►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting #142
Description
Introduction
* @LongForWisdom: Hosting, Introduction, Agenda.
Weekly Updates
I’d encourage those listed to try keep this to 5 minutes!
* Governance - @GovAlpha-Core-Unit
* Protocol Engineering - @Protocol-Engineering
* Oracles - @Oracles
* Risk - @Risk-Core-Unit
* Real World Finance - @Real-World-Finance
* Growth - @Growth-Core-Unit
* Sustainable Ecosystem Scaling - @operational-support
* Operational Support - @operational-support
* MIPs - @MIP-Editors
Procedural
* MIPs Governance Poll Review - @GovAlpha-Core-Unit
Segments
* Liquidation 2.0 performance analysis - @Primoz
Resources
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Forum: https://forum.makerdao.com/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
Governance and Community Events Calendar:
https://calendar.google.com/calendar/u/0/r?cid=bWFrZXJkYW8uY29tXzNlZmhtMmdoaXBrc2VnbDAwOWt0bmlvbWRrQGdyb3VwLmNhbGVuZGFyLmdvb2dsZS5jb20
A
A
I
run
these
meetings
yeah
as
usual,
we've
got
a
bit
of
an
agenda
kind
of
had
a
reasonably
busy
week
what
a
busy
week
but
eventful
week.
I
suppose
it's
the
perfect
way
of
saying
it
this
week
so
we'll
be
chatting
all
about
later
as
well,
but
yeah
we've
got
our
regular
weekly
updates
from
all
of
the
core
units.
We're
gonna
have
the
mips
updates.
I
think
we're
gonna
have
a
segment
from
primoch
talking
about
the
liquidation,
2.0
performance.
A
A
A
Cool,
I
think
that
covers
oh,
I
guess
the
the
general
preamble
yeah
we
like
to
be
sort
of
your
comments
and
questions.
If
you
have,
if
you
have
either
of
those
please
please
don't
be
shy,
feel
free
to
interrupt
or
or
sort
of,
oh
yeah.
Ask
questions,
see
all
right
with
that.
I
think
I'll
do
the
governance
updates
so
this
week,
so
we
had
an
executive
last
week
on
friday,
which
I
do
not
believe
was
passed.
Yet
it
happened
when
I
checked
earlier.
A
A
So
this
week's
polls
we
had,
I
think
three
polls
regarding
unisop
liquidity,
pool
tokens
or
false
thoughts
based
on
tokens
and
moving
those
to
the
equation
2.0
framework.
So
the
wrist
team
proposed
parameters
for
those
liquidations
for
the
collision
stupid
framework
for
those
faults
they
were
passed,
so
those
will
be
in
the
australia's
executive.
A
All
right
to
give
a
sort
of
quick
update
on
what
gov
alpha's
been
doing,
sort
of
been
working
on,
building
and
setting
up
a
sort
of
more
focused
documentation
platform
as
a
serve
governance
still
in
the
early
stages
and
sort
of
lifting
a
lot
of
documentation
from
that
we
sort
of
published
elsewhere.
I've
been
trying
to
organize
it
in
a
way
that
makes
kind
of
more
sense
to
the
audience.
A
Then
also
figuring
out
how
we
can
improve
the
poor,
the
forum
a
little
bit
so
eli's
been
been
working
pretty
heavily
on
this,
and
I
made
some
kind
of
minor
changes
to
the
top-level
categories
earlier
today.
You
may
or
may
not
have
noticed
yet,
but
we're
going
to
kind
of
continue
trying
to
set
up
the
categories
in
the
most
in
the
way.
That
makes
the
most
sense
for
for
users
who
want
to
find
things.
A
And
then
the
last
thing
I've
been
kind
of
working
on
is
sort
of
trying
to
figure
out
how
to
onboard
contributors
into
sort
of
alpha
more
efficient
effectively.
I
guess
more
efficiently,
just
trying
to
figure
out
like
sort
of
good
like
sort
of
starter
tasks.
We
can
get
people
to
do
and
you
know
figure
out
sort
of
you
know
what
sort
of
things
we
want.
People
want
people
to
sort
of
build
up
into
and
generally
get
a
little
bit
more
organized
on
that
front.
A
B
Yep
double
dipping.
I
guess
I
did
it
last
week,
but
back
again
let
me
drop
the
link
in
the
chat
for
you
in
case.
You
want
to
follow
along
yeah,
pretty
pretty
quiet
week
right.
So
my
three-point
summaries
are
pretty
much
all
about
yesterday.
I
imagine
we'll
hear
a
bit
more
about
it
throughout
the
length
of
this
call,
but
we
did
liquidate
over
40
million
die
worth
of
collateral,
so
liquidations
2.0
shown
some
serious
strength
there
that
resulted
in
over
1100
mkr
being
burned
in
the
24
hours.
B
I
wanted
to
draw
your
attention
to,
first
of
which,
being
the
speaker
series,
the
kind
of
first
iteration
of
that
that
paper
imperium
is
brought
to
us
with
the
st
louis
fed
senior
vp.
Guy's
name
is
david
and
he
will
be
with
us
on
june
29th
at
1500
utc,
so
mark
that
on
your
calendars
should
be
a
pretty
exciting
event.
B
Other
thing
that
came
out
this
week
was
the
maker
wrist.
Dashboard
has
been
adding
lots
of
lots
of
features.
I
know
that
came
in
handy
yesterday
for
for
tracking
a
lot
of
the
vault
liquidations
and
how
well
or
how
scary
the
next
hour
was
going
to
be.
Perhaps
so,
I'm
sure
promotion
will
give
us
some
more
updates
on
that.
