►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk | Ep. 174
Description
Agenda:
Introduction
@GovAlpha-Core-Unit : Hosting, Introduction, Agenda.
@gov-comms-core-unit : Slides
Governance Round-Up
@GovAlpha-Core-Unit Poll + Executive Status
@blimpa - MIPs Update
@Artem_Gordon Forum at a Glance
Selected Discussions
- Revisiting Dai’s Stablecoin-Backing
- Ideas for relieving stablecoin dependence, options being pursued
- Multidisciplinary approaches to governance evolution
- How can interdisciplinary approaches to governance be incorporated into our medium-term evolutionary planning?
- For reference- Research-Driven Insights About DAO Governance 1
Other Discussions and General Q&A
- D3M spread management
- Market making
- Altering Community Greenlight Polls process.
- Institutional Vault Deals,
- Delegate Compensation
- Ways we can improve governance
More Information:
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/governance-and-risk-174-thursday-january-13-17-00-utc/12577
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in these public calls are those of the hosts and guests involved and do not reflect the official policy or position of MakerDAO or any of its contributors, Core Units, or affiliates.
A
A
All
right,
hello,
everyone
and
welcome
this
is
the
174th
scientific
governance
enrichment.
Today
is
thursday
january
13th
2022.
My
name
is
peyton.
I
go
by
pros
online
at
pros,
11
more
specifically,
and
I'm
one
of
the
governors
facilitators
here
at
maker
down
I'm
joined
today
by
a
bunch
of
awesome
people
who
both
work
for
care
about
and
are
interested
in
the
maker
protocol,
and
this
is
kind
of
our
weekly
governance
and
risk
meeting.
A
A
I
think
that
mostly
does
it
for
our
little
housekeeping
matters.
We
do
have
a
bit
of
an
agenda
to
get
to.
If
you
don't
mind,
kicking
us
the
next
slide,
thanks
arden,
it's
the
first
time.
Arnold
has
to
work
with
maya
erratic
slide
skipping
so
appreciate
you,
you're
sticking
with
me
today,
we'll
start
as
usual,
with
our
governance,
roundup
and
then
we'll
go
into
some
kind
of
presentation.
Class
discussions
really
more
discussion
topics,
one
about
the
die
stable
coin
backing.
A
On
on
different
pools
of
knowledge
and
kind
of
where
other
groups
have
done
and
tried
in
the
past,
and
and
using
that
to
improve
our
our
governance
system
here
at
maker
doubt
that
was
a
topic
that
was
proposed
by
one
of
our
recognized
delegates.
So
that's
also
exciting
and
can't
wait
to
kick
it
over
to
her
to
introduce
that
topic
when
it
comes
cool.
A
A
Cool
so
starting
with
the
polls
for
this
week,
we
had
five
polls
that
passed
and
those
are
listed
there.
A
couple
goals:
checking
community
temperature
on
new
d3m
implementations
raised
to
the
emergency
shutdown
module
threshold,
esm
as
we
call
it
increase
in
desk,
parameter
to
select
lp
token
vaults.
A
A
The
only
other
polls
you
should
be
aware
of
is
there
are
five
green
light
collateral
polls
and
those
and
on
the
24th,
so
make
sure
you
drop
your
opinion
there
if
you're
so
inclined
to
vote
I'll.
Take
us
to
the
next
slide
here
and
talk
about
the
executive.
This
will
be
the
first
executive
of
2022,
pretty
exciting
playing
contents.
B
Hello,
everyone,
thank
you
peyton,
paulo
here
I
think
I've
been
under
the
weather.
So
sorry,
my
voice
is
not
very
clear,
so
we
have
11
gratification
polls
that
went
up
on
monday
and
we're
going
to
be
taking
a
quick
peek
at
the
votes.
So
far,
so
we
have
our
three
mips
as
opposed
to
some
proposals,
map
62
the
collateral
reporting
process,
which
defines
how
users
automaker
faults
are
to
be
notified
when
affording
collaterals.
B
And
finally,
we
have
a
ratification
poll
for
reporting
the
content,
protection
facilitator
and
reducing
its
budget
to
zero.
This
one's
the
only
ratification
pole
so
far
with
no
as
the
winning
option,
and
we
have
a
ratification
point
for
onboarding
with
rammer
as
facilitator
for
real
world
finance
after
the
current
facilitators
facilitator.
Sorry
for
the
voluntary
deferred
dimension
that
will
become
effective
on
january
25th,.
B
B
C
First
up,
it's
great
to
see
more
of
gala
on
the
forums
of
govalfa,
announcing
the
launch
of
the
maker
operational
manual.
The
manual
aims
to
become
the
main
source
of
information
and
documentation
to
make
governance
more
accessible
and
navigateable
for
the
whole
community.
This
will
continue
to
be
an
ongoing
initiative
that
is
open
to
community
feedback
and
help,
and
next
up,
acrillo
and
sayon.
Both
members
of
the
blockchain
at
berkeley
announce
their
research
project,
stable
sims,
where
they
created
a
simulation
of
dye
stablecoin
system
and
sought
to
optimize
the
liquidations.
C
Next
up
alan
peterson
publishes
a
comprehensive
post
breaking
down
the
maker
trust
foundations
and
the
trustee
role
and
introduces
a
potential,
a
tester
role
in
a
maker
trust.
He
analyzes
the
differences
between
the
conventional
board
of
trustees
and
another
kind
of
trustee
called
professional
corporate
trustees.
C
He
analyzes
their
functions
and
explains
the
need
for
a
tester
role
in
maker,
which
he
introduces,
and
he
explains
it
in
detail
with
methods
to
be
appointed
and
the
responsibilities
he
also
just
recently
released.
Another
related
post,
which
I
didn't
have
time
to
put
up,
but
definitely
recommend
to
check
these
out
in
more
details.
There's
a
lot
of
stuff
and
there's
actually
in
this
forum
at
a
glance,
a
more
comprehensive
summary
than
usual
about
the
post
and
moving
on
to
our
active
signal
requests,
there's
actually
no
active
signal
requests
currently
on
the
forum.
C
However,
five
signal
requests
have
just
recently
passed
their
polls.
It's.
This
is
also
available
on
the
forum
at
a
glance
if
you
want
to
check
it
out
with
links
and
everything
and
that's
it
for
the
forum
at
a
glance
for
the
the
actual
format
of
glance
post
contains
some
more
information,
such
as
a
three
point
summary
this
time.
