►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 89
Description
# Agenda
Let's have a call to discuss the community's intentions in light of the recent call to action in the forums.
We'll discuss:
- Possible collateral additions to increase liquidity
- Possible scheduling options to implement the new collateral types
For review:
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/action-required-state-of-the-peg/2025/51
## Governance Segment
- [Richard Brown](https://twitter.com/richatmakerdao): Intro
## Risk Segment
- [Cyrus Younessi](https://twitter.com/cyounessi1) and Team: Rapid Collateral Onboarding Options and other Contingency Plans to restore the peg.
## General Q&A
We'll open the floor for any questions about Scientific Governance and Risk.
Please join us and help shape the future of the MakerDAO.
## Links
- [Video/Voice](https://zoom.us/j/697074715)
- [Dial-in](https://zoom.us/u/acRbIMDvK)
- [Calendar](https://calendar.google.com/calendar/embed?src=makerdao.com_3efhm2ghipksegl009ktniomdk@group.calendar.google.com&ctz=America/Los_Angeles)
A
Hello
and
welcome
to
a
midweek
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting.
My
name
is
Richard
Brown,
it's
April
21st
we're
going
to
talk
about
some
some
weighty
themes
today,
particularly
as
they
relate
to
the
state
of
the
peg.
The
peg
has
been
off
by
a
couple
percent
ever
since
the
apocalypse
happened
and
we're
here
to
do
a
little
bit
of
a
level
set,
establish
some
context
and
figure
out
what
next
steps
might
look
like
I'm
not
going
to
dig
into
too
many
of
the
details.
A
I'm,
not
good
at
numbers
I'm,
mostly
just
fitted
people
so
I'll
hand
off
the
actual
analytics
to
people
I
get
paid
to
do
that.
Stuff.
I
want
to
do
some
brief,
because
I
know
how
much
everybody
looks
forward
to
this
at
the
opening
of
these
calls
so
I'm
going
to
set
some
context,
throw
some
questions
out
there
and
have
hopefully
had
these
things
percolate
in
the
back
of
people's
minds
as
we
discuss
mixed
up
in
skating.
Who's
ran
like
sorry,
just
like
no,
no.
A
A
Sorry
for
the
brief
detour,
so
here
we
go
some
philosophy.
We
have
an
open
governance
system,
there's
long
debates
than
debates
that
will
end
anytime
soon
about
the
utility
of
human
governance
versus
algorithmic
governments,
as
the
engineers
in
the
world
endlessly
march,
to
have
us
all
replaced
by
Python
scripts
and,
in
the
meantime,
we're
not
there.
A
A
D
I'll,
keep
it
really
brief.
You
know,
I,
think
that
you
know
what
the
impetus
behind
the
post
was.
You
know
simply
that
we're
in
somewhat
of
an
unprecedented
situation
on
maker,
in
that
all
of
the
obvious
levers
from
a
monetary
policy
perspective
have
have
been
pulled,
but
I
kind
of
still
remains
significantly
off
the
peg.
D
You
know
we,
you
know
in
talking
to
different
DD
Phi
teams,
building
applications
in
the
space
we've.
You
know,
hurt,
increasing
frustration
with
the
lack
of
liquidity
and
the
volatility
of
dye
in
you
know,
over
the
past
month,
kind
of
compelling
people
to
look
at
other
stable
coins
as
a
primitive,
and
you
know
that
that's
that
was
concerning
for
us
on
its
face,
because
you
know
we
care,
you
know
deeply
about
the
success
of
maker,
Dow
and
I.
D
D
D
We,
you
know,
don't
really
have
any
particular
bias
towards
any
one
of
the
options.
I
mean.
Certainly
we
think
some
are
better
than
others
are
more
feasible
than
others.
You
know
we
think,
frankly,
that,
like
what
we
do
feel
conviction
behind
is
that
action
does
need
to
be
taken
and
it
should
be
taken
swiftly
and
it
it
you
know
and
and
and
it
shouldn't
be
dragged
out
so
maybe
I'll
pause
there.
That's
that's
kind
of
if
anyone
else
on
the
purifi
team
has
anything
to
add
to
what
I
said.
B
Everyone
is
on
gin
with
paraffin,
it's
just
just
a
quick
note
on
that
I
think,
there's
I,
guess
two
buckets,
there's
kind
of
these
more
drastic
collateral.
You
know
onboarding
challenges
and
process
that
we're
kind
of
monitoring,
this
kind
of
ease
or
existing
monetary
policy
changes,
and
we
think
we
can
kind
of
take
this
multifaceted
approach
towards
adjustment.
Peggy
doesn't
necessarily
just
have
to
be
onboarding
you
collateral
or
adjusting
new
levers.
Do
you
think
we
can?
You
know
just
a
few
the
levers,
and
we
still
have
in
mind
that
it
is
the
u.s.
u.s.
B
A
Thanks
for
the
potentially
recap,
I've
posted
the
link
to
the
forum
in
the
sidebar
there's
a
lots
of
a
thread
to
read
so
I'm,
not
sure
people
are
gonna,
get
caught
up
in
the
next
couple
minutes,
but
it's
there
for
reference
and
I
think
that
the
swift
action
is
the
theme
that
we
need
to
latch
onto
here.
What
is
the
nature?
Switch
a
swift
action,
a
swift
action
needed.
A
What
are
the
options
available
to
us
and
this
loops
back
to
a
theme
that
I've
been
beat
that
I've
been
hitting
in
a
number
of
calls
recently
and
I'm
going
to
continue
to
do
that.
I
think
because,
for
whatever
reason,
exogenous
circumstances
just
from
general
roadmap
type
stuff.
We
are
reaching
sort
of
a
tipping
point
in
the
ecosystem
or
in
our
protocol,
make
it
one
same
ecosystem
as
if
the
protocol
is
the
ecosystem.
It's
not
a
good
look
so,
and
it's
out
of
our
protocol.
A
A
That
doesn't
mean
that
that's
going
to
happen,
here's
why?
Because
external
intention
requires
internal
or
engaged
stakeholders
to
actually
do
the
work
and
work
takes
time.
So
that's
one
of
the
things
that
I
want
to
throw
out
there
to
just
subconsciously
percolate
throughout
the
course
of
this
call,
because
there's
a
call
to
action.
Let's
fix
the
peg
as
initiated
by
paraffin
capital,
we're
here
to
talk
about
how
that
will
work.
A
Let's
keep
in
the
back
of
our
minds
what
we
want
versus
what
rational
implementation
plan
like
look
like
so
here
is
the
end
of
metering
out
weighty
questions,
I'm
going
to
hand
it
over
to
Cyrus
to
give
us
clear
and
actionable
answers
to.
Hopefully
the
questions.
Sorry
I
couldn't
resist
so
I'm
gonna
hand
it
off
to
you,
and
maybe
we
can
talk
about
where
the
threads
landed
and
some
of
the
decisions
that
the
risk
team
sure.
E
Hey
guys
so
just
a
quick
recap
of
what
happened
in
the
governance
community
over
the
weekend
past
couple
days.
