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From YouTube: Ethereum 1559 community call
Description
Announcement blog - https://medium.com/ethereum-cat-herders/ethereum-1559-community-call-d43d5f0bf909
EIP-1559 resources
- Proposal - https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1559.md
- PEEPanEIP-1559 - https://youtu.be/ZbSKo_x9RvU
- Tim Beiko updates - https://hackmd.io/@timbeiko/1559-updates
- Barnabe’s Notebook - https://github.com/barnabemonnot/abm1559/tree/master/notebooks
- EIP 1559 and Fee Structure by Vitalik Buterin - https://vitalik.ca/files/misc_files/EIP_1559_Fee_Structure.pdf
- What Does a Miner Revolt Look Like? By Micah Zoltu - https://micah-zoltu.medium.com/what-does-a-miner-revolt-look-like-a99216fe270e
- Analysis of EIP-1559 by Hasu & Georgios Konstantopoulos - https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/analysis-of-eip-1559/
- EIP-1559: Fee market change for Ethereum 1.0 chain on Peep an EIP - https://youtu.be/ZbSKo_x9RvU
- ETH miner revenue with and without EIP-1559 - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nkSPk12XvwRGZ73J9ajQX3ue8PY02CAyuJuygcX7bY4/edit#gid=0
And a comprehensive resource list available on Ethereum Cat Herders website - https://github.com/ethereum-cat-herders/ethereum-cat-herders.github.io/blob/master/index.md#1559-fee-market-change
Network upgrade survey - https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScc1vrOXzaoFQZ4uuy2oJnWGibRGSs7anZPyzEfuWGhTTt8pg/viewform
Contact Ethereum Cat Herders
Discord: https://discord.gg/tzYmDmF
Twitter: https://twitter.com/EthCatHerders
Medium: https://medium.com/ethereum-cat-herders
GitHub: https://github.com/ethereum-cat-herders/PM
Email: support@ethereumcatherders.com
Website: https://www.ethereumcatherders.com/
A
A
A
A
Hello,
everyone
and
welcome
to
the
ethereum
1559
community
call
I'm
going
to
be
your
host
and
moderator.
Hudson
and
today
we
have
an
awesome
set
of
panelists
who
are
here
to
discuss
1559.
Let
me
just
give
everyone
kind
of
a
quick
rundown
of
why
we're
having
this
call
and
basically
kind
of
the
guidelines.
A
A
To
help
us
understand
their
viewpoints
on
1559,
no
decisions
about
whether
or
not
1559
is
going
into
ethereum
are
going
to
be
made
today.
This
call
is
completely
separate
from
the
core
developer
calls
and
basically
it
and
the
way
ethereum
governance
is
set
up
right
now
we
kind
of
rely
on
core
developers
to
listen
to
concerns
and
ultimately
make
decisions
on
what
they
code
into
the
software.
So
we're
not
going
to
have
any
you
know
thing
today,
that's
like!
Oh,
this
is
definitely
going
to
happen,
or
this
definitely
isn't
going
to
happen.
A
First,
let
me
see:
oh
here
we
go
yeah,
that's
working
all
right,
I'm
going
to
go
through
each
person
and
give
a
quick
intro.
So
first
we
have
aftab,
who
is
someone
in
the
community
who
is
a
active
user?
Community
advocate
y'all,
probably
seen
him
around
on
twitter.
He's
there
here
to
kind
of
represent
the
user
base.
We
have
barnaby
who's,
an
ethereum
foundation.
Researcher
has
done
the
most
simulation.
Work
for
eip1559
actually
released
a
few
blog
articles.
As
recently
as
last
night.
A
We
have
james
who
was
previously
a
project
manager
for
vulcanize
during
part
of
that
implementation
from
a
while
ago,
and
was
an
eip
champion
during
the
first
phase
of
implementation
a
few
years
ago.
Micah
is
an
eip
editor.
It
also
says
here
he
has
the
most
prs
merged
on
1559
without
being
an
author,
as
he
is
in
the
ip
editor.
A
Thomas
is
a
core
developer
and
client
implementer
for
the
net
ethereum
client
nether,
mind
trent
has
worked
on
gathering
community
sentiment
on
eip
1559
as
a
and
his
kind
of
community
liaison
advocate
tim
is
a
project
manager
for
eip
1559
he's
facilitated
some
of
the
1559
calls
and
wrote.
The
community
updates.
A
Wang
chun
is
from
f2
pool,
which
is
a
major
mining
pool
and
part
of
a
group
of
miners
supporting
1559
bitsby
trippin
michael.
They
are
one
in
the
same
as
a
miner
and
host
of
the
bitsby
trippin
youtube
channel,
which
is
a
very
popular
minor,
hobbyist
and
channel,
and
I
guess
beyond
hobbyist,
actually,
but
just
a
popular
channel
on
mining
and
has
some
really
good
videos
out
there.
A
A
The
next
phase
of
this
is
going
to
be
a
kind
of
a
tl,
dr
from
tim,
about
what
1559
is
and
then
we're
going
to
go
through
and
structure
this
giving
minor
some
time
to
speak
and
then
give
a
broader
group
discussion
based
on
rebuttals
from
people
and
in
response
to
some
of
the
questions
that
might
happen.
We're
also
going
to
have
q
a
from
chat,
we've
taken
questions
from
discord
and
reddit
over
the
past
week,
and
we
also
will
take
youtube
chat
questions.
A
C
I'll
try
to
keep
this
very
short.
I
guess
the
first
thing
I'll
say
is
like
this
is
not
the
place
to
learn
about
1559,
there's
a
ton
of
resources
for
that.
I
believe
some
of
them
are
linked
in
the
youtube
description.
So,
if
you're
unfamiliar
with
the
eve,
I
really
recommend
just
reading
those
before,
because
it
is
quite
a
big
change
and
they
would
take
up
half
the
call
to
properly
go
over
the
nuances,
but
at
a
high
level.
C
What
1559
does
is
it
goes
from
having
gas
prices,
be
something
that's
not
part
of
the
protocol,
so
that's
kind
of
implicit
and
that
we
need
to
estimate
to
have
them
be
explicit
and
be
part
of
the
protocol.
So
we
basically
add
the
minimum
gas
price
that
the
transaction
needs
to
pay
as
part
of
the
block
header.
C
This
has
a
lot
of
nice
benefits,
the
the
biggest
of
which
is
that
it
makes
transaction
fee
estimations
much
simpler
and
and
the
the
reason
for
that
is
that
you
go
from
having
to
estimate
what
everybody
else
is
willing
to
pay
to
be
included
to
just
looking
at
what
is
being
kind
of
proposed
in
the
block
header.
And
if
you
don't
want
to
pay
that
price,
then
you
simply
cannot
be
included
and
there's
a
ton
of
kind
of
ripple
effects
from
that.
C
There
is
obviously,
if
we
pay
miners
no
transaction
fees,
then
they
have
no
incentive
at
all
to
include
transactions
or
even
to
run
a
node
that
has
a
transaction
pool.
So
we
add
this
second
component
to
the
transaction
fees
called
tip
which
earn.
I
believe
it's
called
inclusion
fee
now,
actually,
which
is
the
part
of
the
transaction
fee
that
goes
directly
to
the
miners
and
as
with
our,
I
guess,
models
and
research
on
the
eep.
