►
From YouTube: Towards Fairer DEXs on Ethereum
Description
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https://archive.devcon.org/archive/watch/6/towards-fairer-dexs-on-ethereum/
MEV is inherent to Ethereum and cannot be banned at the core protocol layer. Dapps should therefore carefully assess and reduce the amount of MEV they create. Multi-dimensional batch auctions with just in time competition for order flow offer a fundamentally fairer way of trading on Ethereum. P2P matching reduces the amount of extractable AMM interactions, while best price execution is guaranteed through a network of competing “solvers”.
Speaker(s): Felix Leupold
Skill level: Intermediate
Track: Cryptoeconomics
Keywords: Mechanism Design,MEV,Batch Auctions
Follow us: https://twitter.com/efdevcon, https://twitter.com/ethereum
Learn more about devcon: https://www.devcon.org/
Learn more about ethereum: https://ethereum.org/
Devcon is the Ethereum conference for developers, researchers, thinkers, and makers.
Devcon 6 was held in Bogotá, Colombia on Oct 11 - 14, 2022.
Devcon is organized and presented by the Ethereum Foundation, with the support of our sponsors. To find out more, please visit https://ethereum.foundation/
A
A
My
name
is
Felix
I'm
working
with
an
awesome
team
of
people
at
cow,
Swap
and
I
want
to
talk
to
you
today
about
how
we
can
design
fera
trading
mechanisms
for
ethereum
and
I
want
to
frame
this
Vision
based
upon
an
idea
of
just
having
a
single
price
per
token
per
block
and
we'll
explore
a
little
bit
of
why.
We
think
this
is
the
most
Fair
Way
of
trading
on
ethereum.
A
The
reason
why
we're
talking
about
this
is,
if
we
look
at
a
main
adoption
of
decentralized
trading,
we
can
see.
We've
made
some
progress
in
the
last
couple
of
years,
but
we
are
just
seeing
the
tip
of
the
iceberg
here.
Even
digital
asset
trading
as
a
whole,
including
centralized
exchanges,
is
many
times
larger
than
Dex
trading
today
and
when
we
want
to
get
into
more
interesting
markets
like
the
U.S,
Securities
Market,
or
maybe
the
Holy
Grail
of
trading
Global
foreign
exchange
trading,
then
we
really
need
to
step
up
our
game
and
I.
A
Think
personally,
that
ethereum
has,
as
this
credible
neutral
settlement
layer,
the
potential
of
enabled
trading
of
all
different
parties
in
across
Nations
supernational
actors.
So
I
really
think
this
Global
foreign
exchange
trading
is
a
goal
that
we
can
strive
for
so
to
talk
about
how
we
get
there.
A
And
so,
if
we,
if
we
look
at
how
everything
started
a
couple
of
years
ago,
the
first
taxes
on
ethereum,
where
etherdale
to
idex
Oasis,
basically
on
chain
limit
order
book
dexes
and
those
worked
fine.
For
some
token
pairs,
like
etherus
DC,
maybe
worked
quite
quite
well.
But
they
had
a
fundamental
flaw,
which
was
that
they
required
active
Market.
A
Amms
really
solved
the
problem
of
liquidity
provision
and
allowed
every
one
of
us
to
become
a
liquidity
provider
just
by
staking
two
assets
into
a
smart
contract
that
would
then
automatically
sell
them
on
our
behalf,
based
on
some
based
on
some
curve,
based
on
some
preference
curve
and
all
of
this
started
in
the
context
of
prediction
markets
way
before
blockchains
were
born.
Robin
Hansen
had
a
paper
on
logarithmic,
basically
amms
and
then
in
the
context
of
ethereum.
We
had
many
different
teams:
pioneering
more
or
less
complex
functions.
A
Everyone,
of
course,
Knows
X
times
y
equals
K,
but
really
the
the
key
thing
that
amm's
brought
to
the
space
was
overcoming
the
liquidity,
bootstrapping
problem
and
creating
thick
markets
even
for
long
tail
tokens.
So
what's
the
problem
with
amms
the
problem
with
amms
and
again,
we
have
heard
many
talks
about
this
at
this
conference
is
Mev
or
how
I
would
call
it
in
this
presentation,
pay
as
bit
pricing
and
pay
as
bit.
