►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk | Ep. 168
Description
Agenda:
@GovAlpha-Core-Unit : Hosting, Introduction, Agenda.
@gov-comms-core-unit : Slides
Governance Round-Up:
@prose11 Poll + Executive Status
@blimpa - MIPs Update
@Artem_Gordon Forum at a Glance
Selected Updates / Discussions:
- Prepping for Alternative Market Conditions;
- Various Parties: Risk, PPG, etc…
- Prepping for alternative market conditions;
- Collateral Bear Markets
- PSM drainage
- Soft peg underneath the PSM-caused hard peg
- Monetary Policy levers for peg control
- DSR
- Emergency Playbook, for when things happen fast.
Full written:
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/agenda-discussion-scientific-governance-and-risk-168-thursday-november-18-17-00-utc/11677
A
Hello,
everybody
and
welcome
this
is
the
168
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
for
maker
dao?
My
name
is
peyton
rose
I
go
by
pros
11
online
and
I'm
one
of
the
governance
facilitators
I'll,
be
kind
of
leading
or
moderating
our
meeting
today,
mostly
just
here
to
keep
things
on
track.
We
really
appreciate
all
the
smart,
dedicated
people
that
are
joining
us
on
the
call
today
also
those
of
you
that
are
watching
the
recording
back
later.
A
For
those
of
you
that
are
here
just
a
few
housekeeping
matters,
we
do
encourage
open
participation.
So
do
ask
your
questions.
If
there's
a
lull
in
the
conversation
feel
free
to
hop
on
the
mic,
if
you're,
unable
or
otherwise
do
not
wish
to
speak
your
question,
you
can
drop
it
in
the
sidebar,
I'm
happy
to
ask
it
for
you
at
an
appropriate
time.
A
A
We
start
with
our
more
governance
updates,
both
on
the
votes,
current
mips
proposals
and
stuff
going
on
the
forum,
then,
while
time
for
a
community
discussion
around
the
kind
of
prep
for
for
alternative
market
conditions,
basically
what
we
do
if
things
stop
going
well
and
then,
if
there's
still
time
after
that,
we'll
open
things
up
for
open
discussion.
So
if
you
do
have
kind
of
unrelated
questions
that
you
drop
in
the
chat,
this
is
when
we'll
be
circling
back
to
them,
yeah.
A
Pretty
busy
week
or
last
couple
weeks
really
for
for
votes,
so
a
lot
of
polls
stopped
at
yon.
All
six
that
ended
this
week
did
pass.
That
includes
changes
to
the
local
liquidation
limits.
That's
the
alkol,
basically,
how
much
of
a
specific
collateral
type
can
be
auctioned
off
at
one
time,
we've
got
the
rates
proposal
that
passed.
Let's
change
the
wbtc
stability
fees,
as
well
as
an
update
to
the
covenant
for
p1
drop.
That's
the
people's
company
series,
one
drop
token.
A
We
also
had
the
three
off-boarding
polls
for
ave
a
balance
balancer
in
cape.
They
all
passed,
so
you
will
be
seeing
those
I'll
update
that
in
the
next
slide.
I
guess
before
I
get
ahead
of
myself
two
green
light.
Poles
are
still
ongoing.
That
would
be
for
the
solid
block
red
frog,
digital
coin
and
the
monitalis.
A
A
A
A
A
I
mentioned
earlier
as
well
as
the
people's
company
covenant
change
and
then
finally,
off
boarding
collaterals
both
the
three
that
were
mentioned,
as
well
as
updates
to
previous
ones
that
we've
already
initiated
our
off-boarding
process
too,
we'll
be
updating
the
liquidation
ratios
for
those
all
that
stuff
will
be
found
in
the
executive
copy,
as
well
as
available
for
tracking
in
our
new
spells
channel
on
discord
awesome.
So
that
should
do
it
for
my
side
of
the
governance,
I
will
pass
it
over
to
our
mip
editor
pablo
for
his
update.
B
B
B
Moving
on
to
coordinate
budgets,
we
have
the
content,
production,
resubmission
and
budget
for
governance,
communications
and
real
world
finance,
or
also
for
real
world
finance.
We
have
an
mkr
compensation
plan
and
finally,
we
have
the
meep
six
template
amendment
proposed
by
christian
peterson.
I'm
not
sure
pronouncing
that
correctly.
B
Also,
I've
been
working
slash
reworking
on
a
couple
of
documents
that
are
not
quite
ready
for
debut.
Yet
can
we
move
to
the
next
slide
yeah
those
documents
they
should
be
pretty
shortly.
One
of
them
is
a
very
robotic
manual
and
the
other
is
a
mips
portal
how
to
use
kind
of
kite,
because
I
think
there
might
be
more
to
the
mips
portal
than
meets
the
eye
and
the
next
slide.
I
think
artem.
B
We
will
talk
about
this,
but
I
just
want
to
give
a
shout
out
to
ses
and
retro
in
particular
for
the
coordinated
budget
transparency
maps
that
they
put
together.
It's
a
very
cool
thing
to
have,
and
I
will
be
looking
into
ways
to
integrate
them
onto
the
maps
portal
and
yeah.
That's
pretty
much
it
for
me.
Thank
you.
A
Awesome
thanks
pablo
retro,
pointing
out
that
petru
was
also
a
big
player
and
making
those
so
come
together.
So
thank
you,
scs.
We
appreciate
the
increase
in
transparency
for
for
the
budgets
with
those
awesome
that
should
bring
us
over
to
form
at
a
glance.
I
believe
artem
will
be
doing
the
hosting
on
that.
C
Yes,
with
a
new
mic
check
that
out
quality
all
right,
all
right,
so
welcome
to
the
forum
at
a
glance,
a
weekly
review
of
what's
happened
on
the
forums
for
the
week
of
november
11
to
november
18th.
Let's
begin
with
the
week's
top
announcements
with
winter
holidays
around
the
corner.
Long
for
wisdom
shares
the
weekly
governance
cycle
for
the
next
two
months
for
the
weeks
of
december
20th
and
december
27th.
There
will
be
neither
weekly
polls,
executive
proposals
or
governance
and
risk
calls
happening
and
normal
coverage
resumes
on
january
10th
of
2022.
C
C
All
right
next
up,
the
ses
core
unit
shares
a
diagram
that
overviews
each
core
unit's
mip
40,
which
they
call
the
mipmap
as
earlier
mentioned.
Their
intended
purpose
is
to
create
an
interactive
tool
to
explore
all
budget
structures
used
in
the
dow
and
anyone
interested
in
core
unit
budgets
will
find
it
easier
to
compare
contrast
and
explore
transactions
by
engaging
with
this
new
tool.
C
C
Metrics
from
this
report
will
be
soon
integrated
into
the
risks
dashboard
for
open
access
to
the
whole
community
and
moving
on
to
the
top
three
discussions.