So,
as
mentioned
a
parent
fly
capital
put
out
a
thread
on
Saturday
and
at
the
end
of
it
there
was
a
towards
foreign
poll
asking
if
whether
the
current
situation
constituted
some
sort
of
emergency
or
not.
E
Otherwise,
if
it
wasn't
going
to
increase
our
risk,
then
we
would
have
pulled
these
levers
a
long
time
ago.
So
a
few
different
solution,
a
few
different
ideas
that
were
proposed
I
just
want
to
make
sure
that
we
set
the
context
very
clearly
from
the
outset.
Is
that
pretty
much
all
of
the
all
the
proposals
they
increased
risk
to
the
protocol
in
some
fashion
or
another
I?
E
So,
after
a
very
lively
discussion,
it
appeared
that
the
discussion
started
to
center
around
three
or
four
different
proposals
and,
as
a
result,
we
held
individual
forum
polls
from
each
of
these
four
proposals.
They
were
the
first
one
was,
should
we
add,
link
as
a
collateral
type
to
the
system
and
I'll
get
into
the
four
we
can
get
into
the
pros
and
cons
of
all
these
afterwards.
But
first
one
was,
should
we
add,
link
as
a
collateral
type
to
the
protocol.
E
E
E
E
So
presumably
governance
may
be
interested
in
adding
implementing
some
of
these
these
solutions,
potentially
as
early
as
this
week,
if
not
next
week,
it
means
we're
gonna
have
to
kind
of
rush
through
the
whole
process.
Unfortunately,
there
there
will
not
be
time
to
kind
of
do
a
deep
dive
analysis
into
link,
for
example,
and
evaluate
all
of
the
the
nuances
there
won't
be
sufficient
time
to
do.
It
super
deep
dive
into
TUSD,
for
example,
and
try
to
have
a
long,
fruitful
discussion
on
its
counterparty
risk.
E
We've
got,
we've
got
to
go
with
governance,
heuristics
and
logic,
and
then
try
to
iterate
as
quickly
as
we
can
over
time
so
that
we
end
up
in
a
state
that
we're
happy
to
be
in
as
a
community,
so
yeah
so
I
mean
there's,
there's
a
bunch
of
items
to
discuss
on
the
agenda,
in
addition
to
just
trying
to
hash
out
the
risk
parameters
for
these
collateral
types,
but
other
things
I'm
interested
in
hearing
from
today
are
some
sort
of
proposed
timeline
for
implementation.
So
some
of
these
can
fairly
trivially
be
implemented.
E
This
week,
for
example,
changing
the
u.s.
DC
parameters
should
be
really
no
more
than
a
than
an
executive
vote,
whereas
at
the
other
spectrum
adding
a
completely
new
collateral
type
such
as
link
requires
a
an
end-to-end
process
that
involves
a
whole
bunch
of
engineering
efforts
and
integrations
efforts,
and
just
a
lot
of
things
on
that
pipeline.
So
I'm
hoping
to
hear
from
some
of
the
teams
that
are
involved
with
collateral
onboarding
today
as
well
on
this
call.
E
That
being
said,
just
to
wrap
this
up,
I
want
to
try
to
keep
this
a
freeform
discussion
like
to
see
as
much
participation
as
possible.
As
I
said,
there
isn't
any
sort
of
like
very
specific
presentation
or
from
from
the
wrist
team,
or
anything
like
this.
It's
kind
of
been
more
ad
hoc
in
nature.
There
was
just
a
really
really
amazing
discussion
last
few
days
in
the
forums
and
I
just
kind
of
would
like
to
see
this
be
somewhat
of
an
extension
of
that
I'm
gonna
pause
there
for
comments
or
anybody
to
kick
this
off.
E
B
Well,
if
nobody
volunteers
out
I'll,
just
say
that
anything
that
relates
to
adding
in
collateral
of
course
means
you
know
adapters
and
more
smart
contracts
work.
So
we
do
have
to
take
that
into
consideration.
If
you
know
the
community
votes
yes
and
either
of
these
things
and
I'm,
not
even
talking
about
you,
know
the
rest
parameters
and
just
talking
about
the
due
diligence
that
needs
to
happen
when
onboarding
new
collateral
at
the
technical
level.
B
D
Hey
this
is
a
band
from
purify
again
I
mean
I.
Think
if
you
kind
of
look
at
the
four
options
that
were
proposed
as
potential
remedies
or
partial
remedies,
and
we
were
to
kind
of
stack
rank
them
from
you
know
easiest
to
implement
to
most
difficult
to
implement,
as
well
as
from
you
know,
call
it
most
consensus
to
least
consensus,
I,
think
kind
of
the
easiest
to
implement
and
and
the
the
one
that
has
kind
of
the
most
community
support,
at
least
based
on
the
polling
results
seems
to
be
the
u.s.
D
E
So
I've
heard
a
lot
of
feedback
from
the
community
regarding
us,
DC
on
basic
understable,
a
fee.
How
basically
started
super
high
at
20%
and
then
it's
just
kind
of
very
slowly
been
coming
down
and
potentially
at
too
slow
of
pace.
I
won't
rehash
I
won't
get
into
the
the
reason
behind
why
it
started
so
high
again.
E
Just
looking
at
other
kind
of
other
protocols
and
other
comparables
I
mean
I.
Think
the
US
DC
stability,
if
you
can
just
go
well
I'd
like
to
hear
some
other
thoughts,
but
I
mean
there's,
it
could
really
go
as
low
as
that
community
wants
it
to
go
so
I
think
maybe
informal
poll
for
that
might
be
useful,
but
I
wouldn't
say
that
there's
really
much
in
the
form
of
so
okay.
So
here
are
the
risk
considerations
with
with
instability.
One
is
obviously
the
counterparty
risk
which.
E
For
better
or
worse,
we've,
more
or
less,
we
haven't
really
discussed
too
in-depth
until
now,
and
then,
additionally,
as
a
reminder,
the
liquidations
for
u.s.
DC
are
currently
disabled,
and
so
the
community
is
internalized
with
what
that
means
for
us,
DC
and
potentially
other
stable
coins
that
may
be
added
in
a
similar
fashion.
E
Another
data
point
is
as
recently
as
just
some
time
the
last
week
or
two
you
could
have
borrowed
dye
against
us
DC
on
compound
for
0.5%,
for
0.5%
stability
fee
and
as
I
understand
it,
it
wasn't
really
heavily
utilized.
So
this
may
potentially
dull
the
if
any
intended
effects
that
we're
hoping
to
see
out
of
this
it's
hard
to
say
how
much
dye
generation
would
be
created
from
making
the
u.s.
DC
parameters
less
conservative,
but
it
certainly.
F
It's
Aras,
it's
Tom
from
from
dragonfly
I
I'm
a
bit
skeptical
that
be
like
stable
Clara
is
gonna,
join,
generate
Mieville,
die
generation,
I,
think
partially,
for
the
reasons
that
you
mentioned,
which
is
just
like
I,
don't
know
if
stability
fees
are
really
the
thing,
that's
driving
die
generation,
given
that
there's
already
competitive
lending
Protocol's
out
there
that
are
offering
great
rates.
I
think
the
problem
is
just
like,
as
you
mentioned,
do
sort
of
aid.