A
two
point,
summary
evaluations,
reports,
assessments,
all
the
ongoing
initiatives
and
help
wanted.
C
That's
it
on
my
head:
actually,
no,
that's
not
it
online
we're
gonna
move
on
to
our
our
first
discussion
of
the
gnr
call
I
guess
coming
in
in
clutch
with
the
post
I
just
mentioned
talking
about
die,
stable
coin
backing
and
basically
reducing
stable
coin
dependency.
Most
discussion
is
about
usdc
and
the
fear
of
blacklisting
of
usdc
and
as
well
as.
C
As
well
as
dye
being
backed
by
a
large
amount
of
usdc,
so
a
couple
of
prompts
that
I
put
up
thanks
to
david
and
peyton
and
other
people
that
helped
and
we'll
get
started
with
the
first
prompt
and
discussion
on
ideas
on
reducing
stable
coin
dependency
for
dye,
especially
in
the
case
of
a
potential
bear
market
coming
along.
We
can't
we'd
love
to
be
bullish,
but
we
can't
always
be
bullish.
We
have
to
expect
and
prepare
for
the
worst
and
so
yeah.
D
E
A
And
I
guess
for
some
framing
there,
particularly
well
thinking
about
the
bear
market
is
important.
It's
because
typically
like,
unless
die,
demand,
also
dries
up
with
with
a
bear
market.
You
have
a
problem
where
there's
still
a
ton
of
demand,
and
currently
the
only
way
at
scale
of
accessing
the
dyes
is
stable
coins
through
our
psms.
A
C
And
I'll
move
on
to
the
next
prompt
seems
like
maybe
I'll
get
more
discussion
actually
so
the
next
prompt
is
completely
a
180.
interesting
discussion
on
shifting
public
relations
regarding
usdc
back
die
sort
of
everyone.
You
know
thinks
of
it.
The
public
sentiment
is
pretty
negative
and
it's
kind
of
seen
like
a
die
rapper,
but
you
know
what
about
promoting
the
public
sentiment
towards
seeing
it
as
a
security
buffer
or
just
promoting
a
positive
sentiment
overall.
E
G
I
did
I
did
come
across
like
a
kind
of
funny
post,
where
somebody
basically
reinvented
die.
People
were
talking
about
how
expensive
transactions
got
with
usdc
on
chain
and
how
they
get
worse
because
of
the
the
blacklist
and
all
of
the
like
upgradeability
and
like
poor
memory
management.
So
transferring
usdc
is
actually
like
reasonably
expensive.
G
Right
now,
like
I
think,
if
you
wanted
to
transfer
a
hundred
dollars
worth
of
usdc
or
like
nearly
paying
half
of
that
in
transaction
fees
and
gas
in
order
to
do
it,
and
so
people
were
like
theorizing
about
making
the
usdc
wrapper.
That
allowed
like
a
more
gas,
efficient
transfer
and
it
turns
out
like
die,
is
like
one
of
the
most,
if
not
the
most,
like
efficient,
stable
coin
implementation
on
chain.
A
I
know
one
interesting
aspect
that
came
to
mind
for
me
was
like
a
lot
of
the
kind
of
risk-weighted
assessments
have
to
do
with
how
much
non-stable
collateral
we
have,
which
makes
sense
right
like
unless
it's
a
black
swan
scenario,
though
you
don't
have
to
worry
as
much
about
the
the
stable
backing
as
you
do
like
the
volatile
ones.
So,
in
some
ways,
by
having
more
stable
coin
backing
like
it,
frees
us
up
a
little
bit
on
on
the
wrist
side
with
the
rest
of
our
portfolio.
E
G
E
Yeah
people
bringing
up
like
a
track
seriously
except
you're
on
the
sidebar
yeah,
we've
kind
of
discussed.
A
few
of
these
before
right,
like
part
of
the
issue,
is
in
some
cases,
market
caps
just
aren't
high
enough
right,
like
we
have
a
lot
of
usdc,
we
would
need
to
shift
if
we
wanted
to
switch
completely
to
one
of
these
also
there's
kind
of
the
question
about
how
stable
these
will
be
like
over
the
long
term.
F
I
mean
fundamentally,
these
coins,
if
they're
over
collateralized
they'll,
have
the
same
sort
of
supply
issues
that
we
have
or
they're
backed
by
centralized
stable
coins
as
well.
So
I
don't
think,
there's
really
or
or
they'll
just
plain
like
explode,
so
if
they're
under
collateralized
but
yeah,
I
want
usd,
of
course,
but,
like
I,
don't
think,
there's
really
sort
of
a
get
out
of
jail
free
card
with
any
of
these.
H
Yeah,
I
feel,
like
the
dow,
is
kind
of
having
a
preference
for
in
action
right
now.
Regarding
the
usdc
issue,
I
think
there's
different
solutions
and
people
don't
want
to
take
them
because
they're
not
perfect,
like
we
can
look
at
doing
on-chain
defy
stuff,
but
that
has
you
know
counterparty
risk
by
investing
in
other
protocols,
we
can
do
off-chain
stuff,
putting
uscc
in
treasuries
or
other
liquid
credit
assets,
but
then
that's
been
criticized
from
a
you
know,
decentralization
standpoint.
H
You
know
usdc
is
flowing
in
rapidly
to
the
psms.
Now
you
know
we
have
over
four
and
a
half
billion
dollars
of
exposure.
You
know
just
sitting
there
in
stables,
so
you
know
it's
it's
tough,
because
it's
a
lot
of
money
and
it's
a
complex
thing
to
discuss.
I
think
at
some
point
we're
gonna
have
to
come
together
as
a
community
and
really
do
some
deep
analysis
on
it
or
maybe
hire
people
to
do
some
deep
analysis
on
it,
because
you
know
structuring
even
a
traditional
credit
investment
for
treasury
type
services.
H
F
Yeah
until
we
get
the
real
world
assets
online,
really
I
see
it
as
sort
of
we
have
crypto
assets,
but
you
know
we
can
only
get
so
much
supply
from
those,
and
those
are
only
really
people
want
leverage
on
those
in
bull
markets
so
like
having
centralized
stable
coins
is,
is
the
only
thing
we
can
really
do
at
this
stage.
I,
like
I,
don't
see
like
we,
we
may
get
a
boost
from
steak
teeth.
