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From YouTube: IETF106-TMRID-20191119-1000
Description
TMRID meeting session at IETF106
2019/11/19 1000
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/106/proceedings/
C
A
D
A
Okay,
get
a
seat
and
we
can
get
started
and
at
some
point
Daniel
will
be
back
so
welcome
to
to
the
trash
forty
multi-purpose
remote
ID,
both
as
you
know,
this
is
I,
mean
officially
czar
working
group
forming
both
I
guess
or
working
group
recharging.
So
the
idea
is
that
you
know
if
we
agreed
to
do
this,
we
will
think
I
mean
we
will
talk
to
really
can
decide
whether
we
want
to
retire
hip
or
create
a
new
working
group
or
something,
but
that's
not
basically
so
important.
A
So,
let's
focus
on
you
know
agreeing
on
a
charter
and
having
in
discussions
the
way
we're
going
to
run.
The
session
is
like
we
will
have
three
presentations
and
we
already
talked
to
them,
but
we
will
try
to
limit
some,
how
they
each
slot
to
15
minutes
roughly,
you
know
15
20
minutes,
don't
go
over
that
and
after
that
we
will
go
into
the
QA
and
under
discussions.
A
But
if
anything
is
like
clarifying
something,
is
that
clear
just
feel
free
to
interrupt
the
speakers
then,
at
the
end,
bob
has
put
together
a
charter,
because
the
idea
of
this
type
of
both
is
to
basically
agree
somewhat
on
a
charter,
so
we
will
be
projecting
it
at
the
end
and
I'm
thinking
about
that
and
again
summarizing.
What
are
the
main
decision
points
here
would
be
to
agree
if
this
is
a
problem
just
so
that
I
get
you
thinking
to
the
about
the
questions
that
we
will
be
asking
at
the
end.
A
If
this
problem
is
worth
solving,
if
it's
worth
basically,
you
know
working
on
on
this
problem.
If
the
constraints
that
we're
going
to
be
defining
make
sense-
and
you
will
be
the
constraints
basically
defined-
I
mean
in
their
presentations
the
scope
and
then
I
will
be
asking
the
the
presenters
also
and
the
room,
if
there's
people
that
they
are
willing
to
put
cycles
on
that.
So
we
make
sure
that
this
enough
energy,
that's
one
of
the
explicit
questions
we
got
from
our
ad.
A
So
I
will
be
asking
that
okay,
so
now
I
got
Daniel
back
and
we
can.
We
can
start
basically
officially
on
the
note
world.
So
if
you
are
not
familiar
with
a
note
world,
you
should
go
off
and
and
read
the
note
well
and
they
and
the
links
the
references
and
this
meeting
is
governed
by
by
the
note.
Well-
and
this
is
the
agenda
we
put
together
as
I
said
three
speakers
roughly
15
minutes
each
and
then
we
will
go
into
Q&A
on
discussions.
G
G
The
subtitle
here
extending
locator
identifier,
split
and
strongly
dedication
techniques
to
identify
physically
nearby
objects,
you'll
notice,
it
doesn't
say
anything
at
all-
about
unmanned
aircraft
systems.
Unmanned
aircraft
systems
are
the
motivating
first
use
case,
but
I
mean
the
general
problem
is
I
encounter.
This
object
in
the
physical
world
and
I
have
some
reason
for
believing
that
it
or
a
proxy
for
it
is
on
the
Internet.
How
do
I
figure
out,
which
it
that
it
is
so
that
I
can
begin
communicating
with
it
or
its
proxy
or
whatever
so
talk
about
the
UAS
problem?
G
We
need
to
somehow
identify
these
aircraft
they're
small
they're
not
fast,
compared
to
a
jet
airplane,
but
they're
fast,
compared
to
how
big
they
are
and
they're
fast
compared
to
the
distances
at
which
you
can
see
them,
hear
them
receive
short
wavelength,
radio
transmissions
from
them,
etc,
which
means
they
can
close
the
distance
to
you
really
rapidly
from
the
first
point
where
an
audio-based
detection
system
for
drones
can
detect
a
drone
and
it's
been
optimized
to
be
able
to
hear
it
at
range
until
when
it's
on.
You
is
a
matter
of
maybe
15
seconds.
G
If
it's
flying
full-out,
so
if
somebody
is
malicious,
this
is
clearly
a
problem
or
if
somebody
is
merely
incompetent,
it's
it's
a
problem.
The
language
that's
developed
in
the
in
the
industry
to
talk
about
the
operators
is
the
clueless
the
careless
and
the
criminal
right.
The
clueless
guy
doesn't
know
that
he
shouldn't
be
flying
at
Gatwick.
The
careless
guy
knows
that
he
wouldn't
shouldn't
be
flying
at
Gatwick
when
he
doesn't
care.
G
He
figures,
who's,
gonna
notice,
I'll
get
away
with
it
and
then
the
criminal
guy
he's
there
because
he
intends
to
do
harm
the
criminal
guy
I
believe
I
still
have
enough.
Faith
in
human
nature
is
in
the
vast
minority,
but
even
if
he
didn't
exist,
we
got
a
problem
with
the
the
clueless
and
the
careless
remote
operation.
G
You
know
everybody's
used
to
the
little
joystick
controller
for
the
guy
who's
flying
in
the
park,
but
you
know:
we've
slept
Bell
te
modems
on
these
things,
which,
by
the
way
is
mostly
illegal,
and
at
that
point
you
can
fly
them
twelve
thousand
miles
away.
So
this
talk
will
be
a
little
bit
United
States
centric,
because
you
know
those
are
the
people
who
are
paying
me
to
do
this
work
and
that's
what
I'm
most
familiar
with.
But
the
FAA
in
the
u.s.
G
is
just
one
example
of
a
Civil
Aviation
Authority
and
all
the
cia's
worldwide
are
worrying
about
this
problem.
Faa
is
gonna.
Do
a
notice,
we're
poles
rulemaking
this
December?
They
want
to
do
performance-based
standards.
They've
turned
to
ASTM
International
as
a
consensus-based
industry
standards,
development
organization
to
develop
how
this
will
be
done.
I
was
at
the
ASTM
meeting
two
weeks
ago,
where
we
passed
a
standard
that
doesn't
answer
the
mail.
G
It
is
cool,
as
so
far
as
it
goes,
it's
got
two
modes
of
operation,
Network
remote
ID
uses
the
internet
to
get
information
from
the
aircraft
or
a
proxy
for
the
aircraft,
which
might
just
be
the
operators
cellphone,
where
he
goes
to
a
web-based
forum
and
says
I'm
gonna
operate
in
this
airspace
volume
from
this
time,
hack
to
that
time,
hack,
but
somehow
over
the
internet
I
can
find
out
who's
in
this
airspace.
Val
I'm
in
a
particular
time
broadcast
remote
ID
is
an
actual
transmission
from
the
aircraft
to
the
ground.
G
So
I
can
take
my
phone
or
my
tablet
and
receive
it
and
get
a
beacon
from
this
thing.
Who
is
it?
But
the
initial
ASTM
standard
falls
woefully
short
in
making
the
information
immediately
actionable.
First
off
I
can
just
assert
I
am
Adam
stone,
there's
no
signature,
there's
no
verification.
There's
there's
no
basis
for
trust.
What
so
in
the
ASTM
standard,
they
do
have
a
so
called
authentication
message
format,
but
it
doesn't
really
tell
you
how
to
do
authentication,
which
is
kind
of
cool,
because
that
gives
us
a
foot
in
the
door
right.
G
It
gives
the
ITF
an
opportunity
to
write
some
complimentary
standards
based
upon
the
much
greater
knowledge
of
cryptographic
protocols
here
in
this
SDL,
then
in
that
SDL,
which
is
more
concerned
with
strengthen
materials
to
solve
this
problem.
Secondly,
there's
no
way
to
know
whether
the
operator
is
trusted.
If
the
observer
lacks
Internet
connectivity,
I
got
this
ID
I'm
looking
at
it,
I
go.
Ok,
it's
drone
number
one.
G
Two
three:
four
five:
is
that
a
guy
who's
well
trained
and
is
allowed
to
be
flying
near
the
nuclear
reactor
to
make
sure
that
it's
not
leaking
or
is
that
some
hobbyist
who's
flying
near
the
nuclear
reactor
because
he
thinks
it's
fun,
also,
there's
no
way
to
instantly
communicate
with
the
operator
and
say
I
need
to
get
this
guy
to
exit
this
airspace
volume
or
land
right
now,
I
need
to
communicate
with
him
immediately.
It's
not
built-in.
G
So
anyway,
the
problem
comes
from
the
fact
that
aviators
tend
to
be
familiar
with
radio
comms,
but
not
with
the
middle
layers
of
networking.
So
IETF
could
bring
a
lot
to
bear
here.
We
think
that
hip
can
help.
Dns
can
help
the
whole
registry
process,
probably
with
our
DAP,
rather
than
who
is,
could
help.
We
need
to
strengthen
authentication
but
also
balance
operator
privacy
right.
You
don't
want
the
little
old
lady
next
door
who
hears
the
buzzing
sound
and
doesn't
like
it
to
have
remote
ID
as
a
way
of
identifying
and
harassing
an
operator
who's.
G
Doing
something
is
perfectly
legal
and
legitimate,
but
when
a
public
safety
or
security
person
needs
to
identify
that
operator
and
talk
to
them
and
say
you
got
to
land,
then
there
needs
to
be
a
way
to
present
credentials.
You
know
to
our
dap,
for
instance,
and
then
pull
that
information
that
makes
that
possible.
G
We
think
it
can
be
generalized
to
support
lots
of
other
applications
and
fundamentally,
we
think
that
this
mapping
of
an
unmanned
aircrafts,
physical
location
to
an
unmanned
aircrafts
identity,
is
kind
of
isomorphic
to
an
inverse
problem
of
a
host
logical
location
in
the
internet.
An
IP
address
to
a
host
ID,
which
is
why
we've
done
some
work
with
him.
We
have
actually
prototyped
and
flown
a
hip
based
extension
to
the
open
joint
ID
at
the
New
York
State
UAS
test
site.
G
Anyway,
so
obviously
remote
ID
is
critical
for
unmanned
aerial
system.
Traffic
management-
you
see
it,
you
want
to
know
who
it
is
from
that
you
can
look
up
all
kinds
of
other
stuff
lots
of
different
entities.
Need
it
for
lots
of
different
reasons.
You
know
the
first
question
is:
can
I
ID
this
guy?
If
I
can't
ID
him,
then
unidentified
is
an
important
attribute
that
might
go
into
further
decisions.
G
If
I
can
ID
him
is
heat,
askable
can
I
ask
him
to
go
over
there
and
take
video
for
me
to
a
better
look
of
the
building
on
fire,
or
is
he
just
a
low
concern
because
I
can't
task
him,
but
I
can
at
least
ask
him
to
be
cooperative
from
a
safety
perspective,
or
is
he
an
aircraft
of
high
concern?
I
mean
maybe
he's
the
one
who
set
the
building
on
fire.
