►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk | Ep. 171
Description
Agenda:
Introduction:
@GovAlpha-Core-Unit : Hosting, Introduction, Agenda.
@gov-comms-core-unit : Slides
Governance Round-Up:
@prose11 Poll + Executive Status
@blimpa - MIPs Update
@Artem_Gordon Forum at a Glance
Selected Discussions:
Mandated Actors
A form of delegated authority,
who has authority and over what?
partner relations, deal negotiation, role-of, and other related topics.
Handling 3rd party crisis situations
What is our policy for these situations?
How can we document and systematize our response to various 3rd party crises?
How do we handle Dai recovery generally?
Other Discussions and General Q&A
Oralces Core Unit budget for gas fees
A
All
right,
hello,
everyone
and
welcome
to
the
171st
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
here
at
makerdale.
My
name
is
peyton.
I
go
by
froze
11
online
and
I'm
one
of
the
governance
facilitators
we'll
be
kind
of
guiding
or
moderating
our
way
through
the
meeting
today
I
really
appreciate
everyone
who
joined
we're
here
with
a
bunch
of
awesome
maker
people,
both
those
who
work
in
the
protocol,
those
who
contribute
to
it
and
those
who
are
just
interested
generally
in
maker
governance.
A
Yeah.
Thank
you
all
for
being
here.
Also,
you
all
might
be
watching
this
later
on
youtube.
We
appreciate
you
as
well
go
over
a
couple
ground
rules
here
before
we
get
things
kicked
off,
as
you
probably
noticed
this
is
being
recorded,
so
do
be
mindful
of
that.
Try
not
to
speak
over
one
another!
That
sort
of
thing.
B
A
A
If
we
have
time
we'll
circle
back
and
get
to
them
later
cool,
I
think
that
mostly
does
it
so
no
further
ado
I'll
start
the
update
on
the
governance
side.
As
far
as
the
votes
go
we'll
start
with
polls
was
a
bit
of
a
lighter
week
compared
to
what
we've
had
in
past
kind
of
to
be
expected
with
the
governance
cycle
winding
down.
For
the
end
of
year
holidays,
here
we
did
have
two
weekly
polls
that
passed
both
adjusting
the
wrapped
sticky
system
parameters,
as
well
as
the
matic
system
parameters.
A
The
slides
are
hyperlinked
by
the
way.
I
know
we
recommend
the
governance
risk
agenda
that
we
post
on
the
forums.
So
if
you
ever
do
want
to
further
information,
you
can
always
pull
those
up
and
and
click
through
them
fun.
Little
note
we
have
two
active
green
light.
Poles
going
so
do
keep
those
in
mind,
as
I
know,
they'll
be
ending,
pretty
close
to
the
holidays
for
for
a
number
of
people
and
yeah
those
those
end
a
week
from
monday
and
as
a
reminder
with
green
light
polls.
A
Earlier
today
the
executive
was
executed,
which
means
these
changes
are
live
on.
On
the
protocol
we
sent
out
delegate
compensation.
We
had
some
changes
from
the
open
markets
committee
that
went
to
both
stability
fees
as
well
as
debt
ceilings.
There
might
have
been
a
target
available
gap
in
there
too,
I'm
not
forgetting,
and
we
also
had
those
dust
changes
if
you
were
following
along
in
new
spells.
A
We
saw
this
caused
a
bit
of
drama
in
that
we
had
pulled
the
for
changing
the
dust
on
all
other
types
of
vaults,
which
ended
up
being
a
little
confusing.
Considering
a
number
of
our
vaults
have
been
off-boarded
or
otherwise.
You
know
they.
They
may
not
make
sense,
given
our
system,
so
we
kind
of
want
to
be
mind
more
mindful
of
that
in
the
future.
A
A
Tomorrow's
executive.
You
can
expect
a
few
different
things,
both
the
parameters
I
mentioned
earlier,
that
passed
this
week's
polls.
We
also
had
some
cleanup
from
a
previous
past
poll
on
changing
the
vesting
source
for
mkr
streams.
If
you
recall,
a
number
of
the
streams
were
set
up
so
that
they
would
mint
mkr
up
on
the
vesting
people
receiving.
A
However,
this
executive
pass
would
change
the
source
to
actually
pull
it
from
the
protocol
treasury
and,
finally,
there
will
more
than
likely
be
some
mega
poker
updates
included
in
this
executive
change.
So
look
for
a
forum
post
on
that
with
the
official
recommendation
on
what
the
mandated
actors
think
should
be
changed
for
for
efficiency.
Essentially,
all
right.
That's
enough!
Babbling
from
me!
So
more
than
happy
to
pass
it
off
to
someone
else
here.
I
believe.
Next
up,
we
have
pablo
to
give
us
a
mips
update.
C
All
right,
hello,
everyone
pablo
here
with
our
meeps
update
so
it's
december
and
it
seems
december's
proposals
galore.
We
have
three
new
core
units:
five
maps,
four
budgets
for
already
on
boarded
core
units;
facilitarian
boarding
and
off-warding
proposals,
budget
removal,
proposals,
a
special
purpose
fund
and
possibly
more
for
the
benefit
of
gravity.
