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From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 19
Description
In this Governance and Risk meeting with Steven Becker, President & COO of MakerDAO, we continue our deep dive into the impetus behind raising or lowering the Stability Fee through the governance process and how this parameter can directly impact the circulating supply of the Dai while ensuring a healthy ecosystem.
Meeting Minutes: https://github.com/scottrepreneur/mak...
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 2: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-...
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundatio...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 3: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-...
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
I
posted
a
link
to
our
reddit
thread
in
the
chat
at
the
side
of
the
window.
Please
take
a
look
at
some
of
the
questions
and
suggestions
that
arose
from
the
last
week's
meeting
and
if
you
feel
that
any
of
these
aren't
getting
enough
attention,
please
jump
into
the
call
speak
up
before
type
a
question
and
raise
those
points
again.
B
Byrne
right
first
welcome
everybody.
Thank
you
for
joining,
and
one
thing
I
wanted
to
start
up
off
with
going
through
the
questions
and
have
a
look
at
some
of
the
comments
we
received.
It
became
clear
that
I
need
to
just
go
over
what
that
stability
fee
is,
and
you
know
why
what
are
the
components
of
it
and
how
you
can
use
the
stability
fee,
because
this
two
aspects
to
it
there's
this
aspect
where
it
covers
risk
management
and
is
the
aspect
where
it
basically
acts
as
a
policy
tool.
B
So
now
to
that
end,
keep
in
mind
that
the
stability
fee
has
three
very
important
components.
The
one
is
the
component
that
covers
inflation,
the
component
that
covers
the
operational
costs
of
the
organization
and
the
component
that
covers
the
credit
premium
or
the
inherent
risk
of
that
particular
collateral
type
to
the
organization.
B
Now
those
are
the
three
components
that
make
up
the
stability
fee
in
the
difference,
with
an
interest
rate
is
that
an
interest
rate
would
have
a
fourth
component
in
a
liquidity
premium,
but
it
doesn't
really
apply
to
us
for
obvious
reasons,
because
there
are
no
durations
on
the
actual
loans.
But
that
being
said,
they
just
cover
that
again:
inflation,
operational
and
credit
premium.
B
Now,
what
we're
talking
about
today
in
terms
of
a
policy
instrument,
is
more
focused
on
the
operational
component
and
that
operational
component
has
further
layers
that
one
layer
is
obviously
how
much
does
it
cost
to
run
an
organization?
You
need
to
be
compensated
there
and
then
the
further
to
point
to
the
policy
instrument
that
is
specific
to
the
collateral
type
and
the
policy
instrument
that
is
more
general
to
the
system
as
a
whole.
B
That's
how
this
discussion
should
be
framed,
but
it
should
not
be
forgotten
that
the
stability
fee
has
many
other
characteristics
that
provide
different
functionality
to
to
the
system,
specifically
to
the
inclusion
of
collateral
types
to
the
risk
portfolio
and
the
control
of
the
entire
portfolio
as
a
whole.
Now.
A
This
is
really
interesting
and
maybe
I'm
gonna
jump
in
and
make
sure
that
I
can
I
understand
the
nuances
here.
So
yeah,
it's
a
great
point,
because
we
talked
about
the
stability
theory
released
in
the
last
meeting.
The
stability
fee
conversation
was
around
supply
and
demand,
basically
and
towards
the
end
of
the
call.
If
we
began
there's
sort
of
a
starting
realize,
we
started
to
understand
that
you
know
it's
also
a
source
of
funds
for
operational
expenses.
This
is
how
future
we're
going
to
be
covering
the
decentralized
aspects
of
the
system.
A
So
maybe
the
risk
teams
are
paid
from
the
revenues
or
the
surplus
from
the
stability
thing.
Would
you
say
that
that's
kind
of
the
two
primary
considerations
when
we're
thinking
about
Stewie
feel
obviously
we
need
to
remain
competitive?
We
need
to
incentivize
supply
and
demand
in
a
way
that's
healthy
for
the
ecosystem,
but
we
also
need
to
keep
in
mind
or
I
guess
I'm
asking
do
we
always
need
to
keep
in
mind.
What's
the
impact
of
the
operational
success
of
the
organization,
the.
B
There
is
this
inherent
abstraction
to
looking
at
one
number
representing
an
interest
rate
as
we
see
in
a
traditional
world
as
a
Fed,
Funds
rate
or
with
the
policy
rates,
and
you
think
that
that
represents
like
one
simple
function
but
actually
has
a
multi-dimensional
impact,
and
that's
really
how
we
need
to
look
at
it.
You
need
to
look
at
the
stability
fee
and
say:
well
what
components
are
we
talking
about?
And
you
know
what
are
the?
What
are
the
ideas
around
that
particular
component?
B
If
you're
talking
about
the
inherent
credit
risk
of
the
collateral
type
in
the
portfolio,
we're
talking
about
credit
premium,
we're
talking
about
how
how
much
MKR
governance
must
set
aside
of
itself
to
buffer
or
risk
budget
for
that
particular
collateral
type?
But
here
we're
talking
about
operation,
we're
talking
about
the
policy
component
that
is
very
specific
to
the
system
as
a
whole,
and
the
other
part
about
that
is
now
your
notion
of
an
interest
rate
or
or
or
other
rate
is
generally
very
small.
B
You
know
you
think
about
5%
10%,
if
you're
in
developing
economies,
you
might
think
twenty
five
and
thirty
percent,
but
still
the
the
relative
proportion
of
change,
is
always
within
a
certain
reasonability
framework
like
going
from
no
25
percent
to
20
percent.
It's
a
it's
a
big
changes
5%,
but,
relatively
speaking,
it's
not
really
that
big,
but
as
soon
as
you
come
down
to
bootstrap
ecosystem
like
ours
and
you
start
looking
at
changes
from
point,
you
know
point
five
to
two
point:
five
and
back
to
point
five
again.
B
It
is
symptomatic
of
the
fact
that
this
is
a
system
that
is
getting
going.
This
is
a
system
that
is
getting
its
feet,
finding
its
feet
and
gaining
traction
and
getting
adoption.
That
is
the
business
aspect
we
got
to
realize
and
to
that
end
we
need
to
also
keep
into
keeping
consideration
what
the
metrics
we
need
to
think
about
that
guides
this
process.
The
previous
meeting
we
spoke
about.
You
know
finding
a
policy
exchange
rate
to
which
we
can
look
at
and
use
as
the
first
point
of
call.
B
If
there's
a
range
around
that
particular
policy
rate,
maybe
we
can
act
on
it,
but
the
idea
here
is
not
to
think
of
it
as
an
algorithm,
not
to
think
of
it
as
oh.
If
this
happens,
therefore,
we
must
do
that.
These
are
triggering
moments
where
collectively,
with
the
inventory
in
the
system,
with
the
discipline
with
demand
and
supply
and
all
the
first
and
second
order,
metrics
that
we
can
use
to
identify
that
will
provide
and
inform
a
dialogue
within
the
community
to
figure
out
how
we're
going
to
go
about
addressing
the
fee.
