►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 42
Description
The theme for this call will be 'Collateral Risk'
Governance Segment
Richard Brown:
- Results of the Poll
- A look at the new Forum
Risk Segment
State of the Peg: Vishesh Choudry
Weekly Narrative: Matthew V Rabinowitz
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Thread: https://redd.it/c8yiki
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Summaries: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/summaries
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours) : https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/transcripts
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundation-proposal-v2-f10d8ee5fe8c
Governance and Risk Framework: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
There
you
go
hey
everybody!
Welcome
to
the
July
4th
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
with
maker
Dow.
My
name
is
Richard
Brown
I
am
the
head
of
Community
Development
I
will
be
moderating.
Today's
call.
We're
not
gonna
have
a
huge
turnout,
apparently
there's
some
kind
of
holiday
going
on
somewhere,
so
we're
gonna
plow
ahead
with
what
we
have
on
our
schedule.
A
A
Excuse
me
we're
intensely
interested
in
hearing
from
our
community.
So
if
you
have
a
question
type
it
in
the
chat,
if
you
have
a
microphone
jump
right
in
and
let
us
know
your
thinking
don't
be
afraid
to
interrupt
to
kick
things
off.
We
should
talk
about
governance
because
that's
half
the
reason
we're
here
today.
Something
interesting
happens
in
the
poll
and
I
want
to
call
this,
because
this
is
a
recurring
theme
that
we
discussed
over
and
over
in
these
meetings,
and
that
is
voter
turnout
and
what
does
that
actually
mean?
What's
the
impact
of
its?
A
A
Excuse
me
I'm
a
confident
it's
important
for
a
numerous
reasons,
but
today
we
saw
an
example.
That's
happened
a
couple
of
times
in
the
past,
which
points
out
it's
one
of
these
edge
cases
and
one
of
these
edge
cases
is
that
if
you
don't
believe
that
your
vote
matters,
then
somebody
else's
poke
does
and
that's
it's
a
hard
lesson
to
learn.
It's
one
that
people
need
to
internalize,
especially
in
this
ecosystem.
A
But
up
until
early
this
morning
there
was
a
fairly
clear
signal
that
the
voters
had
been
interested
in
raising
with
stability
fee
by
one
percent.
To
seventeen
point
five
at
some
point
and
then
in
the
last
few
hours
someone
sneakily
moved
their
mkr
into
eighteen
point
five,
so
we
have
so
I
have
sort
of
this
11th
hour.
Excuse
me
shifting
of
direction
and
if
only
one
or
two
large
holders
are
showing
up
for
these
polls,
then
one
or
two
large
holders
are
going
to
be
setting
the
yeah
yeah
stability
fees
for
some
miss.
A
Yet
another
reminder
that
people
should
do
their
best
to
keep
their
hands
on
the
wheel.
When
it
comes
to
these
polls,
I
don't
want
to
dig
into
too
much
I.
Don't
think
it's
that
alarming,
because
based
well
I'm,
I'm
I'm,
not
smart
enough
to
know
but
I'm,
assuming
that
when
vishesh
gets
into
his
numbers,
we'll
see
that
perhaps
this
is
not
too
outlandish
a
decision
to
be
made.
A
Second
thing
I
want
to
talk
about
today.
Is
we
have
a
secret
forum
and
I'm
calling
a
secret
to
try
and
create
some
buzz
as
one
secret
at
all?
It's
just
unadvertised.
What's
happened,
you
know,
what's
happened.
What's
happening
is
that
we
have
lots
and
lots
to
go
over
in
these
calls.
We
have
very
in
the
government's
ecosystem
in
general.
There's
there's
a
lot
to
talk
about,
and
we've
been
talking
repeating
this
message
that
these
calls
have
a
very
limited
time
window
associated
with
them,
their
North,
American,
centric.
A
There's
all
kinds
of
reasons
why
this
is
a
very,
very
small
demographic
and
diagram
of
our
constituents
can
show
up
in
these
calls.
What
we
need
are
venues
where
we
can
continue
longer-term,
deeper
debates.
They
really
dig
into
these
issues
that
have
more
of
a
window
a
time
window
that
allows
for
these
discussions
to
occur
up
until
very
recently
that
solution
for
us
was
reddit
depending
on
your
experiences.
The
reddit
might
be
never
a
that's,
not
a
good
solution
for
anything,
but
it's
probably
the
best
one.
We
have,
but
primarily
it's
still
very
time
restrictive.
A
There
get
some
interesting
conversations
happening
and
when
we
do
bring
this
to
the
community,
there's
there's
something
for
them
to
bite
onto,
and
so,
if
you
want
to
have
a
click
on
that
link,
you'll
see
that
this
is
discourse.
It's
kryptos
favorite
forum
solution.
We
did
some
research,
then
this
is
the
best
one
out
there
by
far
so
there
we're
going
with.
We
have
right
now
three
major
categories,
more
categories
of
coming.
These
sections
are
spread
across
major
verticals
of
maker
down,
so
we
have
governance,
we
have
risk
and
we
have
community
development.
A
They're
represented
right
now,
more
departments
from
mickr
coming
on
board
soon,
so
we'll
be
able
to
cross
pollinate
some
of
our
communities.
Please
take
some
time
to
dig
through
these
things,
because
there's
already
some
interesting
stuff
which
has
been
in
there
Matthew's
been
in
there.
We
have
some
interesting
discussions
about
collateral
types
already,
which
surfaced
some
opinions
that
we
were
had
not
anticipated,
particularly
around
rep,
so
there's
some
good
conversations
to
be
had
there.
A
How
this
relates
specifically
to
governance,
though,
is
this:
we
have
a
problem
in
governance
where
we
have
these
chicken-and-egg
situations
where
the
existing
portal,
we
understand
the
limitations
around
that
there's
one
poke
at
a
time,
one
pull
at
the
time.
If
you
pick
two,
if
you
decide
to
signal
on
a
poll,
you
can't
signal
on
the
vote
and
vice
versa.
That's
all
going
to
be
solved
very
very
soon.
It's
a
new
proportion
of
the
portal
that's
being
released.
We
also
have
this
problem
where
our
plumbing
system
is
how
we
surfaced
signals
in
this
ecosystem.
A
So
we
want
the
community
to
talk
about
something
and
signal
their
interest
in
a
possibility.
We
use
a
poll
to
gather
that
information,
and
then
we
move
that
into
an
executive
and
then
in
the
executive
votes,
make
a
decision
about
how
to
change
the
system
based
on
those
signals.
The
chicken
and
egg
situation
comes
in
where
we
have
to
ask
ourselves.
How
do
we
get
signals
into
our
signaling
system?
And
that's
it?
That's
a
tricky
one.
So
because
somebody
just
decided
do
we
come
up
with
rough
consensus?
A
Do
we
measure
by
up
votes
and
read
it
to
figure
out
what
goes
into
a
poll?
These
are
all
very,
very
hard
questions,
as
happily
I
think
the
forum
may
solve
that
problem
for
us
and
the
way
that
it
solves
that
problem
for
us
is
it
creates.
