►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 45
Description
In this call we will be joined by a special guest in the form of Alex Evans from Placeholder who will discuss a recent paper he’s released to the community.
Governance Segment
Richard Brown: Governance is about to ramp up...
David Utrobin: “What’s happening in the forums?”
Risk Segment
- Monetary Policy: Vishesh Choudry: State of the Peg
- Weekly Narrative: Matthew V Rabinowitz
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Thread: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/scientific-governance-and-risk-thursday-july-25-9am-pst-4-00-pm-utc/176
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Summaries: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/summaries
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours): https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-meetings/transcripts
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundation-proposal-v2-f10d8ee5fe8c
Governance and Risk Framework: https://community-development.makerdao.com/governance/governance-and-risk-framework/part-one
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Hello,
everyone
welcome
to
the
July
25th
edition
of
the
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting
with
maker.
Now
my
name
is
Richard
Brown
I'm,
the
head
of
community
development
side
maker
down
in
these
calls.
We
talk
about
risk.
We
talk
about
risk
parameters
as
well.
We
talked
about
new
collateral
types
of
might
be
coming
in
and
out
of
the
system.
We
talked
about
governance
issues
over
time,
the
the
weight
of
which
issues
we
focus
on
shifts
back
and
forth
depending
on.
What's
what's
cooking
it
maker
down?
What's
cooking
in
the
community?
A
That's
that's.
That's
my
way
to
pointing
out
that
we're
not
always
going
to
be
talking
about
risk,
the
way
that
we
have
in
the
past
and
and
in
the
next
couple
weeks
we're
going
to
be
shifting
gears
slightly
to
everybody's
favorite
topic,
which
is
governance.
There's
lots
of
things
we
need
to
figure
out
in
the
governance
world
may
come
as
no
surprise
to
this
group
of
governance
is
not
a
solved
problem.
Maker
Dow,
again
is
sort
of
on
the
leading
edge
of
a
lot
of
issues
in
the
crypto
space.
A
One
of
them
is
how
do
we
organize
lots
of
people
around
the
world
and
how
do
we
organize
them
when
the
stakes
are
high?
I
guess
it
is
an
interesting
way
of
putting
it
the.
What
we
do
here
is
kind
of
important,
and
so
we
need
to
take
governance
seriously
with
those
mechanisms.
Look
like
what
the
processes
look
like
with
the
debase
look
like
how
signals
get
surfaced,
how
they
get
ratified.
These
are
all
important
questions
and
we
need
to
figure
out
then
we're
going
to
start
doing
that
in
earnest.
A
The
reason
why
we're
going
to
start
doing
that
in
earnest
is
because
multi
collateral
thigh
is
a
real
thing,
and
it's
coming
I
touched
on
this
briefly
in
our
last
call,
but
when
multi-cloud
or
thigh
launches
is
a
dependent
on
two
different
factors
basically
includes
the
two
different
buckets
one.
Em
is
the
mechanics,
the
code.
The
audits
are
partners.
All
these
things
need
to
align.
So
it's
what's
pieces
of
puzzle
we
can
put
in
place
and
in
the
foundation,
but
there's
the
other
Spock
I
saw
this
coin
or
whatever.
A
Now
that
G,
you
want
to
mix
together
the
and
that's
governance
in
the
community
when
and
she
launches
is
largely
dependent
on
what
happens
in
the
forum.
What
happens
in
these
calls?
What
happens
in
various
discussions
and
what
ultimately
happens
in
the
voting
portal?
There's
a
lot
of
work
that
we
all
need
to
do
together
in
order
to
make
that
happen.
Lots
of
risk
analysts,
lots
of
governance
fans.
A
If
that's
even
a
thing,
I
guess
it
is
a
thing
we
can
find
them
all
over
our
forums,
so
we
need
to
align
and
we
need
to
get
to
work
and
we
need
to
establish
processes
and
policies
and
principles,
and
we
need
to
optimize
this
process
as
much
as
we
possibly
can
in
such
a
way
that
we
maintain
agility.
But
we
also
gain
some
more
velocity
and
that's
a
lot
of
buzzwords
and
it's
a
lot
of
theoretical.
A
It's
not
gonna
happen
today,
though,
so
I'm
gonna
jump
into
my
preamble
and
then
we're
going
to
hand
it
off
to
David.
You
trogon
the
head:
who
now
has
a
guest
lot
cause
he's
going
to
give
us
a
recap
of
what's
happening
in
the
forums,
and
this
is
a
great
idea,
I'm,
not
sure
whose
idea
was
probably
mine
and
maybe
even
okay.
It
wasn't
those
David's
right,
so
it
was
a
great
idea.
A
So
the
reason
why
this
is
important
is
because
this
is
a
theme
that
we've
been
talking
about
for
months
and
months
and
months,
but
governance
decision-making
does
not
happen
in
these
calls.
If
it's
the
venue
as
far
to
temporary
the
audience
is
parks
you
small,
the
language
is
English.
The
timezone
is
North
America
and
there's
all
kinds
of
reasons
why
this
is
not
the
committee
where
decisions
get
made
where
that
decisions
get
made.
I'm
hoping
will
be
the
forum
itself.
That's
that's
where
the
debate
can
happen.
A
A
Then
we
need
to
create
a
bridge
between
one
of
those
forum,
discussions
and
the
sessions
we
have
here
and
so
David
is
going
to
do
a
recap
of
what
we're
like
what
we
shouldn't
be
calling,
but
we
are
government's
at-a-glance,
which
was
an
amazing
idea
that
we
totally
did
not
steal
from
along
for
wisdom
in
the
forms,
more
panache.
That's
right,
I.
B
A
Little
cartoony
suggestion
Mike
there
you
go
so
here's
the
preamble.
We
are
extremely
interested
in
getting
as
much
feedback
from
this
group
as
we
possibly
can.
So
please,
if
you
have
any
kind
of
question
at
all
type
it
into
the
chat
window,
if
you
have
access
to
a
microphone,
feel
free
to
interrupt
and
just
jump
into
the
conversation
whenever
you
like
we're
going
to
speaking
of
forums,
we're
going
to
continue
these
discussions
in
the
forum,
that's
where
the
long
tail
of
discussion
happens,
I
will
post
a
link.
Excuse
me
into
the
chat
right
now.
A
If
you
have
a
question
that
you
think
requires
a
deep
dive
or
it
doesn't
need
to
be
addressed
in
this
call
or
you
just
want
to
take
notes
or
whatever
you
like
post
it
into
that
forum
thread
and
then
we'll
continue
things
for
the
rest
of
the
week.
All
right
that
is
me
I,
think
so.
I
will
hand
it
off
to
unity
all.
B
Right
cool
thanks,
so
I'm
gonna
post
in
the
chat,
really
quick.
The
governance
at
a
glance
thread
that
long
for
wisdom
is
putting
together.
So
this
is
a
thread:
that's
actually
constantly
updated.
So
you
could
look
at
this
link
and
you'll
see
even
new
conversations
that
are
relevant
and
interesting.
So
it's
a
good
place
to
just
kind
of
see.
What's
going
on
so
the
three
different
sections:
well,
there's!
B
Actually,
four
sections
in
the
thread:
they're
seeking
consensus,
help-wanted,
ongoing
initiatives
and
on
the
horizon,
so
I'm
gonna
skip
over
the
help-wanted,
because
it's
it's
kind
of
peripheral,
but
just
starting
with
the
seeking
consensus
type
threads.
There
have
been
a
number
of
them.