Zero
egg
status
from
the
ducks
core
unit
takes
a
deep
exploration
into
our
low
governance
participation
rate.
They
highlight
several
problems
and
their
potential
causes.
They
provide
a
list
of
potential
solutions
across
multiple
horizons
and
push
for
community
community
discussion
and
feedback
to
help
initiate
improvements
in
low
governance,
participation.
C
The
real
real
world
finance
core
unit
team
presents
as
their
as
a
poll,
their
own
opinions
for
three
strategic
focus
areas
and
ask
the
community
whether
there
are
other
areas
that
we
should
also
focus
on
and
finally,
with
recent
discussions
in
the
community
regarding
centrifugal,
legal
structures,
centrifuge
has
expressed
its
willingness
and
commitment
to
become
an
arranger
and
upgrading
its
structuring
framework
to
accommodate
maker
token
holder
requirements
in
response.
William
r
proposes
a
global
debt
ceiling
and
asks
the
community
whether
and
how
it
should
be.
It
should
be
implemented
for
cfg.
C
C
D
Really
quickly
on
this
signal
request,
I
know
maker
breaker
has
been
posting
in
the
governance
chat
about
like
the
fact
that
this
might
become
an
instant
runoff
vote
and
there's
kind
of
like
a
little
bit
of
nuance.
I
want
to
just
take
a
pause
and
see
if,
if
anybody
from
gov
alpha
kind
of
wants
to
comment
on
that
before
we
move
forward.
A
A
No
worries
no
mike
yeah,
so
basically
we
have
been
using
this
form
formula
to
get
signals
spawned
on
chain
pole
for
a
while.
It's
not
perfect,
but
it
does
kind
of
allow
for
the
most
amount
of
people
to
to
be
happy
when
when
voting
is,
is
done
actively
right
because
you're
voting
for
anything
that
you
would
accept
or
would
support
when
going
to
the
signal.
A
So
while
sometimes
the
outcomes
might
look
a
little
funky,
you
are
kind
of
capturing
the
the
largest
part
of
the
off-chain
sentiment
and
then
one
cool
thing
is:
you
can
always
change.
Your
vote
engage
in
chat.
You
know,
you
know
kind
of
rally
for
for
one
particular
option.
So
if
you
don't
like
how
things
are
are
shaking
out,
we
encourage
you
to
head
to
that
thread
because
it's
not
until
the
the
signal
is
closed,
that
we
use
the
vote
calculations
to
put
it
up.
There.
D
C
The
original
dss
best
stream
for
governance
communications
core
unit
was
configured
incorrectly,
resulting
in
an
unclaimed
39300
die.
Initially,
the
team
believed
they
could
slide
through
their
four-month
stream
period
using
the
buffer
and
other
savings.
However,
legal
services
and
additional
expenses
recently
arose,
which
was
which
pushed
david
utrow
to
formally
ask
the
community
whether
they
support
a
one-off
governance
request
for
a
one-time
payment
of
a
little
over
27
000
die.
C
A
Awesome
appreciate
it
artem
do
check
the
chat.
We've
got
a
few
people
trying
to
submit.
I
just
want
to
make
sure
we're
letting
everybody
expect
any
cool.
So
we
have
moved
on
to
our
kind
of
governance.
Discussion
or
I
guess
kind
of
update
discussion
could
be
risk
related
as
well
right,
and
this
is
on
the
alternative
market
condition.
Preparation
david.
I
know
you're
kind
of
putting
together.
D
D
Yeah
so
I
was
gonna
say
we're
gonna
try
like
a
slightly
different
format,
so
this
is
a
pretty
broad
topic
that
has
a
lot
of
subtopics
within
it,
and
so
I
prepared
a
handful
of
slides
just
to
prompt
us
in
the
discussion,
and
so
the
first
prompt
is:
are
we
prepared
for
alternative
market
conditions?
What
is
being
prepared
mean
and-
and
I
guess
that's
kind
of
like
number
one
yeah
are
we
prepared
and
what
is
being
prepared.
D
D
This
is
actually
kind
of
okay
for
the
peg,
because
we
have
a
few
billion
of
of
buffer
to
kind
of
eat
that
extra
die
demand,
but
I'm
curious
if
anybody
has
other
views
of
things
that
we
might
not
be
considering
for
what
happens
in
a
bear
market
and
also
what
happens
after
the
ps7s
get
drained.
For
example,
what
are
our
fallback
levers.
E
That's
why
we
got
to
like
60
usdc
in
the
first
place,
like
we
kind
of
already
know
what
happens
in
a
bear
market,
because
that's
what
we
experienced
after
black
thursday
with
dye
persistently
above
the
peg,
you
know
ultimately
resulting
in
the
introduction
of
the
psms
and
taking
on
a
bunch
of
centralized
stable
coins.
You
know,
I
think
the
biggest
concern
with
that
sort
of
situation
is
that
if
it
happens
again
in
the
future,
like
what
you
know
what,
if
it
gets
even
worse,
what
if
we
go
to
like
90
usdc
or
how?
E
F
Yeah,
so
I
I
have
a
slightly
I
mean
I
totally
agree
with
this,
but
they
have
a
kind
of
alternative
alternative
view
on
this
as
well.
So
you
know
the
psm
is
basically
a
residual
of
die,
demand
and
die
supply
from
borrowers,
and
normally,
of
course,
if
there's
a
bear
market,
people
will
rush
to
repair
it
repay
their
loans.
F
So
it's
it's
not
really
clear
what
happens
with
stablecon
stablecoin
holdings
in
bear
market,
because
most
of
the
stablecoin
demand
was
actually
driven
by
yield
farming
and,
to
you
know
all
these
cls
and
it's
possible.
If
you're
in
a
bear
market,
these
hills
will
drop.
You
know
now
we're
seeing
them
10
higher
it's
possible.
They
drop
to
a
few
percent,
and
in
that
case
you
know
it's
questionable
how
many
people
will
still
be.
You
know
saving
or
landing
their
stable
coins
at.
F
I
don't
know
two
percent
three
percent,
because
it
might
be
just
too
risky.
You
know,
even
though
this
silt
is
better,
that
you
get
in
a
bank.
You
know
it's
possible,
some
people
might
just
stepped
out
of
their.
You
know
stable
compositions
and
this
could
affect
the
die
as
well.
Right
bunch
of
dice
is
now
on
curve.
Just
imagine
if,
if
stable
coin,
for
some
reason
you
know,
there's
total
unwinding
stable
coins.
I
don't
believe
this
will
be
the
case,
but
it's
one
possibility
right.
F
E
Good
point:
okay,
can
I
say
one
thing
really
quickly,
which
is
that
yeah?
It's
it's
really
a
question
of
how
big
the
different
components
are,
because
there's
another
component
that
increases
die,
demand
in
bear
markets,
which
is
simply
that
if
people
think
prices
are
going
down,
they
don't
want
to
hold
something
volatile
like
eth.