A
Pricing
comes
from
the
fact
that
what
you're
seeing
on,
for
example,
uni
swap
if
you're
trading
some
tokens,
is
not
actually
what
you
are
sending
into
the
mempool
to
be
executed.
This
is
a
trade
that
actually
happened
a
couple
of
weeks
ago.
Somebody
was
selling
one
million
dollars
on
uni
Swap
and
probably
so,
on
the
UI
that
they
would
get
750e.
A
But
the
thing
that
you
need
to
add
on
uniswap
is
a
discount
to
the
current
fair
market
Price,
which
is
referred
to
as
slippage
tolerance,
and
you
can
think
about
slippage
tolerance,
as
basically
how
much
volatility
are
you
willing
to
accept
in
order
for
your
trade
to
still
go
through?
Blockchains
are
asynchronous
by
Design.
So
there's
race
conditions,
and
so
the
moment
you
click
swap
on
uni
swap
somebody
else
might
also
be
clicking
swap
somewhere
else,
and
therefore
you
need
to
price
that
volatility,
tolerance
or
slippage
tolerance.
In
now.
A
The
problem
with
it
is
if
your
trade
is
large
enough.
If
the
slippage
tolerance
is
large
enough,
the
block,
Builder
proposer,
validator
Miner
column,
what
you
will
has
an
incentive
to
actually
manipulate
the
prices
and
execute
your
trade
exactly
at
your
bid
at
the
bid.
That
includes
your
slippage
tolerance,
and
so
this
is
what
happened
here.
A
The
this
person
got
got
sandwiched
and
lost
ten
thousand
five
hundred
dollar
to
the.
In
this
case,
it
was
after
the
merge
to
to
the
to
the
block
producer
or
validator,
and
so
this
is
really
what
makes
amm's
fundamentally
unsafe
by
Design.
The
fact
that
you
cannot
be
honest
about
your
slippage
tolerance.
You
basically
have
to
lie
to
the
amm
and
say:
hey,
you
know
just
set
this
small
slip,
Assurance
because
I
know,
if
I
really
tell
you
what
I'm
willing
to
accept.
A
Somebody
is
going
to
sandwich
me
and
and
run
over
me
and
so
maybe
to
go
a
step
back
and
and
revisit.
Why
is
it
important
to
save
a
a
safe
mechanism
design
here,
a
safe
Market?
The
first
reason
is
that
safe
markets
are
just
fundamentally
simpler
to
reason
about
and
make
conclusions
that,
basically
the
system
is
secure
and
that
the
allocations
is
is
optimal
and,
and
you
find
the
right
answer.
A
The
second
reason
why
safe
markets
are
better
or
important.
Is
that
they're
fundamentally
more
efficient
than
unsafe
markets,
because
if
users
are
incentivized
to
Rel
to
reveal
their
true
preferences,
you
can
just
look
at
the
preference
and
find
the
globally
socially
optimal
application
in
in
one
round
trip,
rather
than
doing
multiple
bits
and
asks,
and
basically
haggle
around
the
haggle
around
the
table.
And
then
the
last
point
is
maybe
a
more
altruistic
argument
that
safe
markets
are
just
fundamentally
fairer
to
the
least
sophisticated
participants.
A
Tyrone
was
talking
about
stealing
from
grandmothers,
I
personally
think
more
about
people
that
visit
Reddit
and
find
a
new
coin,
and
then
go
on
uni
swap
trying
to
trade
it
and
basically
Get,
Wrecked
and
yeah.
The
least
sophisticated
participants
are
automatically
protected
in
safe
markets
and
so
I
agree
with
Maureen
O'hara
who's,
a
professor
at
Cornell
who
says
especially
on
this
problem
of
Mev.
That
blockchain
is
not
going
to
succeed.
If
it's
not
viewed,
it's
viewed
as
fared,
and
so,
let's
you
know,
revisit
the
site
that
we
saw
in
the
very
beginning.
A
If
we
want
to
get
larger
market
adoption,
we
need
to
design
fairer
and
safer
Market
mechanisms.
So
how
do
we
build
safety
on
top
of
amms?
This
is
what
the
second
part
of
this
talk
will
focus
on.
