►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 60
Description
# Governance
- Richard Brown:
- Debt Ceilings
- Polling Schedule
- What do we need from Governance?
- LongForWisdom: Governance at a Glance
# Risk
- Cyrus Younesssi:
- Migration Risk Construct Mini-Review/Q&A
- Auctions in MCD
- Vishesh Choudry: State of the Peg
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Threads: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/746
Podcast version: https://feeds.soundcloud.com/playlists/soundcloud:playlists:623643288/sounds.rss
Summaries: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/summaries
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours): https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/transcripts
Foundation Proposal: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/core-principles
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
There
we
go
hello,
everyone
welcome
to
the
November
7th
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
at
McCord.
My
name
is
Richard
Brown
I'm,
the
head
of
Community
development's,
the
Steve
Graham
was
first
and
they
look
like
with
the
agenda.
It's
weird
if
I
mix
it
up.
We
are
super
keen
to
hear
from
everybody
in
this
call.
So
if
you
have
something
to
contribute,
please
do
type
of
question
and
the
chats
we'll
get
to
it
as
soon
as
there's
a
lull
in
the
conversation.
A
If
you
have
access
to
a
microphone,
you
don't
meet
the
way
for
a
lot.
You
can
just
interrupt
it
so
feel
free
to
jump
in
at
any
points.
One
thing
I
keep
on
forgetting
I
want
to
reiterate
this.
You
make
her
down
employees
they've
been
sneaking
in
this
call.
I
won't
hear
from
you
as
well.
So
if
you
have
things
to
contribute,
if
you
have
questions,
this
is
a
great
place
to
ask
it.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
behind
closed
doors,
we're
all
friends
here,
so
I
guess
I'm
going
to
have
it.
A
Please
do
in
today's
call.
We
are
going
to
talk
about
governance
and
then
we're
going
to
talk
about
risk.
Celts
who
pries
Cyrus
is
going
to
touch.
Do
some
a
bit
of
a
recap
on
the
migration
risk
construct
and
then
we're
going
to
dig
into
the
wild
and
mind-bogglingly
complicated
world
functions.
I,
don't
know
if
I
should
have
framed
it
that
way,
but
so
here
let
me
do
a
caveat.
A
I
find
it
enormously
complicated,
perhaps
of
people
in
the
room
smarter
than
me
who
will
not,
and
then
we
are
going
actually
and
then
I'm
going
to
talk
about
some
governance
issues
with
my
general
squishy
philosophical
take
on
things
that
cannot
be
quantified
so
this.
Actually,
this
is
not
going
to
that.
Let
me
make
it
as
fast
as
I.
Possibly
can
we
have
some
things
that
happened
recently,
how's
that
for
an
opener,
so
smart
with
these
things?
A
The
thing
is
that,
through
the
heroic
efforts
of
long
for
wisdom,
he
Shepard
did
an
initiative
through
the
forums
over
the
course
of
a
month
or
two
I
think
that
thing
took
which
we,
where
we
learned
a
lot
of
really
interesting
things.
We
learned
about
how
the
community
comes
together,
to
make
something
happen
and
to
move
the
eCos
of
the
ecosystem
necessarily
unlikely
to
grandiose,
but
they
certainly
moved
Baker
down
and
the
way
that
they
moved
maker
doubt
was
deciding
how
we
handle
debt
ceiling,
so
the
situation
ever
arise
where
we
hit
the
debt
ceiling.
A
This
presumption
was,
we
should
probably
raise
that
that's
orange
I
think
was
probably
a
good
idea.
I,
don't
know
I'm
gonna
risk
analyst,
but
so
that
proposal
went
through
the
system
and
what
that
did
my
special
on
this
last
week,
but
I
want
to
touch
on
it
again
because
it's
important
this
is
the
first
month
if
the
community
has
empowered
an
actor
it's
been
ratified
by
the
community,
namely
me
to
take
action
based
on
activity
in
the
ecosystem
and
then
do
something
which
is
that's
really
big,
because
generally
we
have
one
I.
A
Don't
always
we
have
a
poll
reach
out
or
we
have
a
forum
post
and
then
we
have
a
poll
on.
Then
we
have
a
vote
and
something
happens.
The
proposal
stated
that
in
the
events
that's
we
hit
or
we
come
within.
Ten
million
of
the
existing
debt
ceiling,
the
governance
interim
government's
ability
attorney
myself-
is
empowered
to
skip
the
forum
posts,
get
the
poll
and
simply
put
in
an
executive
or
a
tap
on
a
new
parameters
of
the
weekly
executive,
which
is
maintained
that
10
million
buffer.
A
That
happened
this
week,
which
is
fascinating
so
great
the
system
works.
But
here's.
Where
is
what
I
wanna
talk
about
specifically
because
I
was
chatting
about
this
in
the
raca
chat
yesterday
I'm
going
to
make
a
forum
post,
so
the
wider
audience
is
able
to
follow
along
with
the
debate,
but
I'm
also
going
to
recap
today.
A
Here
we
have
some
stress
cracks
form
in
our
governance
system
and
those
cracks
will
become
more
apparent
as
the
weeks
and
months
progress,
particularly
post
MCD,
where
we
need
to
have
a
system,
that's
flexible,
but
also
capable
of
handing
on
in
unexpected
situations
and
here's
an
example
of
an
unexpected
situation.
That's
proposal
stated
that
we
maintain
a
ten-million-dollar
ten-million-dollar
and
the
threshold,
for
that
is
if
we
hit
that
minimum
threshold
for
even
so
much
as
a
block,
and
then
we
we
thought
about
that.
A
We
shouted
about
it
and
we
debated
it
for
a
month
or
two
like
I
said,
but
immediately
we
ran
into
a
situation
that
nobody
had
anticipated.
So
this
is
where
we
need
to
start
figuring
out
how
we
do
governance
in
the
future.