F
There's
a
server
cap
to
you,
the
usage
of
these
things
right,
they're
used
for
four
pegs,
peg
maintenance,
and
so
you
can
imagine
in
a
world
where
you
know
we
lower
the
USOC
stability
fee.
Really,
this
is
a
useful
tool
for
people
going
long
on
the
particular
pair
which
would
be
died.
Us
DC,
so
people
see
dies
about
the
peg.
They
want
to
short
it.
They
generate
die,
sell
it
for
us
DC,
and
so
we
sort
of
reduce.
We
generate
fine
supply
and
sell
it
to
drop
the
price
of
diet.
F
The
promos,
like
there's
a
fundamental
ceiling
right,
there's
not
going
to
be
long-term,
sustained
of
an
interest
in
doing
this
trade
these
as
soon
as
I
started
to
draw.
You
know
that
below
$1
people
when
it
closed
out
and
so
as
quickly
as
that
died
was
was,
was
minted.
It'll,
be
your
bought
back
up
and
it
closed
out.
F
E
F
In
the
short
run,
but
you
know
it's
a
very
short
period
of
time,
I,
don't
know
why
anyone
would
you
know,
pay
money
or
the
readers
you
had
the
opportunity
cost
of
having
the
USD
see
sitting
in
maker.
Just
a
minute
died
like
I.
It's.
It's
really
only
useful
for
this
for
this
trade.
Otherwise
it's
just
sort
of
strictly
losing
value
proposition,
especially
cubits,
considering
that
they
would
be
getting
paid
to
you,
possibly
USD,
see
somewhere
else
and.
F
So
yeah
I
told
to
say
I
think
we
need
to
be
focused
on
figuring
out.
Somebody
to
you
know
not
I,
don't
I
say
permanently,
but
on
a
very
long
time
rising,
encourage
people
to
generate
die.
Australia
means
you
know,
creating
some
sort
of
long-term
interest
in
levering
up
on
the
underlying,
so
ether
has
has
been
pretty
good
for
this
I
think
that
needs
to
be
sort
of
the
focus
of
this
discussion
and.
I
There's
liquidity
and
then
they're
simply
like
the
market
price
of
die
and
I.
Think
that
the
the
absolute
supply
relative
to
is
like,
in
a
long
run
generally
in
markets
for
an
asset
like
this
or
a
swap
like
this
correlated
with.
You
know
the
sort
of
like
available
to
click
literally
working
out
a
greater
size.
I
grant
that
point,
but
to
like
the
actual
market
price
of
die
like
irrespective
of
a
liquidity
concern
which
I
think
would
be
fairly
said,
is
greater
than
a
dollar
today,
not
greater
than
a
dollar
at
some
marginal
size.
I
Like
isn't
really
that's
kind
of
a
distinct
issue
from
the
absolute
amount
of
die
in
existence,
so
I'm
not
sure
that
I
agree
that,
like
strictly
trying
to
increase
the
supply
here
is
as
the
goal
like
is
an
appropriate
goal,
because
there's
no
real
reason
to
believe
that,
like
marginal
demand
for
dollars
or
marginal
demand
for
dollars.
That
can
be
lent
out
on
compound
at
like
four
point.
F
No
I
think
that's
a
very
fair
point.
I
think
my
point
is
is
more
probably
just
focusing
on
trying
to
correct
the
price
by
using
this
USD
C
pair
is
going
to
be
served
a
superficial
victory,
so
I
agree,
but
it's
like
this
specific
problem,
I
think
is
at
the
specific
solution.
I,
don't
think
it's
like
gonna
be
the
most
effective
way
to
do
this.
I
I
DC
as
like
a
peg
management
tool,
I
think
probably
is
not
going
to
be
viable
in
the
medium
to
long
term
like
given
the
attached
counterparty
risk
or
really
that,
like
as
a
simple
thought
experiment
there
is
some
region
of
you
know
the
percentage
of
die
collateralized
by
USC
as
a
non
bearer
asset
able
to
be
called
anytime
by
the
issuer
versus
eath,
at
which
we
would
say
die
itself
is
no
longer
a
bearer
asset
or
not
decentralized.
So,
like
put
very
simply
one
99%
of
all
die
is
composed
of
underlying
eath
collateral.
I
It
doesn't
really
matter
what
happens
to
us
DC
all
of
it
could
get
called
by
the
issuer
and
whatever
the
system
probably
continues
and
like
died
as
a
whole
or
died.
Shelling
point
isn't
really
affected
on
the
flipside.
If
99%
of
all
die
is
underlied
by
us,
DC
or
even
I
would
argue
a
constellation
of
assets
with
similar
counterparty
risks
attached
them.
I
Ie
that
are
truly
bearer
assets
then
die
itself
is
no
longer
a
bearer
or
decentralized
asset,
and
so
I
think
on
that
side
of
the
collateral,
we're
kind
of
hesitant
to
treat
it
as
like
a
viable
lever
to
lean
on
anytime
there's
an
issue
with
the
peg
especially
longer
than
in
the
short
term
and
then
to
the
other
points
on
on
additional
collateral
types.
I
think
that
if
there's
a
lot
of
moral
hazard
posed
by
approaching
an
issue
like
a
monetary
policy
issue
with.
I
Like
letting
that
sort
of
impact,
how
we
view
collateral
risk
discussions,
u.s.
DC
I
think
could
be
fairly
argued
on
Black
Thursday
as
a
true,
one-off
or
sort
of
like
an
exogenous
event.
But
to
do
that
going
forward,
it
seems
like
kind
of
an
unreasonable
position
to
say
that
you
know
collateral
risk.
Governance
is
actually
a
fair
process,
if,
like
the
primary
impetus
for
most
of
in
in
hindsight
at
this
point,
would
be
most
of
those
meaningful
decisions
we
make
as
a
group
being
monetary
policy
related.
I
So
like
just
that's
kind
of
just
a
general
concern
about
the
world.
Hazard
posed.
I
think
that,
in
summary,
we're
more
excited
about
continuing
to
try
at
the
monetary
policy.
Letters
then
letting
this
bleed
over
into
collateral
parameters
or
would
be
in
a
vacuum.
But
if
we
were
to
do
that
in
the
short
term,
as
potentially
the
easiest
fix
think
that
it
should
be
done
intentionally
with
the
view
or
the
understanding
that
it's
quite
likely
that
we
won't
be
able
to
access
these
same
levers
like
in
similar
future
situations.
A
F
A
Opportunity
to
ask
a
potentially
stupid
question
because
I've
enough
caveat
said:
I
understand
how
money
works,
so
hopefully
people
will
forgive
me.
So
maybe
something
from
the
wrist
team
can
speak
to
this
question
about
whether
do
we
just
simply
exist
in
a
risk-off
environment?
Do
we
know
that
people
are
still
seeking
leverage?
Do
we
know
that.
F
A
J
So
briefly,
the
the
point
was
asked
a
couple
of
weeks
ago.
Actually,
if
this
was
sort
of
a
momentary
pause
in
activity
on
maker
or
if
this
was
like,
some
sort
of
you
know
exodus
of
demand
to
other
platforms.
I
think
the
first
point
to
mention
is
this
is
like
a
market
condition
event
going
on
right
now.