They
might
want
to
sell
and
wait
for
lower
prices.
You
know,
after
black
thursday,
when
the
diet
peg
was
persistently
high.
Like
don't
forget
that
was
before
yield.
Farming
was
even
a
thing.
E
You
know
compound,
didn't
start
till
you
know
the
summer
after
black
thursday
and
we
were
having
a
high
peg
until
then.
So
there
was
just
enough
demand
of
people
just
wanting
to
be
in
stables
because
of
the
uncertainty
of
the
market.
You
know
they
didn't
care
about
yields.
They
just
didn't
want
to
be
in
something
that
was
going
down.
G
Well,
I
mean
we
do
have
an
example
of
this
from
2018
during
the
bear
market
with
psy,
we
didn't
have
as
many
tools
for
maintaining
the
peg
upwards,
but
but
I
think
people
do
want
to
exit
crypto
kind
of
in
the
early
parts
of
the
bear
market.
You
know
things
have
gone
up
and
then
you
know
they're
gonna
pull
their
dollars
out
to
a
bank
account
or
something
like
that
and
they're
like
it
is.
D
F
So
yeah
I
mean
we're
doing
this
kind
of
simulations
to
you
know
to
calculate
risk
premiums
and
what's
the
the
surplus
buffer
needed
like
you,
can
go
on
our
dashboards
and
you
can
actually
even
yourself
tweak
parameters,
and
you
see
you
know
how
bad
it
goes.
It
is
if
you
know
you
simulate
50
drop
in
a
day
or
versus
40
drop,
and
you
can
basically
yourself
test.
You
know
whatever
you
believe
it's
it's
it's
possible
to
happen,
but
this
is.
F
F
This
becomes
really
important
and
we
are
actually
planning
to
develop
a
framework
where,
when
we,
where
we
you
know
as
best
as
we
can,
we
say
this
amount
of
esm
should
always
be,
as
a
percentage
should
always
be
or
stablecoin
backing
should
always
be
at
maker.
Considering
you
know
all
these
different
scenarios
of
bear
market
bull
market
and
to
be
planned
around
some
kind
of
simulation
analysis
and
say
you
know,
let's
say,
there's
a
there's,
actually
a
bear
market
and
what
happens
on
the
demand
side.
F
Considering
all
these
inputs
that
I
mentioned,
you
know
the
fields
drop.
You
also
have
some
somewhere
else
which
actually
are
delta
catch,
so
you
have
die
supply
which
is
borrowed,
and
then
it's
actually
put
in
amms
right.
So
you
have
demand
and
supply
matched,
and
you
need
to
subtract
that
so
yeah
we
will
probably
trying
to
solve
this.
It's
going
to
be
really
hard
because
you
need
to
simulate
all
different
versions
of
you
know.
F
H
Maybe,
since
we're
on
the
topic
of
simulations
I'll
I'll
just
mention
that
I've
been
running
the
auction
demo
keeper
in
a
hard
hat
forked
environment
in
order
to
sort
of
simulate
a
market
crash
like
this,
so
I
I
fork
it
and
then
I'm
basically
like
across
the
board,
I'm
dropping
the
price
of
all
of
our
assets
with
hard
hat
down
by
like
10
or
20.
I've
even
done
like
99
just
to
see
what
would
happen
and
the
current
demo
auction
keeper
or
auction
demo.
H
Keeper
is
set
up
to
use
uniswap,
v2
liquidity
and
there
were
a
number
of
assets.
First
I'll
say
on
larger
vaults
so
like
when
I
go
and
liquidate
like
nexo
in
simulation
unit
swap
v2,
obviously
taps
out
like
right
away.
So
we
get
terrible
prices
with
just
that
one
liquidity
source
and
then
across
the
board.
H
So
so
our
you
know,
this
is
maybe
even
going
back
to
like
prompt
one,
but
I
don't
feel
like
at
least
the
auction
demo
keeper,
which
is
one
of
the
sort
of
myriad
approaches
of
handling
liquidations
that
we
have.
I
don't
feel
like
that
is,
is
currently
ready
for
a
giant
liquidation
wave,
I'm
trying
to
build
into
it
the
capability
of
handling
uniswap
v3,
but
the
apis.
H
Everything
has
changed
like
quite
a
bit
in
v3
and
it's
taking
me
longer
than
I'd
hoped,
and
I
should
also
call
out
that
we
don't
currently
have
a
backstop
for
wrapped
state
death,
which
is
an
asset
that
I
will
probably
personally
pump
the
brakes
on
for,
like
dead
ceiling
increases
until
we
know
that
we
have
like
at
least
one
good
liquidator
for
it
now.
That
being
said,
we've
written
the
smart
contract
side
of
both
of
these
things,
because
our
team
is
good
at
that.
H
But
but
we
don't
have
the
the
portion
that
we
need
to.
You
know
to
actually
like
run
a
keeper
or
to
like
put
this
into
the
backstop
keeper.
Yet
so
so
yeah,
I
would
say
in
simulation
the
current
auction
demo
keeper
did
not
perform
well.
It
performed
really
well
on
wild
wednesday,
because
unit
swap
v2
was
like
the
source
of
liquidity,
and
I
don't
think
we'll
get
that
same
level
of
of
like
performance
this
next
time
around.
H
H
Yeah,
it
depends,
I
mean
one
inch
is
pretty
good
about
trying
to
find
you
like
a
gas
efficient
circuit
honestly
at
the
point
where
we
are
liquidating
a
ton
and
we've
tapped
out
one
liquidity
source
I'd,
rather
that
we
had
keepers
that
were
sourcing
even
if
it
was
a
little
more
gas
expensive
that
could
find
liquidity.
That
would
actually,
like
you
know,
like
reclaim
the
bad
debt,
so
yeah.
B
E
D
H
Yeah-
and
we
do
have,
I
think,
there's
keeper
group
being
signaled
for
right
now,
so
my
hope
is
that
they'll
take
over
a
ton
of
development
on
this.
The
foundation
did
development
on
keepers,
and
you
know
that
was,
I
think,
a
extremely
critical
role
in
like
helping
us
whenever
we
had
like
large
liquidations
so.
H
D
D
What
about
the
parameters
of
the
liquidation
system
in
terms
of
like
the
ill
coal
and,
like
the
maximum
amount
of
you
know
a
maximum
amount
of
liquidations?
You
can
have
at
any
given
time
like
yeah,
this
question
of
like
price
risk
like
there's
a
ton
of
liquidations
happening
sort
of
what's
a
comfort
level
or
approach
with
like
a
billion
dollars
of
price
risk
on
eath
or
something
you
know
so
so
yeah.
Those
are
kind
of
the
things
floating
around
in
my
mind.
D
H
You
want
to
liquidate
as
much
as
you
possibly
can
you
know
as
quickly
as
you
can
before
you
like,
tear
the
whole
market
down
and,
and
you
get
bad
rates
so
so
part
of
capping.
