deployed.
C
So
if
you're
looking
to
get
your
refunds
go
ahead,
and
and
do
that
there
it's
a
little
bit
less
than
the
amount
that
we
were
subsidizing
last
time,
but
hopefully
it
should
be
just
as
easy
and
there's
a
the
guide
should
be
the
same
as
before.
Even
though
it's
a
new
contract.
C
And
then
proposal
roundup
after
a
pretty
tumultuous
and
busy
week
a
little
quieter
on
the
proposal
front
this
week
I
know
there
was
gas
was
causing
a
little
bit
of
issues.
So
I
know
that
I
think
elon
and
ezra's
rep
boost
no
one
had
voted
on
until
yesterday,
but
I
think
those
are
now
passing
and
then
there
is
a
couple
other
worker
proposals
and
I
think
that's
about
it
and
I
actually
don't
think
there
are
any
ens
updates.
I
don't
know
if
anyone
had
any
thoughts
or
comments
on
that
related.
B
To
related
to
that-
and
it
also
relates
to
the
refunds-
we
do
see
that
when
gas
is
high
like
clearly,
people
are
way
less
likely
to
vote
so,
even
though
gas
was
high,
I
voted
on
those
because
the
worst
thing
that
happens
is
it
fails
and
no
one
votes
on
it
right.
So,
like
there's
one
day
left,
so
you
just
suck
it
up
and
you
pay
the
gas
it
would
be
like
in
general
nice.
B
If,
if
there's
some,
if
there's
like,
if
that's
more
of
like
a
processing
thing
right,
like
everyone
kind
of
agrees
on
consensus,
that
those
rep
boosts
are
good,
we
don't
need
10
people
voting,
but
if
someone's
gonna
like
process
it
or
someone's
gonna
like
boost
something
or
like
what
I
would
consider
like
processing
and
that's
a
real
cost
to
that
person,
it
doesn't
seem
like
75
refund,
makes
sense.
It's.
Those
in
theory
should
be
100
refunded.
B
I
feel
like
because
it's
almost
like
a
processing
operations
task
and
if
that's
the
cost
to
do
it,
that's
the
cost
of
the
dow.
Otherwise
these
things
fail
and
no
one
votes
on
it,
and
then
it's
a
problem.
So
it's
like
you
know:
a
lot
of
people
spend
a
bunch
of
money
doing
these
votes
just
because
they
have
to
be
vote.
They
have
to
get
done
and
you're
and
it's
costing
money
like
it's
costing
hundreds
of
dollars
over
the
course
of
months
right.
B
C
And
I
guess
staking
is
staking
and
execution
I
think,
are
reimbursed
100
and
I
guess
part
of
the
concern
is,
if
you
do
reverse
100
percent,
then
this
could
just
lead
to
some
additional
expenses
for
geek
stout.
Everyone
is
kind
of
voting
and
doing
that.
So
maybe
there's
some
limit.
We
want
to
make
on
that.
But
yeah
I
mean
things,
get
things
get
weird
when
gas
prices
get
high
like,
for
instance,
I
was
basically
like
watching
those
proposals
and
like
yeah
every
couple
hours.
D
C
Like
oh,
okay,
I'll
wait
and
make
sure
that
this
will
go
through,
but
that's
because,
like
I'm
looking
at
it-
and
maybe
part
of
this
onus
is
on
like
the
person
who's,
boosting
the
proposal
because,
like
the
boost
that
person
actually
has
some
financial
incentive
to
see
that
proposal
pass
and
so
at
the
end
like
they
should
at
least
be
voting
on
it.
But
I
think
that's
somewhat
separate
from
is
the
75
percent
for
voting
refunds,
sufficient
yeah.
C
C
I'm
just
looking
down
it
says
like
21
hours
and
23
minutes,
and
I
think
it
was
boosted
I
mean
I
think
it
was
voted
on
like
a
day
ago.
So.
B
Cool,
so
if,
if
something
because
there
was
no
votes
and
then
one
vote
happens
so
as
long
as
that's
within
48
hours
of
it
of
it
of
it
finalizing,
then
it
goes
into
overtime,
right,
yeah,
yeah,
okay,
so
I
guess
we
gotta,
I
mean
theoretic,
it's
not
a
big
deal.
If
this
goes
into
overtime,
but
in
general
we
should
make
sure
that
we're
watching
them
with
with
at
least
48
hours
to.
B
C
C
And
then
just
because
I
I
checked
the
one
other
proposal
I
forgot
to
mention,
I
checked
the
block
scout
employ
block
explorer
for
this,
but
this
is
a
proposal
to
reimburse
3000
action
into
dx
dot
into
x,
dx
dow,
and
I
actually
wasn't
sure
exactly
what
this
was.
But
it
looked
like
that
the
block
explorer
did
this.
This
address
did
spend
2000
gen.
So
I
don't
know
if
someone
wanted
to
comment
on
that.
B
Yeah,
I
guess
this
is
like
an
example
of
a
of
a
workaround
with
like
bridge
technology
still
being
young,
the
dow
stack
bridge-
I
don't
I
it
looks
like
it.
