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Description
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https://archive.devcon.org/archive/watch/6/notable-security-incidents-since-devcon-v/
October 2019 seems like an eternity ago, and there have been a variety of interesting, sometimes novel, and sometimes repetitive security incidents across the ecosystem since then. We will discuss those incidents, what went wrong, how they've been resolved, and what lessons have been learned, or new mechanisms put in place, in the service of preventing a repeat.
Speaker(s): Lane Rettig, Ryan Lackey, Tom Howard, Arun Devabhaktuni
Track: Security
Keywords: security,lessons learned,countermeasures
Follow us: https://twitter.com/efdevcon, https://twitter.com/ethereum
Learn more about devcon: https://www.devcon.org/
Learn more about ethereum: https://ethereum.org/
Devcon is the Ethereum conference for developers, researchers, thinkers, and makers.
Devcon 6 was held in Bogotá, Colombia on Oct 11 - 14, 2022.
Devcon is organized and presented by the Ethereum Foundation, with the support of our sponsors. To find out more, please visit https://ethereum.foundation/
A
A
B
Hi
I'm
Ryan
Lackey
I've
been
a
cyberpunk
since
the
early
1990s
started.
The
world's
first
offshore
data
Haven
company
in
havenco
on
Sealand
in
the
North
Sea
did
defense,
Contracting,
building,
satellite
and
cellular
networks
in
Conflict
zones
for
a
while
and
then
I
started
as
CSO
at
a
bunch
of
crypto
projects.
I'm
currently
CSO
a
chief
security
officer
at
evertas
Insurance,
a
crypto
asset
insurance
company,
where
I
see
a
bunch
of
interesting
risk
events
happen
thanks.
C
C
One
blockchain
called
space
mesh
based
on
a
novel
consensus
mechanism,
so
I
currently
lead
r
d
at
that
project
and
just
generally
kind
of
follow
the
security
ecosystem
very
closely
contributes
to
you
know
kind
of
security
response
here
and
there
and
just
think
deeply
about
it.
In
the
context
of
my
work
at
space
mesh
nice
to
meet
you
all,
my.
D
Name
is
Arun
I've
been
a
full
stack
developer
at
the
bug.
Bounty
Hunter
for
a
few
years,
and
just
generally
like
a
very
active
D5,
DJ
I
was
previously
lead
developer
at
a
web.
3
security
like
related
startup,
called
anti-dot
finance
and
I'm,
currently
head
of
research
at
Marana,
Ventures
and
before
crypto
I
was
a
scientist
in
systems
biology.
Where
I
did
research
in
high
throughput
protein
sequencing.
B
And
Tom
Howard
who's
currently
stuck
in
traffic
as
the
founder
of
D5
payments,
wallet,
monsendo,
crypto
options,
exchange
power,
trade
he's
an
unreformed
D5,
degenerate
angel
investor
and
he's
now
got
a
newly
formed
seat
fund.
Network,
zero,
he's
working
on
building
tools
and
infrastructure
to
support
the
network.
State
concept
that
Bellagio
developed
as
sort
of
a
successor
to
the
nation
state
so
there's
a
whole
bunch
of
security
incidents
that
have
happened
in
the
last
three
years.
The
world
was
very
different
in
2019
and
I'm
sure
we've
all.
B
We
can
all
remember
how
things
have
changed.
I
think
there's
some
some
broad
categories
that
we're
going
to
discuss
of
things
that
have
happened,
broken
down
by
category
and
then
hopefully
for
10
or
20
minutes
toward
the
end,
our
views
of
how
things
are
going
to
get
better,
because
the
current
state
is
terrifying,
like
I
I,
wonder
how
people
who
have
very
large
fractions
of
their
net
worth
in
these
in
projects
locked
on
the
on
chain
sleep.
B
So
I
think
to
start
with
one
of
the
things
I've
noticed
over
the
past
like
at
least
12
years
in
the
overall
crypto
industry
is
a
lot
of
the
vulnerabilities
that
we're
seeing
in
crypto
are
actually
old
vulnerabilities
that
were
either
core
internet
infrastructure
or
fundamental
to
human
nature.
They're,
not
things
that
are
really
novel
and
new
to
any
of
these
protocols.
They're
a
whole
class
of
things,
they're
like
Insider
threats,
Personnel
issues,
Key
Management,
leaky,
abstractions,
bugs
versioning
things
like
that.
B
So
there's
a
whole
range
of
things
that
we've
seen
that
that
have
really
affected
people
and
I.
Think
some
of
the
incidents
that
we
can
talk
about
clearly
fall
into.
That
I
mean
there's
a
bunch
that
I
can
think
of.
But
if
either
of
you
have
any
that,
you
can
think
of
that,
come
off
off
the
top
of
your
head
specific
incidents
and
then
the
kind
of
vulnerability
it
was.
C
Be
interesting
if
you
want
to
go
this
direction
to
kind
of
do
sort
of
a
taxonomy,
because
there
are
so
many
different
buckets,
I
mean
at
least
kind
of
three
or
four
different
buckets,
and
you
touched
upon
a
couple
of
them
right
now.
Some
of
them
are
social
engineering
related.
Some
of
them
are
bugs
in
the
code.
Another
bucket
is
multi-cigs,
where
kind
of,
like
your
your
vanilla,
Bridge
exploit,
where
you
know,
one
or
more
kind
of
keys
were
compromised
from
where
I
sit.
C
The
most
interesting
of
these
is
kind
of
low
level,
bugs
in
sort
of
low-level
libraries
that
are
that
that
live
there,
that
lurk
there
for
years
and
and
they're
not
discovered
until
the
whole
world
blows
up.
So
the
most
obvious
and
Salient
example
of
this
is
the
the
binance
hack
that
just
happened
a
few
days
ago
right.
C
That
was
like
a
very
low
level
library
and
it's
kind
of
in
retrospect,
incredible
that
it
was
there
for
years
and
that
code
is
used
not
only
in
the
binance
ecosystem
but
also
in
the
cosmos,
ecosystem
and
Cosmos
kind
of
got
off
like
like
very
luckily
in
this
case,
because
the
the
vulnerability
wasn't
present
there
in
the
same
fashion,
I,
don't
know
we
could
dig
into
one
of
these
or
we
could
do
a
taxonomy
in
whatever
Direction
you
think
is
the
best
way
to
go.
That's
my
favorite
category
of
vulnerability,
yeah.
D
Actually,
just
to
like
jump
on
that
point
before
I
move
on
yeah,
it's
really
important
to
to
realize
that
this
code
is
very
complicated
and
it's
very
new.
Actually
vitalica
have
a
great
talk
a
couple
of
days
ago,
talking
about
bringing
Roll-Ups
online
so
I
believe
it
was
the
the
optimism
fraud,
proof,
I
think
it
was
a
get
note.
Actually
it's
about
34
000
lines
of
new
code
any
and
any
small
bug
in
that
code
could
lead
to
actually
billions
of
dollars
being
lost.