The
first
thing
that
I
want
to
kind
of
revisit
is
what
we
think
is
probably
the
fundamental
root
cause
of
most
of
the
Meb
that's
out
there,
maybe
maybe
even
all
Meb,
and
that
is
that
a
single
asset
today
on
ethereum
can
have
many
different
prices
within
the
same
block.
A
Here's
an
example
block
from
I
think
a
week
and
a
half
ago,
where
the
most
liquid
pair
that
exists
on
ethereum
ethusd
was
traded
11
times
within
the
same
block
and
at
eight
different
prices.
The
difference
between
the
lowest
and
the
highest
price
in
this
block
was
more
than
one
percent,
and
imagine
the
block
really
just
happens
at
a
single
moment
in
time.
That's
what
blockchains
do
they?
A
They
freeze
kind
of
the
the
state
of
the
world
in
a
specific
instant
of
time,
and
yet
that
instant
of
time
told
people
well,
there's
eight
different
prices
for
for
the
most
liquid
pair
and,
for
example,
latency
Arbitrage.
When
you
see
a
price
change
on
binance
and
you
try
to
Arbitrage
it
away
against
an
amm.
That
is
an
example
of
Mev
that
comes
from
have
one
asset
having
multiple
prices,
because
the
first
person
that
gets
to
trade
in
the
amm
still
has
the
outdated
price
available
and
then
everyone
else
in
the
block
trades.
A
At
the
fair
market
Price,
we
have
one
asset,
many
prices.
The
reason
that
liquidations
cause
Mev
is
because
that
whoever
triggers
the
liquidation
gets
to
trade
at
a
discount,
whereas
the
rest
of
the
market
trades
at
a
different
price
rather
than
using
the
liquidation
volume
and
put
it
into
the
fair
price
finding
and
just
settle
everything
at
a
single
price
and
then
the
last
point
the
sandwich
attacks
we
saw
on
the
last
slide.
It's
very
obvious.
A
There
was
three
different
prices:
the
opening,
the
victim
and
the
sandwich
again,
one
asset,
many
prices,
and
that's
why
we
have
Med
so
I
argue
that
any
Market
structure
where
prices
depend
on
arbitrary,
the
the
block
producer
can
choose
it
at
no,
basically
at
their
own.
Will
that
arbitrary
interblock
ordering
just
makes
the
mechanisms
unsafe
by
Design.
And
so
what
is
the
solution?
A
Well,
you
might
have
guessed
it
from
how
I've
started
this
this
this
chapter,
but
the
solution
is
to
just
have
one
price
per
token
per
block,
and
so
how
would
this
look
like?
We
basically
associated
with
every
ethereum
block,
have
a
price
Vector
for
every
asset
that
is
traded
in
the
block
and
that
asset
just
has
a
single
price
at
which
it
can
be
accessed
within.
Well
that
block-
and
this
price
here
is
denominated
in
dollars.
A
So
now,
I
want
to
talk
about
how
we
at
Cal
swap
have
built
a
batch
auction
system
on
ethereum
we've
been
live
for
a
year
and
a
half
now
and
yeah.
You
can
actually
achieve
this
with
everything
that
ethereum
offers
today
and
just
six
simple
steps.
The
first
thing
that
we
need
to
do
is
we
need
to
stop
people
from
sending
raw
ethereum
transactions,
because
that's
just
a
fundamental
limitation
of
the
protocol
layer.
Today,
you
cannot,
when
a
user
signs
a
raw
transaction,
you
cannot
open
up
this
transaction
batch.
It
together
do
anything
with
it.
A
So
we
basically
have
this
multi-dimensional
order
book
of
signed
trade
intents,
which
we
then
combine
with
the
entirety
of
on-chain
liquidity
that
exists
on
ethereum
today.
So
all
the
amms,
you
know
about
all
the
RFQ
systems
you
know
about
and
that
together
creates
a
thick
Market.
We
saw
earlier
that
amms
are
really
responsible
for
the
thickness
and
so
by
adding
user
orders
to
the
to
that
liquidity
pool.
We
have
the
first
criteria,
which
is
a
fake
Market.
A
In
this
case,
for
example,
the
maker
token
that
the
first
user
wanted
to
sell
would
flow
directly
to
another
user,
that
user
would
sell
their
usdc,
maybe
on
curve
to
die
and
then
sell
it
to
give
it
to
the
third
user,
and
so
we
can
in
so-called
ring
trades
mix
and
match
amms
together
with
direct
peer-to-peer
trading
with
the
only
basically
the
only
credit,
the
only
constraint
that
everything
has
to
happen.