That,
for
me,
is
also
if
those
are
capped
we
allow
for,
like
the
sort
of
natural.
You
know
the
auctions
take,
let's
say
like
40
minutes
to
an
hour
to
recapitalize
right.
H
You
have
this
like
40
minute
to
an
hour
buffer
where,
like
arbitrage,
can
happen,
happen
from
centralized
exchanges
and
begin
to
push
itself
into
these
pools
or
from
like
more
esoteric
places
and
ends
up
pushing
itself
in.
So
that's
that's.
I
think
the
answer
on
how
we
try
and
set
those
particular
parameters,
and
I
think
risk
thinks
about
it
in
a
similar
way.
So.
F
F
If
you
liquidated
the
largest
world,
it
would
take
so
the
1.5
billion
world
on
itae.
It
would
take
us
10
hours
right
and
that's
a
lot
of
market
risk.
Just
imagine
that
it
price
drops
further,
there's
a
loss
right
there,
but
then
it's
actually
not
as
bad
as
it
sounds,
because
in
some
cases,
if
you're
liquidating
in
smaller
chunks,
the
borrower
can
still
save
itself
right.
F
So
if
you,
if
you
believe
he
can
react
within,
you
know,
if
not
in
the
first
hour
that
he
can
still
save
himself
if
he
can
save
himself
in
the
second
hour,
then
it's
okay
right,
because
you
don't
liquidate,
you
don't
have
the
market
risk.
You
know
the
user
still
stays
with
you.
It's
not
wiped
out.
You
still
collect
the
stability
fees,
but
again
you
need
to
you
need
to
believe
he's.
Gonna
save
himself
right
but
yeah
like
how
exchanges
do
it
like
they
liquidate
as
much
as
possible.
A
D
Yeah,
so
you
guys
know
about
the
two
prompts
I
have.
I
also
have
a
third
prompt,
it's
what
happens
in
the
event
of
a
sudden
loss
or
invalidation
of
collateral,
and
I
guess
this
is
a
little
bit
less
related
to
specifically
a
bear
market
and
it's
more
related
to
you
know
like
what
happens
when
you
know
a
major.
D
H
H
I
wonder
if,
before
in
prompt
one,
you
talked
about
an
emergency
playbook
so
before
we
do
prompt
three,
because
we've
talked
about
prompt
three
a
little
bit
in
the
past.
I
I
did
let's
say:
are
we
prepared?
Oh
yeah,
the
emergency
playbook
done
at
the
end
there
yeah
so
yeah,
so
so
yeah,
if
you
can
david
that'd,
be
great.
D
Yeah
sure
so
so
I'm
david,
I'm
the
facilitator
of
governance,
communications,
core
unit
and
a
part
of
our
mandate
was
to
support
maker
dow
with
emergency
comps
and
in
the
event
of
an
emergency.
It's
not
so
simple
as
just
comps
like
an
emergency
is
a
whole
domain
in
and
of
itself
right
there's.
You
know
proactive
measures
that
you
have
that
the
dow
does,
even
before
an
emergency
happens
like
threat
monitoring
at
various
levels
and
then
when
an
emergency
does
happen,
it's
like
there's
five
or
six
different
emergency
types.
D
You
know
and
then
underneath
those
emergency
types
there
are,
you
know,
derivatives
within
those
types
and
so,
and
so
when
such
an
emergency
happens,
there's
a
few
different
coordination
tracks
that
happen.
So
there's
a
communications
coordination
track
where
you
know,
there's
internal
and
external
cons
that
have
to
be
drafted
forum
posts
have
to
be
drafted,
information
has
to
be
aggregated,
summarized
and
shared.
D
You
know
impact
assessment
has
to
happen
and-
and
you
know,
written
on
and
documented,
but
then
there's
also
like
a
technical
coordination
track
where
you
know
the
engineering
teams
and
and
key
and
other
key
people
kind
of
come
into
a
war
room
and
really
assess
the
exact
situation.
With
regards
to
the
emergency,
then
there's
also
a
general
coordination
track.
Where
you
know
it's,
maybe
it's
not
just
engineering,
but
so
so.
D
The
emergency
playbook
that
our
team
is
working
on
sort
of
encapsulates
all
of
this
stuff
into
a
single
playbook.
That
then
has
deeper
links
to
more
granular
resources,
so,
for
example,
actually,
if
you
guys
would
like,
I
could
really
quickly
share
actually,
no,
I
won't
do
that,
but
I'll
I'll
briefly
say
we
do
have
a
a
very,
very
good
first
draft,
already
mostly
done
but
yeah.
So
in
general
it
kind
of
documents,
everything
as
well
as
the
processes
for
specific
emergencies
and
emergencies
in
general.
So
yeah,
that's
the
gist.
H
You
know
the
the
session
we
had
what
last
week
of
the
sort
of
web
three
liquidator,
that
you
know
that
uses
flash
loans
or
whatever
so
yeah.
That's
the
sort
of
side
stream,
one.
So
so,
there's
a
number
of
things:
there's
also
communicating
all
of
that
like
on
twitter
and
to
other
people
to
try
and
get
them
to
participate
in
those
auctions
and
and
yeah
and
aggregating
information
about
it
and
then
obviously
there
there
may
be
something
that
happens.
H
D
Yeah
and
just
to
comment
a
little
bit
more
on
that
sorry
really
quickly.
So
on
the
market
event,
which
is
one
major
category
of
emergency
type
that
we've
identified,
we've
actually
met
with
the
risk
team
three
three
weeks
ago
to
try
to
further
define
what
a
market
event
emergency
is,
and
also
we
do
have
like
a
preliminary
bucket
of
resources
which
do
include
you
know,
outdated
or
not
outdated.
D
We
have
to
check
like
keeper
resources
links
to
auction
front
ends,
all
of
that
stuff
and
so
yeah
to
your
point.
Chris
like
this
is
certainly
a
part
of
being
prepared,
and
this
is
something
that
our
team
at
govcoms
is
extremely
focused
on
and
not
just
alone,
like
we're,
focused
on
doing
it
and
building
it
out
in
a
high
quality
way
with
others
that
are
involved
in
this
process,
which
is
pretty
much
many
of
the
core
units
like
pe
risk,
oracles,
etc.
I
Chris,
do
you
have
the
list
of
the
people
running
those
keepers
or
at
least
like
where
I
can
contact
to
understand,
like
the
current
situation
of
the
keepers
and
also
the
signal
group
that
you
mentioned
is
it
is
active?
Still,
I
mean
because
I
don't
know
we.
We
should
like
double
check
everything
that
used
to
work
during
the
foundation
times
and
see
if
everything
is
still
working
or
not,
and
if
not
set
up
a
new
group
or
I'm
just
thinking
out
loud.
Maybe
we
should
create
like
a
a
keeper's.
