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From YouTube: TEEP WG Interim Meeting, 2020-04-06
Description
TEEP WG Interim Meeting, 2020-04-06
A
All
right
so
good
morning,
good
evening
and
good
afternoon,
everyone
this
is
the
T
or
trusted
execution
and
environment
provisioning
working
group.
So
if
you
were
not
expecting
to
and
the
teeth
call
you
can
drop,
I've
got
my
cooked
chair
Thiru
on
with
me
started.
This
is
a
virtual
intermedia.
The
note
well
applies
with
respect
to
the
policies
and
procedures
list.
Everyone
on
the
call
has
been
in
t
p--
sessions
before
so
I
will
just
leave
it
here
and
move
forward.
So
for
the
agenda.
A
A
A
A
A
Good,
so
I'm
using
the
Acrobat
I
will
update
it
later,
but
Hannes.
Thank
you
and
we'll
use
whatever
time
we
have
left.
So
if
you're,
okay,
since
I
didn't
have
this
at
the
time
that
I
was
posting
this,
so
you
must
have
sent
it
after
3:00
or
4:00
in
the
afternoon
my
time
but
anyway
so
from
the
agenda,
I
moved
it
since
I
didn't
know
that
you
would
be
presenting
I
moved.
You
last
is
that
okay
or
do
you
want
me
to
move
it
back
up
and
have
the
hackathon.
C
A
A
D
D
Oh
six
was
posted
and
February
and
the
interim
meeting
we
had
a
number
of
discussions
and
a
little
bit
of
follow-up
on
the
list
that
which
was
about
how
do
we
resolve
the
working
group
last
call
comments,
and
so
we
resolved
the
meaning
one
remaining
ones
and
draft
oh
seven
and
Mars,
taking
into
account
the
feedback
from
the
virtual
interim
meeting
and
since
then
Ben
no
list
discussion,
but
there
have
been
two
new
issues
filed
since
draft.
Oh
seven,
so
now,
okay,
previously.
D
The
interim
meeting
this
was
our
proposed
timeline.
This
is
the
same
slide
as
from
February
intra
meeting.
This
is
not
the
current
next
steps
right.
We,
the
plant,
was
that
post,
oh
seven
before
March
9th,
which
we
did
and
then
the
point
is
we
agreed
to
do.
A
second
working
group
last
call
to
be
discussed
at
IETF
107,
which
of
course
didn't
happen,
and
so
work
doc
and
approximately
at
that
point
in
this
timeline.
Okay,
so
remember,
our
original
goal
was
to
progress.
D
D
Right
so
I'm
going
to
walk
through
the
issues
that
been
filed
since
oh
seven,
the
first
one
was
feedback
that
came
in
from
a
confidential
computing
consortium.
If
you
remember
at
last,
face-to-face
I
ATF
I
gave
a
short
slide
deck.
The
introduction
of
the
confidential
computing
consortium,
which
is
a
body
that
hosts
open
source
projects
that
are
relevant
to
UT
E's,
and
there
was
a
piece
of
feedback
that
keep
me
from
them
and
by
the
way
full
disclosure
I
am
the
chair
of
the
Technical
Advisory
Council
and
the
confidential
competing
consortium.
D
D
There
was
a
change
made
in
two
places
in
the
document,
the
abstract
in
the
introduction
and
which
had
the
same
text
about
what
the
definition
of
a
te
was,
and
you
can
see
this
notion
that
only
authorized
code
can
execute
within
that
environment
was
changed
to
you.
Any
code
in
that
environment
can
be
tampered
with,
and
the
main
point
was
the
draft
delete
it's
really
about
code
integrity
rather
than
allowing
her
disallowing
code.
D
If
you
think
about
how
something
like
SGX
works
right,
you
can
run
a
bunch
of
different
things,
but
they're
isolated
from
each
other
and
they're,
not
tamper
herbal,
but
whether
you
prevent
execution
or
not,
is
not
really
core
to
the
point
of
there
being
a
te.
The
point
is
that
you
can't
tamper
with
a
code,
and
so
we
made
that
change
to
align
it
with
their
recommendations,
because
the
editors
also
create
itself.
D
Unless
there's
any
comment,
so
we
go
on
to
the
next
slide,
just
explaining
what
the
change
was
and
why
so,
next
one
and
the
other
one.
So
this
is
one
of
our
a
ist
colleagues
go
off
to
Bates
and
you
know
a
sh
t.
Folks
participate
and
Hackett
and
our
hackathons
and
so
on
and
ask
you
know
why
does
the
tea
protocol
need
to
support
devices
with
no
REE?
D
Now
you
may
remember:
issue
number
139
lumina.
You
may
remember
that
we
discussed
the
similar
thing
recently
in
teak
sometime
around
the
time
of
the
last
face-to-face
at
106
and
there
and
it
was
I.
Then
it
was
139,
which
was
this
contradiction
about
whether
the
device
has
to
have
a
REE
to
use
teat
or
not
different
places.
In
the
document
that
said,
one
versus
the
other,
there
was
a
contradict
the
February
interim
meeting.
D
We
then
resolved
that
with
an
agreed
resolution
that
it
should
be
supported,
but
the
canoe
Yasu
had
asked
so
I
can't
figure
it
out.
When
would
that
actually
happen?
And
so
the
resolution
was
to
add
an
example,
and
so
that's
the
text
in
bold
that
appeared
in
draft.
Oh
seven
right
example
is
a
microcontroller
blah
blah
blah.
B
D
Go
ahead,
I.
B
B
D
It
covered
lots
of
other
cases,
but
this
case
was
not
actually
mentioned,
so
the
text
and
bulls
was
added
into
two
sections
to
do
that,
so
in
9.1,
which
is
the
overall
broker
trust
model
where
it
talks
about
what
the
broker
can
and
can't
do
and
what
its
what
it
still
can
do,
because
it's
not
trusted
right.
That's
the
whole
point
of
re
e.
The
key
can
still
conduct
off
the
tax
is
discussed
in
nine
point
three
right.
D
Nine
point
three
is
the
one
that
covered
different
types
of
attacks
forward
reference
there
and
then
in
nine
point
three
you
can
see
in
the
middle
there
of
the
compromised
re
may
terminate
the
chief
broker.
So
after
the
transaction,
it's
not
greasy
te
or
it
might
drop
or
delay
messages
between
at
a
manatee
pages.
Okay.
So
that
was
the
knob
that
says:
yep,
that's
another
one
in
the
list
and
then
the
discussion
after
that
is
the
same
across
the
set
of
das
attacks.
D
D
D
That
came
up
with
well
roughly
for
the
first
time
at
the
February
interim
meeting
was
often
the
TAM
or
the
attestation
service
should
be
checked
right.
So
what's
the
frequency,
how
long
our
results
valid
and
so
on.
So
we
had
this
long
discussion
which
you
can
find
in
the
minutes,
and
the
you
know
can
find
notes
about
in
the
February
intermediate
minutes,
and
so
the
bottom
two
lines
here
are
on
the
slide
of
the
snippet
from
those
actual
minutes.