J
So
to
some
extent,
there
is
a
decreased
global
demand
for
leverage
on
eath,
because
a
lot
of
people
are
potentially
uncomfortable
with,
what's
going
on,
with
either
price
right
now
and
not
quite
ready
to
live
rock,
which
just
kind
of
exacerbates.
What's
going
on
with
dying,
it's
not
so
much
like
this
is
a
purely
maker,
specific
issue.
That
being
said,
obviously,
when
dye
is
consistently
trading
above
$1,
that
creates
a
bit
more
additional
uncertainty
of
a
type
that
the
system
has
not
really
had
to
deal
with.
J
Yet,
where
people
are
a
little
bit
uncertain
of
the
timing
of
dye
returning
back
to
peg
and
so
they're,
also
more
hesitant
to
do
things
like
market
making
or
to
you
know,
take
out
debt
because
they're
unsure
at
what
price
they'd
be
able
to
close
out
those
positions
that
they're
effectively
opening
up.
So
that's
kind
of
the
obvious
problem
that
I
think
brought
a
lot
of
people
to
this
conversation
in
terms
of
segmenting
out
you
SDC
versus
other
collateral
assets
versus
price
impact
versus
you
know,
liquidity.
J
The
the
main
thing
I
think
that's
important
to
make
clear
that
a
separate
is,
on
the
one
hand
you
have
the
die
Peck
and
the
fact
that
it's
trading
above
and
the
general
uncertainty
associated
with
that.
On
the
other
hand,
you
have
the
idea
that
there's
demand
being
at
sort
of
a
low
or
globally
depressed
level,
and
if
demand
for
leverage
is
just
generally
lower,
it
actually
kind
of
potentially
overrides.
What's
going
on
with
with
the
dye
peg
in
terms
of
preventing.
J
You
know
people
from
taking
out
new
debt
positions,
so
there's
a
separate
problem,
which
is
the
market
making
and
the
availability
of
things
like
US,
DC
versus
the
actual
demand
and
desire
for
leverage.
So
you
could
increase
the
dye
supply,
but
if
you're
not
also
increasing
the
demand
for
leverage
there,
you're
potentially
not
solving
the
problem.
Let's,
let's
see
where
I
wanted.
A
To
sort
of
narrow
the
conversation
to
examine
whether
the
solutions
of
curve
being
presented
in
the
state
of
the
peg
thread
are
specific
or
targeting
a
micro
problem
within
the
protocol
or
whether
they're
targeting
a
macro
program
problem
with
the
the
market
itself.
So
is
the
addition
of
new
collateral
types
going
to
solve
the
fact
that
everything
is
burning
all
around
us
or
is
this
a
long-term
fix
or
a
short-term
yeah.
E
C
From
para
fight,
I
just
wanted
to
provide
kind
of
my
view
upon
everything
that
is
happening
here,
not
just
for
my
micro,
specific
sort
of
you
know,
maker
specific
issue,
but
really,
I
said,
global
to
issue
that
we're
seeing
in
the
market
so
kind
of
view
backtrack
to
what
happened
over
the
past
couple
months
in
financial
markets
and
global
economies.
You
saw
this
big.
You
know.
Risk
of
you
know
a
sentiment
where
people
sold
off
risk
on
assets
and
move
them
to
potentially
cash.
C
What
cash
is
that
that's
usually
mostly
US
dollars,
because
people
kind
of
trust
that
currency
above
other
other
currencies
so
dice,
really
a
proxy
of
of
us
of
a
dollar
really
just
in
you
know
and
encrypted
dollars.
If
you,
if
you
want
to
say
it
that
way,
and
if
you,
if
you
look
at
you,
know
the
strength
of
the
dollar
over
over
other
emerging
currents
of
emerging
market
currencies,
it's
been
significantly
higher.
I
mean
the
dollar
rally
liked
4%
5%
in
march
and
so
on
this
since
normal
ice.
C
But
it's
normalized
because
you
know
central
banks
have
had
this
mentality
of
do
whatever
it
takes.
That's
literally
a
quote
from
the
european
central
bank
that
is
like
we'll
do
whatever
it
takes
to
maintain
the
economy
to
inject
liquidity.
You
know
monetary
money.
Supply
m2
has
increased
by
11%
from
an
all-time
high
before
the
events
unfolded
over
the
past
couple
months
from
like
15
two
trillion
to
17
trillion.
So
there's
been
just
this
massive
injection
of
liquidity
by
central
banks
to
try
to
keep
the
dollar
stable
and
that's
that's.
Adding
liquidity
banks
need
that
liquidity.
C
People
need
that
liquidity
to
make
sure
that
the
system
continues
to
to
function
so
that
you
know
credit
swap
lines,
don't
break
and
so
on
and
so
forth.
I
mean
the
Fed.
Funds
rate
is
already
at
65
bits
and
so
I
don't
think
that
really
the
the
fact
that
we're
talking
about
monetary
levers
use
decieve
bringing
it
down.
You
know
two
to
zero,
is
really
what's
gonna
make
Drive
any
sort
of
structural
change
around
the
dye.
Peg
really
what's
happening.
Is
that
because
of
this
part?
C
Partly
because
there
is
this
flight
to
safety
and
some
people
are
using
dyes
or
proxy
to
a
dollar
potentially
because
they
cannot
actually
buy
dollars.
For
example,
if
you
look
at
the
there
was
a
website
shared
by
one
of
the
members
from
the
maker
team
that
shows
how
dye
in
Argentina
in
Argentine
peso
is
trading
around
ten
percent
above
above
you
know
above
spot
really
offshore
markets,
because
people
have
this
strong
bid
for
dye.
C
So
there's,
certainly
this
really
relentless
bid
for
dye,
and
that
is
not
being
matched
equally
by
a
offer
to
sell
dye,
and
that's
probably
because
you
know
we're
in
somewhat
of
a
risk
of
you
know
cycle.
So
the
only
way
I
see
dye
coming
into
circulation
is
by
adding
new
collateral
types
by
by
expanding
them.
C
You
know,
eat
itself
and
minting
dye
to
maintain
the
stability
of
the
peg
right,
just
like
a
normal
central
bank
would
kind
of
go
by
increase
the
balance
sheet
and
and
kind
of
print
money
for
lack
of
a
better
word.
I
think
that
if
that's
not
a
feasible
way
of
doing
it,
I
certainly
think
that
the
additional
collateral
options
are
the
way
to
go
to
to
bring
a
long-term
stability
to
the
peg
I'm.
C
Not
looking
not
not
focused
on
some
of
the
this,
the
small
monetary
level
levers
that
are
left
to
pull
because
I,
don't
think.
That's
really
what's
gonna
fix,
what's
happening
to
dye
peg,
giving
given
the
macroeconomic
and
both
the
sort
of
structural
issues
that
the
maker
system
is
currently
experiencing.
I'm.
I
Don't
really
think
that's
true
to
the
extent
that
it's
the
case
that
maker
to
your
point,
not
a
central
bank,
but
the
underwriter
of
a
bunch
of
credit
swap
lines
doesn't
have
the
ability
to
prevent
the
neutral
interest
rate
on
those
swaps
from
breaching
zero
ie.