So
the
meta
is
that
the
community
is
wanting
to
use
the
forum's
to
do
some
soft
consensus
before
we
actually
launch
into
having
a
robust
enough
governance
polling
system
to
do
multiple
polls
at
the
same
time.
So
at
the
moment
about
a
month
ago,
the
first
signal
requests
thread
was
launched
and
yeah.
B
It
just
outlines
that
and
I
think
most
people
are
not
that
I
think,
but
in
the
thread
it
was
a
majority
vote
that
this
was
a
good
kind
of
conceptual
idea,
just
establish
consensus
through
forum
polls,
but
again
there's
concerns
around
that.
There's
concerns
about
people
that
don't
hold
maker
coming
in
and
affecting
these
consensus.
There's
no,
you
know,
there's
no
real
verification
that
you're
a
maker
holder
if
you're
voting
in
these.
So
it's
not
a
perfect
solution,
but
hopefully
a
better
solution
will
be
coming
with
the
1.5
governance
portal
soon.
B
The
next
thread
is
the:
should
we
modify
the
stability
fee,
voting
cadence
and
stepping
actually
hold
on
give
me
one
second,
actually
rich.
If,
if
anybody
in
the
chat,
can
you
just
stop
me
if,
if
their
question
is
relevant
to
the
thread
that
I'm
talking
about
I,
don't
want
to
like
pause
and
read
through.
A
We
have
this
chicken
and
egg
issue
that
the
community
has
been
wrestling
with
for
months,
and
that
question
is:
how
do
we
aggregate
signals
for
this
to
enter
into
the
signaling
mechanism?
So
how
do
things
get
into
the
pole
and
the
forum?
We
have
some
emergent
processes
happening
here
and
one
of
those
emerging
processes
I
anxiously
encourage
people
to
look
at
this
forum
thread.
The
question
is,
how
do
we
determine
that
signal
or
a
consensus
has
been
reached
in
the
forum's
and
one
of
the
things
we
talked
about
in
there
is
the.
A
A
That
so
interesting
to
mark
when
I
say
I'm
not
going
to
derail
the
whole
thing.
The
reason
why
I
find
that
things
so
interesting
that
the
threads
so
interesting
is
because
it's
it
helps
us
as
a
group
understand
the
difference
between
community
and
governance.
I
think
that
governance,
people
who
own
maker
kokum
voters
who
participate
in
the
polling
system
have
a
bunch
of
alignments.
They
need
to
think
about
enough
a
bunch
of
incentives,
but
there's
also
sort
of
their
responsibility.
C
A
Some
ways
to
act
as
representatives
for
the
wider
community
as
well
or
at
least
internalize
some
of
the
arguments
that
come
from
non
maker
token
holders,
and
so
that's
where
there's
this
Venn
diagram,
where
there's
this
overlap
of
community
and
governments
and
I
think
that's.
It
was
personally
polling
in
the
forums,
should
be
open
to
absolutely
anybody,
and
that
can
inform
wider
sentiment
that
the
maker
token
holders
can
sort
of
internalize
when
they
come
into
the
voting
for
something.
B
B
I
mean
polling
is
really
really
important,
just
as
data
points
and
just
things
that
guide
our
decisions,
because
you
know
we're
trying
to
do
this
in
a
decentralized
fashion,
and
you
know
it's
it's
kind
of
hard
to
do
things
in
a
decentralized
fashion.
You
you
need
somebody
to
make
the
decision
and
what
are
you
basing
that
decision
off
of?
Basically
alright?
So
for
the
rest
of
the
the
review
of
this
of
this
governance
at
a
glance,
I'm
gonna
just
give
kind
of
like
two
sentences
on
each
thread.
B
So
we
don't
spend
too
much
time
on
this
and
then
afterwards
we
can.
We
can
answer
questions
from
the
chat
or
anything
like
that.
So
the
other
seeking
consensus
thread
is
the
should
we
modified
the
stability
fee,
voting,
cadence
and
stepping.
So
as
a
recent,
the
discussion
has
leaned
towards
making
it
a
biweekly
cadence
for
stability
fee
adjustments,
and
we
saw
that
there
was
a
79%
to
21%
split
for
a
bi-weekly
cadence
and
so
there's
like
and
that's
based
on,
16
votes.
B
So
it's
it's
kind
of
hard
to
say
if
there's
real
consensus,
which
is
still
just
some
some
issue
to
keep
in
mind
in
regards
to
the
polling,
but
it
seems
that
people
are
actually
for
a
bi-weekly,
cadence
and
also
vishesh
makes
a
really
great
point
for
it
in
that.
If
we
have
a
very
fast
reaction,
every
time
something
is
going
on
with
the
peg,
it
doesn't
actually
give
time
for
our
previous
adjustments
to
have
an
effect.
B
The
next
signal
requests
seeking
consensus
thread
is
regarding
it's
called:
define
standard
stability,
fee
changes
based
on
recent
price
of
dye,
so
user
late,
taught
kind
of
put
out
a
signal
request,
seeing
if
people
would
be
willing
to
standardize
what
the
poll
should,
or
rather
what
the
executive
vote
should
should
be
based
on
something
like
a
three-day
volume,
weighted
average
price
for
dye,
and
so
there
was
a
lot
of
back-and-forth
in
that
thread,
it
was
was
pretty
interesting.
The
open
questions
that
exists
that
actually
make
it
really
hard
to
do.
B
This
is
the
fact
that
you
know
how
do
you?
How
do
you
decide
on
these
parameters
like?
What's
the
lag
time
for
the
effect
to
kick
in?
Is
it
a
one-day
view?
Opposite
a
three-day
view?
Rock
was
a
seven-day,
and
so
there
was
a
there
was
not
a
lot
of
strong
consensus
around
that
signal
request
and
then
the
last
signal
request
I
want
to
talk
about
is
the
thread.
B
Should
we
move
to
exponential
rates
that
being
for
stability,
poles,
so
the
way
stability
poles
are
right
now
it
goes
in
one
percent
increments
up
and
down
nine
different
options.
The
middle
option
is
to
keep
it
there's
four
up
and
four
down,
and
so
the
exponential
rate
stepping
is
just
you
know:
you
walk
to
it.
It's
like
two
percent,
four
percent,
eight
percent,
so
it
makes
it
gives
more
flexibility
to
governance
to
make
like
more
radical
changes
if
they
needed
to,
and
there
was
16
votes
in
in
that
poll.
B
Seventy
five
percent
over
twenty
five
percent
for
two
against
so
mostly
people
are
for
it,
but
again,
I
actually
didn't
see
any
serious
negative
comments
against
the
suggestion,
except
for
maybe
remove
the
eight
percent
because
eight
percent
is
like.
So
it's
a
really
big
move
and
also
because,
if
you
have
eight
percent,
that's
actually
I
think
two,
four
six,
eight
yeah,
it's
still
nine
options.
So
if
you
remove
the
eight
percent,
so
you
actually
have
less
options
on
the
poll
overall
than
we
currently
have.
Since
that
of
nine
options.
B
I
think
it'll
be
seven
options
and
that
might
make
it
actually
better
for
a
user
experience,
but
again
that
actually
takes
away
your
options
from
what
we
have
now,
because
we
have
the
one
percent
increments.
So
interesting
thread
alright
and
that's
it
for
the
signals
for
the
different
types
of
signals
that
are
being
seeked
on
the
form.
