►
From YouTube: Evaluating Hyperledger URSA for Production Deployments - Pierre Roberge & Hart Montgomery
Description
Evaluating Hyperledger URSA for Production Deployments - Pierre Roberge, Digital Identity Laboratory of Canada & Hart Montgomery, The Linux Foundation
With decentralized identity and tools maturing, many organizations are moving their focus from proof-of-concept (PoC) to mission critical systems dependent upon decentralized identity technologies. Several leading Canadian public and private organizations, using a “trust but verify” philosophy, required an independent cybersecurity review of the URSA library. Hyperledger URSA is a shared cryptographic library used to avoid duplicating other cryptographic work and increases security. It is an opt-in repository for Hyperledger and non Hyperledger projects to place and use crypto. Project sponsors, several Canadian public sector entities and Interac, recognise that end users rely on strong security to deliver high levels of assurance required of important consumer transactions with their governments and their financial institutions. Many of the world’s leading advancements in decentralized identity, several originating in Canada, rely on the Hyperledger family of technologies. The URSA library is a key component, depended upon to provide the security overlay for decentralized identity. Come join Pierre Roberge and Hart Montgomery to hear about the URSA review and its outcomes!
Sessions Details & Slides (if available): https://sched.co/14H5O
Access All Sessions: https://events.linuxfoundation.org/hyperledger-global-forum/program/schedule/
----
Hyperledger – Open Source Blockchain Technologies
Hyperledger is an open source community focused on developing a suite of stable frameworks, tools and libraries for enterprise-grade blockchain deployments.
It serves as a neutral home for various distributed ledger frameworks including Hyperledger Besu, Fabric, Sawtooth, Indy, as well as tools like Hyperledger Avalon, Cactus and libraries like Hyperledger Aries, Ursa. Learn more about Hyperledger projects: https://www.hyperledger.org/use
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License
Creative Commons Attribution license (reuse allowed)
A
Good
afternoon,
everyone
thank
you
for
being
here
today.
It's
a
pleasure.
It's
an
honor
to
present
some
of
the
work
that
was
done
earlier
this
year
around
the
security
code
review
of
the
Ursa
Library.
My
name
is
Pierre
Robert
I'm,
the
CEO
and
president
of
the
digital
identity.
Laboratory
of
Canada
and
presenting
with
me
is
Art
Montgomery,
the
CTO
of
hyperledger
I.
A
Will
we
will
keep
some
time
at
the
end
for
question,
we'll
ask
that
you
keep
your
question
for
DM,
but
we
would
love
to
to
hear
your
question
and
be
able
to
exchange
so
the
agenda
for
today,
we'll
just
do
a
brief
introduction
of
who
is
the
digital
identity
lab
like
what's
your
business?
What's
your
interest
in
this
we'll
we'll
do
a
bit
of
a
level
setting
about
hyperledger
about
Ursa
and
then
we'll
go
and
we'll
go
into
the
detail
of
what's
the
Genesis
of
the
project,
what
was
the
engagement,
the
scope?
A
What
did
we
do
we'll
talk
about
what
we
found
and,
at
the
end,
we'll
go
more
into
detail
about
some
of
the
findings
on
the
specific
of
those
and
some
of
the
mitigation
plan
that
were
put
in
place,
there
is,
in
addition
to
today's
presentation,
which
is
recorded,
there's
also
a
Blog.
That's
available,
I
have
a
a
URL
here,
it's
more
oriented
for
business
people
that
want
to
know
about
the
process
and
what
was
done
and
why
we
did
that.
A
There's
also
the
full
report
not
remember
how
many
pages
it
is
I
think
might
be
a
40
page,
50
50,
page
report,
so
everything
that
we're
gonna
talk
about
today
is
documented
in
the
report
and
here's
the
report,
so
I
figure
I
would
give
you
a
big
QR
code.
So
if
you
want
to
snap
this,
you
can
go
straight
to
the
report
and
it's
publicly
available.
It's
meant
to
be
a
public
good.
It
was
it
was.
A
The
work
was
made
made
possible
by
sponsored
and
the
idea
was
always
to
contribute
back
to
the
community.