As
we
go
on
in
terms
of
active
discussions,
we
got
a
few
ones.
I
wanted
to
highlight
here,
first
being
a
pre-map
discussion
brought
to
us
by
none
other
than
mr
bourbon.
B
B
Thanks
for
shoot
me
to
pointing
that
out.
So
I
could
add
it.
In
first
one
came
to
us
from
aaron
who's
pulling
or
signaling.
Rather,
the
reduction
of
the
tap
parameter
for
the
us
dc
psm.
This
would
essentially
pulling
dropping
it
to
zero
to
to
make
swapping
felis
and
with
no
slippage
when
going
from
die
to
usdc,
and
then
shoopy
did
post
a
poll
there
for
a
new
type
of
wi-fi
vault,
with
a
higher
liquidation
ratio
and
lower
stability
fee.
B
Much
like
ec,
and
that
came
from
a
conversation
with
growth
and
and
the
folks
over
here
so
pretty
exciting
there
other
than
that,
it's
just
our
usual
ongoing
initiatives
and
help
wanted
sections,
hopefully
we'll
be
having
more
places
to
add
to
that
as
we
grow
bigger
and
if
there's
anything
you
ever
want
highlighted.
Let
me
know
shoot
me
a
message
happy
to
add
it
into
the
post,
for
you.
B
A
A
C
C
Paid
and-
and
we
think
that
moving
to
a
design-
that's
closer
to
dss-
vest
in
fact,
actually
is
basically
just
dss
vest
with
a
few
lines
of
code.
Changed
is
probably
going
to
be
more
sufficient
right
now,
so
we're
going
to
we're
going
to
table
the
keg
just
for
a
little
bit,
because
I
think
the
keg
has
other
useful
functionality
that
that
we
could
implement
when
we
need
it,
but
it's
a
little
more
complicated
that
I
think
we
need
for,
for
you
know
sending
funds
to
teams
so
yeah.
C
C
C
C
You
know
I'm
still
cautiously
optimistic,
but
I
I
kind
of
maybe
should
pause
here
and
say
it
was
a
huge
effort
across
so
many
teams
and
and
there's
just
like
you
know,
there's
not
one
person,
that's
sort
of
responsible
for
it.
There's
a
lot
of
coordination.
There
was
a
lot
of
you
know,
like
almost
every
engineer
touched
it,
including
engineers
that
are
no
longer
with
maker
and
yeah
so
and
also
we
we
built
it
in
the
keeper
ecosystem
came
and
used
it
and
man
did
it
work.
C
Well
so
about
that,
and
so
yes,
we've
got
one
piece
of
ongoing
work,
we're
also
working
on
converting
the
clipper
collie
for
for
liquidations2o
over
to
the
lp
tokens
and
so
keeper,
or
let's
say
the
auction
demo
keeper.
As
some
people
know,
it
will
be
capable
of
liquidating
lp
tokens
as
well,
when
it's
ready,
I
think,
there's
also
maybe
some
mega
poker
omega
poker
work,
although
I
don't
know
where
we
left
that,
but
it
for
protocol
engineering.
C
Yeah
so
we're
we're
b-lining
it
to
the
the
sort
of
lightest
touch
or
simplest
implementation
that
we
can.
The
the
irony
is,
I
think,
the
most
of
the
code.
I
wrote
back
in
osaka,
so
so
it's
just
been
sitting
around
since
devcon
and
and
then
sam
sort
of
updated
it
for
modern
times
and
and
then
I
think,
we've
got
one
sort
of
general
concern
with
that
implementation,
which
is
that
it
doesn't.
It
doesn't
expire
delegate
and
so
there's
a
bit
of
a
like
concern.
C
You
know
off
to
infinity
yeah,
and
so
so
we
think
we're
gonna
add
in
like
at
least
a
rough
ex
expiration
that
maybe
is
like
a
year
or
18
months
or
something
because
we
do
expect
to
have
dss
vest
replacing
the
chief
at
some
point,
but
that
would
make
it
so
at
least
like
people
or
somebody
that
we're
delegating
to
doesn't.
You
know
maintain
that
power
or
that
voting
power,
for
you
know
a
year
or
two
years
or
for
infinity,
so
so
anyway,
that
sorry.
C
That
was
a
long
answer
to
say.
Probably
you
know
if
I
had
to
guess:
we've
got
some
stuff
in
early
june
to
mid-june,
but
I
would
bet
that
delegation
could
be
ready
by
like
mid
to
late
june.
I
I
sometimes
over
promise,
and
I
don't
I
don't
want
to
do
that.
So
if
anyone
else
on
the
political
engineering
team
sees
me
doing
that.
E
The
other
dependency
is
the
front
end
work,
so
we
were
talking
with
the
js
team
yesterday,
walking
them
through
what
the
requirements
are
for
this,
and
there
is
a
bit
of
work
there.
They
also
have
a
bit
of
dependency
on
completing
liquidations
to
work
they're
also
working
on
that
portal.
So
I
I
think,
mid
mid
and
june
is
a
is
a
safe
assumption,
but
I
can't
commit
to
that
because
the
team
has
to
size
it
and
they
have
to
commit
to
that.
E
But
I
think
in
our
discussion
yesterday
that
was
giving
a
good
indicator
of
where
this
was
going
to
land
the
code
itself.
Chris,
is
like
you
said
it's,
I
think
mostly
it's.
It's
all
done,
there's
the
the
expiry,
which
will
be,
I
think,
a
foreign
post
to
governance
to
to
pick
a
date
or
accept
the
one
year
in
the
future.
E
D
C
C
C
F
Let
me
ask
curt,
thank
you,
you
do
it
yeah!