G
The
ASTM
standard
uses
various
internet
media
to
do
your
Mon
ID,
typically
B
LTE,
there's
a
network
Ridd
service
provider
that
gathers
data
from
all
the
sources
and
then
there's
a
network
redisplay
provider.
That
is
where
you
point
your
web
browser
to.
If
you
want
to
find
out
who's
flying
in
this
airspace
volume
right
now,
they
can
be
co-located
and
they
can
be
the
same
corporate
entity,
running
them
or
not,
and
a
so-called
UAS
service
of
supplier,
which
is
a
big
part
of
this
new
UTM.
A
UAS
traffic
management
system
is,
it
does
other
jobs.
G
The
idea
that
you're
your
average
volunteer
fireman,
needs
to
be
able
to
go
to
a
scene
and
see
an
aircraft
and
be
able
to
identify
it,
which
means
we're
not
going
to
equip
him
with
a
special
radio
or
whatever
he's
gonna
phone,
which
meant
they
decided
that
we
got
to
be
able
to
do
this
with
Wi-Fi
neighbor
awareness,
networking
and
Bluetooth
five
and,
to
my
chagrin,
also
a
Bluetooth
4,
which
really
constrains
the
physical
range
and
the
packet
size,
so
we're
just
using
the
beacons.
Basically.
G
G
G
Cryptographic
handshakes
are
a
big
problem
because
you
got
little
processors,
not
much
processing
power,
and
you
know
two
aircraft
that
pass
in
the
night
have
got
a
very
brief
radio
contact
window
to
do
these
handshakes
before
they
move
their
actual
traffic
and
then
you've
got
the
whole
aggregating
information.
You
know
if
Amazon
can
watch
Walmart's
delivery,
drones
and
vice
versa,
then
they
can
infer
things
about
their
businesses.
G
So
the
first
mitigation
that
we've
applied
for
command
and
control
is
just
to
take
advantage
of
multiple
wireless
links.
That
brings
a
lot
of
benefits.
All
these
slides
are
available,
so
I'm
not
going
to
waste
a
lot
of
time
on
each
of
them.
Second
mitigation
is
strong
identity
based
security.
Now
a
big
aircraft
has
a
tail
number
on
it.
You
know
you
look
at
it
sitting
there
on
the
runway
and
it
says
you
know
n
one.
G
Two,
three,
four
five
on
the
back
of
the
aircraft
problem
is:
if
the
aircraft
is
this
big
and
it's
a
few
hundred
feet
away,
you
can't
read
that
number
plus
they're
allowed
to
put
it
inside
the
battery
compartment,
so
obviously
an
aircraft's
an
aircraft.
A
low
number
doesn't
change
when
it
hands
off
from
base
station
to
base
station
to
base
station
its
IP
address
does
so.
This
is
one
of
the
things
that
drove
us
to
hip.
G
So
this
is,
you
know
this
is
an
aerial
shot
of
where
we
do
some
of
this
test
work
at
the
New
York
UAS,
test
site
we've
actually
maintained
positive
command
and
control
using
hip.
Where
you
flew
outside
a
Wi-Fi
range
you
just
rolled
over
to
LTE,
you
got
back
within
Wi-Fi
range.
You
rolled
back
over
to
Wi-Fi
remote
pilot,
never
even
knew
the
difference.
Our
approach
to
unmanned
aerial
system,
remote
ID,
is
to
adopt
and
extend
existing
standards
and
there's
a
whole
boatload
of
different
standard
setting
bodies
involved.
G
The
International
Civil
Aviation
Organization,
the
radio
technical
Commission
for
aviation,
the
various
civil
aviation
authorities,
including
here
in
the
United,
well
we're
not
here,
including
where
I
live
in
the
United
States,
the
FAA.
The
FAA
has
said
that
they're
gonna
cite
this
ASTM.
While
it
was
draft
when
I
created
this
slide.
Now
it's
a
standard
as
of
two
weeks
ago,
but
security
in
the
threat
model
are
still
be
not
addressed
in
the
draft.
G
G
Unlike
the
hobbyist
who's
in
the
registry,
that's
used
by
everybody
who
buys
the
drone
at
Walmart.
I
think
this
is
it
for
my
first
I
go.
Here's
the
last
slide
for
them.
For
my
first
part
of
the
deck
over
on
the
Left,
we've
got
the
case
where
there
is
Internet
connectivity,
so
the
observer
sees
the
aircraft
he
receives
his
Bluetooth
broadcast
with
a
remote
ID.
He
does
some
lookups,
he
figures
out
who
this
guy
is.
G
G
The
observer
doesn't
have
internet
connectivity,
but
he
does
have
this
database
of
registries
and
you
can
see
that
this
guy
is
not
in
a
registry
of
trusted
operators,
so
at
a
minimum,
although
he
may
not
be
able
to
communicate
with
the
pilot,
he
at
least
knows
that
this
is
an
aircraft
of
concern
that
he's
gonna
have
to
do
whatever
it
is.
He
does
so.
G
Yeah,
okay,
so
I
guess
I
should
wrap
up
with.
With
with
this
slide,
my
two
keywords
are
UAS
remote
ID
information
must
be
immediately
actionable.
I've
got
to
be
able
to
trust
it.
It's
real,
not
that
it's
being
spoofed,
if
there's
any
way
to
have
communications
with
the
guy
who
can
land
that
aircraft
or
exit
this
airspace
volume
I
want
to
be
able
to
do
that
instantly,
not
by
looking
at
a
screen
calling
a
phone
number.
G
The
guy
doesn't
answer
the
phone
because
he's
flying
a
plane
right
and
we
want
to
know
whether
the
operator
is
trusted,
and
yet
somehow
we've
got
to
maintain
privacy
when
it
hasn't
been
forfeited
by
clueless
careless
or
criminal
action,
and
we
believe
that
there
are
several
protocols
within
ITF
land
that
can
complement
the
SDM
stuff
to
make
this
happen.
Standards
and
IIST
in
ASTM
are
going
to
need
two
minor
tweaks.
There's
a
UAS,
remote
ID
type.
G
It
is
either
type
1
a
manufacturer
serial
number
when
the
thing
came
from
the
factory
or
type
2,
a
number
that
was
assigned
by
the
FAA
or
other
Civil
Aviation
Authority,
and
whatever
jurisdiction
you're
in
static
okay,
enabling
correlation
attacks
or
three
it's
a
UTM
assigned
ID,
which
in
principle
could
be
dynamic,
but
all
of
them
today
are
static.
We
want
them
to
assign
type
4,
probably
a
hierarchical,
host,
identity
tag.
That's
are
going
in
position
now.
G
People
here
in
the
room
know
enough
law
about
enough
lot
of
other
protocols
that
may
bring
something
to
help
solve
this
problem.
All
I've
been
able
to
find
that's
able
to
fit
nice
little
tiny,
Bluetooth
packets
and
provide
the
trust
properties
that
we
need
is
hid,
but
there
may
be
things
less
I
see
if
they
could
help.
G
We
need
to
have
hierarchical,
host
identity
tags
in
hip,
which
Bob
will
talk
about,
and
we
need
to
look
at
what
we
can
do
in
DNS
for
stuff
that
any
member
of
the
public
should
be
able
to
look
up
and
what
we
could
do
in
the
registry
system,
with
our
DAP
for
things
that
only
duly
constituted
authority
can
look
up
when
they
present
their
credentials.
That's
my
time,
thanks.
H
G
There
is
one
chairman
who
remains
to
be
convinced,
but
those
who
actually
produced
the
standard
that
was
just
approved.
They
appreciate
it
when
they
started.
Trying
to
add
trust,
I
mean
they
didn't
they
didn't
take
it
going
in
position
of
all.
You
know,
just
gonna
assert
claims
and
they
are
what
they
are.
They
wanted
to
have
this
thing
trustworthy,
but
they
just
couldn't
figure
out
how
to
make
signatures
short
enough
and
how
to
make
certificates
short
enough.
G
I
You
Barbara
stark
AT&T.
This
sounds
pretty
rational,
but
I'm
curious.
You
didn't
list
CTA,
which
is
another
player
in
this,
and
they
recent
they
a
couple
of
years
ago
now.
I
guess
did
a
thing
on
identifying
the
syntax
of
an
ID,
and
then
they
tried
to
start
getting
into
this
and
it
was
really
horrible.
I
G
Yes,
liaison
is
going
to
be
a
key
piece:
I
don't
have
standing
in
the
vast
majority,
these
organizations
but,
for
instance,
ray
Young
who's
here
he
has
long
been
involved
in
the
aviation
industry
and
so
he's
plugged
into
several
of
those
Bob,
obviously
as
well
plugged
in
here
and
we're
gonna
need
to
recruit
people
who
are
plugged
into
these
other
SD
O's,
so
that
we
can
do
that.
Okay,.
G
So
I
hope
I
didn't
give
the
impression
of
thinking
the
trust
was
binary.
Personally,
I
I
got
a
little
bit
more
nuanced
view
than
that,
but
really
what
we're
looking
for
in
terms
of
trust
is
most
fundamentally
that
there
is
some
evidence
that
the
asserted
ID
of
this
aircraft
or
of
this
aircraft
operator
is
indeed
the
ID
of
that
aircraft
or
its
operator.
Then,
once
you
start
getting
into
what
is
the
information
that's
in
the
registry
and
has
that
information
been
vetted
and
all
kinds
of
other?
G
You
know
second
order
issues
like
that
will
kind
of
cross
that
bridge
when
we
come
to
it,
but
right
now
it's
just
that
the
ASTM
standard
I
can
assert.
I
am
Adams
drone
and
that's
it
we're
done,
and
we
want
to
at
least
have
something
or
when
I
make
that
assertion.
I
can
sign
that
assertion
with
something
where
you
can
verify
that
signature.
That's
like
the
first
step.
F
I'm
and
I
represent
the
New
York
UAS
test
site,
which
is
one
of
seven
test
sites
in
the
United
States
designated
by
the
Federal
Aviation
Administration
to
test
unmanned
aircraft
systems
I'm.
Also,
a
member
of
the
ASTM
f38
group
and
I've
been
working
with
rtca,
which
is
the
radio
technical
commission
for
aeronautics
on
unmanned
aircraft
standards
since
2011
and
the
answer
it's
to
whether
ASTM
is
seeking
help
from
IE
TF
is
yes
the
problem
with
the
current
ASTM
standard,
which
we
call
version
4
remote,
ID
version.
1.0.
F
We
are
under
great
pressure
to
get
out
of
remote
ID
standard
from
the
FAA,
because
the
FAA
will
not
allow
drones
to
fly
over
people
or
over
crowds
or
beyond
the
line
of
sight,
visual
line
of
sight
of
the
pilot
without
a
remote
ID
standard.
So
the
version
1.0
that
we
approved
we
had
to
deal
with
some
objections,
which
was
a
difficult
process,
but
we
finally
got
the
version
1.0
standard
out
just
to
get
something
that
people
could
work
with.
F
We're
committed
to
working
on
version
1.1,
which
hopefully
will
include
host
identity
protocol
and
we're
already
planning
on
version
2.0,
which
will
incorporate
a
higher
standards
of
cybersecurity
when
the
final
roll
is
approved
by
the
FAA.