B
So
it's
really
great
to
see
a
community
actively
like
being
excited
about
doing
this
kind
of
work,
but
regardless
were
kind
of
on
pause
for
this
waiting
on
the
internal
risk
scene
and
then
there's
another
thread
in
ongoing
initiatives
called
systemic
risk
directory
also
made
by
user
long
for
wisdom.
It
basically
puts
a
1
to
10
weighted
pull
yeah
I'm
gonna
mute
you
or
actually
rich.
Can
you
manager,
yeah,
you're,
gonna,
alright,
so
yeah,
so
the
systemic
risk
directory
basically
puts
a
sentence
to
each
kind
of
unique
risk
and
pulls.
B
You
know
our
governance
community
about
how
how
concerned
they
are
with
the
risk
one
being
not
concerned
at
all
and
is
basically
the
maximum
concern.
They
think
an
emergency
shutdown
could
happen
because
of
this
risk
or
something
right,
and
so
on
average.
You
know:
there's
three
different
risks
there
currently
so
I'm
not
going
to
go
through
them
right
now,
but
I
encourage
you
to
check
it
out,
and
each
of
the
risks
is
also
linked
to
a
discussion
thread.
B
So
it's
not
just
the
poll
and
a
sentence
for
the
risk
type,
but
there's
also
a
place
to
talk
about
it.
The
last
thread
in
ongoing
initiatives
is
estimating
to
die
USD
price
from
the
eath
to
die
order
book
instead
of
Dex
trades,
so
in
here
I
think
it
was
Lix
right.
Just
double
check
that
yeah.
So
Sollux
did
a
lot
of
work
around
calculating
the
die
price
and
he
made
a
point
that
calculating
it
from
trades
actually
introduces
a
lot
of
noise
because
of
the
nature
of
how
trades
are
made.
B
The
fact
that
you
know
removing
a
limit
order
from
like
eath
to
die
takes
multiple
blocks
and
that
there's
a
lot
of
noise
and
signal
basically
from
watching
die
price
through
Dex
trades,
and
so
he
did
a
similar
die
price
analysis,
but
instead
of
using
Dex
trades,
he
used
the
order
book
activity
and
it's
actually
really
interesting
here.
There's
a
couple
of
graphs
in
the
thread
that
that
you
know
overlays
the
signals
and
and
shows
actually
the
reduction
in
noise
and
and
also
just
it's,
it's
a
really
really
great
suggestion.
B
B
So
these
are
threads
that
are
further
looking,
so
they're,
not
immediate
concerns,
but
they're
they're
conversations
and
problems
that
needs
to
be
sorted
through
and
the
main
problem
right
now,
that's
being
sorted
through
is
how
we
create
policy
around
stability,
fee
changes
and
DSR
changes
with
the
coming
of
multilateral
died,
because
right
now
in
single
collateral
died,
the
stability
feat
is
used
as
a
policy
tool.
It's
a
monetary
policy
tool.
B
It
doesn't,
you
know,
nobody
in
governance,
really
thinks
of
the
stability
fee
right
now
in
terms
of
the
risk
premium
of
the
underlying
asset,
but
come
multi
collateral
die
and
the
DSR
with
it.
We're
actually
gonna
have
a
kind
of
an
intersection
between
monetary
policy
and
risk
management
of
all
these
underlying
collaterals
and
CDP
types
and
CDP
packages,
and
so
it's
it's
not
obvious.
What
the
best
way
to
do,
the
math
there
is
and
the
decision-making
but
yeah.
So
the
first
threat
is
called
navigating
the
waters
between
now
single
collateral
dive.
B
The
multi
collateral
die
with
the
DSR
so
specifically
to
this
thread.
Matthew
Rabinowitz
talks
about
what
the
best
step-by-step
process
for
launching
multi
collateral
die
would
be
without
disrupting
the
die
price,
because,
if
multi
collateral
die
launches
with
like
with
some
ability
for
for
CDP
would
be
CDP
users
to
mint
a
lot
of
excess
die.
B
We
want
to
be
able
to
control
the
supply
so
that
it
kind
of
increases
gradually
if
it
does
or
we
don't,
we
want
to
do
it
in
a
way
that
kind
of
maintains
the
homeostasis
of
like
the
system
as
it
is,
and
then
slowly
transition
out,
and
he
outlined
a
couple
of
really
great
about
a
couple.
I
think
it
was
four
or
five
great
steps
for
actually
managing
this
kind
of
transition,
and
then
the
second
thread
is
is
anything
wrong
with
DSR
and
stability
fee
calculations
as
planned
for
Mt.
B
That's
where
the
discussion
that
I
just
referenced
earlier
is
actually
outlined.
Pretty
fantastically
so
long
for
wisdom
defines
all
the
turns
and
actually
boils
down
the
problem
to
like
this
one
sentence
which
I'm
going
to
read
right
now.
So,
under
the
current
currently
proposed
system
and
policy,
there
is
no
adequate
tool
that
could
be
used
to
curtail
a
high
demand
for
a
single
collateral
package
without
negatively
affecting
other
collateral
packages,
especially
those
with
lower
risk
premium
and
so
yeah.
B
And
that's
that's
basically
the
summary
of
what's
been
going
on
in
the
forum
and
that's
not
referencing
yeah,
so
so
Kiva
actually
makes
a
good
point.
So
the
thread
that
I
just
talked
about
the
DSR
like
on
the
horizon
threads,
they
are
gonna,
have
a
lot
of
back-and-forth
because
it's
not
obvious
what
we're
gonna
do
and
coming
to
the
solution
of.
What's
best
is
gonna.
Take
some
back-and-forth
in
our
community
and
some
some
constructive
thinking
on
top
of
constructive
criticism
and
that's
just
the
path
we
have
to
take
to
come
to
a
real
solution.
That's.
A
A
One
of
the
main
takeaways
here
is
surfacing
the
fact
that
there's
a
lot
of
interesting
things
happening
in
this
forum,
so
serious
business
is
going
on
deep
discussions
are
going
on.
Future
direction
is
being
established.
So
if
you
have
an
interest
in
governance,
you
have
an
interest
in
risk.
Please
participate
because
there's
it's
the
way
that
the
basic
room
and
the
forum
are
better
than
I
could
possibly
have
hoped,
and
it's
working
out
precisely
the
way
that
I'd
hoped
it
was
so
I'm.
A
Sorry,
I
got
distracted
a
second,
so
I
had
lots
of
really
interesting
things,
and,
and
the
discussions
that
are
happening
in
the
forum
now
will
be
surfaced
and
in
these
calls
soon
and
will
eventually
be
changing
the
course
of
the
Dow
so
I
get
in
early
and
have
your
say
because
there's
a
lot
of
interesting
things
happen
with
that.
I
think
we're
going
to
turn
over
to
you,
vishesh
for
the
state
of
the
peg.
C
Okay,
so
if
everyone
can
see
everything
well
just
to
kick
it
off
stated,
the
peg
seems
all
right
at
the
moment
is
the
synthesis
so
trading
volume
you
know
for
the
last
24
hours
was
about.
3.8
million
died
Freeth
earlier
it
was
a
little
bit
higher
a
little
bit
over
4
million,
so
I
think
the
the
trading
volumes
are
like,
but
not
you
know
so
small,
but
we
should
be
concerned.
The
price
is
not
actually
around
$1
but
yeah.
C
It's
trading,
like
you,
know,
very,
very
slightly
over
$1
and
in
the
previous
24
hours
it
was
trading
very
slightly
below
$1,
so
it
appears
to
to
be
hovering
right
around
the
peg,
and
so
we
just
touched
on
that.