I'm
skipping
proposals
that
haven't
seen
much
activity
lately
and
maybe
even
forsaken,
so
I'll.
Try
to
make
this
quick.
C
We
have
three
new
covenant
proposal
sets
one
for
strategic
finance
in
former
times
known
as
financial
strategy.
By
former
times
I
mean
yesterday,
I'm
going
to
be
sharing
links
here.
We
also
have
tech,
ops,
also
known
as
toku001,
also
sharing
a
link
here
and
maker
talent.
All
of
these
coordinates
have
been
incubated
by
ses.
C
C
C
C
Spend
much
time
here
instead,
I
will
just
share
all
the
links
so
that
you
guys
can
check
them
for
yourselves.
There's
really
many
many
proposals
for
today
the
oracle's
budget
is
a
proposal
center
around
gas
cost,
as
you
many
of
you
probably
already
know,
but
just
in
case
and
finally,
we
have
a
number
of
somewhat
controversial
proposals.
We
have
a
set
of
proposals
for
removing
content,
creations,
budgets
and
facilitators
set
goal
far.
C
We
also
have
a
set
of
proposals
for
removing
sebastian,
as
the
facilitator
for
real
world
finance
and
for
boarding
will
remember
as
the
new
facilitator
and
less
controversial.
We
have
a
special
purpose
font
to
create
a
real
dial
spf,
I'm
going
to
be
sharing
the
link
to
this
samsung
links.
No,
I
don't
only
this
one,
sorry,
so
yeah
there's
a
lot
of
proposals
to
read
through
so
I
suggest
you
guys
start
right
after
the
meeting.
So
so
that's
it
for
me.
Thank
you
very
much.
A
Right
on
pablo,
thank
you.
I
know
yesterday
was
a
busy
day.
It
was
the
last
day
to
kind
of
submit
proposals
for
rfc,
so
they
would
be
eligible
for
the
january
cycle
if
you're
new
to
maker
governance,
that's
why
there
was
an
increased
activity
in
the
proposals
yesterday,
so
appreciate
you
giving
us
the
run
down
there,
papa
all
right
with
that.
Next
step,
I
believe,
is
going
to
be
our
form
at
a
glance
artem
I'll,
kick
it
over
to
you.
D
D
D
D
D
Gov
alpha
core
unit
would
like
to
propose
a
change
to
the
cutoff
value
for
delegate
compensation.
They
introduce
a
performance
modifier
which
will
result
in
a
reduced
amount
of
compensation
at
lower
levels
of
metric
and
ask
whether
we
would
we
should
introduce
a
performance
modifier
to
delegate
compensation
trial.
D
A
A
B
A
E
Yeah
sure
I
could
I
could
speak
a
little
bit
about
this
topic
so
and
also
just
generally
speaking,
the
way
that
we
decide
which
topics
we
cover
during
this
gnr
call
is.
We
have
a
big
list
of
current
events
and
current
topics
and
between
the
mandated
actors
we
kind
of
choose
what
we
think
makes
sense,
we're
also
open
to
hearing
suggestions
from
anybody
on
what
topics
they
would
like
to
talk
about
or
hear
on.
These
calls.
E
E
I
have
to
move
my
thingies
here
yeah,
so
we
were
going
to
talk
a
little
bit
about
sort
of
the
mandated
actor
role
in
deal
negotiation,
the
importance
of
authority
in
partner
relations,
kind
of
what
can
help
various
mandated
actors
be
more
effective
at
producing
impact
and
really
driving
business
growth
at
maker
and
yeah.
So
let
me
actually
switch
forward
to
some
prompts
that
I
created
so
prop.
A
A
I
was
just
gonna
yeah
pop
in
real,
quick
and
say
like
so
one
area.
This
particularly
came
up
with,
and
talking
about,
the
mandated
actors
was
like
our
institutional,
vaults,
right
and
kind
of
the
ability
to
make
deals,
because
it's
very
hard
to
with
a
doubt
right.
The
the
dow
has
to
prove
the
deal.
So
when
you're
in
negotiations,
you
lose
a
lot
of
leverage
from
not
being
able
to
say
yes,
this
is
what
I'm
offering
it's
like.
A
E
Dude,
no,
no,
it's
totally
fine
you're.
More
than
welcome
to
cut
me
off
at
any
point,
yeah
exactly
so
problem
number
one
was
kind
of
digging
into
the
types
of
delegated
authority
sort
of
examining
this
whole
topic
of
what
direct
authority
should
be
given
to
mandated
actors
and
what
needs
to
follow
our
traditional
governance
process.
E
You
know
like
how
much
authority
within
a
deal,
for
example,
should
a
mandated
actor
have
compared
to
what
has
to
be
signed
off
on
at
the
end
by
governance
and
then
also
like
what
sort
of
checks
are
in
place
to
prevent
abuse
of
special
power,
privileges
and
and
kind
of?
How
do
we
support
transparency
around
these
permissions,
because
when
you
do
give
people
permission
within
a
business
it
it
gives
them
special
power
and
a
leverage
point.
E
F
F
1.5
billion,
which
is
amazing
and
also
well.
We
we
talked
about
this
with
celsius
and
they
also
got
super
excited
about
that
and
they
started
using
again
maker
bolts.