B
It
was
able
to
do
like
an
alternate
receiver
so
like
theoretically,
a
multi-sig
on
mainnet
could
send
gen
through
the
dow
stack
bridge
to
the
xdx
dao,
but
when
it
when,
when
we
tried
it
didn't
work,
so
instead,
someone
sent
jen
directly
or
xgen
directly
into
the
dao,
and
then
that
same
wallet
address
looks
like
is
asking
for
the
same
amount
of
gen
that
was
sent
to
x,
dx
dial
reimbursed
as
gen.
So
it's
I
mean
x,
gen
and
gen
are
equal
one
to
one,
and
it's
really
just
like
a.
B
C
And
there's
no,
there
is
a
little
bit
of
a
leap
of
faith
from
whoever
is
submitting
that
proposal
that
the
that
rep
holders
will
re.
I
guess
reimburse
according
to
that.
I
guess
what
makes
sense
for
people
that
have
maybe
gone
through
the
proposal
process
and
under
and
having
expectations
of
what
rep
holders
will
will
do,
but
I
think,
maybe
that
little
bit
of
leap
of
faith
might
be
holding
people
up
a
little
bit.
I
mean
because
I
think
the
die
and
the
mental
balance.
C
I
think
it's
a
it's
an
interesting
idea
and
I
think,
would
be
more.
We
would
be
implementing
on
some
kind
of
larger
scale
if,
if
we
didn't
have
the
mo
the
multi-call
scheme
kind
of
coming
coming
down
the
pipe,
I
don't
know
if
there's
a
concern
like
do.
We
want
to
push
that
in
some
more
formal
way.
C
B
The
so
that
that
tool
basically
works
better.
Let's
say
we
want
200
000
die
into
dx
dao
getting
200
000
die.
That
way
is
going
to
be
a
huge
pain
right,
but
once
we
use
the
multi
call
or
something
and
do
us
trade
and
we
get
200
000
die
into
being
dow.
If
you
wanted
to
like
maintain
200
000
die
so
like
if
it
dips
to
190,
there's
some
incentive
to
push
it
back
up
to
200,
and
so
you
have
some
target
in
mind.
B
It's
a
good
tool
for
that
for
maintaining
a
certain
target
within
a
dow,
because
then
you're
only
gonna
have
to
do
like
smaller
clips.
Like
you,
it
would
be
hard
to
get
200
000
die
worth
of
people's
taking
this
slight
leap
of
faith.
Even
if
there's
a
discount
to
the
market
price
to
get
200
000
die
into
the
dial.
So
once
we
have
the
die
in
there
like,
maybe
we
could
implement
it
to
maintain
a
target
amount
which
would
be
cool.
B
I
guess
one
thing
like
in
the
unboosted
proposals:
it
looks
like
there's
quite
a
few
these
days
and
like
a
bunch
of
them
are
like
mistake
proposals.
It
would
be
nice
to
be
able
to
like
hide
or
mark
like
if
someone
makes
a
mistake
proposal
like
really
it's
their
market,
don't
have
to
be
looking
at
it
right.
Yeah,
yeah,.
C
Yeah
I
mean
I
I've
like
gotten
used
to
that,
but
I
think
that
is
yeah.
That
is
the
kind
of
something
that,
if
you're
coming
to
you're
looking
at
the
voting
interface
for
the
first
time,
that
might
be
a
little
confusing
and
especially
because
now
we're
just
it's
almost
like
there's
just
like
a
little
bit
of
trash
down
there
at
the
bottom.
So.
E
C
C
F
E
B
One,
what
would
be
cool
is
just
a
sub
section,
so,
right
now
we
have
boosted
like
boosting
and
regular,
and
then,
if
the,
if
the
person
signs
it,
it
just
goes
below
that
into
another
section
called
like
graveyard
proposals,
and
it
just
sits
there
until
it
expires.
So
you
just
have
one
more
section
down
below
which
is
like
the
graveyard
you
can
put
in
there.
E
C
The
other,
the
other
signal
is
most
of
the
ones
at
the
bottom-
have
been
unboosted
right
like
they
were,
so
they
have
some
gen
staked
against
it.
I
think
all,
but
like
one
of
those
do
because
I
remember,
for
instance,
one
of
them
down
there
like
I
had
boosted,
but
then
it
was
working
proposal
and
then
I
unboosted
it,
and
so
now
it's
just
kind
of
there.
C
D
C
B
B
C
Yeah
and
also
capital
capitalized
letters
searching
is
always
great,
but
I
think
that,
like
interface,
is
a
very
good
way
to
like
now
go
and
see
like
what's
about
to
happen
in
geek
style
governance.
What's
happening
now
with
as
the
way
is
this
is
failing.
This
is
boosted.
This
is
gonna
pass.
I
think
it's
a
good
good
start
for.
C
C
Cool
and
then
wanted
to
shift
to
the
post
all
right,
already
pausing
minting
from
the
bonding
curve.
So,
of
course,
after
the
proposal
passed,
I
think
it
was
on
christmas
day.
It
was
the
christmas
afternoon,
the
after
two
overtime
sessions,
the
immediately
halt,
the
bonding
curve
proposal
did
pass
and
so
john
had,
I
think,
taken
the
first
crack
on
what
the
next
steps
would
be
to
implement
that
and
he's
got
a
post
there
on
some
of
the
things.
I
think
there's
kind
of
three
steps
that
he
said
there.