Yes,
so
you
can
see
over
time
previously
we
were
hovering.
You
know,
between
98
99
had
a
little
bit
of
a
rough
period
at
the
beginning
of
July,
dipping
down
to
97
some
a
couple
of
times
and
then
basically
slowly
but
surely
after
this
18.5%
increase.
C
So
you
can
see
some
of
the
driver
of
that
as
well
right
and-
and
this
is
something
that
I
say
at
this
point
pretty
much
every
week,
but
stability
fee
doesn't
determine
that
dye
price
right.
If
it
did,
then
it
would
have
immediately
gone
up
to
a
dollar
at
twenty
point,
five
or
even
previously,
at
nineteen
point
five
or
just
added
a
dollar,
so
clearly
there's
more
going
on
than
just
the
stability
fee,
and
so
that's
another
thing
that
I
wanted
to
kind
of.
Here's.
C
We've
now
entered
a
little
bit
of
periodicity
with
what's
been
going
on
with
dye,
so
you
can
see
here
at
the
16.5
19
17
16,
17,
18
20
levels,
so
civilian
fees,
increasing
dye
price
is
still
low.
Dye
price
comes
up
and
then
comes
down
a
bit.
Stability
fee
is
lower.
Dye
price
stays
relatively
steady
for
a
while
and
then
suddenly
dips
stability
fees,
increased
dye,
price
stays
relatively
steady,
civility
fees,
further
increased
and
dye
price
holds
for
a
moment
and
then
continues
to
rise.
C
So
essentially,
if
you
were
to
draw
a
simple
correlation
which
I'm
happy
to
show
up,
somebody
wants
to
see
it
between
the
stability
feeding
the
dye
price.
It's
it's
not
a
very
strong
relationship,
but
if
you
start
to
use
it
as
kind
of
a
multivariate
calculus,
what's
going
on
with
eath
price,
it
does
start
to
make
a
little
bit
more
sense.
So
you
know
at
this
20.5%
stability
fee.
Another
thing
was
going
on
right
at
the
same
time,
which
was
this
eath
price
was
coming
down
pretty
significantly
and
pretty
suddenly.
C
So
during
the
decrease
and
I
think
this
is
something
that
we
tend
to
see
over
time
with
eath
during
the
decrease
there's,
not
necessarily
a
recovery
and
dive,
but
post
this
decrease.
If
the
eath
price
is
just
holding
steady,
then
if
multiple
people
are
not
levering
back
up
on
eighth
because
they
were
already
levered
up,
so
the
eath
price
had
had
risen
in
the
june
time
period.
People
were
levering
up
during
that
time.
It
held
steady
sort
of
at
the
turn
of
the
month,
and
people
had
not
cashed
out
during
that
time.
C
So,
what's
interesting
is
hadith
prices
and
further,
potentially
people
would
have
cashed
out
and
leveraged
would
have
gone
down.
Then
a
drop
in
eath
price
would
have
precipitated
a
massive
increase
in
leverage
which
would
have
depressed
the
the
dye
price.
So
these
behaviors
actually
are
what
drive
the
dye
price
more
than
anything,
and
the
civility
fee
changes
the
sensitivity
to
those
behaviors.
So
right
now
what
you
have
effectively
higher
civility
fee
and
the
secondary
lending
picture
fills
in
some
of
this
gap
of
why
this
doesn't
visually
make
sense.
C
C
A
C
C
C
That
was
prior
to
the
most
recent
crash,
so
I
couldn't
run
it
and
see
what
it
looks
like
with
the
most
recent
crash,
but
essentially
it
was
decent
enough
where
you
could
reasonably
say
and
and
the
just
the
relationship
between
stability
feedback
price
was
significantly
lower
like
in
the
20s
or
30s.
So
it
was
those.
A
C
No
I
mean
so
this
is
kind
of
like
proxies
right.
So
if
you
want
to
directly
measure
you
want
to
directly
measure
leveraging
behaviour,
and
that
would
give
you
the
most
direct
explanation.
The
problem
is
that
there's
not
like
a
very
good
variable.
You
can
point
to
that
says
this
is
return.
Behavior,
there
are
proxies
for
it.
You
can
look
at
some
of
the
eath.
You
know
USD
long
short,
you
can
look
at.
You
know
some
of
the
purchasing
and
selling
behavior
on
unis
flop,
or
something
like
that,
and
there
are
these
proxies
that
exist.
C
What
I
find
is
looking
at.
Some
of
those
proxies
is
decent
in
terms
of
explaining,
what's
going
on
with
tie
price,
but
a
more
holistic
view
of
like
actually
looking
at
this
graph
and
actually
breaking
down
okay.
When
was
there
a
run-up,
when
did
when
was
dye
price
depressed?
What
were
the
trading
volumes
during
these
times
and
and
actually
like
physically
looking
at
these
graphs
I,
find
to
be
the
most
effective
strategy
for
understanding?
What's
going
on,
but
mathematically
speaking,
you
can
look
at
some
of
those.
C
Those
other
indicators
as
well
like
long
and
short
behavior,
was
something
that
we
had
looked
at
in
the
past,
but
but
even
Eason
died.
So
this
is
where
I
had
a
long
time
ago
spoken
about
this
ratio
between
the
short
and
long
term
prices.
That
effectively
is
a
similar
proxy
right.
So
if
you
were
to
look
at
like
a
second
derivative
of
the
eath
price
compared
to
its
it's
long-run
average
effectively,
what
you're
saying
is
when
was
it
decreasing?
C
So
those
looking
for
those
kinds
of
patterns,
I
think,
is
the
most
reliable
strategy
for
explaining
drivers
for
her
dye
price,
but
but
even
just
visually.
Looking
at
these
things,
it
seems
to
be
pretty
clear,
so
yeah,
sorry
to
just
touch
on
what's
been
happening
with
the
dye
price.
So
what's
really
interesting
about
dye
lately
is
there's
a
lot
of
debate
around.
Is
this
caused
by
the
stability
fee
or
what
have
happened
otherwise
under
a
lower
stability
fee?
C
So
really
now
you
actually
do
have
a
lot
more
exposure
to
the
stability
fee
or
at
least
the
stability
field
it's
like
discount
than
you
did
before,
so
that
really
does
kind
of
bone-on-bone.
That's
a
concept
that
I've
discussed
before
you
have
less
of
a
buffer
for
demand,
and
now
people
are
actually
starting
to
feel
some
of
that
pain,
I,
feel
and
in
that
that
tends
to
put
a
premium
on
dying
and
drive
the
price
up
a
bit,
and
then
you
know
sort
of.
C
What's
going
on
with
supply
makes
that
extremely
clear,
so
you
can
see
here
and
what
I
find
fascinating.
Is
this
this?
You
start
to
see
some
of
this
like
periodicity
and
these
repeated
patterns
and
and
you've
seen
in
peanut
pattern
under
an
extremely
different
rate.
So
if
you
look
back
to
February,
March,
very,
very
low
stability
fees,
the
dye
supplying
was
running
up
fairly
significantly,
all
the
way
up
to
95
million
now
March
18th
around
that
same
time.
Period
of
this
zoom
out
here
a
little
around
that
same
time
period.
C
You
had
the
dye
price
was
you
know
roughly
97
cents
on
the
dollar
so
lower
than
then
what
was
deemed
acceptable
at
the
time
and
I
think
lower
than
what
we
would
currently
deem
acceptable.