The
situation
we
didn't
anticipate
was
what
happens
if
we
gets
greater
than
a
10
billion
increase
and
in
in
the
debt
ceiling
or
the
circulating
die,
and
then
we
get.
A
We
have
to
bump
it
by
20
million
instead
of
10
during
the
course
of
week,
and
that's
the
situation
we
ran
into
so
we
discovered.
This
is
something
that
I
like
to
talk
about
a
bit
somewhere
facetiously,
but
it's
not
really
only
facetious.
So
in
the
crypto
space,
where
we
have
a
tendency
to
reinvent
a
lot
of
things,
we're
kind
of
reinventing
the
financial
world
were
reinventing.
A
Economies
were
reinventing
how
insurance
works
were
reinventing
like
the
list
goes
on
we're.
Also,
probably
this
might
be
a
bit
revealing
a
bit
of
our
hubris,
but
we're
also
in
the
process
of
reinventing
how
governance
works.
I
think
we
all
understand
how
tricky
a
problem
that
is
I'll
make
it
down.
Our
philosophy
is,
let's
be
conservative
about
Daunte
step
by
step,
but
it
were
the
course.
The
last
couple
of
days
we've
also
reinvented
the
judiciary,
which
I
hadn't
seen
that
one
coming
so
here's
here's
the
problem.
A
If
we
need
to
do
this
well,
if
you
need
to
do
that,
so
the
situation
as
it
stands
is:
there's
no
specific
language
in
that
proposal
that
states
that
the
increase
has
to
be,
or
is
bound
to
be
within
10
million
of
the
previous
ratified
debts,
and
we're
going
to
encourage
people
to
dig
into
that
proposal
and
in
the
forums
and
see
what
they
have
to
think
about
it.
My
interpretation,
this
is
where
we
get
into
the
judiciary's.
A
My
interpretation
of
that
proposal
is
that
we
need
to
maintain
a
10-million
buffer
and
that
buffer
is
dependent
on
whatever
the
current
is
circulating
from
a
number
of
diets.
So
if
we
look
at
the
intention
of
the
proposal,
my
reading
states
that
we
moved
to
120
as
a
camp
this
this
Friday
for
a
scheduled
vote.
So
there
we
go
ambiguity
already
in
the
system
and
sorry,
no
constructors
am
beginning
the
system.
The
judiciary's
come
into
effect.
A
A
A
They
expect
a
call
on
a
Thursday
for
us
and
or
me
and
or
a
couple
people
in
a
chat
to
decide
that
that
cadence
is
now
going
to
be
altered,
because
we've
determined
that
there's
an
emergency
makes
me
super
nervous
because
anybody
who's
formerly
ever
been
stuck
in
the
meeting
with
me.
You
know
that
I'm
making
a
question
so
first
thing
I
ask
is
what's
an
emergency
according
to
WHO
and
him.
A
How
do
you
measure
that
and
what
are
the
appropriate
responses,
and
so
we
need
to
start
thinking
some
simple
bus
and
stuff
because
numbers
were
thrown
out.
So
if
the
peg
deviates
by
one
percent
over
six
hours,
two
percent
over
12
hours,
so
they
know
we
had
an
emergency,
but
I'm
I
need
to
I
need
more
eyes
on
that
decision,
because
emergency
for
her
that's
there's,
there's
more
questions,
and
if
you
come
with
an
answer
that
I'll
give
you
a
couple
more
so
there's
this
less
complicated,
there's
there's
additional
risks.
A
If
we
decide
that
oK
we've
we've
now
clarified
what
an
emergency
is.
Now
we
have
an
emergency,
so
we're
going
to
do
an
executive
on
Tuesday
afternoon
that
that
raises
some
more
concerns
for
me,
so
we
already
have
where
every
week
we
we
give
the
ecosystem
homework.
Read
up
on
your
maker
downs
watch,
all
the
youtubes
try
to
figure
out
what's
happening.
The
forum
make
an
informed
decision,
get
yourself
prepared,
move
your
keys
and
then
do
some
work
on
Friday
in
order
to
protect
this
system.
A
That
is
that's
a
pretty
big
task
and
that's
something
that
we
need
to
think
about
in
the
future.
How
do
we
optimize
that
process
a
bit?
But
how
big
does
that
ask
become
if
we
tell
the
community
through
our
actions
that
you
know
what
we're
gonna
have
an
executive
whatever?
So
you
better
be
watching
this
system
all
the
time,
I'm,
not
sure
whether
that's
gonna
be
a
thing
that
we
can
expect.
A
So
I
was
something
to
think
about
and
that
ties
back
to
Mike
mighty
extreme
reluctance
to
exercise
any
kind
of
emergency
powers
or
special
abilities
that
are
tied
up
in
the
government's
facilitator
role.
I
think
that
it
needs
to
be
the
backstop
and
an
administrative
and
bureaucratic
roll,
the
paper
pushing
role
as
opposed
to
making
a
decision
as
well
as
much
as
humanly
possible.
A
We
would
have
had
some
more
oh,
but
we'll
just
do
it
today.
Instead,
no
harm,
no
foul
that
just
gives
people
an
extra
day
to
respond
in
an
extra
day
to
deliberate
all
right
on
that
idea
and
I.
Don't
think
that's
an
abuse
of
power
or
an
overreach,
so
I'm
going
to
try
to
make
that
happen.
So
here's
actually
that
was
gonna
leave
me
into
my
next
month,
but
I
think
I
might
have
lost
with
dread
here.
A
Yeah
well,
actually,
yeah,
okay,
well,
I'll,
see
if
I
can
come
back
to
it,
but
we've
talked
about
there's
Cadence's.
There's
the
expectations
from
the
community
there's
a
exercising
power
that
I
might
be
I'm
not
from
I'm
uncomfortable
with,
and
that
eventually
the
community
might
become
uncomfortable
with
as
well.
But
it's
something
that
we
need
to
figure
out
in
the
future.