We
kind
of
expect
that
most
of
the
time
the
tip
is,
is
fairly
low.
C
It
compensate
miners
for
kind
of
the
marginal
cost
of
including
transactions,
but
there's
a
bunch
of
use
cases
where
the
tip
might
be
quite
high.
So
if
you
look
at
things
like
defy
arbitrage,
for
example,
these
transactions
are
quite
valuable
and
people
will
want
to
put
large
tips
on
them
in
order
for
them
to
be
included
fast.
And
then,
when
we
mentioned
earlier
blocks,
we
want
to
keep
them
50
full.
C
A
All
right,
thank
you,
so
much
tim
and
I
forgot
earlier
on
the
intros,
because
it
wasn't
on
the
initial
sheet
pooja,
who
is
the
chief
cat
herder
from
the
ethereum
cat
herders,
is
the
one
who
was
one
of
the
main
organizers
of
this
call.
She's
also
handling
youtube
chat
along
with
trent
who's,
volunteer,
modding,
and
so
everyone
thank
puja
for
helping
organize
a
lot
of
this
next
up.
We're
going
to
give
two
minutes
each
to
each
minor
on
the
call.
D
D
If,
if
now
it's
like,
because
of
the
erp
wanted
finance,
we
have
another
similar
fork
or
anything
in
other
secondary
german
classic.
I
don't
think
it's
going
to
anywhere
if
it's
the
only
support
from
miners,
because
the
instruments
you
know
it's
eastern
has
value
is
not
because
of
some
miners
mining
on
it
because,
but
you
know,
the
server
has
value
is
because
ethereum
is
a
great
platform
and
they
have
developers
have
users
building
applications
and
users
use
ethereum
network
for
for
for
different
cover
applications.
D
So
if
you
think
this
way,
I
think,
like
a
minor
supported
islam,
you
know
is
my
miners.
This
is,
should
be
like
supports
a
security
network
because
they're
getting
a
reward
and
get
him.
You
know
getting
a
lot
of
benefit
from
the
network,
so
but
if
one
day
like
a
miners
is
going
against
the
the
benefit,
the
the
the
you
know,
the
goal
of
the
israel,
I
think
I
think
you
know
we
probably
cannot
like
to
to
to
go
into
the
to
the
same
direction.
D
E
You
know
block
time
block
reward
that
is
exponentially
higher
than
the
reward
and
in
certain
scenarios,
where
you
have
a
reduction
of
price
like
what's
going
on
right
now,
and
if
it
continues
to
hold
that
trend,
you
could
have
a
very
big
unbalance
by
the
time.
This
thing
goes
live
when
it
comes
to
the
burn
where
I've
been
estimating
around
50
of
the
network.
E
Looking
where
that
hash
power
is
going
to
go,
and
you
have
an
attack
vector
that
ethereum
hasn't
had
to
deal
with
where
pretty
much
every
coin
in
the
market,
that
is
proof
of
work
besides,
bitcoin
has
had
to
deal
with,
which
is
a
resistance
attack
against
51
percent
and
it
isn't
theory.
It's
happened
to
almost
every
network
from
on
the
pick
and
network.
That's
not
ethereum
or
bitcoin.
E
Hopefully,
we'll
cover
a
couple
of
those
today
if
vip
1559
goes
in
as
it
is
wholesale,
I
think
there's
still
a
way
to
address
it
through
a
bump
in
the
block
reward
and
there's
models
that
have
been
built
on
that
and
I'll
I'll
point
to
folks
to
that
that
development
that
has
you
know,
been
a
kind
of
a
community
effort
on
explaining.
You
know
that
risk.
So
hopefully
we
can
get
to
that
some
point
today,
but
you
know
that's
where
I
feel
I'm
representing
the
the
larger
group
out
there.
E
F
F
As
we've
talked
to
other
miners,
and
we've
talked
to
the
devs,
we've
come
to
say
that
we
we
don't
mind
one
five,
five,
nine.
I
said
it
does
bring
several
improvements
to
the
ecernium
network
and
honestly,
we
do
think
it
would
improve
things,
but
when
1559
was
first
thought
up
that
the
gas
was
so
small
on
blocks
and
and
now
it's
more
than
double
the
actual
base
fee.
F
As
michael
has
pointed
out,
we
do
believe
the
base
fee
should
be
increased
from
two
to
three
just
so.
Instead
we
have
a
50
drop.
You
have
basically
a
40
drop,
but
also
miners.
We
put
out
sorry
someone
because
I've
been
working
together
with
a
couple
of
minors,
so
one
of
them
put
out
a
poll
on
reddit
and
in
that
poll
we
had
different
options
of
what
miners
want
to
do
so.
F
55.33
percent
of
those
miners
said
they
could
accept
one
five,
five,
nine,
if
969
came
along
with
that,
9669
is
like
the
minimum
change
necessary
to
prevent
broad
asic
proliferation
on
the
network.
As
you
might
remember,
from
two
points
from
etach
2.0,
several
miners
believe
asics
should
not
be
part
of
the
network
along
with
55
of
them.
Voting
for
969.
Seven
percent
of
them
voted
to
increase
the
dag.
A
Okay,
well,
thank
you
so
much
for
that
and
yeah.
If
you
have
a
link
to
the
poll,
throw
it
in
the
zoom
chat
and
we
can.
We
can
take
a
look
at
that
for
anyone
who
wants
to
do
a
rebuttal
for
some
of
that
piece
and
next
up.
Finally,
for
the
for
representing
the
miners
and
not
necessarily
for
khan,
obviously,
but
whatever
they
want
roger
from
in
silicon,
an
asic
manufacturer
go
ahead.
G
G
G
Whatever
the
decision
will
be
we're
just
a
little
bit
nervous
about
the
discussion
about
you
know
attaching
the
I
think
969
erp
like
since
969
on
top
of
the
1559,
because
that's
going
to
you,
know,
they're
going
to
disable
a
lot
of
our
customers
from
being
able
to
continue
to
do
mining.
So
overall,
I
think
because
we
have
the
first
hand,
data
and
overall,
I
believe,
right
now.
The
asic
mine
only
represents
a
small
fraction
of
of
the
total
hash
rate
out
there.
G
We
believe
that
a
lot
of
the
times
we've
been
blamed
on
our
people,
worried
about
you,
know
the
asic
minor
proliferates,
but
in
in
reality
it
probably
only
represents
around
10
percent
of
the
total
health
rate,
if
you
add
all
the
asic
minors
together,
so
we
want
to
say
that
we
we
will
support
whatever
decision
was
made
on
the
1559,
but
we
don't
want
that
969
to
be
added
on
top
of
on
top
of
it
yeah.
I
think
that's
all.
I
want
to
say.
A
B
The
point
where
many
networks
have
had
issues
with
their
security
is
if
they
went
for
gpu
over
asic
mining.
So
I
would
name
this
as
a
different
concern
that
I
have
to
removing
or
to
introducing
erp6
969,
which
is
that
no
network
that
has
asic
mining
or
an
asic
friendly
mining
algorithm
has
ever
been
attacked
with
double
spent
attacks.
Whereas
many
gpu
mining
coins
have.
A
E
Well,
if
we
talk
the
2018
peak,
where
we
hit
about
300
terahash
total
network
and
drew
all
the
way
down
to
136
tara
hash
at
the
lowest
point
and
including
last
year,
we're
at
about
140
terahash
when
we
had
86
those
were
natural
events,
things
pulled
back
down
and
you
know
a
lot
of
miners
turned
off
the
difference
that
this
proposes
is
not
a
gradual
decrease
and
a
decision
point
for
miners.