Well,
let
me
clarify
a
little
bit
about
well,
I
mean
first
of
all,
what's
what's
the
exact
motivating
question
here,
because
I
mean
there
is
a
separation
between
like
the
ui
and
what
is
what
are
the
underlying
contracts?
Actually
doing?
You
know,
as
things
stand
my
unders.
Well,
let
me
just
describe
how
it
works
is
that
you
know
people
there's
a
delegation
contract.
F
F
So
there's
not
like
a
vote
proxy
per
se.
It's
like
the
delegation
contract
itself
is
the
vote
proxy.
In
some
sense
now
they
could
separately,
you
know,
have
their
own
mkr
or
something
in
a
in
a
vote
proxy
or
something
if
they
wanted
to.
But
you
know
the
client,
probably
the
cleaner
thing
is
that
they
just
delegate
to
themselves
since
they're
a
delegate
anyway.
D
D
The
one
reason
I
I
see-
and
it's
probably
not
a
good
enough
reason
to
keep
the
book
proxy-
is
to
to
secure
the
actual
voting
itself
right.
So
if,
if
you
have,
if
you
control
a
really
large
amount
of
mtr
that
you
were
voting
with,
but
even
then
like
I
don't,
I
don't
see
how
it
would
make
sense.
So
I
guess
from
your
answer.
The
devote
proxy
can
be
it
after
some
time.
F
F
Yeah,
that's
what
I
was
about
to
say
is
that
you
have
a
very
analogous
thing
of
you
know
you
can
make
your
your
hot
wallet
or
whatever
the
the
thing.
That's
the
the
owner
of
the
delegation
contract
or
whatever.
So
it
can
only
vote,
and
then
you
delegate
to
yourself
or
to
the
delegation
contract
from
a
cold
wallet,
and
so
that
then,
your
the
the
address
that
is
responsible
for
voting
on
proposals
has
no
power
to
actually
move
the
mkr.
A
A
A
G
G
We
can
get
those
in
pretty
soon,
because
there
are
quite
a
few
kind
of
fixes
in
there
right
that,
the
that
the
audit
caught
and
they
they
are
more
gas
efficient
as
well
like
considerably
so
like
kurt
and
some
of
the
smart
contracts
guys
did
a
did
a
really
good
job
at
optimizing.
That
so
would
encourage
us
to
to
get
that
through
soon.
G
That
means
that
compared
to
a
normal
day
where-
and
I
can't
believe
I'm
saying
normal
is
100
way
now,
but
compared
to
a
normal
day
right.
That
means
you're
spending
35
times
the
amount
of
oracle
costs.
You
know
in
a
single
day,
which
is
right:
you
can
reason
about.
Basically,
you
spend
the
months
worth
of
oracle
expenses
in
a
single
day
right,
and
so,
when
you're
thinking
about
right,
that
these
costs
are
currently
being
handled
by
the
foundation
but
are
expected
to
be
taken
over
by
the
protocol.
G
G
You
could
say,
for
example,
that
like
oh
well,
we're
going
to
ask
like
every
month
right,
but
then
what
happens
if
one
of
those
executives
right
doesn't
get
passed
in
time
right
then
you're
kind
of
just
sitting
there,
like
oh
shoot
right.
Similarly,
if
you
start
asking
for
like
a
budget
every
three
months
right-
and
you
see
a
big
spike
in
gas
prices
right
this
estimation
that
you
made
for
how
much
you'd
spend
in
three
months,
you
know
may
maybe
way
way
under.
G
So
I
think
this
is
one
of
those
things
where
you
probably
need
to
have
some
like,
and
I
think
we've
discussed
this
for
for
the
core
units
in
general
right
that
we
have
this
like
emergency
multi-sig
that
they
can
like
dip
into.
So
I
know
that
was
part
of
the
protocol
engineering
core
unit
proposal,
and
it
was
part
of
the
oracle
core
unit
proposal
right
where
there
is
a
kind
of
reserve
multi-state
right
that,
in
times
of
like
you
know,
protocol
distress,
you
know
that
we
can
dip
into.
G
We
probably
need
a
fund
like
that
for
oracle
kind
of
gas
costs,
for
in
case
we
encounter
crazy
days
like
yesterday,
right
where
we
spend
a
month
worth
of
oracle
gas.
You
know
in
a
single
day,
so
yeah,
so
that's
going
to
be
what
I'm
going
to
be
working
on
in
over
the
next
couple
weeks
is
just
coming
up
with
a
way
to
conservatively
model.
How
much
we
need
to
spend-
and
I
think
part
of
that
will
include
also
just
determining
for
a
collateral
type
right.
G
What
are
the
expected
costs,
or
or
at
least,
if
you
can't
say
a
fixed
number?
What
is
the
like
expected
range
of
costs
that
it
costs
you
every
year
in
gas
just
to
have
a
collateral
type
in
the
maker
protocol,
and
I
think
that
will
give
us
a
lot
of
a
lot
of
perspective
of
when
we
want
to
onboard
something
like
you
know
how
much
revenue
and
stability
fees
do.
G
We
think
this
new
collateral
type
is
going
to
bring
and
if
it's
less
than
what
the
expected
oracle
costs
are
right,
then
it's
it's
probably
a
no-go
right
and-
and
that
includes
right
for
some
of
the
existing
collateral
types
we
have
right.
So
if
any
of
you've
been
following
the
discussion
in
the
speculation
channel
or
governance
and
risk
right,
this
was
brought
up
as
well,
where
we
have
a
bunch
of
tokens
where
we
probably
spend
more
on
oracle
costs
annually
than
they
make
in
disability
fees
right.