F
A
H
H
I
think,
since
this
is
so
new
and
novel
there's,
you
know
a
hesitancy
from
the
team,
I
think
to
request
more
funds
and
scale
this.
You
know
we're
kind
of
at
like
the
stage
where
we're
at
a
proving
grounds
right.
You
know,
maybe
someone
from
you
know
real
with
assets.
I
don't
know
if
well's
on
it's
too
late
for
him,
but
you
know
at
some
point.
We
need
to
look
at.
You
know
reinvesting
like
deeply
into
rwa,
once
we've
kind
of
like
proven
a
base
model,
that's
scalable.
H
E
F
F
H
D
So
I
think
there
are
different
issues
here
I
mean,
I
think
the
biggest
issue
is
that
listing
risk,
and
that
has
been
discussed
many
times
that
you
know
it
doesn't
matter
if
there's
four
billion
die
or
two
billion
die
and
make
it
if
it
gets
like
listed
it's
like
game
over.
Essentially,
so
I'm
wondering
you
know
what
is
the
the
problem
here,
because
I'm
not
seeing
die
being
used
less
necessarily
so
yeah.
I
I
just
wanted
to
emphasize
that.
F
D
Yeah,
so
I
I
guess
my
question
is
then
like:
what's
what's
the
goal
in
terms
of
you
know
why?
Why
not
be
wrapped
usdc?
You
know
why
not
50,
I
mean
I'm
not
saying
that.
That's
good!
It's
just
like.
What's
what's
the
goal
post
here,
because
it's
also
good
to
have
some
stable
core
lateral
to
corrosion
us
in
in
the
market.
The
the
downturns
yeah.
F
J
F
Yeah,
I
kind
of
have
another
view
on
that.
From
what
I've
seen
over
the
past
couple
years
die
demand
just
steadily
kicks
up.
In
the
bull
market
side,
it
seems
to
tick
up
from
farming
yields,
but
that's
not
the
entire
thing
or
else
if,
in
the
reverse
case,
the
demand
would
drop,
which
we're
not
seeing
there's
a
there's
a
bit
of
a
drop
when
we
have
a
sort
of
a
big
market
drop,
but
demand
seems
to
kind
of
start
ticking
up
again
after
a
while.
F
F
So
I
think
we
have
to
kind
of
in
the
bull
market
case
we
kind
of
have
the
supply
growing
as
well
to
kind
of
roughly
match
it
or
even
exceed
the
demand
growth
due
to
just
the
fact
that
people
can
mint
more
and
stuff
like
that.
But
like
this
sort
of
trend
of
demand,
just
ticking
up
over
time
seems
to
just,
as
I
said,
die
just
is
up
only
in
demand
for
the
past
little
bit
so
during.
I
So
I
I
just
have
one
question,
because
this
this
is
interesting
for
for
growth,
to
like
understand
what
a
new
collaterals
we
should
be
looking
for,
so
you
think
we
should
be
looking
for
new,
stable
coins
on
the
psm
or
maybe
like
be
more
risky
and
and
go
after
those
that
can
take
loans
in
the
protocol
or
going
and
trying
to
find
more
real
world
assets.
Deals
like
what's.
I
What's
your
take
on
this?
What
do
you
think
we
should
like
be
looking
for
because,
as
I'm
as
I'm
at
least
understanding?
If,
if
we
all
think
that
we
are
going
to
enter
in
a
bear
market,
then
stable
coins
are
inevitable
and
we
just
won't
like
eat
bitcoin
and
stable
coins,
yeah
and
well,
of
course,
real-world
assets,
but
we
all
know
that
we
won't
have
enough
die
coming
from
real-world
assets
in
maybe
for
the
in
the
next.
I
don't
know
one
two
years
or
so.
So
what
are
your
thoughts
about
this.
F
Yeah,
so
for
the
short
term,
I
think
trying
to
capture
as
much
of
the
big
crypto
assets,
wbtc
and
eth
is
probably
the
best
strategy.
I
don't
see
any.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
a
stable
coin
for
the
bear
market,
but
basically
something
that's
not
correlated
to
the
crypto
markets
is
ideal,
but
that
doesn't
really
exist
other
than
stable
coins
like
at
least
at
scale.
We
need
we
need.
We
need
big
numbers.
A
No,
this
topic
has
come
up
before
and
will
probably
keep
coming
up
again,
but
I
thought
it
was
good
to
kind
of
take
the
temperature
here
and
see
what
new
ideas
we
had
looking
at
the
time,
though
I
do
think
it'd
probably
be
good
to
move
us
along
and
also
know,
we'll
get
some
good
delegate
input
in
this
one
at
various
time.
At
the
end,
we
can
always
circle
back
if
you
had
something
else
to
add,
but
yeah.
A
L
G
I
I
mean
I
can
you
want
to
like
a
quick
technical
history
of
how
things
have
changed
and
then
and
then
that's
sort
of,
because
you
know
we
weren't,
we
weren't
always
like
a
protocol
that
had
these
delegates
right.
This
is
like
a
reasonably
new
development,
so
you
know
everything
started
out.
As
you
know,
mkr
voting
is
intended
to
quantify
some
measure
of
like
skin
in
the
game.
G
You
know
so
in
a
way,
it's
a
plutocracy,
but
it's
intended
to
be
that
way,
because
we
want
mkr
holders
to
make
sure
they
make
good
decisions
and
they
would
be.
You
know,
therefore,
financially
penalized
if
they
made
bad
ones
right.
So
good
decisions,
you
get
a
bigger
burn,
bad
decisions,
you
get
diluted
right,
so
that's
the
sort
of
basic
gist
of
it
and
and
then
from
the
very
old
days
there
were.
Usually
you
know
it
was
always
like
a
this.
G
I
guess
you
call
it
continuous
voting
right
like
so
you
we
always
sort
of
stake.
Our
mkr
on
a
particular
state
of
the
system
and
in
the
old
days
like
you,
could
only
change
a
couple.
Parameters
like
in
single
collateral
die
and
then,
when
we
released
multi-collateral
dye,
the
system
became
like
infinitely
more
configurable
in
a
way
completely
upgradable
by
governance.
You
know
with
a
couple
caveats
that
you
know,
but
for
the
most
part,
that's
the
case
and
so
same
same
thing.