This
is
an
abrupt
change
at
a
particular
point
in
time,
and
there
are
many
models
where
this
is
a
non-issue.
E
I
would
say
out
of
the
10
or
12
that
are
part
of
that.
The
mining
analysis
sheet
that
I've
done
so
far,
there's
only
a
couple
that
really
put
it
at
a
real
potential
risk
and
that
really
comes
down
to
a
couple
effects.
If
you
have
a
a
descending
price
and
a
high
volume
usage
of
ethereum,
where
disproportionately
the
transaction
fees
make
up
more
than
60
to
80
percent
of
the
miners
intake,
you
know
we.
E
I
can't
tell
you
how
many
times
in
history
where
certain
things
were
said
that
that
wasn't
a
risk
and
it
happened.
You
know
I
know
some
folks
crossing
the
ocean
were
holding
on
to
some
icebergs
because
they
didn't
think
a
ship
would
sink,
and
what
I'm
trying
to
explain
is
that
I
think
we
can
watch
this
as
a
rolling
wave.
I
think
we
can
be
way
ahead
of
it.
I
think,
even
if
eip1559
moves
forward,
it's
a
mo,
it's
like
a
forecast
is
what
we're
doing
right
now.
E
E
You
know
month
over
month,
compounded
growth,
which
we've
seen
since
essentially
november,
with
the
price
increases.
If
that
continues,
and
if
the
price
continues
to
go
up,
you
know
it
may
offset
it,
but
bottom
line
is
to
ensure
that
we're
tracking
it
and
that's
what
I'm
bringing
up
from
a
risk
because,
as
a
minor
of
as
a
a
minor
of
gpus
we're
along
the
entire
crypto
net,
you
know
ecosystem,
meaning
there
is
no
social
contract.
E
E
It
is
not
asic,
you
know,
asics,
do
not.
They
give
a
false
sense
of
security
if,
if,
when
you're
looking
at
a
51
attack,
if
enough
hash
rate
is
purchased
from
a
brokerage
folks
that
are
that
are
going
after
that
that
brokerage
value,
where
they're
going
to
get
more
yield
than
mining
at
a
pool
unbeknownst
to
them,
could
get
be.
Their
asics
could
be
used
to
attack
the
network.
So
I
think
it's
a
fallacy
to
think
that
asics
protect
you
from
that,
because
their
incentives
are
aligned
to
the
coin.
E
A
B
Yeah,
I
guess
to
to
talk
more
about
like
how.
Well
I
guess
it's
always
good-
to
have
like
a
frame
of
reference,
how
much
revenue
we
are
actually
talking
right,
how
much
revenue
could
be
burned
and
and
how
much
how
minor
profitability
would
actually
be
affected.
So
at
this
point
I
think
it's
important
to
like
to
reiterate
that
minor
revenue
consists
of
three
sources.
So
the
first
is
the
block
subsidy.
That's
two,
each
per
block
plus
the
anchor
rewards.
B
That
shows
that
we
believe
that
the
impact
of
mev
on
minor
revenue
has
been
greatly
understated
so
far,
and
so
flashbots
only
gives
us
like
an
absolute
lower
bound
for
how
much
mev
actually
makes
up
of
minor
revenue,
and
we
find
it
quite
likely
that
we
are
talking
at
most
about
a
reduction
of
20
to
30
but
probably
way
lower
revenue
for
miners
due
to
erp
155
f9.
And
that
is
because
mev
transactions
are
not
affected
by
this.
B
B
So
you
don't
need
to
extract
any
view
specifically.
In
fact,
we
cannot
even
see
the
revenue
that
miners
get
by
extracting
mvv.
Specifically,
we
can
only
see
the
fee
revenue
that
they
get
from
the
so
called
priority:
gas
auctions
between
arbitrage,
bots
and
liquidation.
Bots
that
happen
in
the
memory
pool.
A
F
Hey
I
I
just
wanted
to
reply
here
you
talk
about.
I
I've
seen
discussions
about
the
minimum
amount.
We
should
pay
for
security
and
when
you
have
a
coin,
that's
worth
10
or
100
million.
The
minimum
is
fine,
but
when
you
have
something
worth,
I
believe
200
billion
was
the
number
around
a
quarter
of
what
bitcoin
is
worth
you're,
not
talking
about
the
minimum
here
you're
talking
about
trying
to
pay
the
maximum.
You
want
for
security.
K
I
feel
like
it's
important
to
discuss
why
we're
even
having
this
conversation
for
a
minute,
and
I
do
want
to
say
first,
I
am
sympathetic
to
the
minor
position.
I
understand
their
point
of
view,
but
I
also
want
to
point
out
that
we've
had
this
kind
of
existential
concern
argument
before
and
and
just
economically-
and
this
isn't
a
personal
comment:
it's
just
economically.
K
They
have
an
incentive
present,
two
percent
really
the
worst
case
scenario,
which
may
be
very
unlikely
to
occur,
and-
and
we
saw
this
previously
in
prague,
pow
as
well-
and
everything
that
we
were
told
that
would
happen
in
that
situation
did
not
in
fact
happen.
Ethereum
hash
rate
is
now
higher
than
ever,
and
the
network
is
very
secure,
but
I
do
think
from
a
community
perspective
and
what
I
talk
to
people
about
in
the
community.
Is
they
really
view
this
as
a
massive
ux
improvement?
K
You
know
what
the
price
is
versus
in
real
estate,
you're
bidding
and
have
no
idea
if
you're
going
to
get
it
for
that
price.
I
think
that's
a
really
good
example
for
us
to
think
about,
and
I
do
want
to
talk
briefly
about
the
monetary
policy
benefit
of.
Why
we're
thinking
about
this
and
why
users
and
investors
and
holders
of
eth
think
that
this
is
important.
Miners
have
clearly
provided
a
really
valuable
service
to
the
network
over
time
and
they've
helped
to
distribute
the
token
to
allow
us
to
eventually
transition
to
proof
of
stake.
K
But
let's
not
forget
that
really,
since
the
beginning
of
ethereum's
journey,
we've
had
that
expectation
of
moving
to
proof
of
stake,
and
even
since
those
earlier
days,
eth
has
become
far
more
important
as
an
economic
asset.
It's
a
critical
core
asset
to
defy
a
fundamental
underpinning
of
it,
and
there's
little
doubt
that
economically
hardening,
it
creates
a
benefit,
a
very
broad
benefit
for
all
eath
holders
and
investors
versus
a
concentrated
one
for
the
people
who
participate
in
mining.
K
They
will
have
assets
locked
in
the
base
asset,
which
is
ether
and
so
creating
conditions
where
we
may
economically
harden
that
asset
which
may
lead
potentially
to
an
economic
appreciation,
helps
us
ensure
that
staking
will
be
successful
and
that
proof
of
stake
will
be
successful
and
finally,
fee
burning
perhaps
allows
us
to
have
those
best
that
best
of
both
worlds.
Where
you
have
we,
we
don't
in
ethereum.
K
We
don't
believe
that
a
simple
hard
cap
is
secure,
and
so
we
know
that
we
need
issuance,
and
so
this
allows
us
potentially
to
have
issuance
while
also
keeping
a
check
on
supply.