I
Room
on
our
discord
to
like
a
have
all
the
keepers
there
and
in
case
of
in
case,
we
need
help
with
liquidations
like
ask
for
help
there.
I
don't
know
if
this
should
be
private
or
it
could
be
public.
I
don't
know,
but
but
I'm
I'm
asking
you
this,
because
I
don't
have
that
information.
I
I
know
that
during
the
foundation
greg
usually
greg
and
joe
were
the
ones
coordinating
with
keepers.
So
I'm
just
wondering
if
you
or
anyone
else
here
has
these
contacts.
G
Yeah,
so
I
can
say
that
in
general,
the
professional
market
makers,
who
would
run
keepers
out
there,
they're
quite
hard
to
get
tabs
on,
and
they
are
very
they're,
not
really
that
open
about
what
they're
doing
because
running
these
keepers.
It's
like
it's
like
a
wall
game.
You
know
you
want
to
have
the
best
algorithm
to
sort
of
make
the
most
money
so
they're
very
in
transparent
about
how
they
run
their
operations.
G
So
and
often
you
know,
for
example,
with
maker,
it's
not
like
there's
a
there's,
a
constant
flow
of
liquidations,
so
there's
also
a
lot
of
opportunities
in
the
market
and
they're,
always
like
kind
of
chasing
after,
where
there's
the
most
yield
so
for
maker,
for
example.
What
we've
seen
often
is
that
we
would
have
someone
who's
running
a
keeper
and
then
all
of
a
sudden
they
will
shut
it
down
because
it's
not
worth
it
for
them
to
kind
of
keep
optimizing
their
algorithm.
G
If
there's
only
like
two
liquidations
every
two
weeks,
so
it's
very
hard
to
keep
tabs
on,
because
yeah
these
actors
they're
only
incentivized
by
profits
and
there's
many
ways
to
yeah,
earn
profits
and
coco
ripto.
So
that's
why
it's
so
important
that
we
have
open
tools
that
anyone
can
spin
up,
because
we
can't
rely
on
these
private
actors
to
actually
run
the
keepers
or
have
them
up
to
date
for
like
a
market
car
rash.
G
D
So
I'm
curious
like
when
we
do
launch
collateral
types.
Is
there
a
you
know?
Is
it
a
potentially
a
good
idea
to
have
some
sort
of
standardized
three
six
one
year
you
know
processes
where
we
do
some
sort
of
fire
drill
for
the
liquidation
side.
So
it's
really
like
be
like
me,
maybe
like
as
a
protocol
manually,
liquidate
five
or
six,
like
maybe
of
our
own
customers.
I
I
I
I
like
the
the
idea
of
the
grant
or
hackathon
so
our
bounty,
so
I
think
we
we
should
like
have
the
keepers
chatroom
on
discord
and
explain
how
to
like
run
your
own
keeper,
how
to
and
be
like
have
people
there
answering
questions
and-
and
all
of
that
because,
like
our
last
experience
with
a
hackathon,
was
that
for
a
lot
of
new
devs,
the
maker
protocol
could
be
a
little
bit
complicated.
So
they
prefer
to
develop
things
for
other
protocols.
G
D
G
A
J
Chris,
can
I
ask
a
question
so
something
I
haven't
heard
talked
about.
You
know.
During
black
thursday
we
basically
saw
evidence
of
memphis
manipulation
and
so
nobody's
really
talked
about
lack
of
network
access
for
all
the
tools
that
we're
talking
about
here
right
and
it
was
unclear
to
me
whether
eip
1559
actually
helps
us
in
that
respect,
but
and
I'm
not
entirely
sure
what
to
do
about
it.
But
this
is
the
missing
piece
I
see
here
is
like
what
happens
if
you
lose
network
access,
you're
kind
of
dead
in
the
water.
H
Yeah,
I
mean
you
know
if
you
lose
access
to
the
memory
pool
or
the
nodes.
What's
going
to
happen
with
the
current
liquidation
system.
Is
that
time
is
going
to
continue
to
tick
and
the
price
is
going
to
continue
to
fall.
What's
nice
is
that
we
have
a
catch
for
that
at
a
certain
cusp
or
a
certain
like
tau
amount
of
time
past.
I
think
it's
a
cusp
that
ketchup
catches
at
first,
but
it
basically
says
at
like
60
or
50
percent
price
fall.
It
basically
forces
if
the
option
is
redone.
H
So
if,
if
we
do
lose
access
to
the
mempool,
I
you
know
the
worst
case
would
be.
You
lose
access
until,
like
those
collaterals
were
right
before
the
sort
of
cut
off,
and
then
someone
was
able
to
fire
through
and
take
them
for
this
like
cheaper
amount,
but
we
wouldn't
see
like
the
one-way
bidding
the
way
we
did
on
black
thursday.
So
so
there
is
there's
a
bit
of
a
protection
there
and
I
think.
J
J
It's
kind
of
a
whole
different
mechanic
and
we'd
have
to
think
about
it,
but
we
do
have
other
networks
that
if
we
could
source
liquidity
there
and
provide
kind
of
a
promise
token
right
that
you
know
you
buy
this
us
and
we're
selling
it
you're
going
to
get
it
right,
just
a
way
to
have
a
backup
network.
If
the
primary
network
no
longer
functions
that
we
might
be
able
to
source
liquidity
on.
H
D
So
I
have
another
thing:
that's
related,
so
I
was
recently
listening
to
a
podcast
that
talked
a
lot
about
kind
of
like
provable
fairness
in
nfc
auctions
and
I'm
curious
if,
if
anybody's
been
thinking
about
kind
of
like
improvements
on
that
side
and
would
that
help
with
kind
of
like
the
mempool
manipulation
thing,
and
is
there
a
way,
yeah
kind
of
take
things
off
chain
yeah?
These
are
some
thoughts
flying
around
my
head.
A
D
Yeah
like
to
give
you
guys
an
example
of
what
I
mean
so
like
one
of
the
things
that
some
smart
nft
auctions
do.
Is
they
they
take
orders,
but
they
don't
take
them
on
chains.
So
they
batch
the
orders
until
the
time
of
the
auction
kind
of
comes
to
a
head,
and
then
they
execute.
So
the
orders
don't
actually
ever
go
on
chain,
it's
all
done
off
chain
and
then
the
execution
is
actually
just
determined
after
the
fact
that
processed
and
executed.
H
H
Moving
to
l2
and
l1
is
going
to
be
a
settlement
layer.
For
all
of
that,
like
call
data,
that's
happening
on
l2's,
and
if,
if
that
world
materializes,
we
are
going
to
need
for
anything.
That's
on
l1,
some
sort
of
like
wormhole
liquidation
strategy,
where
we
can,
where
we
can
like
give.
You
know
die
to
this
thing
and,
and
it
will,
you
know,
handle
the
liquidation
and
then
settle
it
over
the
course
of
like
a
week
or
something
like
that
right.