Like
I
said
this,
is
this
venue
for
deep
engaged
the
long-term
debate
from
highly
engaged
stakeholders
to
really
hammer
out
an
issue,
but
it
also
has
a
light
reputation
system
built
into
it.
It
also
has
some
fairly
decent
voting
and
polling
mechanisms
built
into
it.
A
I
think,
that's
probably
a
great
way
to
start
surfacing
signals
that
we
can
gather
consensus
on
and
then
that's
what
leads
into
the
polling
system
immediately
raises
some
questions,
though,
because
right
now
we
have
skin
in
the
game
a
governance
system
where,
if
you
want
to
alter
the
way
that
the
system
works,
it's
easy
just
go,
buy
some
maker
and
then
go
to
the
portal
and
then
start
voting.
And
then
there
you
go.
A
It's
I
said
it's
a
model
that
the
world
understands
and
there's
countless
examples
of
an
inaction
in
the
traditional
business
world,
but
that's
a
skin
of
the
game.
So
that's
that's
maker,
voter
maker
token
holders
voting
on
signals
in
the
forum.
We
have
no
way
to
determine
whether
the
people
that
are
voting
on
these
polls
are
making
soap.
Can
holders
I,
don't
think
that's
a
problem
because
there's
different
ways
we
can
look
at
the
community
there's
well,
there's
a
thousand
ways
for
community,
but
from
our
perspectives.
A
A
You
know
what
I'm
talking
about
there's
the
people
that
are
interested
in
governance
and
it's
a
it's
a
much
smaller
circle
and
that
there's
also
in
that
overlap,
there's
people
that
are
interested
in
governance,
maker
down
and
hold
maker,
which
is
a
new
and
smaller
circle,
but
that
isn't
the
only
source
of
signals
that
we
need
to
take
into
account.
We're
talking
about
governance.
One
of
those
major
sources
of
signals
are
the
community
at
large.
We
need
to
know
what
the
community
wants
and,
as
maker
token
holders
take
that
into
account
when
we're
voting.
A
We
just
want
to
get
a
general
sense
of
what
people
are
thinking,
whether
the
ideas
are
good
and
whether
there's
data
to
back
it
up.
That
I
believe
is
enough
to
achieve
some
kind
of
enough
of
a
consensus
to
a
lot
of
things
into
a
polling
system
where
we're
just
sort
of
refining
that
opinion
there's
like
I,
said,
there's
a
there's,
a
thread
in
the
forum.
A
If
you
disagree
with
me,
if
you
have
some
additional
insights,
please
join
us
there
and
let
us
know
what
you
think:
I
think
that
might
wrap
it
up
for
me
today.
I
don't
want
to
dig
too
far
into
it.
If
you
do
have
suggestions
about
the
forum
or
you're
used
to
discourse,
you've
you've
used
these
things
in
other
cocoa
projects.
In
the
past
we
also
have
a
site
feedback
category.
A
B
I
can't
see
everything
all
right,
you
know
so
I
think
yeah
I
shared
a
little
sort
of
preview
in
the
the
forum
and
I
think.
Maybe
that's
actually
a
good
segue
to
just
start
this
time,
I
shared
a
little
preview
in
the
forum
I
just
my
two
cents,
rich
I,
like
the
forum
I,
think
it's
you
know
a
good
UI
easy
to
use
pretty
clear,
so
might
be
something
that
I
try
to
use
moving
forward,
but
yeah
I
mean
the
basic
takeaways
were
for
the
past
week.
B
B
We've
seen
a
lot
of
you
know,
trading
volume
we've
seen
a
little
bit
of
the
peg
suffering.
We've
seen.
You
know
some
increase
in
supply,
so
a
lot
of
these
metrics
tend
to
indicate
leverage
and
levering
up
behavior,
so
that
kind
of
makes
perfect
sense.
You
know
each
price
dips
a
bit
people
lever
up,
they
meant
died
in
the
process.
Stability
fees
a
little
bit
lower
right
now
than
it
had
been
before
so
early
sit
had
been
when
things
were
kind
of
quote,
unquote
going
well,
so
it's
it's
I,
think
very
facile.
B
To
like
just
say,
the
stability
fee
causes
XYZ
and
I.
Think
a
lot
of
people
just
want
to
get
to
that
quick
answer,
but
I
think
it's
a
little
bit
more
complicated
where
the
stability
fee
changes,
the
reactivity
of
the
system
to
stressors
like
eath
and
so
those
that's
kind
of
like
the
gist
of
what
I'm
gonna
say
to
that.
B
So
just
to
touch
on
I
think
it's
maybe
good
to
mention
this
every
now
and
then
I
try
not
to
show
too
often
it's
kind
of
a
boring
graph,
but
the
curative
loans
that
have
ever
been
issued
is
you
know,
roughly
360
million.
Currently
the
last
time
we
checked
about
this
sometime
in
May
or
you
know,
early
June.
B
In
that
rate,
although
I
think
that
margin
between
the
two
has
widened,
which
is
good,
I,
think
that
that
shows
growth,
and
we
just
want
to
make
sure
that
that
growth
gets
realized
in
terms
of
revenues,
because
it
does
also
come
with
some
risks.
So
it's
just
kind
of
like
a
high
level
thing
to
touch
on
it
right
now
on
that.
B
Five
percent-
and
that
was
something
that
I
had
touched
on,
is
kind
of
an
indicator
that
it's
a
little
bit
slippery
er
and
so
a
stressor
could
push
it
a
little
bit
further
than
it
could
have
at
nineteen
point
five
percent
and
that
stressor
happened
and-
and
so
it
did,
you
know
pressure
it
a
bit,
not
the
end
of
the
world.
I
think
totally
recoverable,
even
on
its
own
and
I
think.
B
You
know
just
how
easy
and
profitable
is
it
to
use
maker
through
CDP's,
which
is
the
stability
fee,
that
the
stability
feed
like
100%
determines
profitability,
and
so
it's
the
trade-off
between
kind
of
tightening
the
variability
in
the
system
versus
allowing
growth
to
happen
a
little
bit
easier,
but
I
think
what
we'll
see
is
that
growth
has
been
happening
despite
you
know,
19.5%
to
levy
17.5
etc,
like
even
at
these
levels,
we've
seen
the
system,
oh
and
so
I.
Don't
think
you
necessarily
need
to
lower
the
stability
fee.
I.
B
Don't
think
you
necessarily
need
to
increase
it.
I
do
think.
If
you
increase
it,
it
will
reduce
some
of
this
variability
I.
Don't
think
it
will
necessarily
100%
contract
the
supply.
Although
basic
economic
says
that
if
everyone
is
operating
rationally,
they
would
refinance
some
of
those
over
to
secondary
lending
platforms
where
there
has
been
an
increasing
supply
and
I.
Think
that
increasing
supply
is
a
really
interesting
metric
to
touch
on
or
a
true
whole
a
little
bit
later,
so
the
eath
price
and
sorry
when
I
reload
these
all
these
become
unselected.