So
I
wanted
to
interject
that
in
in
what
is
otherwise
a
good
technical
discussion,
but
I
think
it's
important
to
remember
why
we're
even
talking
about
this.
L
Hi
everyone-
I
I
think,
over
the
years
of
working
on
this
project
and
the
various
designs
that
have
come
up,
I
and
then
listening
to
the
conversation
today
and
I
haven't
really
been
engaging
with
the
minor
community
on
this
I've.
You
know
we've
sort
of
stepped
away
from
working
on
1559,
but
I
thought
it
was
important
to
to
come
in
here
today.
L
L
J
Yeah,
so
thank
you
hudson,
so,
firstly
like
to
quickly
answer
rick's
question
miners:
don't
need
to
understand.
Mev
the
existence
of
mev
being
extracted
by
traders
generates
fees
that
miners
earn
via
the
priority
gas
auctions.
So
putting
that
aside,
miners
have
another
form
of
revenue
that
comes
from
mev
and
they
don't
need
to
know
anything
about
the
movie.
They
just
get
more
money
because
of
emily.
So
that
aside,
I
want
to
respond
to
chris's
earlier
point
around
how
the
that
you
should
pay,
let's
say
as
much
as
possible,
instead
of
minimum.
J
So
then,
using
that,
like,
as
a
kind
of
like
as
a
compass,
we
can
easily
understand
that
their
their
words
should
should
scale
with
the
network
size
and
they
should
not
be.
They
should
not
be
over
the
network
size.
Neither
should
they
be
lower
than
the
n
core
size.
Currently,
we
overpay
for
security,
so
the
hip.
What
it
does
is
that
it
brings
things
back
to
normal.
A
E
Okay,
yeah,
I'm
just
saying
so:
I'm
gonna
go
down.
I've
been
trying
to
keep
notes,
so
I
guess
I'll
first
start
with
I'm
going
to
cover.
Essentially
the
asic
comment,
the
economic
hardening
comment
and
a
little
bit
of
the
mev
comment,
and
then
that
last
piece
of
where
miners
are
in
the
stack
with
regards
to
supporting
eth,
so
asic's
peace
with
prague
powell,
the
comment
there,
so
the
main
concern
back
in
2018
was
that
there
would
based
on
the
history
of
every
other
coin,
that
went
with
it.
E
Had
the
opportunity
piece
with
asics
was
the
concern
that
they
would
be
essentialization
of
the
hardware
design
and
purely
from
the
economics
of
building
and
taping
out
that
hardware.
You
have
by
design
a
much
less
efficient
supply
chain
to
get
opportunity
out
there
for
participation.
So
you
have
this
natural
collapse
of
your
participants.
You
also
have
a
natural
collapse
of
the
influence
or
anything.
That's
part
of
that
ecosystem,
so
what's
played
out,
is
with
the
growth
of
ethereum
and
the
price
of
the
transactions.
E
There's
more
gpu
miners
than
there
ever
have
been
on
the
network
so
to
the
extent
of
did
asic
resistance,
or
did
any
of
the
that
moved
to
prague
powell
was
it
a
non-issue.
I
think
it
was
just
an
issue
of
the
growth
of
the
network
provided
a
lot
more
participation
and
the
inefficiencies
in
the
supply
chain
and
part
of
the
risk
of
is
ethereum
going
to
move
to
2.0
prevented
certain
players
from
getting
into
the
a6
side
of
it.
E
The
concern
is,
if
it
grew
past
that-
and
you
would
have
a
misalignment
of
you-
know-
that
when
the
network
goes
to
move
to
proof
of
stake,
where
you
have
gpu
miners
that
are
along
all
crypto
market
and
can
pivot
to
another
algorithm,
asics
are
lockstep
with
that
algorithm.
So
now
you
have
this
resistance
model
in
place
for
their
possibly,
you
know,
causing
some
issues
on
the
transition.
E
When
I
talk
economic
hardening,
that's
another
so
for
folks
that
are
not
tracking
that
are
on
the
chat
and
that
are
listening
to
this
that's
effectively,
creating
that
that
reduction
of
supply,
or
at
least
telling
off
the
the
inflation
rate
of
ethereum,
thereby
trying
to
trigger
a
supply
demand
piece
with
ethereum,
thereby
moving
the
price
up
right
for
holders.
You
know
by
design.
I
had
a
piece
of
this
on
a
separate
video.
E
E
All
you're
doing
is
just
telling
it
off
to
try
to
artificially
push
the
price
up.
I
think
the
network
use
and
a
lot
of
the
the
the
features
that
come
with
ethereum
drive
a
lot
of
its
value
and
price
and
its
confidence
in
it
when
we
start
trying
to
tinker
with
the
inflation
rate
you're
in
in
a
non-known
schedule
way
it's
artificially
playing
with
it,
and
I
don't
know
if
that
has
the
same
economic
benefits
and
we'll
see
after
eap1559
goes
in.
If
we
come
back
into
another
bear
market,
not
saying
that.
E
That's
part
of
the
reasons
for
that,
but
I'm
just
saying
just
like
the
two
times
that
the
eth
reward
has
been
reduced.
It
did
not
necessarily
have
the
effects.
I
think
that
was
people
were
expecting
from
the
five
to
three.
It
was
coming
off
of
the
2017
high
from
three
to
two.
We
went
as
low
as
86
dollars
from
330.,
so
I
think
there's
a
misalignment
on
that
understanding
that
that
has
anything
to
do,
and
I,
I
think,
there's
a
lot
more
economics
to
it.
E
I
have
not
covered
it
on
my
channel,
I
I
would
I'm
taking
it
as
a
note
to
do
more
research
to
make
sure
that
can
provide
a
better
view
for
people
to
understand
what
that
means
for
the
ecosystem,
because
we
may
be
downplaying
it
more
than
or
not
talking
about
it
enough
to
help
concern.
You
know
what
miners
can
do,
so
I
think
that
was
yeah
I'll
just
submit
from
that
piece
and
then
we'll.
Let
you
guys
get
back
into
it.
Perfect.
A
I
I
just
did
a
quick
comment
on
the
mep
thing
that
I
suspect,
there's
maybe
a
little
bit
of
misunderstanding
here.
I
just
want
to
clarify
so
nav
is
minor
track
and
value,
and
it's
I've.
I've
argued
for
months
it's
a
terrible
name,
because
miners
are
not
the
ones
extracting
the
value
right
now.
In
fact,
I
don't
think
we've
ever
seen
a
minor
directly
extract
the
value
until
very
recently
and
has
historically
been
traders
and
arbitragers
and
boughters
and
whatnot
the
when
people
say
market
factor
value.
The
reason
it's
called.
I
That
is
because
miners
are
in
the
best
position
to
extract
that
value
and
they
have
a
basically
insurmountable
advantage
over
everyone
else.
So
if
miners
start
participating
in
an
mev,
they
can
extract
all
of
it
and
no
one
else
can
even
stand
a
chance
like
there
is
literally
no
way
you
can
beat
a
miner
at
mev.
I
So
my
thoughts
for
for
miners
out
there
is
that,
and
this
is
kind
of
kind
of
unrelated
to
one
five,
five,
nine.
