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Description
Visit the https://archive.devcon.org/ to gain access to the entire library of Devcon talks with the ease of filtering, playlists, personalized suggestions, decentralized access on Swarm, IPFS and more.
https://archive.devcon.org/archive/watch/6/the-future-of-social-coordination-of-daos/
We build tools to make it easy for projects to align the incentives of all stakeholders (community, VC's, team members, users etc etc). The direction of the talk will be to talk through the lessons we learnt, how other DAO's and teams can take the success stories to their own projects and give an overview of the aspects of what we did that worked. This talk will also go through the experience that have not worked and a critical view of why they did not.
Speaker(s): Chandler De Kock
Skill level: Intermediate
Track: Governance & Coordination
Keywords: incentives,community growth,smart rewards
Follow us: https://twitter.com/efdevcon, https://twitter.com/ethereum
Learn more about devcon: https://www.devcon.org/
Learn more about ethereum: https://ethereum.org/
Devcon is the Ethereum conference for developers, researchers, thinkers, and makers.
Devcon 6 was held in Bogotá, Colombia on Oct 11 - 14, 2022.
Devcon is organized and presented by the Ethereum Foundation, with the support of our sponsors. To find out more, please visit https://ethereum.foundation/
A
A
Hello,
everyone,
if
you're
here
I'm
introducing
him
again,
but
this
talk
is
on
the
future
of
social
coordination
of
daos
and
the
talk
is
being
hosted
by
Chandler
decock,
who
does
growth
strategy
at
Astoria?
Chandler
focuses
on
building
the
future
of
web3
by
solving
the
problems
that
matter
to
people
that
work
in
the
space
every
day.
Please
welcome
Chandler
to
the
stage
foreign.
B
Just
a
quick
shout
out
before
I
get
into
my
talk,
the
previous
panel
that
we
had
before
this
was
wipe
web
3.
Adoption
in
Africa
I
really
loved
that
topic.
It
was
really
great
and
a
shout
out
to
the
fellow
Africans
I
held
from
some
from
South
Africa.
So
that
meant
a
lot
to
me
so
really
great
to
see
that
today's
talk
is
really
just
around.
Why
do
we
need
doubt
and
why?
Why
do
we
need
to
make
them
better
right?
B
B
What's
up,
we
all
know
what
a
Dao
is.
I
think
this
group
is
a
little
bit
more
advanced
than
most
of
them,
but
this
is
kind
of
like
a
very
tldr
version
of
how
I
see
the
life
cycle
of
a
dow
start
right
and
that
was
created.
Everyone
joins
they're
excited,
there's
a
lot
of
hype,
a
lot
of
participation
and
a
lot
of
contribution.
B
B
This
is
where
some
of
the
governance
frustrations
come
into
play,
and
then
this
is
also
around
some
of
the
the
the
concepts
around
like
infighting
and
who
has
rights
in
the
space
and
who
can
contribute
and
who
can
participate,
and
some
of
the
reasons
why
why
does
explode
really
starts
around?
That
right
so
we'll
get
into
some
of
those
in
a
little
bit
but
I
think
the
one
thing
that's.
B
I
think
the
thing
that's
really
important
here
is
the
things
that
don't
work
right,
so
I
spoke
about
Community
contributions
and
participation,
and
those
two
things
are
actually
fundamentally
different.
My
participation
in
a
Dao
is
very
different
to
my
contribution
in
a
dial
and
I
think
the
way
that
dials
were
structured
at
the
moment
in
these
big
monolithic
one
token
one
vote
systems
don't
really
work
because
you're
always
going
to
have
a
sub-optimal
level
of
of
contribution.
Why?
Why
do
I
say
that
right?
So
participation
is
not
the
same.