D
Neither
pad
right,
which
was
the
outcome
of
that
discussion,
was
that
we
should
file
an
issue
in
the
rats
architecture
document
about
how
long
an
attestation
results
would
be
used
and
Hank
had
pointed
out
during
the
interim
here
that
we
should
you
know
talk
about.
There
was
always
be
some
delay
and
the
evidence
may
have
changed
during
the
evaluation
right.
D
So,
by
the
way,
Ming
took
the
actual
item,
Thank
You
Ming
of
actually
filing
the
issue
as
a
result
of
the
inter
meeting,
so
the
issue
148
is
it
was
a
Ming
posting
at
active
meeting
that
the
discussion
all
right,
so
the
facto
seven
partly
addressed
this
I
mean
they
had
the
first
time
you
stuff,
the
first
half
of
stuff
is
the
part
that
coordinated
with
the
rats
architecture.
So
the
section
in
question
here
talks
about
malicious
TAS
right,
because
the
whole
topic
was
what
happens
when
you're.
You
know
out
of
compliance.
D
Something
is
bad,
whether
it's
malicious
or
policy
has
changed
or
whatever,
and
so
for
the
malicious
case.
You
want
to
minimize
how
long
you
can
be
malicious
for,
and
so
the
text
in
bold
was
added
there,
which
talked
about
some.
This
is
summarizing
the
point
that
Hank
and
others
had
made
in
the
intermedia
right.
There
is
a.
There
is,
however,
a
time
window
during
which
a
malicious
ta
might
be
able
to
operate
successfully,
which
is
the
validity
time
of
the
previous
attestation
result.
D
For
example,
if
the
verifier
in
figure
5
is
updated
to
treat
a
previously
valid,
ta
ting
as
no
longer
trustworthy,
any
stationers
old
that
previously
generated
saying
that
the
te
is
valid
will
continue
to
be
used
until
the
attestation
result
expires.
Such
the
Tam's
verifier
should
take
into
account
the
acceptable
time
window
when
generating
attestation
results.
The
rats
architecture
preferred
the
discussion.
So
the
point
is
the
generic
discussion
should
be
in
the
rats
architecture
document
and
the
text
here
in
bold
is
that
keeps
listen.
D
You
know
how
it
applies
to
tea
right,
what
the
what
the
mapping
is
between
you
know,
tas
and
Tam's,
and
so
on,
and
the
generic
discussion
the
rats
architecture.
This
is
the
first
half,
because
this
only
talked
about
how
the
how
long
the
validity
was
and
how
how
long
the
window
lasted
of
vulnerability.
Okay,
and
so
you
can
see
a
pointer
to
the
rats
architecture
document
issue
that
tracks
the
same
issue
on
the
rat
side
next
slide.
So
that
was
draft,
oh
seven,
which
solved
half
of
the
issue.
D
We
think
the
other
half
was
in
draft.
Oh
eight,
so
Meghan
pointed
out
the
question
wasn't
about
how
long
an
excitation
Zoli
data,
the
original
question
was
how
often
some
entity
reaches
out
to
retest
so
draft
o
age
and
is
the
one
that
talked
about
appended
to
the
same
one
that
is
to
recover.
The
chief
agent
must
be
able
to
reach
out
to
the
TAM,
for
example,
went
over
the
request
policy
check
API,
which
is
already
in
section
61,
is
invoked
by
a
timer
or
other
event.
D
The
point
here
is
to
say,
the
time
window
is
actually
bound.
You
know
the
time
window
from
the
security
purpose
is
bound
by
the
duration
of
the
attestation
results.
Okay,
after
that,
you
just
can't
do
the
authorized
operations,
because
your
time
window
has
expired
for
say
so.
Haughton
you
reach
out
depends
on
how
how
fast
you
want
to
recover
right.
You
want
to
recover
as
soon
as
it
expires.
You
want
to
recover
more
or
less
frequency.
D
D
There
already
said
the
eg,
based
on
a
time
where
my
belief
as
editor
as
the
the
two
things
together
and
bold,
do
incorporate
the
discussion
we
had
at
the
February
meeting
the
extent
that
it
needs
to
be
covered
in
the
t,
p--
document,
as
opposed
to
the
rats
architecture
document,
I'd
love
to
hear
anybody
else's
comments
on
how
well
you
think
we
did
here
and
if
there's
other
things,
we
should
keep
into
a
keep
in
mind
in
the
rats
architecture
or
in
the
tea
party.
Texture
on
this
I.
D
This
little
question
was
about
whether
personalization
data
requires
confidentiality
or
whether
there
is
anything
that
only
needs
integrity
but
might
be
device
specific
by
using
specific
meaning.
You
have
two
different
devices
with
tes
and
the
information
you
send
to
one
is
different
from
the
information
sent
to
the
other
right:
that's
sort
of
the
definition
of
personalization
data
personalized
to
a
particular
device.
D
Originally
before
the
February
interim
meeting,
the
text
said:
personalization
data
must
be
encrypted,
that
there's
no
limitations
and
so
Honus
fall.
This
TPR
about
will
make
there's
things.
They
only
need
integrity,
so
maybe
masha
me
may
need
to
you
right.
So
that
was
what
the
issue
was
filed,
the
slide
other
than
the
one
over
three
in
the
title.
It
was
the
slide
from
the
february
meeting,
which
we
discussed
but
honest.
Wasn't
there
so
continue
on
and
we'll
talk
about
what
we
did
next
slide
two
or
three
okay.
D
This
was
some
of
the
comments
that
went
up
to
the
discussion
about,
and
we
talked
about
this
one
a
little
bit
in
the
february
meeting
as
well,
which
was
encryption,
support
is
needed
and
that
may
be
encrypted
doesn't
enforce
the
recommendation
to
implement
encryption
right.
As
you
can
see
as
a
requirement,
the
protocol
must
be
able
to
support
personalization
data
encryption.
We
then
discussed
that
at
the
February
inch
room
and
you
see
comments
in
the
ether
pad
from
the
February
amendment
minutes
like
this
one
Russ
had
said.
D
Implementations
must
support
encryption
to
allow
for
loading
a
sensitive,
personalization
data
right.
So
the
consensus
in
the
February
interim
meeting
was
that
the
important
point
was
to
say
that
encryption
support
is
mandatory
to
implement
write.
Encryption
implementations
must
support
encryption.
Then
the
rest
can
be
left
up
to
the
T
protocol
document
to
say
whether
any
particular
message
is
actually
encrypted
or
not.
That
doesn't
have
to
be
in
the
architecture
per
se
that
could
be
in
the
T
protocol.
D
So
taking
Russell's
point
their
language
here
about
implementations
must
support
encryption
and
ming's
just
above
that
leads
us
to
the
last
slide
here.
Next,
one
on
this
topic
is
what
we
didn't
know.
It
used
to
say:
the
personalization
must
be
encrypted,
and
it
now
says
roughly
based
on
Russia's
language.
Implementations
must
support
encryption
of
personalization
data
at
to
blahblah.