E
Yeah
I
mean
I,
I
also
think
in
that
world.
You
know
you
have
to
have
you
have
to
move
majority
of
your
native
dye
issuance
to
the
l2s
as
well,
and
so
that
the
the
dies
or
so
the
you
know,
the
positions
are
held
at
the
same
place.
The
liquidity
is,
you
know
essentially
like
how
much
actual
or
how
many
actual
or,
like
that
well,
the
size
of
the
actual
vaults
you
can
support
on
l1,
you
know
gets
highly
constrained
by
what
liquidity
is
actually
available
on
l1.
E
In
fact,
I
can
imagine
a
possible
future
in
which
l1
is
basically
just
100
roll-up
commitments,
and
you
know,
like
everything,
happens,
on
l2's,
and
actually
one
of
the
risks
I'm
worried
about
is
that
the
market
is
currently
underestimating
the
the
speed
with
which
this
could
happen
potentially,
and
so
I
it
just
doesn't
decide.
I
think
that's
something
to
keep
an
eye
on
us
at
what
point
to
say.
Fifty
percent
of
the
ethereum
block
space
become,
you
know
all
l2s.
D
So
we
talked
a
bit
about
like
sort
of
what
maker
fundamentally
like
at
home
base
can
do
to
improve
liquidations,
but
I'm
curious
about
a
different
kind
of
approach.
How
can
we
educate
our
vault
users
to
use
risk
mitigation
tools
like
beep
by
saver,
and
is
that
a
good
idea
for
us
as
a
protocol,
to
be
pushing
third
party
risk
mitigation
tools
like
what's
our
kind
of
duty
there?
What's
like?
What's
our
comfort
level
there
and
yeah?
Is
it
a
good
idea.
H
H
So
we've
got
this
like
13
liquidation
penalty
to
sort
of
stop
this,
but
it
turns
out
in
practice
that
liquidation
penalty
ends
up
like
creating
an
enormous
amount
of
income
for
the
protocol,
which
is
a
side
effect
of
it,
and
I
think
we
should
continue
to
think
of
it
as
a
side
effect
of
liquidations.
Otherwise
we're
too
likely
to
try
and
like
rent,
seek
that
particular
mechanism
and
then,
and
so
as
a
result,
I
do
think
it
makes
sense.
I
mean
defy.
Saver
is
doing
like
a
ton
of
work
ahead
of
time.
H
I
think
this
is
a
major
feature
for
users
as
well,
like
that.
The
fact
that
we
have
this
like
delayed
oracle
price
allows
them
to
sort
of
like
see
the
future
and
basically
like
stop
themselves
from
being
liquidated
with
these
services,
and
that's
a
major
selling
point.
I
think
over
other
protocols
so
yeah.
H
I
think
we
should
lean
on
that
heavily
or
or
think
about
like
alternative
liquidation
schemes
like
b
protocol
or
something
like
that,
but
I
you
know,
leave
our
liquidations
the
system
that
we
have
as
the
sort
of
like
I
said
it's
defense
in
depth,
right
you
or
the
swiss
cheese
approach
right
you
if
you
make
it
through
the
first
hole
and
the
first
layer
of
swiss
cheese,
hopefully
we'll
catch
you
with
our
liquidation
system.
You
know
after
that,
so,
oh
by
the
way
I'll
say
for
steak
death
right
now.
H
D
D
And
also
as
a
side
note,
I
think
that,
like
based
on
my
reading
of
the
forums
over
the
last
couple
of
years,
I
I
think
the
consensus
is
pretty
high.
That
dow
members
want
eventually
maker
doubts
to
have
zero
liquidations
and
that
yeah,
like
that
13
penalty,
is,
is
really
like
a
function
of
like
a
game,
theoretical
necessity
to
prevent
auction
grinding
attacks,
as
you
mentioned
so
like
I've,
always
seen
support
for
third-party
risk
mitigation
like
so.
H
Well,
there's
there's
one,
and
this
is
maybe
debatable,
but
on
wild
wednesday
we
ended
up
like
having
so
many
profits
that
the
burner
kicked
on
hard
like
multi.
Millions
of
dollars
went
to
the
burner
and
yeah
and
that
when
I
originally
was
looking
at
like
the
graphs
of
mkr,
it
did
look
like
it
was
supporting
the
mkr
price.
But
then
I
was
less
convinced
like
later
on,
so
I
think
the
jury's
still
out,
but
that's
that's
almost
exactly.
H
E
I'll
I'll
have
to
kind
of
jump
in
and
give
an
alternate
perspective
here
now,
which
is
that
right.
So
so
in
the
happy
case
where,
like
things
dip,
the
system
buys
the
dip
and
then
everything
goes
back
up
and
there's
no
bad
debt.
You
know
that's
great
sure,
but
in
the
case
where,
like
the
market
dips,
we
get
some
surplus
from
penalties,
use
that
to
buy
mkr
and
then
the
market
dips
a
lot
more
and
then
something
goes
wrong.
E
You
know
there's
network
congestion
or
liquidity
constraints
and
we
end
up
with
a
bunch
of
bad
debt.
Well,
I
guarantee
you.
The
mkr
price
is
now
a
lot
lower
than
what
the
system
bought
it
at
and
if
we
have
to
reprint
mkr
to
you
know
cat
that
was
burned
previously
we're
going
to
print
a
lot
more
than
was
burned
and
we
would
have
been
a
lot
better
off
just
saving
that
surplus
for
the
crash.
So
it's
it's
really
like
an
asymmetric
risk
and,
in
my
opinion,
asymmetric
risk
of
the
bad
kind.
E
D
E
Yeah,
I
think,
there's
actually
a
big
like
debate
to
be
had
about
how
should
the
protocol
diversify
its
treasury,
because
you
know
that's
basically
what
you're
doing
if
you're
taking
the
surplus
buffer
and
say
buying,
eth
or
something
you
know
now,
you're,
basically
diversifying
your
treasury
into
other
assets,
and
you
know
like
what
mix
of
assets
does
it
make
sense
for
the
dow
to
hold?
Is,
I
think,
a
really
interesting
discussion
with
a
lot
of
room
for
creative
improvements.
G
Yeah
go
for
it
thanks
man.
I
can
talk
a
little
bit
about
what
our
team's
been
thinking
or
talking
about
in
terms
of
educating
vault
users.
Basically,
our
thinking
is
the
best
policies
to
be
agnostic
towards
what
what
solutions
we
encourage
people
to
use,
but
be
you
know,
focus
on
educating
people
on
what
solutions
are
out
there
and
what
the
pros
and
cons
are
between
using
the
different
solutions.
G
So
we've
talked
about
doing
like
educational
videos
and
that
sort
of
thing,
but
decided
that
actually
probably
wasn't
a
good
idea,
because
it's
harder
to
do
something
that
could
be
evergreen
like
if
we
did
one.