So
I
think
as
a
product
as
a
concept
is
amazing,
but
of
course
like
when,
when
you
start
like
creating
something
that
is
permissionless
as
like
a
product
that
you
and
a
service
that
you
offer
to
to
individuals,
that's
where
things
are
kind
of
messy.
F
So
so
yeah
like
it's
it's
kind
of
difficult,
because
we
we
in
growth
we
are
like,
as
how
I
see
it,
we
are
like
the
the
the
face
of
maker,
so
we
represent
maker
at
a
point
with
with
our
partners.
We
talk
with
them.
We
tell
them
about
like
this,
a
product,
the
institutional
votes.
We
explain
to
them.
What?
F
What
is
all
that
and
by
the
way
we
right
now
we
have
a
lot
of
institutions
super
interested
in
in
using
this
product
and
it's
a
long
process,
because
we
have
to
explain
a
lot
of
things
to
to
these
institutions
and,
of
course,
like
being
a
dao.
Is
it's
also
like
a
pretty
a
pretty
like
difficult
concept
to
explain
to
to
a
legal
and
a
compliance
team,
but
still
like
because
of
how
maker
works?
F
So
one
approach
that
I
took
was
okay.
I
don't
want,
because
I
don't
have
like
all
the
knowledge
to
decide
about
what
are
the
best
parameters
for
this.
We
created
a
working
group
with
with
a
risk
protocol
engineering,
also
a
ace
from
real
world
finance,
and
we
work
on
on
these
on
these
agreements
and
we
propose
risk
parameters
but,
of
course
like
until
like
until
we
posted
in
the
forum.
F
There
are
a
lot
of
discussions
where
the
institution
to
like
have
an
agreement
on
the
terms
and
sometimes
it
it
will
be
great.
If,
if,
if
we
like,
this
working
group
could
decide
and
and
and
not
wait
until
what
the
community
thinks
and
or
what
the
maker
holders
wants
to
do,
so
that's
what
we
are
thinking
like,
I
I
don't
want
like
to
have
all
the
power
to
of
the
decision.
F
I
think
a
working
group
is
is
like
the
right
approach
to
do
that,
because
we
need
like
to
understand
how
the
protocol
is
affected
or
not
in
different
perspectives,
and
that's
why
it's
like
people
from
different
career
units.
But
I
guess
that's
just
like
an
example
on
on
the
institutional,
bold
side,
but
in
the
mandated
actors
called.
We
didn't
wanted
to
just
like
talk
about
this
particular
case,
because
we
see
this
in
different
in
different
cases
like
I
don't
know
how
to
decide
like
right
now.
F
F
But
at
the
same
time
we
want
to
talk
with
the
community
and
ask
for
their
feedback.
But
if
we
do
that
and
we
go
through
a
meep
and
all
of
that
that
takes
time,
I'm
sure
that,
like
like
the
first
approach
like
the
first
solution
where
we
are
taking
on
that
is
like
having
these
working
groups.
That
is
something
that
we
have
been
like
organizing
in
the
last
month
and
I
think
it's
a
very
good
practice
but
yeah.
F
G
G
So
it's
something
to
where,
where
that
gives
more
power
to
some
actors,
and
then
you
have
all
the
the
checks
and
balances
in
place.
That's
also
something
that
I
believe
that
broon
was
bringing
up
in
the
governance
channel.
So
that's
something
worth
checking
out
if
anyone's
interested
in
this
topic,
but
yeah.
I
think
it's
very
very
hard
to
to
agree
in
a
call
again.
I
believe
roone
promised
a
good
document
in
a
couple
weeks
from
now.
So
looking
forward
to
that
and
seeing
where
what
what
he
brings.
G
So
the
I
yeah
I
I
don't
want
to
just
focus
on
the
on
on
the
article
per
se.
But
what
nadia
is
saying
is
is
true.
Sometimes
you
do
need
not
only
the
speed
but
also
the
authority
to
be
able
to
to
have
like
call
or
judgement
calls
in
different
situations,
but
at
the
same
time,
because
it
is
a
down
because
the.
H
G
Holders
need
to
keep
the
the
power
you
need
to
to
add
the
check
and
balances
to
make
sure
that
this
power
is
not
abused,
that
there
are
different
mechanisms
to
for
different
situations.
So
it's
something
that
maker
definitely
needs
to
work
on
yeah.
I
think
that
we're
still
very,
very
green
in
in
that
sense
in
the
imagers
and
it's
not
in
the
clean
sense.
Unfortunately,.
A
So
in
theory,
you,
you
could
get
more
done
with
less
governance
overhead,
while
still
having
checks
and
balances
in
place,
there's
obviously
benefits
and
drawbacks
to
doing
both
ways,
and
we
don't
have
to
have
all
or
nothing
either
right.
We
could
set
up
certain
opportunistic
ways
of
of
approaching
specific
situations
and
keeping
the
standard
model
for
others,
so
kind
of
a
rich
governance
topic
that
gets
me
excited,
I
hope,
isn't
too
boring
for,
for
others.