B
The
the
sense
of
an
algorithm
in
the
idea
of
economics-
and
this
probably
is
a
reference
to
Thomas
Piketty,
the
guy
that
just
recently
wrote
a
term
called
capital
in
3/4
century.
He
reiterates
something
here
that
you
know.
Thinking
of
economic
science
is
a
little
bit
of
a
misnomer.
You
got
to
realize
that
economics
is
a
social
science
and
within
which
we're
using
the
best
forms
of
models
and
rigorous
thinking
to
support
our
evidence
as
to
what
we
need
to
do
in
the
system
and
that's
how
we
have
to
frame
it.
B
We're
going
to
make
sure
that
we're
not
just
falling
into
this
blind
idea
that
we
can
just
create
a
nice
house
with
them
and
switch
it
on
and
it'll
work
for
us,
because
that's
never
going
to
happen.
It
could
happen
to
a
certain
extent
in
informing
our
decisions.
But
ultimately,
that
decision
is
is
quite
subjective,
almost
really
dependent
on
the
the
community
and
the
more
traction
we
get
the
more
adoption
we
get
more
input.
We
have
the
more
robust
the
process
becomes,
so
that
you
know
keep
any
mind.
Okay,.
A
I
just
want
to
make
sure
that
I've
understood
this
conception,
I,
so
I'm
gonna
take
a
little
step
back
so
and
we're
talking
about
the
stability
fee
and
the
intentions
to
raise
or
lower
it
in
the
short
term.
It
feels
like
this
sort
of
ties
into
a
larger
meta
issue.
Where
is
if
it
who's
the
maker
down
boating
community
to
act
in
our
own
best
interest,
but
that
best
interest
should
be
viewed
over
a
long
time
scale.
A
So
we
need
to
incentivize
the
the
success
of
the
dice
table
coin,
not
potentially
at
the
F,
the
expense
of
burning,
great
deals
of
maker
in
the
short
term
right,
and
it
feels
like
the
session
on
some
issues
between
addressed
in
the
last
meeting,
where
we
realized
that
remaining
competitive
on
our
rates
is
important
because
the
market
is
getting
prouder.
People
are
realizing
that
you
know
this
is
a
good
idea.
We
actually
see
places
like
compound
and
there's
others
that
are
coming
up.
A
We
also
need
to
manage
supply
and
demand,
and
this
is
the
primary
policy
tool
to
do
that.
So
do
we
do
we
focus
on
those
two
first
categories
and
then
worry
about
operational
surplus?
You
know
down
the
road,
maybe
next
year
or
the
year
after
words
or
or
is
that
something
that
should
be
baked
in
right
now,
considering
it.
B
So
therefore,
you've
got
a
supply,
a
function
well
defined,
but
if
you,
if
you've
done
extraordinarily
well
on
selecting
the
collateral
types,
you'll
create
an
oversupply
in
your
function
and
to
that
end
it
also
talks
to
what's
the
business
rationale
of
including
those
collateral
types,
not
only
in
terms
of
them
as
collateral,
but
how
they
can
be
developed
on
the
make
it
our
system
as
well.
Further
to
that
it
informs
us,
informs
the
idea
of
what
is
the
supply
going
to
what's
the
demand,
how
does
a
demand
look
to
that
end?
What
is
the
business?
B
What
is
the
business
rationale
in
the
diversification
of
use
cases
that
can
balance
off
the
supply?
We
may
need
to
address
that
as
well,
and
that
is
all
inherent
in
the
understanding
of
not
just
the
the
risk
dynamic,
but
the
economics
dynamic
as
well,
and
also
to
a
certain
extent.
This
is
very
important,
the
social
contract
that
you
have
with
the
stakeholders
in
the
system.
So
the
short
answer
is
looking
at
a
policy
instrument
by
itself
sort
of
I.
B
Think
the
latin
term
is
catchers,
paribus
and
without,
but
everything
else
remaining
equal
is
easy
enough
in
order
to
discuss
what
we
need
to
do,
but
when
it
comes
down
to
practically
implementing
that,
we
want
to
make
sure
that
we
are
fully
aware
that
in
the
real
world,
things
are
interdependent
and
it's
related.
So
we
need
to
move
on
that
premise,
and
that
is
why
need
a
sort
of
a
community
input
to
find
your
your
collective
rationalism
in
the
governance
that
you
want
to
use.
B
Scientific
governance
is
a
very
important,
most
profound
starting
point
in
developing
a
rational
because
it
reduces
contention.
It
reduces
the
the
possibility
of
factions,
but
does
it
reduce
or
mitigate
all
risks?
No,
it
doesn't,
but
it
certainly
puts
us
ahead
of
the
game
and
certainly
makes
us
a
lot
more
competitive
than
other
folks
who
are
choosing
more
subjectivity,
or
rather
injecting
a
lot
more
subjective
subjectivity
in
their
governance
process.
C
B
B
But
if
we
are
not
at
that
asymptotic
level,
if
we
are
constantly
growing,
then
these
as
long
as
the
the
the
growth
of
supply
and
die
is
greater
than
you
know.
Obviously
we're
hoping
it's
gonna
be
much
greater
than
inflation
right.
You
don't
really
need
to
worry
about
that,
because
the
growth
in
the
supply
and
I
actually
compensates
for
that.
B
So
there's
a
sort
of
a
and
indicate
a
function
that
you
need
to
put
there
sort
of
a
binary
component
which
says
that
you
know
as
soon
as
we
get
to
more
of
an
asymptotic,
stable
level,
then
you
need
to
start
compensating
for
for
inflation.
So,
strictly
speaking,
the
stability
fee
in
the
bootstrapping
phase
is
really
what
about
operation
and
credit?
Does
it
make
sense,
so
I
think.
D
C
D
I
can't
think
of
the
concept
of
a
negative
credit
risk
right,
I,
can't
think
of
the
concept
of
you
paying
out
of
operations
for
somebody
to
take
out
a
loan
and
so
and
we've
gone
back,
and
some
of
these
discussions
have
talked
about
the
idea
of
a
zero
rate
or
negative
rate.
I
mean
in
this
model,
insofar
as
we
take
each
of
these
three
components:
I
struggle
to
see
what
what
would
have
to
change
those
three
to
justify
a
zero
or
a
negative
stability
fee.
B
A
Probably
only
imperfectly
understand
the
system
and
I
know
that
brain
is
hearing
it's
all
in
his
head,
probably
clearer
than
anybody.
So
maybe
he
can
explain,
but
the
discussions
that
I've
been
involved
with,
where
there's
any
mention
of
a
negative
stability
feet,
we're
deep
into
the
weeds
of
a
highly
theoretical
future
where
things
have
gone
badly,
wrong
and
and
the
system
is
attempting
to
correct
itself
and
I.
A
Believe
that
then
we're
in
correct
me
if
I'm
off
base
here,
but
we
consider
potentially
consider
a
negative
stability
fee
if
there
was
simply
no
more
die
to
be
created.