D
C
We
have
this
notion
of
a
TCB.
Tcb
means
trusted
compute
base,
and
what
it
means
is
that
there's
some
amount
of
code
which
is
100
critical
to
the
functioning
of
the
network
and
any
bugs
or
vulnerabilities
or
exploits
in
this
inside
the
trusted
compute
base
are
kind
of
apocalyptic
right,
they're
kind
of
like
like
stop
the
world
scenarios
like
like
many
of
the
exploits
we're
talking
about
here,
and
this
is
not
new
to
crypto.
It's
not
new
to
web3
right.
C
This
concept
has
existed
for
ever
it's
present
in
operating
systems,
and
things
like
this,
but
as
a
core
developer
touching
upon
what
you
said
a
moment
ago
about
kind
of
the
diff.
You
know
looking
at
the
changes
that
optimism
has
had
to
make
to
existing
code
like
go
ethereum
or
you
know,
any
anyone
building,
let's
say
modifying
or
tweaking
or
adding
on
to
existing
code
like
this
is
this
is
what
keeps
us
up
at
night
as
core
developers.
C
We
want
those
changes
to
be
as
small
as
possible
those
diffs
ideally
to
be
on
the
order
of
like
tens
of
lines,
rather
than
hundreds
or
thousands
of
lines,
because
every
one
of
those
represents
a
very
real
possibility
of
the
introduction
of
a
bug
right.
Another
principle
of
computer
science
is
that
there's
no
such
thing
as
bug
free
code
doesn't
matter
how
good
of
an
engineer
you
are.
It
doesn't
matter
how
good
your
software
engineering
practices
are.
There's
some
number
you
can
reduce
it
right.
C
You
can
reduce
the
incidence
of
bugs
by
following
best
practices
which
again
have
existed
for
decades.
Things
like
code
reviews,
pair
programming,
there's
various
techniques,
but
it
can
only
go
so
low,
I,
think
Microsoft,
or
someone
did
research
on
this
a
decade
ago
and
found
that
the
most
senior
most
experienced
programmers
are
still
introducing
one
bug
for
every
thousand
lines
of
code
period.
One
bug
for
every
thousand
lines
of
code
go.
C
Ethereum
is
probably
on
the
order
of
100
000
lines
of
code
right
and
let's
say
some
of
those
bugs
have
been
found,
but
there's
still
bugs
there
for
sure.
So
anyway,
it's
just
as
a
as
a
comment
as
a
core
developer
like
this
is
literally
what
keeps
us
up
at
night.
We
want
to
minimize
the
number
of
changes
and
that's
very,
very
difficult
when
we
want
to
add
features
and
bells
and
whistles,
you
know,
add
new
OP
codes
to
our
VM.
C
C
Webassembly
is
a
whole
complex
ecosystem
and
if
we
start
putting
webassembly-based
smart
contracts
on
chain,
then
all
of
a
sudden,
the
compilers
and
interpreters
for
webassembly
are
now
inside
the
trusted
compute
base,
so
you've
added
100,
000
lines
of
code
or
something
to
your
trusted
compute
base.
So
one
I'm
jumping
ahead
here,
but
one
potential
mitigation
strategy
is
to
like
really
minimize
the
number
of
changes.
The
number
of
things
you
add
minimize
the
size
of
your
trusted
compute
base.
B
On
that
front,
I
mean
the
concept
of
a
TCB
is
something
that
I
read
about
in
the
rainbow
books
that
were
the
the
nsa's
security
guides
back
in,
like
the
they
were
written
in
the
80s.
So
this
is
a
very
well
understood,
Concept
in
theoretical
computer
security.
Unfortunately,
it's
kind
of
theoretical,
because
a
lot
of
systems
there's
two
classes
of
errors
here,
one
there's
bugs
in
your
GCB
two
there's
not
identifying.
What
really
is
the
scope
of
your
TCB
correctly?
B
There's
a
lot
of
the
the
craziest
things
I've,
seen
like
the
Yuga
Yuga
hack,
where
a
moderators
account
recovery
credentials
for
a
Discord
server
were
essentially
used
to
cause
like
200
like
crazy,
like
multi,
multi-billion
or
multi-million
dollar
loss
was
like
200
million
dollars,
or
something
like
that.
So
yeah.
C
Yes,
there
was
I
mean
these
things
happen.
You
know
in
in
all
companies
in
all
Industries,
but
it
just
just
your
point
about
the
credentials
being
stolen.
This
is
what
happened
with
that
massive
I
think
it
was
Uber
right
about
about
a
year
ago
or
something
someone
got
credentials
of
an
administrator
by
a
social
engineering
and
then
got
inside
the
slack
and
got
inside
you
know
yeah.
So
we
have
to
be
careful.
This
stuff
too.
D
Yeah,
this
is
actually
happened.
A
good,
a
crypto,
quite
a
bit
now,
mostly
with
Discord
and
Twitter,
actually
exact
xpt
a
couple
weeks
ago
had
like
a
really
interest.
Twitter
I
was
talking
about
someone
having
access
to
a
admin
Twitter
panel
and
basically
that
was
what
allowed
them
to
take
over
all
these
prominent
Twitter
accounts.
B
C
Need
better
tools,
it's
interesting,
I
think
I
agree
very
strongly
with
what
Ryan
just
said.
The
situation
has
gotten
a
little
bit
better,
pretty
much.
Everything
has
two-factor
authentication
now
and
if
you
ask
any
CSO
any
security
expert
in
the
world,
what's
the
one
thing
you
can
and
should,
and
must
do
immediately
to
increase
security?
It's
not
only
enable
but
Force
two-factor
authentication
on
everyone.
C
So
it's
a
little
better
than
it
was
like
five
ten
years
ago
like
when
the
Discord
didn't
previously
have
two
factors:
authentication.
Now
they
do
and
I
think
it's
I
think
it
may
even
be
on
by
default,
but
I
guess
I'm
kind
of
I'm,
curious,
I,
don't
know
the
answer
to
this.
Do
we
think
that
those
tools
that
we
use
to
coordinate,
communicate
Etc
need
to
be
custom
built
or
do
we
think
that
we
can
adapt
existing
tools
to
those
purposes?
Yeah.
D
B
Yeah
I
mean
I
think
most
of
web3
security
is
actually
web,
2
security.
So
these
lessons
have
already
been
learned
by
Enterprise
users.
I
would
go
a
bit
further
than
just
saying:
two-factor
I
think
we
should
be
using
single
sign-on
Hardware
keys
that
are
not
fishable
like
the
whole
concept
of
getting
hacked,
because
one
of
your
emails
clicks
on
an
email
and
goes
to
the
wrong
URL
or
is
message
something
unsolicited
on
telegram.
B
Instead
of
signal
or
telegram
instead
of
Discord,
where
they
routinely
come
with
someone
go
to
a
URL,
that's
a
phishing,
URL
click
on
something
and
then
boom
you're
out.