I
The
problem
with
the
dow
is
like
sort
of
we
have
to
present
these
in
public,
so
it
gives
it
it's
it's
it's
sort
of
required
to
get
the
authority
to
proceed
with
things,
but
it's
a
disadvantage
because
people
who
are
negotiating
with
can
read
this
and
they
can
understand
like
what
we're
offering
what
we're
willing
to
take
and
all
these
kinds
of
things
so
yeah,
it's
just
it's
something!
That's
not
well
suited
to
being
out
in
the
public.
So
it's
something
we
need
to
think
about.
E
Institutional
vaults
right
deals
with
partners
that
need
to
be
negotiated
behind
closed
doors
if
a
mandated
actor
were
given
some
sort
of
special
authoritative
permission
to
make
deals
and
engage
in
those
talks.
What
kind
of
checks
like
would
be
designed
around
that
to
kind
of
prevent,
like
a
bad
deal
from
going
through
or
like
bad
terms
from
going
through?
E
I
E
B
G
G
We
could
reject
it
or
we
can
even
re
revoke
the
this
this
power
from
them,
but
until
something
happens
they
have
the
power
to
to
negotiate
that.
So
so
right
now,
that's
not
at
all.
What
we
have
governance
is
even
approving
every
single
mipsix
for
real
world
assets.
That's
that's
popping
up
like
there's,
no
way
that
a
delegate
can
have
the
can
have
the
the
bandwidth
to
to
properly
analyze
those,
let
alone
a
voter
right.
G
F
We
had
to
pass
through
the
forum
and
ask
for
everyone's
opinion
and
like
create
a
signal
request
and
like
following
all
the
steps,
and
of
course
it
was
good
because,
like
actually
we
we
got
a
lot
of
feedback,
very
good
feedback
of
things.
We
we
didn't
think
in
the
first
place,
and
now
we
are
incorporating
in
the
next
institutional
votes,
but
also
it
took
time
and
well.
It
was
great
that
the
community
was
super
receptive
and
and-
and
you
all
understood
that
we
we
should
like,
give
it
a
try.
F
And
if
we,
if
the
community
rejected
that
that
agreement,
it
was
going
to
be
complicated,
but
still
the
it
is
possible.
The
possibility
of
rejected
of
like
voting
no
for
the
signal,
request,
existed
and,
and
that's
the
problem,
that's
the
first
problem.
The
second
problem
is
the
time
we
spend
on
that
validation
from
the
community.
F
Like
we
also
like
spend
a
lot
of
days
trying
to
get
an
agreement
with
nexo
and
then
we
have
to
like
at
least
have
two
weeks
with
the
community
to
get
feedback
from
them
and
and
like
wait
until
it's
it's
it's
approved.
So
that's
that's
the
problem.
I
think
that's
that
those
are
the
problems
and
we
are
like
trying
to
figure
out
how
to
solve
those
challenges.
J
We
have
an
extensive
vetting
process
to
have
any
core
unit
facilitator,
be
approved
to
be
a
mandated
actor
and
as
part
of
that,
what
I'm
hearing
the
community
say
when
we
say
yes
to
a
core
unit
or
yes
to
a
facilitator,
is
that
we
want
you
to
go.
Do
your
job
based
upon
the
mandate
that
you
have
outlined
for
your
core
unit,
so
inside
of
that
it's
like
help
me
get
my
job
done
so
you've
set
me
up
to
do
something
very
specific
inside
of
the
dow.
J
In
order
for
me
to
do
my
job,
I
need
a
little
bit
of
leeway.
I'm
not
asking
for
card
launch,
I'm
just
simply
saying
that.
There's
some
parameters
that
I
know
that
I
can
work
within
and
then,
if
it
exceeds
those
parameters
that
goes
outside
of
that,
then
we
go
back
to
governance,
to
ensure
that
we're
all
in
agreement
so,
for
example,
to
build
on
what
nikolai
was
saying.
J
One
of
the
ways
very
specifically
in
in
the
collateral
engineering
services
core
unit
is
that
we
have
an
enablement
strategy.
So,
in
the
very
near
future,
we
want
to
be
able
to
reduce
the
friction
for
onboarding
collateral
if
we
have
to
run
through
the
governance
process,
every
single
time
for
a
piece
of
collateral
that
could
be
quite
laborious
and
it
might,
it
might
impede
getting
collateral
onboarding
into
the
system.
J
But
if
we
have
some
parameters
that
we
can
agree
to
to
say,
hey
up
to
this
debt
ceiling
or
up
up
whatever
it
might
look
like
from
a
risk
perspective
as
well,
that
we
can
work
within
and
then
go
check
back
in
with
governance
when
we
need
to
exceed
those
parameters.
So
I'm
asking
the
community-
and
maybe
we
need
to
be
more
clear
as
mandated
actors,
I'm
asking
the
community
that
that
we
we
place
more
authority
in
those
individuals
that
have
been
designated
mandatory
actors
and
allow
them
to
do
their
jobs.
J
K
K
K
Assuming
we,
we
follow
the
procedure
before
going
through
the
forum
going
through
nanchan
on
chain
paul,
but
if
we
have
this
this,
we
can
even
have
a
cut
punch
there.
I
think
so
we
don't
need
to
be
super
super
slow
on
the
whole
process,
but
it
needs
to
be
super
clear
what
are
actually
the
dimensions?