At
least
everything
between
those
hands
has
to
happen
at
this
uniform
price
Cream.
A
Now
the
problem
is
that
this
poses
a
pretty
hard,
optimization
problem.
It's
basically
an
NP
art
problem
because
we're
acting
over
multiple
Dimensions,
not
just
on
a
two-dimensional
order
book,
but
this
problem
can
be
quite
well
approximated
or
the
optimal
solution
can
be
quite
well
approximated.
If
we
just
maximize
the
total
user,
Surplus
user
Surplus
is
basically
the
price
Improvement
you
get
on
the
user's
limit
price,
so
the
user
was
willing
to
buy
either
at
thirteen
hundred
dollars
and
you
were
delivering
it
at
12.50.
A
You
would
have
given
fifty
dollars
of
surplus
to
that
user
and
if
we
sum
all
the
surpluses
up
together,
we
get
one
value
which
we
can
optimize
for
and
by
having
this
optimization
Criterion,
we
can
now
dispatch
this
hard
problem
to
a
network
of
what
we
originally
called
solvers.
Now
we're
starting
to
call
it
batch
Builders
we're
basically
tasked
to
try
to
find
the
most
optimal
solution
to
this
problem
and
they
could
employ
it
very
different
strategies
or
heuristics.
A
Here
we
saw
the
the
settlement
from
the
from
the
previous
slide,
but
you
could
have
a
solver
that
just
goes
and
tries
to
settle
every
single
user
trade
with
the
most
liquid
amm
on
that
pair.
But
by
virtue
of
having
this
approximate
approximation
Criterion
optimization
Criterion.
We
can
now
rank
the
different
solutions
and
find
the
one
that
settles
the
user
trade
at
the
best
possible
price
and
then
that
solution
will
get
chosen
and
the
proposal
for
that
solution
gets
a
protocol
reward.
A
The
UI
looks
very
much
similar
to
what
you
might
be
used
from
your
favorite
amm
front
end,
but
here's
an
example
of
a
batch
that
we
saw
I
think
around
20
days
ago,
where
two
users
were
trading.
In
the
same,
so
we
can
see
there's
one
high-level,
ethereum
transaction,
but
in
that
single
transaction
we
have
two
people
Trading
two
trade
intents.
A
So
we
have
one
person
that
is
selling
the
manifold
token
and
another
person
that
is
buying
the
manifold
token,
and
the
first
thing
to
notice
here
is
that
both
people
were
executed
at
the
exact
same
clearing
price,
whereas
if
they
had
gone
through
a
more
traditional
Dex
mechanism,
one
of
them
would
have
to
go
first
and
get
a
different
price
than
the
second
one.
In
this
case,
it
was
actually
better
to
be
the
second,
because
the
prices,
the
the
trades
were
against
one
another.
So
you
want
to
First.
A
A
To
reason
about
the
other
thing
that
is
cool
is
that,
because
these
tokens
were
traded
exactly
in
the
opposite
direction,
which
is
what
we
call
a
coincidence
of
once
you
want
the
exact
opposite
of
what
I
have
we
actually
saved
about
forty
thousand
dollars
in
trading
volume
that
we
didn't
have
to
send
to
UNI
swap
in
sushi
swap
because
it
could
be
settled
directly
peer-to-peer.
So
here
we
have
one
person
buying
40,
000
UCC
and
one
person
selling
48,
000
usdc,
and
so
in
the
specific
example,
we
actually
not
only
got
fairer
pricing.
A
We
saved
about
800
in
reduced
LP
fees,
and
we
also
saved
about
one
thousand
five
hundred
dollars
in
reduced
price
impact,
which
stems
from
the
fact
when
you
trade
against
an
amm
you're
moving
the
price
up
and
then,
when
you
sell
against
it,
you
will
move
the
price
down
again,
and
so
this
is
how
the
the
solver
competition
I
talked
about
is
looking
at
the
moment.
We
have,
as
of
last
week,
we
had
12
servers
in
production.
As
of
this
week.
