►
From YouTube: IETF97-CURDLE-20161118-1150
Description
CURDLE meeting session at IETF97
2016/11/18 1150
A
A
Yeah,
okay
got:
he
eat
the
mic
right,
so
Daniel,
my
co-chair
was
jet
lag
when
he
made
his
travel
arrangements
so
he's
already
on
his
way
home
yeah
yeah.
He
left
behind
a
bunch
of
document
Shepherds
that
we're
gonna
pass
along
everyone
else.
So
here
is
the
note.
Well,
if
you
haven't
seen
it
and
understood
it
by
now,
welcome
to
Seoul
close.
You
clearly
just
got
here.
A
Ben
said
Ben,
thank
you
very
much.
Your
group
isn't
meeting
so
there
you
go
jabra,
scribe,
Thank,
You,
Kyle,
okay,
good
all
right
order.
We
have
a
bunch
of
drafts,
it
yeah
just
turns
sort
of
turned
out
that
way.
Yeah
we
have
a
lot
of
drafts.
What
we
make
for
up
foreign
quantity,
we
counter
balance
by
in
brevity
which
is
sort
of
the
design
goal
of
this
working
group
right
and
says.
Take
that
thing
and
here's
how
you
use
the
new
hot
new
crypto
with
CMS
drafts.
A
There's
a
couple
on
DNS
SEC
p
kicks
SSH,
that's
sort
of
the
biggest
nest
in
terms
of
reorganization
right
now.
I
want
to
talk
about
signature
contexts,
any
other
business.
Anything
else,
I
hope
we
can
get
out
of
here
pretty
soon
and
go
eat
lunch
or
sites
you
whatever
you
want
to
do
any
bring
them.
Yes,
okay.
Anyone
have
any
agenda
bashing
again
for
the
couple
folks
who
just
came
in
there's
only
one
clipboard,
so
please
make
sure
to
sign
it
on
your
way
in
or
out.
A
All
right,
oh
well,
CMS
graphs,
I'm,
just
gonna
go
report
some
status
and
if
the
authors,
who
are
pretty
much
all
here
on
all
of
our
drafts,
except
for
the
messy
area,
I
want
to
say
step
up
to
the
mic
and
say
something
otherwise.
I'll
just
proceed
with
what
I
know:
CMS
chacha,
poly
30,
that's
been
sent
on
for
publication
request.
Hasn't
you
know
just
before
a
month
ago,
just
before
the
flurry
of
other
activity
hasn't
happened.
A
Yet
Daniel
is
I,
believe
the
Shepherd
on
that
one
there's
to
see
other
CMS
drafts
using
you
know:
II
cdh,
new
curves
and
EDD
sa
signatures.
This
comes
direct
from
Russ.
We
need
a
slight
rev
to
align
it
with
the
pika
craft
and
then
we're
ready
for
last
call
how
many
people
have
read
these.
Besides
Jimin
of
us,
you
raising
hey,
okay,
right
good,
so
if
we
I
mean
yeah.
On
the
other
hand,
I'm
small
small
groups
of
expertise
is
ok
here,
because
this
is
sort
of
a
broad-ranging
group.
A
So
if
only
those
who
live
and
breathe,
CMS
have
read
it
and
we
don't
have.
You
know
that
good
enough
for
me
in
terms
of
saying
consensus
and
we're
ready
to
go
on,
and
then
we
have
Ryan
up
also
as
red.
It's
not
I,
don't
mean
to
say,
doesn't
live
and
breathe
CMS,
but
yeah,
okay
and
and
of
course
the
Agri.
So
is
anyone
else
planning
on
reviewing
this
or
cares
deeply
about
CMS
and
how
it
could
use
modern,
crypto?
B
C
A
Once
we,
you
know,
wait
once
we
put
up
that
once
not
the
next
version,
then
I'll
ask
for
a
call,
will
last
for
call
for
working
group
last
call
and
then
we'll
pass
it
along
if
anyone
this
will
be
a
common
trend.
If
anyone
is
interested
in
helping
the
Shepherd
documents
through
shepherding
is
part
of
the
IETF
workflow.
If
you
haven't
written
drafts
or
you
haven't,
come
too
many
meetings
or
you
haven't
shared
or
been
an
ad.
This
is
an
interesting
and
fun
with
no
fun
interesting,
interesting
way.
A
Ya
know
it's
an
interesting
way
to
get
involved
in
the
process.
This
template
to
follow,
and
you
just
you
know,
document
a
one
or
two
paragraph,
one
or
two
sentence
summary
of
what
the
draft
is,
what
they're
working
thinks
about
it
if
there's
been
consent,
if
there's
been
particular
disagreements
or
contentious
issues,
I'll
assert
that
we
haven't
had
any
contentious
issues,
real
contentious
issues
ever
in
the
history
of
this
group,
so
guys
seriously.