G
So
there's
already
this
sort
of
anti-incentive
to
take
your
mkr
and
move
elsewhere
unless
you
ruin
the
security
of
the
governance
system
and
you
get
diluted
and
then,
after
a
while,
it's
just
like
it's
just
too
complicated
to
to
be
voting
on
like
executives
all
the
time
and
and
we
started
to
have
a
lot
more
configuration
changes.
And
so
we
went
to
like
kind
of
polling
as
a
way
to
signal
what
we
would
want
to
include
into
a
governance
executive.
And
so
now
you
can
kind
of
pull.
That's
not
really.
G
You
send
a
transaction
on
chain,
but
it's
sort
of
off
chain
that
the
transactions
are
quantified
into
like
the
polling
results.
When
we
do
on-chain
pulling
this
isn't
to
be
confused
with
signal
polling
in
the
forums.
So
when
you
do
on-chain
polling,
it's
it's
mostly
just
events
that
are
fired
and
then
counting
the
results
of
those
events,
and
that
allowed
us
to
come
up
with
like
a
better
sort
of
set
of
changes
and
for
people
to
park
their
mkr
and
an
executive.
G
But
but
then
the
gas
problem
became
kind
of
so
great
that
we
we
effectively
like.
Well,
maybe
there's
one
step
in
between
the
gas
problem
we
did
have.
We
were
vulnerable
to
flash
loans
for
a
little
bit,
so
we
did
do
a
governance
upgrade
that
prevented
the
ability
for
people
to
take
flash
loans
and
and
vote
executives
through
and
then
after
that,
to
reduce
the
sort
of
gas
costs
on
individuals
from
having
to
participate.
G
L
Thank
you.
That
was
great.
I
love
you
and
maker
man
that
your
comments
about
other
stakeholders,
fault
holders
die
holders
and
their
ability
to
influence
governments.
How
do
people
view
that
dynamic
today
and
what's
in
it,
what's
a
more
ideal
structure
to
incorporate
their
views?
If,
if
the
current
state
is
not
ideal,.
M
M
It's
it's
designed
for
security
and
and
a
lot
of
it
is
unchained
and
it's
therefore
very
difficult
to
tamper
with
it,
especially
as
a
relatively
new
core
unit.
What
I
actually
learned
from
that
discussion,
with
with
colby
and
also
afterwards
after
talking
with
other
people,
is
that
we
should
consider
the
the
the
voting
system
that
we
use
also
as
a
modular
right.
So
I
really
believe
that
this
this
continuous
voting
mechanism
to
protect
the
on-chain
maker
system.
M
I
think
that
makes
a
lot
of
sense
and
I
I
don't
think
we
should
mess
with
that
in
the
short
term.
But
I
also
agree
that
we
have
a
lot
of
tooling
out
there
like
snapshot,
but
also
there
are
alternatives
out
there
we're
already
looking
into
guestless
voting
mechanisms,
there's
a
lot
out
there
that
we
can
that
we
can
use
for
multiple
things
in
the
dial
we,
we
should
probably
not
use
gasless
voting
for
changing
on-chain
parameters
because
yeah,
that's
probably
very
risky,
but
yeah.
M
L
And
could
that
be
like
a
gateway
drug
toward
getting
more
involved
in
the
maker
core
protocol?
May
not
my
first
really.
You
know
I
was
most
active
before
being
a
recognized
delegate.
You
know
with
the
vaults
and
die
and
that's
a
relationship
that
I
think
more
people
understand
that
you
know
that
stable
coin
and
there
may
be
layers
of
communication
in
which
we
can
engage
the
holders
of
dye
and
then
kind
of
draw
them
in.
E
Yeah,
so
so
maybe
I'll
speak
to
this
a
little
bit.
So
this
comes
up
semi.
Frequently
right,
like
you
know,
can
we
sort
of
extend
some
governance
power
to
die
holders
or
what
holders
and
like
in
theory,
you
know
we
could
do
stuff
like
that
right,
so
snapshot
could
work
for
dynamite.
We
could
have
a
snapshot
system
set
up
versus
die,
so
each
dies
of
votes
and
you
can
vote
on
things.
E
You
know
vote
holders
if
yeah,
basically,
you
can
get
it
clearly
screwed
over
if
things
go
really
badly,
but
there's
kind
of
very
little,
like
I
guess
gradation
there.
I
guess,
like
day,
holders
kind
of
only
are
only
screwed
if,
like
everything
is
broken
and
like
holders
are
only
screwed,
if,
like
it's
broken,
whereas
for
mega
holders,
it's
kind
of
more
graduated,
so
it's
like.
If
we
do
a
bad
job,
then
we
get
like
screwed
a
little
bit
or
if
we
do
a
little
bit
of
a
good
job.
E
So,
like
any
extreme
cases,
like
I
mean
obviously
not
saying
this
would
happen
right,
but
you
know,
if
you
assume
everyone's
perfectly
selfish
right,
then
then
that's
kind
of
the
system
you
end
up
with,
which
is
kind
of
why,
like
traditionally,
it's
been
like
coldest
half
the
voting
because
they're
the
ones
I
have
to
like
balance
the
two.
I
guess
that
makes
sense.
L
It's
also
why
this
post,
you
know
really
jump
jumped
out
at
me
and
that
that'd
be
a
good
add
to
the
conversation
which
is
very
operational
on
the
protocol
as
a
system,
but
you
know
the
potential
and
the
importance
of
of
our
work
as
a
as
a
totally.
You
know
decentralized,
stable
coin,
and
you
know
it's.
L
You
know
the
conversation
around
clean
money,
I'm
just
thinking
about
ways
that
it
could
be
even
just
a
kind
of
kind
of
marketing,
but
also
important
in
terms
of
gauging
views
that
ultimately
impact
the
adoption
and
scalability
just
in
terms
of
the
awareness
and
the
attraction
for
people
of
kind
of
well.
What
make
or
dao
stands
for,
but
I
totally
agree
and
hear
what
you're
saying
it's
like
not
give
those
stakeholders
really
a
foothold
in
some
of
the
important
decisions
around
the
actual
operation
and
kind
of
structure
of
the
protocol.
G
Actually,
I
think
you
bring
a
good
point
that
would
be
relevant
to
the
last
conversation,
which
is
we
may
be
able
to
like
pull
die
holders.
Have
them
signal
in
some
way.
You
know
not
just
like
some
twitter
poll
or
forum
pulled
somewhere,
but
you
know
people
that
actually
have
skin
in
the
game
as
die
holders.