A
I
think
that
the
ecosystem
is
taking
with
regards
to
Mev
and
why
that
could
be
or
why
I
think
this
is
dangerous
and
I
want
to
start
this
by
quoting
one
of
my
favorite
columnists,
the
money
stuff
BBC
writer,
Matt
Levine,
who
is
from
time
to
time
repeating
that
well
cryptos
in
the
business
of
constantly
rediscovering
the
basic
ideas
of
financial
history
and
why
this
I
think
this
is
true
specifically
for
PBS
is
well
I'll.
Talk
about
this
in
the
next
few
slides.
A
But
you
might
have
seen
this
graph
before,
and
this
is
basically
trying
to
resemble
the
Meb
supply
chain
going
from
a
user
that
wants
to
make
a
trade
and
the
trade
being.
Something
like
I
want
to
sell,
UCC
for
Eve,
opening
their
favorite
wallet
or
opening
their
favorite
dab,
which
converts
that
trade
intent
into
a
transaction
and
sends
that
transaction
and
PBS
to
a
network
of
block
builders.
A
This
meme
is
from
from
John
I
have
to
give
credits.
So
how
does
a
block
Builder
actually
get
the
money
to
to
perform?
This
bidding
basically
block
Builders,
try
to
extract
as
much
Mev
from
the
transaction
order
flow.
They
they
get
and
then
pay
back
some
or
most
of
that
in
this
Max
bidding
or
to
the
block
Builder.
So
what
might
a
block
Builder
do
in
order
to
get
an
edge
in
this
game?
A
Well,
they
might
try
to
find
deals
with
wallets
to
get
exclusive
access
to
order
flow
if
they
are
the
only
one
who
can
extract
value-
or
even
just
you
know,
pose
this
transaction
for
its
transaction
fee
into
the
block
that
they
propose.
They
have
an
advantage
over
other
block
builders,
and
so
it
could
be
that
the
buck,
the
the
flow
just
stops
here
wallets
are
starting
to
receive
an
extra
income.
That's
nice.
They
might
take
that.
That
would
be
very
terrible
for
the
user,
maybe
in
a
slightly
better
world.
A
Actually,
in
traditional
Finance,
you
know
there
there
could
be
there's
arguments
on
on
each
side,
but
what
I
try
to
stress
here
is
that
we've
learned
from
traditional
finance
that
this
mechanism
doesn't
work
in
a
decentralized
Fashions,
Market
maker,
there's
just
a
handful
of
them.
They're
highly
regulated
without
the
SEC
users
would
be
run
over
there's.
Basically,
this
law
that
requires
a
market
maker
to
give
people
a
price
Improvement
on
top
of
the
official
bid
and
ads
that
they
see
on
NASDAQ
and
New
York
Stock
Exchange.
A
So
you
require
regulation
in
order
to
make
this
Market
safe
for
the
user,
and
it
is
just
a
centralized
system.
So
if
we
really
want
to
get
ethereum
to
be
this
neutral,
credible,
neutral
settlement
layer,
we
cannot
reinvent
the
system
and
and
work
with
traditional
Finance.
The
other
thing
that
I
hear
a
lot
is
you
know
this
narrative
around
Mev
maximization
is
great.
A
We
all
have
to
focus
on
Mev
maximization
sure
we
should
minimize,
but
we
need
to
maximize
the
the
of
what's
out
there
and
I
just
want
to
pose
the
question
of
these
two
philosophies.
Mev
maximization
and
minimization
can
coexist
at
the
same
time,
because,
at
least
in
my
mind,
Mev
maximization
leads
to
very
dangerous
incentives
for
the
participants
and
creates
an
extremely
hard
coordination
problem
that
Mev
minimizing
protocols
such
as
cow,
swap
need
to
overcome.
A
Definitely,
the
the
people
that
are
trading
because
they're
not
getting
wrecked,
but
even
the
people
that
are
that
are
validating
I'd
argue
that
in
this
system
can
make
much
more
money
from
transaction
fees
and
just
adoption.
But
really,
this
requires
all
Builders
to
cooperate,
otherwise
we'll
not
get
into
this
new
equilibrium,
and
what
we
see
today
is
that,
basically,
everyone
is
focusing
on
the
top
left
corner
and
the
status
quo
is
to
fight
over
the
existing
Meb.
A
That's
in
there
and
potentially
even
fight
against
new
entrants
that
are
trying
to
propose
Mev,
reducing
protocols
because,
basically,
that's
eating
the
searcher's
lunch.