K
What
are
the
variables
we
are
having
here
and
what
are
the
the
boundaries
you
want
to
set
for
essentially
the
autonomy
of
the
many
detectors
here,
and
it's
probably
best
to
start
with
something
that
is
happening
a
lot
of
times
like
institutional
world
and
yeah.
We
gonna
learn
along
this,
how
to
proceed
with
with
other
things,
where
we
need
more
autonomy
for
the
mandated
actors.
A
Appreciate
those
comments
yeah
and
there
are
like
several
mechanisms-
you
know
different
ways
of
implementation.
Right
like
through
executives,
we
can
actually
delegate
certain
on-chain
authorities
to
multisigs
for,
for
instance,
so,
like
that's
a
tool
we
have
in
our
pocket-
and
there
are
others
like
canada's
should
be
alluded
to.
With,
with
going
direct
to
an
executive.
That's
a
power.
We
already
give
our
mandated
actors
like
to
a
certain
situat
to
a
certain
extent,
depending
on
the
urgency
or
emergency
of
the
situation.
A
A
Cool
there
are
other
ideas
we
might
want
to
mention
about
this.
Let's
see
make
a
random
chat
kind
of
mentioning
how
a
pre-requirable
can
be
very
dangerous
right.
There's,
there's,
obviously
a
number
of
considerations
and,
as
well
as
like
negotiating
leverage
to
be
considered
when
we're
constructing
these
systems.
E
I
guess
maybe
like
another
question
I
had
is
at
some
point:
there
needs
to
be
like
a
maybe
like
a
single
place
where
people
can
understand
to
look
like
for
special
authority
just
to
audit
like
who
has
what
authority
across
various
situations
so
like
not
just
deal
negotiation,
but
also,
for
example,
like
who
has
authority
over.
You
know
oracle
feed
relationships
or
whitelisting
privileges,
or
you
know
like
et
cetera.
E
But
the
mandate
and
the
facilitator
proposals
are
the
two
things
that
really
inform
us
of
what
those
authorities
are,
and
I
guess
something
that
I'm
getting
from
this
conversation
is
that
future
map,
authors
or
revisions
should
aim
to
be
a
lot
more
explicit
when
it
comes
to
explaining
the
authority
that
they're
requesting
and
so
yeah,
just
my
two
cents.
There.
E
A
A
E
E
I
know
that
so
far
the
culture
has
been
helpful
right.
If
we
can,
we
do
and
of
course,
like
I'm
curious
about
the
volume
of
help
requests
that
we
that
that
pe
or
tech,
ops
or
whoever
has
gotten
kind
of
like
over
the
last
year
and
also
generally
speaking,
like
how
do
we
handle
these
requests?
Is
you
know?
Are
there
cases
where
we
shouldn't
handle
requests
yeah?
So
that's
kind
of
the
basis
for
the
discussion.
L
Yeah,
maybe
I'll
kick
it
off
just
by
describing
obviously
the
die.
Token
is
totally
decentralized
and
censorship.
Resistant
governance
has
no
powers
on
that
token,
and
but
we
have
like
an
interesting
amount
of
power.
Governance
has
an
interesting
amount
of
power
over
like
the
ability
to
sort
of
create
new
die,
and
so
so.
For
now.
L
I
think
the
most
common
case
is
that
people
are
taking
dye
and
due
to
a
number
of
like
ui
or
ux
problems,
they
they
tend,
I
think,
maybe
to
like
get
used
to
looking
at
like
a
normal,
ethereum
transaction,
seeing
it
to
and
from,
and
then
they
usually
pick
the
like
from
address
to
send
something
to.
But
the
from
address
in
this
case
is
the
die
token,
and
then
they
think
they're
sending
die
to
their
friend
when
in
fact,
they've
just
sent
die
directly
to
the
die
token
itself.
L
We
debated
whether
or
not
we
would
have
that
kind
of
protection
on
dye
when
we
were
originally
launching
it.
We
decided
because
of
the
sort
of
socialized
gas
costs
of
that,
that
we
would
not
prevent
people
from
sending
die
to
the
contract,
although
I
think
since
then,
we've
come
up
with
other
schemes.
That
would
work,
but
it's
too
late
because
dye
is
already
deployed.
So
so
that's
the
general
problem.
So
now
there's
all
of
this
dye
that's
sort
of
accumulating
in
the
die
contract.
L
In
theory,
this
diet
can
be
sent
to
other
contracts
that
are
completely
incapable
of
sending
it
back.
I
think
people
have
sent
die
to,
like.
I
don't
know
other
tokens
like
the
matic
token
or
something
I
I
don't
know
if
matic
was
one
of
them,
but
they
send
it
to
other
tokens
sometimes,
and
so
you
could
say,
we
can
sort
of
provably
show
that
there's
a
bunch
of
die
locked
in
in
a
number
of
contracts
out
there.
L
Now
there
is
like
a
kind
of
trick
that
we
can
use
to
remint
this
dial.
Although
it's
gonna,
it
would
take
some
like
sort
of
deeper
protocol
changes,
but
the
the
trick
is
similar
to
how
we
upgraded
from
sync
collateral
die
to
die
or
to
multi-collateral
die.