We've
hit
the
debt
ceiling,
the
other
things
in
the
system
were
happening,
that
we're
causing
instability
and
we
severely
needed
to
disincentivize
people
from
creating
died.
Is
that
true.
E
Yeah,
so
I'm
actually
some
reason
why
I
joined
I
joined
the
coal
now
right
is
because
well
in
the
past,
I
haven't
been
joining
these
phones,
because
I
deliberately
wanted
kind
of
the
conversation
to
evolve
on
its
own
and
really
get
some
proper
organic
government
community
going
it's
going
right
because
I'm
kind
of
I'm
kind
of
Gaea
has
all
the
answers,
including
this
I
mean.
Let's
talk
about
this
a
moment,
but
actually
what
I
think
like
I
think
it's
really.
It's
very
awesome.
E
The
level
we've
sort
of
the
point
come
to
Nara
and
I
think
there.
The
last
discussion
really
showcase
that
right,
how
you're
able
to
have
this
like
proper
organic
conversation
and
a
lot
of
people
really
on
the
same
page
through
this
kinda
stuff,
but
but
what
I
think
needs
to
happen?
That
right
is
and
then
I
mean
announcement
since,
what's
thrown
like
throw
the
interest
yesterday
right
is
that
it's
time
for
this
meeting
to
become
more
actionable
right?
This
is
about
actually
controlling
the
system.
E
In
addition
to
Caetano
theory
and
and
and
like
knowledge,
sharing,
right
and
people
getting
smothered
and
I
think
we
can
also
like,
in
addition
to
what
we've
been
doing
so
far,
which
is
really
like
spreading
knowledge
and
talking
about
a
lot
of
theoretical
concepts
is
like
I
mean
it's
also,
there's
like
this
attempt
to
peddling
actually
dumb
things
down
and
like
let's
sort
of
identify.
What
is
the
really
simple
stuff,
that's
kind
of
like
what
is
it?
E
What's
the
basic
stuff,
you
really
gotta
focus
on
we're
gonna,
you
know,
like
think
about
in
the
short
run,
I
felt
like
our
immediate
needs,
and
so
we
can
get
there's
also
like.
We
both
have
this
theoretical
understanding
of
governance
for
the
future
and
I
mean
an
example
that
and
I'm
talking
about
inflation
in
the
long
run
and
negative
stability
fees
and
like
it's
pieces,
but
what's
really
exciting
right
now
and
what
I?
What
I
hope
we
can?
E
E
Is
in
the
inter
in
the
fundation
temporary
scheme,
the
you
know,
like
the
numbers
and
the
data
is
sort
of
looking
like
there
may
be
need
for
a
stability
to
change
in
line
with
how
we've
we've
we've
initiated
those
in
the
past,
based
on
on
data
that
we're
looking
at
right
and
a
lot
of
that
data.
It's
not
like
proprietary
data,
because
it's
it's
it's
mainly
about
inventory
levels
that
we
also
think
I
mean.
This
is
also
what
last
meeting
right
leg
inventory.
E
And
then
this
is
a
couple
of
couple
of
legs.
Things
like
starting
points.
I
think
we
really
need
to
establish
and
really
all
like
get
aligned
on
in
terms
of
like
what's
necessary,
so
that
we
can
be
actionable
so
that
these
meetings,
and
so
the
community
can
actually
make
decisions
and
I
think
number
one
is
a
be
very
focused
on
what
we
make
decisions
about
right
right
now.
It
is
balance
and
supply
demand
for
that.
E
So
actually
it's
very
important
that
you
don't
get
like
a
really.
You
know
that,
let's
turn
our
like
remains
that
the
coffer
was
in
shorting
like
that,
but
that's
what
we
that's,
what
we
focus
on
really
like
squaring
it's
what
we
are
when
we
are
lined
on
and
what
what
the
important
things
are
kind
of
how
to
dumb
it
down.
How
do
we
get
everyone
to
understand?
What's
going
on?
E
A
That
feels
like
it's
a
good
starting
point
to
maybe
test
out
how
that
mechanism
would
work.
So,
let's
start
off
with
well
I
said:
I,
don't
want
to
leave
this
mystery
laying
around
so
can
you
could
you
wrap
up
the
potential
for
a
negative
stability
fee
and
like
a
sentence
or
two
and
then
we
could
move
on
because
that's
a
question
that
keeps
on
bouncing
up
and
down
yeah.
C
E
Point
right:
it's
more
coming!
That's
the
time!
I
leave
money
for
this
also
the
credit
risk
component
right
and
that's
kind
of
how
we
got
to
split
up
this
borrowing
cost
right.
On
one
hand
there
is
there's
the
risk-free
interest
rate
or
like
the
value
of
capital
in
general,
and
then
there's
sort
of
this
specific
risk
for
the
particular
collateral
that
you're
putting
in
that
you're
sort
of
exposing
the
system
to
in
doing
this
transaction
and
when
we
think
of
it,
like
anything
that
the
thing
that
whoever.
C
C
E
A
C
E
And
we're
happy
to
have
you
guys,
but,
but
so
what
the
point
you're
making
right
is
that
this
concept
of
like
negative
credit
risk
and
I,
have
some
totally
nonsense,
but
it
doesn't
make
any
sense,
but
that
is
the
pot
like,
but
that
is
only
part
of
what
actually
drives
the
boring
cost
right.
So,
if
you
think
of
it,
it's
kind
of
like
it.
It's
like
this
is
a
tunnel
boring
bus.
This
part
is
the
risk
premium.
The
risk
meter
cannot
go
any
like
beyond
here.
E
Something
has
it
always
is
always
some
semblance
of
it,
but
the
thing
that
can
go
negative
is
like
the
time
value
of
money.
Basically,
and
the
way
that
goes
negative
is
if
it
goes
negative
in
general,
I
give
the
central
bank
over
the
entire
colony,
if
some
particular
currency
size
now
there's
negative
interest
rates
right
and
and
the
way
that
would
look.
What
they
would
look
like
in
reality
is
that
all
the
collateral
that
we
start
using
all
the
collect,
like
all
the
low-risk
collateral
or
die,
were
all
have
negative
interest
rates
as
well
right.
A
E
E
Then,
if
that
looks
very
look
if
thy
has
a
positive
savings
rate
or
like
no
savings
rate,
just
like
that,
it's
just
stable,
it's
gonna,
look
incredibly
attractive
right,
so
you're
gonna
see
a
lot
of
people
buying
that
and
that's
gonna
then
try
to
drive
up
the
price
of
dial
right
and
that's
where
we
then
like
hours
of
our
die
savings
rate
adjustment
process
is
then
gonna.
Look
at
that
and
be
like
okay
look.
The
price
is
too
high,
we
gotta
adjust
the
savings
rate
down
and
that's
where
we're.