B
But
at
the
end
of
the
day,
what
we're
saying
is:
there's
sort
of
a
blue
skies,
fair
weather
relationship
between
Ethan
dye,
which
is
a
little
bit
distinct
from
the
downturn,
relationship
between
Ethan,
died
and
I.
Think,
ultimately,
it's
like
when
people
are
highly
levered
on
CDP's,
then
dye
has
one
relationship
to
and
when
people
are
not
highly
levered,
then
dye
has
a
different
relationship
to
eat
and
that's
the
underlying
mechanic
that
I
think
is
going
on,
and
so
what
I
think
is
currently
happening.
B
B
What
is
pretty
interesting
is,
as
the
the
supply
was
kind
of
steady
or
relatively
steady
between
nineteen
point.
Five
and
16.5%
heat
and
and
eath
was
making
price
movements
during
that
time,
pretty
significant
price
movements.
It
is
a
data
point
that,
somewhere
between
this
nineteen
point
five
and
seventeen
point
five
percent
stability
fee
was
a
relatively
quote-unquote
steady
state
variable
for
for
maker
at
that
time.
Now
it's
not
just
the
stability
fee
and
isolation,
there's
a
lot
that
goes
on
with
secondary
lending
rates
and
secondary
lending
volumes,
that's
kind
of
this
buffer
layer.
B
That
is
also
moving
constantly
and
moving
much
more
wildly
than
the
dye
supply,
but
but
it
just
in
terms
of
the
dye
supply.
Things
were
fairly
quiet
in
that
time
period
and
and
I
think
that
was
an
indicator
that
at
least
for
the
purposes
of
minting
new
dye,
the
that
range
was
a
bit
of
a
steady-state
as
the
supply,
as
the
the
state
stability
fee
was
reduced
to
sixteen
point
five
percent.
B
B
Somewhere
around
this
time
period,
people
decided
to
start
to
seek
more
leverage
again,
and
so
that
definitely
does
contribute
to
the
increase
in
supply,
and
so
there's
I
keep
seeing
this
debate,
and
this
is
why
I
kind
of
harp
on
this
between
the
stability
fee,
what
its
actual
meaning
is,
what
its
actual
effects
are
and
how
much
you
know
all
of
these
things
would
be
happening
if
the
stability,
if
he
had
never
changed.
That
was
a
concept
that
was
raised,
and
my
point
is
just
it's
not
that
simple.
B
The
stability
fee
is
kind
of
like
the
volume,
but
eath
is
the
one,
that's
changing
the
channels
and
so
the
at
the
end
of
the
day.
The
signals
are
coming
from
eath,
but
the
sensitivity
of
the
system
to
those
signals
is,
is
hugely
affected
by
the
stability
fee.
So
I
think,
just
when
you
have
those
things
happening
together.
B
That's
when
it's
very
clear
that
this
supply
will
increase,
and
so
that
is
exactly
what
happens.
The
supply
has
increased
pretty
significantly.
You
know
from
around
80
million
at
the
beginning
of
June.
You
know
90.1,
you
know
1
or
2
million.
Currently,
this
graph
actually
had
cut
off
for
the
24
hour
delay,
so
the
circulation
of
debt
I
think
just
kind
of
echoes
this
a
little
bit.
So
what
we'd
seen
was
with
that
19.5%
increase.
B
You
start
to
see
just
over
time
a
decrease
in
the
age
of
debt,
so
more
and
more
that
old
debt
was
getting
paid
back
more
and
more
debt.
That
was
being
more
and
more.
The
outstanding
debt
was
new,
and
so
this
was
kind
of
continuing
and
then
dropped
to
17.5
16.5
that
started
to
reverse
and
16.5.
Holding
steady,
the
average
age
started
to
drop
again
and
for
open
debt,
but
for
close
debt
was
holding
relatively
steady.
B
So
what
that
just
means
is
more
new
debt
was
being
drawn
out
part
of
this
sort
of
intermediate
period,
where
the
new
debt
wasn't
not
being
drawn
out.
That
aggressively
was
because
a
lot
more
of
that
new
debt
was
really
coming
from
secondary
lending,
so
so
the
demand
for
dye
was
either.
People
purchasing
died
at
a
discount
or
borrowing
it
from
secondary
lending
platforms
during
that
time
period.
So
yeah
we
just
see
the
kind
of
this
long
term
and
it's
interesting.
B
B
So
right,
around
May
we'd
started
to
see
the
collateralization
come
up,
and
that
was
pretty
much
nominally
with
price.
But
then
we
saw
this
sort
of
commensurate
decrease
again
with
price,
but
more
aggressive
than
the
eath
price
had
been
decreasing,
and
so
then,
when
we
saw
sort
of
a
run
up
again
in
collateralization,
this
was
in
some
extent
due
just
to
the
nominal
value
eath
and
I've
had
some
feedback,
which
I
think
is
really
good,
is
to
show
this
sort
of
in
dollar
terms
as
well.
B
You're
sort
of
you
know:
eath
price
adjusted
what
I
mean
with
that?
Collateralization
ratio
had
started
to
run
up
partially
due
to
just
price
and
basic
math,
but
it
was
a
little
bit
more
muted
than
then
the
price
would
justify.
But
when
it
started
when
the
probably
started
to
drop,
the
drop
in
collateralization
was
a
little
bit
more
aggressive,
and
so
what
that
means
is
sort
of
reinforcement
of
how
we
we
have
been
thinking
about
the
collateralization
ratio,
which
is
obviously
it
moves
when
price
moves
and
that's
the
short
time
scale
effect.
B
B
What
will
tend
to
top
up
sort
of
as
a
counter
effect
of
what
the
price
is
doing
and
then?
Similarly,
when
the
collateralization
ratio
runs
up
because
eath
prices
increased
people
are
not
they're,
not
too
quick
to
pull
out
collateral
from
those
CDP's?
If
they
think
that
that
eath
price
has
run
up
too
quickly,
and
might
you
know
have
a
chance
of
dropping
again
cuz,
you
know
once
burned
twice
shy.
They
don't
want
to
get
liquidated
but
to
some
extent
other
people,
especially
on
the
higher
range
of
collateralization
z'.
B
I
think,
tend
to
do
pull
out
some
of
that
collateral
so
that
they
can,
you
know,
realize
some
of
their
profits
pay
back
other
loans.
You
know
whatever
they're
gonna
do
with
that
capital.
I
think
they
don't
necessarily
want
to
pay.
The
cost
of
you
know
having
more
dollars
sit
in
the
system.
So
you
see
this
kind
of
counter
balancing
effect
on
both
ends,
as
one
thing
so
just
to
touch
on
the
price
like
I
said,
has
been
suffering
a
little
bit,
but
nothing
too
extreme.
B
So
I
think
when
the
eath
pry
potentially
runs
up
a
little
bit.