B
So
when
I,
when
I
have
a
token
Vote
or
a
token
in
a
in
a
dial
and
I
can
vote
on
some
of
the
governance
actions,
I
will
always
give
the
bare
minimum
effort
that
it
takes
to
be
considered
a
contributor
for
future
rewards
and
future
incentive
programs
and
kind
of
just
be
known
in
the
ecosystem.
Most
organizations
actually
Thrive
and
do
better
by
by
individuals
contributing
above
and
beyond.
B
What's
expected
right
like
if
you
think
about
your
job,
you
work
for
an
intrinsic
value
and
an
extrinsic
value
and
those
values
you
combine
kind
of
give
you
what
your
output
is,
and
sometimes
you
know
the
jobs
that
you
don't
like
doing.
You
need
some
extrinsic
motivation
and
the
stuff
that
you
really
like
doing.
You
can
kind
of
just
do
for
free,
right
and
so
con.
B
B
Mining
rewards
rewards
maximizing
individuals,
they're
kind
of
like
just
do
the
very
least
that
they
can
to
get
the
reward
ground
scraping.
All
of
these
kind
of
Concepts
provide
governance
rights
to
people
in
the
Dow.
That
might
not
actually
be
there
for
the
best
interest
of
the
doubt,
and
we
can
kind
of
see
that,
like
the
reward
mechanism
for
something
like
a
liquidity,
mining
is,
is
not
really
tied
into
the
longevity
of
the
doubt.
Why
do
I
say
that
in
kind
of
the
broader
concept?
B
Well
like
you're,
just
rewarding
capital
for
your
Dow
and
you're,
paying
an
extreme
cost
for
that
liquidity?
Show
your
particle
needs
to
function,
ensure
liquidity
is
King
in
the
in
most
of
the
D5
ecosystems,
But,
ultimately,
you're,
actually
giving
away
governance
rights
to
somebody.
That's
not
going
to
have
a
long-term
aligned
incentive
with
your
with
your
ecosystem,.
B
Okay,
the
things
that
do
work
right
now,
most
of
the
the
protocols
that
exist
today
that
are
highly
successful.
Have
this
like
concept
of
insert
your
protocol
name
labs
and
that's
the
foundation
that
works
on
the
protocol.
Uni
swap
Labs
works
on
uni
swap
I
used
to
work
at
Uma.
We
were
at
Uma
risk
Labs
that
helped
build
up
Uma
protocol
and
these
are
normally
highly
skilled
teams
that
are
well
compensated
and
have
both
intrinsic
and
extrinsic.
Motivation.
B
B
B
So
what
are
some
of
the
lessons?
I
learned
in
my
time,
working
with
all
the
Dows
and
kind
of
the
figuring
out
some
of
the
Dynamics
on
on
like
what
makes
somedao
successful
versus
others
and
I
think
the
one.
The
one
key
message
that
I
mentioned
a
bit
earlier
is
around
passing
the
access
to
the
governance
within
your
ecosystem.
We
do
that
far
too
cheaply
at
the
moment.
We
do
it
for
the
wrong
reasons
and
we
reward
the
wrong
types
of
behavior
and
I.
B
Think
there's
a
very
big
difference
between
what
is
effective
for
your
protocol
versus
what
is
effective
for
your
for
your
governance
and
your
long-term
management
of
your
of
your
of
your
doubt.
I
also,
fundamentally,
do
believe
that
the
the
kind
of
examples
that
we
have
at
the
moment,
I
put
up
here
the
sushi
swap
example
that
was
like
the
it
should
be
pretty
much
studied
in
every
Dow
business
school
when
we
eventually
get
to
the
size
of
the
ecosystem.
B
For
us
to
have
like
Dow,
Business,
Schools
and
Sushi
swap
will
most
likely
be
the
core
fundamental
case
study
on
what
what
went
wrong
and
what
are
the.
What
are
the
things
that
we
can
do
better
about
that
and
again
token
reward
incentive
programs,
a
governance
system
that
was
extremely
monolithic
and
the
participation
in
that
dial
was
was
the
the
individuals
that
had
the
most
context
of
what
they
were
doing
were
being
stifled
by
by
members
of
the
of
the
community.