E
C
C
E
A
I
think
we
can
firmly
place
that
into
the
theoretical
future
event
kind
of
category
so
but
but,
like
you
said,
we'll
have
the
DSR
at
that
point,
and
so
there's
a
lot
more.
There
will
be
more
levers
we
can
look
at
before.
We
need
to
consider
a
negative
savings
rate,
but
at
least
that
gives
us
something
to
respond
to
people
to
when
the
question,
and
that
comes
up
people
just
look
the
latch
on
to
this
idea.
A
Like
you
said,
the
the
intention
of
these
meetings
from
theoretics
theoretical
discussions
and
philosophy
and
background
in
education
in
over
two
actionable
plans,
and
so
you
you
said
that
if
the
foundation
risky
my
paraphrasing
right
here,
the
foundation
risk
dream
has
identified
an
imbalance
in
the
supply
and
demand
of
the
dice
table
coin
and
that
you'd
like
to
take
the
opportunity
to
use
these
meetings
to
figure
out
what
our
plan
of
action
is.
How
do
we
move
ahead?
We
need
to
change
the
fee.
How
much
we're
gonna
change
it
by?
A
How
often
are
we
gonna
change
it
and
I
think
that
we
should
experiment
with
this
idea
of
using
this
as
a
forum
to
arrive
at
those
decisions,
which
is
great
because
we
have
some
heavyweights
in
the
call
and
we're
all
super
smart
and
we're
also
very
interested
and
maker
down.
What
I
want
to
do
is
I
want
to
ensure
that
we
we're
all
on
the
same
page
and
that
we
haven't
lost
the
progress
that
we
made
in
the
previous
call.
A
So
what
I'm
going
to
do
very
quickly-
and
this
is
going
to
be
slightly
boring
but
I'm
going
to
paraphrase
the
questions
that
we
raised
in
the
last
call
and
I'm
going.
To
paraphrase
those
suggestions
that
were
proposed
in
the
last
call,
if
people,
if
you
hear
something
that
the
peaks
are
interesting,
you
think
is
a
key
point,
noted
that
and
will
engage
it
into
the
discussion.
A
So
after
I'm
done
reading
these
things,
for
what
I'm
going
to
do,
maybe
there's
pass
it
off
to
Stephen
or
you
room
to
kind
of
set
the
stage
of
what
our
proposal
is
or
what
we
think.
Maybe
the
foundation
is
going
to
do
in
order
to
correct
the
supply
and
demand
imbalance,
and
then
we
can
see
how
it
maps
back
to
the
conclusions
from
our
last
meeting
and
whether
those.
A
E
E
Perhaps
even
next
week,
when
we
got
there,
we
can
have
a
meeting
where
there's
basically,
data
is
presented,
like
models
already
exist,
and
then
understanding
already
exists
that
can
process
this
data
and
a
decision
is
then
mate
and
as
like,
as
a
result
of
that
decision,
then
someone
like
anyone
from
the
meeting
probably
is
gonna,
be
someone
from
the
foundation,
but
it
really
could
be.
Anyone
creates
proposal
to
frame,
can
hold
us
and
then
decide
to
change
the
stability
based
on
what
our
you
know,
I'll
set
to
the
consensus
areas,
okay,.
A
So
we
asked
some
some
key
questions
that
are
designed
to
allow
us
to
answer
some
of
the
questions
that
room
was
just
mentioning
to
us
and
the
first
one
was:
what
are
the
canonical
points
of
reference
for
the
exchange
price
of
dye?
So
how
do
we
figure
out
what
the
actual
of
the
real
price
of
dye
is
in
a
market?
That's,
you
know
rife
with
wash
trading
and
and
and
other
types
of
foolishness.
A
A
How
do
we
know
when
there's
a
prop
desk
or
a
market
making
organization?
That's
facing
an
inventory
problem?
The
next
major
question
is:
how
do
we
react
to
these
imbalances?
How
do
we
alter
the
stability
fee
in
increments
over
a
predictable
amount
of
time,
or
do
we
sort
of
rip
the
band-aid
off
all
at
once?
A
What
percentage
of
drift
from
the
peg
do
we
begin
to
initiate
the
governance
process
to
exercise
the
stability
process
tool,
the
policy
tool
so
now,
do
we
use
the
peg
as
an
indication
of
whether
it's
stability
fee
needs
to
change,
or
do
we
look
at
potentially
proprietary
data?
That
implies
that
there's,
an
inventory
problem
know
one
of
the
major
questions
that
we
keep
on
coming
back
to
over
and
over
and
over
again
is:
where
do
we
find
clean
and
trustworthy
data?
That's
a
huge
problem
in
our
space.
How
do
we
know
who's
exchanged?
A
It
is
believable.
How
can
we
this
is
another
interesting
one.
I
think
that
we
should
really
focus
on
this
in
the
future
is
how
do
we
know,
authoritative
ly,
that
a
change
in
the
stability
fee
had
was
the
the
directly
was
directly
responsible
for
the
change
that
we
saw
in
the
market
because
we're
in
a
complex
and
young
ecosystem?
And
it's
it's
very
difficult
to
tell
whether
a
lever
on
our
side
moved
the
needle
somewhere
down
the
line.
A
We
need
to
figure
out
what
the
appropriate
models
are.
We
can
use
to
anticipate
the
results
of
the
stability
fee
changes.
That's
that's
a
complex
issue.
I
just
give
this
next
one's.
How
does
the
wider
community
interact
with
and
inform
the
activities
of
the
risk
teams?
And
that's
that's
one
of
the
things
we
discuss
or
figuring
out
in
these
meetings
in
real-time
I
think
this
is
something
that's
been
discussed
in
the
past
and
planned
for
the
future.
A
But
should
we
create
a
feedback
mechanism
to
manage
small
movements
of
the
stability
fee
and
do
we
understand
the
risks
today
and
how
do
we
better
communicate
this?
Something
should
come
out
of
the
meetings
after
we're
done
maybe
next
week,
how
do
we
better
communicate?
The
fact
that
the
stability
fee
is
a
variable
which
I
think
is
has
implications
for
larger
holders
that
I
hadn't
considered
in
the
past?
No,
and
it's
just
something
that
people
don't
quite
understand
when
their
jump
coming
into
the
system.
A
So
I
know
that
that's
a
bit
of
a
data
dump,
but
please
keep
that
write
a
thread
open
and
reread
it
at
your
leisure,
as
were
chatting
the
rest
of
the
call,
the
suggestions
that
we
came
to
kind
of
few
and
far
between
and
not
very
actionable,
but
there's
some
interesting
stuff
here.
If
maker
data
is
in
fact
a
credit
facility,
it
must
ensure
that
the
stability
fee
remains
competitive.
So
we
have
an
upper
bound
on
what
the
stability
fee
is
potentially
based
on
other
people
in
our
spanis.
A
We
need
to
ensure
that
the
negative
effects
of
the
variable
list
ability
fee
are
compensated
with
by
producing
directly
producing
a
more
stable
pack,
which
is
ultimately
what
the
entire
organization
is
a
vote.