So
here
it
is
very
good.
So
who
is
the
visual
identity
laboratory
of
Canada?
So
the
lab
is
a
fairly
new
organization,
we're
we're
just
over
two
years
old,
we're
a
not-for-profit
organization
that
exists
to
promote
the
adoption
of
digital
identity.
We
don't
do
that
by
building
more
code.
We
don't
do
that
by
selling
solution.
A
We
do
that
by
providing
arms,
land
technology,
neutral
assessment
and
Conformity
work
around
assessment,
Conformity
and
interoperability,
we're
based
in
Canada,
but
we
have
client
around.
We
have
client
in
the
United
States,
we
have
client
in
Europe
and
we
work
with
public
sector
and
private
sector
organization
or
identity.
If
you're,
not
the
identity,
Geeks
or
identity
is
contextual
or
identity
is
evolve
over
time
and
it's
it's
provided
to
us
from
the
public
sector.
A
B
Sure,
absolutely
thanks,
Pierre
and
hi
everyone
I'm
art,
so
many
of
you
are
probably
familiar
with
the
Project's
Aries
indeed
and
Ursa.
This
is
the
hyperledger
digital
identity
stack,
so
India
is
a
distributed.
Ledger
Aries!
Well,
this
isn't
exactly
right,
I'll
sort
of
call
it
the
wallet,
layer
and
Ursa
is
a
cryptographic
library
and
all
of
these
were
sort
of
forked
out
from
the
indie
project
over
time
to
have
a
more
modular
implementation.
A
The
only
thing
I
will
add
to
to
this
slide:
no
coffee
here,
no
disaster.
Okay,
the
only
thing
I
would
say
that
Ursa
is
the
shared
Library
between
hyper
Ledger
project,
where
we
wanted
to
all
of
the
security
implementation
and
the
cryptographic
implementation
were
made
in
one
place,
reducing
risk
and
implementation,
accelerating
deployment
so
on
and
so
forth.
So
there's
a
number
of
reason
to
do
that,
and
that's
where
that's
where
Ursa
is,
brings
a
lot
of
of
its
value.
A
So
what's
the
Genesis
of
of
this
project,
why
have
we
done
this
work
so
it
it
really
came
from
a
from
digital
identity
in
Canada,
so
we
we
ear
globally.
We've
heard
from
a
number
of
speaker
today
that
that
digital
identity
and
and
use
of
blockchain
is
is
happening
around
the
globe.
We've
heard
about
free
example,
it's
happening
in
a
big
way
in
Canada
we
have
public
and
private
sector
organization
that
are
looking
at
deploying
at
scale
digital
identity
solution.
A
So
that's
where
it
came
from
and
as
those
organizations
are
looking
to
go
in
production,
there's
a
due
diligence
process
that
needs
to
happen,
and
so
this
is
really.
This
is
really
the
Genesis.
Why
we've
done
that?
There
was
no
arms
land,
public,
independent
review
of
the
software
Library,
it's
open
source.
We
all
know
it's
there,
but
if
nobody
goes
it's
not
that
useful,
and
so,
if
you
think
about
some
of
the
sponsor
for
the
project-
and
there
were
three
provinces
and
one
one
payment
Network
it.
A
They
have
significant
security
policy
and
risk
mitigation
in
place
to
ensure
that
before
they
go
in
production
that
things
the
teaser,
the
the
teaser
cross
and
the
eyes
are
the
we
have
the
doctor
on
the
eyes.
So
it
was
important
for
these
organization
and
making
sure
that
the
project
doesn't
get
stopped
at
the
last
minute
to
have
that
technology
that
that
security,
due
diligence
performed
by
by
a
neutral
party.
The
spirit
in
which
we
did
the
work
was
trust
but
verify.
A
You
might
have
heard
that
that's
coming
from
privacy
by
Design
privacy
by
Design,
was
created
by
by
Anne
kevlukyan
a
Canadian
and
privacy
by
Design
is
anchored
and
all
of
the
digital.