So
this
is
this
very
logical.
We're
excited
about
the
work
that
this
team
has
done.
We
want
to
see
it
move
forward.
K
We
cannot
change
that,
so
we
have
to
rely
on
existing
identifiers
that
are
on
those,
hopefully
compliant
and
drones.
So
if
that
is
a
case,
then
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
but
I
see
that
the
problem
has
three
issues:
one
is
the
identifier
itself
and
and
being
an
authentic
identifier.
The
second
one
is
getting
that
identifier
to
the
to
the
actual
person
that
is
concerned,
and
the
third
one
is
that
person
authenticating
their
identifiers.
G
Not
convinced
that
the
Mac
will
be
a
panacea
because,
for
instance,
it's
frequently
randomized
for
for
good
reason
and
I
guess
we
can
talk
in
in
in
greater
specifics
later,
I'm
really
hoping
that
people
will
step
forward
with
alternative
solutions.
Besides
the
hip
approach
that
we
have
prototyped,
but
it
seemed
to
me
that
a
hit
was
the
most
suitable
identifier
of
the
various
identifier
options,
of
which
I
was
aware.
L
Hd,
consulting
just
to
longhouses
comment
about
MAC
address
registration.
My
work
with
some
the
processors
which
are
use
these
devices
is
that
they
use
a
local
scope,
MAC
address
for
both
their
Wi-Fi
and
their
Ethernet.
They
do
not
use
a
registered
one.
That
MAC
address
is
derived
from
a
device
number
of
very
inside
the
FIR
of
that
that
particular
chip.
That's
us!
Each
chip
does
get
a
typical
e,
a
different
address,
MAC
address
assigned,
so
you
can.
L
They
can
exist
on
the
same
physical
media,
but
these
are
decent
addresses
that
do
not
go
through
the
I
Triple
E
registration
process
and
I.
Don't
know
what
they're
doing
for
the
Bluetooth
I
can't
speak
to
that.
But
I
can't
speak
to
the
chips
use
of
Wi-Fi
and
they
also
sent
a
house
Ethernet
port
for
configuring
when
they're
on
the
ground.
M
We
had
the
somewhat
unique
distinction
of
being
actually
getting
certification
to
fly
a
UAV
at
night
in
controlled
airspace
under
IFR
conditions,
because
we
had
a
particular
problem,
which
is
that
there
is
a
known
marine
trouble
spot
that
happens
to
be
dead
center
on
christchurch
international
airport's
runway
to
zero
approach
right
about
at
the
middle
market,
and
we
need
to
be
able
to
operate
you
aces
over
that.
So
we
got
quite
a
bit
of
experience
there
talking
to
New
Zealand
CAA
about
these
kinds
of
issues
and
all
of
this
stuff.
M
M
We
actually
got
that
done
by
maintaining
aviation
radio
in
cellphone
contact
with
air
traffic
control
the
whole
time
we
were
doing
it,
which
is
one
option
for
a
search
and
rescue
organization,
but
that
doesn't
work
in
a
situation
where
you
don't
have
radio
comms
that
doesn't
work
in
a
whole
lot
of
whole
lot
of
places,
and
one
of
the
things
about
this
that
occurs
to
me
is
that
there
are
going
to
be
manned
aircraft
running
in
the
existing
air
traffic
control
system.
That
also
need
to
render
this
system
simultaneously,
particularly
search,
particularly
rescue
helicopters.
M
I'm
going
to
try
and
get
in
contact
with
some
people
in
New,
Zealand
and
and
plug
them
into
this
process
as
well,
because
internationally,
that
particular
Civil
Aviation
Authority,
is
very
influential.
The
control
control
zone
is
a
sixth
of
the
planet,
it's
bigger
than
the
FAA
s
and
they
run
I.
Think
for
other
company
other
countries,
civil
aviation
organizations
as
well,
because
they're
just
that
good
at
it
so
alone,
yes
plug
some
people
into
the
process.
Thank.
G
You
Andrew
thank
you
and
and
to
just
speak
to
that
issue
of
the
interface
between
manned
aviation
and
the
ATM
system
and
unmanned
aviation.
The
UTM
system,
the
general
scheme,
is
that
it's,
the
small
unmanned
aircraft
operators
job
to
stay
out
of
the
way
of
the
larger
manned
aircraft.
So
the
larger
manned
aircraft
are
typically
beginning
automatic,
dependent
surveillance
mode,
be
ATS,
be,
and
so
long
as
that
information
gets
plunked
into
the
UTM
system,
then
the
operators
of
these
small
craft
can
stay
out
of
the
way
of
the
big
aircraft.
G
The
big
aircraft
don't
need
to
and
don't
want
to
keep
track
of,
where
all
the
all
the
little
ones
are.
But
that
said,
an
interesting
thing
that
seems
to
be
gathering
steam.
Is
that
because
UTM
well,
because
he
way
us
typically
don't
carry
human
passengers
who
can
die
if
they
crash
they're
being
held
to
a
lower
safety
standard
than
the
manned
aircraft?
That's
both
good
and
bad.
G
The
good
part
is
that
it's
allowing
for
a
lot
more
experimentation,
and
so
the
tech
is
advancing
in
the
unmanned
aircraft
world
much
faster
than
it's
advancing
in
the
manned
aircraft
world
and
eventually
I've
heard
people
say
UTM
is
the
future
of
atm.
Then
we're
gonna
sort
things
out
with
these
small
unmanned
aircraft
and
then
it's
going
to
migrate
its
way
up
into
larger,
manned
aircraft
as
well.
N
Rick
Taylor
Airbus,
so
one
of
the
considerations
that
I
totally
approve
a
potty's
one
of
the
considerations.
When
you
talk
about
moving
technology
onto
aircraft
which
carry
passengers,
as
you
say,
the
reliability
aspects
is
massively
increased,
so
you're
looking
at
real-time
embedded
operating
systems.
Sorry
Mike!
My
voice
is
going
artists,
reliability,
stuff
done
in
firmware
stuff
done
in
triplicate,
with
different
compute
systems.
Lucien
must
be
bulletproof,
so
a
lot
of
internet
star
technologies
don't
go
on
the
flight
deck
you'll
be
pleased
to
know.
N
M
Berger
again,
I'd
like
to
point
out
that
your
major
competitor
is
the
is
also
the
only
organization
that
has
ale
well,
they
and
their
customers
are
the
only
organizations
that
have
a
significant
scale
deployment
of
hip.
Every
Boeing
customer
and
supplier
is
using
a
protocol,
whether
they
know
it
or
not.
G
Okay,
good
moving
on
okay,
so
I
think
I'm
supposed
to
do
a
few
more
slides.
Now
on
the
next
topic
right,
oh.
O
O
This
is
possibly
off-topic
and
I
apologize
for
that.
My
name
is
Mike
with
Mozilla,
and
the
concern
I
have
was
about
the
degree
to
which
this
respects
privacy,
particularly
particularly
because
we've
talked
about
this
technology
scaling
upwards
to
much
bigger
hardware,
but
it's
certainly
envisioned.
I
can
certainly
envision
the
world
where
it
scales
much
downward
towards
communities
towards
pardon
me
commodity,
Hardware
of
any
of
any
type
at
all
right.
O
The
ability
for
the
authorities
to
reliably
identify
a
specific
piece
of
hardware
in
a
specific
location
is
to
the
wrong
kind
of
authorities,
an
extraordinarily
valuable
resource
and
I'd
like
to
hear
more
about
what
you
envision
robust
privacy
concerns
there
to
look
like,
particularly
given
that
the
model
you've
described
involves,
you
know
very
rapidly,
delivering
and
acting
on
very
accurate
information.
So.
G
G
Now
that
assumes
that
there
is
some,
probably
governmental
authority,
that
in
any
given
jurisdiction,
says
this
is
the
information
that
you
must
put
in
the
registry
and
that
we
must
be
able
to
look
up
or
you
don't
get
to
fly
in
our
jurisdiction
and
I'm
afraid
that
that
that
goes
beyond
anything
to
which
I
can
find
a
solution.
If
the
particular
jurisdiction
is
totalitarian.
L
At
least
with
regard
to
unmanned
aircraft
and
privacy
of
information,
be
aware,
students
not
said
this.
The
law
states
that
the
FAA
controls
all
navigable
airspace
in
the
US,
and
so
whether
that's
one
inch
above
the
ground
up
to
the
top
of
the
mesosphere
or
three
feet
above
the
ground
to
the
top
of
the
mesosphere
is
something
we
can
discuss.
You
do
not
own
your
backyard.
You
do
not
own
your
roof.
The
FAA
in
a
sense
does
in
terms
of
your
right
to
privacy
of
to
certain
extent,
to
whom
is.
L
L
The
intent
here
is
that
there
will
be
an
authentication
basis
in
terms
of
who
can
get
what
sort
of
disinformation,
but
this
is
a
safety
concern
of
the
open
air
space,
which
is
a
rather
unique
situation
that
many
people,
even
people
who
operate
in
this
with
their
hobbies
drones,
don't
understand
what
it
is
they're
doing.
We
had
the
case
in
Texas,
where
the
man
shot
down
a
drone
overs
backyard.
L
G
It's
it's
kind
of
like
the
story
about.
You
know
the
right
to
shout
fire
in
a
crowded
theater,
if
I'm
in
a
theater
and
I'm
minding
my
own
business,
watching
the
movie
and
eating
my
popcorn,
the
guy
in
the
seat.
Next
to
me
has
no
business
knowing
who
I
am
or
what
credentials
I
possess
right,
but
the
minute
I
shall
fire
in
that
crowded.
Theater
I
have
forfeited
my
right
to
to
privacy,
so
the
the
the
clueless
careless
and
criminal
operation
of
a
vehicle
in
airspace
forfeits
some
degree
of
privacy.
E
Jonathan
Holden's
carplay
and
just
to
push
back
a
little
bit
on
that
and
we're
talking
about
a
broadcast
medium
that
is
permanently
broadcasting,
so
we're
already,
assuming
that,
even
if
you
may
legally
have
no
rights
privacy
that
nobody
in
any
country
ever
would
ever
want.
Privacy
which
is
sort
of
the
privacy
aspect
should
definitely
be
in
the
protocol
from
the
beginning.
Even
if
you
don't
necessarily
have
a
legal
right
to
privacy,
you
might
still
want
it.
E
G
Correct
and
I'll
go
one
step
further.
What
if
I
observe
your
aircraft
in
a
particular
place
at
a
particular
time
with
my
device
and
I
record
the
beacons
that
you
have
broadcast
and
then
I
subsequently
assert
in
front
of
a
magistrate
that
I
received
those
beacons
at
a
different
place
or
at
a
different
time.
You
may
have
been
flying
in
an
entirely
legitimate
temporal
spatial
volume
and
I
assert
that
you
were
flying
in
an
entirely
different
volume.
We
looked
at
the
need
for
a
a
fair
witness
on
the
observer
device
such
that
be
logged.