Now
the
must
be
encrypted
is
replaced
with
must
support
encryption
and
again
much.
B
I
think
that's
them
something
still
for
us
to
think
about
like
when
we
we.
We
talked
about
the
personalization
data
in
the
past
and
what
we
didn't
said.
What
we
would
do
is
we
put
it
at
the
same.
It's
sort
of
data
that
also
comes
along
with
the
manifest
and
that's
great.
The
confidentiality
protection
is
supported
here,
so
so
the
new
language
fits
India.
B
This
is
different
from
the
actual
application
that
we
then
use
that
data.
So
like
it,
the
notion
of
end-to-end
security,
and
specifically,
if
you
worry
about
who
gets
access
to
personal
days,
personalization
data
I
think
makes
me
believe
that
in
some
cases
it
may
be
more
inside
desirable
to
actually
have
the
trusted
application
then
do
whatever
it
needs
to
do
to
date
or
do
something
about
it
without
involving
the
implementation
of
the
of
the
implicit
endpoint.
Does
that
make
sense
or
do
I
need
to
sort
of
post,
drawing
or.
D
E
E
B
D
For
the
cheap
architecture,
at
the
assumption
would
be
the
t,
p--
agents
and
that's
let
be
the
end
points.
The
encryption
yeah
we've
previously
talked
about
cases
where
you
might
also
have
something
with
a
payload
itself
was
encrypted
and
secret
from
the
Tam,
and
that's
not
what
this
is
talking
about.
But
that
is
also
actually
no
I
think
we
did
add
something
somewhere
else
about
that.
D
B
If,
for
example,
if
you
do
is
an
update
of
another
trusted
application,
then
that
update
will
be
verified
by
code,
that
is
by
keys
that
is
elsewhere
in
in
the
te
typically
coat.
That
resides,
runs
at
a
much
higher
privileges
in
the
TE
so
and
so
I
think
even
they
are
believe.
There's
a
security,
qualitative
difference.
I
think
that
also
carries
over
to
the
personalization
data.
G
H
D
Sounds
like
everybody
that's
spoken
up
so
far,
is
it's
really?
The
question
is:
can
we
consider
132?
As
being
you
know,
issue
and
the
architecture
document
is
being
done
and
move
the
discussion
to
the
T
protocols
so
far
it
would
have
spoken
up
has
been
in
favor
of
that,
even
though
there's
more
to
scottish
on
the
critical
document
is
that's
really.
D
The
question
I've
asked
is
is:
is
the
changes
that
are
made
here
sufficient
that
we've
now
addressed
all
the
issues
right,
that's
what
I'm
trying
to
do
and
that
the
goal
this
slide
deck
is
to
verify
whether
draft
'08
solves
all
the
issues
close
enough
to
be
done
with
it
and
move
the
other
discussions,
the
other
documents
or
other
changes
that
we
still
want
in
addition
to
what's
in
direct
OAH
right,
that's
the
that's
the
main
goal
of
this
particular
presentation.
So
please
speak
up.
D
D
Alright,
so
I
think
this
discussion
will
continue
and
we
have
time
to
talk
about
protocol
stuff,
whether
it's
in
this
call
or
after
this
call
so
next
slide
Nancy.
Unless
anybody
else
wants
to
speak
up
okay,
so,
as
you
recall,
the
next
steps
after
the
interim
meeting
was
to
address
those
comments
and
then
do
a
second
second
working
group
last
call
so
based
on
the
feedback
that
I've
heard
in
this
call.
So
far.
A
A
A
That
said,
I
think
what
I'd
like
to
do
is
solicit
volunteers
to
actually
review
the
architecture
document,
because
if
I
recall,
we
only
had
Nikolai
and
Dena
provides
feedback,
so
can
I
get
at
least
another
volunteer,
hopefully
to
to
help
review
this
and
ensure
that
we
we
have
more
comments
coming
in
the
second
last
call.
Oh.
A
A
D
D
This
is
tip
over
HTTP,
okay,
so
the
timeline
on
this
one
was
we
needed
working
group
last
cause
oh
yeah,
IETF
106
was
to
do
the
changes
talked
about
an
IETF
106
then
started
working
with
less
call.
That
was
then
dawn
in
February,
which
the
working
group
last
call
ended
on
February
26th,
and
we
got
two
reviews.
Thank
you
to
Russ
and
thiru
in
particular
for
those
two
reviews.
Those
were
great
so
in
April,
mark
Nottingham
did
a
recheck
for
conformance
with
the
BCP
56
bist.
That's
how
to
do
protocols
over
HTTP
document.
D
D
Okay,
so
the
pop
lists
are
things
that
were
discussed:
the
IETF
106
right,
so
one
two
and
four
were
things
that
were
addressed
then
before
then,
and
just
verify
that
they
could
be
closed.
Five
was
one
that
we
believed
was
done
and
and
wanted
to
get
settle.
Actually,
five
was
when
we
had
questions
to
the
workgroup
as
to
what
to
do
you
at
the
outcome
of
that
was
to
remove
discussion
that
remove
the
t
p--
over
OTR
key
discussion
from
the
document.
D
Okay,
so
that
was
the
outcome
of
the
IGF
106
discussion
and
then,
since
working
group
last
call,
history
was
for
new
issues
that
came
in
plus
various
pieces
of
editorial
feedback
for
us
interior.
They
didn't
have
that
didn't
get
issues.
Issues
were
following
all
the
main
technical
points
and
if
we
miss
some,
the
last
slide.
I'm
here
calls
out
a
couple
other
questions
about
how
they
actually
technical
issues
or
things
that
you
want
to
bring
up
so
Russ
into
your.
D
D
So
number
eight
was
filed
where
Acura
sent
this
question,
but
then
in
the
issue
itself
a
cure
and
I
have
commented.
We
said
that
this
should
be
noted,
a
tea
protocol
rather
than
the
transports
back
and
so
I
think
both
of
us
meaning
the
filer
and
the
editor
both
agree
that
this
one
can
be
closed,
but
I
didn't
go
ahead
and
close
it.
We
probably
can
because
there's
now
a
tea
protocol
issues,
so
I,
don't
think,
is
anything
discuss
here.
D
Given
that
everybody
agrees
that
this
was
found
on
our
web
document
number
eleven
is
the
hall,
but
the
cherries
put
out
about
you,
know
JSON
verses,
Sieber
or
support
and
t
p--
and
our
understanding
as
the
working
room
consensus
was
to
use
Seaborg
and
not
based
on,
but
all
the
examples
in
the
product
in
the
transport
spec
used,
T,
plus
JSON
and
so
number
eleven
was
we
updated
the
examples
to
use
before
now?
The
actual
content
doesn't
actually
appear
of
the
examples.
It's
just.
D
The
media
type
appears
in
the
HTTP
header,
and
so
the
HT
header,
that's
the
content
type
and
accept
header
was
changed
from
JSON
to
seaboard,
to
match
that
consensus
and
by
the
way
the
actual
value
of
the
media
type
is
normative,
and
the
T
protocol
document
right.