500
million
dollars
is
crazy,
like
that's
the
vulnerability
of
the
system,
not
of
the
individual
that
clicks
on
a
link
and
the
the
idea
of
mandatory
phishing
training
for
users
is
woefully
inadequate
for
protecting
these
systems.
B
The
problem
is
the
person
who
designed
the
buttons
and
put
them
there,
so
you
really
need
to
have
a
single
sign-on,
so
you
can
revoke
credentials
for
an
employee
if
an
employee
here,
like
it's
very
common,
to
have
a
laptop
lost
in
a
bar
or
have
a
cell
phone
stolen
which
might
be
unlocked,
and
things
like
that.
You
want
to
be
able
to
immediately
revoke
everybody's
admin
credentials.
So
I
think.
Essentially,
if
you
have
administrative
credentials
for
any
project
which
includes
public
publishing
to
social
media,
doing
any
sort
of
action
on
Treasury.
B
Anything
like
that
and
you
don't
have
the
ability
to
revoke
those
credentials
remotely
on
loss
in
a
single
like
in
a
like
five
minutes.
After
the
event
is
reported,
you
are
making
a
big
mistake
and
if
it's
possible
for
a
user
to
go
to
the
wrong
URL
by
accident
or
by
phishing
and
lose
their
keys
or
use
their
keys
incorrectly,
you're,
also
making
a
big
mistake,
so
single
sign-on
and
a
hardware
enforced
key
credentialing
are
the
way
to
go.
B
But
luckily
the
the
broader
security
industry
has
largely
accepted
that,
and
we
now
have
things
like
pass
keys
on
iOS
and
we
have
like
the
the
502
ecosystem
and
everything
else.
So
the
key
management
in
the
traditional
Enterprise
security
world
is
getting
a
lot
better
here.
We
also
have
great
open
source
SSO
tools
as
well
as
commercial
tools,
so
so
that
world
is
getting
better,
but
the
the
problem,
one
of
the
biggest
problems
with
security
is
the
the
attacker
can
find
any
vulnerability.
B
The
defender
needs
to
be
protected
against
everything
and
you
get
a
lot
of
cases
where
I
mean
everyone
knows.
As
a
team
like
you
have
a
certain
number
of
hours
in
a
week
for
your
people,
and
you
want
to
spend
your
resources
on
building
the
product,
because
if
your
company
fails,
if
your
project
fails,
no
one
uses
it
because
you
don't
have
any
features.
That's
that's
also
very
bad.
So
if
you
have
one
hour
to
spend,
you
probably
want
to
spend
that
on
working
on
your
product
and
not
locking
down
security.
B
D
So
one
thing
I
want
to
touch
on
with
adapting
web
2
security
practices.
Web
3
is
that
one
thing
we
have
in
web
3
theorem
web
2.
Is
these
systems
need
to
be
sensors,
persistent
and
that's
like
a
very
important
factor,
and
that's
one
reason
why
metamask
doesn't
have
2fa
I
mean
part
of
the
reason
is
also
because
of
the
way
aoas
work
and
you
can
have
multi-cigs
with
2fa.
But
if
you
want
like
an
uncustodial
wallet
built
on
top
of
the
ethereum
platform,
there
is
no
real
way
to
do
a
2fa
on
neo8.
D
You
have
to
have
a
spark
contract
based
wallet
which
I
think
people
are
kind
of
moving
towards
in
the
future,
but,
like
one
example,
would
be,
for
instance,
the
mango
Market
hack
last
night,
people
always
say
after
these
D5
hacks.
Well,
why
don't
you
have?
Let's
say:
let's
look
at
a
circuit
breaker,
something
that
says:
okay,
if
you're
trying
to
withdraw
50
million
dollars
from
the
smart
contract?
D
Maybe
you
have
a
human
being
involved
in
that
process
and
one
reason
why
we
might
not
want
to
do
that
and
I
I
say
with
an
asterisk,
because
in
the
end,
if
any
smart
contract,
which
has
the
ability
for
an
admin
deposit,
is
not
decentralized
so
most
smart
contracts
and
most
deeper
protocols,
don't
really
we
have
a
true
decentralization
as
of
yet
and
I.
Think
that's
probably
a
good
thing
at
this
stage,
but
I
guess
like
assuming
that
that
wasn't
the
case
and
the
smart
contract
was
truly
decentralized.
C
C
I'll
just
add
one
more
comment
on
that
and
then
Ryan
you
can
steer
us
in
one
direction
or
another,
but
so
you
know
the
title
of
this
talk
is
notable
security
and
since
since
Devcon
five,
so
obviously,
if
we're
talking
past
three
years,
A
lot
has
changed
in
the
past
three
years.
You
know
three
years
ago,
I
would
say
best
practices
along
the
lines
that
you're
describing
were
just
emerging.
They
didn't
really
exist.
We
were
still
at
that
point,
struggling
with
basic
things
like
re-entrancy
and
I.
Think
now
we
have
a
much
better.
C
C
You
know,
requires
a
delay
of
two
days
three
days,
I,
don't
know
if
people
are
familiar
with
this,
but
the
reason
the
Dow
hack,
the
Dao
of
2016,
wasn't
worse
than
it
was
the
reason
that
the
the
white
hat
hackers
were
able
to
recover.
The
majority
of
the
eth
was
because
there
was
a
delay,
actually
multiple
delays
baked
into
the
protocol
right,
so
it
could
have
been
far
far
far
worse.
B
Yeah
in
general,
you
have
the
the
frequency
of
an
attack,
the
potential
value
at
risk,
the
amount
that
is
actually
stolen,
which
might
be
limited
by
all
these
other
countermeasures
and
then
any
sort
of
recovery
procedures
that
are
possible
and
we've
definitely
seen
a
lot
of
progress
in
the
last
three
years
on
both
chain
analysis
and
a
lot
of
you,
cool,
cool,
great
okay.
So
we've
seen
a
lot
of
positive
changes
in
the
overall
ecosystem,
where
we
have
now
some
chain
analysis
tools.
B
We
have
a
huge
ecosystem,
a
security
audit
and
infrastructure
existing
in
the
world.
We
have
probably
hundreds
of
audit
firms
both
coming
from
the
web
2
world
and
dedicated
to
web3
Smart
contract
audits.
So
a
lot
of
these
vulnerabilities
are
are
bugs
in
code
and
I'd.
Much
rather
find
a
bug
in
code
in
an
audit
that
I've
just
paid
a
couple
hundred
thousand
dollars
for
rather
than
in
the
wild.
We
also
have
more
of
a
culture
of
bug,
bounties
and
Reporting.
