►
From YouTube: PEEPanEIP #37: EIP-1559: Fee market change with Tim Beiko, Barnabe Monnot, Micah Zoltu
Description
Topics covered
-----------------------------
1:35 - Introduction (Tim)
1:50 - Introduction (Micah)
2:10 - Introduction (Barnabe)
3:00 - Tim’s presentation
3:30 - 1559 Overview
5:28 - Variable sized blocks
7:50 - Feecap & Tip (Priority fee)
10:40 - Block header changes & Transaction format changes
10:55 - Interpret legacy transaction as 1559
11:45 - Fee Burning
13:45 - EIP-1559 Misconception
15:20 - deployment time
16:15 - Barnabe’s presentation
16:30 - What to look for when EIP-1559 launches
17:00 - Oracles: Keep calm and check basefee
19:22 - When is basefee too low?
21:27 - Basefee dynamics
22:54 - About oscillations
23:35 - Other designs
25:13 - Extensions to abm1559
26:10 - Questions
26:20 - How are user interfaces coming along like wallet - Metamask and others?
31:35 - What if a wallet is not ready with a 1559 transaction?
33:35 - Any changes wrt Layer 2 adoption?
37:45 - Are there any analyses published on how much the base fee is burned?
40:45 - What are the changes for miners to consider until PoS?
44:40 - In terms of miners' revenue, is it going to be hard to predict?
46:17 - In terms of consensus for London, do we have miners' consensus, or do we need it? Where do we sit?
49:05 - With 1559 and miners' incentives, is there a way where MEV plays as a revenue stream for miners?
54:20 - Is there a detailed deployment plan that people can follow?
55:53 - A question on market congestion scenario for miners to do
59:40 - Has there been any consideration on the change of gas price with the arrival of sharding?
01:01:17 - For the stakers at Beacon chain, will there be any impact on staking rewards with this proposal?
01:03:05 -Buying gas at low and selling it at a high price, will that functionality still be included?
Resources:
-------------------
EIP - https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1559
Discussion to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-1559-fee-market-change-for-eth-1-0-chain/2783
EIP-1559 Resources - https://hackmd.io/@timbeiko/1559-resources
abm1559 notebooks - https://ethereum.github.io/abm1559/
Slides:
(Tim) https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1uQWc1GZw7ZpjEsus_d-h4gW1CMNxwI1LoTkscKV23xw/edit?usp=sharing
(Barnabe) https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1vVGaezpoj-sYPPBNSY0LdPyJGIex2zl1cdgipVoMkL0/edit?usp=sharing
Check:
EIP-1559 (Episode 16) - https://youtu.be/ZbSKo_x9RvU
London proposals playlist - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL4cwHXAawZxppsQYazgJ3EWWWjY2vNxVp
PEEPanEIP playlist - https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL4cwHXAawZxqu0PKKyMzG_3BJV_xZTi1F
upcoming EIPs in Peep an EIP series at https://github.com/ethereum-cat-herders/PM/projects/2
Survey:
---------------
Ethereum blockchain users and developers research - https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeugRHv93fizew0zeqXFOOnQIbjbWnVHoThLJR3f3g6gVvXhQ/viewform
Follow at Twitter
-----------------------------------------------
Tim Beiko @TimBeiko | @barnabemonnot | Micah Zoltu @MicahZoltu | Shane Lightowler @Coldsnap | William Schwab @William94029369 | Pooja Ranjan @poojaranjan19
Contact Ethereum Cat Herders
---------------------------------------------------
Discord: https://discord.gg/tzYmDmF
Twitter: https://twitter.com/EthCatHerders
Medium: https://medium.com/ethereum-cat-herders
GitHub: https://github.com/ethereum-cat-herde...
Email: support@ethereumcatherders.com
Website: https://www.ethereumcatherders.com/
A
So
if
you're
new
to
eip1559,
it
is
highly
recommended
to
watch
episode,
16
of
if
any,
before,
watching
this
episode
there,
we
discuss
this
proposal
and
with
timbeco
link,
is
available
on
the
top
right
screen
of
your
computer
and
also
in
the
youtube
description
box.
Today
we
are
going
to
be
talking
in
continuation
to
that,
starting
with
a
quick
overview
of
eip1559.
A
The
timeline
of
london
upgrade
will
try
to
understand
what
to
expect
post
launch.
We
have
already
received
a
lot
of
questions
so,
if
time
permits
presentations
will
be
followed
by
the
question
and
answer
with
no
more
delay.
Let
me
introduce
our
guests
tim
baiko,
banabe
and
michael
zolton,
michael
and
tim.
You
have
been
our
show
earlier.
B
C
D
A
B
B
And
a
very
high
level
how
it
achieved
this
is
that,
in
order
to
make
transaction
fees
more
predictable,
it
allows
users
to
specify
or
sorry
it
specifies
in
the
protocol,
the
minimum
fee
which
we
call
the
base
fee.
The
transaction
needs
to
pay
to
be
included,
so
we
go
from
a
system
where
figuring
out
what
you
need
to
pay
to
be
included
in
the
block
is
kind
of
implicit
and
it's
not
part
of
the
protocol
itself
to
a
system
where
every
block
header
tells
you.
Basically,
this
is
the
minimum
fee.
B
You
need
to
pay
and
then
the
way
it
goes
about
reducing
the
inclusion
delays
is
that
it
doubles
the
block
size
compared
to
what
we
have
today
and
aims
to
keep
blocks
half
empty
most
of
the
time,
which
means
that
on
average,
when
a
new
transaction
comes
in,
there's
basically
half
the
block,
that's
that's
empty
in
order
to
accommodate
it.
So
that
means
that
transactions
can
be
included
much
quicker
and
the
way
it
creates.
B
This
positive
feedback
between
the
network
usage
and
the
east
supply
is
that
as
more
and
more
people
want
to
use
the
network,
it'll
increase
this
minimum
fee.
You
need
to
pay,
call
the
base
fee
and
this
part
of
the
fee
is
burnt.
So
that
means
that
more
people
wanting
to
use
the
ethereum
network
leads
to
basically
being
higher
and
therefore
an
increased
deflationary
pressure
on
the
supply.
B
B
It's
basically
by
saying
that
when
1559
happens,
we
will
double
the
block
size
and
aim
to
keep
blocks
half
full.
If
we
see
that
blocks
like
to
be
more
than
half
full,
so
there's
more
than
50
gas
used,
we
simply
raise
the
minimum
fee
and
by
raising
this
fee
we
kind
of
reduce
the
demand
for
transacting
at
that
price.