C
One
is
install
a
plug-in
that
would
allow
dick
style
to
control
the
curve.
Two
is
conduct
a
technical
review
of
any
technical
problems,
of
raising
the
the
price
too
high,
and
then
three
actually
set
the
bonding
curves
min
investment
parameter
to
an
extremely
high
price,
which
would
effectively
pause
the
curve.
C
There
is,
I
think,
so,
the
plug-in
proposal
to
install
new
plugins.
I
think
it
takes
a
total
of
16
days,
so
that
does
have
some
installation
or
some
some
time
there,
but
I
think
this
could
also
be
part
of
the
multi-call
scheme,
effort
that
we're
that
we're
working
on
here.
So
we
could
just
have
the
bonding
curve,
be
one
of
the
contracts.
I
think
that
the
multi-call
scheme
could
interact
with,
and
so
that
needs
to
go
through
its
own.
C
That
would
would
allow
us
to
maybe
shoot
two
birds
with
one
stones
in
terms
of
getting
that
proposal,
the
plug-in
through
yeah.
So
I
don't
know
if
I
guess
john's
not
on
the
call
to
talk
to
answer
questions
about
the
post,
but
how
are
kind
of
people
thinking
about
the
next
steps
forward
for
halting
the
bonding.
G
G
Well,
even
now
that
I
voted
against
the
the
other
proposal,
I
would
try
to
take
care
to
maintain
the
exact
world
right.
This
is
what
I
mean.
I
voted
against
the
harding
of
the
bonding
euro,
but
if
I
see
that
our
governance,
it
is
at
stake
and
the
war
that
the
exile
is
at
risk,
I
will
jump
on
and
defend
the
extra
war
and
commitment,
even
though
I
disagree
with
the
actions
that
we
are
that
we
are
about
to
take.
B
You
also
have
that
snapshot.
I
don't
know
someone
created
a
snapshot
proposal
about
that
vote
as
well,
which
is
interesting.
It's
it's
only
got
a
little
traction
so
far,
but
it
would
be
great
if
we
could
get
more
dxt
holders
just
to
like,
like
vote
on
that
as
well.
Just
to
like
reaffirm
it,
I
guess
would
be
awesome
right.
G
Also,
the
snapshot
either
snapshot
website
or
or
smart
contracts
or
anything
recognized
by
the
exile
shouldn't.
We
signal
that
we
recognize
that
the
excel
the
snapshot
as
a
part
of
something
official
or
it
is
not
right,
because
the
idea
for
that
is
to
was
always
to
use
the
dxe
guild,
which
has
taken
more
time
because
it
took
some
more
time
because
we
are
waiting
for
it
and
we
had
other
priorities.
B
Clearly
it
doesn't
lead
to
anything
official,
but
it
is
a
good
way
to
get
sense
from
known
dxd
versus
we
used
to
just
ask
dxd
holders
like
on
twitter
or
like
on
telegram
right.
So
at
least
this
is
better
but
like
yes,
dx
dxd
guilds
is
is
what
we
really
want
to
use
right
and
when
that's
ready
we
can.
We
can
make
that
more
an
official
dx,
dow
tool,
but
you're
saying
do
you?
Do
we
need
to
do
a
proposal
that,
like
recognizes
snapshot
right.
H
So
I
I
can
see
the
confusion
here
just
because
it
seems
like
we've
had
a
lot
of
when
I
was
even
thinking
about
starting
to
update
the
governance
guidebook.
I
feel
like
we're
pretty
much
in
a
interesting
influx
period
between
between
governance,
2.0,
the
guilds
fractalization
and
some
of
the
signaling
stuff
we've
been
playing
around
with,
and
I
think
it's
good
to
try
things
out.
H
But
we
do
need
to
start
kind
of
gathering
all
of
our
different
ideas
and
figuring
out,
which
ones
we
really
want
to
put
resources
behind.
And
that
includes
communicating
to
the
community
what
we
consider
to
be
like
the
legitimate
way
to
signal
and
how
we
want
to
take
on
just
voting
in
general.
But
I
do
agree
with
you
sky
that
I
think
that
the
snapshot
is
a
nice
tool
to
get
dxd
holders
more
involved.
G
Yeah,
I
just
wanted
to
say
that
I
think
a
snapchat
is
a
great
it's
a
great
step
over
telegram
that
there
is
a
lot
of
people
telegram
and
another.
I
know
we
can
call
it
informant
channels
where
they
can
claim
hey,
I'm
a
dxe
holder,
but
you
you
cannot
prove
how
much
the
how
much
you
have.
How
much
have
you?
How
long
have
you
had
dxe?
Were
you
one
of
the
early
investors?
So
a
two-legged
snapshot
is
already
super
useful
because
we
know
the
sentiment.
G
B
Yeah-
and
there
was
some
decent
turnout
on
the
first,
which
was
a
test
proposal.
You
know
getting
getting
the
snapshot.
B
We
all
hold
probably-
and
you
probably
go-
never
never
go
look
at
it
right,
so
it
takes
that
extra
bit
of
effort
as
a
token
holder
to
go
to
snapshot
care
about
the
governance
for
that
token
choose
to
vote
on
that
token
and
deal
with
like
the
noise
of
the
other,
like
proposals
that
aren't
important.
