►
From YouTube: Evaluating the PBS Experiment: Early insights from MEV-Boost and the Builder Market by Jolene Dunne
Description
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https://archive.devcon.org/archive/watch/6/evaluating-the-pbs-experiment-early-insights-from-mev-boost-and-the-builder-market/
PBS is a major change to the core Ethereum protocol. It attempts to minimise negative effects of MEV by delegating block building to a market of block builders. This talk would cover what we have learned from the rollout of mev-boost, focusing on what is happening in the builder market, and what this means for the future of in-protocol PBS. What are the main improvements that we can make to the PBS design in response to how this prototype version is performing?
Speaker(s): Jolene Dunne
Skill level: Intermediate
Track: Cryptoeconomics
Keywords: MEV,PBS,builder
Follow us: https://twitter.com/efdevcon, https://twitter.com/ethereum
Learn more about devcon: https://www.devcon.org/
Learn more about ethereum: https://ethereum.org/
Devcon is the Ethereum conference for developers, researchers, thinkers, and makers.
Devcon 6 was held in Bogotá, Colombia on Oct 11 - 14, 2022.
Devcon is organized and presented by the Ethereum Foundation, with the support of our sponsors. To find out more, please visit https://ethereum.foundation/
A
A
Hi
everyone,
my
name,
is
Jolene
and
I
work
at
flashbots
research
and
today,
I'm
going
to
be
talking
to
you
about
evaluating
the
architecture
called
proposer,
Builder
separation,
given
the
things
that
we've
learned
and
the
insights
that
we've
gained
since
the
deployment
of
math
boost
and
I'm
also
happy
to
take
some
questions
at
the
end.
If
we
have
time
so
as
a
brief
introduction.
What's
the
point
of
this,
how
are
PBS
and
mavoos
linked
or
how
are
they
different?
A
So
probably
most
of
you
are
familiar
with
these
ideas
already,
but
just
to
make
sure
that
we're
all
on
the
same
page,
proposer,
Builder
separation
refers
to
an
architecture
that
separates
the
functions
of
block,
building
and
block
proposing
within
the
core
ethereum
protocol.
So
instead
of
the
block
proposer,
in
this
case
the
validator
going
to
the
mempool
and
building
their
own
block,
which
they
would
then
proposed
to
the
rest
of
the
network,
all
block
construction
would
be
outsourced
to
actors
that
we
called
block
Builders.
A
So
the
idea
is
that
the
only
thing
that
the
validator
would
have
to
do,
Under
full
PBS,
would
be
to
choose
the
highest
value
block.
That's
presented
to
it
when
it's
time
for
its
thought
block
building
is
a
you
can
think
of
it
as
like,
a
revenue
generating
activity.
There
are
economies
of
scale
involved
in
it
and
opportunities
for
things
like
private
order
flow.
That
might
give
you
an
advantage
over
other
builders.
So
basically,
there
are
incentives
for
Block
Builders
to
centralize
and
to
become
more
powerful
as
time
goes
on.
A
So
that's
a
trade-off
that
was
kind
of
known
about
and
made
and
accepted
at
the
time.
The
PBS
would
take
this
centralizing
Force
out
of
the
ethereum
consensus
layer
and
put
it
into
the
Builder
Market
and
then
logically,
the
only
kind
of
interface
point
would
be
where
the
validator
is
sending.
These
calls
to
the
Builder
Market
on
picking
the
best
block
that
comes
back
like
I
said.
A
So
the
idea
is
that
kind
of
stuff
can
get
very
ugly
in
the
Builder
Market,
but
we
don't
care
because
the
core
of
ethereum,
the
consensus
layer,
is
safe
from
the
effects
of
Mev.
So
where
does
Mev
boots
come
into
this?
And
how
is
this
related,
so
meth
boost
allows
validators
to
engage
in
an
experimental
version
of
PBS
on
this
Builder
market.
So
it's
completely
optional.
A
So
we
knew
that
we
needed
to
kind
of
upgrade
it
and
do
something
different
and
so
flashbots
worked
with
the
ethereum
foundation
to
make
this
piece
of
Open
Source
software
that
could
act
as
a
prototype
for
this
longer
term.
Mev
solution
for
ethereum,
which
was
PBS.
So
in
this
way
we
are
able
to
test
this
idea
of
PBS
through
mad
boost,
rather
than
kind
of
putting
it
in
the
protocol
and
then
being
in
trouble.
If
it
doesn't
work
or
something
bad
happens.
A
A
And
then
we
have
Searchers
who
would
be
monitoring
the
public
mempool,
as
well
as
any
private
sources
of
transactions
that
they
have
and
they
would
be
forwarding
their
bundles
along
to
these
specialized
actors
that
we
call
block
builders,
block
Builders
will
be
receiving
bundles
from
Searchers.