A
Let's
list
of
eight
in
the
farms
or
in
the
chats,
preferably
in
the
forums
and
then
see
what
that
looks
like
I'm
gonna
leave
it
actually
I'm
votes,
asteroid
speechifying,
so
I'm
gonna
cut
myself
off,
but
what
I
do
want
to
do
is
I
want
to
leave
this
question
with
the
community
and
I'm
gonna
I'm
gonna
touch
on
this
more
probably
weekly
I'm,
not
gonna.
Stop
talking
about
that.
So
something
else.
Here's
the
idea.
We
need
to
perform
an
audit
here.
A
We
need
to
think
very
carefully
about
the
government
system
that
we
have
the
tooling
that
we
have
the
mechanisms
we
have.
We
need
to
think
about
pulling
the
need
to
think
about
continuous
approval.
We
need
to
think
about
this
weekly
cadence
and
we
need
to
imagine
a
little
bit
what
the
future
might
look
like,
that's
good
for
in
the
future,
and
we
also
need
to
figure
out
what
it
is
and
once
we've
had
the
past,
because
we're
about
to
head
into
a
very
different
universe
and
the
one
that
we
occupy.
A
Currently,
okay,
maybe
I'll,
give
myself
another
five
minutes
ahead.
I'll
exercise
that
power
we
right
now
we
have
a
single
universe,
we've
deliberated
and
debated
and
optimized
for
us
to
pull
lever
weekly
to
manage
the
stability
feet
and
sango
collateral
that
very
very
soon
two
weeks,
ish
we're
going
to
have
two
universes.
A
A
We
need
to
figure
out
that
stuff
with
the
system
and
the
tooling
and
the
cadence
is
that
we've
built
for
ourselves
and
we're
going
to
see
problems
with
that
system.
So
this
is
the
opportunity
for
us
to
start
iterating
a
little
faster
than
we,
but
we
need
from
governance
and
what
how
governments
operate,
what
kind
of
feeling
we
need
from
this
system.
A
So
let's
get
down
the
back
of
our
minds
and,
as
we
run
into
frictions,
let's
get
a
forum
post,
opera
or
proposal,
or
maybe
a
mini
initiative
or
a
working
group
together
and
let's
figure
out
how
to
improve,
improve
this
world
that
we
live
in
I
think
I
might
leave
it
there.
That's
enough
to
digest
for
now
Cyrus
I'm
going
to
hand
it
off
to
you.
It's
also
good.
What's
not
being
a
risk
world
cool.
B
B
All
right,
but
before
we
get
into
that,
let's
just
do
a
final
or
a
second-to-last
recap
on
migration
risk.
Earlier
this
week
we
posted
a
proposal
to
the
forums
on
the
form
of
governance
poll
for
basically
a
migration
strategy,
along
with
a
set
of
launch
parameters.
The
document
had
a
few
different
talking
points.
One
was
how
to
manage
two
different
pegs.
B
B
B
Have
to
go
to
the
public
markets
to
source
Sai
and
that
shouldn't
be
a
problem
in
the
early
days.
I
would
encourage
everybody
to
migrate
as
soon
as
they
are
comfortable
and
ready
and
willing
is
eventually
when
liquidity
dries
up
for
Sai
emergency
emergency
shutdown
will
have
to
be
triggered
cool.
Well,
there's
been
plenty
of
discussion
on
this
so
far
and
as
always,
reach
out
on
the
forums
or
in
the
chat
or
anywhere,
and
we
can
help
with
that.
B
B
Couple
general
rules
for
how
the
auctions
work
auctions
in
a
blockchain
world
are
a
little
bit
confusing
at
times.
I'll
try
to
do
our
best
to
explain
it
and
yeah
few
weird
things:
one
is
a
bids
can't
be
canceled
once
a
keeper
places
a
bid
for
an
auction,
it's
it's
there,
I
mean,
of
course
someone
else
can
come
in
and
outbid
them,
but
you
can't
change
your
mind,
which
kind
of
implies
that
the
auctions
have
to
end
promptly
due
to
market
risk
right.
B
B
Auctions
are
expected
to
be
primarily
bought,
driven
at
launch.
I
know
this.
This
may
be
disappointing
to
some
was
for
me
because
I
was
I
was
interested
in
potentially
participating
at
some
of
these
auctions,
but
there
won't
even
be
any
gooeys
at
launch,
and
there
are
some
compelling
arguments
for
why
it
makes
sense
for
it
to
be
entirely
by
driven
at
first
that
could
change
in
time,
potentially
we'll
just
kinda
have
to
see.
B
Okay,
so
let's,
let's
start
with
the
collateral
auction,
a
few
different
parameters
to
be
aware
of
here:
one
is
the
lot
size
per
auction.
So
when
a
CDP
is
bitten,
the
entire
collateral
amount
is
not
put
up
in
the
form
of
one
auction,
for
example-
and
this
makes
sense,
because
some
of
these
large
CDP's
that
have
millions
of
dollars
in
collateral
right,
if
that
was
all
to
be
one
auction,
then.
B
Well,
there'd
be
a
very
small
subset
of
people
who
could
participate
in
that
auction.
I
guess
a
caveat
I
should
have
mentioned
the
previous
page
is
that
keepers
must
bid
the
full
amount
of
the
auction
they
must.
They
must
try
to
take
down
the
full
block
size
of
the
auction.
They
can't
you
can't
bid
for
only
a
partial
amount
so
to
compensate
that
for
that
a
large
CDP
will
be
broken
down
into
multiple
auctions.
B
B
Now
the
downside
of
subdividing
these
auctions
is
that
they
take
longer
there's
only
so
many
auctions
you
can
fit
into
a
single
block.
So,
for
example,
if
you
wanted
to
make
it
something
really
accessible,
say
$100
and
you
had
a
million
dollar
CDP,
then
that
would
be
ten
thousand
auctions,
which
is
obviously
a
aux
issue
there.