You
will
see
some
cashing
out
behavior
if
it
happens,
obviously,
and
then
that
supply
should
theoretically
decrease
a
bit
and
then
some
of
this
leveraging
will
unwind
and
you'll
see
more
buying
pressure
on
time,
and
so
that
could
just
totally
even
out
on
its
own,
and
you
may
not
have
to
do
anything
at
all.
B
If
you
do
increase
the
stability
fee,
it's
not
necessarily
going
to
be
a
bad
thing,
because
it
will
simply
help
to
tighten
up
and
increase
more
pressure,
more
incentive
for
people
to
pay
back
those
loans
which
I
will
talk
about.
A
second
is
one
talk
about
demand,
so
you
know,
like
I,
said
these.
These
were
two
new
metrics.
Actually
new
I
mean
you
all
may
have
seen
some
previous
of
it
on
these
calls
of
the
lending
rates
on
variable
term
platforms.
B
C
B
Basically,
I
think,
which
is,
is
basically
this
alternative
ethnic
routine.
So
that's
the
more
important
of
the
two
metrics
here
I
think
it
tells
you
basically
how
cheap
or
expensive
is
it
for
people
to
obtain
dye
from
other
similar
platforms
than
directly
from
a
CP,
and
then
the
supply
rate
is
basically
just
how
much
is
the
effect
of
holding.
B
B
The
supply
or
the
outstanding
amount
of
borrow
and
supply
is
pretty
interesting,
so,
as
I
had
mentioned,
may
needs
kind
of
seen
this
explosion
in
the
amount
of
dye
that
was
being
borrowed
on
secondary
lending
platforms,
and
that
chair
basically
had
come
right
out
of
the
amount
of
dye
that
would
have
theoretically
been
minted
from
CDP's
and
so
I
haven't
shown
it
here.
But
but
there's
a
write-up
I'm
working
on
where
you'll
be
able
to
see
that
which
is
essentially
the
total
outstanding
loan
volume
taking
into
account
CDP's
taking
into
account
secondary
lending
platforms.
B
B
That
would
have
been
minted,
which
I
think
is
actually
a
good
thing,
because
what
it
it
allows
is
sort
of
the
narrowing
of
the
gap
between
supply
and
demand,
and
that
reduces
our
oversupply
problem
that
had
been
experienced
in
the
past,
which
makes
the
system
more
robust
reduces
some
of
the
downward
price
pressure
on
dye
and
I.
Think
is
overall.
In
that
positive,
it's
it's
effectively
value
being
thrown
down.
B
The
drain
is
being
recovered
in
the
sense
that
risk
that
was
being
taken
on
unnecessarily
has
been
shed
for
a
premium
and
and
I
think
that's
good
is
when
you
have
risk
that
you
don't
want
and
you're
able
to
offload
it
so
that
someone
else
can
make
can
get
compensated
for
taking
on
that
risk.
That
is
a
good
thing,
and
so
it's
just
a
paretic
improvement,
and
so
what
we've
seen
is
what
editing
is
a
little
bit
more
curious.
The
borrow
is,
is
explicable,
I
think
pretty
well.
What's
really
curious.
B
That
makes
me
sort
of
think
that
the
increase
in
supply
of
dye
might
be
an
increase
in
oversupply
rather
than
an
increase
in
demand,
and
so
this
has
been
a
big
debate
lately
and
I
know.
We
all
always
want
to
believe
that
the
demand
is
increasing,
but
it
is
entirely
possible
that
that
has
by
and
large,
or
at
least
some
significant
extent
been,
an
increase
in
over
supply.
Now,
I,
don't
think
it's
quite
as
simple
as
saying:
okay.
B
Well,
the
supply
on
these
comparable
platforms
was,
you
know
around
1415
million
and
had
run
up
to
around
nineteen
and
a
half
million.
So
there's
you
know
four
and
a
half
million
that's
attributable
to
oversupply,
and
the
remaining
five
point.
Five
is
that
you're
able
to
demand
I?
Don't
think
it's
quite
that
simple,
but
I
do
think
that
there
is
some
relationship
that
is
close
to
that,
which
is,
maybe
you
know,
a
more
percentage
weighted
term
basis.
B
Now
organic
demand
for
dye
is
actually
a
very
tenuous
concept
as
well,
because
there's
a
lot
of
question
of
whether
you're
gonna
start
counting
leverage
as
an
organic
demand,
use
case
versus
not
I.
Think
right
now
you
kind
of
have
to
because
leverage
is
sort
of
that
big
driving
use
case
for
dye.
There's
also,
you
know
sort
of
that
volatility,
shelter,
there's
no
legitimate
transaction
volume.
There
is,
you
know
the
the
need
for
flash
capital
and-
and
you
know
just
legitimately,
permissionless
loans,
etc.
B
Unfortunately,
I
think
trading
volume
relative
to
transaction
volume
has
and
I
don't
have
that
graph
here
in
front
of
us,
but
trading
volume
relative
to
transaction
volume
has
been
high
and
just
historically
for
dye,
and
so
I
do
unfortunately
think
that
means
that
lending
derivatives,
leverage
etc
are
right.
Now,
big
big
drivers
of
the
usage
of
time.
B
B
But
you
know
there
may
be
the
intention
for
some
people
to
just
pay
the
the
liquidation
penalty
and
sort
of
not
pay
their
fees,
but
again
that
there
may
be
an
element
of
marketed
rationality.
There
may
be
an
element
of
data
that
we
just
have
a
hard
time
getting
eyes
on,
and
this
is
a
really
I
think
hard
and
unpredictable
problem
to
to
model
out.
B
B
A
The
question
there,
though,
and
Steven
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
which
will
at
what
proportion
of
that
is
actually
being
lent
out,
and
I
think,
isn't
the
assumption
that,
with
these
variable
lending
platforms,
that
they
are
actually
lending
out
almost
immediately
like
they
owe
by
being
put
to
work
right.
The.
A
B
So
I
haven't
grasped
the
utilization
rate
here
by
it.
I
think
these
platforms,
especially
like
compound,
for
example,
set
the
rates
so
that
they
maintain
a
relatively
steady
utilization
rate.
The
the
interest
rates
I
mean
but
I
have
not
graphed
that
over
time
it
should
just
be
the
ratio
of
these
two
which,
if
you
look
at
you,
know
currently
compound
thirteen
point,
eight
supplied
and
eight
point
five
borrowed.
So
that
gives
you
a
sense
and
then
calling
similarly
dy
DX.
A
B
Okay,
I
can
you'll
be
better
if
she
knows
how
to
run
it
yeah.
So
revenue
is
a
misleading
term
that
maybe
I
shouldn't
even
use
with
regards
to
maker,
but
stability
fees
are
quote,
are
paid
and
cause
the
deflation
of
maker,
and
so
it's
overall
appreciation
for
everyone,
and
so
that
that
maker,
like
stability
fees,
are
paid
literally
in
maker,
and
so
that
amount
of
maker
that
is
used
to
pay.