That's
where
the
IANA
considerations
are,
and
it
actually
defines
that
the
transport
document
just
says,
use
the
media
type
defined
by
your
bot
that
you're
using
out
of
the
out
of
the
protocol
document,
and
so
it's
just
an
informative
here.
D
D
D
Originally
the
questioned
thiru
and
his
review
said
what
kind
of
guidance
do
you
have
and
what
are
the
privacy
implications
if
you
do
say
because
it
didn't
say
what
version
it
to
you
less
or
what
requirements
are
around?
Which
versions
of
TLS
you
support,
or
you
don't
support
or
whatever
he
said
well,
what
about,
if
you're,
using
TLS
1.2?
What
are
the
issues
because
you
know
TLS
left
like
3
fixes
saw
and
so
do
you
need
to
call
those
out
and
so
on.
D
So
I
asked
mark
nottingham
what
they
did
with
pcp
56
bits
right,
which
is
in
the
document
that
says
how
to
write
protocol
documents
over
that
use.
Http
transport,
and
I
noticed
that
that
document
also
didn't
have
such
guidance,
and
so
I
asked
him
so
why
is
that?
And
he
said
in
his
email
he
said
well,
we
in
56
bits
avoided
this
issue,
since
it's
not
HTTP
specific
right,
it
was
our
job
up
on
our
layer
to
give
that
guidance
either
right,
and
so
that
didn't
really
answer
my
question.
D
So,
however,
what
we
found
is
that
the
security
considerations,
I
think
the
types
of
things
that
you're
is
looking
for,
are
actually
covered
and
be
CP
195
right
where
a
PCP
195
is
the
RFC
that
gives
their
recommendations
for
what
you
should
do
around
TLS
and
DTLS.
But
the
question
here
is
TLS
right.
So
what
are
the
recommendations?
Parished
he
lists
versions
and
and
what
you
should
and
shouldn't
do
and
all
that
stuff,
and
so
it
already
does
that
in
a
way,
that's
not
HP
specific
right.
D
F
D
Why
I
thought
this
might
give
good
resolution
is
that
that
document
already
has
IETF
consent,
so
we'd
have
to
spend
lots
of
time
arguing
about
what
it
might
say,
but
then
you
can
still
say
well
what
about
all
the
cheap
specific
stuff?
Well,
he
was
secured
end-to-end
inside
of
HTTP
right.
So
in
theory,
there
shouldn't
be
really
anything
significant,
that's
teep
specific
to
say
right,
because
it's
any
any
cheap,
specific
security
issue.
It's
the
T
protocols
job
to
solve,
not
TLS
jobs,
protocol.
D
Only
the
TLS
considerations
shouldn't
actually
be
T
specific,
at
least
that's
the
that's
the
claim,
and
so
the
belief
is
because
t
p--
a--
secured
in
to
end.
Then
all
that's
necessary,
in
my
opinion,
is
to
reference,
be
CP
195
as
the
best
current
practice
for
what
to
do
about
us.
So
that's
why
I
did
that.
So,
if
anybody
disagrees
are
things
we
need
to
say
more
in
a
way,
that's
teep
specific.
Now
is
your
time
to
speak
up
and
give
some
recommendations.
G
D
This
text
is
largely
taken
directly
from
BCP
56,
and
so,
if
you
believe
that
that
reference
is
not
correct,
you
should
also
follow
up
with
mark
nodding
hat,
because
when
he
did
his
recheck
I
asked
him.
Do
you
believe
that
this
is
still
saying
the
right
thing
and
he
said
yep
still
looks
good
to
me
or
still
looks
okay,
I
think,
which
is
that
quote.
G
G
D
We
can
start
a
thread
with
at
least
the
three
of
us,
if
not
the
list
or
whatever.
They
just
gave
him
to
confirm
that.
But
since
this
is
a
change
for
the
HB
bist
working
group,
they
changed
their
recommendation
as
to
what
we
should
say
and
I
would
like
him
to
buy
off
on
that.
I.
Don't
disagree
with
you
I'm
just
saying.
I
want
to
keep
in
sync
with
other
document,
because.
G
D
B
D
So
I,
if
I
remember,
right
HT,
this
working
group
owns
the
particular
pcp
56
bits
and
they
are
not
under
the
security
area.
So
if
we
have
a
recommendation
they're
not
on
this
career
area,
if
we
have
a
recommendation,
they
ought
to
go
along
with
it.
So
like,
if
say,
you
know,
Ross
and
tier.
When
all
of
us
had
this
conversation,
the
interim
meeting
feel
free
to
check
our
minutes
here,
but
our
recommendation
is
to
change
your
six
following
then
that
would
be
a
security
working
group
recommendation,
twin
security
working
group.
D
G
D
D
I,
don't
think
what's
typical
is
important,
I
think,
since
the
56
bits
is
talking
about
guidance
for
people
using
HTTPS
of
transport,
it
doesn't
mean
people,
typically,
they
use
HTTP
as
a
transport
in
typical
situations.
I'm
saying
56
bit
should
cover.
You
know
the
wide
range
of
stuff,
including
you
know,
IOT,
and
so
on.
D
D
G
D
A
D
Okay,
great
so
the
next
one
was
about
ham
certificate.
Caching,
the
OTR
piece:
the
history
was
the
co-chair
piece:
Beck
did
have
text
in
there
that
talks
about
caching,
the
TAM
certificate,
so
the
T
agent
could
learn
the
TAM
certificate
a
and
so
when
it
needed
to
reach
out
to
the
TAM,
I
could
immediately
encrypt
with
the
town's
public
key
without
having
to
ask
for
a
roundtrip
to
actually
go
and
fetch
it
again
right.
That
was
the
what
the
caching
was
for
the
teeps,
but
it's
not
yet
have
any
discussion
about.
D
Caching
right
does
the
cheap
spec
as
much
newer
it
rather
than
passing
the
certificate
directly
again.
This
is
my
understanding
of
how
Oh
CFP
data
work.
Somebody
will
correct
me
if
I
have
this
right
now
the
chief
spec
uses
OCSP
data.
No
CSP
data
contains
certs.
One
of
those
certs
would
be
the
Thames
at
cert,
but
it
doesn't
mention,
get
caching
yet
right.
That's
issue,
17
that
was
filed
on
the
T
protocol.
So
here's
the
change
that
I
made
and
hopefully
I,
didn't
get
this,
but
somebody
I'm
sure
will
correct
me
if
I
did
so.
D
So
again,
the
intent
is
that
you
should
be
able
to
cache
the
Tam's
OCSP
data
so
that
you
have
its
public
key
so
that
you
can
encrypt
a
message
to
the
TAM
by
sending
a
query
response
without
having
received
a
query
request
for
this
is
the
very
first
query
request
career
response
exchange.
You
can
skip
the
initial
connect,
get
back.
The
same
career
request
would
send
to
everybody
and
just
immediately
send
the
query
response
that
you
would
have
sent
had
that
happen.