N
Thank
you,
Rick
Taylor
again
as
the
very
valid
point
which
is
I
understand
that
this
is
largely
being
funded
out
of
the
US
and
the
US
has
a
single,
fairly
open
legal
system.
But
the
IETF
is
not
a
u.s.
organization
and
the
FAA
will
lead
the
way
on
this
and
whatever
the
IETF
works
on
has
to
be
applicable
in
jurisdictions
outside
of
the
West
in
quotes
into
some
other
places
in
the
world
where
they
will
just
pick
up
and
run
with
this
technology.
G
Granted,
but
to
to
allay
some
concern,
the
FAA
z--
us
from
what
identification
aviation
rule
mating.
Rulemaking
committee,
AR
C
in
their
final
report
of
recommendations
in
the
file
of
2017,
devoted
a
considerable
number
of
pages
to
the
protection
of
personally
identifiable
information,
which
is
not
something
that
you
might
have
expected
from
a
regulatory
agency
stay.
L
H
They
don't
like
hey
I,
want
to
sort
of
reflect
on
this
in
a
second
and
then
we
can
move
on,
but
I'm
delighted
that
in
the
first
40
minutes
of
a
ball
that
talks
about
this
stuff,
we
spent
20
minutes
talking
about
privacy,
because
I've
never
seen
that
before
right.
It's
clearly
important
and
it's
something
that
presumably
working
good
for
actually
spent
time
working
on,
based
on
what
I
hear
people
saying
right
so
that
this
is.
This
is
great.
G
First
briefing
was
really
intended
to
convince
anyone
who
needed
convincing
that
the
problem
of
unmanned
aircraft
system,
remote
identification
is
an
important
problem
and
that
the
IETF
can
help,
and
that
was
the
whole
point
right.
The
point
of
the
second
briefing
is
that
although
I
was
not
one
of
the
original
hip
developers,
I
have
been
a
hip
true
believer
for
many
years.
I
have
several
small
deployments,
and
maybe
it's
because
all
I
have
is
a
hammer.
This
looks
to
me
like
a
nail,
but
maybe
hip
really
is
a
good
match
for
this
application.
E
So
quake
deeds
as
posted
in
the
Java
chat,
saying
I'm,
one
of
the
authors
of
STM
remote
ID
standard
I,
don't
recall
this
talking
about
privacy
being
widely
considered
at
the
meeting.
This
is
not
a
consensus
model
being
discussed
by
ICAO.
Ietf
support
is
support.
Effort
is
early.
There
are
other
options.
Ietf
can
offer
via
OAuth
2.
We
need
both
to
be
fixed
and
it
can
roll
in
hit.
Icao
trusts
frameworks
is
not
considering
this
for
integration
with
large
aircraft,
which
is
needed
for
UTM
to
be
accepted
worldwide.
G
Summary
response,
I
was
late
to
the
party.
Ok,
ICAO
has
been
working
on
this
for
a
while
STM's
been
working
on
this
for
a
while.
I
was
a
woefully
ignorant
of
those
efforts
until
quite
recently,
and
they
have
problems
that
they
didn't
think
could
be
solved
and
I
said:
hey
wait
a
minute
over
here,
an
IETF.
There
are
solutions
that
could
be
applied
and
they're
like.
We
don't
believe
you.
This
is
too
hard.
There.
E
G
I
I
guess
I
have
to
disagree,
because
this
is
moving
so
fast.
The
FAA
is
going
to
issue
the
notice
of
while
making
in
December.
It's
already
been
delayed
repeatedly
for
something
on
the
order
of
a
year,
and
if
we
don't
bring
forward
the
solutions,
including
the
privacy
protections
that
the
IETF
can
offer
now,
we're
gonna
be
stuck
with
something
and
it's
gonna
be
an
ugly
baby.
Andrew.
M
G
You
okay,
so
so,
if
you're
not
familiar
with
hip
RFC
44
23
lays
out
the
architecture.
There
is
a
current
draft
for
RFC
44
23
bits.
The
only
reason
that
draft
is
not
preceded
is
it
refers
to
a
couple
of,
although
drafts
they
have
some
issues,
so
they
have
not
yet
proceeded.
So
it's
just
a
dependency
issue
on
the
overlay.
Routable
cryptographic
hash
identity,
which
is
what
a
host
identity
tag
is,
is
defined
in
73
43
74
alone
is
the
basic
hip
standard.
G
Eight
thousand
two
through
eight
thousand
five
are
various
extensions,
some
of
which,
even
though
they
are
considered,
extensions,
are
pretty
fundamental.
The
general
thing
that
hip
does
for
us
in
remote
ID
is:
it
gives
each
device
a
persistent
identifier
that
remains
the
same
across
IP
address
changes
so
just
like
the
tail
number,
the
aircraft
doesn't
change.
You
know
the
the
hip
host
identity
doesn't
change.
The
big
beauty
of
this
is
it
enables
persistent
TCP
connections.
G
G
It
can
also
be
a
very
dangerous
thing
when
we
go
back
to
the
privacy
issues
I'm
already
using
it
in
the
secure
mobile
architecture
and
derivatives
thereof,
it's
a
natural
match
to
aeronautical
networking,
or
you
associate
the
persistent
identifier
with
the
aircraft
tail
number.
Now
it's
not
really
called
a
tail
number
for
small
UAS.
It's
called
something
else.
Just
like
it's
not
called
a
flight
plan,
it's
called
an
operation
or
whatever
and
then
wealthy
homing
is
really
really
helpful
because
we
can
do
make
before
break
smooth
handoff.
G
You
really
don't
want
a
lapse
in
connectivity
when
you're
doing
remote,
ID
or
command
and
control
or
various
other
things.
So
what
worker
mode
ID
can
leverage
all
of
hips
advantages.
So
it's
not
just
that
we
can
have
a
host
identity
on
the
aircraft.
We
can
have
a
host
identity
on
the
UTM
service
supplier,
the
USS.
We
can
have
a
host
identity
on
the
registry
host
that
you're.
G
Turning
to
too
so,
you
know,
I,
don't
know
how
far
we
want
to
take
this,
and
one
of
the
beauties
of
hip
is
Auto
magical
setup
of
IP
security,
ESB
tunnels
from
the
observer
to
a
pilot.
So
I
can
say
you
know,
I
need
to
talk
to
this
guy
right
now
and
I
want
that
connection
to
be
mutually
authenticated
and
strongly
encrypted
broadcast.
Remote
ID
is
much
more
constrained,
but
we
can
still
have
a
verifiable,
persistent
ID
if
it
is
specifically
a
hierarchical
hit.
G
As
a
start
and
a
radical
idea
that
I
want
to
propose
is
multicast
hip,
because
sometimes
what
I
want
to
do
as
the
public
safety
person
is
contact,
all
the
operators
of
all
the
vehicles
that
are
currently
operating
in
this
airspace
and
say
full-stop,
get
out
or
land
or
whatever,
right
and
and
multicast
would
be
very,
very
handy
for
that.
I
think
this
is
the
last
of
mine,
yeah
yeah,.
A
P
Hey
everyone
so
Adam
Whittaker
I
work
for
ax
Enterprise
I've
been
working
on
this
for
maybe
about
eight
months
now.
Maybe
twelve
months
and
I've
been
focusing
on
authentication
message
formats,
so
I'm
gonna
go
into
a
little
bit
of
detail
technical
detail
here,
just
to
give
you
some
scope
of
what
we're
dealing
with
mm-hmm.
Okay,
so
obviously
stood
up.
The
ASTM
standard
I
passed
the
Bell
on
November
7th
everything's
great,
so
there's
an
authentication
message.
So
there's
a
bunch
of
different
ethic
message
formats
in
the
standard.
P
One
of
them
that
we
were
focusing
on
is
the
authentication
message
format
and
it's
a
paged
format,
so
it
has
up
to
five.
It
has
up
to
five
pages.
This
is
the
things
to
do
was
mentioning
that
we
need
the
number
to
go
from
five
to
ten
and
you
can
see
a
very
general
outline
of
how
this
looks
in
the
packet
format
in
a
Bluetooth
packet.
P
So
you
only
hit
a
hundred
and
nine
bytes
of
payload
for
authentication,
be
it
a
signature,
be
it
a
certificate
whatever,
and
this
align
authentication
data.
Signature
is
exactly
what
the
ASTM
standard
says.
They
don't
specify
anything
beyond
what
you
see
here,
and
this
is
a
very
stripped
out
version
of
it.
So
I'm
going
to
be
a
little
bit
of
background
on
Bluetooth.
So
what
you
see
to
your
right
is
the
Bluetooth
packet
format,
there's
19
bytes
of
header,
there's
25
bytes
for
the
message:
that's
it.
P
We
have
25
bytes
in
a
singular
Bluetooth
message,
whether
it's
Bluetooth,
4
or
Bluetooth
5.
Well,
mostly
Bluetooth
4,
and
this
is
all
we
have,
and
this
is
where
our
constraint
is.
So
that's
where
we're
fighting.
So
we
have
a
couple
different
solutions
that
we've
been
thinking
of
and
been
trying
to
prototype.
The
ax
first
was
a
entik
ation
wrapper.
So
in
the
open
drone
id
message,
the
25
bytes,
we
would
include
the
host
ID,
the
hierarchal
host
identity
tag,
a
timestamp
for
trust,
the
signature
and
the
payload.
P
P
P
The
payload
has
to
have
some
sort
of
dynamic
thing.
If
we
want
to
sign
that's
why
there's
a
timestamp
that
we
have
there,
but
it
could
be
any
message
conveniently
the
payload
is
just
big
enough
to
fit
any
other
message:
format
from
the
ast
M,
because
they're
all
24
to
25
bytes
long,
so
we
could
just
fit
them
in
so
how
we
got
up
with
this
I'm.
Sorry,
if
this
is
a
little
too
small,
but
the
slides
are
available.
P
We
came
up
with
a
trusted
vector
or
trusted
message
format
where
you
put
in
the
payload,
as
you
can
see
here
on
the
far
right,
a
vector
message,
and
now
the
vector
message
is
signed.
You
can
sign
the
vector
message
and
assert
its
trustworthiness.
So,
on
a
the
RIT
application,
you
might
see
vector
dots,
every
second
blink-blink
blink-blink,
but
every
third
one
will
turn
yellow
because
of
this
format,
where
we
resend
a
vector
message,
almost
instantaneously
to
cert
and
sign
yeah.
P
This
is
where
I'm
going,
and
this
is
my
path
so
currently
we
only
have
the
Sun
side
prototyped
we're
working
on
the
on
the
receive
side,
and
that
was
part
of
my
hackathon
thing,
I'm
still
working
on
it,
so
hopefully
I'll
get
something
by
the
end
of
the
week.
Maybe
we'll
see
about
it.
The
other
thing
that
we
came
up
with
was
signed.
Hashed
lists.
This
is
an
invention
of
Stu's.
I
did
not
think
of
this
I'm,
just
implementing
it
and
I'm
trying
to
make
sense
of
it
still.