We
need
a
stable
pack.
Any
updates
we
make
the
stability
fee
must
take
into
account
the
size
of
the
change
as
well
as
the
frequency.
The
community
must
be
willing
to
make
the
nimble
changes
to
the
rate
which
goodness
self,
have
a
stability
stabilizing
effect
on
supply
and
demand.
A
We
need
to
determine
the
trigger
that
brings
the
community
consensus
on
these
great
changes
and
we
need
to
optimize
the
collateral
for
oil
to
minimize
risk,
while
optimizing
for
business
efficacy
all
right,
so
there
you
go
I've
forced
everybody
to
listen
to
that.
But
these
these
are
all
important
discussions
or
topics
and
will
probably
be
touching
on
some
of
them
into
this
week's
meeting
in
next
week's
meeting
as
well.
A
So
with
those
things
in
mind,
I
guess
that
kind
of
places
us
the
the
point
where
there's
a
supply
and
demand
imbalance,
and
how
do
we
move
forward
in
that
so
I'm
going
to
kind
of
kick
that
conversation
off
with
the
thing
that
interests
me
the
most
particularly,
is
how
do
we
know
that
there's
a
supply
and
demand
imbalance
right
now,
ooh?
Where
did
that
information
come
from?
How
do
we
measure
it?
Just
things
like
that
and.
E
E
It's
a
nice
little
thing
called
a
target
or
a
feedback
mechanism,
so
the
target
rate
feedback,
and
it
raises
actions
still
in
the
white
paper
to
this
day,
but
it's
gonna
be
replaced
soon,
though,
finally
get
some
get
some
consistency
and
it's
gonna
be
replaced
in
the
same
suite,
but
so
the
tiger
great
feedback
mechanism
was
described
as
this
like
algorithm
that
you
know
there
would
be
some
lines
of
code
and
then
that
code
would
then
ensure
that
I
was
always
stable
through
some
algorithm
and
I.
Think
this
is
an
Emmy
and
I
see.
E
Actually
one
of
the
questions
here
is
like:
can
we
do
that
right?
Can
we
make
it
algorithm
that,
just
like
looks
at
small
changes
and
then
makes
our
response
based
on
some
some
math
like
and
as
Steven
was
saying
earlier?
The
answer
is
no.
We
can't
it
can
be
done,
and
this
is
one
of
the
big
sort
of
realizations
we
came
to
with
it
with
the
tear
them
and
the
reason
why
that
can't
be
done
is
well.
E
I
mean
like,
like
you
were
saying,
rich
right,
it's
because
there's
no
sir,
like
there's
actually
no
such
thing
as
data
right,
like
real
data,
really
doesn't
exist
right.
It's
like
signals
on
like
shadows
in
the
wall.
In
a
way
right,
you
don't
know,
what's
actually
true,
and
if
you,
if
you
do
something
as
naive,
if
it's
kind
of
like
take
data,
it's
the
truth,
then
you're.
You
know
someone
will
figure
out
how
to
make
money
by
manipulating
the
data
and
then
mess
with
you
right.
E
So,
and
once
do
you
realize
that
the
ramifications
of
this
right
that
we
actually
don't
have
any
don't
have
objective
truth
to
rely
on
that's
when
a
lot
of
the
other
stuff
becomes
very,
very
difficult
right
and
also
and
well,
and
it
also
just
I-
mean
there's
also
just
like
we're
getting
whenever
they
like
sort
of
seeing
the
tip
of
the
iceberg.
That's
just
hot
like
like
what
does
stability
even
meet
right?
E
What
is
the
goal
even
of
what
we're
trying
to
achieve,
for
instance,
when
we
do
this
is
a
stability,
feed
change
right
because
and
and
then
I
mean,
then
there's
this
this
initial
and
question
why
this
is
really
the
perfect
way
to
think
about
right?
What
is
the
what
is
like
the
reference
for
the
Exchange
price
of
dye
right,
because
in
a
way
like
actually
the
holistic
way
to
look
at?
That
is
actually
that's
totally
subjective.
E
Right
like
this,
it's
you
know
like,
or
rather
I
mean
there
would
be
a
decision
to
whether
it
should
like
is
the
goal
of
diet
to
sort
of
be
optimized,
for
you
know,
Wall
Street
people
in
New,
York
right
or
is
it?
Should
it
be
optimized
for
people
in
some
other
place,
or
should
it
be
sort
of
like
optimized
equally
for
everyone
and
kind
of
like
the
SS
in
like
sort
of
it's
fair
or
something
to
everyone
without
really
like
playing
favorites
to
any
particular?
E
And
then-
and
this
is
really
a
like
this-
is
such
a
complicated
feel
like
this
is
not
really
something
that
you
can
really
like.
You
know
like
look
at
some
data
and
look
at
some
models
and
then
come
with
an
answer
to
this
question
right,
especially
not
for
the
long
run
but
I.
Think
for
this,
like
for
the
short
run,
you
know
we
can
we
can.
We
can
think
of
it
as
something
like
I
mean.
E
This
is
like
it's
about
kind
of
usability
if
that
is
like
a
bomb
like
and
sort
of
the
attractiveness
of
diet
in
terms
of
its
its
its
value
as
a
stable
coin
right,
so
we
really
get
back
to
that.
What
does
it
mean
stability
and
then
that's
where
you
get
to
yeah
exchange
rates,
that's
kind
of
what
most
people
think
of
instability,
but
also
I
mean
very
quickly
from
there
you
get
to
what
else
are
you
quiddity
right?
I
mean
an
exchange
rate,
isn't
just
an
exchange
rate.
E
So
so,
basically,
there
are
two
like
the
really
big,
so
pieces
of
data
that
we
have
looked
at
in
the
foundation
and
we've
made
the
stability
like
proposals
to
change
the
stability
in
the
past.
It
has
been
yeah.
Basically,
it's
been,
it's
been
looking
at.
The
exchange
rate,
like
I
mean
almost
the
basically
like
looking
at
climb
like
a
kept
by
I,
mean
obviously
it's
a
little
bit
like
you.
E
Don't
want
actually
look
at
them
like
you
want
us
move
yours
to
America
to
find
all
these
changes
you
can
find
and
then
look
at
the
if
they
actual
exchange
and
look
at
that
data
right,
because
one
miner
cab
doesn't
necessarily
like
to
like
faithfully
reflect
the
real
data
that
exchanges
outputting.
It
sometimes
like
messes
living
a
little
bit,
but
but
that's
like
one
very,
very
obvious
thing
to
look
at.
However,
there's
I
mean
already
here
this.
There
are
some
pitfalls
right.
E
If
you
look
at
something
like
the
exchange
rate
of
the
price
of
diet
in
a
in
a
diver
versus
each
pair,
you're
you're
not
really
gonna
get
the
full
story,
because
you're
also
gonna
have
like
a
lot
of
uncertainty
and
volatility.