Maybe
they're
also
monitoring
the
public
mempool.
A
So
when
I
say
the
Builder
Market
experiment
webmav
boost
this
is
what
I
mean
and
when
we
talk
about
full
and
protocol
PBS,
we
are
trying
to
figure
out
a
version
of
this
that
has
the
important
bits
that
enable
this
Market
kind
of
baked
into
the
ethereum
protocol.
So
that
means
nomev
boost
and
probably
no
relays
as
well.
A
So
the
previous
question
kind
of
turned
into
these
questions
is
abstracting
the
Mev
away
from
the
core
protocol,
a
good
obstruction
or
does
it
leak?
Are
there
more
interface
points
between
where
the
Mev
is
happening
on
the
core
protocol,
then
people
would
lead
you
to
believe
and
if
things
get
very,
very
bad
in
the
Builder
Market,
maybe
imagine
a
very
small
number
of
very
powerful,
very
centralized
actors
that
dominate
block
building.
Are
there
really
no
knock-on
effects
on
core
ethereum,
assuming
at
some
point
in
the
future?
A
We
have
a
full
and
protocol
PBS
in
this
in
protocol
PBS
world
I
started
thinking
about
what
parts
of
ethereum
are
still
influenced
by
Mev
and
I
came
up
with
kind
of
two
families
of
effects,
so
the
first
order
effects
are
kind
of
the
Direct
effects
on
the
core
protocol.
So
these
are
places
where,
even
though
this
Mev
is
supposedly
over
on
the
other
side
of
the
room-
and
it
doesn't
affect
ethereum,
it's
still,
it
still
influences
part
of
it
and
the
other
type
are
more
kind
of
second
order
effects.
A
And
if
so,
what
kind
of
medications
might
we
need?
So,
let's
have
a
look
at
the
first
kind.
What
parts
of
ethereum
are
still
affected
by
Mev
under
fall
in
protocol
PBS,
so
it
might
be
more
than
this,
but
these
are
the
main
ones
that
I
came
up
with
for
now.
So
the
first
one
is
the
contents
of
the
block.
So
we
are
now
getting
these
blocks
from
the
Builder
market.
A
So
now
all
transactions
in
the
block
can
be
directly
influenced
by
Mev,
and
this
wasn't
the
case
before,
because
it
was
possible
for
minors
or
validators
to
kind
of
opt
out
of
using
my
booster
MAV
geeth
if
they
really
wanted
to
so
in
the
future.
If
most
or
all
of
the
blocks
come
from
the
Builder
Market,
the
purpose
of
the
builders
is
to
reorder
and
rearrange
transactions.
Their
block
can
be
as
profitable
as
possible,
so
hopefully
that
one's
kind
of
straightforward,
this
kind
of
idea
of
like
losing
control
of
plot
content.
A
The
second
one
is-
maybe
not
so
obvious,
so
the
contents
of
the
public
mempool
are
influenced
by
Mev
Under,
full
PBS.
So
how
can
that
be?
Well
in
a
world
where
we
have
full-in
protocol
PBS
Builders
are
incentivized
to
have
private
sources
of
transactions
that
we
talked
about
earlier
and
we
call
this
exclusive
order
flow.
So
if
Builders
are
competing
just
on
the
contents
of
the
public
mempool,
there
is
and
there's
no
difference
between
the
kinds
of
transactions
that
they
have
available
to
them.
A
Then
their
success
comes
down
to
maybe
their
algorithm
or
their
trading
strategies.
However,
the
more
order
flow
that
they
have
access
to,
that
other
builders
do
not
the
more
likely
it
is
that
they
can
build
a
better
block
with
that
on
our
flashbots.
We
generally
think
that
order
flow
is
going
to
be
a
big
differentiator
in
how
successful
block
Builders
are
going
to
be,
and
if
this
order
flow
is
exclusive
in
that
it's
going
to
a
private
mempool
instead
of
the
public
mempool,
it's
it's
not
going
into
the
public
Med
pool.
A
So
you
you
could
have
this
situation
where,
as
as
there
is
more
Mev
activity
because
the
the
Builder,
what
is
happening
with
the
builders
is
associated
with
this
Mev
than
the
contents
of
the
public,
mempool
might
get
smaller
and
then
the
last
one
which
kind
of
relates
to
the
first,
but
maybe
a
little
bit
of
a
different
Focus
blog
posters.
As
block
proposers
used
to
have
control
over
what
the
contents
of
their
blog
would
be
so
Under
full
PBS
there
used
to
be
sorry.
The
the
big
difference
would
be.
A
A
But
we
think
that
you
know
Under
full
in
protocol
PBS,
there
may
not
be
an
option
for
Builders
to
or
for
validators
to
opt
out
of
that,
so
you
might
have
no
choice
but
to
get
your
blocks
from
from
an
external
market
and
then
kind
of
going
on
to
the
second
family
effects.