And
so
my
call
to
action
here
at
the
end
is:
let's
not
focus
on
Mev,
maximization
and
split
the
pie.
That's
out
there,
because
it's
tiny
compared
to
what
we
want
to
unlock.
Let's
work
together
and
grow
the
pie
and
try
to
get
ethereum
to
the
next
order
of
magnitude
of
adoption,
and
with
that.
Thank
you
very
much.
B
There
we
go
all
right,
hey
great
talk
by
the
way,
so
I
have
a
kind
of
a
quick
question.
Right
like
what
you've
done
is
you've
taken
a
heart
problem.
You
have
made
it
an
NP,
hard
problem.
You
still,
you
have
an
NP,
hard
problem,
which
is
like
this
very
complicated
auction
which
brings
a
bit
of
a
you
know,
difficult
situation,
because
NP
hard
problems,
kind
of
by
definition,
are
very
sensitive
to
like
people,
kind
of
manipulating
things
and
adding
Solutions
and
I.
Think
by
our
call
correctly.
B
Bancor
had
some
interesting
issues
with
this.
So
why
not?
For
example,
you
know
one
simple
condition
to
have
one
price
for
many
assets
or
sorry,
one
price
for
many
dexes
with
or
for
one
for
specific
assets
is
just
to
do
optimal.
Routing
and
optimal.
Routing
is
a
convex
problem.
You
can
do
it
efficiently,
it's
very
simple,
to
solve.
Why
not
just
do
that.
Instead,
yeah.
A
So
I
think
just
having
one
price
per
token
pair
per
block
is
I.
Think
what
you're
suggesting
that
you
know
would
already
be
a
huge
Improvement
to
the
status
quo
and
it
would
be
very
computationally
feasible
to
solve.
I
totally
agree
with
that.
I
think.
The
reason
why
we're
aiming
for
a
multi-dimensional
batch
auctions
is
to
make
the
life
of
our
solver
team
harder,
of
course,
but
also
to
because
we
we
know
that
or
we've
seen
that
the
token
space
is
just
absolutely
fragmented
right.
A
But
we
would
still
have
this
implicit
fragmentation
and
the
simplicit
Arbitrage,
and
so
we
think
the
most
efficient
way
of
like
you
know,
of
arbitraging
the
if
usdc
to
die,
is
one
one
and
then
eth
die
is
1300
and
ethucc
is
1200.
We
still
have
like
some
some
imbalance
on
that
right
and
so
I
mean
I,
agree
with
you.
It's
it's
a
good
first
step,
maybe,
but
we
kind
of
already
aimed
for
the
for
the
second.
C
Great
talk,
I
think,
like
one
question
on
kind
of
like
seeing
liquidity
effect,
rent
between
l1s
and
l2s.
How
do
you
see
it
kind
of
like
like?
Is
there
a
way
on
how
Cole
swap
could
settle
like
cross
layer,
one
like
cross
layer,
twos
because
I
think
like
yeah,
it's
probably
like
the
next
problem
in,
like
every
view.
A
Yeah
I
mean
yeah.
We
are
definitely
I.
Think
one
one
problem
that
we're
trying
to
solve,
rather
sooner
than
later,
is
to
just
access
liquidity
on
another
chain
through
the
solver
abstraction.
So
right
now,
if
you're,
for
example,
trading
on
polygon
a
large
amount,
you
have
to
potentially
bridge
to
mainnet
trade,
there
Bridge
back
and
that's
kind
of
annoying
from
a
user
perspective,
because
we
already
have
this
abstraction
of
solvers.
That
can
just
happen
under
the
hood
right.
The
solver
can
do
the
bridging
swapping
bridging
back
for
you,
and
just
you
know
well
needs
to.
A
Let
you
know
that
you
might
have
to
wait
a
little
bit
longer,
but
you
as
a
user,
don't
have
to
worry
about
it,
but
then,
of
course
the
the
true
Holy
Grail
is
to
just
have
one
price
per
token
per
block
across
many
chains
and
I.
Think
it's
an
it's
a
very
interesting
research
problem
which
we've
where
we've
touched
the
surface
on,
but
not
gone,
super
deep,
yet
synchronicity
between
chains,
maybe
you
have
to
do
some
locking
of
funds
like
there's.