So
what
we
would
do
is
we
would
basically
instantiate
some
like
dummy
token
type,
that
probably
was
like
dead
dye
or
something
like
that
right.
L
So,
with
this
collateral
type,
you
wouldn't
want
to
just
hand
out
dead,
die
components
to
everybody,
because
there
there'd
be
no
way
to
redeem
that
dead
die.
So
what
you
would
need
is
an
emergency
shutdown.
You
would
need
to
sort
of
scrape
this.
This
special
collateral
type
out
of
the
accounting
so
that
you
didn't
get
rolled
up
as
like
total
die
and
it
so
we
need
the
end
contract.
L
Then
emergency
shutdown
would
work
with
dead
die
and
we
in
theory,
could
have
a
way
to
sort
of
give
die
back
to
all
the
people
that
end
up,
you
know
losing
their
die
and
and
then
we
can
discuss
like.
Maybe
we
periodically
do
it
around
the
holidays,
and
you
know
once
a
year
as
a
sort
of
like
you
know,
holiday
gift
to
everybody.
We
end
up
like
giving
them
their
locked
eye
back
or
something.
L
You
know,
sort
of
greater
sort
of
aggregator
of
a
bunch
of
this,
unless
of
course,
we
can
do
it
permissionlessly
and
which
we
may
be
able
to
do
with
the
dye
token
itself.
So
I
I
think
I
think
that's
a
the
general
case,
there's
another
sort
of
extra
there's
an
institutional
case.
I
think
as
well.
That's
like
kind
of
driving
this
right
now,
but
I
don't
think
it's
subject
to
the
same
problems
and
maybe
sam
or
someone
else
would
want
to
talk
about
that.
L
L
L
H
So
what
was
I
saying?
There's
also
the
issue
of
like
how
do
we
determine
who
sent
these
you
you?
We
would
need
a
customer
service
core
unit
or
something
like
that
just
to
process
and
verify
that
the
peoples
of
them
are
the
people
who
sent
them
just
following
back.
You
know
the
sender,
like
the
original
center,
that
sent
to
the
contract
may
just
mean
that
we'd
end
up
sending
these
tokens
to
a
different
contract
that
had
sent
these
and
it
would
just
be
locked
there
because
it
couldn't
process
tokens
itself.
H
A
Yeah
definitely
good
good
points
and
I'm
sure,
like
I
don't
know
if
it's
just
because
I'm
an
admin,
I
imagine
a
number
of
the
pe
and
other
people
get
it
too,
but
I'm
constantly
in
flux
with
dms
about.
I
said
my
diet
here:
what
can
you
do
and
and
that
sort
of
thing
so
you
know
even
though
we're
not
addressing
it.
It
still
requires
quite
a
lot
of
cognitive
load.
A
L
E
A
And
from
the
governance
end
like,
obviously
it's
much
easier
for
us
to
negotiate
with
protocols
and
large
amount
of
dye
and
like
see
the
problem
there
like,
we
do
have
to
think
about
the
president
that
sets,
if,
like
we're,
only
returning
die
for
some
people
and
not
for
others
right.
So
it
is
kind
of
an
interesting
governance
question
there.
E
Yeah
I
mean
something
that
was
on.
In
my
mind,
is
okay,
like
for
a
10,
you
know,
10
or
20
million
die
locked
like
okay.
It
makes
sense
to
kind
of
devote
some
special
resource
to
help
them,
get
it
actually
back
right
or
reimbursed
or
actually
back,
but
but
then
for,
like
I
don't
know,
the
380
000
die
that's
sent
to
the
contract
by,
like
you
know
the
50
people
or
100
or
150
people
that
did
it.
E
So
like
I'm
thinking
like
if
like
sending
to
contract,
is
a
temporary
problem
because
eventually
I
expect
like
wallets
to
block
it
off
and
like
things
to
be
designed
in
a
way
where
you
can't
do
that.
Wouldn't
it
kind
of
make
sense
to
just
handle
it
case
by
case
and
perhaps
do
like
a
yearly
like
assessment
and
reimbursement
of
like
the
smaller
locks
like
even
out
of
the
surplus
buffer.
Wouldn't
that
be
a
cheaper
way
of
solving
the
problem.
L
A
B
E
L
Yeah
the
arbitrary
oasis
thing
which
wasn't
dye,
it
was
collateral
itself
and
it
was
really
just
a
very
happy
accident
that
we
were
able
to
sort
of
fix
that
because
we
controlled
the
contract
that
we
controlled
the
address
that
deployed
the
original
deus
proxy
factory,
and
so
we
could
reproduce
that
same
sort
of
chain
of
hashes
that
led
to
the
same
contract
where
the
funds
ended
up.
So
we
were
able
to
recover
that
user's
funds
yeah.
L
I
I
guess
one
thing
I'll
add
is
for
l2di.
We
are
actually
able
to
just
manually
pull
that
out
just
because
the
actual
l1di
is
sitting
in
an
escrow
contract
which
is
in
governance's
full
control,
so
somebody
like
burns
their
l2
die.
We
can
potentially
recover
that
without
any
sort
of
special
mechanism.