So
there's
a
there's
a
bit
of
a
trade
off
of
what
you
want
to
make
that
lot
size
to
be
I'll.
Talk
about
bullies
chosen
in
a
moment.
B
B
B
Will
that
expected
volatility
in
the
form
of
a
discount
and
he'll
just
underbid
the
auction
and
the
maker
protocol
will
end
up
receiving
less
die
now,
if
that
number
is
too
low,
you
run
into
other
risks,
primarily
network
issues,
block
times
full
blocks,
high
high
gas
prices
and
so
on,
and
then
you
run
the
risk
of
an
auction
ending
without
anyone
bidding
and
then
the
entire.
The
entire
debt
would
go
to
a
debt
auction,
which
is
also
undesirable.
B
So
basically
go.
If
you
look
on
the
centralized
exchanges,
if
you're
bidding
on
eath
on
coinbase,
for
example,
you
can
you
can
bid
every
penny
increment,
the
so
you
can
bid
like
180
180
and
a
penny,
and
so
on.
The
size
of
that
increment
has
some
pretty
important
implications
for
for
the
auction.
So
if
it's
set
too
low,
then
what
can
happen?
C
B
Open,
yes,
there
is
there's
plenty
of
documentation
out
there.
There
is
even
a
open
source
auction
bots
for
users
to
spin
up
to
participate
in
these
auctions.
There's
there's
plenty
of
documentation
out
there.
I'm
hoping
yep
David,
just
link
to
one
oh
and
Kenton,
just
linked
to
the
the
open
source
thought
that
I
was
referring
to
okay.
So
here's
an
example
of
a
of
a.
B
B
B
Now
the
collateral
auctions
have
two
phases
in
them,
so
the
first
phase
is
a
keeper
would
come
in
and
they
say:
I'll
bid
50
die
for
this
120
dollars
worth
of
collateral.
Now,
if
this
ends
up
being
the
winning
bid,
he
wins,
he
wins
the
thief
and
maker
goes.
They
have
a
63
die
shortfall
because
they
were
trying
to
recover
this
113
and
they
only
get
50.
B
This
is
a
type
of
here
that
should
be
keeper
D
and
basically,
if
this
ends
up
being
the
winning
bid,
then
the
keeper
pays
113
die
for
0.98,
eath
still
turns
a
profit
and
the
CDP
owner
will
get
back
the
balance
of
their
collateral,
which
in
this
example,
is
point
zero.
Two,
you
is
that
clear
for
everyone,
it's
just
how
the
auctions
work.
A
Yes,
anybody
who's,
not
on
the
payroll
asking
a
question:
all
they
want
sorry.
This
is
a
question
for
a
during,
for
one
of
the
architects
of
the
system
are
some
weeks
from
those
auctions?
Is
there
a
name
for
whatever
this
is
like
is?
Is
this
a
new
kind
of
auction,
or
is
this
like
some
kind
of
inverted
upside-down
auction
or
something
like
can
we
can
we
do
research
on
how
these
mechanisms
Worth's
external,
making
it
yeah.
B
I
think
I'm
not
an
options.
Expert,
myself
but
I
think
it's
a
English
auction,
which
is
I,
think
it's
just
a
standard
auction,
so
this
first,
this
first
phase
is
fairly.
This
is
how
everybody
intuitively
thinks
of
options
right.
Just
increasing
bid
amounts
for
what's
up
for
sale,
that's
just
what
everybody
thinks
of
when
they
see
auction.
The
second
part
is
kind
of
the
the
weirder
part.
Where
now
people
start
reverse,
it
basically
saying
how
little
of
the
total
amount
they're
happy
to
walk
away
with.
B
So
the
problem
is
printer,
as
we
have
for
the
for
the
collateral
auction
block
size
is
around
10.
We
targeted
about
10
grand
this
kind
of
hits
that
balance
between
endlessly
creating
too
many
small
auctions
versus
something
that
is
able,
for
that
is
easy
for
most
keepers
and
market
makers
to
absorb
the
minimum
bid
increment
of
3.
Are
you
sorry?
The
bit
duration
of
10
minutes
is
also
a
happy
middle
ground
between
network
issues
and
market
risk.
B
The
minimum
bid
increment
of
3%
was
designed
to
closely
mimic
that
her
sed
structure
as
closely
as
possible,
given
that,
basically,
if
somebody
comes
within
97%
of
the
collateral
amount,
then
it's
it's
not
rational
for
anyone
to
outbid
them.
So
it
kind
of
guarantees
a
three
percent
profit,
somewhat
safety
measure
of
auction
duration,
three
days
and
a
liquidation
penalty
of
of
thirteen
percent.
B
B
So
we
can
extend
this
a
little
bit
to
be
a
little
bit
safer
and
then
the
surplus
options
trigger
when
the
lock
size
is
reached
above
the
above
a
surplus
buffer,
which
is
which
is
a
system
parameter
which
we'll
probably
talk
about
next
week,
but
essentially
the
buffer
is
the
amount
of
dye
reserves
which
is
a
which
is
something
bow
down
by
governance
as
well.
Cyrus.
B
They
want
those
auctions
to
end
quickly,
but
the
surplus
auctions
occur
kind
of
uniformly
when
stability
feasel
when
stability
fees
are
collected
and
they'll
happen,
very
they
should
happen
very
uniformly,
which
means
that
it's
much
less
likely
that
that
the
surplus
auctions
will
occur
during
any
sort
of
market
volatility
and
in
any
case,
the
surplus
options
get
worse
when
the
em
care
price
is
increasing
rather
than
decreasing.
Actually
it's
a
it's
an
mkr
rally
that
I
think
is
the
market
risk
because
they
end
up
over
bidding
for
the
preset
dye
amount.