G
We
could
ask
them
questions
like
how
much
stable
coin
packing.
Are
they
willing
to
tolerate
right
like
like?
We
may
actually
be
able
to
get
like
really
good
signals
from
them
and
we're
we're
in
the
stable
coin,
backing
scenario
because
die
holders
and
integrators
effectively
told
us
they
weren't
willing
to
tolerate
like
a
soft
peg
right.
If
they
were
willing
to
tolerate
a
soft
peg,
then
we
wouldn't
need
psms.
G
We
would
just
be
floating
four
cents
above
or
four
cents
below
peg
at
any
given
time,
but
the
die
holders
and
integrators
were
specifically
like
not
using
dye
because
of
the
floating
peg,
and
so
you
know
you
may
be
able
to
like
quantify
almost
like
where
the
sentiment
is
like
at
what
threshold
do
they
do?
They
find
it
like
completely
intolerable,
or
they
would
rather
have
a
floating
peg
than
a
tight
integration,
and
that
sort
of
thing
right,
but
without
actually
affecting
any
protocol.
I
I
What's
behind
die,
they
just
care
about
diving,
a
heart
attack
to
one
well
hard,
you
know
and
to
like,
find
different
on-off
ramps
where
a
low
spread
and
low
face
in
the
middle
and,
of
course
they
they
care
about
having
like
gasless
transactions,
if
it's
possible
and
pretty
much
that's
it.
So
they
care
about
liquidity,
about
the
fees
that
are
in
the
middle
of
each
transaction
and
they
need
the
they
need,
like
the
die
to
be
a
stable
coin
and
keep
the
peg
that's
what
they
care
about.
A
A
D
Yes,
sorry
yeah.
I
just
wanted
to
comment
that
I
had
written
that
in
theory,
mkr
holders
are
incentivized
to
you,
know,
keep
both
die
holders
and
bolt
hold
us
happy,
but,
as
chris
writes
in
the
sidebar
that
there
might
be,
you
know,
emcar
holders
might
have
imperfect
information
about.
You
know
the
sentiment
of
these
actors,
which
I
completely
agree
with
and
to
nadia's
point.
You
know
I
was
working
with
her
in
the
foundation
on
integrations
and
one
thing
that
we
did
in
the
integrations
team
was
basically
you
know.
D
Integrators
are
not
following
mega
governance,
because
there's
simply
too
much
to
to
follow.
As
I'm
sure
people
on
this
call
also
think
sometimes
so
what
they
care
about
us
also
see
is
like
a
a
a
stable
per
product.
That
is
useful,
so
we
would
try
to
just
make
sure
that
there
weren't
any
like
breaking
changes
happening,
for
example,
integrators
or
major
upgrades
that
would
have
impacts.
You
know
major
impact
on
the
die
holders
where
they
would
have
to
migrate
that
die
or,
or
something
like
that.
So
that's
just
my
two
cents.
A
N
Other
complex,
so
it's
it's
hard
to
keep
track
and
learn
all
the
stuff.
It
takes
a
long
time
it's
not
going
to
well.
If
you
are
complaining
about
npr
holders,
not
having
enough
information
to
make
good
decisions,
how
are
we
going
to
get
better
if
we
get
more
people
in
who
have
even
fewer
information
and
probably
not
even
the
attention
span
or
the
willingness
to
learn
all
that
stuff?
N
I
don't
think
we
have
a
problem
on
the
on
the
side
of
non-in-care
holders
participating
if
you're,
if
you're
a
die
holder-
and
you
disagree
with
with
stuff-
that's
going
on
just
join
the
forum
and
complain
and
interact,
because
that's
the
the
only
way
you
can.
You
can
learn
about
the
stuff
anyway,
because
usually
it's
not
about
yeah.
As
a
vault
holder,
I
want
low
low
stability
fees
yeah.
Of
course
you
want
that.
But
it's
just
one
part
of
the
equation:
it's
just
one
parameter.
It's
super
complex.
N
I
think
the
the
system
that
we
have
right
now
of
of
signal
request,
which
is
basically
the
house
of
commons.
So
regardless,
if
you
hold
mkr
or
not,
and
how
much
you
hold
or
not
you
have
just
one
vote
is
actually
pretty
good.
I
think
it's
it's
a
it's
a
great
system
that
that
we
have
in
there.
In
some
cases
it's
maybe
super
slow
and
sometimes
maybe
you
don't
think
that
the
results
that
are
reasonable
are
actually
going
on
chain.
N
I
actually
suffered
from
this
during
the
surplus
buffer
discussions
we
had
in
the
last
12
months,
but
actually
I
think
it's
still
a
valid
system.
Of
course
it's
a
system
of
compromises
but
yeah,
but
I
think
that's
that's
healthy
to
do
it.
This
way,
that's
decentralized,
I
would
say.
I
don't
think
that
we
have
a
big
issue
on
that
topic.
M
So
I
I
think
there
are
a
lot
of
ways
to
redesign
or
improve
both
the
voting
tools,
but
also
the
governance
process,
to
make
sure
that
we
do
not
ask
for
too
much
attention
from
our
users,
but
also
from
our
our
delegates.
I
think
there's
a
lot.
I
think
there's
a
lot
to
gain
by
exploring
that,
and
I'm
also
happy
that
we
have
that
we're.
Having
this
discussion
because
yeah,
we
should
not
regard
our
current
system
design
as
the
way
to
go,
simply
because
it's
technically
decentralized.
O
O
Little
bit
because
I
think
we're
kind
of
working
on
two
things
here
one
is
like:
is
there
really
a
governance
problem
right?
I've
had
advocated
for
a
long
time
that
we
should
hear
from
all
stakeholders,
not
necessarily
that
all
stakeholders
should
have
levers
on
maker
to
adjust
the
system
right.
You
know,
you're
running
a
business,
you
kind
of
like
to
hear
from
the
people
that
are
using
it,
so
you
can
have
your
pulse
on
the
people
right,
the
idea
of
governance
and
the
issues
of
governance.
O
I've
been
around
the
block
on
this
for
decades
now,
with
lots
of
different
organizations.
The
real
issue
that
I
see
at
maker
I've
seen
this.
In
other
places
we
see
it
in
stocks
is
kind
of
the
centralized
ownership
right
I
mean
if
we
really
analyzed
our
maker
holder
wallets
and
what
happened
in
governance
in
the
past
and
currently
I'm
thinking,
there's
50
wallets
at
most
that
have
delegated
right
and
probably
five
of
those
hold
90
percent
of
the
major
maker
that's
been
delegated.