So
the
blocks
should
converge
again
to
a
spot
where
they're,
where
they're
half
full.
B
And
similarly,
if
we
see
that
blocks
are
not
being
half
full,
so
there's
not
fifty
percent
of
the
gas
used,
then
we
could
just
lower
the
minimum
fee
and
kind
of
induce
demand
for
for
transactions
on
the
network,
and
you
know
one
of
kind
of
the
questions
people
have
about.
This
is
well.
If
we
could
do
this,
you
know
why?
Don't
we
just
do
it
today
or
why?
B
So
that
means
that
in
roughly
20
blocks
or
five
minutes,
the
gas
prices
on
the
networks
are
at
10x
in
40
blocks
or
10
minutes,
they're
up
100
x
and
then
60
blocks
they're
up
1000,
and
to
give
you
a
rough
idea
in
the
entire
history
of
ethereum
we've
seen
gas
prices
basically
vary
by
about
a
factor
of
a
thousand
x.
So
that
means
that
in
15
minutes
we're
able
to
accommodate
kind
of
as
much
demand
change
as
we've
seen
in
all
of
the
theory
of
history.
B
So
it
means
we
won't
be
to
a
spot
where
we
get.
You
know
massive
amounts
of
full
blocks
on
the
network,
and
obviously
you
know
what
happens
is
once
this
basically
is
high
enough.
Then
users
stop
be
being
willing
to
pay
to
pay
it,
so
the
blocks
stop
being
full,
and
so
the
base
fee
converges
again
to
the
point
where
blocks
are
only
50
full
second
big
part
of
1559
is
this
concept
of
a
fee
cap
and
the
tip
which
is
now
called
a
priority
fee.
B
B
Basically,
your
fee
cap
needs
to
be
larger
than
the
sum
of
the
base
fee
and
your
priority
fee.
So
that
means
the
amount
that
gets
burned
and
that
goes
to
the
minor
and
what
the
fee
cap
allows
you
to
do
is
that
it
provides
some
flexibility
for
users
in
case
that
basically
changes
right
like
we
said
they
can
go
up
twelve
and
a
half
percent
from
one
block
to
the
next.
B
So
if
you
put
a
fee
cap
that
that's
quite
high
once
you've
paid
the
base
fee
and
your
priority
fee
to
the
miners,
the
the
difference
gets
refunded
back
to
you
as
a
user,
to
put
numbers
on
this.
Imagine
you
know
the
network
base
fee
is
100
way.
You
put
a
priority
fee
of
five
and
your
fee
cap
at
250
way.
B
B
Okay
last
part,
so
basically
fee
birthing.
So
one
of
the
I
guess
the
main
intuition
behind
why
we
burned
the
fee
is
that
if,
if
we
were
not
to
burn
the
base
fee,
part
of
the
transaction
miners
would
have
a
really
high
incentive
to
just
collude
and
keep
the
baby
high.
And
what
this
would
look
like
is,
they
could
just
add
a
bunch
of
transactions
in
the
block
that
send
that
send
funds
back
to
themselves
and
because
they're
getting
all
the
transaction
fees
anyway.
B
It
would
raise
this
basically
for
everybody
else
in
the
network.
So
by
burning
the
bc,
you
know
you've
removed
that
incentive
for
minors
to
basically
stuff
the
block
with
their
own
transactions
and
and
raise
the
fee
for
everybody
else.
It's
worth
noting
that
miners
will
still
get
both
the
priority
fee
and
the
block
reward
and
any
kind
of
additional
rewards
from
things
like
med
and
historically,
and
especially
when
this
eve
was
written,
fees
have
been
significantly
smaller
than
buck
awards,
but
over
the
past
year.
B
So
we've
already
seen
this
change.
So
you
know
in
the
last
summer,
during
d5
summer,
which
is
right
after
right
before
I
originally
did
this
presentation.
We
actually
had
days
where
fees
eclipsed
the
block
rewards
for
the
consistency
for
the
first
time
on
the
network
yeah,
so
the
the
conditions
that
kind
of
changed
since
the
eip
was
originally
introduced
by
a
high
level.
You
know
it's
still:
it's
still
necessary
to
burn
the
base
fee
and
it's
worth
highlighting
that
miners
will
still
get
the
priority
fee.
B
The
block
reward
and
any
other
rewards
from
things
like
med,
and
that,
like
I
mentioned
at
the
beginning,
burning
this
basically
also
creates
a
kind
of
secondary
effect
where
the
more
people
want
to
use
ethereum
the
higher
the
basically
goes,
and
that
means
that
the
higher
the
higher
the
percentage
of
the
supply
that
gets
burnt
every
time
a
transaction
is
paid
and
yeah.
Two
things
that
I
wanted
to
hit
on
that
that
people
often
get
wrong
about
1559
are
first,
that
it's
gonna
lower
gas
prices.
B
So
this
is
really
only
partially
true,
so
it
won't
lower
gas
prices
by
you
know
an
order
of
magnitude,
but
one
thing
that
it
will
do
is
make
gas
prices
within
a
single
block
more
consistent,
so
help
everybody
who's,
getting
included
at
the
same
time.
Kind
of
pay
similar
amounts
aside
from
people
who
have
these
very
high
value
transactions
that
submit
any
v,
bundles
and
stuff
like
that.
B
So
if
there's
more
people
that
want
to
use
ethereum,
then
there
is
block
space
on
it,
then,
obviously,
that
will
lead
to
gas
prices
rising
and
then
the
other
misconception
that
comes
up
a
lot
is
that
1559
will
make
east
deflationary
and,
what's
worse,
knowing
there
is.
This
is
only
true
if
the
base
key
consistently
exceeds
the
block
rewards.
So
until
recently
you
know
that
was
not
the
case
and
it's
worth
noting
that
any
part
of
the
priority
fee
doesn't
doesn't
contribute
to
supply
reduction
right.
It
still
goes
to
minors.
B
Client
developers
wanted
to
feel
a
bit
more
confident
of
you
know
seeing
it
live
on
the
testnet
before
we
go
ahead
and
schedule
mainnet
assume,
assuming
we
find
no
issues
on
the
testnet,
I
suspect
we'll
probably
have
a
main
block
somewhere
late
july
mid-august,
but
yeah.
This
will
be
confirmed
in
the
next
couple
weeks
and
that's
all
I
had
barnaby
you
wanna,
take
it
from
here.