D
B
B
A
A
B
B
B
A
A
Based
off
of
you
know
some
sort
of
mechanism
to
either
throw
rate
or
have
a
I
guess,
you
can
have
a
good
parameter
like
I'm
willing
to,
in
my
bid,
I'm
willing
to
also
pay
this
amount
more
or
less,
and
then,
when
you're,
when
you're,
creating
the
book
on
when
you
originally,
you
kind
of
look
at
like
what
is
this
person
done
with
me
recently
and
I?
Imagine
there's
a
lot
of
potential
reputation
built
up
in
keepers
and
you
can
kind
of
create
a
cover.
A
You
can
see
a
process
in
the
t-shirt
where
we
would
look
at
this
I'm
parameters
to
share
equally
and
also
a
account
for
regular
keepers.
Just
just
a
thought,
I
was
that
would
take
a
lot
more
thought
and
design
changes,
but
it
feels
a
lot
like
that
process,
where
you're
trying
to
account
for
multiple
people
in
the
similar
fashion,
similar
bids
yeah.
B
That's
that's
a
great
point
and
I
mean
there's
I
agree,
there's
a
lot
of
time
to
get
there,
because
these
parameters
are
all
subject
to
change
as
well
and
and
the
choice
of
parameters
really
has
some
pretty
big
implications
on
that
on
how
the
auctions
turn
out
so
I'd.
Imagine
that
we'd
have
to
kind
of
standard
or
optimize
these.
These
numbers
before
any
type
of
reputation,
emerges.
Anyways.
Oh
yeah,
good
point!
B
B
B
B
B
So
there
is
this
notion
of
the
maximum
amount
of
MKR
that
could
be
requested
or
minted
per
auction.
So
if
you're
trying
to
bail
out
$100
worth
of
bad
debt,
then
the
protocol
might
impose
a
limit
and
say
that's
great,
but
we're
not
going
to
mint
more
than
five
nkr
for
this
and
then,
if,
if
that
number
is
too
low,
then
the
auction
can
reinitialize
an
increase
that
initial
maximum
bid
amount.
B
Maybe
that's
confusing
so
I'll
try
to
go
through
an
example.
Again,
so
let's
say
you
have
a
let's
save
a
ten
thousand
I
fall
and
the
m
care
price
is
five
hundred
and
you
may
set
the
maximum
initial
bid.
250-
and
this
is
about
twenty
five
thousand
dollars
so
now.
Well,
the
situation
we
wanted
we
want
to
avoid
is
a
keeper
coming
in
and
saying
I'll
cover
that
ten
thousand
shortfall
but
I
want
five
thousand
MKR
in
return,
which
is
something
absurdly
high
and
this
number
could
be
could
have
been
arbitrarily
large.
B
But
this
is
now
an
invalid
request
amount,
the
maximum
that
they
could
request.
Is
this
parameter
here
so
keeper
comes
in
and
he
bids
10,000
died
and
he
says:
I
want
25
grand
worth
of
MKR.
This
would
represent
a
huge
profit
for
him,
so
another
keeper
comes
in
he
and
this
is
kind
of
like
a
reverse
bidding
auction.
Next
guy
comes
in,
he
says:
I'll
pay,
ten
thousand
die--and
I'll
accept
only
thirty
mkr
in
return
and
so
on,
and
you
know
it'll
probably
converge
somewhere
close
to
ten
thousand
plus
some
spread
for
liquidity
and
profit.
B
B
B
Is
yeah
see
that's
exactly
like
it's
exactly
like
phase
two
of
the
collateral
auction,
where
you're
agreeing
to
bid
the
full
amount,
that's
needed
to
be
raised
and
you're
just
saying.
What's
the
least
amount
of
MKR
you're
willing
to
walk
away
with
now
in
the
collateral
auction,
this
isn't
necessary
because
the
most
that
they
could
walk
away
with
what
is
whatever
is
in
the
collateral
from
the
CDP,
but
because
this
mkr
is
minted
on
the
spot.
You
need
to
implement
a
limit
hard-coded
into
the
protocol.
B
B
Parameters
are
also
pretty
standard,
except
fairly
recently,
we
made
a
change
to
the
lock
size
where
we
increased
it
from
10,000
to
50,000,
because
there
was
this
extremely
minor
edge
case
with
the
DSR
during
migration,
where,
if
you
had
a
bunch
of
Sai
holders
migrate
over
and
start
earning
the
dsr,
then
you
might
accidentally
trigger
one
of
these
debt
auctions,
because
there
would
be
no
offsetting
stability
fees
potentially,
if
so,
assume
assume
Sai
holders
migrated
over.
They
earned
the
dsr,
but
no
CDP
owners
migrated
over.
B
We
have
to
talk
a
bit
about
some
governance
issues
that
have
come
up,
and
both
of
these
are
my
fault
and
I'm.
Sorry
about
that.
Fortunately,
both
of
these
are
relatively
minor
issues
and
easily
fixable.
This
won't
affect
launched
in
any
way,
but
we
probably
do
need
to
come
to
consensus
on
a
short-term
solution,
and
then
we
can
discuss
how
to
make
sure
this
doesn't
happen
again.
B
B
Normally
there
are,
or
would
have
been
a
few
options
on
how
to
deal
with
that,
and
and
that's
kind
of
what
the
point
of
that
forum
post
is
to
gauge
feedback,
but
unfortunately,
due
to
the
second
issue,
I,
don't
I,
don't
think.
There's
any
good
options
left
other
than
running
a
clean
up
governance
poll
on
Monday,
so
essentially
that
maximum
bid
amount
for
the
debt
auction.
B
We
forgot
to
increase
it
in
conjunction
with
the
increase
for
the
lot
size
and,
as
a
result,
it's
too
low,
and
so
now
keepers
will
not
rationally
bid
on
the
auction
until
that
discount
has
kicked
in
a
couple
times,
which
means
that
the
the
bad
debt
would
sit
in
the
queue
for
a
number
of
days.