O
If
that,
and
so,
if
we
really
want
to
talk
about
governance,
we
need
a
governance
analysis
to
understand.
What's
going
on
in
governance,
and
then
we
need
to
think
hard
about
what
we
think
a
problem
is
and
what
we
think
the
solution
is
in
terms
of
what
we
want,
and
a
lot
of
us
are
going
to
disagree
and
discuss
right,
and
so
you
know
I
want
to
hear
from
other
stakeholders.
O
I
would
like
polling
to
not
cost
an
arm
and
a
leg
like.
I
would
really
like
to
see
that
move
somewhere
else,
because
it
doesn't
do
anything
on
chain
except
give
us
a
signal,
and
so
you
know
I
see
this
as
two
different
things
I
want
to
hear
from
stakeholders.
I
would
like
to
have
mechanisms
in
place
for
that
and
then
I
would
like
to
really
look
at
a
an
analysis
of
maker
ownership
with
respect
to
governance,
and
then
we
can
start
to
address
these
issues
and
think
about
if
there
are
problems
or
not.
G
I'm
just
going
to
give
a
little
technical
feedback
so
today
the
polling
contract.
When
we
do
on-chain
polling,
it
knows
nothing
about
mkr.
You
just
send
a
transaction
that
fires
an
event,
so
it's
as
cheap
as
possible
and
then
it's
sort
of
off
chain
stuff
that
checks
how
much
mkr
was
held.
We
could
easily
deploy
that
contract
onto
an
l2.
People
could
send
a
transaction
on
that
l2
it'd
be
wildly
inexpensive
and
we
could
quantify
as
many
tokens
as
they
were
holding.
G
N
N
You,
the
the
value
of
your
mkr,
is
not
changing.
If
you
are
taking
part
in
governance
or
not,
and
that's
the
flaw
that
we
need
to
fix.
If
we
really
want
to
drive
up
the
the
participation
rate
of
mkholders,
if
you
well,
it's
I
I
think
most
of
the
m
car
holders
just
have
this
as
an
investment
they
actually
don't.
N
They
don't
want
to
care
and
that's
okay,
but
there
should
be
a
strong
incentive
that
they
that
they
basically
put
their
their
mkr
at
work
by
delegating
someone
else-
and
this
will
also
drive
drive
in
a
lot
of
more
of
active,
delegators
or
delegates
into
the
system.
But
if
there
is
zero
incentive
for
doing
so,
it's
not
going
to
change
if,
if
we
do
snapshot
voting
or
if
we
do
a
polling
on
on
an
l2,
that's
my
bet
at
this
thing.
O
You
know
like
putting
a
bounty
on
purple
and
particularly
executive
participation,
and
that
way
it
rewards
the
people
who
participate.
It
rewards
them
in
direct
proportion
to
their
participation.
So
you
don't
have
any
of
these
issues
about
arbitrary
levels
of
whatever,
and
you
can
use
that
reward
you
know.
Could
I
had
it
at
like
the
point
two
percent
level
of
maker
inflation
and
we
could
have
a
fifty
percent
pass
through
on
delegates
and
basically
compensate
delegates
and
then
basically
the
50
pass-through
can
go
to
the
rest
of
the
people.
O
O
C
That
actually
perfectly
brings
up
the
next
prompt
between
you
and
shoopy
on.
You
know,
we
can't
meet
everyone's
needs
and
we
have
to
decide
on
on
the
best
approach
going
forward.
You
know
we
want
to
improve
incentives
or
improve
user
experience
or
something
like
gasless
voting,
but
also
we
want
to
control
the
power
that
some
some
voters
have.
Let's
just
say,
guestless
voting
would
be
bad
for
risk
parameters
and
we
also
want
realistic
steps
going
forward,
something
like
short
or
medium
term
plans
moving
the
next
six
to
12
months.
C
O
G
A
K
Let's
see
if
I've
fixed
my
microphone
issues,
can
you
all
hear
me?
Yes,
yeah.
Okay,
awesome
one
consideration
for
chris
mooney's
suggestion
from
a
technical
perspective.
Is
that
would
decrease
gas
costs
but
in
but
would
require
anyone
participating
in
those
polls
to
have
whatever
l2
gas
transaction
token
is
required,
so
they
would
have
to
be
able
to
get
that
before
they
could
participate
in
those
polls
right.
Chris.
G
Yeah,
alternatively,
we
could
we
could
count
the
snapshot
date
on
all
chains
at
once,
so
we
could
deploy
it
to
optimism,
arbitrum
and,
let's
say
on
mainnet
and
then
just
count
up.
You
know
anyone
that
sent
a
transaction
but
yeah
if
you're
you're
not
already
on
an
lt.
You
gotta
move
f
over
to
that
l2
to
make
the
transaction.
P
Hey
would
it
be
possible
to
get
data
on
other
protocols
results
for
using
snapshot,
because
I
can
tell
you
from
someone
that
enjoys
lurking
around
other
protocols,
balancer
fake
protocol
matter,
whoever
else
they
don't
get.
A
big
turnout
with
snapshot,
maybe
20
30
different
addresses
the
only
time
I
ever
see
like
a
lot
of
excitement
and
a
huge
voter
turnout
is
when
you
have
a
new
protocol
that
got
a
lot
of
people
excited.
P
Maybe
they
got
an
air
drop
and
all
of
a
sudden
there,
you
see
an
onslaught
of
voters
come
out
and
participate
on
snapshot
right
because,
obviously
it's
free
but
yeah.
I
just
wondering
if,
if
someone
has
some
kind
of
the
ability
to
post
some
data
and
see
what
these
og
protocols,
what
type
of
turnout
they're
getting
with
snapshot,
because
I'm
willing
to
bet
that
it's
not
big
and
if
maker
goes
into
a
snapshot
model
you're
going
to
get
maybe
a
few
more
turnout.
A
Mark
drop
the
link
to
snapchat.org
so
pretty
easy
to
browse
through
there.
It
would
be
nice
to
get
some
comprehensive
data.
We've
looked
into
some
stuff
in
an
upcoming
research
report
of
alpha,
but
it
wasn't
specifically
related
to
delegating.
So
I
don't
believe
those
metrics
are
going
to
be
included.