B
So
if
there
is
a
bug
found,
I
can
legally
make
a
couple
million
dollars
as
a
bug,
Bounty
and
be
a
good
person
and
also
build
my
own
reputation,
and
do
it
publicly
everything
else,
rather
than
just
exploiting
it
and
probably
taking
20
30
million
dollars,
plus
in
dirty
money
and
being
a
horrible
person
and
having
to
hide
it
and
everything
else,
and
no
one
learning
from
it.
So
there's
a
lot
a
lot
of
positive
changes
that
have
happened.
The
counter
argument
to
all
this
is
just
the
whole
ecosystem
has
continued
to
grow.
C
So,
like
folks,
like
trail
of
bits,
have
multiple
libraries,
multiple
tools
that
you
can
use
to
do,
inspection
and
Analysis
at
various
layers
of
the
stack
and
I
would
actually
say,
I
wonder
if
you
guys
agree
with
this
simply
running
these
open
source
tools
today
will
probably
get
you
more
than
you
would
have
gotten
if
you
paid
six
or
seven
figures
for
an
audit
three
years
ago,
so
there's
really
powerful
stuff
I
mean
it's.
It's
depends
on
your
your
threat
model
like
it
may
not
be
sufficient.
D
Yes,
Slither
is
quite
nice.
One
thing
I
want
to
say
about:
the
existing
models
is
I.
Do
think
they're
they're
fairly
insufficient,
like
I
I.
Don't
think
that,
aside
from
a
few
auditing
firms
have
very
style
reputations,
like
let's
say
trail
of
bits
or
or
daub
most
times
when
I
see
an
audit
I'm,
not
necessarily
thinking
like.
Oh,
this
code
is
safe
because
we've
seen
many
times
the
audits
are,
are
faulty
like
they're
humans
are
being
human
code.
People
can
miss
bugs
either
way.
D
Another
thing
about
bug,
bounties
is
actually
that
the
system
is
is
just
not
really
working
very
well
as
a
bookbinder
I
can
tell
you.
Ironically,
it's
often
you
make
more
money
if
you,
if
you
hack
the
smart
contract
and
then
hold
the
fund
for
ransom
and
then
keep
10
versus
just
reporting,
the
bug
which
is
just
insane,
but
so.
B
That's
an
argument
for
possibly
increasing
the
amount
like
there's
a
whole
calculus
of.
If
you
offer
people
too
much
for
reporting
bugs,
then
you
end
up
with
bugs
get
reported
through
that
channel
and
possibly
introduced,
and
you
have
available
as
I
used
to
do
security
Contracting
in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,
and
there
was
a
concept
of
like
paying
people.
If
U.S
forces
caused
a
injury
to
someone
or
death-
and
there
was
a
crazy
cat
like
I
would
obviously
say
you
should
pay
as
large
amount
of
money
as
possible.
B
But
if
you
make
that
amount
too
much,
there
was
an
argument
that
people
would
intentionally
cause
innocence,
just
to
get
the
county,
which
is
terrible,
but
you
have
the
same
risk
with
insiders
like
one
of
the
whole
categories
that
crypto
companies
do
not
address
really
at
the
level
that
traditional
finance
and
everything
else
addresses
is
Insider
threat.
You
can
have
a
team
if
a
team
is
a
few
people
that
have
started
a
project
together
and
have
worked
together
for
a
long
time.
B
That's
one
level
of
trust,
but
if
you've
got
a
team,
that's
hundreds
of
people,
you're,
hiring
people
using
like
LinkedIn
and
whatever
else
somebody
joins.
You
don't
really
know
what
people's
motivations
are.
They
could
be
incompetent,
they
could
be
nation
state
Affiliated,
they
could
be
criminal
Affiliated
everything
else
they
may
introduce
bugs
intentionally
and
then
exploit
them.
They
may
discover
something
in
the
course
of
their
work
and
then
pass
it
off
to
a
friend
externally
who
exploits
it.
B
There's
all
sorts
of
stuff
like
that
traditional
Finance
solves
this
by
having
separation
of
Duties,
so
no
single
person
would
ever
be
able
to
have
a
vulnerability
that
would
ideally
that
would
be
able
to
exploit
things,
but
that
isn't
really
compatible
with
an
ecosystem
where
stuff
is
being
built
as
you're
as
you're
going
like
you
have
a
trade-off.
Basically,
you
can
build
new
stuff
or
you
can
prioritize
for
extreme
safety
and
resilience
against
this
kind
of
Insider
threat
and
I.
F
Sorry
about
that
learning
about
Bogota
traffic
this
morning,
getting
ddosed
on
the
road
cool,
yeah,
I'm,
Tom,
I,
founded
a
D5
product
called
mosendo
a
few
years
ago,
focused
on
D5
payments,
I
also
co-founded,
a
crypto
options
exchange,
which
is
a
centralized
exchange,
so
dealt
a
lot
with
custodial
risk
and
then
I've
been
an
investor
in
the
space
for
a
while
and
just
started.
A
seed
fund
called
Network
zero,
so
I've
actually
been
following
the
mango
markets
hack
even
on
the
right
over
here.
B
And
so
one
other
point
just
before
we
move
on
was
the
the
interesting
argument
about
decentralization
the
binance
hack.
That
happened
a
couple
days
ago.
They
were
able
to
mitigate
their
loss
because
they
were
able
to
just
stop
their
chain,
which
is
crazy
from
a
centralization
perspective,
but
did
save
them
900
million
dollars.
So
that's
the
counter-argument
against
proper
decentralization
also.
D
Yeah,
so
actually,
for
that
binance
side,
specifically
I
would
argue
that
was
certainly
change.
Sovereignty
is
an
important
factor,
and
social
expense
is
important
factor
of
mitigating
loss
for
sure,
and
that's
something
that,
for
instance,
protocols
which
have
strong
Bridges
to
ethereum
don't
have,
because
if
that
theorem
bridge
is
hacked,
basically,
they
have
no
ability
to
roll
back
changes
on
ethereum
to
recover
that
money,
but
with
the
buying
stack
in
particular,
the
hacker
had
about
three
hours
to
wreak
havoc
and
he
didn't
so.
That
was
almost
like
an
issue
of
hacker
incompetence.
B
Yeah
one
of
the
things
that
I
think
Tom's
a
particular
expert
in
is
a
lot
of
the
D5
vulnerabilities,
which,
in
a
weird
way,
are
some
combination
of
software
bugs
and
economic
vulnerabilities
and
figuring
out
exactly
what's
what
in
that?
Space
is
difficult.
The
main
value
of
having
a
taxonomy
is
because
you
can
then
identify
Trends
and
underlying
risks
and
assess
them.
So
I
don't
know
if
it's
worth
trying
to
figure
out
which
of
these
assets,
which
of
these
risks
are
more
economic
versus
more
software
bugs
and
how
to
mitigate
those.
E
F
It's
and
it's
new
since
the
last
Devcon
right,
flash
loans
only
came
into
existence
in
late
2019,
early
2020.,
and
then
we
had
the
first
flash
loan
attack
happened
in
8th
that
number
2020
in
February
I.