P
So,
basically,
we
want
to
try
to
provide
provenance
to
the
messages
you're
spitting
out
on
Bluetooth
messages
every
second,
at
least
that's
a
lot
of
messages,
and
you
might
not
trust
all
of
them.
So
what?
If
you
could
hashtag
and
ship
them?
So
these
are
two
variants
on
message:
signing
message,
hashing
and
then
signing
a
list
of
those
hasit
hashes
to
help
out
there.
You
might
notice
that
there
I,
noted
I,
say
pseudo
blockchain
blockchain
is
a
nice
word
that
we
use
a
lot
and
kind
of
annoys
me.
P
But
if
you
can
link
these
authentication
message,
the
signed
hashed
list,
authentication
messages
together
and
you
trailed
ad
Rome.
Somehow
you
could
in
theory,
reput
back
together
the
entire
flight
path,
but
the
question
that
I
have
and
I'm
still
working
on
is:
is
this
really
worth
it?
Based
on
the
number
of
hashes?
We
have,
as
you
can
probably
see
here,
there's
only
seven
message:
hashes
in
the
left,
one
and
there's
only
five
message:
hashes
in
the
right
one.
If
this
is
only
being
sent
out
once
every
three
seconds,
is
it
worth
it?
I
don't
know.
P
P
This
is
your
offline,
where,
if
you
get
the
idea
of
a
drone-
and
you
don't
have
it
at
connectivity,
you
can
still
at
least
trust
it,
because
you
have
the
registry,
the
auth,
in
this
case
side,
where
you
can
look
at
the
registries
hit
and
you
can
look
at
its
signature
and
be
like
yeah
I
trust
him,
because
he's
in
a
registry
that
I
trust
I'm
in
the
DHS
registry
that
drones
in
the
DHS
registry
well
he's
flying
over
an
Air,
Force,
Base
I,
guess
this
kind
of
makes
sense.
So
this
is
this.
P
However,
this
does
not
fit
the
authentication
message.
Format
is
only
five
pages
long,
so
the
max
is
a
hundred
and
nine
bytes.
You
need
a
minimum
of
200
bytes
to
get
this
to
fit.
If
someone
has
some
other
way
to
do
this
thing
in
109,
bytes
I'm
curious,
but
that's
one
of
the
pushes
we're
going
for
ASTM
is
to
go
from
five
pages
to
ten
pages,
to
make
this
thing
possible
and
not
fragment
it
as
badly
as
we
want
so
future
work.
We
need
to
talk
to
the
STM
on
five
to
ten
pages.
P
This
entire
formatting
stuff
that
I
just
went
over
might
get
pulled
into
the
ASTM
instead,
but
that
won't
happen
tomorrow.
It
won't
happen
next
month.
It'll
happen
a
year
from
now
in
version
two
most
likely
so
I'd
love
feedback,
I'd,
love
comments,
and
you
know
hey.
Maybe
this
kind
of
format
would
look
better
to
have
a
list
of
things
that
we
could
bring
to
the
ASTM
to
be
like.
Look,
this
might
be
useful,
might
be
worth
it.
P
K
Thank
you.
Good
luck.
Soon.
You
go
again
thanks
a
lot
for
information
and
just
I'm
just
curious.
Try
to
figure
out
how,
in
your
mind,
this
should
work
you,
because
we
keep
talking
about
backwards.
Compatibility
in
the
Bluetooth
I.
Think
so.
Bluetooth
has
this
advertising
services
right,
so
they
have
to
say
I'm
a
thermometer,
I'm
audio
device.
So
I
guess
you
are
relying
on
some
existing
service
of
Bluetooth
that
potentially
will
be
broadcast
by
hundreds
of
devices
in
the
exact
same
area,
and
you
have
to
figure
out
which
one
of
these
hundred
beacons
is.
P
There's
a
lot
of
layers
to
this.
It's
quite
complicated.
Let's
be
honest.
Yes,
so
I
really
don't
know
how
to
phrase
this
properly.
The
Bluetooth
format
is
dumb.
Let's
be
honest,
I
mean
you
can
see
it
here.
I
only
get
25
bytes,
that's
and
that's
where
we
fit
and
the
ASTM
standard
breaks
this
further
down.
Actually
let
me
jump
to
I
will
come
back
to
that
I'll
jump
to
this
slide,
because
this
is
one
of
my
beautiful
backup,
slides.
P
You
can
kind
of
see
where
the
ASTM
there's
a
header
in
the
ASTM
so
that
you
can
find
out
what
message
they
have,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day,
we're
just
using
their
beaconing
Bluetooth
beacon
frames.
That's.
Q
P
Okay,
so
do
I
have
that
slide
here.
I
do
not
have
it
here
so
in
the
Bluetooth.
At
the
very
end
of
the
Bluetooth
frame
of
the
Bluetooth
headers,
there
is
a
application
code
and
the
ASTM
has
gotten
approved
an
application
code.
It's
0d,
that's
that's
their
application
code
so
ended.
So
that
will
be
that's
been,
was
comfortable
to
bluetooth.
For
yes,
it
should
be
yes,
I
I,
don't
know
the
exact
answer.
I'd
have
to
look
at
it
and
then
get
back
to
you.
So.
K
L
The
interesting
Matt
Moskowitz
the
interesting
part
about
this.
Of
course,
these
are
bluetooth,
broadcast
messages
and
I
would
suspect
that
most
phones
are
not
listening
to
these,
except
when
they're
in
discovery
mode.
So
you
have
to.
Basically,
you
have
to
have
your
phone
go
into
discovery
mode
on
Bluetooth
to
be
looking
at
these
messages,
whether
that
then
interrupts
the
use
of
your
your
your
bluetooth
headphone
at
that
time
be
able
to
do
that.
L
I
depend
Zahn
again
how
the
radio
code
is
designed
on
that
they
go
then
into
look
at
just
the
broadcast
messages
and
then
do
I
even
know
what
the
zero
have
code
to
recognize.
Oh,
this
is
zero
D
type.
Oh
I
need
to
pass
this
up
to
the
application
that
deals
with
that.
That's
the
the
the
open
drone
ID
code
to
be
able
to
process
these
messages.
L
So
there's
a
lot
of
yes
underlying
hidden
things
here
when
you,
when
you
get
and
and
who
will
be
actually
doing
a
Bluetooth
beacon
e
other
than
troublemakers
who
want
to
confuse
to
know
what's
what's
available
in
this
case
and
why
fine
and
then
produces
yet
another
interesting
set
of
concerns
as
as
a
different
media.
That's
being
used
this,
but
if
you
get
down
for
those
of
you
who
live
down,
these
lower
levels
have
experiences
low
levels.
It
is
in
a
node
and
Juan
Carlos
because
he
deals
with
us.
L
He
he
knows
a
lot
of
authors
as
well.
It's
a
mess
down
there,
but
once
that
Packer
now
gets
passed
up,
it's
a
it's
a
bluetooth
broadcast
it's
a
zero
D
type.
It
gets
passed
if
it's
a
application,
it's
saying,
gonna
be
making
whatever
decision
is
going
to
be
making,
and
then
we
have
the
sub
messages,
our
single
broadcast,
the
the
the
general
ID,
the
vector
information,
but
then
see
off
messages
which
is
a
change.
These
messages,
together,
which
thing
comes
to
question.
What?
L
S
Just
woman,
what
do
you
do
when
you
have
five
hundred
out
of
five?
So
I
can
tell
you
what
my
students
were
to
when
they
read
this
document.
They
will
write
a
thing
that
waits
for
the
first
page
and
then
supplies
alternate
values
for
the
other
pages,
so
the
receiver
would
have
a
lot
of
fun.
Recombining
these
all
and
finding
out
which
of
the
ones
is
actually
the
renal.
So.
P
I'll
make
an
interesting
comment
on
that
to
extend
to
it
so
shout
out
to
James
ax.
If
he's
listening,
I
don't
see
him
on
the
make
echo,
but
when
we
were
developing
a
ridah
plication
our
demo
prototype,
we
decided
to
try
to
make
the
phone
a
surrogate
to
a
UAS,
because
that
was
what
we
were
doing
initially
turns
out.
Android
phones
changed
the
MAC
address
randomly
when
you
send
messages.
P
The
ASTM
standard
expects
that
the
MAC
address
stays
static
because
that's
how
they
correlate.
You
know
what
droning
came
from
I
I
won't
go
any
further
than
that,
because
we'll
get
into
technical
implementation
details.
But
I
just
want
to
point
that
out,
because
that
is
I
think
a
similar
vein
and
Ruger.
M
I
just
like
to
point
out
that
there
are
some
existing
commonly
used
gadgets
that
use
these
features
of
Bluetooth
from
apps
on
both
major
phone
Oasis.
So
somehow
it
can
be
done.
I
don't
happen
to
know
how.
But
if
you
look
into
the
remote
control,
remote
control
protocols
for
hearing
aids
you'll
find
that
they
don't
unbind
as
audio
devices
while
they're
in
remote
control
mode
and
the
phone
did
go
into
discovery
mode
to
get
this
so
yeah.
Somehow
it
works.
P
G
G
G
6500
41
in
ASTM,
Gabriel
Cox
from
Intel,
has
said
that
the
two
thing
changes
that
we've
asked
for
are
no
brainers
and
he
expects
them
to
be
in
version
1.1
if
there
is
a
version,
1.1
and
definitely
in
version
2.0,
so
simply
getting
them
to
accept
the
hierarchical
hit
as
a
UAS
ID
type,
not
a
problem
and
getting
them
to
extend
from
five
page
to
10
page
for
authentication
data.
No
problem
now
somebody
could
stand
up
and
object
when
it
actually
comes
before
the
committee,
but
but
that's
the
opinion
of
the
Chairman.
At
this
point.
P
E
E
A
A
P
P
That's
not
what
we
really
did,
though
I
did
quite
a
bit
of
work.
So
open
hip
is
an
implementation
of
hip,
obviously
I
fixed
it
well
partially
fixed
it.
It
didn't
really
work
that
well
in
a
bun
1804,
there
were
some
dependency
issues
and
whatnot.
So
I
made
the
builds,
go
from
1604
and
did
some
manual
work
and
fix
the
make
files.
P
P
The
source
code
is
was
floating
around
the
TM
read
list
at
one
point:
I,
don't
know
where
it
is
now
other
than
in
my
possession
and
I
was
using
EDD
sa
255
one
nine
key
pairs
for
signing
and
verifying
I
attempted
to
update
to
see
shake
instead
of
sha-1.
That's
a
pain,
see
shake
hurts
my
brain
so
because
there's
no
Python
implementation,
so
I
need
to
kind
of
review
some
stuff
and
do
that
then.
Finally,
the
UAS
demo
application.
P
He
helped
me
remotely
a
couple
of
times
where
it
was
midnight
in
New,
York
and
I,
emailed
him
or
I
like
just
texted
him,
and
he
answered
me
at
midnight
one
o'clock
in
the
morning,
even
though
it
was
ten
o'clock
here,
and
he
helped
me
out
and
debug
some
problems
for
me
and
got
me
unstuck
a
couple
of
times
so
huge
shout-out
to
him.