This
isn't
anything
technically
bad,
but
it's
definitely
something
we
want
to
avoid
and
if
we
have
time
to
clean
this
up
before
launch-
and
we
do-
we
definitely
should
so
pause
here
for
some
questions.
B
All
right
well,
I'm,
not
sure,
if
kind
of
the
implication
this
has
come
across
as
well
as
I'd
like,
but
essentially
I
mean
we
put
out
a
governess
pull
and
we
just.
We
don't
want
to
launch
an
executive
with,
and
we
definitely
can't
launch
an
executive
with
parameters
that
are
different
from
what
was
voted
on.
The
governor's
pull
so
we're
just
gonna
have
to
kind
of
run
a
quick
fix
governance
poll
that
inserts
this
missing
parameter,
which
was
carelessly
left
off
and
then.
B
A
Alright
thanks
iris
I
think
I
should
jump
in
here,
just
yeah.
So
that's
that's
the
situation,
the
Orient.
We
have
one
additional
weekly
kids
of
governments.
We
can
utilize
between
now
and
launch
so
next
week,
we'll
be
having
a
stability
for
you
poll
as
usual
and
I
clean
up
all
night
clean
up
fall,
my
preference
will
be,
but
we're
still
debating.
A
But
as
I
search
pointed
out,
there's
there
are
debates
in
the
forums
or
at
least
explanations
and
details
in
the
forums
if
there's
contention
or
confusion
or
issues
that
people
want
to
bring
up.
Please
do
I
forgot
to
talk
about
it
in
the
preamble,
but
at
the
top
of
the
now
or
ref
you're
getting
pretty
tense
on,
but
sometime
after
the
top
of
the
hour
or
at
we
will
have
a
free-form
Q&A
session.
So
we
touched
on
a
lot
of
really
tasty
issues
actually
today.
A
A
D
A
D
D
The
other
new
active
discussions
that
arrives
this
week
were
the
inclusion
of
died
stability
index
to
MKR
holder
risk
profile
by
Pat.
So
he
opened
the
discussion
around
how
to
ensure
that
we
get
more
and
care
to
vote
about
directly
incentivizing
keeping
the
die
peg.
This
actually
arised
from
the
discussion
we
had
towards
the
end
of
the
call
last
week,
so
Pat
went
on
and
made
a
thread
like
rich
gave
him
the
action
item
to
do
so.
That
was
pretty
cool.
D
We
had
a
new
maker
governance
analytics
dashboard
and
there
is
a
thread
there
accompanying
it.
I
know
the
guys
at
proto.
Fire
are
looking
for
feedback,
so
definitely
add
feedback.
In
that
thread,
there
was
also
the
Uni
v1.
You
know,
swap
liquidity
tokens
as
collateral
through.
This
is
a
super
interesting
I
know
that
our
community
has
been
considering
liquidity,
tokens
kind
of
from
afar,
and
this
thread
gives
us
a
chance
to
dive
into
it
and
and
get
some
of
these
pros
and
cons
and
considerations
on
paper.
So
to
speak.
D
Yeah
there
was
a
the
Syrus
posted
the
migration
risk
construct,
not
just
the
on
the
proposal,
but
also
on
the
forum.
I,
don't
know
if
there
was
too
much
discussion
in
that
thread,
but
yeah
that's
pretty
pretty
much
it
if
I'm
missing
anything
like
glaringly
obvious
feel
free
to
jump
in,
but
that's
that's
the
gist
of
the
most
pressing
stuff
for
the
most
active
stuff.
This
week,
as.
A
A
This
is
a
living
project,
so
this
is
phase
one
phase
two.
It
is
on
its
way
out
the
door
Ashley.
Oh,
my
god,
the
door
is
the
plan
for
Phase.
Two
is
on
its
way
out
the
door.
It's
never
too
late.
So
please
have
looked
at
this
tool.
We're
soliciting
the
community
or
the
team
and
built
into
solution
in
the
community
to
improve
it.
So
if
there's
things
that
this
group
would
like
to
see
additions,
tweaks
or
fixes,
please
join
us
in
the
forums.
There's
just
thread
there
about
it
and
offer
up
your
suggestions.
A
I
think
that
this
kind
of
thing
is
gonna,
be
critical
for
us
to
identify
issues
around
engagement
and
who's.
Doing
what
and
when
and
why
that
allow
us
to
subdivide
some
merchant
categories
of
users
that
then
we're
gonna
start
dealing
with
demographics
of
users
more
than
we
have
in
the
past,
and
we've
touched
on
this
in
previous
calls,
but
there's
a
world
forming
which
will
become
more
apparent
as
it
saw
for
organizers,
but
we're
gonna,
see
parties
form
eventually
or
we're
gonna
box
and
doves
and
conservatives
and
yo
lower.
A
D
Actually
hold
on
also
in
regards
to
that
tool,
if
you
guys
want
to
see
a
run-through
of
like
a
really
good
run-through
of
it.
Oh
one
of
the
guys,
a
Leonardo
from
from
proto
fire
from
the
team
that
built
it
on
today
on
Tuesdays
this
past
Tuesday's
community
call.
We
had
him
on
and
the
first
half
an
hour
that
calls
him
running
through
that
dashboard
and
exploring
some
of
the
features
so
definitely
check
that
out.
It's
on
our
youtube
yeah,
that's
all
I
would
say,
are.
A
C
C
C
So
yeah,
first
and
foremost,
we
hit
the
debt
ceiling.
So
that's
the
big
notable
for
this
week.
I
mean
supply
just
exploded.
We
saw
since
the
fourth
a
roughly
10
million
die
increase
in
supply,
which
is
particularly
interesting.
Considering
that
the
total
amount
of
borrowing
that
we
saw,
dropped
from
secondary
lending
platforms
was
say,
12
million
for
compounder,
then
maybe
a
million
for
dy/dx.
So
you
know
save
13
million
in
secondary
lending
volume
dropped,
but
only
10
million
increased
in
total
supplies.