So
that's
still
like
the
hurdle
that
has
to
be
over
come.
H
Maybe
we
could
put
something
on
dow
talk,
just
kind
of
legitimizing
the
use
of
snapshot
as
kind
of
something
we
want
dxd
holders
to
go
to
as
we're
figuring
out
how
to
do
something
more
on
chain,
and
that
could
be
maybe
just
a
good
hat
tip
to
say,
hey.
This
is
something
dxdow's
talking
about,
and
it's
a
good
way
for
dxd
holders
to
have
their
voices
heard.
C
Yeah,
I
think
it's
hard
to
have
too
much
signal,
so
I
think
like
we
should
be
welcoming
new
ways
of
signals
just
because
we're
a
lot
of
ways
we're
flying
blind
in
this.
So
I
definitely
welcome
that.
I
think
it
is
about
it's
also
about
voter
engagement,
so
I
think
we
need
to
encourage
the
use
of
that
and
I
guess
the
question
is:
what
can
we
do
to
encourage
the
use
of
that
and
so?
C
Well,
I
think
the
the
bonding
curve
proposal
is
important.
I
wonder
if
that's
kind
of
like
the
best
way
to
start
engagement
on
like
the
snapshot,
so
I'm
wondering
if
there's
something,
maybe
with
swapper
or
something
else,
that
we
can
have
like
some
type
of
vote
by
dxd
holders
that
would
drive
engagement
to
snapshot
that
we
could
potentially
like
link
to
in
that
first
post
in
dow
talk
where
we're
kind
of
explaining
the
role
of
snapshot,
any
ideas
on
what
what
we
could
do
or
just
kind
of
do,
the
bonding
proposal.
C
H
B
Yeah
on
on
the
first
test
proposal,
which
which
was
good
like
do
dxd
holders
want
to
be
able
to
vote
on
signal
or
whatever,
whatever
it
was
exactly
like.
My
guess
was.
I
can't
like
I
was
guessing
an
over
under
a
5000
would
be
something
good
and
we
got
about
5
000
dxg
votes
out
of
out
of
what
48
000
or
whatever
49
000.
So
that's,
okay,
it's
not
like
a
super
majority,
but
it's
like
pretty
good.
C
And
I
think
this
actually
sets
up
very
well
for
the
guild,
the
dxd
guild
itself,
because
it
kind
of
starts
the
engagement
starts
kind
of
getting
things
running
on
that.
So
I
think
that
will
be
that'll
kind
of
slide
right
into
this.
It's
almost
like
snapshots,
the
the
first
or
like
the
draft
version
of
dxd
voting,
but
we
can
start
to
engage
people
then.
C
We
were
talking
about
the
pausing
minting
for
the
bonding
post,
john,
that
you
wrote,
and
so
we
were
just
kind
of
thinking
of
the
the
next
steps
there,
and
so
I
guess
the
idea
now
is
to
combine
that
first
step
the
plug-in
proposal,
step
with
the
multi-call
scheme
proposal
itself,
and
so
I
guess
that's
kind
of
the
first
thing
that
we
need
to
get
that
we
need
to
do
in
order
to
start
to
execute
on
that,
and
so
what?
What
exactly?
C
D
Yeah,
installing
a
plug-in
is
the
next
step
and
I
think
it
makes
sense
to
use
the
multi,
because
the
multical
scheme
is
about
ready
to
go
and
basically
it
can
point
to
multiple
contracts.
So
I
think
we
were
going
to
do
this.
Anyways
basically
add
the
bonding
curve
to
that
list,
and
then
you
know
that
accomplishes
that
that
first
step
of
having
a
plug-in
to
connect
and
control
the
bonding
curve
parameters,
but
yeah
niko
could
speak
more
to
where
we
are
at
with
that.
D
I
think
it's
the
matter
of
testing
and
then
making
the
proposal
to
install
the
plugin.
I
don't
know
if
you
want
to
do
some
more
testing
on
x9.
I
was
a
little
confused
on
that
myself.
F
Yeah,
that's
like
the
question
I
have
too
and
I
would
maybe
propose
it
in
a
downtown
post,
so
maybe
making
a
little
poll
there
what
people
think
if
we
should
do
a
test
on
xdi
first
or
if
we
should
test
the
multi
call
directly
on
mainnet.
F
So
that's
like
just
a
just
a
question
we
need
to
find
concerns
about,
but
basically
the
next
steps
to
be
able
to
use
the
multicall
scheme
would
be
that
we
tested
either
on
xtype
or
directly
on
mainnet,
and
once
we
tested
it,
we
can
directly
interact
with
the
bonding
curve
contract
and
do
whatever
changes
we
want
to
do
so.
F
D
I
think
maybe
it
makes
sense
to
make
mozzarella
install
it
both
on
mainnet
and
on
xdi,
since
next
day
is
faster.
It
gives
us
time
to
test
on
xdi
if,
for
some
reason
something
gets
discovered,
that's
a
problem.
The
mainnet
proposal
would
not
have
passed
yet
anyways.
C
Yeah
and
just
thinking
about
timing
here,
because
because
I
think
we
had
thought
about-
maybe
the
multi-call
scheme-
at
least
I
was
thinking
about
this.