So
overall,
it
was
super.
Productive,
I
learned
a
lot
of
things
mainly
that
ACLS
really
suck.
P
If
you
don't
know
they
exist
or
you
forget,
they
exist
and
DHCP
is
not
your
friend
when
you're
using
ACLs
and
C
Shake
is
a
pain,
so
I
need
to
figure
that
all
out-
and
these
are
some
next
steps-
help
is
always
appreciated,
whether
it's
just
supporting
me
through
a
mailing
list
or
email.
If
you
can
help
me
out,
that'd
be
great
or
any
any
of
us
out
and
really
more
implementations
are
needed
for
interoperability
testing.
E
I've
not
tested
it
I,
don't
I
haven't
even
downloaded
it,
but
Google
says
there
is
one
download
it
this
machine
and
something
from
relaying
from
great
deeds.
Keep
in
mind
that
remote
ID
is
also
about
avoiding
collision
with
aviators,
thus,
why
we
all
need
the
need
to
have
the
big
areas
work
it
out.
We
also
need
Apple
to
allow
the
speaking
reception,
which
is
not
part
of
the
I
Triple
E
Wi-Fi
standard.
Yet
Google
phones
do
support
it.
Now.
G
It's
to
card
here
so
I
personally
agree
that
UAS
remote
ID
is
a
foundational
technology
for
detect
and
avoid
vehicle
to
vehicle
and
vehicle
to
infrastructure,
communications,
etc,
etc,
etc.
However,
the
official
party
line
at
ASTM
is
that
UAS
rid
is
UAS
rid
period
done
that
it
is
not
a
component
or
subsystem
for
detect
and
avoid
or
anything
else
now
there
is
a
reason
for
them
to
say
that
detect
and
avoid
is
a
safety,
critical
application
and
UAS
remote
ID
is
being
treated
as
a
security,
critical
application
and
within
ASTM
and
I.
G
Think
within
the
FTAA
rate
can
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong
safety
critical
is
regarded
as
a
higher
bar
than
security
critical,
and
so,
if
you,
a
s,
rid,
is
good
enough
to
address
security
concerns.
It
may
or
may
not
be
good
enough
to
address
safety,
contradict
all
safety,
critical
concerns
of
detect
and
avoid
for
collision
avoidance.
So
I
just
wanted
to
make
sure
that
that
was
out
there
that
you
know
I
may
I
may
agree
with
it
with
the
commenter
on
jammer
right,
but
but
ASTM
officially
doesn't.
E
E
P
Yeah
there's
a
bit
of
fragmentation
in
the
Bluetooth.
It's
surprising,
my
pixel
four
supports
everything
for
Bluetooth
five,
which
is
quite
surprising,
including
the
long
range,
a
lot
of
phones
that
say,
Bluetooth
five,
don't
actually
support
the
long
range,
so
there's
that
hurdle,
but
that's
a
technical
hurdle.
That's
beyond
the
IETF
I'll
just
make
a
shameless
plug
I'm
here
all
week,
find
me
talk
to
me:
I'd
love
to
sit
down,
show
you
my
draft
talk
about
the
message
formats
and
everything
so
feel
free
to
do
so.
A
L
I'm
Bob
love,
you
know
me
I
can
assert
that
I'm
Bob,
though
my
sister
calls
me
Robert,
is
my
classic.
In
terms
of
talk
about
identity.
He's
11
years
old
I
got
my
first
phone
call
from
a
classmate
back
in
61,
getting
a
phone
call
or
something.
My
classmate
called
my
younger
sister,
who
was
seven
picked
up
the
phone.
My
classmate
said:
hello
is
Bob
there
to
my
younger
sisters,
responses,
bye,
Bob,
there's
no
Bob
here,
and
she
hung
up
the
phone.
B
L
Didn't
get
high,
I
didn't
come
up
my
bill.
Sorry
I
lost
him
somewhere
along
the
way.
Now
they
use
him
to
get
here.
Okay,
okay,
there
we
go
okay,
so
my
hierarchal
hits
what
are
them
here?
The
idea
here
is
an
implicit
domain
of
use.
I'm,
assuming
there
is
knowledge
of
what
a
host
identity
tag
is
but
really
quickly.
L
Host
identity
tag
is
a
hash
of
a
public
key
into
96
bits
within
4
bits
to
add
in
terms
of
what
is
the
public
key
algorithm
and
then
28
bits
in
front
of
it,
which
is
available,
IP,
v6
prefix.
In
other
words,
the
hitch,
is
a
valid
ipv6
address.
It's
just
not
routable
on
hierarchal
hits
is
what
I'm
adding
here
is
an
implicit
domain
of
use
into
it
and
again
the
details,
how
that
is
done
on
the
hierarchy.
Information
forms.
L
What
the
hit
is
for
the
higher
go
here
associated
with
hacking
prevents,
could
have
been
duplicate
prevention,
defense
against
hit
hashing
attacks
because
of
how
to
be
registered
and,
and
importantly,
scalable
lookups
on
the
original
hit
work
on
distributed
hash
tables
and
how
we
could
support
large
communities
of
lookups.
But
even
though
we
had
a
stupid
hash
tables,
here
came
the
question
about
distributed
registration
of
them
and
who
registers
and
control
said
it
was
problem.
L
Everything
there
is
an
RFC
out
on
distributing
hash
tables
for
four
hits
I'm
trying
to
be
better
than
that,
but
why
hire
go?
Hits
now
that
wasn't
in
the
original
design?
Back
in
2002
it
was
pulled
out
of
2003,
because
at
that
time
there
was
no
use
case
for
it.
Now
there
is
a
use
case
for
it
on
the
UAS
could
use
national
domains,
for
instance,
FAA
or
other
a
CAS
providing
the
registry
of
authority
on
services.
These
are
minimal
to
registering
an
and
signing
the
hierarchical
hit.
L
The
HTA's
of
forget
domain
Authority
on
to
this,
the
regional
you
TMS
would
then
actually
provide
the
domain
authority
services
accepted
there.
There
are
unmanned
management
systems.
You
a
flying
from
Canada
us
with
quickly
identified
as
such,
potentially
because
oh
this
hit,
my
Rohit
was
registered
to
the
Canadian
Systems
flying
in
in
the
u.s.
that
may
be
perfectly
okay
or
not
okay,
depending
on
the
situation
or
just
movement
just
launched
in
the
u.s..
That's
a
separate
issue,
but
the
point
is
that
you
can
identify
the
domain
in
which
it
was
registered.
L
Each
on
CA
can
apply
its
own
policy,
honest!
Is
you
TMS
and
any
other
of
markets?
Hca
providers,
so
you
can
have
different
policies
in
terms
of
what
needs
to
be
registered,
who
has
authority
to
get
what
private
this
P
I
information,
whatever
they
are
on?
But
by
doing
this,
there's
not
just
in
the
distributed
hash
table
table
the
flat
one.
There
could
not
be
separate
policies.
L
L
L
There
is
math
behind
this.
The
draft
gives
the
math
and
if
you
want
I,
can
even
supply
you
with
a
a
Excel
spreadsheet,
which
actually
makes
it
very
easy
to
plug
in,
but
it
the
it
shows
is
that
if,
if
a
domain
has
66
million
registered
addresses
the
next
one
coming
in
has
a
100
percent
chance
of
a
collision.
L
We
actually
generate
a
million
armed
hierarchical
hits
on
a
test
and
there
were
no
collisions
in
that
1
million
we
generated
we
stopped
after
million.
Actually
I
only
asked
Adam
to
do.
A
million
I
thought
that
a
reasonable
request,
collision
prevention
through
the
hierarchal
hit
registration,
which
I'll
be
getting
to
in
a
bit
and
I,
said
in
the
draft
appendix
a
gives
the
collision
for
me.
So
you
can
work
it
out
for
yourself,
I
said:
66,
663
million
is
where
you
get
to
1%
collision
risk,
so
it
seemed
reasonable.
L
The
64
bits
for
the
hash
and
32
bits
for
the
hierarchy.
So
what
do
I
do
with
these
32
bits
per
hierarchy?
What
I
decided
to
break
it
up
into
two
levels
for
the
registered
assign
register
assigning
Authority
give
them
it's
14
bits
that
means
that
that
that
solar
system
wide
there
can
be
16384,
Ras
I
felt
that's
a
reasonable
number
of
such
entities
with
each
entity
can
then
have
in
the
18
bits
for
the
higher
cohere
domain
Authority.
Each
one
can
then
just
register
to
262,000
144hz
ace
for
each
RA
again.
L
So
that's
the
decision.
I
came
up
with
I'm
open
to
other
ways
to
play
around
those
32
bits,
but
this
as
as
I
explained
to
arms,
to
a
stake
in
the
ground
and
a
stake
in
the
ground
is
a
very,
very
strong
statement.
And
if
you
want
to
apply
now,
I'll
explain
to
you
what
a
stake
in
the
ground
really
means,
or
at
least
what
it
meant
originally.
So
but
how
are
these
top
level
members
numbers
assigned?
L
How
to
distinguish
a
flat
space
from
the
hakko
hits.
This
becomes
a
problem
we're
having
if
it
within
the
current
flat
space
heart
will
go
hit.
How
can
we
tell
which
way
to
powers
it
on
there?
We
have
two
choices.
We
can
either
have
specific
suite,
IDs
or
hierarchical
hits
in
those
four
bits,
or
we
can
have
a
different
prefix
different,
slash
28,
so
I
recommend
different
prefixes,
because
there
are
only
a
limited
number
of
Suites
and
four
bits.
L
We
could
potentially
use
the
hit
v1
prefix,
except
we
know
there
are
deployments
of
those
and
we're
probably
not
gonna
go
away,
and
maybe
they
won't
have
collisions
so
that
that
is
a
question.
That'll
be
again
be
answered
by
the
people
who
own
the
prefix
space
so
but
looks
like
that.
Hopefully,
they'll
be
only
two
prefixes
either
one
for
flat
and
one
for
hierarchy.
Thus
we
need
to
get
that
our
key
right
to
do
it
right,
the
first
time,
good
foot.
L
L
Is
was
designed
for
96
big
cache
of
the
high
there's?
No
flexibility
in
that
no
support
for
hierarchical
bits.
So
this
is
a
change
to
how
orchids
are
constructed
right
there
and,
additionally,
though,
it
cannot
take
advantage
of
the
new
variable
output
hashes
on
both
shake
and
seat
shake
put
out
exactly
how
many
bits
you
want
our
tradition
in
hashes,
with
using
sha-1
shot
to
show
all
to
be
six
whatever.
Yes,
we
say
we
got
so
many
bits
out.
I,
don't
need
some
bits
hash
it
well.
How
do
we
ask
or
discussion
on
trunk
area?
L
How
do
we
truncate
a
hash
with
shake
you?
The?
It
is
a
variable
output.
It
is
look
at
learn
about
if
you're
all
involving
hashes
look
at
sponge
functions.
They
are
it's
an
amazing
invention
in
the
world
of
hashing
and
we
get
up
as
many
bits
as
you
want.
So
this
is
a
change
to
order
construction
with
this.