The
majority
of
the
digital
ID
deployment
that
we
see
in
Canada,
so
in
that
Spirit
of
trust,
but
verify,
which
means
we're
not
expecting
to
find
a
back
door.
We're
not
expecting
to
find
a
big
problem.
But
it's
not
sufficient
to
just
say
it's
there.
A
The
one
of
the
reason
that
hyperledger
was
adopted
by
public
sector
organization
in
Canada
is:
is
this
idea
of
working
in
the
open
when
the
government's
not
working
in
a
closed
room?
Where
you
have
no
clue
what's
happening
and
maybe
they're
spying
and
they're?
You
know
they.
They
don't
want
anybody
to
say
we're
spying
on
or
citizen.
They
want
to
work
in
the
open.
A
The
code
is
available
so
that
that
was
one
of
the
great
value
of
using
hyperledger
using
hyperledger
technology
and
in
that
same
Spirit
when
right
at
the
beginning,
when
the
work
was
started,
the
idea
was
to
give
back
that
report.
So
it's
good
for
them.
It's
probably
good
for
for
the
citizen
of
Canada,
but
in
the
in
this
idea
of
supporting
Community
supporting
deployment
in
in
other
industry
in
other
countries
was
important
for
for
or
sponsor
to
make
this
public
and
we're
really
happy
to
do
that
with
you
today.
A
Just
briefly:
what's
the
you
know
why
a
security
audit?
What
why
is
that
important
and
and
for
some
of
you
it
will
be
obvious
and
and
but
but
maybe
not
for
everybody.
So
we
do
security
audit
to
mitigate
risk
ahead
of
time.
So
the
idea
is
really
to
find
if
we
have,
if,
if
there
is
risk
of
fraud,
disruption
or
losses-
and
we
do
that
security
audit
before
going
in
production,
so
we
try
to.
We
try
to
have
a
clean
house
as
as
much
as
possible.
A
Before
we
go,
we
might
find
something
in
production
that
might
happen
after
and
there's
other
there's
other
type
of
security
tests
we
can
perform
for
live
system.
But
the
security
audits
really
met
too,
is
a
check
before
we
go.
It
is
not
a
punishment
from
you
know
the
business
side
to
the
technology
side,
because
it
takes
time
you
will
be.
You
know
we
need
to
produce
documentation,
we
need
to
produce
evidence,
but
the
the
spirit
of
this
is
really
a
business
continuity.
A
So
what
was
the
scope
of
this
review
because
there's
many
way
we
could
have
done
this
I
I
think
about
it
really
in
two
blocks.
So
there
was
a
Security
review,
it's
a
library,
it's
a
shared
Library,
so
our
how's,
the
entry
point
to
the
library
done
what
what
is
the?
What
is?
How
can
we
call
those
entry
points
that
was
the
API
structure,
we're
looking
at
the
coding
standard?
Do
they
it's
their
coding
standard
that
were
applied?
It's
a
community
library.
A
So
are
we
all
doing
the
work
in
the
same
manner
in
a
similar
Manner
and
is
it
consistently
implemented?
There
was
a
review
for
coding
and
language
issue.
It
happened
a
fresh
pair
of
eyes.
You
know
when,
when
you're
used
to
working
the
code,
sometimes
you
just
don't
see
it.
The
fresh
pair
of
wires
coming
from
the
outside
sometimes
help
to
identify
that
we've
looked
for
logical
flaw
and
and
also
and
and
more
recently,
somebody
talk
about
you
know
recently.
A
They
use
and
dependency
of
third-party
library
or
third-party
package.
It
made
the
news
last
December,
let's
let's,
let's,
let's
learn
from
that
and
let's
look
at
if
if
there
is
dependency
on
third-party
package
and
librarian,
does
that
create
what
kind
of
risk,
or
is
there
a
known
risk
associated
with
these
in
in
the
Ursa
Library?
So
that's
security
on
the
crypto
side,
what
we
wanted
to
do
was
to
look
at
the
cryptographic
implementation.
We
wanted
to
look
at
the
entropy.