G
I
think
the
discussion
yesterday
was
around
zrx
right
and
zrx
is
definitely
one
of
those
vaults
and
you
know
just
because
it
ended
up
being
profitable
for
the
protocol.
You
know,
because
yesterday
we
made
a
bunch
of
liquidation
penalties,
I
don't
think
we
should
really
account
for
revenue
from
liquidation
penalties
when
considering
whether
to
whether
something
that
we
on
board
is
profitable
or
not
profitable.
G
So
just
to
kind
of
add
to
that
list,
just
throwing
out
some
stuff
right,
knc,
definitely
unprofitable,
balancer,
definitely
unprofitable
comp,
definitely
unprofitable.
Some
of
the
lp
tokens
we
added,
I
think
die.
Usdt
hasn't
had
like
a
single
die
minted
against
it
right,
definitely
unprofitable.
I
think
ave
eth
to
link
eth
those
are
all
unprofitable
as
well.
G
So
I
think
it's
one
of
these
things
where
we
want
to
you
know
onboard
new
collateral
types
liberally,
I'm
sorry
liberally,
because
it's
it's
the
demand
for
a
vault
right
has
kind
of
been
all
over
the
place.
It's
been
hard
to
predict
right.
We
have
some
tokens
like
you
know,
wi-fi
that
are
runaway
successes,
and
then
we
have
you
know
much
higher
market
cap
tokens
right
like
compound
that
have
just
been
complete.
G
Okay,
yeah-
and
that's
my
cue
thanks
thanks
along
for
keeping
me
in
check.
That's
that
that's
that's
my
update,
but
I
just
want
to
get
some
discussion
going
in
the
forum
about
that
and
I'll
be
posting
a
proposal
in
the
next
few
weeks
about
about
oracle,
gas
and
and
how
we
want
to
structure
that,
from
from
a
dow.
A
H
I
guess
we'll
discuss
this
later
in
the
call,
but
in
general
we
have
some
generic
auction
price
curves
and
other
parameters
ready.
Then
they
can
all
be
used
for
all
cyber
coins
and
even
if
you
liquidate
them
into
psm,
which
was
one
of
the
ideas-
and
we
might
talk
about
today-
some
of
them
are
still
over
collateralized,
so
they'll
still
they
stay,
they
will
stay
in
old
worlds
and
we
need
to
have
these
liquidations
2.0
support.
H
In
any
case,
sushi
lp
evaluations
were
also
done
today
by
marco.
They
should
be
posted
shortly
in
general,
proposing
similar
parameters
as
for
unilps,
apart
from
stability
fee,
which
is
proposed
to
be
higher
because
the
yields
are
on
sushi
lp
leverage
farming
are
just
higher
and
then
we
also
release
just
mentioned
this
new
risk
dashboard
from
our
site.
You
can
read
more
about
the
roadmap
on
the
forum.
H
H
I
may
just
need
to
notice
that
the
site
is
still
in
beta,
so
there
might
be
some
errors
or
not
really
errors,
but
some
data
might
be
updated
for
10
to
20
30
minutes.
So
don't
get
scared
too
soon.
When
looking
at
those
numbers
and
yeah
we
had
liquidations.
Yesterday
I
published
a
presentation
on
forums.
H
Yesterday,
we
even
noticed
that
unbinding
five
thousand
dollar
die
depth
vault
because
of
high
gas
costs
was
was
yeah.
It
was
just
maybe
even
unprofitable,
but
which
means
we
might
need
to
sadly
evaluate
our
dust
limits
once
again,
also
related
to
keepers,
kicking
them
and
so
on
and
bidding
for
them.
H
And
lastly,
we
also
discussed
to
introduce
flat
fee
for
kicking
auctions.
So
this
is
the
tip
parameter
is
different
than
the
other
one,
which
is
which
is
called
chip
parameter,
which
is
a
variable
incentive,
and
that's
because
the
variable
fee
doesn't
offset
the
gas
costs
for
kicking
smaller,
smaller
volts,
and
we
knew
actually
about
this.
But
there
were,
there
were
always
some
edge
case
attack
vectors,
because
if
the
tip
is
too
high,
so
this
flat
fee
keepers
could
be
farming.
H
You
know
these
kick
incentives
or
reset
incentives,
so
we'll
re-evaluate
this
again
now
probably
propose
a
flat
fee
somewhere
in
the
range
around
300
to
be
seen,
but
in
general
it
should
be
lower
than
the
penalty
fee
on
the
dust
size,
and
this
is
650
dollars.
Otherwise,
there's
this
attack
vector
again
and
yeah.
That's,
I
think,
that's
it
from
my
side.
A
I
Yes,
so
first
one
good
news:
we
have
now
more
than
one
million
die
coming
from
hillary
clinton.
We
have
now
1.3
million
die
coming
from
new
silver
and
those
are
not
going
anywhere.
Even
if
there
is
somebody
in
the
crypto
markets,
because
they
are
locked
for
12
months
anyway
on
the
sanskrit
fishbats.
So
we
are
trying
to
to
publish
an
executive
on
june
11th
with
all
the
centrifuge
craters
that
you
will
want
to
onboard.
The
poor
wisco
will
go,
live
either
next
week
or
the
week.
I
I
We
are
working
as
well
to
see
how
we
can
incorporate
a
make
a
representative
or
fun
company
in
the
cayman
island,
so
it's
quite
similar
to
the
mature
id,
because
what
we
see
in
the
trust
of
the
cartel
agents
is
that
they
are
willing
to
do
almost
anything
for
money
for
cash,
but
they
don't
want
to
make
any
decision.
Never.