So
the
big
difference
is
not
really
I
mean,
but
97
cents
versus
and
I
need.
It's
not
a
huge
difference,
so
the
big
difference,
I
think,
is
in
the
variability
of
fret
of
die
price,
and
so
I'll
actually
want
to
show
volatility
here.
C
But
it's
effectively,
the
volatility
of
die
is
decreased
significantly,
and
so
that's
a
big
difference
between
that
time
period
versus
now
is
died
was
far
more
volatile.
During
that
time
period
the
supply
was
higher.
Over
supply
was
obviously
higher,
but
in
in
nominal
price
and
supply
terms,
it
wasn't
a
significant
difference
right.
So
if
I
run
this
back
through
an
analysis
script,
it
wouldn't
produce
hugely
different
values,
but
when
you
plug
in
sort
of
that
that-
and
this
is
some
of
what
licks
you
know-
is
alluding
to
is
noise
in
the
prices
versus
order
books.
C
C
Around
80
million
drops
of
the
civility
fee
and
at
the
same
time,
if
price
running
up
and
then
dye
supply
is,
you
know,
running
up
with
significant
amount
of
leverage
and
behavior,
but
at
a
higher
stability
fee,
so
actually
comparatively
a
fairly
stable
dye
price
right,
98,
99
cents
of
the
dollar
is
not
that
bad.
So
this
was
effectively
a
similar
situation
to
what
was
going
on
in
February,
but
with
a
different
experience.
C
I
think
for
those
that
are
trading
die
and
part
of
that
is
just
you
know,
a
different
level
of
confidence
in
the
ability
to
arbitrage
die
and
that
I
think
that
psychological
effect
is
not
to
be
discounted,
but
also
I,
think
less
oversupply,
and
so
this
at
this
point
in
time
you
know
85
million
versus
before
meant.
Two
very
different
things
is
effectively
the
answer,
and
so
what's
really
interesting
is
with
the
20.5
presents
really
fee
and
just
a
tremendous
amount
of
stress
on
people
going
along
on
eath
right
now.
C
This
is
data.
I
think
that
indicates
either
holding
the
position
or
even
dropping
the
stability
feedback.
You
know
half
a
point,
a
point
to
to
see
the
effect,
but
this
this
is
strong
caution,
I
think
against
increasing
this
ability
fee
further,
at
least
just
in
terms
of
what
the
data
is
indicating
and
I
think
the
circulation
of
debt
tends
to
back
this
claim
up
quite
a
bit,
so
what
you
saw
was
essentially
open.
Deck
had
significantly
decreased
in
age,
and
close
debt
has
actually
increased
in
age
bit
so
to
overtake
the
age
of
open
bed.
C
Now,
what
that
effectively
means
is
more
old
loans
getting
paid
back,
which
we
only
tend
to
see
happening.
I
think
that's
a
good
thing
to
look
out
for
effectively
like
on
its
on
a
standalone,
I.
Think
the
repayment
of
old
debt
is
more
often
a
good
metric
than
the
bad
metric,
and
it
speaks
to
circulation,
which
I
think
is
is
good
for
the
system.
C
It
keeps
unrealized
fees
lower,
which
you
know
is
obviously
a
mathematical
benefit
to
make
your
holders
and
I
think
it
decreases
the
amount
of
risk
and
keeps
efficiency
up
effectively.
Economic
efficiency,
after
the
system
and-
and
this
is
I
think
fairly
directly
related
to
some
of
what
we're
talking
about
in
terms
of
like
compound
in
sedap
and
things
that
have
been
going
on
there,
so
the
just
to
quickly
explain
the
the
open
debt
age
decrease.
C
So
this
kind
of
ties
into
more
of
the
debt
that's
being
drawn
out
is
being
drawn
out
from
pre-existing
CDP's
and
less
new
open
debt
has
been
created
recently,
but
more
old
debt
has
been
closed
out,
and
so
that
makes
total
sense
when
you
consider
that
the
dye
supplies
come
down
from
you
know.
Ninety
million
twelve
days
ago,
you
know
seventy
eight,
seventy
nine
million,
which
is
I,
think
one
of
the
more
significant
drops
in
like
a
ten
day
period
that
you've
seen
I
mean
there.
C
Was
there
a
similar
degree
of
drops
in
the
end
of
2018
and
in
like
August,
when
never
seen
a
lot
of
new
stuff
being
released
so
just
to
touch
on
here
collateralization.
So,
with
this
twenty
point,
five
percent
increase
collateralization
had
run
up
with,
what's
pretty
interesting,
July
14
to
19th
range,
because
if
you
look
at
back
out
here,
if
you
look
at
the
eath
price
during
that
same
time,
period
is
fairly
flat,
actually
decreasing
a
bit.
So
this
is
actually
perfectly
opposite
reaction
to
the
eath
price
right
around
here.
So
people
were
scared.
C
There
were
liquidations
and
a
significant
amount
of
eath
was
was
being
locked
and
then
on
a
daily
basis,
and
then
what's
interesting
is
just
in
the
last
few
days
with
the
significant
decrease
in
dye
supply.
There
was
a
fairly
significant
decrease
in
locked
collateral,
which,
which
kind
of
makes
sense
and
what
it
actually
speaks
to
is
some
of
those
CDP's
that
were
closed
out
appear
to
have
been
fairly
well
collateralized,
CDP's,
so
so
fairly
risk-averse
actors,
and
I
think
it's
just
a
bit
of
a
selection
that
that
caused
this
dip.
C
B
I
have
a
quick
question
about
the
collateralization
ratio.
Actually,
so
I
was
I
was
thinking
about
it
and
what?
If
a
CEP
holder
wipes
their
ma,
their
entire
died?
Debt
has
zero
died
in
their
CDP
and
they
just
have
their
eath
sitting
there.
So
you
know
technically
you
know,
and
just
collecting
whatever
the
the
path
appreciation
rate
is,
as
people
get
liquidated
so
like
that
eath
is
not
actually
collateral,
I
mean
I,
guess
it
is
collateralizing
the
system
somewhat,
but
it's
not
actually
backing
any
died
debt.
This
is
that
significant.
C
B
C
B
C
I
think
there
are
much
better,
safer
ways
to
to
cash
out,
but
Keith,
but
yeah
I
mean
the
simple
answer
is
I,
don't
think,
there's
a
significant
portion
of
CDP's
that
have
large
amounts
of
collateral
and
know
that
it's
the
simple
answer,
but
I
can
just
pull
the
exact
percentage
four
years
next
time,
so
just
to
polish
it
off
here.
These
secondary
lending
rates
is
this
is
where
a
lot
of
the
magic
is
going
been
going
on
in
the
past
week.
So
I
don't
want
everyone
to
like
just
here,
Oh
dice.
C
If
I
dropped
my
10
million
everything's
going
to
hell
in
a
handbasket,
because
it's
not
that
simple,
it's
a
severe
destruction
of
oversupply.
There
may
be
some
slight
decrease
in
demand.
It
would
be
stupid
to
to
totally
exclude
that
scenario,
but
that's
that
wouldn't
be
the
whole
picture.
And
so,
if
you
look
here,
the
the
weighted
average
borrowing
rate
for
dy/dx
and
compound
has
like
basically
come
up
within
spitting
distance
of
disability
feet,
and
you
know
it
has.
You
know,
come
close
in
the
past
and
there's
always
you
know,
kind
of
a
spread.