A
A
Sorry
for
this
session,
so
we're
talking
about
the
said
that
people
complete
take
out
draw
dye
out
of
a
CDP
and,
if
they're
not
actively
putting
this
into
a
use
or
they
need
to
store
it
for
any
certain
amount
of
time
they
can
stick
to
that
diet.
So
a
secondary
lending
platform
and
sort
show
off
some
of
the
hit
they're.
Taking
with
the
stability
feat
but
is,
is
the
is
there
some
way
for
us
to
figure
out
which
the
dye
that's
in
secondary
lending
platforms?
A
A
B
It
is
possible,
I,
believe,
have
I
done
it.
No
I
think
it
involves
a
fair
amount
of
detective
work
in
the
sense
of
tracking
transfers
between
addresses,
which
is
I,
think
a
pretty
heavy
chain
analysis
question
of.
To
what
extent
can
you
track
the
movement
of
the
money
straight
from
the
CDP's
all
the
way
to
being
supplied
to
those
secondary
lending
platform
contracts?
B
Eliseo
had
had
done
some
work
on
this
with
regards
to
the
overlap
between
compound
and
maker
and
I
think
what
they
had
determined
was.
There
was
a
pretty
heavy
overlap.
I,
don't
think
they
looked
into
to
what
extent
did
like.
What's
the
proportion
of
that
relative
to
the
dye
that
was
not
overlapping
effectively
and
had
gone
through
second
or
tertiary
hands
before
getting
to
the
secondary
lending
platforms?
I
am
very
curious
about
this,
but
no
I
have
not
computed
that
answer.
At
this
point.
D
Is
below
a
dollar
less
mercury
makers
and
arbitrage
there
will
be
because
they
won't
be
able
to
get
as
good
of
returns
if
it's
staying
below
a
dollar
for
significant
period
of
time,
I
think
we
need
to
take
an
aggressive
approach
and
move
it
move
the
stability
speed
to
get
it
back
on
par.
That
way
in
the
future.
The.
B
Makers
so
I
think
the-
and
this
is
not
a
new
question
by
any
means,
this
is
sort
of
an
ongoing
discussion,
but
I
think
what
first
part
of
that
is
100%,
true,
which
is
when
and
by
definition
right.
So,
if
die
perfect
case
if
die
was
literally
always
a
dollar
and
never
traded
above
or
below,
market
makers
would
have
100%
confidence
that,
in
the
event
that
it
ever
there
actually-
and
this
is
this-
is
probably
a
fallacy.
B
If
dye
had
always
perfectly
been
a
dollar,
then
if
it
drifts
below
a
dollar,
would
market
makers
immediately
think
that
oh
I
have
strong
confidence
that
this
will
return
to
peg
I?
Don't
think
the
answer
is
necessarily
yes.
I
think
it
is
helpful
for
market
makers
to
see
dye
oscillates
above
and
below
a
dollar
pretty
predictively
and
I
have
seen
it
drift
from
peg
before
many
times
and
still
return
to
the
peg
I
actually
think.
B
In
that
case,
there
is
a
greater
confidence
that,
in
the
event
it
dips
in
the
future
that
they
will
arbitrage
it
in
the
hopes
that
it
will
return
to
peg
I.
Do
definitely
think
that
the
further
it
drifts
from
the
peg
for
the
longer
period
of
time,
a
hundred
percent
that
reduces
the
confidence
of
market
makers
and
I,
don't
know
if
there's
any
market
makers
currently
on
the
call,
but
I
love
hearing
from
them
the,
and
so,
if
there
is
feel
free
to
interrupt
me
any
of
you.
But
the
the
one
thing
is
I.
B
B
Sure
so
the
velocity
of
arbitrage
with
dye
is
a
little
slower
than
Fiat
backed
coins.
Do
you
think
this
would
speed
up
in
the
future
or
eating
speed
at
all
speed
of
arbitrage,
in
the
sense
that
how
quickly
dye
drifts
and
returns
from
peg
is,
it
is
important
for
sure,
I,
think
and
I
don't
want
to
just
sort
of
become
the
the.
B
Justification
important
but
I
think
what
you
can
say
is
when
that
arbitrage
cycle
is
slower.
There
is
a
little
bit
more
risk
both
for
the
system
and
from
the
market
maker
perspective.
But
again
I
don't
want
to
speak
for
market
makers.
I
would
much
prefer
they
speak
for
themselves
in
terms
of
their
incentives.
B
Is
it
a
problem
like?
Is
it
a
significant
problem
if
that
arbitrage
cycle
is
slower
than
you
know,
the
ability
for
a
reserved
back
coin
to
to
mint
or
burn
I,
don't
think
that's
necessarily
a
problem.
I
think
it's
always
going
to
be
like
that.
There's
always
going
to
be
that
Delta
I
think
arbitrage,
mechanics
and
you
know,
liquidity
constraints
are
always
going
to
cause.
A
Okay,
cool
thanks
for
Treach.
That
was
amazing,
as
always,
we'll
have
a
recap
or
David
will
have
a
synopsis
Horace
that
will
post
into
the
forum
and
the
subreddits
that
captures
all
of
the
salient
points
we're
at
the
top
of
the
hour
almost
but
I
don't
want
to
skip
this
next
section.
So
if
you
feel
like
hanging
out,
please
do
Matthew.
Did
you
have
a
weekly
recap
for
us
that
you
wanted
to
talk
about.
E
Yes,
so
basically
the
main
point
that
I
wanted
to
chat
about
was
you
know,
as
we
migrate
from
a
single
collateral
die
world
to
a
multi
collateral
die
world.
You
know
that
there's
not
only
a
question
of
where
we're
going.
It's
also
the
big
picture,
the
steps
we
have
to
do
to
get
there
and
you
know
as
I
understand
and
that's
always
a
loose
point.
You
know
we're
we're
switching.
E
We
will
be
pivoting
from
what
we're
doing
today,
of
a
we're,
almost
half
way,
ignoring
our
risk
policy
and
in
a
single
collateral
world
and
smashing
risk
policy
and
monetary
policy
and
as
a
function
of
switching
to
multi
collateral
die.
We
are
basically
bifurcating
the
to
where
we're
going
to
have
collateral
with
asset
quantity
of
parameters.
E
Whatever
that
debt
ceiling
liquidation
ratio,
collateralization
ratio
is
for
a
given
collateral,
just
pick
e
for
a
moment,
you
know,
and
that
will
have
a
given
risk
premium,
that's
associated
to
it
to
in
effect-
and
this
is
a
rich
team
question-
it's
not
me
to
answer,
but
should
be
to
the
point
where
it
makes
the
output
any
any
dye.
That's
minted
from
that.
In
effect,
riskless,
more
or
less
probably
to
a
95
percent,
that's
100
percent
of
or
to
the
risk
premium
would
be
infinite.
So
it
goes
to
a
certain
degree.
E
We
can
argue
that
16
and
a
half
percent
is
too
high
back.
We
even
had
a
down
to
zero
and
a
half
percent,
and
it
still
didn't
have
any
losses.