I
So
that's
why
we
need
to
have
someone
to
tell
them
what
they
should
do
and
what
script
they
should
follow,
or
at
least
trigger
the
the
launching
of
the
of
the
script
that
they
need
to
follow.
They
will
follow
only
one
script,
but
you
need
someone
to
to
kick
them
and
there
was,
although
the
first
redwater
set
committee
this
week,
so
quite
excited
about
that.
I
So
that
means
that
a
lot
of
community
members
are
putting
together
ideas
and
concerns
and
feelings
about
redwater
set
to
move
this
space
forward
as
as
repetitive,
more
or
less
representative
of
the
community.
They
are
not
really
representative,
but
they
choose
to
dedicate
more
time
to
study,
credible
assets
and
make
and
become
better
listening
and
guide
the
governance
on
those
topics.
So
that's
quite
exciting
as
well,
and
that's
all
I
have
for
now.
J
We
also
started
conversations
with
because
we
wanted
to
develop
this
use
case.
I
told
you
two
weeks
ago
about
having
custom-made
bolts
or
these
induced
industrial
bolts
for
our
biggest
vault
users,
because,
like
us
as
paper,
has
been
telling
us
in
the
forum,
I
think
it's
super
important
to
like
understand
how
these
users
are
using
the
protocol
and
try
to
like
help
them
to
using
it.
Even
more
so
you
can.
J
So
that's
that's
impressive
and
well
should
be
talked
with
them,
and
please
read
the
post
and
write
your
comments
because
we
want
to
do
this
kind
of
things
with
other
er
volt
users
like
nexo
or
cell
or
celsius,
which
are
the
biggest
users
of
our
protocol,
and
one
last
thing
is
something
I
I
want
to
ask
you
the
community
to
help
us
during
the
last
week,
which
is
like
incredible.
We
have
been.
J
J
A
K
A
All
right,
let's
maybe
move
on
we're
running
a
little
short
on
time,
so
we've
got
a
couple
of
cool
things
to
get
to
at
the
end,
so
we'll
try
and
move
along
swiftly
cool,
so
sustainably
ecosystem
scaling.
One.
Do
you
guys
want
to
give?
Oh,
oh
watch,
I
guess
watches
here
as
well.
Do
you
guys
want
to
give
an
update
or
anything.
K
I
posted
a
an
operational
support,
weekly
update
about
where
you
can
add
anything
if
you,
if
you
want
but
yeah
just
to
give
the
the
very
very
brief
update
we
had
a
well
pros,
was
presenting
his
candidacy
yesterday
in
a
call
you
can
already
watch
this
on
youtube.
It
was
very
non-controversial
and
boring
so
not
much
to
see
there
since
everyone
likes
pros
for
better
or
worse
then
yeah
to
two
announcements.
Next
wednesday
we'll
have
more
monkey
irish,
presenting
the
collateral
boarding
core
unit
and
the
wednesday
after
so
that's
june.
K
L
Should
be
said,
okay,
cool
all
right,
yeah,
welcome
everybody
to
the
weekly
mips
update.
My
name
is
david,
I'm
a
myth,
mid-editor
and
contributor
here
at
maker
and
so
yeah.
Let's
take
a
look,
so
we
are
in
the
month
of
may
today
is
may
20th,
as
you
know,
so
we
actually
just
concluded
the
bundled
mips
governance
poll
which
I
believe
passed.
So
we
should
be
looking
forward
to
the
bundled
mips
executive
vote
this
coming
week
and
just
to
review
may's,
formal
submissions
and
also
the
inclusion
poll
results.
L
L
We
had
strategic
markoms
and
sustainable
ecosystem
scaling
and
only
sustainable
ecosystem
scaling,
passed
the
inclusion
poll
stage
and
moved
on
to
the
bundled
poll
in
executive
vote,
and
so
the
may
bundle
is
looking
like
this
one
core
unit,
a
couple
of
mips
and
one
amendment
proposal,
and
so
there's
gonna
be
a
direct
deposit
module
which
is
an
interface.
It's
a
technical
map
for
an
interface
for
makered
out
to
interact
with
third-party
lending
protocols
and
also
we
are
having
mip
51
an
update
to
the
governance
cycle.
L
So
yeah,
two
mips
one
core
unit,
one
amendment
this
month.
So
right
now
we're
in
week
three
next
week
week,
four
on
monday,
we're
gonna
see
the
bundled
mip
executive
vote.
It's
gonna
go
live
it's
the
only
executive
vote
that
actually
has
a
time
limit.
So
that's
gonna
run
for
four
days,
almost
like
a
typical
governance
poll.
So
so
please
get
your
vote
in.
It's
really
important.
L
You
know
inside
of
the
bundled
executive
vote-
that's
happening
next
week.
So
if
that
passes
june,
which
would
have
looked
like
this
using
our
current
governance
cycle
will
actually
end
up.
Looking
more
like
this.
So
instead
of
having
the
inclusion
poll,
the
bundled
governance
poll
and
the
bundled
executive
vote,
there's
just
gonna
be
a
formal
submission
period
and
then
individual
ratification
polls
for
for
both
mipsets
and
individual
mips
and
subproposals.
So
if
there's
a
few
mips
that
are
posted
together
and
they're
related,
they
can
obviously
happen
through
one
poll.
L
So
yeah.
This
is
gonna,
be
really
cool,
also
because
mkr
voters
can
now
like
comfortably
vote
for
these
things
on
the
weekend
over
a
longer
time
period.
So
I
really
like
the
personally.
I
really
like
these
changes,
and
so
I'm
looking
forward
to
june.
If
we
see
this,
if
we
see
this
mips
bundle
pass
and
just
a
quick
overview
of
ratification
polls,
so
their
duration
is
for
two
weeks
their
minimum
positive
participation
requirement
is
10,
000
mkr,
which
means
that
yes
must
exceed.