The
point
at
which
the
strength
the
dollar
means
that,
rather
than
being
paid
to
take
out,
rather
than
paying
to
take
out
leverage
against
it,
you
actually
have
to
pay
to
offer
exposure
or
sorry
pay
for
exposure
to
dollars.
A
A
G
I
In
my
mind,
like
monetary
policy
levers
again,
and
also
it's
not
really
interest
rate
in
the
same
way
that
a
central
bank
would
think
of
one
just
to
like
make
it
explicit
right,
like
the
foundation,
we
collectively
as
a
community,
don't
have
the
benefit
of
underwriting
an
arbitrary
amount
of
liquidity
risk
or
even
go
so
far.
The
solvency
risk
as
Kevin
to
me,
the
point
the
Fed
is
willing
to
other
central
banks
have
the
ability
to
in
terms
of
their
own
currencies.
So
it's
like
if
we
were
to
reframe
the
question.
I
As
you
know,
die
is
ultimately
a
dollar
swap
thanks
for
voting
fixed
for
floating
dollar
swap
on
the
collateral
based
underwritten
by
us
as
MKR
holders
as
like
a
decentralized
Clearing.
House.
There's,
no
reason
that
that
that
interest
rate
whatever
you
want
to
call
it
swap
rate
I,
can't
be
negative
at
all
oil
and
gold
flip,
frequently
emerging
market
currencies
and
other
commodities.
I
There's
no
zero
bound
here
like
this,
we're
not
as
number
one
we're,
not
a
central
bank,
but
two,
it's
not
even
like
number
one.
Sorry
we
could
have
that
discussion
about
like
if
we
wanted
to
frame-maker
as
a
central
bank
and
like
whether
or
not
it
could
breach
the
error
in
that
case.
But
it's
kind
of
a
moot
conversation
giver
or
not,
and
so
the.
I
B
I
It
I
think
that
the
if
we
abstract
the
target
rate
out
as
a
way
of
getting
to
a
negative
stability
fee,
given
that
we
can't
literally
implement
mechanically
a
negative
stability
fee,
it
becomes
much
easier
to
think
about.
Then.
The
answer
your
question
on
Johnny
is
clearly
yes,
which
is
if,
at
some
point
you
know
the
neutral
swap
rate
becomes
positive.
Again.
First
dye
would
return
to
one
dollar
as
the
target
rate
and
then
the
stability
she
would
become
positive.
I
D
I
guess
you
know
practically
speaking
like
negative
stability
fees
and
adjusting
the
target
rate
are
not
really
things
we
can
do
in
a
in
a
short
period
of
time
to
address
this.
If
I
understand
correctly
from
the
foundation
team
and-
and
you
know
the
kind
of
how
long
it
would
take
to
implement
these
things
it,
it
doesn't
seem
like
it's.
D
It
particularly
piece
of
lemon
dressing,
kind
of
like
more
of
like
the
near
term,
the
near
term
price,
I,
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
anyone
on
the
call
I
I
feel
like
look
I
I
here
kind
of
some
of
the
points
around
adjusting
the
USD
C
parameters,
and
maybe
they
won't
be
effective,
but
I
think
it's
hard
to
argue.
It's
not
positive.
Some
in
that
you
know
it
may
not
fully
solve
the
problem,
but
it
will
help
it
incrementally.
D
So
it's
not
like
I,
don't
view
it
as
a
panacea
and
adjusting
the
dyed
peg
back
to
back
to
one,
but
will
it
help
on
the
margin?
I
think
it's
hard
to
argue
that
it
would
it
like,
if
you
lower
rates
from
8
to
close
to
zero
and
I.
Also
think
you
can
do
it
in
a
way
that
you
know
mitigates
risk
to
the
system.
D
If
we're
thinking
you
know,
as
we
kind
of
underwrite
USD
C
risk,
if
we
leave
the
debt
ceiling
as
is
but
just
lower
the
interest
rate,
you
know
we're
still
we're
still
effectively
kind
of
taking
the
binary.
You
know
binary
bearer
risk
on
us
DC,
regardless
of
what
the
stability
fee
is
like.
I
guess,
in
my
mind,
like
the
core
product
of
maker,
is
die,
being
stable
and
die
being
liquid,
and
so
the
core
product
is
isn't
working
right
now
and
so
really
like
fixing
it.
You
know,
with
more
urgency.
I
think
is
important.
D
D
Given
you
know,
you're
paying
exchange
fees
when
you
sell
and
when
you
buy
and
you're
also
in
current
slippage,
when
you
sell
and
when
you
buy
plus
you're,
taking
kind
of
die
volatility,
risk
and
so
kind
of
you
boil
those
all
together
and
depending
on
the
duration
of
the
loan,
you
know
your
implied
cost
of
capital
could
be.
You
know,
you
know
it.
You
know
in
the
mid-teens.
D
D
You
know
action
needs
to
be
taken
sooner
and
it
needs
to
be
kind
of
the
most
pragmatic,
simplest
actions
and
even
though,
even
though
some
of
the
things
that
have
been
proposed
in
the
forums
may
not
in
and
of
themselves,
fully
solve
the
problem,
I
think
collectively
they'll
all
chip
away
at
the
problem
and
put
us
on
the
right
path
and
in
the
interim
we
can
continue
to
brainstorm.
Other
longer-term
solutions
like
the
ones
that
Charlie
is
mentioning
but
I,
think
in
the
very
near
term.
D
A
I
might
take
this
opportunity
where
to
if
I'm
missing
us
at
the
top
of
the
hour
to
circle
us
back
to
part
of
my
pressing
theme
of
intention
versus
feasibility
Cyrus.
Maybe
can
you
speak
a
bit
to
what
the
polls
stated
in
the
forum
post
sort
of
what
the
implications
of
those
might
be
and
then
possibly
talk
to
feasibility,
because
there's
signaling
has
happened
in
that
forum
post
people?
A
The
people
have
spoken
to
a
certain
extent
and
so
those
their
stakeholders
in
both
this
process,
though-
and
this
is
the
caution
that
I
have-
is
that
we
should
do
something-
that's
great
it's
going
to
take
fifty
or
a
hundred
people
to
do
that
thing.
So,
let's
think
about
what
this
actually
means
right.
E
So
I
mean
the
next
step
would
be
an
on
chain
governance
poll,
and
it
would
be
great
if
the
governance
poll
for
that
could
contain
the
proposed
risk
parameters
for
whatever
collateral
type
wants
to
be
added
and
then
additionally
have
to
work
with
the
governance,
crew
you
and
long
for
wisdom
and
others,
and
how
to
structure
the
polls
are
going
to
have
1:1
governance.
Bolded
holds
all
the
collateral
types
are
just
individual
one
by
one
and
then
yeah
I
think
today
and
tomorrow
we
should.
E
A
What
the
target
is,
though,
so
the
idea
if
we
had
the
discussion
over
the
weekend
with
the
forum
thread,
we
have
a
call
today
to
discuss
some
meta
issues
and
see
if
anything,
surfaces
and
then
we
move
into
threads,
broken
down
threads
per
collateral
type
suggest
and
then
those
have
to
get
translated
to
the
actual
governance
mechanism.