Maybe
the
multi-call
scheme
plug-in
proposal
is
an
opportunity
to
get
a
majority
vote
just
because
I
think
that
was
something
that
could
could
attract
enough.
C
C
F
Yes,
almost
ready,
like
the
only
little
part
I
just
missed,
is
like
that.
We
actually
need
to
wait
until
someone
deploys
the.
F
That's
because
we
need
to
have
the
address
of
the
contract
once
it
was
deployed
to
actually
whitelist
it
on
the
on
the
multi-core
scheme,
but
yeah.
We,
we
should
see
some
action
there
and
should
be
good
to
put
up
the
installation
plugin.
B
Sweet,
I
I
know
this.
This
topic
may
make
things
more
complicated,
but
like
there's
always
the
risk
that
someone
is
able
to
do
something
with
the
multi
call
and
like
get
a
proposal
through.
That
does
something
that
we
don't
expect
right.
That's
like
the
biggest
risk
right,
the
safest
way
to
protect
against
that
would
be
to
like
have
dx
dao
like
number
two
put
some
funds
in
there
and
then
do
all
this
stuff
from
that
second
down
right.
But
that
causes
a
lot
of
complexities
and
things
is
that
is.
B
F
Exactly
the
same,
but
the
sky,
what
you
just
described
is
exactly
the
decision
we
took,
so
we
decided
that
we
don't
want
to
use
the
vertical
scheme
to
actually
transfer
any
kind
of
tokens
or
funds
natively.
F
So
currently
it
can
just
interact
with
contracts,
but
it
cannot
move
any
of
the
funds
from
the
treasury,
which
means
in
case
of
the
swapper
liquidity
or
on
the
trade.
We
have
to
create
a
separate
proposal
that
basically
transfer
the
tokens
or
esc
20
balances
into
the
relayers
first.
So
that's
like
kind
of
the
software
that
is
holding
the
contracts
and
then
the
multicall
basically
just
executes
the
transactions
we
want
to
execute.
So
that's
that's
how
we're
doing
it
right
now.
F
We
want
to
continue
to
research
better
pattern,
but
as
of
now
that
seems
to
be
a
proper
solution
just
to
make
sure,
even
if
we
got
attacked,
nobody
can
train
the
treasury
funds
at
all.
F
A
C
And
just
looking
a
little
bit
more
at
the
post
from
nico
that
there
are
some
kind
of
decisions
that
we
should
make
on
the
specific,
I
guess
the
parameters
of
the
scheme,
and
so
I
think
john
had
some
thoughts
on
on
maybe
adjusting
some
of
them
and
then
geronimo,
I
think,
created
a
poll
on
on
some
of
them.
So
I
think
that
the
polls
are.
The
three
polls
are
first,
what
should
the
queued
vote
period
limit
be
for
the
multi-call
schemes?
C
I
think
this
is
how
long
it
would
take
proposals
to
expire
sky,
to
your
point
about
clutter
earlier
two.
What
should
the
proposing
rep
reward
be
for
the
multi-call
scheme
so
right
now
any
proposal
is
given,
I
think
500
rep,
and
so
should
we
potentially
lower
that
and
then
three
should
we
disable
the
voters,
reputation,
loss
ratio,
so
no
one
is
losing
any
reputation
by
voting
on
proposals,
so
this
is
in
the
current
scheme.
C
If
you
vote
on
a
proposal
before
it's
boosted,
you
basically
stake
your
reputation
and
put
it
put
it
at
risk.
I
think
yeah
there's
some.
I
don't
know
if
anyone
has
any
thoughts
on
these
or
corgis
or
john
wanna
speak
more
to
them.
I
Yeah
regarding
the
proposing
rep
reward,
it
is
connected
to
the
question
regarding
if
the
d
star
is
fractalizing
itself
seeing
omen,
then
those
rewards
should
be
happening
on
the
guild
side,
and
then
I
don't
see
like
why.
H
I
Exactly
like,
like
I
see
the
market
curation
process,
for
example,
stuff
like
that,
should
be
rewarded
not
only
for
workers
like
our
goal,
should
it's
very
specific
use
case
right
now,
but
it's
it
is
a
very
helpful
tool
for
community
invites
right.
I
We
have
a
lot
of
like
a
few
oman
hardcore
guys
who
would
like
to
get
rewarded
for
that
and
seeing
that
rather
on
the
guild
side,
and
not
on
the
I
mean
the
d
star
itself
will
delegate
to
the
guild
a
lot
of
work
regarding
omen,
which
is
definitely
the
right
way,
because
a
lot
of
dxdo
rep
holders
are
not
looking
at
the
market
creation
and
they
shouldn't
like
it's.
It's
a
lot
of
work
to
verify,
market
validity
and
stuff
like
that.
B
The
tricky
thing
I
see
is
that
while
you
want
the
guild,
rep
distributions
to
really
be
their
own
monster
and
expand
to
like
that,
those
communities
of
those
products
and
things
at
the
same
time,
you
still
want
dx,
dow
rep
distribution
to
continue
to
grow
and
spread,
and
actually
a
lot
of
that
will
also
want
to
be
spread
to
the
same
people
that
are
helping
the
products
and
the
guilds
of
dxdow.
So
you
kind
of
have
to
do
you
want
to
maybe
do
both.