E
Yeah
yeah,
I
mean,
I
think,
investigating
some
sort
of
cheap
lady.
The
gases
are
ultimating,
makes
sense
right.
It's
it's
yeah,
it's
kind
of
just
more
or
less
an
obvious
progression
from
what
we
have.
I
think,
but
like
they
as
well,
people
said
I
don't
expect
it
to
drastically
change
the
amount
of
participation
we're
getting.
I
think
it's
still
worth
doing
right
because
it
makes
it
cheaper
for
those
people
who
are
participating,
which
is
a
benefit
of
itself
but
yeah.
I
don't
think
it's
gonna,
fundamentally
change
the
game.
A
G
G
There's
a
forum
post
about
it
and
people
can
add
comments
there
if
they
have
more
ideas,
although
that
that
that
current
development
path,
I
think,
is
on
the
back
burner,
at
least
from
particle
engineering's
perspective.
So,
but
still,
if
you
have
ideas,
it's
a
good
idea
to
quantify
them,
because
at
some
point
you
know
this
is
going
to
come
to
the
forefront,
we're
going
to
want
to
redesign
everything.
J
I
should
mention
that
the
the
current
delegation
contracts
have
a
one-year
expiration
on
there
as
well.
So
I'm
not,
I
don't
remember
when
we
started
that,
but
those
those
will
all
come
to
an
end
at
some
point
and
delegates
will
have
to
reinitialize
a
delegation
contract.
It
might
be
worthwhile
to
consider
changes
around
that
time.
Otherwise
we're
we're
going
to
roll
into
another
year
of
the
same
system.
A
Make
sense,
and
for
anyone
wondering
like
the
reason
behind
the
expiration
okay,
if
something
were
to
happen
to
a
delegate
right,
especially
one
that
just
is
using
the
you
know
a
personal
addresser,
or
what
have
you
to
to
make
their
votes
from.
Obviously
that
mkr
would
be
stuck
in.
Anyone
who
didn't
realize
it
or
isn't
paying
attention
would
just
have
their
mkr
delegated
to
someone
who's
not
doing
anything.
G
Yeah,
the
other
one
that
was
more
powerful
for
me
was
was
in
the
opposite
direction,
so
so,
like
let's
say,
like
micro
whale
right
like
you've
got
a
couple
hundred
mkr
or
a
thousand
m
care.
So
you
delegate
that
and
then
I
don't
know
like,
like
you
get
hit
by
a
bus
right
and
without
the
expiration,
then
the
person
you
delegated
to
effectively
has
control
of
your
voting
power
off
into
eternity.
J
E
D
E
H
All
right,
I
still
think
we're
kind
of
over
complicating
it.
I
just
clicked
through,
like
10
different
dows,
and
they
all
have
tremendous
voter
participation
on
snapshot.
I
don't
really
see
any
that
have
less
than
us
to
be
honest,
and
these
are
even
smaller
projects
than
us.
So
I
don't
know
I'm
sure,
there's
some
data
that
can
be
pulled
somewhere.
Maybe
snapshots
themselves
have
a
report.
They
could
share
with
us
to
do
some
analysis
on,
but
from
what
I
see,
participation
is
significantly
higher
than
ours
from
a
individual's
wallet
standpoint.
E
Yeah,
I
agree.
We
are
complicating
right
now
and,
as
I
said
before,
I
still
think
it's
a
good
idea
to
pursue,
but
I
will
make
the
point
that,
like
there's
like
no
civil
protection
at
all
for
like
snapchat
votes,
it's
like
completely
free
to
vote,
like
I'm
sure
in
some
cases
like
well.
This
way
it's
legitimate,
but
I'm
also
sure
there's
some
places
where
they're,
not.
K
This,
your
last
call
so
peyton,
one
quick
thing
that
may
be
helpful
long
for
wisdom
suggested
and
to
me
in
discord
that
we
on
protocol
engineering
write
up
a
description
of
this,
but
it
might
be
helpful
to
talk
through
it
in
this
week's
executive.
We're
going
to
have
the
optimism
recovery
of
the
10
million
die
that
got
burned
and
since
that's
a
fairly
unique
up
to
this
point
at
least
governance
action,
and
we
have
several
people
that
will
be
voting
on
that
on
here
and
recordings.
Hopefully,
others
are
watching.
K
K
Awesome,
okay,
great
so
this
week
we
are
dealing
with
the
two
million
die
that
was
burned
by
the
user
lost
some
dye.
There
was
a
forum
post
about
it
and
the
poll
passed.
Basically,
what
happened?
Is
this
user
called
the
burn
function
on
the
optimism
die
contract
and
that
destroyed
10
million
die
on
optimism
in
the
executive?
This
week
we
are
going
to
be
approving
the
transfer
of
that
from
the
mainnet
layer,
one
escrow
contract
to
the
user
on
mainnet
we're
able
yeah.
So
thank
you
kurt.
K
That's
a
really
important
thing
that
this
user
destroyed
the
die
on
optimism,
which
means
that
our
optimism
die.
Total
supply
is
less
than
significantly
less
than
10
million
less
than
the
main
net
balance
of
the
escrow
contract.
This
opens
us
up
to
just
transfer
the
10
million
die
on
mainnet
to
the
user's
address
on
mainnet,
while
keeping
our
balance
rules
and
variants
in
place,
which
is
that
the
mainnet
escrow
balance
should
be
greater
than
or
equal
to,
the
total
die
supply
on
optimism.
K
So
it's
fairly
simple
governance
action,
we're
making
a
erc20
approval
on
main
net
die
and
then
we're
executing
a
transfer
from
from
the
past
proxy
to
move.
10
million
die
from
the
escrow
to
the
user's
account
on
mainnet,
we're
not
touching
anything
on
optimism.
We're
not
passing
any
governance
actions
from
l1
to
l2
I'll
stop
there,
because
I
feel,
like
I'm,
probably
going
to
start
rambling
into
technical
details
and
see
if
there's
any
questions
or
discussions.
People
have
points
of
clarification.
K
A
See
making
man
commenting
and
kind
of
questioning
about
the
need
for
like
a
tester,
some
sort
of
verification
for
the
user
if
you're,
following
the
form
we
did
have
the
wallet
address,
sign
a
specific
message,
saying:
okay,
yes,
this
is
me,
I'm
the
one
who
lost
the
die.
It
might
be
interesting,
just
a
brief
technical
like.
Why
is
that
enough?
For
us.