No.
L
When
the
poll
closes
and
the
yes
vote,
weight
must
exceed
the
minimum
positive
participation
value
when
the
poll
closes,
so
there
has
to
be
at
least
10k
on.
Yes,
no
matter
what
and
it's
a
binary
poll.
So
yes,
no
abstain,
which
is
like
trinary,
but
we
won't
call
it
that
all
right
new
mips
in
rfc
we've
seen
a
handful
of
things
posted
this
month.
So
we
actually
saw
a
couple
of
budget
updates
from
core
units.
L
L
But
having
this
mip
in
this
process
defined
is
definitely
a
step
in
the
right
direction
for
us
as
a
as
an
org
mip
53,
the
mkr
compensation
guidelines,
so
mip
53
was
posted
by
planet
x
in
partnership
with
the
compensation
working
group,
it
details,
cu,
rewards
and
recommended
practices
and
and
just
to
also
fill
in
some
info.
Here.
L
There
is
an
alternative
set
of
compensation
guidelines
that
have
been
posted
to
the
forum
by
the
sustainable
ecosystem
scaling
core
unit,
and
I
believe
they
might
have
a
to
follow,
but
not
100
sure
I'll.
Let
them
speak
to
that,
but
regardless
it's
going
to
be
interesting
and
definitely
be
mindful
of
the
fact
that
there
are
two
different
sets
of
mkr
compensation
guidelines
and
again
mip
53
is
from
the
working
group
and
the
others
are
from
scs.
L
And
then
we
also
saw
two
new
core
units
enter
into
rfc.
We
saw
monkey
irish
post
collateral
onboarding,
it's
a
core
unit
that
solely
focuses
on
the
collateral,
onboarding
aspects
of
the
maker
protocol
and
yeah.
It
takes
monkey
irish
facilitator.
Its
proposed
annual
budget
is
approximately
2.5
million
dollars
a
year
with
the
team
size,
a
starting
team
size
of
six
permanent
full-time
positions
with
an
additional
two
temporary
rules
and
as
for
the
strategic
happiness
core
unit,
which
is
a
little
bit
less
less
heavy.
It's
a
core
unit.
L
That's
focused
on
community
engagement
by
memes,
swag
and
good
vibes.
It
was
proposed
by
our
very
own
unofficial
maker
down
mascot
saint
bourbon,
for
efforts
facilitator,
and
its
proposed
annual
budget
is
a
whopping
zero
dollars
with
a
one
mkr
annual
grant
requested
and
its
team
sizes
one
permanent.
So
yeah,
that's
about
it.
For
the
mips
update
this
week
check
out
the
mips.makerdao.com
site
for
the
mips
portal.
You
know
we
keep
that
repo
up
to
date
and
yeah,
so
everything
canonically
can
be
found
there.
L
A
L
L
A
Yep
cool
all
right,
so
I
think
it's
my
job
to
do
the
whips,
governor's,
full
review
kind
of
officially
so
just
confirm
what
david
said
that
yes,
the
e-maps
governance
poll
passed
and
the
contents
will
continue
to
the
executive
votes
on
monday
and,
as
david
said,
hopefully
that'll
be
the
last
time
we
need
to
do
an
executive
on
monday.
In
addition
to
once
on
fridays,
or
at
least
outside
of
your
problems,.
H
H
Yeah
we
had
the
biggest
liquidation
event
at
maker
as
many
other
places
in
defy
ether
and
other
currencies,
so
ether
actually
dropped.
I
think
it
was
the
second
biggest
drop.
As
we
checked,
I
think
the
the
largest
drawdown
in
today
was
46
percent
and
the
black
thursday
one
last
year
was
48,
so
it
was.
It
was
pretty
good
stress
test
for
proliferation
2.0,
so
I'm
going
to
show
some
stats.
H
So
this
is
the
cumulative
debt
being
liquidated,
including
penalty
fees.
In
the
on
one
day,
which
is
the
19th
of
may,
I
think
it
covers
24
hours.
I
think
it's
missing
the
two
other
heat
liquidations
we
had
overnight.
So
I
think
roughly
50
million
of
debt
was
liquidated
if
you
include
those
in
one
day,
including
penalty
fees,
and
you
can
see
that
initially
most
of
the
bitcoin,
maybe
I
should
use
this
pointer
grab
bitcoin
got
liquidated
initially,
this
is
the
green
color.
H
H
Auctions
and
the
penalty
fee
was
5.1
million
that
was
collected
pretty
much.
All
the
penalty
fee
was
collected
successfully
apart
from
one
other
one,
few
volts
where
it
wasn't-
and
this
were
these
were
actually
two
or
three
volts
on
it,
which
were
kind
of
unlucky
when
they
got
liquidated
right
at
the
worst
point
of
time,
especially
considering
the
price
curve.
H
I'm
gonna
talk
about
this
a
bit
later
and
it
be
because
it'd
be
a
slower,
qualitization
ratio,
so
any
discount
from
auctions
from
you
know,
keepers,
profits
or
just
slippage
related
or
anything
leads
to.
You
know
penalty
fee
not
being
fully
collected,
but
you
know
it's
kind
of
full
and
then
there's
xerox,
which
also
was
a
special
case,
because
it
was
liquidating
in
few
batches
because
we
limited
auction
throughput,
because
the
launching
liquidity
is
not
that
good.
So,
but
all
in
all
this
is
the
full
number.
H
Nothing
to
complain
really
same
chart
basically
same
status
here,
just
with
yeah.