If
we
made
a
video
specifically
about
how
to
use
oasis
but
not
deep
by
safer,
then
obviously
that
looks
like
we're
favoring
one
over
the
other,
but
so
for
now
at
least
we've
focused
on
putting
this
information
or
getting
this
information
into
the
community
portal.
G
J
Yeah
I
apologize
for
the
background,
so
I
was
in
the
car
when
you
guys
were
talking
about
the
psm
and
one
of
the
things
that's
kind
of
really
changed
since
the
you
know,
I
wouldn't
say
the
the
wednesday,
but
the
black
thursday
is
that
you
know
the
impetus
to
mint
die.
Was
a
high
die
price
right
and
now
we
don't
have
that
impetus
anymore,
and
so
you
know
the
how
the
psm
is
going
to
act
in
different
situations.
J
I
think
the
discussions
previously
that
we
might
have
some
different
kind
of
activity
with
respect
to
die,
demand
and
minting,
given
the
fact
that
the
price
is
effectively
locked
is
important
to
consider
that
it's
just
really
unclear.
What's
going
to
happen,
I
mean
there's
a
general
tendency
to
think
that
the
psm
will
just
fill
up
and
and
nobody
discussed
well,
what
happens
if
usdc
doesn't
you
know
or
stable
coins?
A
E
E
But
I
mean
okay,
I'm
gonna
have
to
jump
in
here
again
now,
because
back
when
we
did
have
that
so-called
natural
incentive,
I
think
what
we
saw
empirically
is
it's
just
extremely
weak
right
there
is
this
natural
incentive.
After
you
know,
black
thursday,
hey
die.
Price
was
hard,
but
people
are
sorry.
E
It
was
high,
but
you
know
people
were
either
too
scared
of
putting
money
in
maker
or
just
didn't
have
the
appetite
for
leverage
you
know
to
to
take
advantage
of
it,
and
I
I
agree
that
if
you
had
waited
long
enough
and
let
the
price
get
high
high
enough,
you
know
it,
it
would
have
eventually
motivated
people
to
mint.
Maybe
I
I
guess
we
we'd
it's
an
empirical
question,
but
you
know.
E
E
The
thing
that
we
saw
was
that
die
adoption
was
being
abandoned
because
you
know
for
better
or
for
worse.
The
integrators
of
dai
had
come
to
rely
on
having
a
very
tight
peg
and
they
just
couldn't
tolerate
from
a
business
perspective.
You
know
a
four
or
five
cent,
you
know
or
four
five
percent.
You
know
persistent
deviation
and,
and
so
the
market
just
basically
told
us
like
you
know,
we
don't
want
a
soft
paid
currency.
H
Yeah
this
to
the
second
part
of
your
question
maker
man.
I
I
do
think
that
you
know
if
the
market
really
does
want
to
hold
on
to
usdc
or
die
breaks.
Peg
high.
I
do
think
there's
an
interesting
situation
with
like
liquidity
providers,
like
liquidity
providers,
are
basically
going
to
allow
there
to
be
an
arb
because
they're
like
they're
they're,
like
asleep
at
the
wheel,
basically
right
so
like
whatever.
If
people
actually
have
a
preference
for,
you
know,
let's
say
die
over
uscc
or
uscc
over
die
or
whatever.
H
J
Well,
in
general,
I
agree
right,
I
mean
it
was
the
reason
why
I
mean
I
was
the
one
who
proposed
or
I'm
sure
other
people
talked
about
it,
but
really
pushed
for
usdc
during
black
thursday,
because
we
were
kind
of
stuck.
We
had
no
collateral
that
wanted
to
move
into
mint
die
and
we
needed
to
fill
a
six
million
dollar
hole
right,
and
so
you
know
there's
this
real
issue
of
like
what's
a
good
collateral,
that's
not
going
to
liquidate
and
we
put
up
one
that
absolutely
would
not
liquidate
like
we.
J
We
set
it
to
one
and
just
said
we're
not
going
to
liquidate
this
collateral
everybody's
like
hey
hallelujah,
you
know,
and
then
we
made
it
into
a
vault
right,
and
so
you
know
talk
about
liquidity.
I
was
looking
at
the
v3,
you
know
the
g-uni
right
and
you
look
at
that.
V3,
it's
a
very
tight
band.
That's
supposed
to
be
able
to
move
around.
You
know
with
the
bots
that
are
going
to
post
a
new
transaction
to
float
that
liquidity
into
a
new
ban,
but
what,
if
they
can't?
J
J
If
anybody
can
access
the
network,
they
can't
drive
it
to
zero,
whereas
v3
they
can
pass
right
through
that
band
and
they
can
drive
that
v3
price
right
to
zero
rate.
With
that
liquidity
straight
up,
you
know,
and
so
you
talk
about
like
where
the
liquidity
is.
I
keep
insisting
that
we
need
to
have
a
real
price
band,
because
when
you
have
a
price
band,
you
have
fees
and
fees
will
find
liquidity
and
that
liquidity
is
going
to
be
there
potentially
to
be
sourced.
If
it's
in
the
right
configuration.
J
So,
but
in
principle,
I
agree
with
you,
I
think
was
kurt
or
it
could
have
been
brian,
but
basically
that
during
that
time
you
know
all
our
all.
Your
basic
liquidity
is
bad,
except
for
these
stable
coins
and
so
you're
kind
of
stuck
with
like
what
do
you
do?
You
know
that
the
psm
is
going
to
be:
what's
left,
that's
pretty
gas
inefficient,
and
then
you
have
a
vault.
Maybe
you
know,
and
so
there's
just
not
a
lot
of
places
that
we
can
deposit
collateral
and
find
liquidity.
Should
the
price
drive
in
a
direction?
A
D
Yeah
but
it
isn't
like
certain
liquidity,
it's
available,
but
there's
no
precedence
to
use
it
use
it
like.
You
know
like
we
have
liquidity
in
our
treasury,
but
you
know
what's
the
precedent
for
us,
you
know
being
our
own
auction
keepers
right,
like
should
maker
protocol,
be
one
of
the
participants.
You
know
I
I
don't
know.
H
H
So
whenever
we
liquidate
it
immediately
comes
out
of
the
surplus
buffer
so
that
it's
the
first
thing,
if
we
see
a
giant
liquidation
wave,
don't
panic
everyone's
going
to
see
the
surplus
buffer
basically
drop
like
in
just
by
insane
numbers.
Your
first
inclination
is
going
to
be
like:
oh
it's
black
thursday.
Again,
you
don't
need
to
panic,
that's
that's
what
happens,
and
then
we
reclaim
the
die
from
those
auctions
and
it
goes
back
into
the
surplus
buffer.
So
yeah,
that's
just
so
that
that
does
sit.
There
sort
of
naturally
see.