C
So
not
all
of
what's
been
going
on
is
perfectly
explained
by
refinancing,
which
is
particularly
interesting.
So
one
of
the
things
that
we've
kind
of
been
talking
about
is
this
buffer.
That
is
existed
between
the
stability
fee
and
the
compound
or
o
rate,
and
that's
been
something-
that's
been
really
interesting
to
watch
because
as
disability,
if
he
dropped
from
twelve
to
ten
to
nine
to
five.
The
compound
borrow
rate
stayed
pretty
steady
between
13
to
11,
point
eight
and
then
very
recently,
very
suddenly.
On
the
fourth,
we
saw
a
huge
dip
on
huge.
C
So
what's
interesting
is,
though,
that
supply
shot
up
through
a
few,
very
large
minting
on
the
fourth
and
then
a
little
bit
on
the
fifth
and
again
on
the
sixth,
we
didn't
see
the
the
dye
price
necessarily
crater,
so
that
that
increased
supply
did
not
just
immediately
make
its
way
onto
the
market,
which
sort
of
begs
the
end.
So
this
is
the
other.
C
The
view
is
the
seven-day
so
again
more
or
less
stable
at
peg,
and
actually
not
a
huge
trading
volume
on
those
Dex's
so
and
and
coinbase,
and
so
what's
interesting
is
though
there
was
a
large
supply
that
was
pulled
out.
It
is
not
yet
necessarily
made
its
way
right
onto
the
market,
which
kind
of
begs
the
question
of
how
that
dye
is
being
used,
because
it's
not
immediately
being
sold
for
collateral
to
reapply
leverage.
C
Now
it's
also
possible
that
a
fair
number
of
people
have
kind
of
gotten
the
message
that
there
will
be
a
liquidity
crunch
on
single
collateral
die
and
so,
like.
Perhaps
some
folks
are
just
pulling
some
out
to
hold
on
to
it
at
a
relatively
cheap
rate.
Some
folks
obviously
did
refinance
some
of
this
12
million
dip
over
to
makers
TP
positions
because
they're
just
cheaper
and
that
part
makes
sense,
it's
fascinating
to
consider
the
the
remaining
sixteen
or
seventeen
million
that
are
still
sitting
at
a
higher
interest
rate.
C
Partly
again,
people
have
been
kind
of
theorizing
about
this,
but
partly
due
to
different
risk
parameters
that
are
available
and
so
ultimately,
a
different
risk
profile
that
people
would
have
access
to,
potentially,
partly
due
to
the
fact
that
they
may
be
using
different
collateral
assets
to
back
these
positions,
and
so
it's
just
not
worth
the
the
cost
and
the
accepted
risk
for
switching
so
they're
willing
to
pay
those
few
extra
points
in
an
interest
rate,
but
that
supply
volume
has
also
not
moved
significantly.
So
again
that
dye
that's
been
drawn
out.
C
It's
not
like
it
was
immediately
dumped
back
onto
something
like
compound
to
be
lent
out
again,
so
it
it
is
more
or
less
sitting
there
being
held
unless
someone
knows
of
which
contracts
it's
been
dumped
into
recently.
But
it
will
be
interesting
to
see
what
happens
with
that
most
recent
10
million,
whether
it
does
get
slowly
sold
on
to
the
market
for
collateral,
whether
it's
held
onto
and
and
it's
just
inventories
forced
on
market
maker
out
there.
That
wants
to
try
to
arbitrage
a
profit.
C
It
will
be
interesting
to
see
what
happens
but
yeah
by
extension,
dy/dx
utilization
rates,
slight
dip
compound
utilization
rates
have
gotten
even
lower
down
to
the
forty
three
percent,
so
very
interesting
to
see
what's
been
going
on
with
compound
lately,
but
yeah.
So
on.
The
the
price
side,
like
I,
mentioned
a
pretty
normal
curve
of
what
we
might
expect.
You
know
swap
as
sort
of
slipping
down
into
some
of
those
lower
prices.
C
So
obviously
there
is
some
dye
that
was
sold
on
the
market
and
sold
at
some
lower
rates,
I'm
guessing
that
was
primarily
due
to
slippage,
but
yeah
Oasis
and
radar
relay
and
coinbase
kind
of
sitting
squarely
where
we
usually
expect
them.
You
know
between
$9.99
and
a
dollar
zero
one
more
or
less
so,
prices
compared
at
least
able,
though
at
low
volumes.
C
So,
as
mentioned
supply
shut
up,
we've
talked
that
to
death
collateral
increased
commensurately
a
bit
as
we
tend
to
expect
when
the
dye
supply
increases
very
like
no
liquidations.
Recently,
the
price
each
price
has
been
pretty
more
or
less
stable
during
that
timeframe,
though,
so
that
makes
sense
yeah,
and
so
just
in
the
grand
scheme
of
things.
This
time
frame
from
end
of
July
to
beginning
of
November
was
a
dip
in
the
rate
of
growth
of
debt
that
has
ticked
back
up
I'm,
not
a
hundred
percent
certain.
C
How
sustained
this
10
million
increase
will
be
because,
as
we
have
talked
about
in
the
past,
and
one
thing
that
we
have
not
touched
on
in
a
while
is
the
degree
of
this
oversupply,
so
the
the
22
ish
million
of
excess
supply.
That's
just
sitting
there
on
platforms
like
compound
that
that
is
still
a
buffer
that
exists
so,
theoretically
of
people,
we
hit
the
debt
ceiling.
C
If
people
are
unable
sourced
I
like
theoretically
or
you
can
source
it
from
here,
it
does
become
a
little
bit
trickier,
and
this
is
why
we
were
in
the
past
really
interested.
In
that
rate
differential.
It
does
become
trickier
when
the
rates
are
more
expensive
on
something
like
compounds
and
they
are
out
maker,
and
so
this
is
kind
of
put
us
back
into
the
state
of
like
a
little
bit
of
an
economic
anomaly
where
you
would
have
expected
that
rate
arbitrage
to
occur,
but
it
has
not
occurred.