We
have
some
charts,
I'm
not
going
to
waste
time
here
and
then
we
also
had
two
loss
events,
so
I
wanted
to
include
this
to
be
fully
transparent,
but
why
they
actually
happened.
So
this
is
really
small
world
that
got
liquidated
and
when
keepers
liquidate
a
small
world,
it
costs
a
lot
in
gas
fees
related
to
the
debt
being
bought.
H
So
they
they
beat
lower
prices,
and
you
can
see
that
the
the
slippage
towards
soy
sam
was
here
even
28,
but
yeah.
The
loss
was
80
81
die
at
this
world
and
then
there's
it
be.
This
one
is
not
as
small
but
still
because
it's
edb
and
again
any
slippage
related
to
keepers,
profits
or
just
bad
price.
Trajectory
versus
the
price
curve
leads
to
a
loss.
So
we
have
a
bit
of
loss
here,
12
000,
so
the
total
loss
for
maker
was
about
12
000
versus,
as
I
showed
5.1
million
of
revenues.
H
So
that
is
still
positive.
Then
there's
one
another
metric,
which
is
also
relevant,
and
this
is
you
know,
there's
actually
three
parts
of
the
of
the
whole
thing:
how
much
penalty
fees
maker
collects.
What's
the
profit
of
keepers
and
how
much
volts
get
back
so
this
is
also
especially
important,
and
this
metric
may
might
be
kind
of
confusing
and
basically
checks
how
much
collateral
world
owner
got
backed
got
back
versus
his
total
deposited
collateral.
H
Some
normal
prices
is
about
30
to
35
percent
of
the
remaining
collateral,
and
this
is
what
we,
what
we're
mostly
seeing,
whereas
at
some
lower
collateralized
world
such
as
eta
or
even
heat
b,
those
shares
are
smaller
right
because
liquidation
ratio
is
smaller
and
the
penalty
fee
is
still
is
actually
higher
related
to
the
whole
collateral
and
for
each
be.
You
know,
normal
number
is
around
15
percent
for
et,
for
it
a
should
be
closer
to
20,
and
this
could
be
a
bit
better.
H
Why
it
wasn't
it's
mostly
because
of
those
two
volts
that
I'm
going
to
show
later.
That
were
it's
really
unlucky,
as
I
said,
liquidated
at
the
worst
possible
time,
and
and
then
you
have
this
chart
yeah.
I
couldn't
include
the
labels
here,
so
you
could
see.
What's
what's
what
so
this
is
it
a
you
know
the
detail,
auctions
in
total
measure,
this
debt
side?
H
This
is
this
is
very
bitcoin,
for
instance,
and
what
this
chart
tries
to
show
is:
how
do
you
measure
auction
efficiency
right
and
normally
it's
related
to
osm
price
right?
We
know
osm
price
is
left
by
one
hour
and
if
keepers
bit
late,
if
they
want
more
profit,
if
price
trajectory
is
worse
than
the
auction
price
curve,
you
have
this.
H
So
if,
if
we
wanted
to
have
auctions
like
100
efficient,
everything
would
be
would
be
somewhere
here,
maybe
even
higher
depends
how
the
price
trajectory
goes,
but
normally
you
wanted
to
have
like
100
percent
efficiency,
zero,
zero
slippage
in
osm,
but
why
does
this
happen?
One
one
reason
is
just
the
auction
price
curve
versus
price
to
market
price
trajectory.
H
It's
not
perfect
right.
You
can't
just
determine
it
because
you
don't
know
how
the
prices
will
move.
The
other
one
is
related
to
keepers.
So
here's
efficiency
that
basically
looks
at
settlement
prices
at
auction
versus
the
market
prices.
So
we
wanted
to
check
you
know
what
was
the
market
price
at
the
time
of
the
settlement,
whereas
we
looked
at
the
off
chain,
real-time
prices.
This
is
not
necessarily
100
correct,
because
many
keepers
just
flip
collateral
on
on-chain
venues
and
it's
not
necessarily
one-to-one
synced
with
option
prices.
H
So
this
this
is
just
an
estimate,
but
it's
still
it's
about
there
and
what
does
that
one?
What
does
it
show
right?
It
shows
that
keepers
who
were
beating,
for
instance,
for
instance
on
eta
etay,
they
were
actually
beating
six
to
seven
percent
below
market
prices
right.
This
was
on
average.
This
was
some
kind
of
estimated
profit
again,
it's
not
100
correct,
but
of
course
they
need
to
take
something
for
themselves.
H
And
what
does
this
basically
tell
us
that
this
slippage
that
you
see
versus
osm
is
not
necessarily
related
just
to
bad
pricing,
bad
price
trajectory
versus
auction
curve,
but
also
keepers.
You
know,
keeper
keepers
are
not
100
competitive
they're,
not
working
with
zero
profits,
and
that's
why
we're
seeing
you
know
part
of
the
force
performance
also
because
of
this,
but
still
good
numbers
in
general.
H
What's
maybe
worth
to
add
here
is
that
some
smaller
volts,
of
course,
have
higher
slippage
again,
because
gas
costs
are
high
because
keepers
will
a
bit
lower,
but
also
because
this
other
world's
the
liquidity
tokens
is
is
not
as
good
right.
So
when
keepers
offload,
they
need
to
assign
the
slippage
which
they
can
already
see
on
the
unit
swap,
for
instance,
so
they
bit
lower
right
and
that's
why
we
have
throughput
limitations,
as
we
did
yesterday
for
zero
x
and
then
pretty
much
similar
thing.