D
D
D
The
second
one
was
to
add
an
informative
reference
for
quick,
because
it's
used
in
a
diagram
to
illustrate
where
the
broker
boundary
can
be
between
the
REE
and
the
TE
and
T
hrough
pointed
out
about
the
notes
in
there
about
firewalls
would
also
apply
to
Nats,
and
so
he
said
and
nasan.
So
those
are
all
editorial
I,
don't
think
they
need
to
be
discussed
and
less
rust
or
tear
thing
want
to
reopen
them,
because
I
think
those
are
just
editorial.
So,
let's
go
into
the
last
slide.
D
D
G
E
E
D
D
Question
raised
was
I
think
this
came
out
of
a
tea,
were
your
review
was?
Should
we
actually
specify
what
the
HTTP
error
codes
are
right
right
now
the
Texas
basically
says
use
an
appropriate
HTTP
error
code.
So
you
know
you're
200
level
for
another
level,
whatever
use
an
appropriate
one
and
figure
it
out,
and
so
I'd
asked
in
mark
Nottingham
hey
if
you're
56
bit
stuff.
What
do
you
think
the
protocol
should
do
with
respect
to
specifying
HB
error
codes
right
and
his
response
was
well,
as
response
was
what
you
don't
want.
D
Is
you
don't
want
the
receiver
to
have
like
a
switch
statement,
a
particular
code?
You
know
to
rely
on
there
being
yo,
a
404
verses.
You
know
5
or
whatever,
so
the
receiver
should
only
based
behavior
on
whether
it's
200
level,
400
level
or
500
levels.
You
have
to
be
careful
to
not
over
specify
things
in
a
way
that
would
come
as
receivers
most.
The
actual
error
codes
themselves
within
the
200
for
5.0
level
might
vary
greatly
by
implementation,
okay
and
so
marked
comment
list.
D
He
thought
that
the
text
looked
okay
as
it
was,
but
I
didn't
put
that
as
a
result
here,
I
want
to
ask
that
and
get
any
discussion
here
is
now
that
forwarded
marks
response
to
the
list
right.
So,
with
his
permission,
the
question
is:
is
there
anything
more
specific?
We
want
to
do
here,
or
are
we
okay
with
it?
With
the
current
answer
to
the
question,
because
it
wasn't
a
request
for
change,
it
was
a
question.
I
hear
Oh.
D
G
D
No
specific
things
we
can
say
use
the
specific
error
in
response
to
this
particular
thing:
right:
the
200,
a
success
and
the
400
500
have
specific
meanings
about
internal
server,
error
or
temporary
or
whatever,
but
yeah
I
couldn't
think
of
anything.
We
could
say
that
implementations
would
need
to
do
or
anything
that
was
taught.
B
D
B
Think
one
important
aspect
is
that
most
of
the
error
codes
when
they
happen
at
the
deep-level
they
actually
don't
populate
down,
so
it
may
be.
If
you
have
an
error
deep
level,
it's
still,
it
may
still
be
a
200
okay,
but
then
it's
an
error
at
the
tip
level.
I
think
that's
also
what
an
important
point
the
HTTP
it's
or
the
HTTP
PCP
document
says
that
you
are
not
supposed
to
dictate
the
error
code
that
the
application
from
the
application
down
to
the
HTTP
layer
right.
D
B
D
Now
my
proposal
is
to
do
nothing
here,
other
than
maybe
you
know
keep
discussing
it
whatever,
but
I
can't
think
of
any
change
that
actually
makes
sense
that
document.
Yet
somebody
else
I'd
like
to
propose
one
feel
free,
but
right
now,
I
thought
about
this
and
after
my
discussion
with
mark
and
so
on,
I
don't
think
there's
any
change
that
I
could
make.
That
would
make
sense
so.
D
Well,
people
think
about
that
one.
The
last
question
that
I
have
on
my
slides
here
is
and
I
don't
remember
who
asked
this
and
if
it
was
a
hero
or
fan
or
somebody.
Why
is
56
bits
and
informative
reference
and
the
short
version
is
well:
it's
not
used
in
a
normative
statement
right.
It's
used
in
security
considerations
where
it
says
for
other
security
considerations,
C
56
bits
right.
D
There
is
do
what
we're
doing
now
is
informative
reference
and
these
make
it
be
normative
and
then
I'd
have
to
have
in
the
normative
statement
that
references
it
and
right
now
my
opinion
is
we're
doing
the
right
thing
of
making
it
be
informative.
So
that
was
a
question
and
I'm
hoping
I
didn't
file
an
issue,
because
it
was
the
question
so-
and
this
is
my
last
slide
so
I
think
not
on
here-
that
you
rustic-y
brought
up
in
your
review
that
we
have
not
talked
about
that.
You
want
to
talk
about.
A
D
A
D
D
D
A
C
C
C
C
Hackathon
in
Berlin
is
going
to
have
only
seaboard,
represented
format,
query
response
and
trust
a
trusted
application
store
a
trusted
application
to
each
sequence
is
the
same.
We
wanted
to
have
at
least
all
three
working,
and
we
also
want
start
see.
Poor
implementation,
starting
and
and
also
my
initial
prototype
was
on
our.
He
should
have
been
working
on
risk
five,
but
not
much
yet
and
was
always
wanted
to
work
on
this
GX.
C
C
C
C
C
This
is
what
happened
at
the
hackathon,
so
we
we
never
really
finished,
even
the
three
sequences
in
Jason
format,
so
we
we've
finished.
It
confirm
it
was
working,
but
the
so
based
on
Stan
surfer
and
my
device
and
and
now
from
the
virtual
hackathon.
Until
today,
I
was
able
to
focus
on
Zeebo
format.
That
was
did
help
a
lot
and
support
format
during
the
virtual
hackathon
didn't
finish,
implement
making
a
message
in
support
format.
We
started
to
prepare
the
library
in
the
hips
description
of
the
binary
decoding
and
binary
presented
station.
C
C
Yes,
we
when
we
implementation,
we
we
saw
some
places.
We
could
use
tickets
or
binary
strings
inside
a
message
which
is
the
size,
because
seaboard
meant
to
be
smaller,
binary
format,
data,
asn.1
or
other
formats,
and
that's
what
I've
been
what
I've
been
working
after
virtual
hackathon
until
today
and
and
few
on
the
mailing
list
today,
and
probably
that's
going
to
be
the
discussion
on
the
next
topic
from
honest
and
also
yes,
people
in
Japan
was
was
calm
down,
yeah
tip
good
work
on
the
CX.
Yes,
that
was
that
was
I
was
personally
yes,.
C
C
C
F
C
C
A
Sounds
pretty
cool
so
issues,
lessons
learned
that
came
out
from
the
hecka.
D
D
That's
true
I
think
that
had
to
do
with
how
the
routing
was
set
up
so
that
when
because
all
that
would
have
been
necessary
minimally,
if
we're
to
do
it
again
in
the
future,
is
if
the
VPN
has
no
default
route
right,
because
because
we
were
always
using
unlink
addresses
to
talk
to
each
other
right,
and
so
that
meant
that
whenever
we're
trying
to
get
to
the
internet,
then
the
default
route
was
going
across.