B
B
There's
a
big
difference
between
being
able
to
have
like
a
verifiable
trusted
execution
of
a
particular
outcome
versus
actually
something
where
you
can
just
kind
of
agree.
As
long
as
like
you
know,
there's
some
sort
of
like
soft
consensus
around
something
you
can
kind
of
move
on
and
I.
Don't
think
everything
needs
to
be
voted
on
and
I.
Think
one
of
the
more
important
elements
here
is
that
attention
in
a
Dao,
especially
if
you're
in
many
like
I've
been,
is
a
fading
acid.
Your
token
isn't
the
most
valuable
part
of
your
dial.
B
The
the
number
of
people
are
not
the
most
important
thing
in
your
Dao.
The
attention
that
you
can
Garner
from
people
and
of
particular
types
of
skill
sets
is
the
most
important
and
then
I
kind
of
also
briefly
touch
that
not
everything
needs
to
be
a
blockchain,
but
like
really,
there
are
many
elements
around
like
how
we
can.
What
what
gets
put
towards
the
vote
and
gets
discussed
is
sometimes
a
bit
over
the
top.
B
If
you
look
at
some
of
the
most
effective
teams,
I
remember
how
like
I,
drew
parallels
to
like
highly
effective
teams,
building
out
something
if
you
look
at
the
size
of
uni
swap
their
team
is
famously
small,
yet
they're
the
biggest
asset
swapper
in
our
in
the
in
the
D5
space.
And
if
you
look
at
some
a
team
like
coinbase
famously
large
and
they
roughly
do
the
same
amount
of
volume,
sure
they've
got
differentiating
products
and
show
you
it's
not
apples
for
apples
here.
B
But
really
the
concept
here
is
that
bigger
doubts
are
not
necessarily
better
you,
the
more
people
that
you
introduce
into
the
dial,
the
more
elements
of
of
like
having
a
a
a
stifling
force
in
your
in
your
dowel
and
starts
to
become
prevalent,
and
these
like
mass
air
drops
and
these
Mass
token
distributions
I
kind
of
just
go
out
willingly.
They,
they
typically
kind
of
like
help,
perpetuate
that
these
large
dials
and
it's
not
really
designed
for
humans
right.
B
Chats
right
so
towers
are
built
by
humans
and
are
for
humans,
and
we
should
always
kind
of
keep
that
as
like
a
core
premise
of
how
we
design
our
interactions,
even
in
the
data
space,
so
I've
I've
had
some
experience
with
some
tools
I'm
going
to
go
through
three
of
them.
This
is
just
from
my
point
of
view
on
some
of
the
things
that
worked
and
what
what
never
worked.
So
the
first
one
was
kpi
options
from
the
Uma
protocol.
B
What
a
kpi
option
was,
was
it
basically
a
conditional
payout
token,
where,
let's
say,
for
example,
I
was
a
a
D5
protocol
that
wanted
to
get
increase?
My
tvl,
instead
of
just
Distributing
liquidity,
mining,
Rewards
or
or
doing
an
airdrop
to
kind
of
help
promote
this?
You
you
built
in
a
conditional
metric,
and
you
gave
that
token
to
your
community
members
or
the
stakeholders
that
could
actually
improve
that
and
then,
depending
on
how
that
metric
got
achieved
over
a
period
of
time.
B
You
could
get
more
rewards,
and
you
can
kind
of
think
of
this
as
a
really
powerful
primitive
to
to
incentivize
people
kind
of
in
a
decentralized
way
right.
It
was
really
great
for
Community
compensations
because
you
compensated
people
for
an
outcome
that
you
got
and
so
that
outcome
really
really
helped
motivate
the
the
each
individual
kind
of
on
a
on
an
extrinsic
level.