So
I'm
gonna
keep
it
short,
but
I
strongly
encourage
you
to
look
into
getting
into
mep
extraction
like
there
is
millions
of
dollars
a
day
in
mvp
extraction
that
is
currently
being
taken
by
bots,
because
they
have
the
resources
to
it
so
consider
going
into
that
business,
and
then
you
can
just
ignore
fees
altogether,
because
you're
just
making
so
much
money
in
other
things
that
you
don't
need
the
fees.
I
B
I'd
hate
to
interrupt,
but
I
think
it
has
to
be
said
that
what
like
what
you
said
is
not
true.
The
miners
do
capture
a
substantial,
substantial
amount
of
all
the
possible
mvp
today,
even
if
they
have
no
idea
what
mev
is
and
that's
because
the
front
running
bots
bit
up
bid
for
priority
in
the
mempool
and
the
miners
earn.
These
rewards
that
often
often
go
up
to
like
eighty.
Ninety
percent
of
the
entire
med
opportunity,
via
the
transaction.
I
The
I
should
I'll
rephrase
slightly
just
before
I
close
out
the
there
is
a
lot
more
value
that
miners
could
make
if
they
get
into
this
directly,
rather
than
just
relying
on
the
price
gas
options,
if
you're
only
relying
on
price
gas
auctions,
you
get
a
little
bit
depending
on
how
long
the
block
is
kind
of
determines
how
much
you
get
because
the
longer
the
gas
auction
goes
on
the
closer
you
get
to
maxing
it
all
out
and
so
for
short
blocks.
You
can
make
a
lot
more
long
blocks.
I
A
D
Yeah,
I'm
just
trying
to
equal
what
georgia
jordis
has
said.
I
think
we
are
trying
currently
overpaid
for
the
security
and
if
you
check
the
ethereum
power
network,
what
is
today
like
we
have,
including
the
fees
we
have
more
than
20
000
users
created
per
day
as
mining
reward,
and
that's
that
means
about
8
million
users
generated
per
year
and
compare
that
to
other
pos
blockchains,
including
eastern
profile
of
the
beacon
chain,
and
we
are
also
violating
there
and
but
the
staking
reward,
barely
pay
for
wealth
or
developers.
D
You
know
so
I
think,
compared
to
pos
and
pow
rewards.
Is
there
there's
a
perhaps
10
times
a
difference
in
term
of
security
and
yeah?
So
compared
to
that,
I
think
the
pow
chain
is
seriously
overpaid
and
I
think
it's.
It
should
be
fine
this
when
we
trying
to
switch
to
you
know
lower
the
reward
yeah.
If
you
want
to
find
nice
because
you
know
compare
that
to
btc
bitcoin
huffing
the
the
manual
reward
of
bitcoin
last
may
suddenly
instantly
reduced
by
half
and
the
ecosystem.
D
Just
you
know
going
well
and
the
the
entire
process
like
went
quite
smoothly.
So
I
I
don't,
I
don't
personally
worry
about
like
the
the
transition
the
the
activation
makes.
The
ethereum
have
any
anything
like
any
incident.
Any
security
issues,
and
I
do
think,
like
the
mev,
will
take
a
important
role
like
to
replace
the
fee
reduction,
and
I
think,
once
the
I
mean
we
become
more
we're
actively
trying
to
doing
the
research
how
to
make
the
mpv
part
also
redistribute
to
our
miners
and
them
our
users.
D
A
A
F
F
So
we
don't
feel
that
miners
are
overpaid
in
the
end
as
you
pay
more
more
miners
join
and
the
amount
per
miner
evens
out.
So
what
we
have
here
is
a
situation
where
eip
took
a
very
long
eip.
1559
took
a
long
time
to
come
in
and
now
you
have
many
more
miners
than
there
would
have
been
had
to
come
in
earlier.
F
So
now,
you're
stuck
and
and
now
we
have
a
lot
of
miners,
basically
all
making
around
the
same
as
they
would
have
before
one
five,
five
nine
came
in
so
now.
We
have
many
pools
that
are
saying
they
don't
want
to
lose
their
miners.
Because
again,
this
is
a
very
big
community
and
you
have
many
people
who
are
working
here
and
I
know
people
say
miners,
not
workers,
but
we
are
workers.
We
maintain
our
rigs.
We
put
in.
We
put
money
down,
we're
basically
all
small
business
owners.
F
A
K
So
that's
the
first
point
and
I
want
to
address
michael's
point
from
earlier,
comparing
this
to
other
issuance
reductions
in
the
past,
and
I
certainly
see
the
point
there,
but
I
think
this
is
not
equivalent
to
those
kinds
of
changes.
This
is
a
coherent
policy
change,
that's
designed
to
create
greater
certainty,
around
ether
supply
and
within
the
market,
especially
among
larger
funds
and
investors.
A
Okay,
thank
you
also.
We're
gonna
just
have
no
more
hands
up
until
after
q
a
because
we
only
have
a
limited
amount
of
time
left,
so
no
one
else
put
your
hands
up
until
after
I
start
q
a
and
then
we'll
start
doing
that
doesn't
mean
take
them
down
if
you
already
have
them
up
necessarily,
but
I
think
I
have
the
order
still
next
up.
I
think
we
have
james.
M
Yep
I
wanted
to
address
the
point
of
giving
elite
time
or
that
miners
need
to
be
able
to
prepare
for
this
change
and
that
this
is
something
that's
been
in
the
works
publicly
for
a
long
time,
even
if
today
you
are
learning
about
it.
You
have
at
least
four
months
to
plan
and
the
last
three
months
have
been
pretty
heated
discussion
or
a
lot
of
discussion
within
the
community,
and
the
first
part
was
like
two
years
ago.
M
C
Well,
just
two
quick
points,
I
guess
the
first.
You
know
this
going
a
bit
far
about
the
a6
versus
gpu
discussion,
but
it's
worth
noting
that
you
know
with
regards
to
the
point
of
like
asic
centralizing,
the
network,
there's
already
been
several
options
brought
up
about.
You
know
things
that
ethereum
could
do
if
this
became
a
problem.
Proc
pal
is
obviously
a
big
one.
C
969
was
brought
up
on
this
call,
so
I
do
think
we
are
in
a
spot
where,
like
you
know,
it's
like
asics
are
not
a
dominant
part
of
the
network
today
if
they
became
one
and
that
caused
a
threat.
I
I
think
we
have
like
a
lot
of
approaches.
We
can
take
to
deal
with
that
and
then.
The
second
point
I
just
want
to
make
is
with
regards
to
the
idea
that,
like
yes,
miners
are
small
businesses
and
there's
more
miners
that
came
in.
C
I
think
this
is
you
know
something
I
want
to
just
stress,
like
the
mining
community,
that's
making
you
know,
profitability
assumptions
based
on
historically
high
transaction
fees,
historically
high
ethereum
to
us
dollar
prices
and
relatively
low
hash
rate
growth
because
of
a
gpu
shortage.
It's
you
know,
you're,
basically
buying
the
top
and
you're
coming
in
at
like
the
peak
of
the
bull
market.
It
is
an
extremely
risky
business
decision
and
you
know
miners
should
be
aware
of
that.
It's
also
worth
noting
that
you
know
the
difficulty
will
adjust
up
and
eat.
C
You
know
most
excess
profits
in
mining
over
time
and
that
1559
is
not
the
only
thing
that
can
impact
the
fees
that
miners
receive
from
transactions.