A
We've
had
some
disagreements,
but
nothing's
been
contentious
right
with
that
open
issue,
so
this
is
a
kind
of
really
easy
thing
to
to
Shepherd
through,
and
so
someone
is
looking
for
way
to
dip
their
toe
into
the
ITF
process
and
decide
whether
or
not
they
like
it.
You
know
when
we
go
to
last
call,
please
volunteer
to
be
a
shepherd.
D
A
E
A
So
Ben
said
the
key
point:
is
it
open
to
new
participants?
My
shepherd
in
my
first
back
before
I
had
my
before
I
had
my
first
RFC
still
haven't
had
my
first
rc,
okay,
all
right
so
CMS
dress.
We
got
more
set
on
that
DNS
SEC
that
Tim
working
group
last
call
I
got
updates
from
Daniel
s
yesterday.
He
said.
Oh
that's
already.
Unless
call
so
I
went
that's
why
you
saw
like
5am
tracker
updates,
he's
the
shepherd
for
this.
A
A
The
PK
x
rafts
okay
notice,
Daniel
shepherding
this
too
will
have
Jim
up
in
a
minute.
This
process
does
not
scale
I
mean
in
theory,
could
always
be
a
working
group
author,
a
working
group
chair,
but
we
want
to
do
some
more
of
that
do
more
than
just
that.
So
we'll
turn
have
Jim
come
up
and
present
his
sort
of
one
and
a
half
slides
on
the
status
of
P
kicks.
So
give
me
a
sec
here.
A
C
Ok,
so
talking
about
this
is
real
fast
solving.
It
may
not
be
so
there's
basically
one
contentious
open
issue
that
we
need
to
deal
with,
and
one
issue
which
has
been
pushed
by
the
chairs
to
the
in
the
meeting,
which
is
probably
not
contentious,
and
this
is
do
we
keep
the
current
language
which
says:
ca's
must
not
use
the
pre
hash
version.
Basically,
arguments
pro
is
you've
got
much
better
security.
C
If
you
make
the
statement
there
used
to
be
an
argument
which
says,
if
you
don't
make
this
statement,
you've
exposed
yourself
to
an
attack,
but
we
have
at
least
cleared
that
attack
up
when
we
finish
the
EDD
essay
draft
in
c
FR
g
and
the
cons
are
basically
people
who
generate
really
long.
Cr
l's
are
going
to
be
in
this
situation
where
there
are
going
to
be
devices
h,
SMS,
which
will
not
be
able
to
consume
and
hold
that
much
in
memory
in
order
to
run
the
hash
over
it
twice.
C
C
A
B
I'm
going
dang
so
42
options,
you
know,
Whitney
has
version.
If
somebody
uses
a
good
hash
function,
then
the
two
options
are
all
secure
to
me
and
Dad
about
security
and
the
choice
up
which
one
to
use
I
don't
have
install
pinion
over
dass,
either
way.
If
it
works
for
be
bold
and
that's
fine
are
but
for
security
of
funds.
If
the
hash
function
is
good,
then
there
are
no
security
issues
with
either
approach
and.
B
Mom,
no,
it's
us
too,
but
the
reason,
if
you
know
on
the
technical
ground
we
if
something
wrong
with
the
hash
function,
then
we
will
speak
it
out.
If
something
secure
is
good,
then
we
confirmed
that
it's
good,
but
you
know
the
group
here
is
going
to
choose
whatever
one
we
all
you
know
have
a
consensus
on
which
one
would
work
for
most
people
right
and
I.
I
would
totally
support
that
sure.
A
C
F
G
F
Actually
is
any
of
our
anywhere
in
IDF,
our
code,
usually
pre
hash
in
anywhere,
because
I
think
ipsec
is
not
and
I
think
TLS
is
probably
not
done
if
it
happens,
so
that
we
are
not
going
to
be
using.
Pre
has
anywhere
else
than
this
would
be.
The
only
I
know
only
place
in
IETF
I
think
it
would
be
the
bad
idea,
because
then
you
know
there
would
be
only
reason
to
implement
the
pre
has
would
be
the
DS
and
I
hate
to
have
a
you
know,
stuff
that
would
be
implemented.
G
A
Alright,
we'll
just
take
a
quick
consensus
home
here
and
confirm
it
on
the
list
in
those
in
faith.
So
the
question
will
be:
are
you
in
favor
of
must
not
on
pre
hash?
Are
you
opposed
to
must
not
cumulative,
or
do
you
not
have
enough
information
to
decide?