A
The
scope
of
the
review
was
not
to
confirm
the
mathematical
fundamental
of
the
crypto,
so
the
the
library
is
using
non-cryptographic
algorithm.
What
we,
what
we
did
is
review
as
the
algorithm.
What
is
the
I
was
the
algorithm
supposed
to
be
implemented
and
is
the
code
implementing
is
as
a
properly
implemented
that
logic?
So
we're
not
saying
if,
if
BBS
plus
signature
is
really
solid
or
we're
not
making
a
statement
about
the
value
of
the
crypto,
we're
saying
that
the
implementation
of
the
crypto
follow
the
description
of
the
standard
and
that's
an
important
nuance.
A
A
A
That's
pretty
quick,
and
then
it
was
the
examination
and
and
from
the
examination
we
move
to
validation
and
Remediation.
We've
not
done
that
in
isolation.
We've
worked,
the
digital
identity,
lab
team
worked
with
the
hyperledger
team.
We
also
work
with
the
Ursa,
Ursa
team
and
and
I
want
to
take
10
seconds
to
thank
them.
So
heart
was
was
part
of
that
Mike
Lauder,
cam,
para
and
Nathan
George
all
participated
in
the
review
and
and
the
validation
and
the
remediation
plan
for
this,
and
so
so
we
do
an
examination.
A
We
find
something
we
make
sure
that
we
have
agreement
on
the
finding
about
the
severity
of
of
the
finding
and
and
the
the
scope
of
the
finding.
After
that,
we
can
go
into
remediation.
What
is
the
plan?
How
will
we
will
we
address
this
issue?
Will
we
address
this
issue?
When
will
we
address
this
issue?
If
there
is
some
and
then
there's
a
reporting
and
we're
here
today
to
there's
been
a
red
report,
but
but
it's
not
sufficient
to
keep
this
for
herself.
A
Somebody
we've
heard
a
number
of
time
earlier
about
working
in
the
open,
working,
providing
transparency.
This
is
this
is
today
is
another
example
of
being
transparent
about
the
work.
The
great
work
that's
being
done
here,
so
kind
of
good
news.
There
were
some
finding
the
worst
scenario
is,
there
is
no
finding
and
then
people
start
questioning
if,
if
the
work
was
done
properly,
there
were
some
minor
deviation
that
were
identified.
We
will
go
into
the
detail.
Heart
will
will
go
into
the
detail,
but
the
good
news.
There
was
some
finding
better
news.
A
We
have
remediation
plan
for
all
those
findings,
so
we
had
funding
to
do
the
security
review.
We
didn't
have
funding
to
address
bugs
or
issues
independent,
bugs
and
issues,
and
so
the
worst.
The
other
worst
case
scenario
is
we
find
something
significant
and
we
have
we.
We
we
don't
have
people
that
are
able
to
address
the
problem.
We
ended
up
in
the
in
The
Sweet,
Spot,
minor
issue,
remediation
plan
for
all
of
the
issue,
remediation
plan
or
or
so
planning
or
actually
fixes
for
dose
plan,
and
heart
will
will
talk
about
that.
A
A
B
Okay,
well
I'll
just
stand
at
arm's
length.
Sorry
about
that
everyone,
so
I'll
go
into
a
little
bit
more
detail
about
some
of
the
findings
of
the
audit,
and
this
is
not
only
interesting
I.
Think
for
Ursa,
but
also
in
general.
Is
it
sort
of
reveals
a
lot
of
the
difficult
trade-offs
you
have
to
make
when
thinking
about
security?
B
So
the
first
point
I
have
is
well.
There
are
a
lot
of
trade-offs
and
security.
Trade-Offs
can
be
tricky,
so
are
people.
Everybody
here
is
familiar
with
digital
signatures
right
yeah,
great,
so
suppose
we
have
a
signature
scheme
where
users
post
some
kind
of
verification,
keys
on
the
blockchain
right.
B
And
I
have
sort
of
two
algorithms
here
right
or
two
algorithm
sets,
so
an
algorithm
set
one
I
give
you
a
verification,
key
validation,
algorithm,
which
is
this
blockchain
verify,
and
then
this
verify
signature
algorithm
right
and
the
idea
is,
you
know,
you're
supposed
to
call
the
verify
algorithm
to
check
the
key,
and
then
you
can
verify
the
signature
right
and
then
algorithm
set
2.