D
All
right
so
yeah
thanks
tim,
great
presentation,
so
this
is
kind
of
a
few
things
that
I'll
be
looking
out
for
when
eip1559
launches.
So
it's
been
as
team
mentioned
long
in
the
work,
and
we
have,
I
think,
a
very
good
theoretical
idea
of
how
we
want
the
mechanism
to
behave,
but
obviously
there's
going
to
be
a
lot
of
data
that
we
receive.
That
will
be
very
important
to
to
even
fine-tune
the
mechanism
as
it
goes
on,
so
I
just
want
to
discuss
a
bit
about
this
all
right.
D
So
the
first
point
is
so
currently
how
price
estimation
is
done.
Is
users
typically
use
oracles,
which
are
maybe
embedded
in
their
in
their
wallets
and
oracles
kind
of
try
and
tell
you
what
you
should
be
paying
for
to
be
included,
but
current
oracles
are
very
sophisticated.
They
don't
rely
on
any
kind
of
objective
measure.
D
They
have
to
rely
on
what
users
have
been
bidding,
maybe
monitoring
transactions
and
see
if
they
get
included
at
a
certain
price
point-
and
this
is
a
bit
brutal
and
as
we've
seen,
we
can
easily
get
into
situations
where
you
you
get.
Spikes
and
users
tend
to
overpay,
because
you
just
want
to
make
sure
that
your
transaction
is
going
through
and
you
you
want
to
make
sure
that
you
don't
have
to
resubmit
so
you're
kind
of
trying
to
low
ball
so
that
you
don't
pay
too
much.
A
D
We
know
that
this
is
maybe
a
moment
that
users
should
change
their
bidding
pattern,
but
if
we
observe
that
blocks,
they
are
not
full
like
they
they're
below
the
block
limit.
We
know
that
we
can,
just
by
default,
give
this
kind
of
a
default
strategy
to
the
user
and
it's
good
enough,
and
it
should
get
them
included
with
much
higher
certainty
than
that
they
would
have
been
under
the
current
paradigm
and
so
most
of
the
time.
We
don't
actually
need
much
input
to
make
this.
D
This
estimation,
apart
from
the
base
fee,
even
then
so.
The
current
thinking
now
is
to
have
in
the
clients
of
gef
and
other
clients
we'll
have
access
to
the
basically
we'll
have
access
to
a
few
more
data
points
such
as
the
priority
fees
that
users
have
been
paying,
but
regardless
this
is
still
a
very
different
beast
than
it
was
in
the
current
system
and
and
so
I'll
definitely
be
keeping
a
look
at
how
these
all
right,
how
these
new
oracles
function
and
and
if
there's
any
improvement
that
we
can
do
there.
D
So
the
second
thing
I'll
be
really
looking
out
for
so
we
know
that
there's
a
regime
where
eip1559
kind
of
breaks
down
it's
not
such
a
severe
breakdown,
it
still
works,
but
I'm
plotting
here
on
the
right.
What
we
call
the
demand
curve,
so
you
can
think
of
users
you
order
them
by
how
much
they
are
willing
to
pay.
So
you
bet
you,
you
put
the
most
willing
to
pay
users
to
the
left,
and
so
we
know
that
depending
on
where
the
base
fee
is
so,
let's
say
this
is
a
good
base
b.
D
So
if
the
base
figure
only
is
50
way,
we
know
that
we're
targeting
like
the
right
amount
of
users
in
our
demand
curve.
We
know
that
only
these
15
million
gas
will
be
willing
to
pay,
at
least
that
price,
and
this
is
exactly
where
we
are
targeting
our
block.
But
let's
say
that
base
fee
is
too
low
for
some
reason,
like
a
lot
of
new
users
have
come
in
the
system
and
and
and
the
base
fee
that
we
have-
maybe
let's
say
20
grey
is
too
low.
D
Then
we
we
kind
of
have
a
problem
where
the
block
suddenly
is
too
full,
so
we're
going
to
be
leaving
users
behind,
even
though
we
have
this
block
slack
that
allows
blocks
to
go
above
30
million
and
when
we're.
In
that
case,
there
is
some
weak
incentive
for
users
to
kind
of
change
their
behavior
and
maybe
want
to
tinker
a
bit
more
with
the
parameters
of
the
transactions
they
don't
have
to
do
it.
We
could
simply
still
use
the
default
strategy,
it's
still
a
good
option,
but
we
know
that.
D
We
do
believe
that
this
case
is
quite
infrequent
in
particular,
because
we
have
this
block
slack,
which,
most
of
the
time
dampens
the
effect
of
huge
demand
shifts,
but
but
it'll
be
kind
of
interesting
to
to
to
to
compute
just
well.
How
infrequent
is
it
so
with
the
meme
was
kind
of
okay,
five
percent
of
the
time?
D
So
another
thing
about
the
basic
dynamics
which
really
ties
with
the
previous
point
in
terms
of
the
base
field,
we're
kind
of
code
between
two
options.
So
we
have
a
trade-off
to
make.
So
I
said
that
sometimes
the
base
fee
is
too
low
and
when
it's
too
low
it's
because
it
hasn't
really
caught
up
with
the
state
of
the
market.
D
If
we
make
base
fee
update
too
quickly,
well,
sometimes
we're
overshooting,
and
then
the
the
market
is
actually
not
very
stable
and
we
can
get
into
this
regime
of
oscillation,
which
I'll
discuss
a
bit
more
in
the
next
slide.
But
on
the
other
hand,
if
we,
if
base
fee
updates
too
slowly,
then
we
get
like
this
not
great
estimation
as
well,
which
is
laggy.
D
So
it's
always
like
constantly
trying
to
catch
up
with
the
market,
and
it
means
that
we
should
theoretically
more
often
be
in
that
state,
where
there's
actually
more
users
which
are
includable
and
the
block
limit
would
be
overtaken
so
so
we
have
this
trade-off.
Currently,
we've
kind
of
said
this
constant.
I
think
it
was
there
in
the
first
specs,
and
we
said
okay,
that
looks
good.
You
know
it
takes
six
blocks
for
base
fee
to
double.
D
That
seems
reasonable,
like
we
don't
often
see
prices
going
from
50
to
100
way
within,
let's
say
the
span
of
six
blocks,
but
you
know
we.
We
could
also
check
the
data
on
this
and
see
well.
Is
there?
Is
there
a
way
that
we
can
tune
this?
Do
we
need
to
tune
it
at
all
yeah?
That
would
be
interesting
speaking
a
bit
about
the
oscillation
and
I'm
really
feeling
my
work
here.