C
The
UI
DX
fluctuates
above
and
below
compound
basically
keeps
to
spread
below
that
spread
was
kind
of
sitting
for
a
while
earlier
in
July,
but
in
the
past
week,
or
so
has
just
come
up
very,
very
close
and
that's
pretty
easily
explicable
with
the
utilization
here.
So
dy/dx
utilization,
like
I,
said
for
other
reasons,
fluctuates
a
little
bit
more
and
stays
a
little
bit
lower,
because
I
think
dy/dx
is
kind
of
nestled
into
this
use
case
of
being
a
little
bit
more
shorter
term
loans,
a
little
bit
more
derivative.
C
You
know
highly
levered
plays,
but
compound
is
kind
of
like
the
the
discounted
version
of
maker
at
the
moment
so
effectively
like
when
people
want
to
source
die
at
a
slight
discount,
though
source
it
from
compound
incitive
maker.
If
people
just
want
to
supply
I.
Currently,
since
there's
no
DSR
at
the
moment,
they'll
just
go.
Do
that
on
compounds.
So
that's
that's
kind
of
where
that's
sitting
right
now,
but
the
utilization
rate
has
shot
up
in
the
past
month
and
now
is
hovering
around
98%,
which
is
pretty
crazy.
C
So
the
excess
amount
of
supply
on
dy/dx
and
compound
are
both
very
low.
Less
than
two
million
in
total
in
the
borrow
was
just
you
know,
exploited
exploded
in
May
was
kind
of
quiet
in
June
and
then
has
shot
up
again
in
July
and
no
small
part
of
this
is
attributable
to
or
you
know
you
can
attribute
a
decent
portion
of
this
to
what's
been
going
on
with
instead
app
the
changes
in
the
compound
rates
and
I.
Think
just
you
know
a
lot
of
it.
C
Don't
underestimate
UI
and
awareness
branding,
marketing
things
like
that
are
very
powerful
as
well,
so
I
think
just
a
better
awareness
of
the
fact
that
you
can
get
the
same
diet.
A
cheaper
rate
has
reduced
the
excess
supply.
That's
it
all
these
platforms,
and
so
you
know
you
can
see
you
know
it
tweeted
about
this.
The
other
day,
like
38%,
of
the
total
supply
of
dyes
being
borrowed
on
secondary
lending
platforms.
Right
now,
that's
huge
and
actually
that's
a
just
dy/dx
and
compound.
That's
not
counting
in
like
Dharma
a
new
or
anything
like
that.
C
So
that's
that's
fairly
significant.
It's
I,
don't
think
something
to
be
worried
about
per
se
right,
so
I
don't
think
there
should
be
this
narrative
of
like
oh,
what
you,
what
happens
when
you
idec's
and
compound
is
taking
market
share
away
from
maker
is
not
necessarily
true
and
that's
where
this
excess
supply
comes
in
right.
So
this
has
basically
been
like
10
million.
C
A
couple
of
points
it
was,
you
know
like
three
points
earlier
and
now
it's
down
to
about
a
point
which
makes
sense
right
so
as
that
opportunity
decreases
in
size,
the
profitability
of
an
opportunity
decreases,
and
so
the
I
think
that
explains
a
decent
portion
of
what's
been
going
on
with
the
decrease
in
supply.
I,
don't
think
anybody
should
make
the
case
that
it's
even
I
think
it
mostly
been
a
decrease
in
demand.
I
think
it
has
mostly
been
an
improvement
in
efficiency,
but
at
the
same
time
now
we're
very
very
close
to
the
margin.
C
I
would
seriously
take
this
as
a
data
point
to
keep
the
stability
phases
or
even
potentially
decrease
it
slightly,
but
again,
I
would
caution
again
and
I.
Think
David
is
really
good
to
point
this
out
earlier
in
the
call
I
would
caution
against
this
sort
of
ping
pong
in
behavior
and
overshooting
in
both
directions,
which
I
think
has
caused
some
problems.
B
C
Got
it
thanks
yeah,
sometimes
it's
hard
to
keep
up
with
the
most
recent
update
yeah,
so
a
18.5%
again
I
mean
that's,
that's
hopping
it
back
to
where
it
was
July
9th.
So
there's
there's
actually
a
logical
reason
for
doing
that.
I
would
have
probably
suggested
a
smaller
decrease,
and
so
this
I
think
speaks
to
the
exponential
voting
polls.
I
I
think
having
small
infrequent
changes
is
most
of
the
time
going
to
be
easier
to
manage
for
the
system
and
I
think
manage
abilities
is
something
to
significantly
prioritize
for
the
system.
B
Have
a
quick
and
that's
totally
relevant,
it's
it's
the
fact
that,
with
this
decrease,
if
it
passes
it
actually
is
gonna
I
guess
some
I,
don't
know
what
I
don't
know
if
it's
gonna
like
make
it
even
more
narrow
or
even
potentially
beat
the
borrower
rate
on
compound.
But
do
you
see
like
the
parody
of
the
rates
between
something
like
compound
or
secondary
lending
markets
in
general,
with
maker
to
be
like
a
significant
kind
of
point
of
data
yeah.
C
It
is
significant,
dye
is
inherently
asymmetric
and
I
would
say
that
over
and
over
and
over
again
so
similar
to
how,
when
you
arbitrage
dye
above
$1,
it's
a
quick
and
easy
thing.
When
you
arbitrage
dye
below
a
dollar,
you
have
to
potentially
sit
with
it
until
it
returns
to
peg
and
take
on
a
bit
of
risk
in
a
bit
of
time
and
cost
of
capital.
So,
similarly,
when
it
comes
to
lending,
if
you
drop
the
stability
fee
to
below
the
like
compound
borrow
rate,
you
will
immediately
incentivize
refinancing
people.
C
B
C
Extremely
predictable
outcome,
I
would
say
that
that
would
be
a
very,
very
likely
scenario.
The
problem
is
doing
it
in
the
reverse
direction,
when
the
stability
fee
is
higher.
Having
that
bridge
and
refinancing
to
compound,
for
example,
has
not
always
been
as
quick,
I
think
of
a
reaction,
as
you
would
see
in
that
suit,
I
think
people
will
be
quicker
to
refinance
back
to
maker,
because
the
stability
fee
is
a
slightly
more
predictable
rate.
C
I
think
then,
like
compound
rates,
for
example,
or
dy/dx
rates
for
that
matter,
so
there
are
reasons
why
it
would
make
sense
for
people
to
immediately
switch
back
to
maker.
It
takes
a
little
bit
more
time,
I
think
for
people
to
refinance
to
do
something
like
compound
so
again,
inherent
asymmetries
in
dye
and
I.
Think
you
gotta
be
wary
of
those
similar,
a
symmetries
I.
C
Then
you
do
increasing
it
to
a
rate
that
is
higher
than
what's
available
on
other
platforms,
because
when
you
increase
it
to
a
rate
that's
higher
than
what's
available
on
other
platforms,
people
can
just
eat
into
excess
supply
and
and
there's
you
know
relatively
little,
relatively
little
increased
risk
for
the
system
when
you
do
it
in
the
reverse
direction.
You're
now
immediately
going
to
justify
refinancings
back
to
maker
and
you're
immediately
going
to
justify
potential
increase
in
dye
supply
and,
at
the
same
time,
dumping
more
excess
dye
supply
back
on
the
secondary
lending
platforms.
C
Potentially,
making
it
cheaper
and
potentially
putting
more
dye
back
on
the
market
which
could
potentially
decrease
to
the
price,
so
it
could.
I
rana
Klee
have
a
much
stronger
effect.