Excuse
me,
so
actually
what
we
found
is
this,
isn't
this
isn't
actually
very
like
it's
not
a
very
good
measure
for
kind
of
like
we're
like
for
precise
adjustments
like
oh,
like
yeah,.
A
E
E
Judgments,
we've
done
in
the
past
have
been
like
made
massive
adjustments.
They've
actually
still
not
been
done,
while
I
mean
they've
not
been
like
I
think
them
I.
Think,
like
the
most
obvious
case
was
when
we
did
the
need
to
decrease.
We
went
from
2.5
percent
down
to
0-5
so
like
at
that
point
of
time.
When
you
read
a
lot
calmer,
you'd
actually
see
like
one
point:
zero
to
four
died
on,
like
every
pair
there
right.
A
E
E
But
yet
the
other
really
big
thing
is,
as
I
saw
earlier,
is
the
inventory
levels
from
the
quiddity
provider
so
like
big
traders
that
are
actually
the
ones
that
go
on
these
markets
and
buy
and
sell
die
against
the
other
assets
and
yeah,
so
I
think
I
think
what's
what
we
should
talk
about
now
is
kind
of
it's
like
like
so
well.
So
actually,
what
like
actually
want
a
starting
point
like
yes,
I,
look
like
a
rock
kind
of
we
can
said.
E
Well,
it's
reducing
kind
of
like
it,
something
simple
or
kind
of
like
like
a
simple,
and
what
do
you
call
it
almost
dr.
Matt
or
something
right
on
like
axiom,
you
can
kinda
like
simplify
the
whole
discussion
right,
and
this
is
the
thing
that
was
also
talking
about
the
last
meeting
that
isn't
what
if
we
agreed
to
initially
look
at
when
you
do
adjustments,
we
do
it
in
increments
of
0.5
percent.
E
Does
that
kind
of
set
the
stage
for
what
is
a
level
of
granularity
and
like
a
label
like
what
is
the
the
type
of
signal
that's
necessary
for
us
to
actually
take
action?
But
because,
if
we
you
say
it's
like
0.01
percent
right,
we
want
to
do
these.
Like
super
tiny,
precise
adjustments,
then
the
problem
is
we
yeah?
We?
How
can
we
even
get
data
that
that
precise
and
actually
we
can't
write,
that's
probably
for
sure
at
this
stage,
all
right?
Let
the.
E
A
You
get
about
the
cryptocurrency
space
is
suspect,
deeply
suspect.
So
we
need
to
think
more
in
terms
of
signals.
Trustable
signals
that
we've
seen,
probably
historically
that
have
been
indicative
of
the
truth,
or
maybe
we
have
some
pre-filtered
selection
of
exchanges
that
we
actually
believe
as
opposed
to
others.
The
second
part
of
that
equation
is
having
a
developed
relationship
with
prop
desks
or
market
makers,
and
have
them
somehow
convey
to
us
in
a
way
that
we
believe
that
they've
seen
an.
A
Imbalance
and
use
that
as
sort
of
another
signal
to
take
into
the
account-
and
the
third
thing
that
you've
proposed
is
that
we
can
begin
to
use
those
first
two
signals
to
imply
that
there's
something
that
needs
to
be
corrected
and
therefore
we
should
initiate
a
small
and
measure,
but
regular
stability
fee
change
to
see
whether
that
has
an
impact
on
the
system
in
a
way
that
we
expected
based
on
our
previous
signals.
So
it
looks
like
the
pegs
drifting
because
of
exchange
x,
one
two
and
three,
and
we
trust
those
exchanges.
A
Market
makers
and
prog
desks
have
told
us
that
the
inventory
is
imbalanced.
We
and
that's
our
second
data
point,
and
then
that
takes
us
to
these
meetings
where
we
say
you
know
it's,
it's
probably
time
for
us
to
lower,
raise
the
stability
feedback
0.5
and
then
we
wait
to
see
with
a
week
or
two
I
guess
until
the
market
is
corrected
itself
in
a
way
that
we'd
hoped
and
or
expected.
So
that
would
be
the
model
that
we
look
at
yeah.
E
And-
and
the
critical
part
here
right
is
that,
while
we
I
mean
on
this
and
in
the
last
15
minutes,
this
is
what
we
can
maybe
try
this.
Yes,
you
get
ready
work,
but
well,
we
should
think
about
something
else
mentioned
last
time.
The
ranch
right
like
at
what
point
like
if
we
see
die
at
one
point,
zero
two
on
gix
Congress
Pro,
but
that's
not
good.
That's
a
trigger
right!
That's
like
a
RIF
flick.
You
got
to
do
something
right.
E
Like
I
mean
that
would
be
enough
to
trigger
a
0.5%
stability
change,
potentially
right,
but
we
again
to
go
back
to
the
tier
of
em.
Thing
like
this
is
not
should
not
be
an
algorithm
like,
so
they
should
not
be
that
you
know
if
a
men
be
guaranteed,
it
should
really
be
like
we
use
these.
We
use
these
some
pre,
like
you
know
this
alignment
of
this
consensus.
We
already
have
around
what
do
we
think
like?
E
How
do
we
interpret
these
signals
and
then,
ultimately,
we
basically
like
we
try
to
basically
come
to
a
consensus
from
these
cons
right
and
the
way.
I.
Really.
Imagine
that
you
know
the
process
of
coming
to
a
consensus
really
is
to
I
mean
it
really
is
kind
of
like
an
probably
like
literally
every
single
one
of
you
when
you
see
okay,
but
make
that
sound
like
anything,
okay
and
that
about
totally
get
off
my
London.
E
Well,
you
know
like
we
used
to
have
the
government's
meetings
back
in
the
day
right
in
the
first
two
years
of
maker,
where
we
like,
we
was
running
the
foundation
out
of
these
meetings,
where
we
had
this
formal
governments
process
and
so
on,
right
and
and
really
the
wait
work
was
just
if
no
one
says
no,
then
we
agree
like
so
that
means
it's
consensus
right.
It's
like
not
really
that
it's
not
that
people
have
degrees.
E
Just
people
have
to
not
oppose,
of
course,
and
like
the
reason
why
we
moved
away
from
that
is
because
it's
a
stupid
idea
right,
because
anyone
who
come
in
and
troll
and
be
like,
oh
off,
let's
shut
down
everything
right
because
I
oppose
anything.
You
say
so
there
has
to
be
like
there
has
to
be
some
level
of
of,
like
I
mean,
what's
what
we
also
in
the
foundation
for
rough
consensus
right
and
like
it's,
not
every
little.
E
Everyone
has
to
agree,
but
it's
just
that,
like
those
who
agree
have
to
agree
that
they're
not
they
have
to
basically
agree
to
that.
They
are
confident
that
they
don't
represent
really
a
super
majority
and
there's
absolutely
no
way
that
this
proposal
will
not
actually
go
through
both
because
I
mean
I
mean.
Unless
and
when
we
think
about
that
right,
then
we
have
Stocking
about
the
crypt
economics
right.