D
There's
this
weird
regime
that
can
sometimes
happen
where
blocks
alternate
between
being
empty
and
being
full
and
it
kind
of
happens
when
the
demand
is
particularly
concentrated
and
then
base
fee.
If
it
shoots
a
little
bit
up,
everybody
is
priced
out
and
the
block
is
empty,
and
so
then,
when
it
comes
back
down,
suddenly
there's
a
lot
of
people
waiting
to
get
in
and
it
goes
back
up
and
it
keeps
doing
like
this
flip-flopping,
it's
very
pathological.
We.
D
We
don't
really
believe
that
okay,
we'll
observe
that
a
lot
in
practice,
but
you
know
I'll
be
I'll,
be
looking
out
to
to
see
if
it
does
happen
and
if
you're
interested
there's
a
link
to
the
paper
and
finally,
there's
also
like
some
other
things.
So
there's
been
like
other
designs,
we
could
tune
the
current
design,
which
is
based
on
this
multiplicative
update
rule.
We
will
actually
also
consider
different
update
rules
to
maybe
a
bit
more
intelligent
or
a
bit
more
yeah
fine-tuned
to
to
the
data
that
we
get.
D
One
of
them
is
actually
vitalix
id
and
you
can
find
it
on
if
research,
it's
a
it's
a
way
to
update
the
base
yield
to
think
of
a
gas
market
as
almost
like
a
one
of
his
automated
market
makers,
so
kind
of
think
of
it,
like
uni
swap
and
in
this
paradigm
you
think
of
a
block
producer.
So
the
miner
as
someone
who
needs
to
buy
gas
from
the
protocols,
the
protocol
has
this
supply
of
gas
and
every
time
there's
a
new
block.
D
This
quota
kind
of
goes
up,
let's
say
by
15
million.
So
the
block
is
willing
to
sell
that
gas
to
the
miner.
But
if
a
miner
wants
to
buy
too
much
gas,
so
if
there's
too
many
transactions
to
including
the
block,
then
the
price
start
to
rise,
which
is
kind
of
what
we
we
see
here.
So
you
have
like
this
invariant
so
this
curve
that
gives
you
the
pricing
that
the
miner
should
pay.
And
then
the
miner
tries
to
recoup
this
cost
from
the
transaction
fees
of
the
user.
So.
A
D
A
bit
of
a
different
paradigm,
it
might
actually
smooth
these
oscillations
that
I've
presented
before
we've
done
like
a
couple
of
initial
simulations
on
this.
But
it's
it's
a
it's
an
interesting.
Let's
say
idea
that
that
we
could
pursue
in
the
future
and
to
to
improve
eip1559
or
to
maybe
fine
tune
it
a
bit
further
right
and
last
night.
So
another
thing
that
I've
been
working
on
for
the
for
the
last
year
is
a
flea
market
simulation
library
with
which
we've
tried
to
analyze.
Let's
say
different
scenarios
for
one
five:
five:
nine.
D
So
the
scenario
where
the
blocks
are
full:
what
happens
when
we
are
moving
from
this
legacy
system
to
1.559?
How
should
we
think
about
the
transition?
We've
also
explored
things,
such
as
the
proposal
to
combine
the
escalator
mechanism,
which
is
a
separate
free
market
mechanism
and
one
five,
five,
nine
together,
you
can
find
all
of
this.
We
have
notebooks
which
are
open,
so
you
can
reproduce
the
code
and
run
it
yourself.
A
F
I
can
start
with
sort
of
user
user
perspective
questions
that
you
haven't
covered
already.
First
of
those
is
around
making
this
more
easy
to
use
for
users.
How
is
the
user
interface
implementations
coming
along,
I.e,
metamask
the
wallets
how's,
the
work
progressing
for
them
to
accommodate
the
base
fee
max
and
priority
fee.
B
So
I
can
yeah,
I
can
maybe
chat
about
that.
Basically,
we've
had
a
lot
of
calls
with
wallets
right
now.
I
think
you
know
wallets
are
obviously
very
mindful
of
trying
to
provide
like
the
best
experience
for
their
users,
but
it
is
like
a
large
change
and
I
think
they're
you
know
trying
to
find
what's
the
best
way
to
gradually
roll
this
out
and
what
what
makes
this
hard
is
like.
B
So
I
suspect
that
yeah,
once
59
is
rolled
out,
we'll
see
what
it's
like
to
experiment
more
and
and
come
up
with
better
designs
that
are
kind
of
1559
native.
But
I
wouldn't
be
surprised
if
it
takes.
You
know
a
few
weeks
to
a
few
months
for
that.
That
happens
just
because
yeah
it's
a
hard
transition
that
the
marriage.
B
C
That
a
little
a
little
bit
a
while
back
coinbase
wallet,
which
was
a
pretty
pretty
popular
wallet,
did
not
allow
users
to
adjust
their
gas
prices
and
during
the
happy
path
for
those
users.
This
is
great
because
they
were
just
told
this.
How
much
transaction
would
cost
click
confirm?
That's
it.
There
was
no
configuration.
It
was
very
simple.
Unfortunately,
when
there
was
high
congestion,
coinbase
wallet
users
would
suffer
greatly,
because
during
high
congestion,
the
users
had
no
recourse.
C
There
was
no
particularly
times
of
rapid
increase
in
congestion,
where
the
coinbase
oracle,
like
the
gas
price
oracle,
failed
and
again
it's
not
coinbase's
fault.
Every
gas
oracle
fails
at
some
point
in
time,
just
due
to
the
way
the
system
has
historically
worked,
and
so
eventually
coinbase
added
in
the
ability
for
users
to
set
gas
prices,
this
added
complexity
to
their
wallets.
So
previously
they
had
a
nice
simple
wallet.
C
My
I
believe
that
coinbase
and
other
wallets
will
be
able
to
go
back
to
that
model
where
they
just
tell
the
user
hey.
This
is
what
this
will
cost.
You
we'll
deal
with
figuring
out
how
to
get
your
transaction
included
and
we'll
have
a
success
rate.
That's
you
know
some
number
of
nines,
like
99.9
percent
of
transactions
succeed
rather
than
previously.
You
know
where
it
was
like.
C
You
know
all
these
other
things
that
also
use
metamask
as
a
wallet
have
switched
yet
and
so
or
maybe
they
won't
switch
ever
I
don't
know,
and
so
they're
in
a
little
tighter
spot,
it'll
be
hard
for
them.