Remember
the
bzx
team
being
quite
excited
about
their
products
and
then
that
day
they
got
flash
loan
attacks
and
I'd.
F
F
Yeah
so
flash
loans,
flash
loans
are
interesting
and
actually
you
probably
only
hear
about
them
in
negative
context,
but
they're,
actually,
a
net
positive
for
the
ecosystem,
they're
actually
very
useful.
So
flash
loan
basically
allows
you
to
borrow
a
nearly
unlimited
sum
of
money
without
having
any
money
yourself,
but
you
have
to
do
it
within
a
single
transaction.
So,
at
the
end
of
the
transaction,
say,
there's
multiple
lines
that
make
up
a
transaction.
F
You
have
to
repay
that
loan
at
the
end
of
it.
So
people
use
it
a
lot
for
Arbitrage,
Bots
or
keeper
Bots
liquidation
Bots.
These
keep
financial
markets
in
order
because
coder,
who
has
the
skills
to
run
these
things,
but
not
the
capital
to
can
use
Flash
loans
to
say,
borrow
a
million
dollars
to
Arbitrage
a
position
across
markets
into
place.
So.
C
F
D
Yeah,
just
to
kind
of
like
add
a
bit
to
that
point.
What's
about
flashlights
for
protocol
perspective
is
basically
riskless.
I
can
lend
out
any
money
for
my
my
protocol
and
get
repaid
back
by
any
transaction.
It
could
roll
back
to
already
paid
basically
there's
no
down
to
the
protocol
and
it
makes
markets
more
efficient,
but
yeah
I
think
the
issue
is
it.
It
provides
like
asymmetric
ability
for
for
hackers
to
kind
of
wreak
havoc.
It's
definitely
like
a
very
powerful
tool.
D
I
remember
at
one
point:
last
year,
Dai
was
considering
having
the
ability
for
both
a
mint
arbitrary
amount
to
die
in
a
transaction
and
then
repay
a
data
transaction,
and
you
can
imagine
just
like
what
people
can
be
capable
of.
They
could
just
like
mint
Billy
and
die
and
then
repaint
another
transaction.
That
would
be
kind
of
insane,
at
least
with
the
current
flash
loans.
B
Yeah
one
of
the
the
issues
is,
you
could
certainly
do
this
with
most
of
these
exploits
would
be
possible
without
the
flash
lines
you'd
be
able
to.
If
you
had,
a
large
pool
of
assets
exploit
something
that
requires
a
large
bowl
of
assets
to
exploit
it.
But
the
set
of
people
who
have
a
large
pool
of
assets
lying
around
is
much
smaller
and
it's
very
hard
to
move
100
million
dollars
on
chain
anonymously
and
then
the
whole
chain
of
moving
stuff
to
and
from
and
everything
else.
So
this
opens
up
to.
F
So
the
the
key
to
these
flash
loan
attacks
is
that
you
basically
have
one
smart
contract
system
which
is
doing
imperfect,
accounting
on
some
other
smart
contract
system
and
when
they're
coding
it
they
think.
Oh
nobody
could
ever
possibly
have
that
amount
of
money
to
manipulate
that
imperfection.
They.
F
After
flash
loans
happen,
I
kind
of
view
it
as
like
the
immune
system
of
defy
like
if
coders
are
taking
shortcuts
and
they're
they're.
Taking
these
assumptions
and
being
imprecise
in
their
calculations,
flash
loan
attacker
will
eventually
find
it
and
exploit
it.
So
it
actually
encourages
people
to
be
more
responsible
with
their
coding
practices.
C
F
But
yeah
I
I
think
it's
like
a
fascinating
category
of
of
attacks,
because
they're
not
exactly
bugs
like
code,
was
kind
of
working
as
intended,
but
like
yeah,
they
were
able
to
get
like
insane
amounts
of
Leverage.
The
other
way
that
the
flashlight
attacks
are
commonly
used
is
for
Oracle
manipulation.
F
C
Just
want
to
point
out
these
this,
this
class
of
attack,
if
you
want
to
call
an
attack,
is
really
interesting
and
really
fascinating,
but
I
think
it's
very
important
to
make
a
distinction
between
this
and
other
forms
of
security
incidents,
because
I'm
inclined
to
actually
put
these
sorts
of
attacks
and
again
I'm
using
scare
quotes
into
the
Mev
bucket
right.
It's,
as
you
said
a
moment
ago,
it's
code
working
as
it
was
intended,
and
it's
this
is
not
new
I
have
a
background
in
high
frequency
trading
right.
We
just
call
this
Arbitrage
right.
C
It's
people
finding
mispricings
or
yeah.
It's
exactly
like
you
said
when
there's
some
sort
of
a
mispricing
or
an
assumption,
that's
baked
in
at
the
interface,
it
tends
to
be
the
interface
of
two
different
kind
of
systems,
or
something
and
and
taking
advantage
of
that
I'm
not
sure
I'd
call
that
a
security
incident
like
an
actual
bug
in
core
code
or
something
so
it's
important
to
make
that
distinction
and
by
the
way
we
should
talk
more
about
Meb,
because
Meb
is
also
really
interesting.
This
is
why
I've
been.
D
Yeah
I
just
want
to
make
a
point
that,
like
more
generally
speaking
because
smart
contracts
are
immutable
when
you
write
smart
Contour
code,
it's
it's
very
unreasonable
to
imagine
like
I,
have
to
write
this
code,
so
it's
a
cure
for
the
next
hundred
years
against
any
future
Innovation.
That
could
possibly
happen
in
D5
like
like
a
lot
of
these
archives
written
before
flash
loans,
lots
of
came
along
you'll
kind
of
support
these
smart
contracts.
So
how
do
we
get
around
this?
B
I
think
we
see
a
large
number
of
things
where,
in
the
traditional
security
world
you
you
hear
about,
like
the
zero
day
versus
the
the
well-known
exploit.
That's
been
out
there.
Things
like
the
profanity
key
generator
that,
yes,
if
we
were
the
first
person
like
one,
you
should
have
reviewed
it.
Two,
if
you
were
the
first
person
to
fall
prey
to
that
yeah
that
sucks,
but
everyone
else
who
suffered
from
that
and
hundreds
of
millions
of
dollars
lost
after
the
well-publicized
exploit,
existed
and
clear
way
to
mitigate
it
existed.
F
C
I
mean
a
lot
of
very
prominent
folks
among
them,
like
investors,
security
researchers
had
were
very
vocal
from
you
know,
months
or
even
years
prior
about
about
this
class
of
of
economic
attacks.
We're
talking
about
economic
attack
now
and
in
fact
there
were
warning
signs
right
because
there
was
there
was
a
I,
don't
remember
the
details,
but
there
was
an
attack
six
months
prior
or
something
against
one
of
the
other
coins
or
assets,
or
something
in
the
Terra
ecosystem
and
the
price
kind
of
It
kind
of
depeged
and
then
went
back.