Then
an
increase
in
this
ability
feat
would
have
on
improving
the
dye
price
and
so
I
think
you
have
to
be
very
careful
about
doing
that
and
again
another
just
another
data
point
for
why
I
would
have
suggested
and
have
suggested
slow
were
more
slight
decreases,
even
potentially
keeping
at
22.5
or
dropping
to
20
or
19.5.
C
And
so
you
know,
18.5
we'll
see
what
happens
but
small,
even
half
a
percent
changes
at
a
time.
I
think
make
a
ton
of
sense
and
making
them.
You
know
slower
than
then
intra
week,
and
definitely
you
know
seven
days.
I
think
makes
sense
so
every
other
week,
half
a
percent
I
think
is
not
crazy
and
it
makes
a
ton
of
sense
in
terms
of
managing
the
system.
B
B
So,
currently,
stability
fees
like
twenty
nine
percent.
What
do
we
have
to
see?
Do
we
have
to
see
a
change
in
the
profile
of
what
die
is
demanded
for
it
to
see
like
rates
drop,
let's
say
like
if
we
were,
if
we
wanted
to
see
an
equilibrium,
come
come
about,
naturally,
of
let's
say
a
ten
percent
stability
fee
on
die
like
in
single
collateral
cause.
This
might
okay.
C
I
get
the
question
so
I'm,
just
gonna
restate
in
my
own
words
what
I
think
is
effectively
when
do
you
consider
like
actual
data-driven
scientific
signals
for
decreasing
stability
fee
and
I?
Think
one
you
watch
that
excess
supply
and
you
watch
the
utilization
rates
only
secondary
lending
platforms,
especially
in
the
absence
of
the
DSR.
So
to
what
extent
is
there
excess
dye
supply
floating
out
around
there
and
to
what
extent
can
that
shield
the
demand
curve
from
the
stability
fee
being
potentially
too
high
right?
C
So,
theoretically,
if
you're
gonna
lower
the
stability
fee,
it's
because
you're
saying
it's
too
high.
You
shouldn't
just
lower
the
civility
fee
to
try
to
get
it
as
low
as
possible.
You
should
lower
it
because
you
think
it
is
too
high
and
the
loser
I
think
an
important
distinction
that
seems
very
very
subtle.
I
think
gets
lost,
but
but
the
nuance
is
important,
so
there
there
is
an
equilibrium
that
theoretically
exists.
You
want
to
manage
to
that
equilibrium
so
that
you
know
you're,
balancing
dye
price,
you're,
balancing
cost
of
using
the
system,
you're,
balancing
holistic.
C
We
have
low
visibility
on
the
equilibrium
point,
and
so
you
use
the
stability
fee
as
kind
of
this
very
indirect
gain
knob
to
to
try
and
navigate
to
that
equilibrium
point,
and
so,
when
you're
trying
to
decrease
the
stability
fee,
each
should
be
because
you
think
it
is
too
high,
and
so
then
what
does
it
mean
when
you
think
of
stability
fee
is
too
high?
Well,
what
you're
saying
is:
there's
a
demand
curve
and
there's
a
cost
and
that
cost
exceeds
the
demand.
C
Curves,
you
know,
preferred
cost,
and
so
it
wouldn't
say
price,
because
this
isn't
the
same
economic
question
but
effectively
if
that
excess
supply
is
not
present
or
as
significantly
decreasing.
Now
you
run
into
the
risk
of
hampering
the
the
demand
curve
and
so
I
think
excess
supply
is
effectively
what
you're
trying
to
manage
towards
with
that
stability
fee.
So
if
you
see
the
dye
price
is
relatively
steady,
if
you
see
that
excess
supply
is
decreasing,
then
you
can
start
to
say:
okay
well,
potentially
this
ability
fees
too
high.
B
B
B
C
C
No
so
die
price
is
a
function
of
where
all
the
markers
are
at
and
what's
the
volume
of
you
know
both
buying
and
selling
die
for,
eath
need
for
die,
and
so,
if
there
was
right,
scissor
I
was
talking
about.
As
the
volume
is
you
know,
mid
to
low
range
in
you
know
the
three
to
four
million
range.
Had
it
been,
you
know
14
million
yesterday,
then
you
would
have
seen
a
huge
run-up
in
that
price
had
had
you
know
a
bunch
of
people
decided
to
lever
up
at
you
know
whatever
228
to
eath
price.
C
Currently
had
you
seen
a
bunch
of
people
decide
to
lever
up
at
that
price,
then
you
would
have
seen
die
price
depressed
significantly
it.
You
would
have
seen
it
depressing
in
less
than
if
it
had
been
16.5%
stability
fee,
but
with
that
excess
supply
being
lower
I
think
now
it's
not
about
the
dye
prices.
Basically,
my
answer-
and
this
is
I-
think
that
the
really
hard
thing
for
people
to
get
away
from
is
just
looking
at
dye
prices
being
the
be-all
end-all.
When
that
excess
supply
has
soaked
up.
You
know
fairly
significantly,
I.
C
Yeah
I
mean
there's,
there's
still
there's
still
a
little
bit
of
wiggle
room.
So
it's
not
like
a
extremely
stressful
scenario
where
and
the
thing
that
I'm
cautioning
against
being
extremely
worried
about.
Is
this
decrease
in
dye
supply?
So
I
could
hear
you
know
people's
thoughts
effectively
when
I
saw
that
dye
supply
go
down
and
I'm
sure
they
were
playing.
People
who
are
concerned
that
you
know
okay
maker
is
losing
you
to
user
ship
to
things
like
compound
I.
Do
I
DX
and
I'm
sure
that's
the
narrative
that
ran
through
some
people's
heads?
C
C
So
it's
not
impossible
to
think,
but
I
think
it
would
be
primarily
due
to
eath
price,
not
doing
a
stability
fee,
that
there
was
some
decreased
demand
for
leverage,
and
so
there
may
have
been
a
slight
decrease
in
demand-
that's
totally
possible,
but
that
10
million
was
not
a
you
know:
10
million
drop
in
demand.
It
was
at
least.
B
C
5
million
yeah
I
mean
I,
think
is
more
than
half
and
and
it's
hard
to
say
exactly
how
much
but
at
least
half
was
a
decrease
in
in
oversupply
and
just
kind
of
an
arbitrage
refinancing
I
mean
I
think
at
least
four
point:
nine
million
of
that
was
literally
threw
in
sedap
so
or
something
like
that,
and
so
I
think
you
know,
there's
there's
a
big
portion
of
your
answer.
Yeah.
D
I
pose
a
scenario
that
I've
been
like
kind
of
worried
about
and
I
brought
it
up
a
couple
times
on
Chad,
but
I'm
actually
really
interested
to
get
vishesh.
His
point
of
view
on
it,
which
is
that
compound,
did
not
uncap
the
their
rates.
What
they
did
was
they
moved,
or
maybe
it's
changed
since
then
I
could
be
wrong,
but
it
within
the
past
week.
D
But
then
none
of
the
lenders
can
actually
take
it
out
to
rebalance
the
system
where
they
actually
hold.
You
know
a
third
of
the
dye
in
the
market
where
people
may
need
to
close
out
their
positions
like
I,
actually
think
in
a
in
a
quick
crash
scenario.
Dye
price
is
heavily
stressed
because
in
in
a
case
where
we
are
heavily
leveraged,
because
people
need
to
buy
dye
to
close
their
positions
quickly,
and
so
that's
it.
It
is
a
very
short
window
of
time.