I
do
think
eventually,
though
they
will
eventually
transition
to,
like
tim,
said,
1559
wallet,
at
which
point
my
hope
and
my
dream
is
that
users
can
just
forget
about
gas
pricing.
G
So
maybe,
while
we're
talking
about
the
transition
period,
that
came
up
a
couple
of
times
here
so
tim-
I
think
you
touched
on
this
before,
but
I
wanted
to
kind
of
dive
into
it.
Further
there's
been
some
attention
drawn
to
the
fact
that
trezor,
for
instance,
does
not
have
a
1559
implementation.
There's
been
a
volunteer
that
is
pushed,
but
it
still
hasn't
been
reviewed.
I
just
checked
again:
some
wallets
will
not
be
ready
for
1559..
B
Yeah,
I
mean
that's
totally
fine,
so
they'll,
probably
overpay
slightly
with
regards
to
gas
and
that's
kind
of
the
incentive.
That's
there
for
wallets
to
adopt
1559
is
it'll,
enable
them
to
lower
the
gas
prices
for
their
users,
but
everything
will
work.
So
you
know
there's
no,
no
functionality
that
will
be
broken.
C
Yeah
and
they
they
will
to
clarify
a
little
bit
that
they
will
overpay
exactly
how
much
they
overpay
right
now.
So
they
can.
It's
like
right.
Now,
everybody
overpays
a
little
bit.
It's
very
rare
that
you
pay
exactly
the
minimum
amount
of
gas
price
that
you
could
like
the
only
people
that
succeeded
that
are
basically
bots,
who
have
you
know
great
insight
into
the
system,
and
so
right
now
everybody
overpays
with
one
five,
five:
nine.
C
If
you
submit
a
one,
five
hundred
one
five,
five,
nine
transaction,
you
will
no
longer
be
in
the
class
of
users
that
is
overpaying.
You
will
now
be
in
the
class
of
users
that
are
paying
exactly
what
you
need
to
pay
and
no
more
people
who
don't
switch
over
one
five.
Five
nine
will
just
continue
to
overpay,
like
they
do
today.
D
As
as
more
and
more
users
are
using
one
five,
five
nine,
like
as
tim,
was
saying
the
prices
that
we
observe
in
the
blog.
They
will
tend
to
vary
a
lot
less,
so
there
will
be
less
of
these
users
over
paying.
So
you
might
even
see
kind
of
ripple
effects
where
people
who
are
using
these
legacy
wallets.
We
actually
start
over
paying
a
little
less
as
there
are
more
and
more
people
using
the
1559
system.
So
that's
another
thing
to
keep
in
mind.
F
C
So
if
a
fraud
proof
takes
5
million
gas
as
an
example
and
the
gas
price
is
100
nano-eats
per
for
gas
that
costs
10
times
as
much
as
if
the
gas
price
is
10
right
and
so
the
the
fraud
proof
or
the
system
needs
to
pay
the
fraud
prover
enough
to
make
sure
that
they're
at
least
covering
the
gas
cost.
Now
one
option
is
just
say:
okay:
well,
let's
make
sure
you
come
well,
you
always
pay
them
way
more
than
enough,
so
pay
them.
You
know
a
thousand.
C
Similarly,
if
we
set
it
too
low,
you
can
end
up
a
situation
where,
if
there's
ethereum
usage
is
just
really
high
for
a
long
period
of
time,
it's
not
profitable
to
actually
submit
a
fraud
proof
for
the
entire
duration
of
the
fraud.
Proof
opportunity,
which
is
you
know,
different
systems
set
it
for
different
durations,
sometimes
an
hour
sometimes
a
week,
and
so
what
you
have
to
do
to
deal
with
that
is
basically
extend
the
fraud,
proof
duration,
which
extends
the
withdrawal
duration
from
your
layer.
C
Two
solution
with
one
five:
five:
nine:
the
base
fee
is
well
known
on
chain,
and
so
your
fraud
proof
contract
on
layer.
One
can
know
exactly
what
the
base
fee
is
and
because
it
knows
what
the
base
fee
is.
It
knows
basically
exactly
how
much
it
needs
to
compensate
the
fraud
prover
in
order
to
make
sure
that
they
have
a
financial
incentive
to
actually
submit
the
fraud
proof,
and
so
the
this
allows,
hopefully
layer,
2
solutions
who
leverage
this
knowledge.
C
You
can
just
say:
okay,
the
we're
going
to
pay
the
fraud
prover
base
fee,
plus,
10
or
whatever,
and
that
way
you're
kind
of
always
guaranteed
more
or
less
that
someone
will
be
able
to
afford
to
submit
a
fraud
proof
and
therefore
you're
going
to
shrink
your
fraud
proof
window
down.
If
you
shoot
your
shrink
or
frog
proof
window
down,
then
it
means
that
the
withdrawal
time
goes
down
as
well,
which
improves
the
usability
of
layer,
2
solutions
significantly,
because
a
one
hour,
fraud
proof
window
is
way
better
than
a
one
week.
Fraud
proof
window.
D
That
arbitrary
is
actually
using
a
mechanism
which
is
a
bit
similar
to
one
five:
five,
nine
on
their
layer,
two
which
is
which
is
to
regulate
the
congestion
on
their
own
system.
It's
a
bit
different
in
in
the
actual
implementation.
But
it's
it's
very
much.
This
idea
of
dynamically
pricing.
If
there
are
too
many
users
on
the
roll-up
at
some
point,
so
yeah.
F
F
G
B
So
I
mean
there's
a
lot
of
analyses.
They
all
vary
greatly.
I'd
say
most
of
the
ones.
I've
read
vary
between
25
to
75
of
transaction
fees.
You
know
being
burned.
If
you
want
to
take
the
middle,
that's
like
half,
I
yeah
the
the
hard
part
with
that
is
knowing
how
much
of
the
current
gas
price
would
correspond
to
the
priority
fee
and
how
much
would
correspond
to
the
base
fee.
We
just
don't
know
that
we'll
see
when
the
network
goes
live,
but
you
know
I
yeah.
C
So
something
keep
in
mind
with
these
estimates
is
they
are
very
much
a
function
of
demand
for
block
space
on
ethereum
and
so
back.
If
you
look
at
an
estimate
that
was
authored
three
or
four
months
ago,
it
would
have
assumed
you
know
200
nanoweights
per
gas
as
the
kind
of
the
burn
rate
which
is
much
different
than
it
is
today
like,
and
I
haven't
actually
checked
tech
today,
but
like
a
few
days
ago,
it
was
you
know,
10.