F
Inside
yeah
sure,
so
it
is
a
notable
security.
It
is
a
notable
security
incident,
so
it
basically,
this
Terra
Luna
design
protocol
was
basically
it
had
a
mechanism
to
mince
a
a
so-called
algorithmic,
stable
coin,
where
you
burn
the
The
Sovereign
asset
Luna
in
order
to
Mint
UST,
which
is
supposed
to
be
packed
to
a
dollar
and
the
idea
there
is
that
you'll
always
be
able
to
redeem
it
for
a
dollar's
worth
of
luno,
which
then
gets
minted.
F
Is
so
many,
including
myself,
have
been
vocal
publicly
about
the
death
spiral
inevitability
of
this
design
and
I?
Don't
think
anyone
expected
it
to
get
as
big
as
it
did,
but
what
I
find
quite
interesting
is
that
not
only
did
I
would
say
people
who
are
less
informed
in
the
space
who
it
is
not
their
job
to
maybe
know
better.
You
know,
okay,
it's
understandable,
that
they
didn't
understand.
That
would
happen
and
they
were
kind
of
sold
a
risk-free
thing
that
wasn't
risk-free.
F
C
F
C
So
so
something
else,
that's
new,
since
the
last
Devcon
which-
and
this
is
actually
the
the
aspect
of
the
Terra
Luna
situation-
that
I
find
the
most
interesting.
This
goes
back
to
composability,
which
we
talked
about
before
it's
the
intertwined
nature
right,
it's
that
we
have
now
assets
built
on
top
of
assets
built
on
top
of
assets,
and
so
when
one
failure
occurs
right
three
four
years
ago,
if
something
broke,
it
didn't
cause
this
Cascade
effect
throughout
the
ecosystem
and
actually,
in
the
case
of
Terra
Luna,
it
was
across
multiple
ecosystems.
C
Right
I
mean
Bitcoin,
began
crashing
and
there's
a
whole
reason
for
that.
They
had
this
Terra
Luna
Atari,
Terra
Foundation
guard
treasury
that
held
Bitcoin.
They
had
to
start
selling
Bitcoin
to
defend
it,
but
this
what's
the
word
for
it,
this
contagion
yeah
the
contagion
that
spreads
throughout
like
this
is
a
new
class
of
economic
risk
that
didn't
exist
before
I
think
we
need
to
understand
it
better
because
it
will
happen
again.
D
But
I
think
contagions
existed
in
in
tradify
for
quite
a
while.
People
are
well
aware
of
of
contagion,
and
but
you
have
something
like
like
Central
Bank
to
kind
of
like,
perhaps
contain
it
and
and
and
limit
it,
which
arguably
is
not
good
for
the
long-term
economic
viability
of
traffic
markets,
and
perhaps
it's
better
with
D5
for
these
to
kind
of
play
out
and
just
kind
of
like
it's
almost
like
a
forest
fire
Just
Let,
the
Fire,
Burn
everything
and
then
regrow.
D
Everything
versus
just
kind
of
keep
these
like
sick
trees
alive
forever,
like
we
have
it
in
web
2..
So
one
thing
that
I
want
to
kind
of
touch
on
with
the
hotel
incident
is
we
got
very
touched
on
it?
This
idea
of,
like
the
illusion
of
like
security,
which
was
actually
very
dangerous.
We
had
the
lfd
reserve,
we
had
people
like
jump
and
Delphi
and
many
prominent
people
kind
of
say:
hey.
We
know
about
dead
spiral,
we
have
a
handle.
D
We
have
six
billion
dollars
of
BTC
we're
going
to
buy
everything
and
it's
going
to
be
fine.
Ed
I
think
many
people
looked
at
and
said.
Okay,
well
jump
has
a
lot
of
really
good
quantitative
researchers,
I
assume
they
did
that
kind
of
modeling
I
assume
they
they
rent
numbers
and
we're
like
okay.
This
is
probably
work,
but
it
turns
out
no
one
knew
what
they
were
doing.
So,
how
exactly
do
we
do?
We
like
mitigate
this
particular
class
of
like
issues
I
think
it's
very
dangerous.
D
When
you
have
a
situation
where
people
know
an
issue
can
occur,
and
then
people
also
think
that
other
people
who
are
very
smart,
also
know
this
quicker
and
we
see
all
types
of
spark
contracts
like
when
Alameda
jumps
into
a
smart
contract.
I
think
people
tend
to
assume
that,
because
they're
in
that
spark
contract
they've
audited
it
and
they
they
know,
what's
going
on,
they
put
100
million
dollars
into
it.
They
probably
does
happen
in
reality.
D
There's
like
several
examples,
contract
for
yield
and
there's
been
critical
bugs
in
that
bar
contract,
which
is
just
kind
of
insane,
and
it
just
kind
of
goes
to
show
you
that,
like
yeah,
you
really
cannot
rely
on
like
reputation
Authority
in
this
space
to
make
your
decision
making,
and
that
makes
things
very
difficult.
I
think
for
the
average
person
working
in
D5,
because
people
who
are
not
experts
in
these
systems
rely
on
Experts
and
those
experts
have
been
showing
time
to
come
and
again
to
not
be
doing
proper
due
diligence
on
their
own.
There's.
B
F
They
so
there
was
four
four
validators
controlled
by
the
foundation
and
five
were
independent,
and
then
there
was
basically
it
was
a
usability
problem.
So
withdrawals
were
happening
too
slowly.
So
one
of
the
by
the
way
the
four
run
by
the
foundation
were
like
all
in
the
same
AWS
machine,
so
they
were
basically
one
and
then
they
convinced
a
fifth
one
to
give
them
like
temporary
permission
to
like
sign
for
them.
B
The
I
think
the
term
is
the
normal
normalization
of
deviance.
It's
a
concept
from
like
aerospace
engineering,
so
one
of
the
interesting
things
about
crypto
is
and
a
lot
of
people.
I
talk
with
come
up
with
the
same
thing
is
if
you're
deploying
an
immutable,
smart
contract
and
there's
reasons
why
you
want
to
be
immutable.
B
Protection
from
Forced
upgrades,
malicious
Insider
of
everything
else,
but
if
you're
deploying
in
a
mutable
system,
you're
really
in
the
same
safety
regime
as
Aerospace
nuclear
engineering,
everything
else
not
something
similar
to
normal
software
engineering
and
you
need
to
have
procedures
in
place
for
for
that
kind
of
ecosystem.
Where
traditionally,
you
have
more
way
more
design
work
than
you
have
implementation
lots
of
review.
You
have
review
of
your
review
process,
feedback
on
that
and
it's
very
different
than
normal
software
engineering,
and
that's
not
really
how
stuff
is
built
in
the
broader
ecosystem.
B
C
C
F
To
that
point,
and
to
an
earlier
point
about
Trad
Phi
in
the
tradify
world,
there's
something
called
ratings
agencies.