We
we
only
give
you
one
algorithm
for
verify
and
it
checks
the
key
and
then
checks
the
signature
right
and
it
forces
you
to
do
both
at
the
same
time.
B
So
there
are
some
advantages
and
disadvantages
to
both
approaches.
Right,
so
algorithm
set
one
exposes
all
functions,
so
you
know
this
is
a
minus,
because
the
users
have
to
remember
to
call
this.
This
blockchain
verify
function
right
because
or
else
there
could
be
potential
issues,
but
on
the
other
hand,
if
you're
a
smart
user,
you
can
avoid
repeated
calls
to
this
blockchain
verify
right
if
you're,
using
a
public
key
and
using
it
over
and
over
again
right.
Well,
you
don't
necessarily
want
to
have
to
call
that
function
over
and
over
again
right.
B
And,
on
the
other
hand,
you
know
this
algorithm
set
two
forces,
this
verification,
key
verification,
and
you
know
the
users
don't
have
to
remember
to
do
this
call.
But
if
you're
calling,
if
you
wanted
to
call
this
verify
function
on
the
same
public
key
again
and
again
and
again,
it
would
be
very
inefficient
right-
and
this
is
a
lot
of
the.
This-
was
a
large
class
of
things
that
sort
of
came
up
in
the
security
review
as
minor
issues.
B
B
So
one
example
is
the
security
audit
told
us
that
you
know
the
implementation
does
not
check
that
a
signature
is
an
element
of
a
prime
order
subgroup.
So
basically
this
is
you
know,
checking
that
you
know
sort
of
something
is
well
formed,
but
you
know
we
do.
We
need
to
check
it
every
time
or
do
we
just
check
it
once
let
the
programmer
check
it
once
and
then
you
know
not
sort
of
waste
efficiency
continually
checking
it
again,
and
this
was
sort
of
a
theme.
B
This
is
again
a
public
key
check,
so
the
BBS
public
key
validator
did
not
check
the
the
subgroup
every
time.
So
you
know
the
question
is
again:
do
you
want
to
force
this
on
the
programmer
or
you
know,
do
you
want
to
give
the
programmer
the
freedom
to
to
make
the
call
whether
they
need
to
do
this
or
not.
B
Once
again,
this
is
the
same
kind
of
proof
check
and
again,
as
the
feedback
says,
you
know
this
was
considered
when
we
were
actually
talking
about
designing
the
system.
We
considered
this
and
we
didn't
implement
it
due
to
Performance
concerns,
but
it's
it's
something
that
we
could
think
about
in
the
future,
and
it's
also
been
discussed
that
we
could
have
you
know.
Multiple
function,
calls
sort
of
a
safe
function
call
and
an
unsafe
function
call
for
people
that
wanted
more
performance.
B
B
B
B
So
you
know,
and
not
only
do
you
need
to
Define
your
threat
model,
but
you
need
to
think
about
attacks
that
are,
in
some
users
threat
models,
but
not
others.
So
what
if
I
have
a
system
where
you
know
my
threat
model
doesn't
include
an
attack
and
Pierre
has
a
system
where
he
needs
to
be
secure
against
something
you
know
and
what,
if
the
fix
is
even
computationally
expensive,
and
this
is
something
that
happened
with
the
with
malicious
keys
and
identity
mixer
and
the
basic
idea
is
the
spec
of
identity.
B
B
Now
some
people
have
said
well,
you
know
if
your
issuer
is
malicious
at
Key
generation.
You
know
that
that
sort
of
scope.
You
know
that
that's
not
a
reasonable
thing
to
consider.
Why
are
you
getting
credentials
from
people
if
you
think
they're,
malicious
at
the
time
of
key
generation
and
and
others
have
said
you
know?
Well,
you
know
we
should
be.