So
for
timing,
the
hope
is
that
we
do
that
tomorrow
or
the
next
day.
Or
do
we
go
straight
to
an
executive
assistant.
A
And
is
the
intention
then,
that
after
the
executive
vote
happens,
what's
the
delay
between
intention
and
implementation
there
so
executive?
What
happens
on
Friday?
Do
we
expect
or
does
the
community
expect?
Is
it
feasible
to
have
these
collateral
types
just
to
show
up
in
on
the
internet
or
or
is
there
going
to
be
a
delay,
and
this
is
this
is
maybe.
A
Of
the
additional
stakeholders
can
contribute
some
input
because
it's
easier
said
than
done
so
integrations
business
developments,
smart
contracts,
hers
risk
community
governance,
content,
blog
post
writers,
the
entire
orcas
ort
of
mobilize,
and
that's
just
inter
inside
the
org
that
doesn't
take
into
account
external
parties.
Oracle's
I
forgot
Oracle's
as
well
so
is.
Does
anybody
want
to
speak
to
the
feasibility?
Does
anybody
have
any
blockers
that
they
want
to
talk
about
people
that
are
actually
expected
to
do
the
work.
E
And
one
last
point
there's
just
to
reiterate
that
there's
a
distinction
between
the
different
solutions
right,
so
some
of
them
are
super
easy
to
implement
such
as
changing,
do
SDC
risk
parameters,
but
then
adding
new
collateral
types
either.
A
new,
stable
coins
or
link,
for
example,
would
require
significant
engineering
work
so
really
like
to
hear
from
some
of
the
devs
on
the
call.
G
And
so,
if
you
just
if
you
just
use
cracking
right,
then
you're
ultimately
given
giving
crack
in
this
centralized
kind
of
hook
into
the
system
to
kind
of
enact
change
right
just
by
modulating
with
what
their
API
returns.
So
that's
kind
of
an
issue
that
that
needs
to
be
addressed,
whereas
everything
else
is
is
a
lot
more
straightforward.
B
G
H
H
Just
wanted
to
add
the
PAX
gold
like
if
anyone
hasn't
looked
into
it
yet
I
recommend
to
look
into
it,
because
pax
gold
has
very
robust
regime
ability.
Kind
of
you
know
operationally
I
think
it's
it's
by
far
superior
than
any
other
gold
gold
token
that
I've
seen
so
you
know
if
you
literally,
have
an
account
with
the
with
with
the
clearing
broker
at
the
London
gold
thing.
Whatever
it's
called,
you
can
literally
get
that
gold
into
your
into
your
account
the
same
day
from
from
pax
Gold
and
vice
versa.
K
I
worry
about
any
any
sort
of
a
shame.
Custody
situation
like
this,
though,
if
some
reason
their
vaults
turn
up
empty.
The
price
of
that
token
can
decline
quickly
and,
if
we're
still
still
displaying
the
the
commodity,
gold
price
and
the
token
market
doesn't
reflect
that
that
that
can
be
problematic.
E
It
can
be
problematic.
We
can
also
be
helpful
in
certain
circumstances
as
well.
So,
for
example,
a
lot
of
people
have
questioned
whether
it's
a
smart
idea
to
have
liquidations
disabled
for
u.s.
DC
and
have
the
price
just
set
to
one,
but
there's
an
argument
to
be
made
that
if
something
disastrous
were
to
happen
and
the
price
were
to
fall
to
say
20
cents
or
50
cents
or
just
anything
that
it
might
be
better
to
not
liquidate
those
and
have
maker
governance.
E
Try
to
resolve
that
issue
out
of
out
of
protocol.
It
could
probably
it
could
potentially
get
better
value
out
of
that
collateral
through
some
sort
of
off
chain
system,
rather
than
just
liquidating
it
at
fire,
sale
prices
and
so
the
same
might
apply
for
others
as
well.
So
pax
Gold
order
for
whatever
reason
drops
severely
in
price.
There
may
be
worth
it
to
try
to
resolve
that
somehow
out
of
them
just
an
idea.
It's
just
not
I'm.
Just
my
point
is
it's
just
not
so
clear
that
I
agree.
H
So
that
means
that
you
know
the
way
to
manage
counterparty
risk
is
probably
through
diversification,
that
is
to
say
managing
the
debt
ceiling,
to
make
sure
that
you
know
you've
accepted
the
possibility
of
of
kind
of
party
risk
without
without
risking
Brewin,
given
that
it
would
be,
it
would
be
capped
by
the
by
the
debt
ceiling.
The
same
thing
stands
for
for
USD,
Ceefax,
gold
and
all
the
other
ones.
H
K
H
K
H
Now,
to
be
clear,
I'm
not
saying
that
we
should
be
less
cautious
about
it.
I'm
just
saying
that
the
approach
should
be
defensive
with
the
debt
ceiling
rather
than
trying
to
basically
pick
up
information
in
real
time
from
some
market
price.
And
then
you
know
the
I
think
that
that
just
introduces
more
risk
than
it.
B
Against
it's
so
good,
it's
a
good
token
in
th,
good
film,
but
I,
don't
I
think
the
risk
is
to
iPhone
negative
yeah.
Well,
it's
not
really.
The
risk
associated
with
the
token
itself
are
like
in
some
ways
like
you
know,
all
wrapped
assets
kind
of
deal
with
this
problem
of
what
do
you
do
when
it
actually
met
like
when
you
actually
need
to
mint
and
redeem
a
bunch
of
rat
BTC
like
when
the
pressure
is
on?
B
H
Anything
here
about
like
about
debt
ceiling
again
so,
like
you
know,
for
if
we're
entertaining
have
us
DC
we're
talking
about
tax
G
doesn't
doesn't
the
same
thing
apply
to
the
WPT.
C
has
a
custodial
asset,
like
obviously
I
think
we
probably
all
agree
that
adding
W
BTC
with
like
a
huge
deaths,
doing
it's
because
it's
not
the
same.
It's
not
the
same
as
great,
which
is
a
bear,
is
a
true
bear
asset,
but
isn't
just
a
question
of
debt
ceiling.
H
H
E
H
We
don't
need
to
fill
in
around
WPTZ
for
too
long,
but
I
just
wanted
to
add
that
you
know
I've
spoken
to
them
too
that
2-bit
go
recently.
Who
is
you
know
the
only
custodian
right
now?
That's
that's!
That's
participating
in
that
and
they're.
You
know.
They're
I
think
they're
very
interested
in
having
a
discussion
with
with
the
rest
of
the
community,
in
particular
the
the
maker
community,
about
further.
You
know
about
starting
to
decentralized
the
custodian
of
Records.
You
see
so
the
refugee
sea
model.
H
If
you
look
at
the
original
light
paper,
you
know
actually
pretty
supposedly,
you
could
have
multiple
multiple
custodians,
potentially
also
separate
custodians
and
witnesses.
So
witnesses
being
you
know,
engineer's
that
don't
actually
custody
in
the
assets,
but
act
as,
as
you
know,
the
essentially
vouch
for
transactions
having
been
finalized
on
on
the
Bitcoin
blockchain.