E
So
we
both
thinking
about
that
in
terms
of
literally
the
amount
of
in
care
that's
like
represented
in
terms
of
like
who
believe
this
is
the
case
and
also
who
are
like
similar
and
have
NPR
and
believe
in
this.
But
actually,
more
importantly,
it
is
about
like
it's
not
so
much
about
again.
Instead
of
much
it's
not
about
thinking
who's,
there's
four
rights
of
their
thinking,
who's
against
and
really
like
making
sure
that
those
who
are
against
are
really
like
a
very
small
majority,
perhaps
a
biased.
E
Perhaps
somewhat
rolling
and
there's
not,
you
know
like
if
that
is
not
the
case.
If
there
is
a
legitimate
opposition,
then
it
really
should
be
very
difficult
to
you
know:
there's
a
legitimate
argument:
there's
a
legitimate
opposition.
There
definitely
should
not
be
like
okay
yeah.
We
think
it's
absolutely
what
you're
saying,
but
we
disagree.
So.
Okay,.
A
Let
me
see
if
I
can
unpack
that
process,
then
so
we've
talked
about
scientific
governance
and
we've
talked
about
sort
of
how
rough
consensus
is
also
a
sort
of
a
valid
at
least
pre
filtering
mechanism.
So
so
the
rough
consensus
would
be
or
kind
of
arrived
at
in
these
calls
where,
if
there
isn't
some
like
enormous
Li,
compelling
or
vocal
objections
to
something
to
a
proposal,
then
that
would
move
on
to
the
rich
teams
to,
or
somebody
else
would
actually
formulate
that
proposal,
and
then
it
would
go
into
the
normal
governance
mechanism.
A
The
thing
that
I'm
curious
about,
though,
is
how
do
we
maintain
agility
and
how
much
overhead
does
a
system
like
this
impose
on
the
ecosystem?
If
we
decide
that
you
know,
there's
a
inventory
imbalance,
we
need
to
correct
that
little
corrected
by
2.5
increments
over
the
course
of
X
number
of
weeks.
Does
that
mean
that
we
need
to
return
to?
Are
we
going
to
be
sort
of
a
hold
into
a
weekly
meeting
schedule
and
then
a
week
of
voting
and
then
so
every
three
weeks
we
will
have
the
ability
to
change
it
by
0.5.
E
B
There
is
a
difficulty
in
saying:
well
if
we
decrease
the
civility
fee
from
2.5
2.5
we've
seen
the
increase
in
supply,
how
much
of
it
is
actually
attributable
to
the
fact
that
it
was
just
decreased
or
was
it
actually
attributable
to
the
amount
by
which
it
was
decreased?
You
know
a
lot
of
that
has
to
be
unpacked
still
so.
C
B
I
mean
there's
the
actual
structural
components
which
need
to
be
unpacked
as
well.
I
mean
you
spot
on
these
aspects
which
make
up
the
whole
data
frame
that
we
need
to
consider
will
inform
the
decisions
going
forward,
but
in
order
to
start
somewhere,
we
need
to
obviously
bootstrap
from
from
an
ID
from
a
reasonable
place
and
that
reasonable
place
would
have
to
talk
about
or
what
is
one
of
the
instruments
we
won't
talk
about
here.
I,
don't
think
moving
things
up
and
down.
B
B
We
continuously
provide
an
open
dialogue
on
this
issue
and
keep
vigilance
over
the
the
specific
metrics
that
we
want
to
look
at
and
then,
when
we
do
have
a
point
where
everything
seems
to
coalesce
into
a
very
clear
sort
of
green
light
to
change
something,
then
we
can
take
action,
how
that
is
actually
structured,
how
that
is
formulated?
I'm,
not
terribly
sure,
I
think
that's
going
to
be
more
organic,
but
in
order
to
get
to
that
point,
I
believe
that
we
need
to
start
something
somewhere
very
simple,
and
that's
really
where
these
meetings
are.
B
You
know
quite
essential
because
it's
the
case
of
saying
we
have
a
good
construct
in
place.
We
have
a
good
idea
of
what's
in
place,
but
ultimately,
what
we
do
not
have
is
data
and
a
diversification
of
opinion,
because
both
of
those
two
factors
combined
create
the
robustness
in
the
system
and
allow
it
to
get
that
momentum
to
get
that
value
that
we
actually
require.
B
D
Keep
coming
back
to
this
idea
of
data
and
where
we
get
it
and
what
constitutes
good
data,
and
if
we
want
to
measure
the
impact
of
a
change
you
know,
how
would
we
do
that?
How
do
we
distinguish
that
from
randomness
and
so
forth?
So
so
far,
I
think
the
dependent
variables
that
we've
specified
for
those
changes
are
one.
The
some
measure
of
the
exchange
rate
that
sounds
practical
to
me
in
the
sense
of
we
could
go
and
check
the
various
exchanges.
Maybe
it's
not
perfect,
but
maybe
we
can
improve
it
over
time.
It's
okay!
D
Maybe
we
trusted
this
exchange
yesterday.
Maybe
we
don't
today
and
we
can
as
a
community,
we
work
towards
doing
that
if
we
said
that
as
a
goal
and
we
specify
what
we
want
to
get
as
an
output
from
that
process.
Well,
I
guess:
I
struggle
a
little
bit
more
with
the
second
one,
which
was
the
the
inventory
levels
and
the
market
makers.
Insofar
as
some
of
that
may
be
on
on
centralized
exchanges
wouldn't
really
be
observable.
D
C
The
market
makers
best
interest
to
all
share
that
data
one
another
or
to
share
their
pods.
You
know
that's
as
a
centralizing
force,
just
saying:
okay,
we'll
be.
We
won't
share
this
with
your
competitors,
but
if
you
share
this
with
us
that
this
actually
allows
us
to
help
you
all
within
this
model
and
make
money
off
of
market
yeah.
A
Those
are
great
points
we
need
to
address
those
I
want
to
attack
a
question
on
to
that
tears.
Are
we
convinced
that
the
work,
the
data
that
the
market
makers
are
presenting
to
us
are
in
our
own
best
interest?
Is
that
in
their
at
best
interest
to
mislead
us?
So
that's
that's
another
consideration.
Well,.
E
E
Basically
right-
and
you
know
don't
talk
to
them-
that
it's
time
I
mean
from
from
that
sort
of
level
right.
They,
like
just
last
extent,
right
the
reason
why
they've
gotten
involved
in
the
first
thing,
they've
got
sort
of
interested
in
the
first
thing
they're
actually
using.
It
is
because
then,
what
they
believe,
this
idea
that
there
are
some
levers,
some
stability
fees,
whatever
some
monetary
policy
that
can
be
done
and
that'll
that'll,
make
sure
that
it
stays
stable
over
time
and
that's
actually
what
it
I
mean
to
the
popular
too
far
right.
E
E
In
a
way,
it's
always
like
humans
making
arbitrary
decisions.
So
it's
also.