There.
I
think
that
was
the
real
problem.
D
C
C
B
We
had
this
plan
for
the
IDF
hackathon,
which
unfortunately
was
demolished
by
by
Charles
and
so
on,
but
because
we
spent
some
time
setting
that
one
up
so
I
think
it
would
be
worthwhile
to
schedule
another
virtual
hackathon,
whether
some
people
are
grouped
together
locally,
physically
or
not.
The
dam
I
think
that
should
be
refining,
persuade.
C
Her
to
her
cousin,
orchid
and
support
for
my
great
achievement
was
I
was
able
to
use
my
old
expertise
when
I
was
junior
high
school
high
school
reading,
the
documentation
of
the
and
writing
down
how
the
binary
should
work
by
reading
and
then
changing
the
battle
for
the
converting
city.
Their
format
took
me
all
week,
class.
A
A
A
A
B
A
B
B
This
question
about
the
nuns
which
we
used
in
context
of
their
work,
turning
rats
with
the
entity
attestation
token,
which
allows
the
dam
to
as
a
demonstration
of
lightness
been
announced
over
to
the
to
the
device
in
his
device
returns
the
dope
compacted
the
e
token,
which
includes
then
the
nuns.
So
we
clarified
that
on
the
list
that
this
nuns
needs
to
be
relatively
long.
So
there's
some
indications
on
how
long
that's
supposed
to
be
in
there
each
specification
and
if
we
just
use
the
same
lens,
then
we
won't
have
any
issues.
B
B
D
D
B
B
D
B
Difference
the
nonce
is
for
the
is
in
a
query,
request:
I'm,
the
damn
sends
it
to
the
client
and
if
it
wants
to
get
and
wants
to
get
an
attestation
entity
attestation,
token
pack
and
then,
and
that
nuns
would
in
response
would
not
show
up
in
the
in
the
people.
Search
buddy
would
instead
be
included
in
the
eat
message.
As
one
of
the
claims
that's.
B
C
Of
token,
in
the
tape
protocol
is
very
handy
for
the
implementation,
because
token
is
able
to
use
as
a
sequence
of
the
message.
So
if
one
message
from
time-
and
they
reply
is
going
to
be
from
device
it
and
it's
just
going
to
have
to
keep
incrementing
the
token
number-
probably
the
most
use
cases
and
that
will
be
easy
to
track.
If,
when
have
lost
or
it's
the
packets
not
received
we're
just
waiting
for
just
the
next
packet.
For.
B
D
B
B
I
think
what
I
recommend
is
to
sort
of
change
this
pull
request
from
into
unsigned
in,
but
and
then
merge
it
into
the
protocol.
I
think
that's
good,
but
there
will
be
more
changes
later
with
in
one
of
the
issues
that
Akira
raised
on
sort
of
fine-tuning
the
CD
DL
so
we'll
we
can
talk
more
about
this
aspect.
What
is
these
type
of
changes
in?
There
would
be
some
work.
D
Yeah
I
would
still
like
I
think
you
answered
my
question
earlier
about.
Why
is
there
both
I'd
like
to
see
some
text
in
the
document
and
I
know
that
you
added
me
as
a
as
a
co-author,
and
so
I
may
help
to
author
that
text?
But
when
I
was
talking
about
rets
formatted,
you
actually
entered
that
by
saying
the
dances
and
the
rents
formatted,
which
is
each
right
just
for
I.
C
B
Yeah,
that's
why
I
since
I
was
working
on
on
the
implementation
and
I
thought
that
we
need
a
little
bit
more
text
about
creating
and
verifying
the
deep
messages
and
so
I
I
created
a
boom
request
to
do
that.
So
if
you
go
to
the
files
changed
that.
B
Whatever
it
is,
yeah
scroll
down
a
little
bit,
so
it's
made
some
changes
here,
not
so
relevant
yeah.
Actually,
that's
something
I
want
to
bring
up
so
previously.
I
am.
This
is
goes
back
a
little
bit
to
work
where
we
actually
allowed
in
signing
and
digital
signatures
and
Max
and
but
so
far,.
B
That
we
only
had
talked
about
in
the
architecture
document,
at
least
the
talked
about
digital
signatures
are
not
not
Mac
in
so
iiep
I
sort
of
stripped
that
out
in
specifically
to
focus
only
on
cosine
one
on
its
cozy
sign.
One
signature,
which
is,
as
you
know,
for
one
signer
I
think
we
should
be
very
explicit
about
what
functionality
one
we
want
to
support,
because
cozy
is
kind
of
a
broad
toolbox
and
we
shouldn't
just
wrap
everything
in
because,
after
all,
this
code
will
go
into
the
trusted
computing
base.
B
F
B
D
Yeah
cases
suit
does
have
cases
where
you
have
counter
signings
right,
because
the
author
of
the
suit
manifest
and
the
TAM
and
marry
other
entities
besides
just
those
two.
But
here
if
messages
are
just
coming
from
the
time
of
the
t,
p--
agent,
then
maybe
you
don't
need
counter
something
which
is
I,
think
what
Han
is
assessing.
Yes,.
C
D
B
F
B
F
B
Of
course,
the
content
of
the
message
are
not
obvious,
but
the
content
of
the
message
goes
into
the
sign
payload.
There
are
different
options
that
cause
the
office
and
I'm,
basically
choosing
one
here
and
and
there's
also
I'm,
using
a
seaboard
tag
to
indicate
that
this
is
a
deep
message.
There
is
also
possibility
to
use
that
indication
elsewhere,
but
that's
kind
of
a
sensible
approach.
What.
B
D
D
Think
at
the
Berlin
hackathon
I
think
there
was
also
a
question
that
we
answered
during
the
hackathon
about
that
I,
Kira
and
folks
asked,
which
was
our
t
p--
messages
when
they
put
in
too
close
there,
they
sign
and
then
encrypted
or
encrypted
and
then
signed
and
I
think
it
is
answered,
but
I
think
in
the
section
here
and
creating
a
teep
message.
I
think
the
wording
could
be
clearer
about
what
the
relationship
is
to
encryption.
What
that
happens
just
in
terms
of
the
text.
B
So
at
the
moment,
like
there's
only
signatures-
and
there
is
no
encryption
here-
that's
since
at
this
level,
I'm.
B
B
Would
be
at
the
at
least
that's
what
we
said
previously.
Of
course
we
can
always
change
our
mind,
but
it
was
at
the
level
of
what
the
does
to
manifest
and
they
the
sort
of
data
that
comes
along
with
it,
would
be
there
so
that
that's
the
place
where
the
encryption
would
go.
But
currently
the
text
doesn't
talk
about
this
and
and
I
think.
Obviously
it
should
I
think.
D
It
has
to
you
one
of
the
OTR
P,
so
Ming
help
me
out
here,
but
one
of
the
discussions
that
I
believe
that
we
had
around
OT
RP.