This
doesn't
exist
in
crypto
in
in
Trad
fi.
You
pay
professionals
to
evaluate
the
risk
and
give
it
a
rating
of
a
financial
asset,
not
even
a
security,
not
even
security,
wise
there's,
also
security
ratings
and
certifications
as
well,
but
so
we're
missing
that
in
crypto
there's,
no
professionals
that
are
actually
actively
monitoring,
even
the
economic
risks
of
these
various
systems.
The
thing
that
defy
has
that
tradify
doesn't
have
is
real-time
transparency
and
auditability.
F
So
if
you
look
to
the
2008
housing
crisis,
that
was
basically
you
know
a
series
of
packaged
and
repackaged
and
repackaged
debt
instruments
that
eight
layers
deep,
nobody
could
see
through
to
what
the
underlying
was
and
they
just
trusted
that
the
ratings
agency
that
gave
it
an
A
plus
that
everything
was
a
plus
turned
out.
There
was
a
bunch
of
you
know,
F
through
a
debt
within
that
package,
which
caused
people
to
basically
buy
risk
that
they
didn't
know
they
were
buying
with
D5.
F
We
have
that
real-time
transparency,
but
what
we
were
lacking
right
now
is
basically
professionals
that
evaluate
that
risk
and
give
ratings
on
it
or
give
metrics
on
it.
So
I'm,
seeing
the
beginnings
of
that
happening,
I'm,
seeing
a
couple
of
projects
that
are
focused
on
becoming
this
risk,
Oracle
risk
engine,
so
I'm
excited
for
that
in
the
future,
because
you
know
we
will
combine
this
transparency
and
D5
with
the
the
various
ratings
mechanisms
or
risk
evaluation
mechanisms
that
are
coming
out.
C
Massive
massive
massive
opportunity
seriously:
anyone
out
there
who's
interested
in
this
stuff,
who
has
a
background
in
finance
who's
inclined.
This
stuff
is
sorely
needed
and
there's
huge
lack
of
the
stuff
in
the
market.
Today,
it's
a
huge
opportunity
like
work
on
it,
talk
to
us
we'll
we'll
help
you
make
sure
you're
talking
to
the
right
people.
D
Yeah,
actually,
funnily
enough,
like
talk
to
him,
yeah
yeah,
so
so
Auntie,
which
was
the
project
I,
was
briefly
Devon
is
essentially
trying
to
do
this
in
a
in
a
decentralized
way.
I
I
think
that
one
of
the
issues
with
having
kind
of
like
centralized
risk
Auditors
is
the
fact
that
they
are
foul
we're
not
saying
decentralized.
D
Earthquers
are
perhaps
better
it's
just
the
entire
system
as
a
whole,
I
think
is
fallible
to
some
level
of
human
error
and
any
kind
of
appeal
to
Authority
I
think
is
kind
of
dangerous
I
mean
just
because
we
have
Moody's.
This
period
doesn't
mean
that
tried
fly
is,
is
immune
to
like
contagion,
stuff
like
that,
like
it'd,
be
it
it.
F
So
the
big
problems
with
rating
agencies
is
that
they
don't
have
any
skin
in
the
game.
So
what
I'm
really
bullish
on
is
Insurance
and
other
types
of
systems
where
they're
underwriting
the
risk
rating
that
they're
giving
so
there's
lots
of
different
ways.
You
can
do
that,
whether
it's
with
a
regular
insurance
company,
which
is
what
ever
toss
does
or
various
D5
mechanism
designs.
This
is
something
that
I've
researched
very
deeply
and
seriously.
B
We
do
underwriting
for
a
lot
of
problems
for
technical
risk
and
projects
for
practical
risk,
and
things
like
that
and
the
problem
with.
How
much
can
you
trust
a
software
audit
or
a
software
Security
review
Auditors
actually
hate
the
term
audit
when
applied
to
their
their
work
product.
But
how
do
you
trust,
different
firms
and,
honestly
at
every
firm
I've,
talked
to
can
do
great
work,
the
the
thing
from
an
insurance
and
a
Reliance
perspective?
B
Is
you
really
need
to
look
at
the
the
like
the
the
worst
work
that
they'll
pass
and
make
sure
that
that
is
high
quality,
because,
if
you're
going
to
just
blanket
trust
the
security
review
performed
by
a
firm,
you
really
care
about
their
internal
Quality
Control
process
and
knowing
that,
if
somebody's,
it's
a
new
system
where
they're
not
already
expert
in
it
or
where?
Perhaps
they
don't
have
their
they're
very
busy
one
of
the
biggest
problems
in
the
security
review
industry?
B
So
one
of
the
critical
things
that
we
absolutely
as
an
industry
need
to
improve
is
better
tooling,
but
also
more
Security
Professionals
in
the
industry,
so
that
we
can
do
more
of
this
stuff
in
parallel,
because
every
project
out
there
needs
to
have
this
work
done
and
it's
a
contended
resource
and
you
you
absolutely
want
to
be
one
of
the
ones
that
gets
a
Security
review
and
not
one
of
the
ones.
That's
waiting.
While
you
get
popped.
F
I
don't
know
if
we
want
to
touch
on
something
that
we've
kind
of
uncovered,
which
is
that
technical
Auditors
are
basically
expected
to
take
on
this
role
of
doing
an
economic
audit
as
well
and
they're,
actually
not
the
best
people
to
do
that.
Right.
They've,
they've,
categorized
the
known
economic
attacks
but,
for
instance,
the
mango
Market
attack,
which
just
happened
yesterday,
was
a
blatant
Financial,
Oracle
manipulation
attack.
They
manipulated
if
you're
not
aware
mango
got
drained
for
about
100
million.
C
To
be
clear,
there
are
folks
who
specialize
in
the
financial
side
of
things
so
shout
out
to
Gauntlet,
shout
out
to
block
science
right.
They
have
tools
they're
experts
in
this,
but
those
are
the
only
two
I
know
of
whereas
there's
dozens
of
Auditors
who
are
like
you're
describing
technical
Auditors,
who
I
think
would
not
have
the
sophistication
to
catch
this
category
of
bugs.
So
again,.
D
Yeah,
so
so
one
thing
touching
on
the
economic
audit
I
do
know
subology
programs
that
now
do
this
kind
of
auditing
separately,
and
actually
there
are
like,
for
instance,
compound
and
Ave
will
will
retain
people
to
do
ongoing
economic,
Audits
and
I
think
it's
very
necessary
to
be
able
to
adjust
the
parameters
of
your
protocol.
It's
subconscious
way,
of
course,
to
to
adjust
for
the
changing
kind
of
parameters
of
like
what's
actually
in
that
protocol,
because
otherwise
you
end
up
situations
like,
for
instance,
mango
markets.