So
the
question
really
or
the
community
and
then
that
there's
a
mathematical
form
it's
not
just
how
you
feel,
but
what
is
the?
What?
What
would
be
the
risk
premium,
given
the
same
parameters
that
we
have
today?
You
know
I
suspect
that
it's
way
way
lower
than
16
and
a
half.
But
the
big
question
really
is:
how
do
we
go
correctly?
E
E
What
one
would
assume
that,
if
that
new
risk
premium
is
material
materially
lower,
say
2%
instead
of
16
and
a
half,
if
we
just
flip
the
switch,
we
have
a
surge
of
dye
which
would
erode
the
price.
So
there's
there's
a
sequence
that
we
have
to
go
through
to
navigate
the
waters
from
single
collateral,
a
multi
collateral
of
which
we
can
go
through
some
of
those
recommendations.
Now,
if
you
want.
A
Yes,
all
right,
then
it's
an
interesting
conversation
I
think
that
I
followed
some
of
the
debate
in
the
forum,
but
it
wasn't
able
to
like
follow
it
closely.
So
you're
saying
that
right
now
we
understand
the
system
is
sure
we'll
say
over
the
we
understand
the
system
right
now
with
ether
as
a
collateral
type.
It's
it's
been
priced
in,
there's
premiums
associated
with
it
and
all
the
rest.
We
know
what's
going
on.
Basically,
but
the
minute
we
add
a
new
collateral
type
where
we're
basically
shifting
the
sand
beneath
our
feet.
A
We
don't
understand
what
impact
that
new
collateral
type
is
going
to
have
on
the
underlying
risk
models.
That's
established
that
stability
fee
that's
or
the
stability
fee
that
created
the
data,
it's
already
in
the
ecosystem,
right
so
you're,
saying
that,
because
dye
is
sort
of
fungible
because
we
don't
know
which
dye
is
being
backed
by
which
collateral
type
it's
difficult
to
predict,
the.
E
Just
for
right
now,
the
question
is:
what
is
the
risk?
What
risk
premium
would
we
logically-
and
this
is
a
risk
in
question
like
what
is
the
risk,
sir,
that
die
with
a
hundred
and
fifty
percent
collateralization
ratio
with
Oracle
feeds
every
30
minutes
that
come
in
with
a
debt
ceiling
of
whatever
number
we
picked
hundred
fifty
million
doesn't
matter.
What
is
the
risk
premium,
such
that
when
the
risk
premium
is
in
effect
and
insurance
funding?
E
With
that
risk
premium
that
we're
associating
in
a
multi
collateral
die
world
is
just
what
does
it
take
to
cover
the
pop
theoretical
losses
of
a
liquidation
event?
It
should
have
nothing
to
do
with
monetary
policy
thing
to
do
with
dye
outstanding,
nothing
to
do
with
the
dye
price
purely
to
do
with
the
collateral
at
hand.
E
E
A
Just
want
to
say
that
this
is
probably
I'm
completely
unqualified.
To
answer
that
question
so
but
from
an
amateur
economist
perspective
and
that's
that's
being
modest
I
think
over
there
I
don't
know
sorry,
you
know
I'm
saying
the
riskiness
you
saying
that
the
risk
in
this
system
has
to
be
looked
at
holistically.
It
there's
no
way
to
draw
to
compartmentalize
this
stuff
and
my
understanding
of
how
the
system
is
designed
and
the
way
that
it's
supposed
to
operate
is
that
it
is
compartmentalized
that
there's
a
liquidity.
E
A
For
token
X
and
that's
why
it
has
a
very
has
disability
fee
associated
with
this
very
conservative
debt
ceiling
associated
with
it,
and
so
the
addition
of
token
X
the
risk
there
is
essentially
capped
by
how
much
of
token
X
can
be
liquidated
and,
of
course,
24
hours.
If
token
X
goes
south
rapidly
right
and
and
from
that
perspective,
these
are
individual
units
of
risk
and
you're,
saying
that
that
they're,
not
individual
units.
E
We
take
our
existing
system
today.
Just
imagine
right
now
we
could
flip
a
switch
and
it
was
going
to
exist
in
a
multi
collateral
world.
Just
assume
the
software
got
deployed
right
now.
Does
it
stability?
Excuse
me:
does
a
risk
premium
of
16
and
a
half
percent
make
sense
for
the
etherium
collateral
package
that
we
have
with
150%
collateralization
ratio?
Does
that
make
sense?
My
argument
is
that
that
is
way
overdoing
the
actual
risk,
because
we've
embedded
monetary
policy
in
the.
B
C
E
No,
this
is
I,
mean
we're
going
to
watch
this
video
in
five
years
and
say:
let's
look
back
and
say
this
was
a
short-term
phenomenon
where
we
were
where
we
were
using
the
risk
premium
to
handle
monetary
policy.
We
should
be
dealing
the
risk
premium
for
every
single
collateral
should
be
specific
to
that
one
collateral
package,
and
also
you
know
the
covariance-
is
to
see
if
they
know
are
related
to
other
collaterals.
So.
C
C
E
What
we
should
do,
yeah
I
mean
at
the
end
of
the
day
we
should
view
my
respectful
view
is
that
we
should
be
looking
at
each
one
of
the
collateral
packages
in
isolation
grant
again,
there's
covariances.
So
if
you've
got
a
theorem
with
a
hundred
eighty
percent,
collateralization
versus
one
with
a
thousand
and
you've
got
them
sitting
next
to
each
other.
You
have
to
include
how
the
two
might
interact
right.
E
It's
not
that
they're
completely
isolated,
but
the
risk
premium
that's
associated
or
let's
pick
the
one
that
had
a
collateralization
ratio
of
a
thousand
should
be
much
much
lower
than
the
one
that
has
a
higher
kalapa.
Excuse
me,
a
lower
collateralization
ratio,
the
risk
premium
for
the
one
that's
more
risky
should
be
higher,
but
that's
all
we're
focused
on.
So
the
question
is
the
point
I'm
trying
to
raise
as
we
navigate
the
waters
when
we
launch
multi
collateral
die
and
again
this
community
question
feedback.
E
My
understanding
of
it
is
when
we
launch
multi
collateral
died
when
it
is
launched,
the
DSR
is
not
being
launched
in
parallel.
It
should
be
launched
sometime
after
the
fact.
So
the
question
is:
when
you
move
from
code
set,
a
single
collateral
die
to
multi
collateral
die,
and
then
you
go
for
multi
collateral
die
to
a
world
where
you
start
introducing
the
DSR
we
have.
We
need
to
find
a
phased
approach
where
we
migrate
without,
and
the
ultimate
objective
here
is
to
continue
doing
everything
I'm
mentioning
without
degrading
the
price
of
died
during
this
endeavor.
E
Wait,
there's
an
economic
sequence
to
do
this,
where
we
in
effect
can
refi
out
collateral
package
that
has
that
stability
fee
that's
ridiculously
too
high
and
introduce
a
new
stability.