L
Right
if
it's
the
burn
mechanism,
so
sam
is
talking
about
a
hypothetical
case
that
is
worth
paying
attention
to
as
a
hypothetical
right
now.
Yes,
well,
what
happens,
and
this
is
any
for
anybody
on
pe.
If
you
want
a
conjecture,
so
let's
say
it's
not
the
burn
function,
that's
called,
but
rather
die
that
gets
sent
in
locked
in
a
contract
on
l2
like
do
we
do.
We
have
a
recovery
path
for
die
like.
I
H
L
I
I
L
Right
like,
if
what
is
it,
if
no,
if
there's
a
incorrect
state
transition
and
no
fraud,
proof
is
submitted
for
that
within
the
like
seven
day
window
in
in
theory,
you
can't
make
any
assessments
about
the
state.
If
that
doesn't
happen,
so
in
theory,
the
like
the
rollup
is
dead.
I
think,
in
that
case,.
H
H
L
L
L
I
L
So
that's
that's
why
it's
a
doubt
in
fact,
it
kind
of
goes
back
to
the
the
first
sort
of
discussion
topic
right
is,
you
know
it's
way
more
efficient
to
run
an
organization
and
to
have
business
relationships
as
a
central
company.
There's
a
reason
corporations
have
evolved.
They
have
this
sort
of
hierarchy,
structure
and
and
dows
are,
are
a
response
in
a
way
to
against
sort
of
centralization,
they're
a
response
towards
certain
regulatory
climates
that
prevent,
let's,
let's
say,
like
you,
know,
actions
in
in
certain
arenas
and
yeah.
M
H
M
A
B
E
I
guess
I
have
a
question
like
if,
if
maker
were
to
move
towards
a
more
optimistic
governance
model
like
what
would
the
veto
power
look
like
like?
Who
would
have
it?
Is
it
something
like?
Oh,
you
need
like
a
thousand
mkr
to
veto,
because,
right
now
you
just
need,
like
I
guess,
to
block
the
vote
via
your
actual
voting
weight.
So
it's
not
really
a
good
way
to
veto
or
an
efficient
way
to
veto.
But
I
don't
know
what
are
like.
The
downsides
of
maker
were
to
do
optimistic
governance.
D
L
Any
any
sort
of
decisions
or
actions
that
require
an
executive
vote
mean
that
we
basically
are
just
not
framed
to
do
optimistic.
Governance
like
like
mk
holders,
are
always
going
to
have
to
instantiate
some
sort
of
change
in
the
protocol
in
that
particular
case.
But
if
it's,
if
it's
like
an
arrangement
outside
of
that
somehow
or
a
parameter,
that
we
don't
need
governance,
for,
I
would
imagine
maybe
just
a
poll
with
like
a
low
bar
threshold
or
something
for
people
to
veto,
would
probably
you
know,
be
sufficient.
H
So
my
power's
back,
I
hope
it
works.
So
we
also
do
have
to
consider
that
die.
Recovery
can
be
good
for
the
protocol,
so
not
just
the
users
having
liquid
die
on
the
market
is
obviously
good
for
the
bag,
so
in
in
large
you
know
if
somebody
loses
10
million
100
million.
It
might
be
in
the
dow's
interest
to
recover
that
just
so
that
we
don't
get
back
into
a
situation
where
we
are
pushing
the
peg
up,
because
there's
not
enough
dye.
L
I'll
bring
one
thing
nikolai
said,
which
is
just.
There
is
a
sort
of
unintended
consequence
of
having
like
this
recovery
flow
for
dye,
which
is
just
that
people
are
gonna,
they're,
they're,
more
likely
to.
I
don't
know
like
in
this
traditional
financial
system
right
you're,
you
can
usually
make
a
claim
on
your
credit
card
and
get
your
money
back.
Dude
you
go
and
like
spend
your.
I
don't
know
your
credit
card
on
some
like
really
shady
like
website
or
something
right.
A
E
A
And
could
also
just
be
for
general
for
core
units
right.
A
lot
of
us
have
to
use
each
for
things
and
oh
yeah,
in
a
situation
of
buying
it
and
like
I
know,
long
and
eye,
for
instance,
you
know
when
we
submit
polls
right,
we
have
to
use
gas
and
then
we
refund
ourselves
and
die
that
we
didn't
have
to
swap
to
even
you
know,
spend
a
decent
percentage
of
that
junk
just
for
the
transaction
fee
to
swap
it.
So
it
feels
there
would
be
a
more
efficient
way
to
do
that.
A
M
Yeah
sure,
if
I
suspect
I
didn't
know
if
maker
man
wanted
to
take
the
lead
on
it,
yeah
and
just
if
some
of
us
had
been
interested,
maybe
trying
to
separate
out
the
the
gas
oracle
gas
proposal
into
two
for
like
one
for
the
actual
oracle
gas,
that's
looking
forward
and
one
for
the
figuring
out
this
whole
amount
that
would
be
repaid
to
the
foundation.
Considering
that,
like
it
covers
a
period
that
hasn't
even
completely
elapsed
yet
so
anyways
I
just
wanted
to.
A
M
A
M
Yeah,
so
I
guess,
since
makerman
doesn't
have
a
mic,
so
some
of
the
concerns
I
had
were
you
know
just
number
one.