So,
for
example,
there's
a
lot
of
talk
about.
You
know
the
high
gas
cost
right
now
and
moving
to
layer
two.
If
there
is
a
mass
move
of
say
most
of
d5
to
layer,
two,
the
fees
on
on
the
main
chain
will
drop
considerably
and
that'll
have
a
similar
impact
on
miners
profitability.
C
So
pldr
is
you
know
it.
It
feels
like
it
is
a
very
frothy
environment
for
mining
and
yes,
if
we
put
1559
through
or
if
we
alleviate
the
congestion
on
mainnet
with
l2
mining
rewards
will
drop
significantly
and
that
will
kick
a
lot
of
miners
who
are
only
profitable
at
kind
of
the
you
know
most
profitable
period
in
mining
of
the
network
and
that's
that's
kind
of
you
know
by
design.
C
G
A
Okay,
thank
you.
So
much
roger
next
up
we're
gonna
go
to
q,
a
we
have
some
questions
from
youtube
discord
and
reddit
discord
and
reddit
questions
were
taken
in
the
previous
days
via
our
the
ethereum
cat
herders
request
for
comments
first
one.
When
does
1559
come
into
effect.
If
it
does
pass,
you
know
the
core
devs
and
it's
decided
that
it's
going
into
a
hard
fork.
What
what's
the
timeline
for
that?
If
that
does
happen-
and
I
guess
probably
tim
or
james-
is
the
best
one
to
answer
this.
C
Sure
I
can,
I
can
take
a
quick
stop
at
it
so
on
the
next
alcor
dev
call,
which
is
next
friday,
we're
going
to
discuss
whether
we
want
to
include
1559
in
the
next
upgrade,
which
should
go,
live
sometime
this
summer
and
call
it
july
or
august
on
mainnet.
So
if
it
gets
accepted
by
the
core
developers
and
thomas
kind
of
went,
you
know
on
about
the
process
at
the
beginning
of
the
call,
then
it
would
go.
Live
on
mainnet
around
you
know,
say
july,
just
to
be
to
be
safe.
A
M
A
A
Sure
have
to
address
that.
Yes,
that
is
correct,
regardless
of
the
1559,
goes
in
we're
addressing
the
ice
age
with
london,
so
actually
that
first
question,
when
it
would
come
into
effect,
was
fritz
1818
from
reddit.
This
next
question
is
from
bitcoin
root,
user
and
reddit.
I
would
like
to
hear
how
burning
0.0001
of
the
supply
every
day
will
make
the
price
rise
enough
to
make
up
for
50
reduction
in
profits.
A
The
miners
will
experience
they're
talking
about
how
to
further
centralize
ethereum
as
it'll
impact
hobbyist
miners,
significantly
more
than
larger
farms
who
negotiated
lower
electricity
and
hardware
cost
yeah.
So
I
see
some
hands
raised
if
you
don't
want
to
respond
to
this
put
your
hand
down.
Otherwise
we
will
let
someone
respond
to
this
and
actually
so
yeah,
who
was
who
had
their
hand
up.
First,
someone
just
speak
up
just
roll.
H
Yes,
so
I
think
that
the
argument
of
pricing
being
affected
by
the
change
of
issuance-
it's
we're,
not
saying
it's
true
or
not.
It
seems
that
it
will
be
affected,
obviously,
because
even
if
it's
a
small
number,
you
have
to
discount
all
the
future
payouts
and
also
we've
seen
recently
that,
with
the
higher
gas
prices,
the
transaction
fees
actually
amounts
to
a
significant
part
of
the
of
the
payments
to
miners
rights.
If
you
burn
all
of
that,
that
becomes
significant.
H
But
still
this
is
not
the
goal
of
the
of
the
ip1559
eip1589
answers
the
problems
of
the
short-term
predictability
of
the
prices
and
better
user
experience
in
picking
the
right
payment
for
a
transaction
in
any
given
time
and
allowing
the
demanded
supply
to
be
floating
a
bit
more
freely
around
that
short-term
short-term
demand
shifts.
So
when
you
have
sudden
spikes
due
to
some
events
in
the
network,
the
network
will
be
able
to
accommodate
to
that
also
by
expanding
the
blocks
in
the
short
term.
So
you
may
also
see
more
supply
when
it's
most
needed.
G
E
Yeah
I
mean,
I
think
the
question
is
a.
I
mean
relatively
good
point
with
the
amount
of
total
issuance
that's
already
out
there
and
then
how
much
it's
actually
going
to
be
get
burned.
I
I
think,
there's
I
think
it's
more.
This
is
going
to
be
me
putting
on
a
marketing
hat
and
kind
of
tapping.
My
old
anheuser-busch
experience.
I
think
the
messaging
that
comes
with
certain
activities
when
it's
a
heavy
transaction
time.
Let's
say
the
last
couple
days:
we
had
12
to
25
coin
per
block
happening.
E
That's
gonna,
there's
a
huge
message:
that's
gonna
happen
with
that
when
you
start
seeing
that
much
being
burned.
When
you
have
the
the
you
know,
the
typical
block
reward
inflation
being
at
two,
but
then
you
burn
25.,
there's
a
huge
amount
of
in
that
particular
transaction
that
I
think
the
messaging
the
bots
that'll
be
on
twitter,
the
feedback
loop
from
and
the
investment.
You
know,
folks
that
are
invested
long
on
ethereum
are
gonna.
You
know
use
that
to
a
an
advantage
on
a
messaging
and
that's
not
necessarily
bad.
E
For
miners
too,
like
don't
get
me
wrong,
that
it's
not
all
about
yield
and
price,
any
action
that
has
that
influence
if
price
goes
up
exponentially.
Even
if
yields
go
down,
it's
just
a
math
problem.
Either
one
swings
right
now
we
have
both
right.
We
have
price
growth
and
we
have
yield
growth,
which
is
creating
this
rolling
wave
of
new
miners.
If
yields
come
down
but
then
they're
being
burned,
that
messaging,
I
think
that
will
come
out,
is
showing
you
know:
nine
ten,
twelve
million
dollars
a
day
being
burned
on
heavy
transaction
times.
E
Now,
that's
still
not
really
fixed
any
user
experience.
If
that's
what's
still
occurring.
If
we
have
huge
amounts
of
transactions
happening,
it's
costing
the
user
a
lot,
but
I
think
the
messaging
on
the
the
supply
will
be
far
outweigh
the
realities
of
the
supply.
Even
if
it's
going
in
a
downward
motion
because
of
the
amount
of
inflation
over
years
and
stuff.
B
I
would
have
a
just
an
addition
to
what
michael
said,
because
it's
it's.
This
is
a
big
thing
that
happened
in
ethereum
a
few
days
ago
right
there
was
this
one
transaction
that
actually
had
25
e
block
reward
to
minus.
That
is
the
transaction
that
michael
addressed,
and
I
was
just
want
to
briefly
say
that
in
this
transaction,
so
the
fees
were
that
high,
because
there
were
liquidation
boards
competing
to
liquidate
positions
on
compound
okay.
B
So
in
this
block
about
so
two
about
two,
if
of
subsidy
would
have
gone
to
minus
and
about
let's
say
19
19
to
221
from
the
fees
would
have
also
gone
to
minus,
because
that
is
an
mev
transaction
and
only
two
to
three
eve
would
have
been
burned
in
congestion
fees.