Was
that
say
the
query
response
equivalent
that
comes
back.
It
gets
encrypted
with
the
Tam's
public
key
such
that
the
information
coming
out
of
the
TE
can't
be
decrypted
about
anybody
other
than
the
Tam
right,
that's
the
type
of
stuff.
We
want
to
use
the
cozy
objects,
encryption.
F
C
E
B
B
It's
it's
using
a
map
and
and
for
each
of
the
keys
in
a
map
you
have
to
essentially
define
a
number
for
them
on
or
whatever
you
want
on,
so
that
it
maps
to
the
value,
and
so
far
that
was
missing
from
the
document,
so
it
seems
that
maybe
I
should
maybe
the
term
key
is
the
right
term
name
key
and
then
there's
also
the
data
type
related
to
that
item.
If
you
can
again
go
to
files
change,
you
will
see
what
what
actually
mean
by
this.
B
H
B
Okay,
then
change
it
to
label
on
if
you
go
down,
is
another
change
that
I
probably
should
have
made
shouldn't
not
have
made
here,
but
it's
okay.
This
is
the
real
item.
So,
for
example,
you
see
there's
a
pipe
sort
of
filled
in
the
message
that
we
talked
about
token
requests,
etc.
B
Nuns
in
India's
and
each
of
them
needs
to
have
is
it's
filled
in
this
map,
and
so
so
we
can
associate
that
and
I'm
obviously
suggesting
to
add
that
to
the
to
the
document
to
make
the
hoard
specification,
implementable
and
I
I
think
I
looked
at,
it
was
the
CWG
on
what
we
did
there
at
sort
of
kind
of
where
I
copied
it
and
yeah.
We.
D
B
D
Am
asked
is
if
there
are
fields
that
are
not
optional
and,
like
type
is
when
it
jumps
out
at
me,
then
could
it
be
an
array
with
two
elements
with
the
first
element
as
the
type
and
the
second
element
is
the
map
of
stuff
or
something
like
that?
I
don't
know
I'm,
not
the
super
expert
is
what
the
most
efficient
coding
is.
D
B
D
Too,
but
when
I
did
my
implementation
at
the
Berlin
hackathon
I
was
just
using
an
array
of
fields
in
a
particular
sequence,
because
there
was
no
labels
right
and
so
I
was
using.
I
was
assuming
that
everything
was
Amanda.
It
was
mandatory
in
the
first
implementation.
I
was
doing
so.
I
didn't
have
enough
information,
so
I
just
did
an
array
with
no
window
labels.
Okay,.
H
Yeah
so
conventionally
it's
it's
easier
to
to
an
implementation
to
take
monitor,
feeds
out
of
an
array,
because
in
a
map
they
may
be
anywhere,
so
somebody
so
I
could
send
the
type
last,
and
so
you
cannot
really
process
anything
else
of
the
message
before
you
I've
seen
that
type
think
Dave's
approach
is
actually
a
good
one.
The
other
observation
I
have
is
that
the
the
content
of
that
table
particular
the
third
column
really
is
in
this
CD
DL,
so
I'm
not
sure
how
much
we
win
from
having
it
in
the
table
here.
C
H
C
C
B
We
can
it's
probably
a
good
time
to
switch
over
to
that
issue,
I'm
to
just
see
how
that
look,
because
I
think
there's
a
lot
of
good
stuff
in
here.
If
you
switch
over
to
the
issues
on
the
edit
that
the
topmost
1:21.
C
Yes,
there's
no
sentence
just
City.
The
description
here
is
just
my
reverse
from
my
binary
writing
my
my
notes
from
the
hackathon.
So
from
the
vine.
Every
format
is
meant
to
be
compact
and
doesn't
have
all
the
information
like
a
label
name
is
disappearing,
reversing
to
the
tickets
format,
and
the
city
took
me
a
while,
but
I'm.
So
one
of
the
changes
is
I
wanted
to
for
the
implementation
perspective.
Wanted
to
note
each
member
in
the
map
or
array
wanted
to
know
what
is
the
type
so
I
wrote.
B
B
C
F
B
A
D
So
this
one
came
up
at
the
Berlin
hackathon
because
we
had
previously
added
this
into
the
OT
RP
spec,
but
had
not
been
added
into
the
T
protocol
spec
and
so
the
t
p--
architecture
talks
about
passing
the
list
of
requested
tas.
So
you
have
say
install
our
program
is.
I
would
like
to
install
or
I
have
a
dependency
on
the
following
team,
and
so
the
Tim
may
have
a
whole
bunch
of
you
know,
authorized
ones,
but
whatever
something
needs
to
be
installed
may
depend
on
whether
there's
some
dependency
or
not
so
I
might
have.
D
You
know
a
hundred.
That
would
be
okay,
but
it
only
wants
to
take
the
space
of
installing
the
ones
that
are
actually
needed,
and
so
this
would
be
a
way
of
passing
a
set
of
things
that
are
potentially
needed.
Then
the
team
can
decide
whether
it's
authorized,
and
so
that's
what's
going
on
here
in
the
architecture
document.
In
the
query
response
that
comes
back
from
the
device.
D
There
was
no
field
for
passing
in
the
set
of
requested
to
use
only
the
set
of
ones
that
are
installed,
and
so,
as
I
mentioned,
we'd
added
it
into
ot
RP,
and
so
this
to
say,
we
need
the
same
thing
in
the
T
protocol,
so
another
field
in
the
list
of
OTA
is
just
like.
You
have
a
list
of
TAS
installed.
We
need
another
thing
in
there
to
add
the
list
of
TAS
desired.
B
D
This
is
in
the
query
response,
so
the
response
in
accuracy
DDL
that
we
just
we're
looking
at
right.
There
was
like
the
query,
request
and
so
on.
So
this
is
here.
Ya
know
that
the
dam
says:
hey,
please
t
p--
agent,
please
give
me
your
state,
so
the
t
p--
agent
gives
it
back,
oh
and
by
the
way,
here's
my
state,
here's
the
tas
I've
installed
and
then
here's
the
TA
said
list
of
TAS
that
I
don't
have
installed
that
I
have
dependencies
on
that
things
would
use
them
if
you
would
install
them.
Okay,.
D
So
this
is
just
noting
that
we
need
to
add
that,
in
for
consistency
with
what
we
did
in
Oh
TRP,
okay
yeah,
wasn't
there
an
initial
in
OTR
P
either
like
I?
Don't
think
it's
in
there
in
a
global
platform
version,
but
we
did
put
it
in
based
on
the
discussions
that
Ming
and
I
had
had
previous
hackathons
and
so
on.
So.
D
D
If
you
already
have
a
cache
right,
so
the
very
first
time,
if
you
have
the
cold
cash
or
that
your
certificate
is
expired
or
whatever
else,
then
are
you
flushed
your
cashed
and,
of
course
you
can
just
reach
out
and
do
the
normal
thing
and
connect
wait
for
it
to
send
you
the
query
request.
Then
you've
got
the
TAM
certificate.