D
If
you're
not
aware
this
is
a
very
Capital
attentive
attack,
it
took
I
think
around
five
or
ten
million
dollars
of
the
user
on
Capital
due
to
that
attack,
and
the
thing
is
like
I
think
most
people
looking
at
Mega
markets
are
like.
Oh,
this
book
has
10
million
dollars
in
it
was
audited,
is
Oracle.
Attack
is
going
to
be
very
expensive,
pull
up.
It's
not
worth
it
once
that's
100
million
dollars
in
it
so
in
this
oracles
are
very
viable.
D
B
C
You
know
I,
think
you're,
right,
Ryan,
I
think
like
it's
incumbent
upon
us
as
designers
and
builders
in
this
space
to
like
build
better
tools
and
and
install
some
of
those
safety
rails
or
airbags
like
you're
talking
about,
but
I
just
want
to
highlight
that
as
someone
who
thinks
deeply
about
this
and
has
been
working
on
this
for
years,
there's
a
tension
here
right,
because
the
easiest
way
to
install
safety
rails
is
centralization
right
is
to
say
yeah.
You
know
for
my
grandma,
like
maybe
she's,
not
gonna,
really
effectively
manage
her
private
Keys.
C
Maybe
she's
not
really
going
to
understand
a
ledger
or
a
multi-sig.
So
maybe
the
best
thing
for
her
to
do
is
keep
her
crypto
on
coinbase
and
and
Outsource
custody
to
someone
else,
and
that
in
some
respects
is
antithetical
to
like
the
whole
reason
we're
here.
So
there's
no
easy
solution
to
this,
but
I
just
want
to
highlight
that
tension
and
that's
where
I
approach
this
as
a
protocol
engineer
as
a
developer.
D
Yeah
I
think
kind
of
a
good
balance
between
this
is
that
the
base
protocols
really
stay
true
to
like
the
tenets
of
crypto.
It
should
be
decentralized
such
a
persistent
permissionless,
all
this
stuff,
so
Bill
can
build
it
on
top
of
that,
and
I
think
that
it's
kind
of
on
us
to
educate
people
on
the
right
right
on
board
themselves,
like
Grandma,
should
not
be
probably
creating
a
metamask
wallet.
I
think
that's
generally,
something
that
is
is
is
difficult
to
secure,
I.
D
Think
for
the
vast
majority
of
people
and
in
the
current
situation,
as
we
see
with
the
Mt
space
that,
like
there's
no
way,
we
can
onboard
a
billion
people
into
crypto
with
the
current
state
like
people
like
it's
just
like
it's
just
going
to
create
like
a
Feeding
Frenzy
for
the
Piranhas
that
are
constantly
looking
for
ways
to
steal
people's
money.
So
we
need
to
figure
out
these
more
robust
wallet
systems
for
these
people
and
I
think
that's
probably
a
better
compromise.
B
But
one
of
the
things
that
scares
me
is
while
these
these
losses
might
be
relatively
a
small
dollar
values
relative
to
the
larger
G5
particle
hacks,
and
things
like
that.
The
number
of
victims
is
very
high
and
politically,
if
you
have
a
lot
of
victims
that
individually
like
lost
event
of
any
kind,
and
it
makes
it
very
easy
for
Regulators
to
point
it
at
like
a
grandmother.
Who's
lost
something
or
it
otherwise
unsophisticated
user,
who
felt
prey
to
some
some
system
or
possibly
was
scammed
and
then
pushed
for
regulation.
B
So
we
have
the
centralization
risk
as
a
as
a
the
potential
to
use
centralization.
As
a
countermeasure
to
a
lot
of
this
stuff
is
a
risk
of
centralization,
but
also
acquiring
a
very,
very
bad
public
relations
nightmare
as
well
as
regulatory
nightmare
is
also
an
existential
threat
to
the
the
overall
industry.
G
You
talked
a
little
bit
about
account
instruction,
so
I
want
to
know
if
you
could
talk
a
little
bit
about
that,
because
I
think
that
it's
like
their
solution
to
have
like
easier
Coastal
systems
without
depending
on
I,
mean
self-costal
systems
without
depending
on
centralized
entities.
So
what
do
you
think
about
that
and
how
we
are
advancing,
and
when
do
you
think
we
will
be
able
to
have
that
for
the
General
Public.
D
So
I
think
there's
like
two
classes
of
transcription,
so
just
to
define
the
term
very
generally
kind
of
abstraction
is
essentially
when
you
make
no
distinction
between
smart
contracts
and
editor.
While
it's
on
ethereum
right
now,
individual
wallets
are
fundamentally
different
than
smart
contracts,
because
individuals
are
our
public
private
key
pair.
D
So
people
with
Roll-Ups
were
trying
to
do
that,
but
eventually
ended
up
deciding
not
to
because
you
know
making
these
kind
of
protocol
level
changes
just
made
it
very
difficult
for
ethereum
developer
to
kind
of
compose
and
build
on
them.
But
the
nice
thing
about
kind
of
Attraction
the
design
space
is,
is
very
wide.
People
could
do
things
like
multi-cigs.
D
They
can
do
things
that
are
much
more
complicated,
like
have
like
off-chain
oracles,
that
you
know
involve
human
beings
process
and
do
basically
kind
of
the
sky's
the
limit
in
terms
of
what
people
are
kind
of
building
gear.
One
interesting
project,
that's
kind
of
actually
never
mind
up.
Yeah,
sorry,.
C
So
we
built
this
for
space
mesh.
Okay,
we
built
the
content,
abstraction
I
think
we
may
be
the
first
layer
one.
Maybe
the
second
near
has
something
similar.
It
was
really
really
really
really
really
hard
to
your
point.
It
had
very
deep
profound
implications
and
ramifications
on
the
protocol,
but
it's
a
very
powerful,
primitive
and
it
means
that
the
really
simple
way
to
think
about
this
is
every
account
by
default.
Is
a
multi-sig
and
there's
always
multiple
Keys
associated
with
it
again.
C
C
C
There
was
a
hack
in
a
Solana
ecosystem
wallet
about
four
or
five
months
ago.
Does
anyone
remember
the
name
of
the
wallet
slope
wallet?
Thank
you
and
what
happened
here
was
a
bug
in
the
wallet
that
exposed
the
private
keys
because
of
some
Telemetry
kind
of
tooling,
very
common,
because
called
Sentry
or
something
I
think
we
actually
use
it
in
in
space
mesh
as
well,
and
the
reason
that
I
find
this
one.
C
So
impactful
is
because
this
was
the
actual
total
number
of
funds
was
very
small
and
I
think
it
was
eight
or
ten
million
dollars
worth
or
something.
So
it
was
like,
maybe
even
less
than
that,
but
it
was
thousands
of
users
who
were
impacted
and
each
of
them
had
a
very
small
amount
of
money
in
their
wallets
and
they
woke
up
one
day
and
their
funds
were
gone.
That
I,
don't
think,
has
ever
happened
before
that
particular
class
of
attack
and
everyone
was
panicking
and.