B
I
I
I
see
your
point
yeah
yeah
and
also
like
if,
if
the
excel
goes
fractalization
a
lot
of
stuff
will
will
go
like
a
level
lower
like
guilt
level,
but
there
will
be
like
I
hope,
proposals
which
are
like
way
more
activist
style
and
those
should
be
like
rewarded,
yeah
right
yeah.
I
don't
have
anything
against
keeping
the
rewards
for
the
g's,
the
external
level.
B
I
mean
part
of
it
so
like,
for
example,
the
the
xdx
dow
there's
now
a
few
people
that
got
some
rep
from
the
omen
markets,
sourcing,
competition
right
and
they
have
that
rep
on
on
xdxdow,
currently
there's
an
argument.
There's
a
maybe
it's
it'd
be
smart
to
also
like
have
an
option
where
they
can
get
that
rep
on
on
mainnet
as
well.
Right
like
they
earn
that,
and
it's
not
just
the
x
die
rep
that
they
that
they
earn.
B
Maybe
they
earned
some
rep
for
mainnet
as
well,
so
some
kind
of
top-up
or
something
we've
we've
talked
about
in
the
past.
But
we
don't
have
a
great
way
to
do
it
at
this
point.
But
these
guild
rep,
the
reps
of
the
guild
and
the
rep
of
mainnet,
I
think,
are
highly
connected
to
each
other,
because
anyone
contributing
to
one
is
contributing
to
the
other
one
as
well,
but
it
gets
complicated.
I
Yeah,
it's
a
that's
like
a
major
governance,
2.0
question
which
could
be
answered
by
just
saying
yes
or
no
like
as
soon
as
the
omen
team
and
community
is
moving
into
its
guilds.
There
is
no
reason
why,
if
I
am
working
full-time
on
oman,
I
should
get
pxt
rep
right.
Then
it's
like
the
question
how
much
d
style
rep
did
give
will
get
per
successful,
quarterly
results
or
something
like
that.
C
Yeah,
I
think
that's
I
mean
that's
assuming
that
you
would
be
like
sending
proposals
to
the
guild
themselves.
So
I
think,
like
I
guess
for
this-
that
we
do
need
to
get
some
consensus
on
the
specifics
of
these
parameters,
because
I'd
actually
think
that
three
ones
that
you
did
polls
on,
I
think
all
there's,
I
think
all
should
be
changed
or
altered
in
some
way
and
that'll
kind
of
have
effect
very
right
now
and
soon
so
on.
C
Just
those
kind
of
three
parameters,
I'm
just
gonna,
update
on
what
the
the
polls
are
so
right.
Now
the
q
vote
period
limit
with
eight
votes.
The
average
rate
is
19.25
days.
Currently
it's
45
and
then
the
proposing
rep
reward.
The
average
rating
is
162.
right
now
it's
400
500.
and
then
should
we
disable
voters,
reputation,
loss
ratio,
so
no
one
is
losing
any
reputation
by
voting
on
proposals
right
now
with
eight
votes.
75,
yes,
25!
C
No,
so
just
to
get
some
idea
that
we
can
narrow
down
on
these
numbers
so
that
we
can
move
forward
with
the
plug-in.
I
Yeah,
I'm
curious
why
people
want
to
have
like
I
for
me,
it's
totally
reasonable
to
have
like
14
days,
cute
vote
period
like
why
do
people
want
a
longer
time
frame.
H
D
So
the
21
or
whatever
this
q
vote
period
limit,
is
how
long
it
takes
to
expire
if
it's
not
boosted
right
so
so
I
agree
with
the
like
fact
that
I
mean
we're
already
it's
difficult
to
get
to
the
50
and
get
the
absolute
majority,
but
this
is
sort
of
like
the
time
you
need.
D
C
And
we
were
actually
talking
about
this
at
the
beginning,
was
the
clutter
at
the
bottom
of
the
current
proposal
queue.
So
I
think
that
this
is
something
that
we
see
now
of
a
lot
of
different
ones
is
yeah,
so
I
mean,
I
think
I
I
definitely
think
we
need
a
shorter
period
for
that.
I
do
think
there
is
a
benefit
to
like
even
what
we're
doing
now
with
the
plug-in
scheme,
which
is
we're
kind
of
testing,
while
the
proposal
is
in
the
queue
right
and
there's
some
flexibility
for
us
to
have
that.
C
I
But
piper
actually
made
a
really
great
point
like
again.
If
we
are
going
to
fractalization
part
and
seeing
like
moses
dao,
maybe
is
getting
some
rap
geeks
downrip,
then
I
guess
this.
The
whole
proposal
process
will
be
actually
increasing
in
time
to
make
sure
that
all
those
slow-moving
dows
are
able
to
participate
in
voting
like
thinking
longer
term,
but
right
now
I
don't
think
we
need
to
have
like
a
very
long
period.
C
B
I
Yeah
I
mean
the
guilt
like
I.
I
don't
expect
the
guilt
to
have
a
lot
of
money,
so
there
there
could
be
ways
to
like
reduce
the
voting
process
on
the
guild
side.
But
that's
like
a
it's
a
very
interesting
question:
how
we're
going
to
deal
with
all
of
this
stuff.