So
you
kind
of
gave
that
reward
for
a
total
outcome.
Token
rewards
and
an
outcome
based
results
were
really
really
useful
for
that.
B
So
let's
say
you
as
a
dollar
really
wanted
to
get
some
something
done,
and
you
would
give
a
reward
or
a
bounty
out
for
it
depending
on
how
well
that
that
outcome
go
how
that
outcome
was
achieved.
You
would
end
up
getting
a
better
result
and
we
found
this
to
be
quite
a
powerful
like
primitive
mechanism.
B
But
then,
in
my
experience,
I
found
that
there
were
a
lot
of
issues
with
these
conditional
tokens.
Firstly
in
Dows,
no
one
actually
knows
in
a
doubt
what
your
important
most
important
metrics
are,
and
this
was
the
most
shocking
thing.
I
ever
experienced,
I'd
walk
up
to
a
team
and
say:
hey
they'll,
come
to
me
and
say:
hey:
do
you
want
to
do
kpi
options
and
I?
Say
yes,
great
I'm
here
to
help
and
they
would
end
up
our
first
question.
B
There
was
a
lot
of
effort
to
put
into
place
for,
like
smaller,
smaller
incentive
programs
and
in
the
case
of
like
something
like
sushi,
where
the
the
community
really
mistrusted
the
team,
and
there
was
this
conflict.
Kpi
options
made
sense
there
because
it
was
kind
of
like
an
on-chain
guarantee,
whereas
most
dials
and
most
community
members
really
do
trust
their
dial.
So
just
saying
hey,
we
can
do
this
and
we'll
you
know
give
your
reward
out.
If
we
achieve
these
results
is
actually
something
that
is
a
lot
more
efficient
and
I.
B
The
other
topic
that
I
worked
on
for
a
while
was
optimistic.
Governance
I
call
this
the
lazy,
Dao's
Choice,
optimistic
governance
for
anyone
that
doesn't
knows.
Most
actions
of
governance
get
executed
by
multisigs
multi-cigs
are
a
legal
liability
for
the
signer
and
also
a
security
hole,
and
so
you,
what
you
can
then
do
is
instead
of
actually
submitting
everyone
sign
that
and
again
attention
attention
is
the
most
important
thing.
The
the
multi-sex
sign
is
ultimately
really
struggled
to
to
keep
up
with
the
context
of
everything
that
they're
signing
right.
B
Just
like
every
vote,
you
don't
have
all
the
contacts.
Every
every
signature
for
a
multi
executor
is
the
same.
So
what
you
can
then
do
with
an
optimistic
Governor
is
basically
submit
the
transactions
that
would
execute
on
the
on
the
on
the
on
the
wallet
and
that
execution
can
can
be
vetoed
by
someone
in
an
optimistic
sense.
So
transactions
can
be
submitted
and
all
you
have
to
do
is
have
one
person
disagree
with
it
if
there's
anything
wrong
right,
so
less
votes,
less
on-chain
actions.
B
So
great
idea
right,
there
was
actually
a
talk
on
this
stage
Yesterday
by
someone
called
Isaac
that
that
went
into
a
lot
more
detail.
So
if
you
want
to
know
more
details
of
how
how
that
all
plugs
in
from
snave
slap
to
reality.eth
and
how
that
process
and
the
configuration
of
one
of
these
are
that's
a
great
idea-
but
really
these
are
extremely
new
and
untested,
and
one
of
the
biggest
issues
that
you
can
have
is
you
could
actually
submit
a
transaction
and
if
no
one
is
watching
steal
some
funds
right.
B
There's
a
security
hole
there,
because
the
security
is
based
on
the
assumption
that
everyone
is
watching
these
transactions,
so
optimistic
governance,
I
think
also
induces
a
lot
of
anxiety
for
individuals
when
you
as
a
as
an
executor,
execute
a
transaction
on
a
multi-sake.
You
know
when
you
have
to
do
it.