I
D
Yeah,
but
so
this
this
might
be
too
technical,
but
I
was
wondering
like
why:
why
can
you
call
the
burn
function
like?
Why
isn't
it
off?
It
seems
like
we
would
yeah
people
could
take
die
out
of
circulation.
That
would
have
some
repercussions
yeah.
I
was
just
interested
from
an
engineering
point
of
view.
A
G
Know
maybe
there's
a
good
argument
that
it
should
have
been
off
from
a
die
token,
but
I
mean
we.
We
heavily
rely
on
burning
in
the
dye
joint
adapter.
In
theory,
you
could
just
give
the
dye
joint
adapter
a
privilege
to
burn,
but
I
think
there's
also
approval
burdening
right
and
we
have
the
like.
You
can
approve
a
certain
amount
and
then
someone
else
can
burn
if
you've
reproved
them
to
is
that
true.
G
D
G
Yeah,
I
I
actually
I
none
of
us
asked
as
far
as
I
know,
you
know
I
like
imagining
how
they
did
it
more
than
the
reality.
Maybe
but
but
yeah.
The
reality
is
probably
something
like
they
were
testing
some
amount
of
code
and,
like
didn't
realize
they
were
connected
up
to
our
pc
endpoint
and
like
executed
the
burn
or
something
but
that'd,
be
my
guess,
but
yeah
hey.
I
I
do
want
to
discuss.
K
Chris
sorry,
real
quick
before
we
move
on,
I
want
to
make
sure
that
I'm
addressing
the
comments
in
the
chat
here
about
documenting
the
process
or
you
all
asking
about
having
a
formal
process
for
this,
that
we
can
apply
now
and
in
the
future.
Or
are
you
asking
about
a
write-up
for
what
the
specific
action
is
going
to
be.
O
I'll
speak
a
bit
for
delegates
here,
there's
a
number
of
us
that
we
would
just
like
to
see
a
global
process
for
a
criterion
of
when
we're
going
to
do
it,
whether
there's
a
fee
or
not,
and
the
process
involved
for
how
to
do
it,
and
so
we
don't
want
to
have
to
deal
with
this
in
a
one-off
event
model.
It
just
doesn't
feel
right.
O
G
Yeah
that
that's
actually
literally,
the
comment
I
was
gonna
make
is
the
the
hazard
that
we
create,
especially
at
different
thresholds.
So
it
just
makes
sense
for
us
to
probably
have
a
policy
in
my
mind.
I
was
thinking
you
know,
for
these
really
large
amounts.
We
are
moderately
incentivized
to
try
and
take
any
deflationary
pressure
off
the
pig
right
so
like
earning
10
million
these
days.
Isn't
that
big
of
a
deal?
G
I
don't
know
dead
right
and
then
and
then
you
can
mint
die
against
dead
and
the
merkel
distributor.
Basically,
like
does
all
this
under
the
hood
and
mince
you
a
bunch
of
new
die
and
then
the
end
contract
basically
cleans
the
accounting
up
at
emergency
shutdown,
so
that
we
don't
account
for
dead
as
a
real
collateral
type.
So
so
I
think
that
we
can
handle
smaller
cases
on
like
one
giant
aggregate
once
a
year
and
then
like
larger
cases.
G
J
It
I
want
to
say
that
this
also
is
a
special
case,
because
it's
l2,
and
because
we're
able
to
do
this
without
with
kind
of
this
slighter
hand
that
doesn't
mess
with
the
the
accounting
the
burn
function
on
l1
die
is
also
unoffed.
So
this
could
theoretically
happen
on
layer
one
and
we
wouldn't
have
the
same
ability
to
you
know
just
pull
this
out
of
a
distributor
contract
where
the
the
escrow
contract
so
there's
the
question
of
what
we
would
do.
J
If
this
had
happened
on
on
l1,
where
10
10
million
die
was
just
burned,
the
mint
function
is
off
and
the
only
contract
that
has
the
ability
to
mint
new
dye
is
the
join
adapter
for
dye.
So
we
do
have
to
create
creative
solutions
like
chris
was
talking
about
there.
If
we
want
to
perform
a
similar
action
on
l1.
G
Yeah,
I
would
say,
maker
holders
should
probably
like
signal
on
chain
what
they're
willing
to
accept
as
a
policy
for
this
and
then
yeah
from
like
a
legal
perspective
or
whatever.
Then
I
think
it
just
comes
down
to
whether
or
not
a
particular
jurisdiction
can
coerce,
send
care
holders
into
performing
an
action.
J
I
mean
we,
we
can
pat
ourselves
on
the
back,
but
the
the
guy
that
came
in
here
a
couple
months
ago
and
lost
a
few
eth
on
l2.
It
was
a.
It
was
a
much
smaller
amount
than
this,
but
it
meant
a
lot
to
them.
So,
like
you,
as
things
stand
right
now,
we're
really
just
taking
the
stuff
on
a
case-by-case
basis
and
that's
probably
not
the
right
way
to
go.
L
Has
that
idea
the
public
relations
of
like
the
small,
the
little
guy
sort
of
like
sorry,
I
can't
help
you
and
then
the
big
whales
like.
Oh,
we
can
help
you
even
if
there's
a
technical
difference.
I
think
that's
important
to
keep
in
mind.
Hence
the
policy
and
I'm
not
sure
what
the
next
steps
are.
If
there's
already
a,
I
think
there's
already
some
discussion
about
that
policy
and
how
we
can
move
that
forward.
L
O
An
interesting
question
is
anyone
actually
working
on
a
policy?
I
think
we
need
one
right
so
that
we
can
it's
going
to
be
one
that
has
this
fitting
in
and
then
we
have
to
exclude
some
yeah.
I
mean
we
have
to
really
come
up
with
a
policy
here.
I
think,
because
of
just
pr
reasons
and
just
optics
right
and
so
as
well
as
just
technically.
G
N
G
A
D
For
me,
the
complex
thing
is
like
where
you
to
draw
the
line
when
dye
is
burnt.
That's
pretty
nice
because
it's
easy
from
a
technical
point
of
view
to
say:
okay,
we're
not
worried
about
it.
You
know
appearing
somewhere
else,
but
and
then
there's
die
in
the
die
contract.
That's
another
case,
but
then
what
about
people
who
lose
their
die
by
sending
it
to
some
other
wrong
address
or
locking
it
up
in
some
contract?
So
yeah?