So
how
are
actors
in
the
Builder
Market
incentivize
is
to
mess
with
the
base
layer,
the
consensus
layer
in
order
to
gain
an
advantage
on
the
big
issue
that
I
see
with
this
is
that
the
Builder
Market
is
actually
out
of
protocol.
A
So
there's
nothing
enforcing
participants
in
the
Builder
Market
to
stick
to
the
structure
that
we
saw
in
the
diagram
earlier.
The
map
boost
architecture
that
exists
is
kind
of
a
template
for
what
is
safest
for,
like
independent
ecosystem
aligned
parties
like
flashbots,
to
run
under
a
certain
number
of
assumptions
baked
into
it.
A
So
the
only
part
of
the
Builder
Market,
that's
in
the
core
protocol,
is
this
Builder
specification
which
divines
like
the
API
calls
and
sequence
between
the
validator
and
some
software
that
looks
like
MAV
boost
on
that
side
of
that
kind
of
anything
goes
by
now,
we've
identified
a
few
kind
of
concrete
areas
where
we
think
that
Mev
might
still
affect
the
core
protocol,
Under
full
PBS.
So
what
can
we
do
with
this?
A
Well,
there
have
been
a
lot
of
really
awesome
data
collection
efforts
by
various
parties
in
the
ecosystem
in
the
last
few
weeks
since
the
merge.
What
if
we
took
a
look
at
some
of
these
and
see
if
there
are
any
clues
based
on
these
areas,
that
we've
identified
it
that
this
prototype
Builder
market
via
Mev
boost,
is
starting
to
affect
the
core
protocol
in
an
undesirable
way.
A
And
so
the
first
question
that
we
want
to
ask
is
going
back
to
what
we
identified
previously.
How
much
block
content
right
now
is
currently
decided
by
the
Builder
market.
So
here
is
a
graph
that
measures
how
many
blocks
have
come
from
relays
since
the
merge.
So,
as
you
can
see,
as
of
today,
we're
up
to
60
percent
of
blocks
coming
through
relays
and
I
looked
at
these
this
graph
last
week
and
it
was
about
45.
A
So
it's
increasing
quite
quickly
and
again,
it's
important
to
note
here
that
this
might
not
be
the
full
picture.
So
many
of
these
dashboards
measure
what
comes
from
relays-
and
this
might
not
be
an
accurate
reflection
of
what
blocks
are
coming
from
the
Builder
Market
as
a
whole.
So
it's
probably
best
to
think
of
this
as
a
lower
bound
on
how
much
block
content
is
coming
from
the
Builder
Market.
That
seems
to
be
increasing
over
time
and
then
on
to
the
second
question.
So
is
the
public
mempool
changing
since
math
boost
launched?
A
So
here
is
a
graph
of
the
count
of
unconfirmed
transactions
in
the
mempool
over
the
last
30
days,
and
if
we
look
back
at
when
the
the
merge
happens,
September
15th
it
it
looks
like
something
may
be
different,
so
the
Baseline
seems
to
be
a
little
bit
lower
and
what
I
would
expect
to
see
over
time.
If
my
speculation
is
correct,
is
this
Baseline
kind
of
trending
downwards?
However,
I
don't
think
I
could
say
at
this
point
that
this
is
definitely
because
of
Mev.
A
My
plan
is
to
to
keep
monitoring
this
and
look
into
other
things
that
might
be
affecting
the
mempool
since
the
merge
and
the
next
question
is
linked
to
the
idea
of
things
kind
of
getting
nasty
in
the
Builder
market,
and
if
there
are
actors
with
big
advantages
that
they
might
you
know
use,
they
might
be
in
a
position
to
use
those
to
start
to
influence
the
base
layer.
So
are
there
early
indicators
that
Builders
are
centralizing,
so
this
chart
measures
block
Builder's
success
since
the
merge,
so
percentage
of
blocks
that
landed.
A
That
came
from
a
particular
Builder.
So
if
we
think
of
that
60
that
we
saw
in
the
diagram
a
few
slides
ago,
how
many
of
that
60
came
from
a
particular
Builder
and
the
orange
one
is
flashbots,
so
that
doesn't
really
look
great
right
now.
However,
if
you
look
closely,
it
does
seem
like
flashbots
is
losing
its
lead
a
little
bit
as
time
goes
on
or,
as
some
other
people
have
pointed
out
to
me
that
the
non-flashbot
slice
looks
as
though
it
might
be
kind
of
diversifying
a
little
bit.
A
But
this
is
probably
another
good
thing
to
keep
an
eye
on,
and
so,
when
I
talked
about
actors
trying
to
influence
core
ethereum
in
ways
that
we
haven't
thought
of
yet
I
think
the
big
one
for
me
is
whether
Builders
and
validators
will
eventually
decide
not
to
bother
with
the
out
of
protocol
Builder
market
and
just
start
making
deals
with
each
other
directly.