So
that
is
actually
the
prime
example
of
what
part
of
a
transaction
is
affected
by
erp
one
five
f9,
and
what
isn't
so
to
reiterate,
most
of
this
transaction
would
have
still
gone
to
minus
like
way
over
90
of
it.
A
So
this
actually
brings
me
to
the
last
question,
which
is
an
mev
related
question.
Someone
asked,
let
me
actually
see
who
that
was.
Oh,
I
lost
it
anyways.
Why
not
stop
mev
altogether
via
protocol
level,
provable
transaction
shuffling
mev
is
the
reason
of
the
bad
ux
and
high
tips
will
cause.
The
same
problem
is
what
someone
said
and
yeah.
So
who
has
a
response
to
that?
I
think
I
saw
rick
micah
and
georgios.
A
J
Yes,
yeah
I
like
to
echo.
Basically,
the
problem
comes
from
the
fact
that
ordering
and
execution
are
kind
of
like
both
in
the
hands
of
the
miners
and
if
there
was
a
way
to
separate
that,
then
sure
but
doing
this
kind
of
separation
is
very
hard
and
it
would
require
us
to
use
like
fancy
cryptography,
and
we
have
no
idea
how
to
do
that
reliably
today,
while
also
letting
users
express
their
fee
preferences.
J
A
And
you
know
what
we
have
an
extra
couple
minutes:
there's
a
really
good
question
that
pooja
put
in
chat
from
crackling
ice
in
youtube
have
feeds
been
modeled
based
on
how
full
the
block
is.
What
is
the
potential
for
reduction
in
fees?
I
think
some
of
you
have
done
done
analysis
and
research
on
this.
Does
anyone
have
any
comments
we
can
start
with
rick
than
thomas
or
rick
is
your
hand
just
still
up
from
earlier.
H
Yeah
so
leave
the
research
party
burnaby,
but
yes,
the
ip1559,
a
listen
short
term.
It's
all
about
this
about
adjusting
fees
based
on
the
how
full
the
block
is.
As
for
the
was
the
potential
of
decreasing
the
phase,
all
the
research
says
that
eip
1559
generally
does
not
decrease
the
long-term
fees.
This
is
only
driven
by
the
supply
and
demand
on
the
on
the
block
space.
N
That
would
be
better
done
by
scalability
if
to
all
of
this,
but
it's
also
important
to
keep
in
mind
that
another
issue
that
we
observe
is
the
fees
within
a
single
block
are
very
widely
distributed.
The
variance
of
the
fees
is
very
high,
so
you
have
this
basic
uncertainty
on
how
much
you're
supposed
to
pay-
and
you
are
also
referring
to
oracles-
that
tell
you
how
much
people
have
paid
recently,
and
so
you
can
create
these
kinds
of
bubbles
where
everybody
is
just
overpaying
continuously
and
eap.
N
1559
by
its
design,
really
breaks
this
cycle
and
tells
well
actually
no.
This
is
objectively
what
the
congestion
price
currently
is,
because
that's
what
eip
1559
is
it's
a
congestion,
pricing
mechanism?
It's
also
why
mev
is
out
of
the
burning.
Let's
say
it's
out
of
range
for
this
mechanism,
because
mev
isn't
specifically
congestion.
What
we
really
mean
is
that
users
want
to
use
the
chain,
and
it's
not
really
about
position.
It's
just
about
inclusion,
and
this
is
why
eip1559
works
the
way
it
does.
A
O
O
I
So
I
can
talk
about
the
attacks.
I
am
not
a
price
speculator,
so
I
won't
try
to
speculate
on
the
impact
it
would
have
on
the
price.
So
if
50
50
of
the
hash
rates
suddenly
decides
to
all
move
to
nice
hash,
for
example,
I
think
this
is
what
michael
is
getting
getting
that
if
half
the
hash
rate
moves
nice
nice
hash,
it
creates
an
opportunity
where
someone
can
rent
enough
hash
power
to
do
a
51
attack.
I
The
reason
this
is
particularly
dangerous
compared
to
other
types
of
51
attacks
is
because
the
people
have
who
are
executing
the
attack
have
no
long-term
commitments,
whereas
someone
who's
running
a
mining
farm,
for
example,
they
have
long-term
commitments
like
if
they
burn
down
ethereum,
they
burn
down
their
own
mining
farm
like
so.
If
they've
spent
a
billion
dollars
on
a
mining.
E
I
And
ethereum
goes
to
zero
because
they
attack
the
network.
Then
they
lose
that
billion
dollar
investment
because
there's
nothing
else.
They
can
do
with
it,
and
so
this
is.
This
is
a
very
serious
attack
like
if
50
of
hashtag
goes
to
nice
hash.
That
is
very
dangerous
for
ethereum
like
we
should
be
worried
and
we
should
take
immediate
action
to
deal
with
it,
because
that
is
a
very,
very
bad
situation
because
you
can
rent,
like
you
know
an
hour
for
100k
and
do
very
bad
things.
I
So
that
being
said,
whether
we
hit
50
on
nice,
hash
or
not,
is
a
speculative
question
that
again,
I'm
not
going
to
speculate
on
where
hash
rate's
going
to
go,
but
it
is
real
attack.
So
the
the
question
you
have
to
ask
yourself
is:
do
you
think
it
is
likely
for
51
of
hashrate
to
show
up
on
nice
tomorrow?
I
E
At
the
current
exponential
growth,
we're
going
to
be
close
to
700
tear
hash,
if
that
comes
off,
people
that
are
investing
in
that
are
going
to
be
looking
on
how
to
whether,
where
the
money's
coming
from
if
the
broker,
if
there's
a
play
for
a
competitive
network,
not
saying
calling
any
networks
out
that
somebody
would
do
that.
But
somebody
that's
long
in
that
position
has
every
incentive
in
the
world
to
have
an
issue
with
to
create
an
issue
for
ethereum,
and
this
isn't
theoretical
things.
E
This
has
happened
to
several
other
networks,
pretty
much
every
almost
every
proof
of
work,
large
proof
of
work
mining
network
out
there.
So
I
I
just
I'm
trying
to
ensure
that
people
are
taking
it
seriously
and
then
I
think
we,
I
think
mathematically
we
can
keep
track
of
where
things
are
at
and
how
big
of
an
impact
it's
going
to
be.
If
this
is
put
in
in
june
or
july,
where
we're
at
in
the
stack
and
if
a
block
reward
or
something
like
that
needs
to
be
adjusted
to
to
lessen
the
risk.
A
Okay,
we're
gonna
have
thomas
take
30
seconds
to
respond
to
the
question,
and
then
each
person
on
the
chat
is
going
to
get
30
seconds
or
less
to
give
just
final
statements
on
their
position
or
whatever
they
want
to
say.
If
they
want
to
shill
anything,
I
don't
care
and
then
we'll
close
out
with
puja
and
myself
and
that'll,
be
it
so
thomas
go
ahead.
H
K
Thanks
hudson,
I
I
just
want
to
close
with
the
with
the
thought
that,
from
the
discussions
that
I've
had
with
folks,
the
user
and
app
community
are
strongly
in
favor
of
eip1559.
And
it
represents
a
profound
improvement
to
you
to
user
experience
by
providing
reasonable
guarantees
of
transaction
inclusion
both
for
new
and
experienced
users.