C
That
being
said,
just
I
know
and
too
negative
there.
That
being
said,
we
can,
if
you
give
an
estimate
of
the
base
fee,
it
is
very
easily
to
get
easy
to
calculate
like
if
you
give
an
estimated
average
base
fee
over
some
period
of
time.
It
is
very
easy
to
calculate
how
much
eath
has
burned
and
if
that
average,
I
think
someone
around
numbers
double
check
me
on
this,
but
I
think
it
comes
out
to
like
around
135
nano
eats
per
gas.
C
C
I
think
that
drops
down
to
about
10.
So
if
the
gas
price
is
10
for
a
whole
year,
then
again
we're
net
neutral.
If
it's
higher
than
10,
we
are
deflationary.
If
it's
lower
than
10,
then
we're
inflationary
and
again
this
all
whether
we
will
be
above
or
below
135
or
10
depends
entirely
on
future
ethereum
demand
demand
and
we
don't
know
what
that
is.
B
So
again,
hard
to
predict
for
miners,
I
mean
there's
no
real
change
except
upgrading
like
they
do
for
every
hard
fork,
and
you
know
this
estimate
of
25
to
75
percent
of
transaction
fees
that
are
burned
is
basically
what's
removed
from
miners.
It's
worth
noting
the
block
reward
will
be
unchanged,
and
you
know
the
two
other
things
that
affect
miners
kind
of
much
more
than
1559
are
the
usd
price
so
like
that
has
a
lot
of
volatility
in
it
as
well
and
the
hash
rate.
So
how
many
other
people
are
mining?
C
The
as
far
as
what
miners
will
have
to
do
or
change,
the
only
thing
miners
should
have
to
do
is
tell
their
clients
how
what
the
minimum
priority
fee
required
for
their
client
to
be
willing
to
include
a
transaction.
So
when
a
transaction
shows
up
with
at
the
minor,
the
miner
can
decide
to
either
include
it
or
not
include
it
for
an
extreme
example.
Obviously,
the
miner
would
not
include
any
transaction
that
pays
no
priority
fee,
so
the
priority
is
set
to
zero.
C
There
is
a
negative
incentive
for
the
miner
to
include
that,
because
it
increases
their
uncle
rate,
which
means
there's
a
chance.
They'll
miss
out
on
the
block
reward
by
including
that,
and
they
gain
nothing
other
than
perhaps
some
karma
or
something,
but
they
don't
get
any
financial
rewards
for
it
at
the
other
extreme.
You
know.
If
someone
is
paying
like
a
hundred
eighth
per
gas,
then
yeah.
The
miner
is
going
to
include
that,
basically,
no
matter
what
somewhere
in
between
those
two
numbers
is
a
number
where
it
it
is.
C
The
opportunity
cost
of
uncle
chances
is
worth,
including
the
transaction.
That's
estimated
to
be
around
one
or
two
nano
eights
per
gas
and
and
that's
the
calculating
that
is
much
more
complex
like
most
of
the
things
simplify.
That
is
a
very
complicated
thing.
We've
known
how
to
calculate
that
for
a
long
time,
but
it
is
complicated
also
it
gets
more
complicated
because
as
the
revenue
from
other
fees
in
the
block
increase,
so
as
the
block
gets
bigger,
that
number
actually
needs
to
go
up,
because
you
know
your
chance
of
getting
uncled.
C
I
think
I
don't
know
if
any
clients
will
launch
london
with
that
implemented
with
the
more
advanced
strategy
implemented.
I
think
they'll
all
launch
something
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong
on
this,
but
I
believe
they're
all
going
to
launch
with
just
the
ability
for
a
minor
to
set
a
hard-coded
value
and
again
my
recommendation
to
miners
is
set
it
to
around
the
opportunity
cost,
which
is
like
one
or
two
like.
C
If
you,
if
you
don't
want
to
do
any
calculations-
and
you
want
to
be-
you
prefer
having
a
steady
revenue,
then
two
is
maybe
the
right
number
there.
If
you
want
to
be
a
little
more
aggressive
and
you
think
fees
are
generally
going
to
be
low,
then
setting
to
one
will
mean
you're
going
to
include
more
transactions
and
therefore
you
might
actually
make
more
money
that
way.
But
it's
a
little
riskier
because
your
uncle
rate
may
go
up.
You
know
noticeably.
C
I'm
sorry,
we
don't
know
what
percentage
of
minor
revenue
will
be
in
fees
the
day
before
london
launches,
and
so
that's
kind
of
like
what
you'd
want
to
gauge
it
on,
but
again
that
maybe
in
in
reality,
the
day
after
london
launches
gas
prices
go
down
because
they're
volatile
and
they
go
up
and
down
all
the
time.
And
so
it's
really
hard
to
say,
like
it
really
depends
on
what
your
premises
are
and
what
you're,
assuming
future
congestion
is
going
to
be
like
and
a
bunch
of
other
factors.
C
F
B
I
mean
miners
are
free
to
do
whatever
they
want,
like
anybody
else
on
ethereum.
If
you
know
it,
it
seems
like
there's
an
extremely
strong,
if
not
like
unanimous
consensus,
that,
like
applications
and
developers
and
whatnot,
wants
the
london
upgrade.
You
know
if
miners
want
to
provide
kind
of
their
services
to
the
people
who
want
that
upgrade
they're
free
to
if
they
want
to
stop
mining
at
london,
because
it's
not
profitable
for
them.
B
They're
also
free
to
do
that,
I'm
personally
not
aware
of
any
kind
of
group
of
miners
or
users
or
whatnot
that
want
to
kind
of
fork
or
not
fork,
basically,
when
london
arrives.
But
you
know,
if
part
of
the
community
wants
to
do
that,
then
start
their
own
fort,
like
that's
their
right
to
I'm,
just
not
aware
of
one.
That's
that's
like
planned,
or
that
has
any
kind
of
significant
support
right
now,.
C
And
something
to
keep
in
mind
is
that
every
time
there's
a
hard
fork,
there
are
one
or
more
miners
who
stay
behind
on
huge,
almost
always
on
accident
like
they
just
forget
to
upgrade
or
something
like
that,
and
so,
if
what
london
launches
and
people
start
tweeting,
oh
my
god,
someone's
mining,
the
fork
do
not
be
surprised
by
that.
Just
give
you
a
heads
up
that
happens
every
single
hard
fork.
It
is
normal.