So
how
should
these
changes
to
Orkut
be
addressed?
L
Some
are
here
some
learn
new
crypto
draft,
which
I
keep
those
are
or
am
I
going
to
create
a
separate
draft
which
is
a
an
addendum
to
Orkut.
That's
again
organizational
that's
for
the
working
group
to
decide,
but
to
note
that
right
now,
I've
been
discussing,
this
I
am
changing
Orca
construction
for
this
work,
the
Python
script
soon
to
be
available
to
create
Jaco
hips
for
testing.
We
already
have
kind
of
one
of
the
things
we
don't
have.
P
P
L
E
Maybe
it's
maybe
I'm
just
not
paying
enough
attention,
but
is
there
no
worry
about
finding
collisions
or
is
it
like?
Do
you
assume
that
the
hashes
are
generated
truthfully
like
like?
Could
I
not
try
come
up
with
I
find
a
drone?
Can
I
not
try
and
clone
it?
You
know
like
trying
663
million
hashes,
that's
what
two
three
minutes
computer
time.
L
Yes,
these
are
concerns.
That's
the
next
presentation
on
the
registry.
The
registry
will
have
the
hierarchal
hit
and
the
high,
so
it
is
a
first
come
first
serve
baby
space,
jumping
it
when
it
set
asides
and
then
yes,
when
you're
talking
about
e2
519,
there
are
our
issues
in
terms
of
that
you
can
have.
Was
it
multiple
public
values
for
private
I?
Forget
there's
this
much,
though,
which
I'm
covering
in
in
the
security
considerations
on
that,
but
the.
M
M
It
off
and
make
that
yeah
another
graph
of
F
for
anything
else
that
speeds
up
the
process
to
Jonathan's
point
sure
you
can
Chloe
you
can
find
you
can
find
something
that
matches
that
that
hit,
but
you're
going
to
have
to
have
a
to
run
the
protocol
you're
going
to
have
to
have
a
valid
matching
private
key
and
yes,
but
what
you
can't
do
is
get.
This
is
get
the
registry
to
sign
it
because
they'll
just
refuse,
because
it's
a
collision.
M
I
had
one
of
the
principles
of
hip
is
that
the
is
that
the
tag
is
just
a
tag
you
could
use.
You
can
actually
make
the
protocol
work
using
a
random
tags
that
are
not
cryptographically
bound
to
the
to
the
public
key,
but
that
makes
various
things
less
efficient.
So
the
actual
there,
the
hashing,
is
an
optimization
here.
I.
L
L
Okay,
so
this
is
service
provided
by
the
Hakka
Mohit
domain,
Authority,
HDA
and
also
da
race
for
the
HDA
itself.
All
hierarchal
hits
for
domain
must
be
registered,
prevents
duplicate
hits
and
the
high
is
associated
with
the
higher
go
here
it
which
does
and
allows
us
to
deal
with
various
attacks
against
them.
Hashing
attacks
Colette's
other
information
based
on
the
HCA's
policy
for
other
lookup,
based
on
who
has
authorization
for
that.
The
registries
provide
retrieval
based
on
the
heart,
go
hit
and
authorization
initially
we're
looking
at
is
using
our
C
805
DNS,
hip
resource
record.
L
We.
This
is
what
we're.
Actually
you
were
testing
with
Stu
provided
the
tablet.
Atoms
are
brought
for
body
the
Android
phone
I
supplied
the
the
server
that
Ash
was
running,
a
version
of
buying
where
we're
actually
hit
were
fighting
domains
and
the
lookups
for
this
to
show
that
we're
actually
we're
retrieving
the
the
hip
resource
record
using
the
hits
and
getting
the
high
as
a
result,
and
but
other
information
register
information
based
on
authorization
and
we're
talking
about
what
protocols
that'll
be
because
DNS
has
no
authorization.
So
we
have
to.
L
That
is
something
else
in
DNS
expansion
to
this.
The
this
draft
is
expansion
to
800
3,
the
registration
extension.
The
registration
of
hierarchal
hits
is
always
authenticated.
No
your
clients,
no
support
for
opportunistic
registration.
It
will
be.
You
have
to
be
able
to
prove
who
you
are
to
be
able
to
register,
because
what
you
have
to
have
something
either
using
an
x.509
certain
in
an
egg
problem
or
a
pub
or
a
pre-shared
key
again.
Where
did
this
device
gets
pre
shared
key
that
can
be
done
through
some
sideband
furnaces.
L
The
device
first
tries
to
register
because
it
has
nothing.
It
fails,
but
in
their
registration
says
no
semi
PSK
over
to
here,
and
it's
very
common.
What
we
see
today
in
various
web
base
SMS
a
sending
of
an
authorization
code
method
can
be
used.
This
needs
a
lot
of
work.
Still
I
won't
say
they
have
that
done
again
getting
in
to
hit
some
of
the
other
things
that
can
happen
is
that
the
I
to
message
in
the
registration
can't
contain
a
CSR.
L
L
In
terms
what
information
Oh
give
me,
the
operators
name
the
operators
phone
number,
whatever
other
information
that
they
may
want
for
it,
and
and
whatever
format
this
this
client
info
blob
will
be
and
making
no
attempt
yet
to
find
that
the
now
the
operation,
how
this
works
you,
starting
from
the
top,
they
are
a-
must
have
a
heart
who
hit
with
an
HD
a
value
of
zero.
The
HGS
must
also
have
narco
here
and
they
register
with
the
Raa.
There
says:
I
am
now
a
valid
HD.
A
Raa
and
the
RF
provides
lookup
service.
L
Convert
confirm
that,
yes,
this
HTA
really
did
register
with
me
on
the
the
are
a
may
provide
a
PKI
going
back
to
those
certificates,
for
though
they
example
RC
802,
four
hits
inserts
the
the
harken
insert
can
be
used
to
sign
these
client
registrations
and
so
forth,
so
he
can
have
a
parallel
operation.
The
raw
certificates
are
all
here
for
the
efficiencies
in
the
packets,
but
for
those
things
that
that
would
love
and
just
and
say,
I
got
to
have
x.509
source.
L
We
can
do
that
or
there's
also
work
in
chose
it
in
for
a
concise
object,
ID,
and
that
may
be
yet
another
alternative
for
that
work.
So
the
eyes
may
provide
other
signed
objects
for
FDA
validity.
This
gets
back
into
what
Adam
was
talking
about
as
an
example
of
them.
The
the
HD
a
can
then
use
this
and
client
hit
registration.
So
again,
this
is
then.
This
is
proof
of
registration
message.
This
200
bytes
thing
that
I
created
that
the
cloak
and
then
the
the
drunk
and
then
provide
this.
The
observing
say
yes,
all
this.
L
L
L
Which
is
saw
three
shakes
each
shake
and
kmac
these
change,
everything
in
how
we
do
things
in
hip
and
and
they're
really
I'm,
really
fascinated
by
them,
what
they
change
and,
finally,
a
new
aad
I'm
using
k
ik
as
a
placeholder
as
mist,
is
still
having
the
lightweight
competition
I,
really
like
k
AK
for
a
lot
of
reasons,
but
I'm
not
a
crack.
I
will
not
at
all
be
involved
in
the
decision-making
process.
I'm,
just
plumber
that
uses
this
stuff,
but
the
beauty
about
k
AK
over
the
other
Gris.
L
L
Edd
sa
is
a
fine
IRC
8230
to
only
using
the
the
255
19
and
the
448,
not
using
the
pre
hash
forms.
I
we
don't
like
the
fact
that
you
saw
512
and
I've
been
given
how
to
comment
on
what
is
it
165
anyway?
There's
there's
a
standard,
and
this
is
coming
out
which
give
me
a
place
to
comment
about
this,
because
this
may
be
the
only
place
the
device
may
be
needing
to
use
the
old
Shaw
forms
because
handling
the
the
2
for
519.
L
That's
that's
a
side
issue
and
outside
of
its
use.
If
key
here
is
small
key
size,
only
32
bytes,
44
519
and
57
by
4,
4
4
8
y
57
at
84,
it's
not
called
gory
locks
for
nothing.
If
you
all
followed
it
wasn't-it
of
discussions,
the
rest
of
it,
why
was
a
car
going
locks
just
just
enough?
Crypto
signatures
are
twice
this
size,
so
the
public
key
is
32
bytes.
L
The
signature
is
64
bytes
and
that's
we're
working
with
there's
nothing
else
out
there
of
this
size,
which
is
reliably
secure
and
usable
purity
for
519
and
careful
for
8
natural
compression
representation.
This
applies
to
EDD
si
as
well.
No
patent
issues
as
within
this
p2
by
6,
which
has
the
complete
compressed
format.
Patent
from
Sirte
Cobb,
is
already
specified
here,
Dex,
but
that
static,
there's
hi.
This
is
not
adding
it
as
a
ephemeral,
diffie-hellman.
L
L
L
No
more
truncating
hashes
no
more
debating
about
how
to
truncate
the
ashes.
This
is
important
packet,
as
I
said,
for
orchids
and
and
instead
of
know,
which
select
and
even
see
orchid
take
some
middle
bits.
Other
people's
take
the
front
bits
something
fat
bits.
That's
a
longer
issue,
shake
128
for
the
our
hash
in
in
in
here.
L
Mac
needs
to
HK
DF,
it
does
to
HVAC
operations
for
h,
k,
DF
and
that's
the
stu
each
to
sha
operations.
So
one
sponge
operation
equals
four
hash
operations
and
what
we
traditionally
do
jury's
still
on
this
construction.
Only
couple
cryptographers
have
commented,
but
I
seem
to
have
a
right
but
a
warrants
more
review.
L
The
lightweight
aad
cipher:
this
is
a
active
competition
going
on
in
this
no
winner,
yet
but
k.
Ik
is
cat
check,
base
and
the
same
code
base
and
if
he
PR
g
implementation,
it's
a
good
for
starting
point.
I
also
be
working
on
a
draft
we're
using
it
in
ESP
for
additional
cipher
for
ESP,
and
I
am
using
it
in
in
hip
cipher
and
find
the
the
p
RF
no
pudding
today
and
so
appendix
185.
L
Appendix
speed
sells
how
you
can
use
shake
as
your
PRF
of
construction.
If
you
need
that
any
implementation,
so
I
kind
of
ran
through
it.
It
is
all
new
crypto
coming
in
on,
but
well
establish
crypto,
and
it
does
him
input,
and
it's
kind
of
like
I,
find
interesting
that
nowhere
else
not
yet
them
I've
seen
discussion
about
the
cat
check,
hashes,
so
Eric.
H
L
L
Some
EDD
s,
a
smaller
signature,
small
signature,
smaller
public
keys,
the
hashing,
faster
hashing,
light
away
code
and
and
in
the
case
of
the
of
the
the
macking
and
and
the
key
generation,
fewer
operations
less
load
on
the
small
devices.
Actually,
these
we
call
small
devices,
remember
they're,
throwing
a
tremendous
amount
of
power
for
that
for
their
navigation
tremendous
amount
of
power
for
their
cameras.