B
You
know
we
should
really
handle
everything
and
we
should
give
people
the
opportunity
to
handle
this
if
they
want
and
so
we're
in
the
process
of
of
building
a
public
key
proof
to
to
fix
this.
It
is
quite
expensive,
but
then
again
it
will
be
optional.
It
will
definitely
be
in
this.
This
left
model
that
we
considered
so
yeah
I'll,
give
it
back
to
Pierre.
That
was
the
the
bulk
of
the
defects
raised
in
the
Security
review.
A
A
A
So
we
also
need
to
think
about
a
community
and
acceptance
and
and
deployment
so
having
having
a
bad
actor
ill
intent
could
negatively
impact
others,
and
this
is
the
reason
that
we
we
need
to
highlight
those.
We
need
to
be
aware
of
those.
It's
part
of
your
your
risk
mitigation.
Should
that
prevent
you
to
go
for
in
on
in
into
production.
Your
organization
risk
profile
will
dictate
that,
but
it's
important
to
be
aware:
I
want
to
take
the
time
to
identify
who
were
the
contributor
to
the
report.
A
So
it's
one
thing
to
publish
a
report.
It's
a
good
thing,
usually
to
know
who's
behind
it,
so
Neil,
Kettle,
Matthew,
Barker,
Justin,
Gage,
Lish,
Rory,
Francis,
Bruce,
Daly
and
myself
were
the
the
primary
team
that
work
on
the
report.
If
you
have
any
question
about
Ursa,
this
is
the
Discord
server
Ur
barcode
that
you
can
connect
and
I.
Have
your
question
after
today
and
we'll
we'll
be
taking
your
question
today,
but
after
that,
if
you
want
to
connect
and
that's
kind
of
it-
actually
that's
a
report
here.
C
So
the
question
I
have
was
that
you
specified,
on
the
left
hand
side
that
the
two
separate
functions
are
operating
across
and,
on
the
right
hand,
side
that
was
combined
together
right,
but
from
a
normal
perspective
it
could
be
that
the
right
side
function
could
be
there
with
a
flag
with
have
a
default
value
that
both
the
things
are
executed
together
and
somebody
wants
to
override.
Then
they
can
pass
a
flag.
So
the
check
would
not
happen
directly.
The
other
function
would
happen.
B
Yeah
something
like
that
is
definitely
a
good
idea
for
most
of
our
use
cases,
or
at
least
the
people,
not
my
use
cases.
The
people
I
talk
to
about
use
cases.
We
couldn't
find
anyone
who
didn't
lose
a
lot
of
efficiency
by
doing
the
right
hand
side.
So
you
know
we
weren't
really
seeing
anyone
who
wanted
that
so
it
was.
B
It
was
hard
to
motivate
people
to
build
something
like
that
when
there
wasn't,
a
lot
of
you
know
need
or
desire
for
it,
but
but
it's
a
great
point
and
sort
of
the
ideal
world.
You
would
have
something
like
that
with
you
know
a
default
safe,
but
you
know
a
flag
where
you
can
say:
hey,
don't
actually
do
this
check
I've
done
this
check
before.
B
D
B
You
know
there.
We
could
have
a
whole
talk
on
this
and
you're,
probably
familiar
with
the
open
ssf,
so
there's
a
whole
new
Linux
Foundation
project
that
is
entirely
focused
on
best
open
source
coding
practices.
I
believe
they
have
a
workshop
day
on
Wednesday
they're,
giving
a
ton
of
talks
if
you're
sticking
around
for
osseu,
so
I
would
definitely
look
into
that.
B
So
yeah
I
talked
a
little
bit
about
this
yesterday.
The
keynote
if
you
like,
if
you're
at
the
member
Summit-
and
this
will
come
up
more
so
Arno
lahorse-
is
leading
a
security
discussion
later
today
and
he
will
be
interrogating
Brian
balendorf
who's.
Now
the
open
ssf
director,
so
he
he
can
answer
all
of
your
questions
about
that
and
the
tldr
for
Ursa
is
that,
yes,
we
you
know
in
Ursa
and
in
all
hyperledger
projects,
we
try
to
follow
the
the
best
open
source
coding
and
software
practices.