C
Some
miners
just
forget
to
upgrade
now,
if
that
secondary,
that
other
fork
receives,
like
you
know,
95
hash
power,
that's
interesting
like
that's
new
and
different,
but
if
just
there's
some
people
mining,
you
know
the
mining
without
london
changes
again,
that's
totally
normal.
Don't
flip
out
that
the
world's
not
ending
there
is
not
a
contentious,
hard
fork
or
anything
like
that.
D
Just
wanted
to
point
out
that
the
prices
of,
if
have
been,
really
high
recently
also
transaction
fees.
Miners
have
been
extracting
mv,
so
the
hash
rate
has
kind
of
increased
quite
a
bit
in
in
recent
times,
but
hash
rate
is
is
definitely
like
stickier
and
a
bit
more
laggy.
So
we
know
that
there's
an
equilibrium
where
miners
are
kind
of
incentivized
to
mine.
So
to
what
tim
was
saying,
I
don't
actually
expect
miners
would
turn
off
their
rigs
as
much
as
new
miners
might
not
want
to
to
join
the
system.
G
Yeah
you
actually
touched
on
mev,
which
is
the
point
I
wanted
to
look
at.
There's
been,
I
guess
in
mev
renaissance,
since
the
beginning
of
the
year,
I
mean
at
this
point
we're
looking
at
flashbacks
adoption
being
over
80
of
cash
power
in
thinking
about
the
effects
of
1559
and
minor
incentives,
and
all
of
that
is
there
a
clear
way
that
mev
plays
into
that
as
a
revenue
stream
for
the
miners.
Is
that
expected
to
maybe
increase
or
decrease
or
anything
of
that
particular
angle?
C
I
wouldn't
expect
it
to
15592
or
london
to
impact
mev.
Much
really.
London
also
contains
another
change
unrelated
to
1.59,
which
is
to
break
or
remove
reef
gas
refunds.
That
may
have
a
slight
impact
because
the
people
who
leverage
that
the
most
tend
to
be
bots
and
bots
tend
to
be
the
ones
that
are.
You
know
extracting
this
mev,
because
you
can
just
it's
a
minor
optimization
that
regular
users
will
almost
never
do
but
a
lot
others
will
so
in
london.
We
might
see
a
little
bit
of
stuff
happen.
C
I
don't
can't
say
what,
but
you
know
there
will
be
some
shifts
around.
I
don't
think.
1559,
though,
is
going
to
have
a
significant
impact
on
mev.
Interestingly,
like
I
mentioned
earlier,
the
the
people
who
are
the
best
at
predicting
gas
prices
are
bot
authors,
and
so
they
will
likely
be
the
last
ones
to
move
over
to
one
five.
C
Five,
nine
like
they
benefit
the
least
because
they
are
like
the
people
who
are
doing
this
sort
of
mbv
extraction
are
the
experts
in
gas
pricing
and
they
know
exactly
what
to
do
and
like
they
don't
really
get
a
big
advantage.
Like
they
were
already
pricing
things
very
precisely
and
now
they're
one
five
five
knives
doesn't
really
help
them.
It's
more
helps
regular
people.
D
I
guess
one
change
with
respect
to
one
five:
five,
nine
is
that
currently
you
can
maybe
trade
directly
with
a
miner
and
get
included
at
a
zero
fee
gas
price.
Now
you
still
have
to
pay
at
least
the
base
fee
to
get
included
very
often
it's
it's
very.
I
mean
it's
residual
compared
to
how
much
you're
paying
anyways
to
get
this
bundle
included.
But
there's
still
this
thing,
which
I
think
is
really
the
major
change
with
respect
to
mev
and
one
five:
five,
nine.
C
C
There
are
certain
strategies
where
you
actually
flash
low
on
everything
you
need,
and
so
you
actually
need
zero
eth
in
the
account,
so
you
can
run
a
boss
strategy
with
an
account
that
is
completely
pristine.
Like
has
never
touched
anything
on
ethereum
before
now,
you
will
need
to
acquire
some
seed
eath
somehow
in
order
to
do
any
sort
of
bot
work.
C
What
we
might
see
is
right
after
london,
like
the
days
after
we
might
actually
see
a
decrease
in
extracted
value
just
because
a
handful
of
the
bots
will
break
because
they
didn't
pay
attention
they
didn't
upgrade
just
like
which
mentioned
earlier.
You
know
some
miners,
just
don't
upgrade
their
software.
There
will
probably
be
some
bots
who
don't
upgrade
their
software,
and
so
you
might
actually
see
a
small
decrease
in
extracted
value
around
london
just
again
as
a
side
effect.
Just
people
not
updating
but
long
term,
I
don't
think
it'll
impact.
B
And
I
have
some
potential
mev
alpha
for
those
listening.
I
think
one
thing
that's
worth
considering
pulse
1559
is:
the
transaction
pool
will
be
segregated
much
more
cleanly
between
transactions
that
can
and
cannot
be
included
so
right
now.
The
transaction
folder
is
just
this
bunch
of
transactions,
all
of
which
could
be
included
and
there's
thousands
of
them.
B
So
I
suspect-
and
this
will
be
probably
even
more
true
in
e2
when
the
block
time
is
fixed
and
when
the
validator
set
is
fixed,
where,
if
you
have
like
a
large
pool
or
something
like
that,
they
can
know
for
sure
that
that
they
yeah
they
will
be
producing
two
blocks
in
a
row.
So
I
I
suspect,
that's
like
something
that
we
won't
see
at
the
get-go,
but
where
yeah
it
will
come
up
over
time.
So
multi-block
mvv
is
yeah.
Gonna,
be
interesting
to
follow.
F
B
You
know
every
tool
that
has
their
own
world
map
like.
I
suspect
the
major
tools
will
want
to
support
this
before
maintenance.
So
you
know,
we've
talked
a
lot
with
infera.
We've
talked
about
with
metamask
and
coinbase
has
been
pretty
engaged
in
those
conversations
as
well,
there's
a
bunch
of
other
ones,
I'm
forgetting
so
not
just
those
three
all
of
the
kind
of
dev
libraries,
so
ethers,
web3.js
and
whatnot
they're.
A
F
Oh
okay,
sure
sure
the
most
upvoted
question
that
I
haven't
asked
yet
was
from
reddit
user
impestable,
it's
quite
a
long
one,
so
I'll
read
it
verbatim
and
then
guess
can
chime
in
so
the
question
is
on
the
assumption
that,
with
increased
market
congestion,
miners
are
free
to
exceed
the
target
gas
limit
to
fit
more
transactions
which
drives
up
which
drives
the
base
fee
up
for
future
blocks.