E
I
think
just
looking
at
the
numbers,
rap
PTC
doesn't
have
enough,
doesn't
have
a
high
enough
debt
ceiling
to
impact
the
peg
I
would
imagine
that,
given
the
context
of
all
of
this
is
somewhat
short-term
nature
of
this
emergency
that
you
probably
wouldn't
want
to
spend
time
doing
additional
governance
work
that
doesn't
achieve
our
short-term
objective
right
now.
It
just
would
feel
like
we're
trying
to
do
too
much
unless
somebody
strongly
feels
it,
it
would
impact
the
PEC,
but
just
looking,
but
there's
only
a
seven
million
with
total
wrapped
Bitcoin.
E
H
E
E
So
if
we're
looking
at
solutions
that
won't
in
the
short
term
generate
more
than
a
couple
hundred
thousand
died
at
best,
I,
don't
know
my
personal
opinion
just
maybe
not
worth
the
effort,
it's
something
that
could
just
easily
be
added
as
part
of
a
regular
governance
cycle.
You
know
one
were
past
this
I.
K
E
Well,
I
mean
that's,
I
mean
I'm
gonna
put
in
those
terms,
but
that's
the
goal
right
we're
trying
to
get
people
to
generate
that
die,
and
that's
that
goes
back
to
my
original
point
of
like.
If
we
want
to
deal
with
this,
if
we
want
to
call
this
an
emergency
and
deal
with
it,
then
we
have
to
take
on
additional
risk
right
and
we
are
looking
for
short-term
solutions
that
will
generate
millions
of
die.
H
E
E
If,
if
they
died,
if
dye
is
a
hundred
million
and
roughly
and
eath
is
one
hundred
billion
right,
then
we're
talking
about
roughly
one
one
thousandth
of
the
market
cap
would
turn
into
die
from
doing
that
math
right,
so
something
that
only
has
seven
million
market
cap
it's
unless
there
is
just
a
huge
aberration.
That's
not
going
to
generate
you're,
not
going
to
see
half
that
rap
BTC
just
hit
maker
down.
In
my
opinion,
Cyrus.
H
I
think
I
think
the
relevant
figure
there
to
compare
is
the
is
Bitcoin,
not
not
wvt
see
the
you
know.
I
very
much
agree
with
this
point
that
one
of
the
main,
the
only
reason
for
W
BTC
to
exist,
is
so
that
people
can,
you
know,
use
it
as
collateral
in
in
defy,
and
in
particular
in
potentially
in
maker,
so
I
would
anyone
bitcoins
got
what
like.
Well,
you
know
almost
ten
extra
market
catalysts
of
ether
like
I
would
very
much
very
strongly
believe,
but
if
anyone
is
gonna
issue
EE
the
guy
goes
w
BTC.
H
They
would
probably
be
minting
neww
BTC,
for
it
I,
don't
even
think
it's
relevant
how
much
of
it
exists
now
I
mean.
Obviously
we
can
use
that
to
basically
gauge,
like
you
know
how
effective
diabetes,
W
BTC
has
been,
and
so
on,
but
I
think
it's
a
very
it's
very
much
a
question
of
creating
this
market
from
scratch.
H
K
F
E
Yeah
I
mean
it's
a
bit
of
a
chicken
and
an
egg
problem
right.
We
can't
know
if
right
we
can.
We
can
clearly
see
that.
Currently
there
is
an
enormous
demand
for
rapid
coin
and
to
say
that
there
will
be
demand
for
it
if
it
were
to
get
added.
I,
just
I,
don't
see
how
anyone
can
definitively
say
one
way
or
another
sure
I
mean,
because
something
governance
wants
to
explore.
That's
fair
yeah.
K
It's
it's
sorry,
it's
not
the
it's,
not
the
ideal
candidate
because
of
low
liquidity
right
now
in
the
centralization,
but
like
it
seems
like
it's
already
becoming
kind
of
the
de-facto
defy
Bitcoin
solution.
Now
that
may
change
as
other
solutions
come
forward,
but
right
now
it's
like
the
only
option
we
have
I.
B
One
thing
is
the
the
supply
of
the
token
and
the
growth
of
the
token
and
such,
but
at
the
end
of
the
day
you
know
if
it's
the
open,
it's
essentially
the
open
interest
on
that
underlying
asset
that
it's
gonna
drive,
the
the
liquidity
and
I
think
you
know,
aside
from
Bitcoin
having
a
huge
cap,
there
is
also
evidence
that
there's
a
lot
of
open
interest
on
Bitcoin
leverage.
If
you
look
at
other
markets
granted,
we
won't
capture
all
of
that.
B
J
Yeah
I
mean
so
just
for
a
second
it's.
What
we've
seen
is
liquidity
is
really
important
factors,
so
I
think
the
question
to
ask
with
assets
like
that
is
in
the
event
that
it
was
used
as
collateral.
You
see
in
these
auction
mechanics
how
important
it
is
to
have
a
sense
of
liquidity
for
that
asset
so
that
it
doesn't
experience
significant
slippage,
mid
auction
and
basically
results
in
a
bunch,
more
losses
in
the
event
that
it
does
get
liquidated.
K
H
I
wanted
to
point
out
that
there's
actually
some
amusing
source
of
data
for
4wd
TC,
which
is
that
in
or
in
particular
in
its
and
it's
the
quiddity.
When
that
you
know
there
was
this
attack
on
bzx,
probably
it
was
already
a
couple
months
ago
now
you
know
yeah
this
attacker,
who
ended
up
with
this
WB
TC
position
that
they
needed
to
liquidate.
You
know
in
which
they
successfully
did
over
the
course
of
a
couple
of
hours.
So
if
you
go
back
there,
you
can
actually
see
how
this
person
was.
H
You
know,
shopping
around,
you
know
and
this
person
wasn't
using
any
any
centralized
exchanges
and
they
were
just
going
around
X's
and
basically
trying
to
to
liquidate
this
WBT
see
see.
This
is
an
interesting
kind
of
example,
of
a
distressed
kind
of
WB,
TC
seller,
who
was
basically
able
to
get
you
know
in
the
end,
you
know
a
pretty
good
average
price
for
their
their
WBT,
see
that
they
just
stolen.
You
know,
just
by
analogy,
you
know
you
know
maker
having
to
liquidate
WB
TC
options
would
also
be
kind
of
stressing
the
same.
H
Well,
he
said
there
were.
There
was
two
issues,
one.
Actually
we
don't
have
to
go
into
that.
But
basically
yes,
there
was,
you
know
if
you
were
just
placing
market
orders
on
on
khyber.
You
know
swap
or
whatever
obviously
you're
getting
a
lot
of
slippage,
but
but
but
but
the
point
is
that,
after
the
factor
it
ended
up
with
all
this
WB
TC,
they,
you
know,
proceeded
to
kind
of
slowly
liquidate
it
out
across
a
variety
of
different
around
different
X's.
That.
J
H
B
H
K
I
guess
to
my
point,
to
the
auctions
like
you're:
putting
up
died
too.
Theoretically,
when
EE
BTC
in
an
auction
right.