And
it
creates
conditions
for
economically
hardening
ether,
which
I
think
will
be
very
important
for
the
long-term
success
of
ethereum
and
its
security.
As
a
proof-of-stake
network.
N
Yeah,
I
just
want
to
close
saying
the
discussion
was
really
amazing
and
I
do
support
the
ap
1559
for
the
improvement
that
it
will
bring.
I
really
do
believe
that
will
make
the
experience
much
more
better
for
users
not
only
for
users,
but
also
it's
been
discussed
for
rollups,
so
the
architecture
of
ethereum
in
the
future
definitely
needs
15
59
to
to
keep
going
and
to
be
modern
and
to
keep
up.
J
The
fee
revenue
that
you
would
lose
is
much
lower
than
you
think,
or
have
calculated
and
so
on,
and
that
I
want
to
rehash
the
fact
that
miners
are
long
ethereum
and
the
ethereum
economy
and
as
the
pi
as
the
ethereum
economy,
pi
grows.
So
will
your
revenue,
so
you
should
consider
the
option
which
grows
the
ethereum
economy
and
not
be
myopic
about
the
situation.
Thank
you.
Rick.
L
Yeah,
I
I
want
to
say
something
a
little
milder
than
that.
I
I
just
hope
that
the
minor
community
takes
their
their
great
opportunity
in
accumulating
heath
to
use
that
eath
to
steak
and
eat
too,
and-
and
I
hope
that
they
continue
to
participate
in
the
ethereum
community
and-
and
you
know,
continue
to
explore
the
other
opportunities.
L
M
A
I
If
any
miners
would
like
to
better
understand
how
they
can
take
a
lot
of
money
from
defy
users
via
mev,
please
reach
out
to
me
on
discord.
I
will
happily
walk
you
through
it
and
also
if
anyone
wants
to
better
understand
the
various
attack
vectors
themselves,
like
on
a
technical
level,
again
reach
out
to
me
on
discord,
I'm
happy
to
talk
to
people
about
the
mechanism
design
and
of
these
attacks
and
how
to
launch
them,
etc.
H
D
D
Well,
for
the
today's
mining
community
well
being
paid
exactly
nicely
by
the
network,
but
who
cares
about
what
they
are
paying,
what
they
paying
them?
Who
cares
for
the
miners
who
care
about?
You
know
what
about
ethereum,
israel,
future
decentralization
or
even
our
earth?
The
client
may
change
and
most
of
miners.
They
do
not
even
know
how
to
use
a
wallet.
They
never
use
the
on-chain
wallet
and
no
never
have
the
know-how
to
to
have.
You
know
ever
use
a
depth
or
defy
application.
D
A
D
A
E
E
I'm
still
concerned
just
looking
at
the
growth
of
ethereum
and
the
the
opportunity,
that's
out
there
for
everybody
that
are
not
tracking
these
conversations
or
not
looking
deeply
that
much
into
it
and
are
you
know
essentially
yellowing
into
into
the
space,
because
it's
an
opportunity
there.
I
think
that
we
need
to
keep
an
eye
on
if
this
is
moving
forward,
that
we
we
take
a
pragmatic
approach
that
we
make
keep
ethereum
safe.
E
E
You
can
help
me
get
that
cleaner
to
represent
the
network,
but
as
long
as
there's
an
understanding
and
an
opening
to
you
know
not
race
to
the
bottom
on
paying
for
security,
but
keep
it
in
a
in
an
amount.
I
think
that
makes
ethereum
go
long
and
secure.
You
know,
I
think
the
mining
community
can
get
behind
that.
So.
F
So
what's
happening
with
one
five,
five,
nine
miners
generally
support
all
the
improvements.
It's
just
that
we're
being
asked
to
make
basically
part
of
the
community
is
asking
another
part
of
the
community
to
make
a
giant
sacrifice
four
one:
five,
five
nine.
So
what
miners
are
saying
is
that
it's
important
that
you
understand
we
have
concerns
and
we're
asking
for
things
from
the
community
too.
F
We
believe
that
over
time,
difficulty
will
adjust
to
bring
minor
rewards
to
nominal.
But,
however,
the
current
modeling
shows
that
it
will
not
generate
a
security
risk
of
approaching
pos
if
it
stays
on
an
unwasted
trajectory.
So
we
believe
that
you
have
a
large
pool
of
non-profitable
hardware
here
and
that
non-profitable
hardware
is
going
to
be
incentivized
prior
to
pos
to
attack,
and
since
many
of
us
gpu
miners
are
moving
on
to
2.0
and
we're
all
planning
to
stake.
F
We
believe
there's
a
risk
to
aesthetium
by
not
passing
969
here,
and
we
think
that,
if
five
nine
passes,
we
should
also
have
something
that
we've
been
trying
to
push
for
all
this
time
past,
to
try
to
balance
it
out
a
bit
and
and
as
I
and
you've
seen
with
the
one
five
five
nine
sign
up.
You
have
ninety
percent
of
hash
rate
by
pools,
who
are
not
pro
one:
five,
five
nine
so
you're
pushing
into
this-
and
you
might
have
it.
You
might
push
one
five,
nine
and
suddenly
you're
left
with
one.
F
Only
one
pull
mining
assertion,
because
every
other
pool
has
not
said
they
are
gonna
join
you
on
this,
so
we
would
much
rather
prefer
a
compromise
where
we
both
get
what
we
want.
Miners
agree
to
take
a
cut,
but
not
as
much
as
the
cut
as
you're
proposing
and
in
return
you
pass
something
that
we've
tried
been
pushed
for
for
a
long
time.
G
G
A
B
No
thanks
satsan,
so
yeah,
so
erp159
will
lower
minor
revenue
and
that's
why
we
are
kind
of
having
all
this
debate
about
it
in
the
first
place,
but
ethereum
exists
to
serve
users
and
holders,
and
those
holders
are
currently
overpaying
for
security,
and
it
is
of
course
within
our
right
to
lower
what
we
spend
on
security
and
that
that's
what
erp
one
first
manages.
It
is
not
one
part
of
the
community
asking
another
part
of
the
community
for
a
favor.
B
This
is
simply
not
true,
and
second,
we
have
plenty
of
empirical
evidence
that
if
we
lower
minor
revenue,
it
does
not
affect
security.
We
have
seen
many
bitcoin
halvings
and
we
have
seen
many
crypto
bear
markets
that
are
not
10
to
20
to
30
declines
in
revenue,
but
that
are
90
to
95
percent
declines
in
you
over
way
longer
periods
of
time.
So,
in
my
opinion,
there's
no
ideological
argument
and
no
practical
argument
against
including
erp-1559
in
the
london
hard
fork
without
further
changes.
That
said
thanks.
Everyone
for
the
discussion.
A
O
Yeah,
just
if
you
find
rewards
it's
so
great
to
see
researchers,
developers,
eip
authors
and
miners
together
on
one
call
organizing
this
meeting
has
been
a
fantastic
opportunity
for
us.
The
fact
that
various
stakeholders
came
together
to
discuss
a
proposal
for
a
future
upgrade
is
impressive
in
itself
and
it's
a
symbol
of
a
strong
progressive
community
on
behalf
of
ethereum
cat
hurdle.
I
want
to
thank
everyone
who
joined
us
on
the
call
and
tune
into
the
live
stream.
This
was
our
second
eap
special
community
call.