Excuse
me
a
new
collateral
package
with
identical
parameters,
but
but
a
quote:
unquote
correctly
priced
risk
premium
and
slowly
raids
that
debt
ceiling
at
the
same
time
we're
introducing
a
DSR
to
offset
the
die.
That's
minted
from
the
point.
More
than
anything,
as
we
start
introducing
more
and
more
collateral
packages
were
the
how
much
we
use
a
given
collateral
should
be
totally
irrelevant.
E
E
And
that
would
be
why
you
increase
any.
If
you
have
you
have
the
idea
being,
is
that
it's
a
riskless
offset
so
there's
too
much
risk
list
dye
that
was
minted.
You
are
fully
justified
and
increasing
the
DSR
to
which
is
a
riskless,
absorbing
tool,
a
mop
to
justify
it
and
that
that
is
the
you're
dealing
with
a
risk.
Let's
point:
you
can
insured
prep
package
at
that
point
right.
E
E
More
importantly,
the
moment
we
start
actually
more
what
I
would
say
correctly
pricing
the
risk
premium,
as
it
relates
to
a
given
collateral
package
in
effect,
segregating
bifurcating
monetary
policy
and
risk
policy
will
end
up
with
and
it
currently
modeled
ether,
with
a
risk
premium,
that's
materially
lower,
which
of
course
raises
the
question:
what
happens
to
secondary
lenders
that
are
used
to
relatively
high
rates?
We
start
introducing
rates
that
are
reasonable,
but
we
now
have
a
secondary
tool
to
absorb
any
excess
dye
that
maybe
they
don't
have.
C
E
Mean
because,
if
you
think
about
it,
we
if
we
just
segregate
for
risk,
forget
rep,
we
talk
about,
you,
know,
WB
TC
I
know
there
are
liquidation
concerns
about
what
what
how
liquid
is
the
secondary
market
to
be
able
to
sell
WB
TC
and,
of
course
that
needs
to
grow.
So
what
should
the
risk
premium
be?
Well,
it
should
be
pretty
high
if
there's
not
a
whole
lot
of
liquidity.
If
there
was
a
lot
of
liquidity
behind
it.
E
Now
the
secondary
question
that
comes
out
is
how
high
do
you
have
to
raise
the
dsr,
and
this
is
like
another
equilibria
question:
how
high
do
you
have
to
raise
the
riskless
risk-free
rate
to
encourage
enough
would-be
investors?
Speculators
buy
die
to
lock
it
into
a
DSR
where
they're
taking
zero
risk?
How
high
do
you
have
to
raise
that
number
again?
The
DSR
is
uniform
in
every
single
one
of
the
in
every
single
stability
fee
in
a
multi
collateral
die
world.
E
C
E
C
E
E
Yeah,
so
you
know,
I
can
kind
of
dovetail
the
conversation
on
that
I
mean
I'm
happy
to
go
on
for
another
half
an
hour
on
it.
If
you
wanted,
but
the
question
here,
it's
just
the
sequence
and
it's
not
only
what
I
think
it's,
how
I
mean
if
you
kind
of
views
it
and
not
only
where
we
want
to
be
in
five
years
of
having
five
or
six
hundred
different
types
of
collateral
and
a
huge
portfolio
and
a
stabilized
system.
E
A
D
In
a
bit,
so
I
think
what
Matthew
is
talking
about
yeah.
So
what
I
believe
is
that
DSR
is
probably
going
to
be
the
main
labor
to
adjust
the
imbalance.
So
the
thing
is
that
the
stability
field
will
always
carry
as
I
think
David
mentioned
on
the
chat
he's
going
to
carry.
He
said
it's
almost
like
the
stability
fee
has
an
additional
the
risk
premium.
D
I
think
it
actually
has
an
additional
monetary
risk
premia,
because
you
will
always
need
to
finance
DSR
with
stability
fee
so
with
the
additional
part
of
upward
of
the
risk
premium,
and
this
this
will
need
to
happen,
and
unfortunately,
that's
the
case.
But
don't
forget,
you
also
have
other
liver,
so
you
can
adjust
the
collateral
ratios
and
so
on.
So
you
have
many
things
at
your
disposal
where
you
could
adjust
the
imbalance,
but
yeah
I
totally
agree
there.
D
There
I
mean
I'm,
not
saying
there's
doing
to
be
a
problem,
but
we
will
need
to
adjust
for
this
and
there's
always
a
question
how
how
we're
going
to
do
this.
These
are
there's
also
another
tricky
thing.
So,
let's
imagine
there
is
DSR
with
three
four
five
percent
whatever
and
the
demand
of
dye
outpaces
supply.
So
in
that
case
you
would
need
to
lower
the
SR
and
what
are
we
going
to
do
with
stability
fee?
E
That
mean
to
me
that
that's
now
we're
inserting
risk
and
that
that
is
the
danger
in
this
whole
equation.
How
do
you
maintain
Ritz
Policy,
segregated
from
monetary
policy,
because
reducing
I
mean
if
your
budget,
by
by
reducing
the
stability
Femi,
you
mean
reducing
the
DSR
and
thereby
thereby
it
reduces?
But
you
should
we
shouldn't
be
touching
the
risk
premiums
associated
to
a
given
collateral
for
the
sake
of
policy
to
change
the
price
unless
the
conditions
on
the
ground
related
to
that
collateral
mean
that
it's
now
less
risky.
D
Yeah
I
totally
agree,
but
what
I'm
saying
is
that
you
might
have
an
additional
spread
on
risk
premium
and
you
might
you
will
also
deplete
it.
You
know
when
the
DSR
is
adjusted
downward,
so
you
have
two
sided
effects
as
well,
but
yeah
I
mean
I,
agree
with
you
that
we
will
need
to
compensate
for
it
with
the
stability
fee
and
how
we're
going
to
do
it
is
this
another
story.
What
I
think
is
is
it's
also
important
is
so
now.
Let's
imagine
there
is
oversupply
of
died
from
one
collateral
which
collaterally
going
to
punish.
D
You
talked
about
this
that
you
would.
You
would
prefer
to
punish
the
risky
ones.
What
I
believe,
which
one
I
would
punish
if
I
stated
such
I
would
punish
the
one
square
the
most.
How
do
you
say
elastic
to
the
change
right?
So
imagine
if
one
collateral
brings
a
lot
of
die
and
you
change
the
stability
feel
downward
it's
going
to
be
probably
the
most
the
most
elastic
of
them,
the
most
responsive
to
the
stability
fee
change
right.
So
that's
that's
my
proposal.
There
I
guess.
E
This
is
really
my
learning
of
this
I'm
by
no
means
an
absolute
expert
I'm,
just
trying
to
learn
as
much
as
I
can
I've
actually
kind
of
switched
back
from
that
mentality
of
how
do
you
quote-unquote,
punish
and
rather
took
a
lesson
from
with
this
mentioned
in
the
back-channel
communication
of
just
saying:
why
don't
you
just
correctly
price
it
on
the
front
end
where
we
really
shouldn't
be
punishing
any
party
from
anything
die
if
they
were
priced
correctly?