H
D
H
I
cut
out
my
starlink
yeah
sorry,
so
anyway,
I
was
just
saying:
don't
panic,
you
see
the
surplus
buffer
drop
in
a
wave
of
liquidations.
It
doesn't
necessarily
mean
that
we're
taking
on
bad
debt,
it's
just
because
it
it
hits
that
surplus
buffer
first
and
then
it'll
recapitalize.
If
the
auctions
are
performing
well,
if
they're
not,
then
then
that's
going
to
become
like
real
bad
debt,
so
yeah
to
matt's
point
and
also
I
think
it
was
your
third
slide.
H
I
I
think
that
real
world
assets
do
give
us
a
bit
of
a
like.
We
can.
We
can
kind
of
roll
our
own
sort
of
psm
with
real
world
assets
as
well.
So
you
know:
there's
there's
this
capability
that
we
have
now
that
we
have
real
world
assets
and
you
could
even
think
of
like
the
success
facility
as
a
real
world
outside
an
emergency
right.
So
you
could,
especially
if
you
set
one
up
like
independently.
H
H
H
D
So
just
to
clarify
would
that
basically
be
like
empowering
a
particular
trust
trustless
because
of
the
legal
structure
of
like
success,
for
example?
Really
I
don't
know,
I
don't
see
trustless,
I
don't
know
if
that's
accurate,
but
so
we
would
be
empowering
a
particular
actor.
That's
already
in
our
system
to
be
able
to
remedy
a
market
liquidity
crisis,
and
we
would
be
able
to
do
that.
D
H
A
So
appreciate
that
reflection
and
the
kind
of
opportunity
for
different
ways
to
keep
the
protocol
safe,
keeping
an
eye
on
the
time
here
we
are
nearing
half
past
the
hour,
which
is
usually
about
when
we
tend
to
wind
things
down.
I
do
want
to
give
people
one
more
chance
if
there
are
questions
or
comments
that
have
gone
unaddressed.
D
Yeah,
I
was
gonna
officially
mention
it
yeah,
so
I
see
jerry
and
chad,
but
while
people
are
thinking
of
other
questions
comments,
jerry
mentions
that
we're
gonna
be
doing
a
full
ama
about
the
wormhole
tomorrow
with
sam
aka
hexanone
and
chris
chris
cazor.
If
anybody
wants
to
join
the
link
is
in
chat
there,
it's
also
available
on
the
calls
calendar.
A
Right
on
brief
note
on
scheduling
as
well,
we
will
still
be
having
and
you
are
still
sharing
your
screen
david,
always
good-
to
call
that,
over
a
brief
note
on
scheduling,
we
will
still
be
having
a
call
next
week.
I
expect
a
lot
of
us
people
who
may
not
be
joining
us,
but
that's
fine.
We
are
a
global
organization,
so
we'll
keep
trucking
on
and
yeah,
hopefully
have
a
another
fun
and
exciting
one
to
engage
with.
E
E
Imagine
we
get
to
a
point
where
all
the
psms
are
empty
and
die
is
trading
at
98
cents.
You
know
how
right
at
that
point
our
solution
becomes
okay,
it's
time
to
raise
rates.
It's
time
to
raise
the
dsr.
You
know
how
how
quickly
could
we
do
that?
And
you
know
what,
if
you
know
we
get
into
this
situation
where
we're
raising
and
it's
not
working.
E
A
The
trust
side
of
this
equation
and
lending
out
capital,
because
there's
another
piece
to
this
call
like
the
next
evolution
of
the
phases,
indifferent
to
the
scope.
Excuse
me
the
scale
of
what
at
least
I'm
trying
to
achieve
and
then
ultimately
changing
out
the
scope
and
scale
there's
an
entire
other
level
of
bringing
on
a
full-on
bank
revolver
engaging
with
the
exact
same
collateral,
while
they're
segregated
having
a
facility
set
up
now
in
that
in
that
type
of
scenario,
died.
Just
humor
the
scenario
went
down
to,
and
I
mean
the
natural
market
maker.
H
H
We
can
also
start
to
raise
rates
which
is
going
to
disincentivize,
creating
new
die
and
it's
going
to
incentivize
closing
positions,
and
then
we
get
to
take
you
know.
So
it's
not
a
rent-seeking
thing.
What
we
didn't
have
in
2019
is
the
dsr,
which
is
that
we
can
then
also
stimulate
demand
for
die
on
the
reverse
side,
so
we
can
increase
the
dsr
and
then
people
want
to
like
actually
hold
die,
and
so
I
think
we
have
a
lot
of
tools
on
the
downside,
yeah,
but
there's
also
some
interesting.
H
There
was
an
interesting
idea
about
the
psm
and,
having
like,
let's
say,
more,
automated
governance
around
like
the
tout
or
or
you
know,
even
tn
t
out
if
you
wanted,
but
the
idea
would
be
to
create
like
this
this
buffer.
This
is
a
discussion
the
other
day
and
I
think,
governance
or
community
speculation.
I
can't
remember
yeah,
where
you
create
like
a
buffer
like
at
a
500
million.
H
B
You
are
not
allowed
to
move
them
for
the
next
six
months
and
maybe
in
the
future
it
could
be
directly
in
the
smart
contract.
Then
you
have
the
dsr
that
you
have
no
nothing
else
in
the
psm.
You
increase
the
stability
fees
on
ease
a
and
others.
But
let's
say
there
is
nothing
left
and
die
continue
to
fall
down.
We
can
increase
the
dsr.
B
E
D
I
think
another
important
thing
is
actually
something
that
joshua
just
brought
up
with
iams.
You
know
so
iams
are
a
tool
that
governance
can
use
to
implement.
You
know
like
if
we
need
to
do
a
really
fast
change
somewhere.
We
could
do
it
through
an
iam
because
it
gives
like
a
very
specific
permission
to
do
so.
So
I
guess,
like
my
open-ended
question
for
the
dow
is:
are
there
parameters
that
should
have
an
iam,
for
example
like
tintout
on
psms,
for
example?
H
I
think
the
short
answer
is
yes.
The
long
answer
is
every
sort
of
automation
comes
with
like
a
sort
of
risk
of
like
doing
it
incorrectly
or
you
know
having
some
peril,
but
I
think
that
we
should.
We
should
be
heavily
thinking
about
how
to
governance
minimize
what
we
can
mostly
because,
like
the
cognitive
load
to
just
manage
all
of
this
is
gonna
far
out
our
capacity
as
humans
to
handle
it.
H
So
thinking
about
these
things
ahead
of
time
and
in
setting
up
an
instant
access
module
that
sort
of
behaves
correctly
in
all
of
these
different
scenarios
for
particular
parameter
changes
is
probably
a
good
idea,
but
again
you've
got
to
be
really
careful
and
some
of
the
stuff
we
can't
do
easily
yet
are
we
can't
we
can't
easily
set
rates
on
chain
right
now?
The
formula
is
complicated.