You
can
see
that
transaction.
You
know
nothing's
going
to
happen.
If
you
don't
do
something.
B
The
dynamic
with
optimistic
governance
is
flipped
around
where,
if
you
don't
look
at
something
something
might
happen
without
you,
you
kind
of
like
paying
attention
and
that's
hugely
scary
right,
you're
not
going
to
be
sitting
here
going
every
single
time
checking
your
multi-sig.
If
there's
a
new
proposal
for
a
transaction
coming
through
and
so
conceptually
I
think
optimistic
governance
doesn't
really
sit
so
well
for
those
that
are
lacking
in
attention
or
super
monolithic,
and
maybe
they
can
be
a
bit
more
effective
at
the
smaller
scale
and
also
a
smaller
treasury
size.
B
In
my
time.
Is
this
concept
of
PODS
unit
to
cause
there's
not
a
clear
vernacular
on
exactly
what
we're
going
to
call
this,
but
these
small,
highly
effective
teams
that
fit
together
within
a
larger
organization
and
these
effective
teams,
basically
are-
are
focusing
on
One
Core
element
right
Mega.
Does
this
in
a
in
their
kind
of
units?
Breakup
and
that's
somewhat
have
has
somewhat
been
effective
and
they
largely
live
within
the
maker
ecosystem.
B
But
if
you
look
at
something
on
how
how
you
can
kind
of
compose
these
core
units
into
something
that's
far
more
effective,
you
can
actually
start
moving
your
core
mini
dial
or
core
mini
units
or
pod
to
other
dials
right.
So,
not
only
can
you
live
with
the
dial
within
isolation.
You
can
start
having
this
Hub
and
spoke
mechanism
where
you
get
dials
within
dials
and
those
dials
help
out
other
dials,
and
you
can
kind
of
see
a
far
more
interconnected
world.
B
B
They
can
govern
themselves
with
a
choose
that
to
be
optimistic
or
not
or
if
they
do
it
on
a
contract
layer
with
the
multi-sig
or
they
just
trust
someone
in
intrinsically,
but
we
can
kind
of
see
that
these
core
units
become
really
really
effective
and
I
I'm
sure
many
of
you
have
been
to
some
of
the
side.
Events
that
happen
at
this
conference
and
many
of
those
side,
events
actually
are
done
by
core
units
and
those
core
units
can
actually
be
helpful
to
other
teams.
B
So
what
does
the
future
look
like
to
me?
I.
Think
any
sort
of
data
structure
needs
three
core
elements:
it's
incentive:
it's
a
an
incentive
program,
it's
governance
and
it's
organizations.
You
really
want
a
small
team
of
Highly,
Effective
and
motivated
individuals
to
work
on
a
particular
project
or
a
particular
problem
that
they
all
agree
is.
B
Is
the
common
goal
that
they're
wanting
to
work
at
work
on
and
that
the
smaller
you,
the
smaller
your
unit
or
the
more
effective
your
unit,
the
more
the
more
you
can
do
in
a
daily
basis,
and
the
other
side
of
that
is.
You
can
even
have
these
small
units
within
a
larger
organization.
Right
people
naturally
like
to
fit
within
a
small
group
and
that
small
group
can
identify
as
part
of
a
big
ecosystem.
B
All
right
and
then
the
other
one
was
being
clear
on
participation
versus
contribution
right
I
can
participate
in
the
ethereum
ecosystem.
I
can
also
contribute
to
the
ethereum
ecosystem.
Those
two
things
I
think
are
really
really
really
important
to
be
to
be
very
clear
on
when,
when
you're
kind
of
working
in
in
a
doubt,
right,
I'm
part
of
a
many
many
discords.
B
Pretending
to
be
a
contributors
and
I
feel
like
that
often
is
quite
a
stifling
force
with
any
sort
of
like
governance
issue
in
action
now
now
being
a
participant
that
raises
a
valid
concern
and
a
valid
issue
is,
is
not
kind
of
the
point
I'm
touching
on
here.