You
can
encrypt
your
security,
your
query
response
with
right,
but
if
you
can
cache
the
thing
that
you
don't
have
to
wait
for
that
certificate,
this.
E
Is
related
to
that
tee
page,
you
may
be
sure
to
call
right
there,
discussion
with
second
award
to
contact
time
first
agent,
local,
but
as
there
we
don't
want
to
send
data.
You
were
doing
the
Tamil
can
trust.
How
do
you
know
that?
So
that
is
more
for
future
run?
A
team
already
have
that
one
then
loco,
lovely
installer,
whatever
constitutive
agent
can
initiate
from
there.
D
Exactly
so,
I
think
we
at
least
Ming
and
I
know
what
needs
to
be
said
in
the
document,
and
this
just
distract
that
we
need
to
write
that
text
and
put
it
in
for
a
consistency
with
what
we
want.
Stuff
sounds
cool,
yeah,
I,
think
there's
anything
else
have
to
discuss
on
that
one.
So
that's
the
end
of
the
two
issues
by
far
are.
C
One
one
one
is
very
easy
one
from
the
second
one
from
the
bottom:
the
tid
device
have
to
match
or
member.
This
is
I,
think
it's
already
resolved.
This
is
also
I
think
it
was
discussed
at
over
trp
when
matching
from
sending
the
TA
ID
from
the
Pam
to
the
device
or
it
or
it
will
be
vintner
ID
in
class,
ID
device,
ID
and
I
think
this
was
end
up
over
only
having
some
byte
string
only
which
will
be
called
the
TA
ID
and
not
with
all
this
vendor
ID
class
ID
in
the
device.
C
B
B
D
B
D
C
D
C
B
Name,
I
think
we
have
to
look
at
what
the
existing.
D
Refresh
my
memory
as
I
recall
the
discussion,
and
this
is
from
memory
which
you've
not
had
enough
keywords:
I,
remember
that
there
was
a
unique
identifier
that
was
outside
of
the
suit
manifest
and
like
a
TA
ID,
which
could
be
a
UUID
or
whatever
it
was
she's
had
to
be
some
unique
identifier,
not
three
of
them
like
not
vendor
class
device,
but
just
one
one
thing
that
was
unique
and
then
all
the
other
details
like
where
to
put
it
and
so
on.
That's
whatever
is
in
the
suit
manifest,
because
suit
had
already
solve
that
file.
D
B
D
Because
that
was,
if
you
remember
a
while
back,
we
had
a
list
of
teep
requirements
on
suit
that
the
t
p--
working
group
prepared
and
that
I
presented
over
into
suit
on
behalf
of
the
chief
working
group
and
the
suit
working
group
went
through
them
and
Brandon
said
yep
already
done
yep
already
there
yep
party.
There
will
add
that
will
add
that
okay.
D
B
C
E
G
A
D
C
C
Currently,
in
the
message
from
query
response
from
the
device
to
the
tab
does
not
have
a
member
to
say,
client
Apple
is
expecting
to
person,
have
the
same,
initiate
East
or
delete
so,
but
some
time
device
have
a
client
app
installed
by
the
vendor
or
pre
install
or
they
it's
the
client
app
installed
by
other
store
or
whatever
it's
called,
and
it
wants
to
have
the
particular
to
hate
buying
into
the
client
app
to
the
yes.
We
have
disobeyed
from
The
Associated.
D
So
this
one,
the
the
list
of
things
that
would
be
in
the
install,
which
is
the
same
as
the
issue
that
I
talked
about
what's
different
here,
is
this
notion
of?
Can
you
can
the
teep
agent
pass
a
list
of
TAS
for
which
you
would
like
to
delete?
That's
what's
new
in
this
issue
beyond
what
was
then
the
other
issue,
and
that's
not
something
the
working
with
was
ever
discussed
even
in
the
old
Sharpie
context
is:
should
we
actually
allow
the
teeth
agent
to
passive
things,
for
it
that
no
longer
has
a
dependency?
D
Maybe
you've
now
deleted
their
rich
apps
that
would
used
to
depend
on
it,
and
so
that's
not
just
kind
of
hanging
out
there
with
with
nothing
that
depends
on
it.
It
she's
consuming
space
and
it
might
like
to
reclaim
space
and
passing
that
knowledge
from
the
chief
agent
Tamm
would
allow
the
tamna
says:
okay,
if
there's
no
dependencies,
then
I'm,
okay,
with
going
ahead
and
pushing
a
delete
message
on
that
one,
and
so
that's
new,
and
that's
why
I
said
it
would
be
useful
to
bring
this
up.
D
Things,
that's
not
a
good
idea,
because
otherwise,
since
I
was
gonna,
do
a
per
request
on
how
to
pass
a
list
of
requests
and
stuff
and
Acura
has
a
little
CDL
snippet.
Then
at
least
between
Acura
and
I
I
think
we
have
enough
information
to
generate
a
pull
request.
But
since
we've
never
talked
about
the
reason
to
do
this,
I
just
wanted
to
take
a
second
to
elaborate
that
on
the
list
here
and
the
on
the
call
here.
Yeah.
B
I
think
I
think
it
would
be
to
think
a
little
bit
more
I
think
it
would
be
nice
to
have
more
context
on
about
use
about
the
use
case
that
you
have
in
mind
because,
like,
for
example,
I'm
I'm
having
a
hard
time
seeing
on
how
just
another
filled
with
unsigned
integer
provides
you
that
information.
It.
D
Doesn't
what
you
need
is
they
need
the
list
of
ta
IDs
and
so
in
the
other
issue
that
I
filed
its
here's,
the
list
of
ta
IDs.
That
I
would
like
to
install
that
I
have
dependencies
on,
but
they're
not
installed
right
now,
I
I
being
the
teep
agent
right
thank
you're,
suggesting
we
might
want
the
same
thing
of
here's
out
of
my
I,
say:
here's
a
list
of
TAS
that
are
installed
that
I
have
right.
D
Well,
here's
a
list
of
the
TAS
that
are
installed
that
I
no
longer
have
dependencies
on
so
it'd
be
okay
to
remove
them.
If
you
want
right
and
so
he's
saying,
we
should
actually
have
a
field
in
there,
which
is
a
different
list,
or
maybe
it's
another
way
of
including
the
same
list,
and
so
unless
anybody
objects
then
akira
and
I
we
can
go
ahead
and
come
up
with
the
pull
request.
That
does
that.
But
we
just
wanted
surface
this
notion
that
the
kara
came
up
with
which
I
said
I.
D
B
D
C
A
B
A
So
I'll
cancelation
and
then
maybe
I'll,
put
a
question
to
the
group.
Maybe
have
the
meeting
five
weeks
out
something
like
that.
D
Sounds
good
I
think
it
partly
depends
on
if
you're
gonna
start
a
working
group
last
call
on
one
of
the
documents
or
a
second
working
request
called
and
then
would
that
complete,
and
so
we
should
line
that
up
with
that
timeline.
So
if
you
don't
decide
right
now,
you
might
want
to
decide
like
shortly
thereafter.
Let.