So
all
those
in
favor,
please
hum
advance.
A
A
C
Okay,
next
slide,
I
think
is
basically
punt
yeah
we're
getting
to
bring
it
up.
Okay,
assuming
that
the
next
issue
goes,
the
way
it
is
I
need
to
do
a
read-through,
but
I
think.
Actually,
the
document
is
probably
finished.
Okay,.
A
C
C
A
H
E
A
Okay,
yeah
it's
in
the
end
of
a
long
week
for
all
of
us,
most
of
us
are
kind
of
jet
lag.
Okay,
p,
cake,
Strauss
next,
the
ssh
dress,
so
one
of
them,
we
believe,
is
ready
for
last
call
how
many
people
have
read
how
to
use
RSA
sha-2
with
ssh
Kyle
good.
That's
almost
enough
expertise
for
the
chairs,
too
Kyle
yeah,
that's
his
expertise,
Akamai!
A
So
one
of
them
anybody
else,
alright,
so
we'd,
really
like
at
least
one
other
person
or
one
or
two
other
people
do
one
or
two
other
people
to
have
read
this
I'll
post
it
on
the
list,
ask
for
some
reviewers
and
then
we'll
go
into
last.
Call
it's
basically
ready,
there's
nothing
wrong
with
it.
These
three
has
anybody
been
involved
with
the
ssh
curdle
drafts
at
all.
Mark
is
not
here
at
juniper,
he's
bent
over
backwards
to
try
to
work
with
folks.
A
What
happened
is
sort
of
two
different
sets
of
authors
have
come
together,
I'm,
not
convinced
and
I.
Don't
think
anyone
has
actually
convinced
that
we've
split
things
out
into
the
necessary
set
of
documents,
yet
so
any
bud
ice.
Has
anybody
here
read
any
of
these
okay
we'd
really
like
to
none
of
them
are
very
long.
I,
don't
think
we
have
any
document
in
our
queue,
that's
more
than
12
pages,
and
if
you
consider
three
of
those
or
boilerplate,
you
know
it's
pretty
simple.
So.
H
A
Remember
cuz
was
risa,
it
was
past.
My
cutoff
deadline
for
reading
dress
for
this
thing,
so
yeah
I'm,
not
sure,
I,
think
what
we'll
do
is
we'll
try
to
start
a
discussion
over
the
following
week
or
two
about
in
general,
the
ssh
documents
these
these
three
arm
there's
a
lot
of
overlap.
We
want
to
make
sure
there
isn't
we
had
problems,
point
into
old
drafts
and
so
on.
So
please,
if
you'd
all
care
or
use
about
SSH
and
I.
Think
almost
everybody
does,
you
know,
read
it
get
your
colleague
to
okay.
A
So
that
concludes
the
drafts.
There's
probably
a
couple
more
coming.
One
of
the
things
that
Dana
and
I
talked
about
was
doing
something
similar
for
ipsec,
where
we
just
go
through
the
rfcs
and
made
me
make
an
eye
on
a
registry
he'll
bring
that
up
later
on
the
list
and
of
course,
I'd
be
sec.
Me
he's
got
main
ownership
that
contexts
I'm
not
going
to
move
to
the
mic
acting
not
as
chair.
A
So
we
all
thought
security
context,
a
signature
context
for
a
good
idea,
maybe
three
months
ago,
six
months
ago,
because
TLS
thought
so
because
at
the
time
TLS
had
issues
till
the
way
TLS
13
was
going
to
work.
Is
you
could
do
key
reuse
in
some
bad
ways
and
you
could
make
you
could
end
up
signing
things.
It
could
be
reused
in
the
wrong
spot.
A
Tls
13
since
fixed
that
problem
I
for
the
cases
where
we
thought
we
had.
It
say
the
EDD
SI
p
kicks.
You
know.
We've
come
up
with
better
solutions
to
that,
like
the
no
hash
mechanism.
So
while
the
CFR
g
signature
formats
still
include
a
context
say
for
future
extensibility,
we,
the
general
advice
from
people
on
this
side
of
the
room,
is
probably
that
we
don't
need
them
anymore,
and
so
what
I
propose
that
we
do
is
we
say,
look
we're
just
gonna.
Don't
do
them.
A
A
A
Okay,
yeah
any,
let's
take
a
hum
of
the
consensus
of
the
room.
I
think
it's
good!
You
know!
You
agree
that
we
should
have
zero
length
context.
You
disagree
with
that
or
you
don't
know
enough
to
decide
and
again
these
will
all
be
reconfirmed
on
the
list.
So
all
those
in
favor
of
no
contexts
all
level-
stake,
all
those
in
favor
of
saying
it's
an
empty
context
in
our
in
our
specs.