B
I
B
I
D
B
H
H
D
Right,
like
I
mean
I
agree
with
the
point
that
it
could
be
difficult
in
general
to
get
the
50,
but
then
you
don't
need
that
to
pass,
though
you
you
can
still
pass
it
by
boosting
it.
So
that
makes
sense.
So
I'm
not
sure
that
really
impacts.
Like
I
agree
with
your
concern,
I
don't
think
it
really
changes
things,
though,
because
because
if
you
boost
it,
then
you
can
still
pass
it.
I
Then
no
problem
yeah,
so
it
looks
like
21
days
for
acute
voted
period.
Limit
is
a
signal
which
is
totally
fine
by
me.
D
For
the
last
question,
the
voter
reputation
loss
ratio
so
like
I
actually
think
that
in
general,
it's
maybe
not
a
bad
idea
to
have
voters
put
a
little
bit
of
skin
in
the
game
in
their
boats,
but
at
least
how
it
currently
works.
I'm
not
really
a
big
fan
of
the
way
it
currently
works
is
the
the
reputation
gets
staked
if
you
vote
before
it's
boosted,
so
basically
what
that
means.
D
C
H
But
also
for
us,
of
course,
we're
constantly
checking
you
know
people
who
are
working
like
or
contributing
frequently
to
the
dow
you're
constantly
checking
alchemy,
but
maybe
you're,
just
like
okay,
I
have
a
small
amount
of
time.
I'm
gonna
go
vote
really
quickly,
and
then
you
basically
decide
not
to
vote,
because
at
that
point
it's
not
boosted
right,
so
that
could
just
kind
of
disincentivize.
C
And
I
actually
also
think
we're
missing
an
opportunity
for
early
votes
to
be
signals
for
boosting
right.
So
you,
like
you,
have
a
proposal
submitted
and
like
it
already
gets
one
and
a
half
percent
or
like
two
percent
votes
right
after
it's
submitted
even
before
it's
boosted.
That
could
be
a
signal
to
someone
that
wants
to
boost
it,
or
you
know
looking
at
specifically
who
the
people
voting
on.
That
could
be
a
signal
for
those
that,
like
want
to
boost
so
yeah,
I
I
don't
think
there's
a
reason
for
that.
H
B
H
B
Yeah
and
and
then
to
the
the
middle,
I
think
it's
the
middle
question.
The
should
people
get
rep
to
make
proposals.
B
I
like
the
idea
of
that,
because
it
helps
distribute
rep
now,
if
it's
always
the
same
people,
that's
a
that's
an
issue,
the
whole
thing
about
it,
giving
more
rep
to
people
that
already
have
four
percent.
That
is
an
issue,
but,
as
we've
talked
about
in
other
discussions,
if
rep
becomes
like
a
measure
of
contribution
and
then
you
just
limit
the
ability
to
for
someone
to
vote
only
up
to
using
four
percent
of
their
rep
and
they
can't
even
if
they
have
five
percent,
they
can
only
vote
with
four
percent
of
it.
B
It's
a
good
thing
to
keep
as
a
measurement
of
contribution
and
proposals
and
stuff,
and
we
just
our
concern,
is
limiting
voting
power
to
only
four
percent
of
rep.
So
if
we're
going
to
go
with
that
path,
then
we
should
maybe
even
keep
this
and
it
gets.
500
gets
the
inflated
over
time.
So,
as
as
more
rep
happens,
it
becomes
over
time
a
smaller
and
smaller
amount
right,
yeah.
I
I
think
it's
helpful
to
look
what
is
like
the
average
amount
of
like
what
is
the
total
amount
of
proposals
done
by
workers
who
already
getting
rep
and
how
many
like
community
contributions
we
actually
have.
And
if
it's
like
eight
out
of
ten
proposals,
it's
workers
then
right.
H
So
that's
I
that's
what
I
saw
from
that
last
bit
of
data
poll.
We
did
on
the
some
of
the
proposals.
H
Of
course,
the
majority
of
proposals
are
coming
from
workers,
but
I
I
mean
it's
kind
of
like
incentivizing
two
interests,
if,
like
our,
if
our
purpose
with
the
whole
limit
of
four
percent
rep
for
workers
is
just
to
keep
the
decentralization
goal
afloat,
we
can
still
do
that
and
just
say
you
know,
even
if
a
worker's
making
a
proposal
is
there
a
way
to
just
modify
the
parameters
so
that,
if
that
address
has
already
four
percent
rep,
they
just
don't
get
the
rep
reward,
but
even
if
they
don't,
if
they're
making
proposals,
it's
like
hey
you're,
a
good
worker,
you're,
doing
good
work.
H
You
you
get
more
rep
until
you
hit
that
four
percent
marker
so
that
we
at
least
don't
limit.
You
know
people
who
aren't
you
know
employed
by
the
dow
to
get
rep
through
proposals.
H
B
It
sounds
like
it
would
be.
The
system
gives
the
rep
and
then
you
would
have
to
implement
something
that
checks
if
over
four
percent
splash
that
rep
that
you
were
just
given,
because
the
dow
can
flash
rep
right,
so
it
would
have
to
be
like
instead
of
not
giggling.
Probably
the
system
just
gives,
because
that's
what
it's
built
to
do
and
then
you
have
to
then
slash
it
right
afterwards
or
something.