The
point
is,
is
when
a
participant
that
has
no
understanding
of
the
problem
that
that
the
contributors
are
working
on
is
is
a
big
issue
like
I
can't
tell
you
how
many
times
you've
seen
like
these
long
well
thought
out.
B
Forum
posts,
and
you
just
see
two
three
people
go.
No.
This
doesn't
make
sense
to
me:
I,
don't
I,
don't
like
it
in
in
Forum
posts,
and
that
governance
happens
on
on
a
lot
of
these
foreign
posts
and
that's
that's
sort
of
like
disheartening
to
the
actual
contributors
that
leads
to
the
inviting
and
the
ultimate
explosion
of
of
the
dam
cool.
So
that's
mainly
what
I
want
to
do
and
talk
about
today.
B
B
You
can
actually
put
that
to
use
these
are
going
to
to
students
for
an
education
path
to
basically
learn
have
the
access
to
the
internet
to
to
kind
of
just
learn
and
there's
going
to
be
web
3
Focus.
So
it's
basically
onboarding
more
people
in
the
web
3
for
people
that
are
in
need
he's
really
collected
over
20
devices,
I
think
actually
I
didn't
I
checked
with
him.
Yesterday,
it's
closer
to
50
at
the
moment.
B
So
if
you
have
a
new
phone
or
if
you
have
an
old
phone
or
an
old
laptop
or
an
old
iPad,
any
internet
connected
device
downstairs
in
the
in
The
Vibes
room
with
the
chair
in
the
music
there's
a
guy
there,
that's
called
John.
You
can
drop
your
device
there.
If
you
do
want
to
still
contribute
to
this-
and
you
don't
have
your
device
here,
I
also
recommend
handing
it
over
into
someone
in
Miami.
B
They
do
have
an
office
there,
so
if
you're
in
the
US,
you
can
also
contribute
to
this,
and
this
I
think
is
just
a
really
great
way
to
say.
Thanks
to
the
team
in
Bogota
and
and
the
entire
city
for
hosting
us,
it's
been
a
really
exciting
experience
and
I've
really
loved
my
time
here
in
Bogota.
So
thank
you
to
Bogota.
This
is
a
good
way.
I
think
that
you
can
say
thanks
to
the
Colombian
people,
for
hosting
a
really
awesome
Devcon.
C
You
mentioned
you
know
small
teams
working
towards
a
common
goal,
but
I
didn't
see.
You
talk
much
about
how
you
come
up
with
that
common
goal
and
how
all
these
small
teams
could
agree
on
that
common
goal,
because
that's
in
my
experience
has
been
a
big
problem
in
a
couple
dollars
where
they
don't
agree
on
the
common
goals.
So
then
they
break
apart
in
their
own
ways,
and
the
arguing
starts
happening.
B
B
Let's
go
do
that
right,
like
I
I'm
gonna
use
the
sharing
Point
example
again,
they're
fundamentally
there
to
like
help
public
goods
and
the
the
conversation,
the
discourse
and
the
whole
like
Dynamic,
around
public
goods
funding,
and
so
they
they
all
work
towards
that
common
goal
right
and
if
you
no
longer
want
to
work
on
that
common
goal,
you
can
go
in
and
out
to
that.
That
was
like
an
organic
formation
based
on
people
just
coming
together.
B
I
think
dials
that
come
together
that
aren't
part
of
a
like
common
goal
that
just
kind
of
want
to
you
know
get
get
together.
I
think
that's
more
like
a
social
club
and
so
I
think
I,
think
being
intentional
about
what
you
want
to
do
with
a
group
of
individuals
is,
is
multi,
it's
extremely
important
right,
because
then
you
can
direct
your
effort.
You
can
direct
your
attention
and
you
can
direct
your
your
your,
like
common
Collective
outcomes,.