It
really
is
about
like
maintaining
that,
like
a
deer
that
died,
stable
and
contented
to
be
stable,
and
if
something
was
going
to
make
it
unstable
it'll,
be
governance
will
change
that
right
so
anyway,
so
they're
like
just
to
sort
of
the
peak
interest
on.
Why
like
how?
We
can
actually
like
my
idea
from
how
I
think
we
can
do
inventory
levels
in
a
way
that
really
makes
sense
right
is
yeah
I
mean
then
it's
like.
E
Why
does
it
even
make
sense
for
a
magnet
like
for
yeah,
for
my
Maker
for
put
a
crazy
provider
to
provide
the
data
right
it
doesn't?
It
doesn't
really
sense
that
they
want
to
always
want
to
keep
it
secret,
except
if
it
gets
me
out
of
it
right,
and
that
is
if
they
actually
provide
really
reliable.
Like
I
mean
if
you
have
a
market
maker
that
that
basically
like
managed
to
convince
us
of
two
things
like
number
one
that
they
always
think
they
assume
dies
worth
$1
and
they
trade
it
kind
of
lie
in
it.
E
They
actually
trade
it
in
a
stabilizing.
Wait
like
they'll,
enhance
its
its
its
instability;
rather
they
actually,
they
trust
the
governance.
So
when
they
see
that
dies
too
expensive
or
something
they
see
that
as
an
opportunity,
because
they
they
trust
the
governance
will
ensure
it
goes
back
to
to
$1
right
and
if,
if
we
believe
that
and
then
second
there,
you
believe
that
they're
in
believe
of
inventory
levels,
they're
telling
us
about,
are
correct
right,
it's
true!
Then
we
really
get
a
good
look.
E
That's
gonna
have
like
that
means
that
if
they're
five
million
died
and
they
wanna
be
a
three
million
dollar-
that's
kind
of
like
they're
at
some
point,
then
that's
when
I
mean
and
and
they're
and
also
what's
happening,
is
that
apparently
the
stability
fees
too
low
right
so
what's
happen
is
overtime.
They're
accumulating
more
more
died
because
they're
buying
died
with
the
assumption
that
the
price
now
they're,
assuming
that
miscibility,
will
be
fixed.
Basically,
then
yeah,
sorry.
C
B
Sort
of
a
thought
experiment:
if
your
car
spaces
has
a
market
maker
or
market
making
function,
it
shows
that
your
inventory
is,
let's
say,
98
cents.
What
are
we
you
incentivized
to
do?
I
mean
you.
Basically
you
want
to
pull
back
to
supply.
You
want
to
get
the
demand
up,
so
your
incentive
there
would
be
to
contribute
an
increasing
increase
in
interest
rates.
B
If
your
cost
basis
is
above
a
buck
now,
your
incentive
would
be
to
know,
submit
an
interest
rate
or
a
stability
P
that
is
below
so
you've
got
these
inherent
incentives
built
into
where
your
cost
basis
is
the
only
thing
that
is
really
difficult,
and
this
is
the
same
problem
I
had
with
liable
markets
when
folks
are
looking
at
the
rates
to
clear
their
their
banking
books
or
that
you
didn't
know
how
much
weight
to
give
to
each
of
the
contributors
I.
Do
you
weight
them
in
terms
of
the
size
of
the
inventory?
B
You
can
expand
from
there
what
what
rune
is
talking
about
and
add
in
it's
like
logical,
sex
and
in
anticipatory
effects
and
in
in
the
actual
economics
that
surround
the
broader
perspective,
but
the
the
cost
basis
gives
incentive
for
submitting
a
certain
type
of
of
stability
fee
and
then
just
on
that
basis
as
well
sorry
with
respect
to
the
meeting
we
are
at
the
top
of
the
hour
so
Rooney.
If
you
want
to
train
your
final
thoughts.
E
Yeah
Before,
we
jump
I
just
want
to
talk
about
that
like
how
do
you
express
the
magnetars
an
answer?
Is
we
don't
trust
the
data
right?
Just
like
we
don't
trust
the
exchanges
do
and
even
coinbase
can't
really.
In
the
end
we
can.
We
can
look
at
the
data
and
we've
you
know,
but
in
in
we
have
to
sort
of
make
the
final
decision
on
whether
or
not
we're
gonna
act
on
this
right.
I
mean
it.
A
E
Like
it's
not
like
a
subjective
decision,
you
know
in
a
sense,
I'm
like
a
random
subject
is
probably
bad
word
to
use
like,
but
is
a
human
decision
ultimately,
because
otherwise,
if
it's
a
mechanical
decision,
it's
gonna
be
game
right,
but
but
so,
but
the
two
things
we
can
do
to
kind
of
make
us
feel
most
secure
about
like
relying
on
the
market
makers.
Theta
right
is,
we
can
go
wide
right,
so
we
can
like.
E
We
can
look
at
more
than
one
right,
so
we
can
say:
look
if
there's
ten
minor
minutes
and
all
same
same
thing,
that's
a
lot
better
than
I
just
want
right
and
then
also
we
can
go
deep
and
I
mean
literally
like
auditing
in
some
form.
Right
and
again,
why
on
earth
would
a
microwave
your
subject,
and
so
that
would
be
because
a
market
maker
that's
actually
getting
audited
on
this
stuff.
It's
really
gonna
have
like
a
massive
I
mean
that
would
be
someone
who
would
actually
be
able
to.
E
E
If
that's
really,
we
can
really
feel
that
that's
true
and
that's
gonna
and
you
feel
like
that
mean
system
I'm,
coming
like
fresh
and
I,
potentially
right,
then
on
its
own,
could
be
a
strong
enough
signal
to
result
directly
in
a
change,
so
that
would
be
that
would
be
potentially
a
value
like
a
trade
off.
That's
worth
it
for
for
such
an
agent,
even
with
the
costs
of
bread,
vault
publishing
data
and
also
like
being
audited
by
some
dumb
decentralized,
community
and
stuff
right.
A
Those
are
some
great
points
and
I
think
that
we've
arrived
at
a
point.
That's
gonna
kick
us
off
for
the
next
meetings
of
what
we'll
focus
specifically
on
these
larger
issues,
but
more
targeted
towards
breadth
and
depth
of
data
who
we
can
trust
and
why,
and
maybe
some
solutions
around
that
and
see
whether
that
leads
to
some
next
steps
for
us,
so
we
can
get
back
on
the
the
actionable
plan
bandwagon.
So
thank
you
think
your
room
for
your
insight.
A
That
was
excellent,
Thank
You
Steven
again
for
a
great
meeting
thanks
everybody
for
their
great
suggestions,
special
shout
outs,
a
placeholder
for
once
again
summarizing
what
it
is,
we're
all
talking
about,
I'll
make
sure
that's
all
reflected
in
another
reddit
post,
which
will
go
up
soon
after
this
call
after
I
rewatch
it
and
take
notes,
and
then
we
use
that
visit
kickoff
for
our
next
meeting
this
one
all
right.
So
thanks.