These
are
typically
quite
capable
devices
further
says
it.
We
don't
want
to
erase
any
of
capability
on
crypto
Kryptos
too
expensive.
L
M
E
L
L
E
Network
time
NTP,
but
okay,
it's
fine,
could
you
I,
know
put
on
the
mailing
list
or
something
a
list
of
all
the
papers.
You've
been
pointed
to
just
hope.
L
Try
to
dig
it
all
together,
I've
been
I've,
been
talking
with
Johan
diamond
in
in
Belgium
she's,
been
speaking
to
him
directly
and
some
of
the
others
I'm.
Also
in
the
past,
in
CFR
G
we've
had
I
forget
the
name
whose
attended
a
couple
of
sessions,
one
of
the
the
other
members
with
the
the
the
monkey
hash
they've,
been
making
their
punky
twelve
hash.
L
A
You
thank
you,
okay,
so
thanks
that
this
has
been
all
the
presentations
and
you
know
we
had
good
discussions,
which
is
good
so
now
we're
gonna
move
today.
Thank
you,
Bob,
the
last
part
of
the
meeting,
which
is
that
you
know
Bob
put
together
actually
a
charter
proposal,
which
I
mean
the
idea
is
not
to
to
do
our
committee
edit
in
or
something
like
that,
obviously
so
go
to
their
materials
page,
and
you
can,
you
know,
get
it
there.
I
mean
we
are
projecting,
but
you
know,
I
mean
you
know.
A
Scrolling
up
and
down
is
not
gonna
work
for
everyone.
So
so
you
know
it's
it's
online
available
and
the
idea
is
with
all
the
presentations,
the
you
know,
problem
space,
the
the
basically
constraints.
You
know
the
the
initial
approach
that
they
are
using
to
solve
this,
whether
or
not
it's
worth
it
basically
chartering
a
working
group
or
rich
artery
in
the
heap
working
group.
So
so
that's
the
question
we
are
having
here.
So
please
take
a
few
seconds
to
read
through
it
and
and
then
we
will
move
into
it
into
the
questions,
but
just
maybe.
R
L
G
It's
to
card
here
so
obviously
there's
a
question
of
do
we
take
this
on
at
all
and
then,
if
the
answer
is
yes
that
we
take
this
on
at
all,
there's
the
question
of.
Do
we
reach
other
the
hip
working
group
to
add
this
scope,
or
do
we
create
a
new
TM
grid
working
group
because
I,
don't
think
hip
is
the
end
of
the
store
in
terms
of
application,
application
of
various
IETF
standardized
protocols
to
this
problem.
Space
I
think
we're
gonna
need
help
in
DNS.
G
If
you
take
it
on
and
back
at
the
ranch,
we
have
Adam
James,
Joe,
Matt,
Ryan
and
Zev
II,
so
k66
young
developers
not
cutting
me
because
I'm
useless
at
this
point
he's
not
in
yes,
we
have,
but
we
have
six
young
developers
who
are
not
focused
exclusively
on
the
remote
ID
problem,
but
they
are
focused
exclusively
on
communications
for
or
communications
and
networking
for
small
UAS
and
a
big
part
of
that
is
is
the
remote
ID
problem
specifically
so,
and
these
guys
are
fully
funded
for
like
the
next
18
months.
So
we
have.
G
H
So
Eric,
not
my
my
question
was
going
to
be
about
the
other
pieces
right
because
I
can
see
that
and
people
are
presented
or
Bob
is
presented.
They
hit
part
of
things
right,
but
then
the
order
thing
because
still
you're
hinting
earlier,
maybe
thought
that
maybe
it's
something
like
order
up
right
and
is
that
something
that
is
can
be
done
later
or
you
know,
because
it's
not
in
the
list
of
deliverables
right
now,
as
I
understand
it.
L
L
There's
like
I
got
two
lines
in
there
talking
about
the
our
DAP
it
maybe
I
need
to
expend
more
on
interacting
with
with
other
areas
and
I
welcome
help
on
expanded,
because
it
there
is
a
need
that
we've
alluded
to
here
on.
How
does
this
the
safety
officer
authenticate
and
get
the
PI
they're
allowed
to
get?
Is
this
something
that
we're
going
to
address
in
this
workgroup
and
how
do
we
do
it?
M
Thank
you,
Bob
Andrew
enter
MacGregor
I,
think
the
hip
parts
of
that
chatter
are
reasonably
complete
and
insensible
I.
Think,
because
we
noted
noting
that
there
are
things
to
be
done
in
other
parts
of
the
of
the
protocol
stack
I
think
the
chart
is
not
sufficiently
complete
at
this
stage
to
know
what
the
scope
is.
P
And
Whittaker
I
just
want
to
make
another
point
for
a
working
group
thing:
it's
trustworthy,
multi-purpose,
remote
ID,
that's
kind
of
what
we're
calling
this.
There
are
other
places
that
remote
ID
that
we
need
to
be
trustworthy
could
be
applied
in
it's
something
that
we
know
that's
there
and
if
we
can
get
something
there
I
don't
know
what
it
looks
like
right
now,
but
I
know
that
I
want
I,
don't
I
don't
want
to
save
the
word
but
IOT,
because
that's
a
very
dangerous
word
to
speak
here.
P
I
think,
because
it's
quite
a
big
term
and
has
a
lot
of
people
involved
in
it.
But
you
know
IOT
devices
and
as
Stu
was
saying
you
have
a
thing
in
front
of
you.
You
want
to
idea,
and
you
want
to
be.
You
want
to
trust
it
I
think
that
is
a
big
piece
of
this,
but
I
don't
know
how
it
fits
overall.
Okay,
thank.
H
Concise
and
comments
so
I
guess,
there's
one
question
wasn't
answered
about
order,
so
he
said
time
frame
wise.
Could
it
be
deferred
for
six
months
to
work
on
those
pieces?
What
do
we
need
to
put
it
up
front
because
we
need
to
get
the
complete
sort
of
registration
process
that
includes
the
hip
part
of
the
registration
and
the
registration
of
the
other
information
into
an
order.
G
Yeah
us
to
cut
here,
I
can't
answer
the
question,
but
I
can
tell
you
what
ASTM
has
done.
G
M
Andrew
McGregor
forgotten
your
name
to
the
point
about
other
areas
than
aviation
Adam,
Adam
Adams
point
I
note
that
marine
traffic
control
and
and
transformative
protocols
and
and
the
like
are
based
on
the
aviation
ones
and
very
very
similar
and
well.
Marine
autonomous
lauder
vehicles
are
a
thing
and
I
have
no
idea
who
to
contact
in
the
protocol
space
for
that.
But
having
been
involved
in
in
new
zealand's
Coast
Guard
I
can
probably
find
someone
who
does
Thank
You
Andrew.
J
It's
like
we
can
just
throw
it
over
the
wall
to
hip
and
we
can
add
it
to
their
Charter
and
and
you
know,
then
you
can
use
those
pieces
for
the
much
harder
building
blocks
that
you
know
related
to
aviation
identification
with
all
of
the
problems
and
all
of
the
we
need
help
in
these
ten
areas.
It
doesn't
seem
like
an
existing
working
groups
going
to
be
able
to
take
on
something
that
large
without
you
know
doubling
their
time
or
something
like
that.
J
A
Okay,
so
yeah
the
last
few
minutes,
we're
gonna
go
through
through
the
questions,
and
then
we
will
ask
the
ad
if
he
needs
more
clarification
or
you
know
so
so
the
first
one
is
basically,
you
know
the
scenario
we
we
talked
about
the
scope,
so
is
there
support
to
form
basically
working
good?
Let's
assume
that
we
are
forming
a
new
working
group.
A
A
You
know
he
will
basically
work
with
with
you
know
the
ideas
and
to
basically
complete
it,
and
there
were
some
comments
that
maybe
needs
to
be
divided
into
two
working
groups,
so
we
will
look
into
all
that
so
the
the
second
is.
You
know
the
community
thing
that
the
problem
statement
is
clear,
well,
scope
and
so
level,
and
it
would
be
useful
to
solve.
So
again,
please
hum,
if
you
think,
that's
true.
A
Okay,
all
against
okay,
so
basically,
I
mean
I.
Like
my
summaries
that
you
know
we,
we
need
to
work
more
on
the
scope
and
I'm,
basically
not
clarify
a
bit
or
I,
think
it
was
clear
from
the
discussion
that
the
concern
was
only
scope,
yeah,
yeah
yeah,
exactly
they
were
discussions
like
yeah,
either,
even
how
many
working
groups
we
would
need
if
this
had
general
problem
versus
the
specific
one.
So
so
we
got
all
the
questions
and
I
think
we
can.
A
We
can
work
on
something
and
now
and,
as
you
know,
I
mentioned
before
and
and
the
Institute
was
following
up
on-
that-
we
need
to
basically
you
know,
get
a
fill
of.
You
know
the
level
of
commitment
and
the
level
of
energy
and
the
level
of
you
know
the
number
of
cycles
people
are
going
to
be
able
to
spend
on
these.
So
the
first
one
is
like
who
would
be
willing
to
review
documents,
and-
and
this
is
not
a
ham-
please
raise
your
hands-
yeah
yeah,
of
course,
I'm
right
in
reviewing
and.
A
A
Yeah
so
I
think
I
mean
I,
think
I.
We
have
covered
everything
so
so
at
this
point
you
know
I,
as
I
said.
The
summary
is
that
there
was
a
strong
support
to
form
a
working
group,
but
we
really
need
to
work
still
on
on
the
scope,
mostly
to
basically
scope
scope.
It
in
a
way
that
you
know
in
is
not
you
know
too
much
to
to
chew
for
a
working
group
and
and
then
I
saw
the
energy.
A
L
Daniel
for
sharing
the
boss
at
the
point,
these
two
gentlemen
are
swamped
in
the
working
ITF.
So
to
note
that
we
will
hopefully
we'll
get
a
work
group
of
this.
So
if
you
want
to
either
have
experience
as
a
chair
and
have
cycles
or
you
want
to
get
involved
in
this
area,
speak
to
the
ad
speak
to
our
both
chairs
yeah
yeah.
A
G
Parting
shot
here,
I
really
want
to
thank
everybody
who
showed
up
today
and
doubly
thank
anyone
who
chooses
to
assist
us
in
this
work.
Not
wishing
to
be
well
melodramatic,
I
do
have
to
say
that
in
all
seriousness,
this
can
save
a
bunch
of
lives.
Thank.
A
T
Way
first,
thank
you
again
for
for
doing
this,
and
thank
you
for
them
and
and
Stu
on
this
Oh.
Usually
the
Charter
is
not
ready
to
go.
This
is
clear.
We
can
do
it,
of
course,
over
mailing
list
getting
something
and
we
do
not
need
another
buff,
maybe
to
form
the
working
group.
So
we
can
go
more
direct
everything
needs
to
be
completed
on
the
mailing
list,
I'm
afraid
there,
but
I'm
quite
positive
and
I'm
pretty
happy
to
see
big
names
here
and
people
are
looking
to
work
beyond
ASTM,
because
that
was
my
major
concern.