So
once
you
win
the
WPT
see
you
could
pretty
quickly
turn
it
into
BTC
and
get
rid
of
it
on
centralized
exchangers
right.
So
I,
don't
think
at
least
for
an
auction
point.
It's
it's
an
issue.
K
I
do
think
you
do
have
a
good
point
in
terms
of
pricing,
which
means
you
know
like
how
how
would
the
Oracles
price
WBT
see
and
there
I
think
yeah
they're,
not
enough
Dex's,
that
trade
w
BTC
in
size,
so
somebody
could
manipulate
that
price.
But
if
you
used
BTC
also
as
a
price,
then
you
know
it's
it's
very
hard
to
like
attack
it.
That
way,
because
I
do
think
it
has
a
pretty
strong.
You
know,
because
there
is
a
creation
redemption
process,
it's
tied
to
PTC
fairly.
J
You
I
just
want
to
say
that,
while
that
makes
sense,
there's
also
a
point.
This
has
been
brought
up
a
couple
times
on
this
call
to
consider
when
you're,
using
the
price
of
an
underlying
asset
as
your
source
for
an
asset
that
is
built
on
top
of
that
underlying
and
and
whether
there's
any
potential
risks
that
you
introduce
there
from
having
those
be
potentially
disjoint.
K
K
No,
it's
a
great
question
and
I
in
some
sense,
I
think
it's
a
governance
question.
So
governance
in
some
sense
needs
to
approve
that
risk
right
that
hey
this
thing
is
a
blend
of
the
underlying
asset
and
the
asset
itself
and
like
what
do
we
think
is
a
fair
value
in
terms
of
the
oracle
price
and
I
think
it
should
be
their
underlying
asset
and
then,
if
something
happens
to
the
actual
asset,
you
need
to
somehow
in
a
governance
way.
I
guess
act
quickly
to
you
know,
stop
trading
in
it
or
or
whatnot.
A
A
E
Those
three
should
go
out
as
I
think
independent
governance
polls
to
find
out
if
maker
community
really
wants
them
and
then
today
in
the
forums
I'll
put
up
some
threads
where
we
can
discuss
what
potential
risk
parameters
makes
sense
and
I
throw
those
as
part
of
the
governance
poll,
the
the
caveat
told
us
being
that,
even
if
the
governor's
pulls
it
yes,
it
I,
don't
think
we
can
say
at
this
time
if
it
will
be
ready
for
this
Friday's
executive
vote.
Hopefully
we
can
get
some
more
discussion
about
that
in
the
forums
as
well.
A
Well,
that's
the
part
of
the
feasibility
thing
that
those
votes-
oh
wow,
I'll-
let
Nick
speak
to
that
specifically,
but
we
have
smart
contracts.
We
have
Oracle's
like
somebody
needs
to
figure
out
how
Keepers
are
gonna,
handle
these
new
collateral
types.
There's
there's
a
lot
of
rather
holes
that
need
to
be
explored
before
we
simply
turn
on
a
switch.
A
So
I
think
once
these
threads
go
up
once
the
poles
go
in
and
encourage
the
community
to
avoid
arbitrarily
picking
Deadline
so
like,
obviously,
let's
move
quickly,
but
we
need
to
do
some
exploration
to
figure
out
what's
possible
and
what's
not
how
quickly
we
do
this.
Sorry
that
was
my
editorializing
nick.
Did
you
want
to
speak
to
commodity
cool.
G
Sure
I
mean
the
that
I,
don't
see
the
technical
work
being
that
much
I
just
only
want
to
do
it.
If
you
know
this
is
something
were
you're
seriously
considering
right.
So
if
the
community
does
some
kind
of
signaling
boat
to
say
you
know
we
wanna
we're
thinking
of
including
some
kind
of
gold
based
token
soon,
so
we
want
to
create
a
gold.
Oracle
now
know
it.
You
know
ahead
of
time,
even
though
we're
not
gonna
use
it
for
anything
for
a
little
while
then
I'm
sure
we
can
do
that.
F
A
I'm
concerned
that
maybe
we
haven't
understood
the
implications
you
and
anybody
else,
who's
interested,
get
together
and
kind
of
think
through
what
the
implications
are
here,
because
up
until
now,
our
sources
of
truth
have
been
from
Texas
on
chain
going
outside.
That
ecosystem
feels
like
a
big
step
to
me.
So
maybe
we
should
do
some
discovery
here.
Yeah.
G
If,
if
I
think
a
lot
of
the
times,
you
see
some
kind
of
churn
right,
so
you
bid
on
a
liquidation
auction
with
some
die.
Knowing
that,
if
you
win,
you
can
immediately
like
recycle
it
back
and
with
with,
but
these
kind
of
redeemable
tokens
right,
you
you
don't!
You
can
still
do
that
arbitrage
loop,
but
it's
not
really
a
a
quick
loop
right.
G
If
there's
there's
a
delay
there,
so
there
may
be
kind
of
limits
to
what
the
the
keepers
are
willing
to
to
what
kind
of
capital
they're
willing
to
front
right,
because
they're
not
going
to
see
quick
turnaround
time
on
that
those
are
just
all
kind
of
things
we
have
to
consider.
So
when
so
so,
yeah,
that's
more
on
the
the
liquidation
side
of
things,
but
the
the
auction
side
of
things
is
triggering
those
liquidations.
And
so
maybe
you
want
to
lik
wait
something
where
the
reference
price
says
you
shouldn't
and
and
vice-versa
right.
A
Okay,
so
I'm
going
to
summarize
Timmy's
left.
We
have
a
whole
pile
of
work
to
do
a
lot
of
discussions
to
have
signaling
needs
to
be
done.
People
need
to
interact
with
the
forums
and
we
have
an
aggressive
timeline
ahead
of
us.
We,
the
first
kick
of
this,
can
implies
that
there's
intent
in
the
community
to
make
some
rapid
changes
to
the
protocol
to
correct
the
peg.
That's
clear,
the
I'm
checking
my
consensus
meter.
Consensus
is
I've,
officially
been
reached
because
I'd
say
so.
A
So,
let's
get
into
the
forums,
and
this
have
some
chats,
let's
figure
out
what
next
steps
looked
like
work
out.
Some
of
these
edge
cases
think
about
the
things
that
I
know
that
in
my
heart
of
hearts
that
nobody's
considered
yet
it
need
to
be
considered
and
then
come
up
with
an
implementation
plan
that
makes
sense
with
all
the
stakeholders
didn't
figure
out.
What
that
looks
like
whether
that
translates
into
an
executive
is
Friday
or
not.
I
think
there's
no
guarantees
at
this
point,
but
it's
an
admirable
goal
and
we'll
take
it
from
there.
A
Cool
the
window
is
not
closed.
So
let's
assume
that
we're
going
to
hash
out
the
details
in
the
form.
So
please
all
the
engage
stakeholders.
Everybody
was
good
in
the
game.
Please
join
us
there
and,
let's
figure
out
the
rest
of
the
details
there,
all
right
thanks
everybody
for
coming
to
the
midweek
call.
It's
appreciated.
Videos
will
be
posted
soon
to
share
with
friends
and
family
and
looking
forward
to
seeing
every
on
Friday
or
Thursday
for
the
next
call.