D
But
then
market
makers
react
by
generating
a
lot
of
dye
to
push
that
back
out.
We
don't
have
to
worry
about
a
long-term
us
worry
in
this
because,
let's
say
dye
settled
at
$1,
o
5.
We
have
plenty
of
cap.
We
can
print
new
dye
and
sell
it
to
the
market.
But
do
you
think
there's
an
issue
if
our
stability
fee
is
above?
The
max
cap
of
compound
is
my
overall
question.
Yes,.
C
D
C
C
Think,
especially
with
the
absence
of
the
DSR.
Currently
maker
has
benefited
from
compound
in
dy/dx
having
more
often
than
not
a
cheaper
route
for
obtaining
dye,
and
so
this
is
where
I
kind
of
go
back
to.
If
the
stability
fee
is
too
high.
It's
very-
and
this
was
a
big
criticism.
While
disability
fee
was
being
raised,
you
know
three,
five,
seven,
eleven
fourteen
etc.
C
So
if
the
civilian
feels
smaller
in
the
supply
rate,
that's
very
bad.
We
go
back
in
to
the
way
things
were
I
think
it
was.
You
know,
end
of
2018.
If
this
really
fee
is
smaller
than
the
borrow
rate
on
these
platforms,
then
it's
cheaper
to
mint
die
than
it
is
to
borrow
it
from
those
secondary
lending
platforms,
but
which.
B
D
C
So
David
just
to
answer
your
question
there.
What
so
what
I
was
saying
was
effectively
it.
May
it
may
happen
yes,
but
first
I
think
what
would
happen
is
people
would
source
dye
for
maker
that
would
drive
up
supply
dye
would
get
flooded
onto
the
market.
Some
of
that
would
potentially
get
supplied
on
these
platforms.
Borrow
volume
a
decrease
in
some
of
these
platforms
and
then
that
propagates
into
their
systems,
and
then
those
rates
get
adjusted
but
like.
B
C
C
So
really,
if
he
gets
raised,
I
mean
this
is
exactly
what
happened
so,
but
even
if
the
borrow
rate
is
cheaper
on
maker
I'm
saying
there
are
some
potential
concerns
to
think
about
where
I
think
you
do
have
a
short-term
effect
of
dye
like
yes,
those
rates
would
get
armed,
but
in
the
process
dye
I
think
would
make
it
onto
the
market
and
the
peg
would
potentially
take
a
hit.
You
know,
I,
don't
know
how
the
market
was.
B
C
C
These
these
roles,
I,
think,
are
what
have
emerged
for
the
3d
platforms
respectively
and
I.
Think
they've
been
working
in
kind
of
tandem,
kind
of
synergy
and
it
I
think
is
nestled
and
you
know
form
following
function,
I
think
it's
evolved
into
the
structure
that
seems
to
work
for
this
market,
and
this
is
where
people
start
to
talk
about
some
of
the
you
know:
efficient
market
hypothesis,
all
that
jazz
and
insted
app
and
what
it's
doing
I
think
the
structure
that
is
currently
emerged
is
the
the
that
that
works
right
now.
Right.
B
So
if
there's
no
other
explicit
questions
or
conversation
that
we
want
to
have
oh
yeah
there
is
this
one
comment
from
Seibel
that
we
didn't
get
to
earlier
in
the
call.
What
do
you
think
people
think
about
posting?
Their
voting
rationale?
I.
Think
I
want
to
do
it
more
regularly,
but
do
people
think
that
it's
positive
negative
to
the
process
I
mean
I?
Have
some
thoughts,
I
I
think
it's!
B
It's
probably
good
when
it's
when
it's
done
well,
I
know
that
if,
like
a
lot
of
people
have
like
a
lot
of
text
like
almost
nobody's
gonna
read
it
except
for
those
people
that
already
are
commenting
and
giving
their
rationale.
But
for
you
know
newcomers
it
gives
them
kind
of
like
a
an
Amazon
ratings
page
where
they
could
go
and
make
their
own
decision
like.
Okay,
this
person
is
doing
it.
For
this
reason
it
like
gives
people
the
ability
to
think
for
themselves.
B
So
I
think
it's
probably
positive,
but
I
think
the
cognitive
overhead
for
like
reading
everybody's.
It's
it's
a
good
option.
I,
don't
think
it's
actually
bad
and
I.
Think
it's
good
for
you
as
a
voter
because
it
lets
you
put
your
reasoning
and
thoughts
on
paper
or
you
know
figuratively
on
paper
and
that's
always
actually
really
useful.
C
David
I
would
actually
agree
with
your
conclusion,
but
I'm
gonna
push
back
on
the
reason.
A
little
bit
so
I
think
there's
been
a
problem
in
maker
governance,
which
is
a
bit
of
a
disconnect
between
what
the
conversation
is
and
what
the
votes
end
up
being
and
I.
Think
in
order
to
have
effective
governance,
you
need
to
resolve
that
gap
or
the
community
to
resolve
that
gap.
That
would
be
my
inclination,
because
how
do
you
manage
something?
C
Well,
if
you're
talking
about
one
thing
and
doing
something
different
or
at
least
then
it
begs
the
question
of.
Are
you
you
know
appropriately
devoting
your
time
and
resources
and
so
I
think
there's
a
tremendous
lack
of
visibility
to
the
thought,
processes
and
rationales
of
a
fairly
decent
chunk
of
the
voters.
C
I
don't
often
hear
you
know,
I
hear
myself
talk,
I,
hear
people
on
these
governor's
crosstalk
I
hear
a
lot
of
you
know
great
posts
on
the
forums
and
the
chats,
but
rarely
do
they
tend
to
be
making
the
same
case
as
what
the
polls
of
the
votes
end
up
being,
and
so
what
I'm,
really
missing
from
my
perspective,
is
like
a
participant
of
this
community.
Is
understanding
really
well?
Why
18.5%?
What
were
people
thinking?
Why
increase
it
to
20.5%?
Well,
where
is
some.
C
Well.
Writing.
Writing.
Out
is
a
very
specific
suggestion
right.
So
it's
like
it's.
This
is
how
you
gonna
go
about
doing
this.
What
am
more
talking
about
is
it
may
not
necessarily
be
writing
it
out,
because
I
think
that's
high
overhead
and
and
you're
not
likely
to
force
people
to
you
know,
write
out
what
they're
thinking,
but
there
there
has
to
be
a
way
at
some
point,
I
think
to
understand
why
people
are
voting
the
way
they
are.
It
doesn't
necessarily
have
to
be
writing
it
out.
So.
D
Okay,
once
I've
made
up
my
mind,
I
think
there
is
definitely
a
piece
of
it
speaks
to
what
David
is
bringing
up.
It's
like.
It
helps
me
kind
of
crystallized.
My
reasoning
but
I
do
think
that,
for
instance,
part
of
the
reason
that
I
think
this
is
important
is
that
I'm,
pretty
sure
there's
some
14,000
maker
or
holder
that
is
constantly
voting
on
the
rates
but
is
not
reading
either.
D
B
B
J-Man
good
question:
all
right:
cool,
well,
I'm,
satisfied
to
end
the
call
here
unless
you
guys
wanna
keep
going
I'm
gonna
stop
the
recording,
so
you
guys
could
keep
talking
and
hang
out
in
here.
If
you
want
after
or
I,
don't
know
if
I
leave
the
room,
if
it'll
kick
you
all
out,
but
I
think
I
have
to
set
some
video
hosts.
But
here
you
go.