Yes,
it
was
taking
the
parameters
of
a
given
collateral
package
and
an
a
risk
premium.
E
Whatever
that
risk
premium
was
that
made
it
through
the
consensus
model,
we're
gonna
have
with
aims
risk
games
and
whatever
that
meant
to
die
that
was
minted
from
it
was
in
effect
the
risk
or
insured
or
quote-unquote
risk
list.
So
if
a
risky
collateral
package,
even
in
extreme
case
like
we've,
talked
about
with
rep
and
how
it
has
some
challenges,
even
if,
even
if
somehow
we
come
up
with
a
model
where
we
say
listen,
the
risk
premium
is
going
to
be
500
percent
per
rep
because
there's
a
possibility
that
it
could
default
well.
E
E
The
DSR
is
used
to
mop
up
the
monetary
policy
mop
up
the
exits
or
in
the
in
the
scenario
you
outlined.
When
you
have
too
much
demand,
you
might
have
to
decrease
the
DSR
right,
but
changing
the
risk
premium
meant
that
it
wasn't
set
correctly
in
the
first
place,
or
it
meant
there
were
situations
on
the
ground
that
changed.
E
When
I
started,
my
company
I
meant
when
I
started.
This
whole
thing
was
where
the
conditions
on
the
ground
for
ether
as
the
fundamental
collateral
base
with
our
current
parameters,
the
parameters
haven't
changed
the
business
case.
The
liquidity
market
for
ether
has
probably
not
changed
if
anything
had
gotten
better
in
the
last
year.
E
So
does
the
risk
premium
that
we're
associating
with
it
today
of
16
and
a
half
percent
make
sense
in
multilateral
world.
You
know
in
two
years,
definitely
not
for
the
first
sequence
to
how
you
go
from
you.
Have
multi
collateral
die
launched.
What
is
step
number
one,
two,
three
four
and
five
well
step.
One
probably
means
you
have
a
risk
premium,
elevated.
C
Well,
it's
okay,
I
I,
just
had
kind
of
a
a
kind
of
little
bit
of
a
tangent
of
a
thought.
Where
would
it
make
sense
in
the
context
of
having
you
know,
a
lot
of
different
collaterals,
a
lot
of
different
collateral
packages
to
actually
use
debt
ceilings
as
it
means
to
damp
and
die
supply,
because
at
that
point,
debt
ceilings
would
be
far
less
risky
on
the
individual
collateral
basis?
C
E
E
I
think
that's
a
thing.
It's
a
firm,
a
very
solid
policy
tool.
I
mean
like
the
sequence
that
I
have
in
my
head,
that
we
that
I
would
entertain
or
recommend
to
the
community
in
step.
Number
one.
You
launch
with
a
collateral
package,
that's
identical
to
what
we
have
and
with
ether
today
with
the
identical
stability
feat.
So
it
shouldn't
change
the
price
and
a
debt
ceiling
of
I.
E
Don't
know
pick
a
number
one
hundred
twenty
hundred
thirty
hundred
fifty
million
something
where
it
doesn't
really
rock
the
applecart
and,
at
the
same
time,
the
next
collateral
package
you
launch
as
identical
parameters,
but
be
correctly
priced
risk
premium
to
be
determined
that,
let's
just
say
it's
too
personal.
But
what
David
just
said
with
a
with
a
debt
ceiling
of
I?
Don't
care
$100,
$500,
something
where
it'll
get
used
instantly,
but
we
won't
they
won't
it's
not
enough
to
change
or
to
change
the
price
of
dye.
E
That
would
be
basically
step.
One
in
1.5
step
two
would
be
to
launch
the
DSR
and
have
it
be.
You
know
0.1%
something
where
it
doesn't
get
a
whole
lot
of
interest,
but
we
can
test
it
step.
Number
two
excuse
me
step.
Three
would
be
to
then
start
to
increase
that
debt
ceiling
on
that
second
collateral
package
and
alternate
back
and
forth
between
that
and
increasing
the
DSR,
so
that
we're
not
changing
the
price
of
dye.
E
Until
we
get
to
the
point
where
you
kind
of
let
it
kind
of
let
it
loose
in
the
wild
and
once
it's
on
its
own
two
feet,
where
we
have
correctly
priced
collateral
package,
B
with
a
very
low
risk
premium
and
a
DSR,
that's
effectively
mopping
it
up
with
whatever
that
equilibria
is
or
would
be.
Then
you
drop
the
collateral.
E
Excuse
me,
you
drop
the
debt
ceiling
on
the
first
collateral
package
down
to
zero,
so
nobody
else
knew
can
hit
something,
that's
incorrectly
priced
and
yet
well,
naturally,
over
time
refinance
themselves
out
the
collateral
package
at
a
federal
package
B
or
whatever
else
is
in
the
market.
We
got
to
find
a
way
to
do
that
without
disrupting
the
price
of
dye.
D
I
just
want
to
switch
debate
a
bit
about
the
state
of
the
pack
and
the
graphs
that
we
share
showed
I.
Think
there's
one
interesting
point
to
it.
So
I
think
rich
asked
how
much
of
the
dye
that
drawn
from
CDP's
has
ended
in
the
secondary
platforms
and
I.
Think
I
mean
that
wouldn't
ultimately
make
much
sense
right,
because
why
would
you
pay
higher
interest
rate
for
borrowing
and
then
landing
the
doubt
on
secondary
platforms,
because
the
interest
rate
there
is
as
much
as
I
know
it
is
now
lower.
D
Maybe
it's
leverage
and
they
would
otherwise
go
to
to
make
her
right
and
they
with
issue
die
there,
and
so
you
have
this
dispositive
effect
of
the
demand
and
supply
and
secondary
platforms
actually
helps
us
with
the
pipe
a
lot
currently.
So
this
should
be
taken
into
into
account
about
the
current
price
and-
and
we
haven't
seen
such
search
for
some
time
yet.
A
Actually,
rush
yeah,
it's
interesting
to
try
and
figure
out.
What's
going
on
at
some
point,
we're
not
going
to
be
able
to
avoid
having
to
do
some
deep
chain
analysis
to
find
out
exactly
what's
happening
here,
because
it's
we're
gonna
need
that
information
involve
a
system
effectively.
I
appreciate
the
follow
up,
we're
at
10th
or
starting
at
10
I.
A
Might
then
everybody
else
is
at
24
minutes
after
the
hour
I'd
like
to
wrap
it
up
here
actually
and
keep
an
hour
and
a
half
there's
a
nice
tight
package
for
these
calls
thanks
everybody
for
sticking
around
and
thanks
Matthew
for
your.
You
recap
again
lots
of
food
for
thought:
let's
not
lose!
This
conversation
looks
it
feels
like,
as
David
said,
this
feels
like
a
debate
is
gonna
be
lasting
for
weeks
or
potentially
months.
So,
let's,
let's
keep
the
momentum
going
and
I'll
be
posting.