No
doubt
this
will
happen
during
periods
of
high
activity.
Would
the
reverse
ever
happen?
F
D
Again,
I
can
take
this
one,
I
mean
mathematically.
You
have
to
counter
balance
high
base
fees
with
low
bxp,
so
on
average
blocks
will
be
at
the
target,
so
15
million,
but
it
cannot
be
that
basically
just
keeps
you
cannot
always
be
above
the
target.
Otherwise,
basically
just
goes
to
infinity.
So
at
some
point,
since
basically,
it's
really
like
a
binding
fee
like
it's,
the
minimum
that
users
have
to
pay.
If
it's
too
high,
it
has
to
come
down.
C
D
C
I
I
can
deduce
kind
of
what
I
suspect
the
person's
actually
trying
to
ask,
which
is
there's
a
lot
of
worry
about
miners
attacking
the
system
and
manipulating
things
by
either
including
their
own
transactions
or
excluding
transactions.
They
could
otherwise
or
would
be
profitable
to
include
for
the
miners,
including
their
own
transactions,
that
one's
easy,
it's
just
prohibitively
expensive
reminders
do
that
attack
like
they
will
just
eventually
run
out
of
money,
doing
that
for
the
the
inverse
miners
excluding
transactions,
this
one's.
C
Also,
it's
not
a
profitable
strategy,
long
term
and
it's
a
little
more
complicated.
Why
that
is
but
to
the
crux
of
it
is
that
it
isn't
any
selfish
participant
is
better
off
defecting
from
some
sort
of
colluding
group
than
they
are
from
participating
in
the
collusion
up
to
up
to
a
certain
limit
where
you
have
a
bunch
of
other
attacks.
If
you
have
50,
51
percent
of
minors
are
all
concluding
in
some
way.
Lots
of
attacks
opens
up.
C
Yes,
there
are
some
theoretical
attacks
where,
if
all
the
miners
got
together
and
they
all
just
100
percent
said
we
are
going
to
mine
less
than
full
blocks
in
order
to
make
sure
that
there
is
no
base
fee
and
we
get
it
all
and
everything
reverts
back
to
the
pre-london
system.
Basically,
everybody's
bidding,
it's
just
like
there's.
C
If
you're
a
miner
and
all
the
miners
are
doing
that,
you
just
immediately
say
yeah
yeah
sure
I'll
do
that
and
then
you
go
don't
do
it
and
you
make
twice
as
much
money
as
everybody
else
like
it's
just
an
optimal
strategy
to
not
participate,
and
so
because
of
this
I'm
not
very
worried
about
miners
colluding
to
attack
the
system.
It's
just
it's
way
too
complicated
for
humans
to
actually
pull
off
at
that
scale.
F
Okay,
we've
got
another
longest
question
up
next
again
I'll
read
verbatim
from
the
question
it's
under
the
current
proposal.
The
gas
fee
would
go
to
zero
guay
from
one
way
since
it
uses
integer
division
to
calculate
the
next
base.
Gas
price
is
that
true,
assuming
it
is
after
sharding
is
implemented.
Is
there
a
chance
that
gas
price
can
go
below
one
grey
to
mwa
levels?
Has
that
been
considered.
C
So
it's
actually
a
very
big
number
and
we
don't
run
into
integer
division
problems
until
you
get
down
to
one
way
or
ato
eth,
which
is
a
very
tiny
number,
and
when
that
happens,
it
can
go,
it
can
drop
down
to
seven
and
then
it
can't
go
lower
than
seven
and
then
from
seven
it'll
go
up
to
eight
and
then
eight
to
nine
etcetera,
etcetera.
So
the
integer
division
problem
is
basically
you
know
when
it's
when
the
cost
of
calculating
the
division
is
far
more
expensive
than
the
difference.
C
C
C
This
will
kind
of
again.
This
affects
them
in
the
same
way
it
affects
minors
and
that
it
affects
how
the
fees
they're
getting
come
in
like
how
much
they're
getting
but
again
that's
something
they
should
always
have
been
prepared
for,
because
the
proof
of
stake
spoofer
steak.
This
was
always
the
plan.
D
Yeah
and
stakeholders
and
if
two
are
part
of
a
consensus
layer
and
all
these
changes
to
the
free
market
and
everything
is
it's
part
of
the
execution
layer
and
the
execution
layer
is
just
grandfathered
into
this
new
consensus
layer.
Once
you
switch
on
proof
of
stake
and
switch
off
proof
of
work
so
from
a
stacker
perspective
like
they
just
replace
functionally
the
role
that
miners
had
until
now,
proposing
the
blocks
and
having
them
included
in
the
chain.
So
no
no
change
for
them
on
that
front,
apart
from
upgrading
as
mick
asses.
C
So
we're
talking
about
is
gas
refunds.
Basically,
that
is
going
away
in
london
but
unrelated
to
one
five:
five:
nine!
That's
the
we're!
Turning
off
gas
refunds
in
the
london
hard
fork
as
a
separate
change
to
one
five,
five,
nine!
So
it's
very
easy
that
a
lot
of
people,
I
think,
get
those
two
confused
where
they
think.
Oh
london
is
just
one
five,
five,
nine,
but
it's
actually
one
five
1.59
plus
a
couple
of
other
minor
things,
one
of
those
things,
the
removal
of
refunds,
which
means
you
can
no
longer
pre-buy
gas.
A
Thank
you
so
yeah
london
is
coming
up
with.
I
guess
five
proposals
in
total
and
we
have
a
blog
on
the
edm
characteristics
medium.
It's
a
london
blog
post
for
people
who
would
like
to
prefer
text
description.
It's
a
good
read
to
have
an
overview
of
the
proposals
that
can
be
expected
with
the
upgrade
and
also
at
the
penny.
Playlist
you
can
find
a
playlist
for
london
upgrade
special
thank
you,
tim
barnabe
micah
for
joining
us
talking
about
1559
and
the
upgrade
timelines.
A
A
If
you
have
got
any
feedback
about
this
proposal
or
if
you
have
any
questions
left,
leave
a
comment:
each
ethereum
cat
holders
are
the
guests.
You
can
also
add
your
comments
to
the
discussion
link
of
proposal,
one
five,
five,
nine
at
the
fellowship
of
ethereum
magician
one
last
announcement,
that
is
about
the
users
and
developers
survey.
So
carriers
are
collecting
community
feedback
with
users
and
developers.
If
you
haven't
filled
up
the
form,
yet
the
feedback
form
consider
filling
it.