Just
you
know
getting
some
documentation,
not
not
just
about
costs.
I
suspect
that's
just
a
pain
in
the
butt,
but
yeah
it
does
need
to
be
done
for
probably
for
three
million,
but
also
you
know
exactly
who
the
counterparty
is.
What
the
terms
were.
E
A
Not
seeing
them
make
a
man
comment
on
the
sidebar
and
yeah
basically
reading
it
out,
since
he
doesn't
have
a
mic
here,
so
he's
kind
of
asking,
like
paper,
to
break
the
costs
up
from
retroactive
and
forward,
as
well
as
like
trying
to
see
who
who
is
actually
being
paid
when
when
this
refund
goes
through
again
nick
is
not
here.
Who
is
the
proposal
author
and
the
way
our
system
works?
Who
is
proposing?
A
M
So
I
I
think
the
question
of
who,
who
the
dow
would
be
paying
is
probably
a
good
one
right.
Just
we
should
know
who
we're
going
to
be
sending
three
million
to,
and
you
know
you
kind
of
wonder.
Why
is
a
a
non-profit
foundation
that
exists
for
the
purpose
of
bootstrapping
maker,
dow
asking
maker
doubt
to
pay
it
three
million
dollars
right?
It's
not
to
say
that
it's
inappropriate,
but
I
would
kind
of
like
to
know
a
little
more,
especially
since
you
know.
Presumably
it
is
dissolving
and
whatever
surplus
assets
are.
I
L
I
L
The
gas
calculations
for
oracles
were
very
difficult
at
that
time,
and
so
they
they
didn't,
have
the
actual
like
amount
that
they
were.
Spending
offhand
like
like
pe,
was
a
lot
easier
to
just
sort
of
look
at
our
deployer
addresses
and
see
how
much
gas
it
was
gonna
cost.
It
was
more
non-deterministic
and
there's
a
lot
more
like
addresses
and
what
not
to
look
at
for
oracle's.
L
So
so
they
do
have
that
calculation
now,
but
I
you
know,
I
guess
this
is
basically
just
a
loan
from
the
foundation
and
and
actually
probably
harkens
back
to
the
again
to
the
original
topic,
which
is
how
much
autonomy
do
sort
of
mandated
actors
or
teams
have
here.
But
I
I
think,
regardless
of
what
the
foundation
does,
I
think
that
the
dow
should
should
honor
its
debts.
L
However,
I
I
do
think
paper
probably
brings
up
some
like
interesting
points,
and
this
maybe
goes
back
to
that
original
discussion
about
exactly
how
much
autonomy
like
teams
should
have
you
know
taking
on
loan
agreements
that
the
dow
is
responsible
for
might
be
a
limit
of
that
or
or
maybe
there
is
like
a
monetary
limit
of
that.
So-
and
this
may
just
be
a
one-off
anomaly
just
because
it
was
part
of
the
transition,
but.
M
Yeah
I
mean
I,
I
think
that
makes
sense
that
you
know
you
know.
Clearly
you
know
if
gas
was
spent,
then
something
probably
should
be
owed,
but
I
guess
my
pushback
there
would
be
that
you
know
if
a
for-profit
venture
fund
is
that
owns
parts
of
lots
of
affiliated
entities
that
the
dow
pays
money
to.
I
think
you
know
if
they're
part
of
this
ecosystem,
maybe
there
should
be
some
kind
of
cost
split
or
something
like
that.
I
don't
know
I.
I
would
just
like
see
a
wider
discussion.
M
I'm
not
out
here
saying
we
absolutely
shouldn't
pay
them
3
million,
but
you
know
it
just
it
just
strikes
me
as
a
little
weird
that
you
take
a
foundation
that
existed
to
get
make
your
doubt
up
and
running
and
then
say
make
your
down
pay
us
some
money
to
help
fund
this.
You
know
private
for-profit
entity.
H
Yeah,
I
would
suspect
that
that
loan
helped
oracle's
core
unit
leave
the
foundation
sooner
then
they
might
have
otherwise
been
able
to
without
it
I'm
not
defending
it.
It
was
probably
an
executive
decision
on
the
facilitator's
part,
but
yeah
I'm
with
I'm
with
mooney
and
others
like
it's
a
it's
a
debt
that
we
would
have
had
to
have
paid
either
way.
M
B
M
B
M
B
A
M
B
Was
saying
it's
the
maker
foundation
all
right,
but
you
know
there's
no
agreement
on
the
form
of,
like
you
know
the
dow
and
the
maker
foundation
as
specified
by
some
legal
entity
or
entering
into
an
agreement,
and
there
was
no
executive
vote
to
approve
the
taking
of
this
loan,
and
you
know.
I
think
this
can
be
a
one-off
thing,
but
you
know
it's.
B
B
B
B
L
A
All
right
right
on
well,
thank
you,
everyone
for
joining
us
today.
We
appreciate
the
discussion
and
all
the
participation.
Let's
keep
it
going
in
the
forums
and
in
our
discord
yeah.
There
will
be
one
more
gnr
call
next
week
for
2021,
so
look
forward
to
seeing
you
there
and
we
can
wrap
up
the
year
in
style
thanks.
Everyone.