H
I
think
we
were
specifically
talking
about
it
regarding
the
auction
with
the
the
dxd
wilkins,
so
I
know
it
could
be
possible,
but
again,
I'm
not
technically
savvy
enough
to
know
how
difficult
it
is,
and
I
don't
want
to
over
complicate
things
but
just
kind
of
find,
a
solution.
F
G
So
it
is
possible
because
solidity
is
a
touring
complete
machine,
but
this
is
something
that
I
think
it
will
be
way
better
if
we
just
enforce
it
on
the
yeah.
How
can
we
say
on
a
social
level
right
on
the
on
the
proposal
level,
for
example,
something
where
we
make
sure
that
no
one
gets
more
reputation
that
the
one
that
we
that
the
limit
that
we
enforce
yeah
it
can
be
implemented
on
chain,
but
I
think
that
will
make
sense
if
we
are
like
a
super
big
organization.
G
For
example,
we
have
like
you,
know
thousands
of
voters
or
people,
and
it
will
be
hard
to
manage
that
limit
manually,
but
we
are
small
enough
where
we
can
still
enforce
that
limit
in
a
manual
way,
even
more
now
with
the
multi-core,
where
I
think
that
we
will
be
able
to
mean
unburned
reputation
of
multiple
accounts.
At
the
same
time,
through
a
through
the
same
proposal,
white
nylon,
he
actually
just
dropped
a
little
okay,
but
yeah.
We
are
going
to
be
able
to
do
that.
To
bar.
I
mean
reputation
multiple
times
through
one
proportion.
G
H
C
Yeah
and
I
think
what
we're
finding
is
we're
running
into
some
problems
or
issues
that
we're
facing
and
then
we're
looking
to
solve
those
like
direct
issues,
but
in
a
lot
of
ways.
These
are
just
parameters
for
the
governance
system
in
general,
so
I
think
we
should
be
thinking
about
what
is
best
for
that,
rather
than
you
know.
What
specifically
our
our
problems
are.
I
think,
with
this
one
there's
the
the
max
rep
and
I
I
really
like
the
idea
of
permissionless
rep
and
I
think
rewarding
proposal.
C
Submission
winners
with
rep
is
the
only
real
permissionless
rep
we
have,
and
I
think,
like
rep
distribution
is
like
an
inherent
good
in
the
world
and
we
should
encourage
it
when
we
have.
But
I
agree
with
the
sentiment
on
these
specifics
that
we
don't
need
to
be
like
just
issuing
a
lot
of
rep
to
those
there.
So
I'm
in
favor
of
some
type
of
rep
reward
for
proposal
submission,
but
also
in
favor
of
like
something
that
makes
sure
that
that
is
not
for
everyone.
D
To
be
aware
of,
is
that
the
funding
and
rep?
I
can
never
remember
the
actual
name
of
this
plugin.
The
main
plugin
that
we
use
for
funding
is
like
500,
rep
reward,
but
other
ones
don't
have
the
500
reward.
Other
ones
are
lower.
Most
of
them,
I
think,
are
lower
and
this
multi
call
is
actually
like
replacing
all
those
other
ones
right.
So
so,
actually
500
is
probably
the
wrong
reference
point
here.
D
Anyways
like
you,
should
probably
actually
go
look
at
what
the
the
token
registry
one
is
in,
like
wherever
most
of
the
other
proposals
are
actually
happening,
and
so,
like,
I
think
in
theory.
I
agree
with
what
everybody's
saying
here,
like
it's
nice
to
reward
participation,
but
I
think
you
have
to
observe
what's
happening
in
practice
and
I
think
what's
actually
happening
in
practice.
Is
people
like
myself
are
actually
just
getting
more
rep
when
I
should
be
maxed
out
and
that's
like
actually
undermining
like
some
of
our
important
goals,
which
is
to
increase
distribution?
D
C
I'm
actually
not
sure
if
it's
not
increasing
distribution,
even
though
you're
getting
it
and
like,
even
though
there's
centralization
I
think
in
like
that,
doesn't
mean
that
there's
not
other
distribution
to
other
people.
That
is
like
worthwhile
for
that,
and
so
I
guess
my
point
is
like:
can
we
solve
that?
One
hiccup,
rather
than
kind
of
like
blowing
up
the
whole
system
of
rep
rewards
for
proposal,
submissions.
B
It's
like
with
rep
boost.
One
of
the
reasons
we
want
people
to
get
their
own
rep
boost
is
so
that
someone
in
that's
already
working
for
dick
style
doesn't
submit
all
the
rep
boost
and
get
the
rep.
We
want
people
to
learn
how
to
do
the
proposal,
but
then
they
get
a
little
bit
of
extra
rep
in
addition
to
their
rep
boost
for
submitting
their
proposal,
which
is
which
is
great,
I
think.
D
So
the
generic
scheme-
dx
token
registry
plug-in,
has
a
10
rep
reward
for
and
that's
what
this
multicall
is
replacing
right,
so
you're,
actually
just
in
yeah
who's,
adding
tokens
to
the
registry.
Is
it
everybody
in
the
community?
I
don't
think
so:
who's
who's
making
yeah.
So
you
gotta
think
about
this
right.
You
actually
have
to
go
and
think
about
who's,
doing
it
and
like
and
what
the
actual
like
impact
is.
So.