And
this
is
the
kind
of
activity
that's
much
more
difficult
to
see.
A
We
really
need
to
keep
in
mind
that
the
Builder
market,
so
this
thing
that
validators
are
able
to
send
their
requests
to
at
the
moment
on
what
goes
through
Mev
boost
on
the
relays
is
not
the
same
thing.
So
what
we
would
need
to
find
out
here
is
if
there
is
a
way
to
tell
if
there
are
blocks
produced
via
some
external
source
that
are
not
going
through
math
boost
or
a
relay
and
I
think
this
is
possible
but
and
managed
to
do
it
in
time.
A
For
this
talk,
but
by
examining
this
number
over
time,
we
could
deduce
that
perhaps
Builders
are
being
connected
directly
to
validators,
bypassing
the
relay
components
entirely,
because,
if
you're
a
big
party
with
a
lot
of
order
flow
and
either
access
to
a
lot
of
validators
or
perhaps
the
means
to
acquire
validators,
you
don't
need
to
participate
in
all
this
relay
and
Builder
competition
business.
So
I
think
we
want
to
keep
as
much
of
this
activity
in
the
light
as
possible.
This
is
something
that
I
think
is
really
important
and
will
continue
to
work
on.
A
A
We
also
saw
that
there
seems
to
be
a
decrease
in
transaction
volume
in
the
public
man
pool
post,
merge
and
if
that
speculation
is
correct-
and
it
turns
out
that
this
is
a
symptom
of
transactions
being
diverted
from
the
public
mempool
and
into
private
pools.
What
implication
might
this
have
and
one
of
the
solutions
that
people
propose,
or
maybe
one
of
the
kind
of
additional
features
that
people
want
to
see
for
math
boost
or
full
PBS?
Is
this
idea
of
a
fallback
solution?
So
that
would
be
allowing
you
know
if
something
goes
wrong.
A
You
allow
your
validator
to
build
blocks
locally
and
then
compare
those
to
Builder
Market
blocks
that
have
been
produced,
and
then
you
would
only
accept
the
Builder
Market
blocks
under
certain
circumstances.
So
the
issue
here
would
be
if
the
public
mempool
you
know,
maybe
got
so
small-
that
effective
fallback
Solutions
like
this
either
weren't
possible
or
relied
on
the
validator
being
altruistic
in
that
building
from
the
public
mempool
alone
is
completely
not
competitive
compared
to
the
Builder
Market
and
for
this.
So
we
still
don't
know
if
this
is
happening
yet.
A
The
Builder
role
itself
might
not
be
feasible
here
as
we're
kind
of
out
of
protocol.
At
this
point
and
therefore
Limited
in
what
we
can
force
Builders
to
do,
we've
identified
a
few
different
things
that,
if
left
unchecked,
might
cause
US
problems
down
the
road
and
I
think
there's
good
awareness
around
most
of
these
already,
especially
the
censorship
resistance
schemes,
which
is
very
topical.
But
there
are
a
few
other
things
that
given
these
early
indicators
might
also
be
a
priority,
so
censorship
resistance,
I
think
we
know
about
that
already.
A
Something
called
transaction
inclusion
lists,
I
believe,
is
being
actively
worked
on
by
flashbots
and
other
people
in
the
ethereum
ecosystem.
Many
it's
over
the
other
things.
Many
of
the
effects
that
I
talked
about
can
be
lessened.
If
we
take
steps
to
ensure
that
things
can't
get
very
centralized
and
ugly
in
the
Builder
market,
so
trying
to
figure
out
how
to
effectively
decentralize
the
Builder
role
might
be
important,
while
also
keeping
in
mind
that
a
decentralized
builder
has
to
be
competitive
compared
to
a
centralized
builder.
In
order
to
make
any
difference.
B
A
A
A
lot
of
the
things
that
we
want
to
do
with
like
transaction
lists
and
other
things
like
that
require
knowledge
of
State
of
the
ethereum
State
on
map
boost
just
doesn't
have
that,
but
I
think
that
there
are
definitely
maybe
some
other
things
and
other
ways
that
mebus
can
be
improved,
and
you
may
have
already
seen
we're
also
trying
to
make
math
boost
more
of
a
kind
of
community
effort
as
well
and
take
Solutions
and
from
from
other
other
parties.
Yeah.
C
A
I
I
think
I
think
you're
completely
correct
about
that
in
terms
of
incentives
and
I
generally
think
that
it's,
it's
really
important
for
us
to
kind
of
design
these
things
in
a
way
to
make
sure
that
people
aren't
missing
out
by
doing
things
that
are
good
for
the
protocol,
so
yeah,
but
I
I,
think
one.
Maybe
one
example
of
where
this
has
actually
worked.