C
So
this
excess
supply
is
not
very
effective
at
the
moment.
I
think
at
shielding
died
from
the
potential
effects
of
oversupply
in
terms
of
depressing
the
price,
because
it
is
more
expensive
and
so
people
are
not
necessarily
going
to
go
and
seek
this
21
million.
If
we
hit
the
debt
ceiling-
or
you
know,
as
we
have
hit
the
debt
ceiling
so
as
that
debt
ceiling
becomes
increased,
I
think
there
is
the
potential
we're
accumulating
some.
Some
economic
risks
there.
So
that's
just
something
to
keep
an
eye
on.
A
It's
gonna
question:
I
might
not
be
directed
specifically
to
you,
the
shesh,
but
it
ties
into
something
that
I've
wanted
to
talk
about.
The
top
of
the
hour
work.
I'm
gonna
keep
on
hammering
this
thing
to
death,
so
we
have
stress
cracks
forming
the
governance
system,
one
of
the
things
that
the
community
has
yet
to
internalize,
at
least
as
far
as
I'm
concerned
you're
on
the.
D
A
A
poll
on
Monday
we
have
an
executive
on
Friday,
that's
fairly
clean,
there's
a
system
reference,
a
couple
of
issues,
but
not
too
many,
but
here's
the
the
deal
each
Friday
we
vote
on
one
issue.
We
vote
on
that
stability
fee
we're
rapidly
moving
into
the
world
where
we're
going
to
be
voting
on
multiple
will
have
multiple
polls.
A
So
now
we
have
doubled
complexity.
So
what
happens
to
this
community?
If
we
have
a
series
of
polls
that
get
rolled
up
and
some
of
those
poll
items
are
potentially
mutually
exclusive
or
the
costs
are
nuts
mechanically
exclusive,
create
contention
and
friction
against
each
other?
So
we'll
have
a
group
of
people
that
believe
this
debt
ceiling
should
be
raised
and
then
what
should
people
to
believe
the
tesam?
Other
stability
should
not
be
moved.
A
Does
that
create
weak
executives
is
that
lower
engagement?
Does
that
spread,
make
her
across
more
executives
than
we'd
like
and
therefore
lower
the
security
the
system?
These
are
all
super
tricky
questions
to
the
answer
and
we're
going
to
have
to
face
them
score
on
hosting
TV
launch.
But
this
reason
why
I'm,
bringing
that
up
now
is
that
we
have
this
mechanism.
A
Let's
raise
the
debt
ceiling
when
we
hit
the
debts
and
because,
obviously,
if
there's
a
requirement
for
more
die,
we
should
satisfy
that
requirement
that
wasn't
her
risk
the
system
so
easy-peasy,
but
and
that's
just
reading
this
in
the
chat.
This
is
what
an
example:
what
if
we
people
are
drawing
die
because
they're
planning
to
do
some
nefarious
activities
and
they
believe,
there's
going
to
be
a
crunch
on
sign,
they
want
to
hold
as
much
as
they
can
to
potentially
profit
off
that.
A
C
C
Do
think,
there's
likely
some
degree
I
mean
we
can
debate
how
much
of
hoarding
behavior
going
on
could
partly
be
due
to
fear
of
risk
for
some
reason
that
people
don't
want
to
themselves
be
subject
to
that
liquidity
crunch
then,
and
so
like
that's,
it's
a
balance
between
nefarious
I,
don't
know,
maybe
is
not
the
right
word,
but
probably
a
balance
between
like
profit,
seeking
behavior
and
like
fear
and
risk
and
preparation,
but
I
think
that
it's
not
like
the
demand
curve
suddenly
jumped
up.
You
know
by
more
than
10
fight
like
11
percent
overnight.
C
I
do
think.
It's
not
a
coincidence
that
this
has
happened
just
before
migration
and
just
post
a
bunch
of
announcements
about
migration,
stuff.
So
yeah,
you
know
it's
Occam's
razor
like
it's
very
unlikely
for
those
things
to
be
unrelated,
but
you
again
guessing
in
people's
incentives
and
their
reasoning
is
always
tricky.
C
C
A
Yeah
interesting
questions:
I
can
provide
no
answers.
It's
something
to
watch
them.
I
think
that's
assuming
the
worst.
We
do
have
there's
an
upper
bound
on
how
much
we
can
move
the
single
collateral
debt
ceiling,
because
the
missus
comes
back
to
the
GVSU
everything
that's
talking
about
the
beginning
of
the
calls
that
we
have
to
adhere
as
closely
to
the
wording
of
these
proposals
as
possible.
A
A
D
While
people
aren't
asking
questions,
I
also
want
to
take
this
chance
to
show
the
community
call
on
Tuesday's
a
little
bit
more
well.
Li
ke
is
from
our
integrations.
Team
is
going
to
be
on
the
call
on
Tuesday
this
coming
Tuesday
to
talk
also
a
bit
about
migrations.
So
if
you're
just
generally
an
integrations
partner
or
somebody
even
penalty
integrated
or
even
users,
I'm
gonna
be
there
as
well.
A
Yeah
cool
there's
lots
of
I'm
kidding
around
obviously
there's
a
ton
of
good
content
in
the
community
call.
So
if
you're
interested
in
maker
death,
it's
a
great
way
to
speak
directly
to
some
of
the
larger
story:
ecosystem
actors,
people
that
are
doing
stuff
building
stuff
forests,
but
also
our
internal
resources
as
well.
A
A
A
The
coach
that
migration
risk
constructs
it's
more
than
a
risk
construct.
That's
what
MCD
looks
like.
We
should
put
exclamation
marks
and
big
stars
around
the
title
when
we
post
that.
But
if
you
want
to
know
what
MCD
looks
like
read
the
migration
construct
and
then
let
us
know
what
you
think
and
then
next
week.