H
H
And
of
course,
the
auction
price
curve
couldn't
catch
the
market
price,
which
was
dropping
and
that's
why
these
two
awards
were
liquidated,
much
lower
at
much
lower
prices,
so
about
25
percent
discount
to
osm
and
this
for
the
world
that
I
think
didn't
carry
the
penalty
fee
and
this.
This
is
why
we
had
a
bit
worse
performance
on
it.
H
H
So
this
is
the
distribution
of
settlement
times,
so
we
said
that
the
aux
expected
auction
duration
is
about
40
minutes.
If
keepers
don't
take
nothing
for
themselves,
if
prices
are
stable
and
so
on,
and
we
can
see
that
the
you
know
on
average
on
all
the
worlds,
the
types
we
were
between
30
and
50,
which
is
40.
H
H
I
can
see
what
is
the
okay
80
to
200
minutes
yeah
as
soon
as
it
goes
above
100
minutes
it
becomes
a
problem
for
it
becomes
a
problem
for
it,
but
for
each
be,
if
those
two
walls
would
be
e
to
b,
they
would
already
carry
a
loss.
So
that's
that's
important,
say
here
and
then
we
have
last
two
slides
keyboard
participation,
especially
important.
So
these
are.
This
is
keyboard
participation
only
for
kick
events
so
when
they
trigger
an
auction.
H
Pretty
surprisingly,
18
keepers
were
kicking
auctions,
especially
by
knowing
that
retail
ma,
I
think,
didn't
kick
any
auctions.
I
don't
know
of
any
uis.
It's
also
good
to
notice
that
these
are
not
necessarily
18
different
entities
right.
They
may
have
different
wallets
many
wallets,
but
then
again
18
different
entities.
While
it's
kicking,
that's
always
good.
This
is
also
the
amount
they
they
received
as
an
incentive.
H
H
What
should
I
say
here
looks
good,
maybe
there's
again
three
entities
which
are
performing,
but
that's
probably
both
related.
So
we
want
to
see
that
as
well,
and
I
think
that's
that's
it.
The
main
conclusions
are
that
we
need
to
probably
introduce
this
tip
value,
so
the
flat
fee,
the
other
one,
is
mostly
related,
and
I'm
still
thinking
about
it.
Should
we
make
an
auction.
There
was
some
discussion.
Should
we
make
auction
duration
shorter?
H
There
are
trade-offs
of
this.
I've
made
a
whole
post
on
forum
about
it.
Definitely
for
these
two
awards
looks
as
if
you
know,
duration
should
be
shorter
and
everything
should
be
fine,
but
it's
really
hard
to
say
if
this
would
be
the
case.
Why
is
that?
Because
if
you
make
auction
duration
shorter,
it
means
it
means.
The
price
is
more
aggressive.
H
H
C
F
Yeah,
I
can
tell
you
that
I
don't
know
if
anybody
kicked
through
the
ui,
but
I
know
of
at
least
one
person
who
bid
through
the
ui
said.
The
experience
was
great
and
also
profitable.
So
you
know
we're
we're
still
in
a
regime
where
it's
not
all
bots
winning
these,
which
I
thought
was
pretty
interesting.
H
A
B
B
H
Hard
to
say
we
I,
I
think
monetary
supply
made
the
table
when
you
can
you
actually
input
gas
cost
parameters,
and
you
know
you
basically
simulate
how
much
it
costs
he
focused
more
on
liquidations,
but
this
was
back
on
1.2
here.
We
need
to
make
a
different
simulation
because
it
works
differently.
Now
I
think
it's
less
gas
intensive,
but
there's
only
this
is
only
one
part
of
the
story.
The
other
part
is
related
to
you
know
just
user
perspective.
H
F
F
Like
you
know,
today,
everything
is
green
and
going
right
back
up,
so
you
know
there
there's
going
to
be
another
one
of
these
in
the
future
and
probably
worse.
So
I
think
this
is
like
our
dress
rehearsal
and
we
really
need
to
make
sure
we,
you
know
iron
out
any
issues
like
around
profitability,
dust
levels,
keeper,
incentivization,
etc.
So
this
this
was
a
great
data
point,
but
we
shouldn't
get
complacent
here
and
we
should
take
it
forward
and
figure
out
how
to
really
make
this
bulletproof.
C
Yeah
I'll,
second,
that
there
was
a
moment
when
we
were
staring
down
the
barrel
of
like
a
one
billion
dollar
liquidation
wave
and
that
that
made
me
feel
a
little
bit
of
despair
because
I
wasn't
sure
I
mean.
Obviously
our
overall
box
is
set
at
like
100
million
right
now,
but
I
think
we
need
to
carefully
think
about.
You
know
what?
C
What
can
the
system
really
push
through
it
right
now
now,
obviously,
the
die
supply
dropped
by
half
a
half,
a
billion
ish
right
or
like
400
million,
or
so
so
so
that
that
is
in
a
way
like
soft
liquidations.
But
I
know
just
worth
thinking
if
this
is
a
dress
rehearsal
for
an
even
bigger
event.
What
do
we
think
we
can
actually
do.
A
A
A
A
C
A
lot
of
that
sort
of
hinges
on
whether
or
not
governance
or
the
community
sees
the
need
for
a
psm
for
various
types
of
stable
coins
right.
So
so,
there's
like
one
possibility
for
low
liquidity,
or
will
I
yeah?
I
guess
that's
probably
the
right
way
to
say
stable
coins
would
be
that
you
know
we
could
basically
put
them
in
a
psm
that
has
a
zero
debt
ceiling.
C
You
know
you
you
throw
it
in
and
on
the
other
coin
back
out,
but
you
can't
sort
of
throw
the
stable
coin
back
in
and
then
get
die
out
of
it.
So
you
know,
maybe
we
do
that
with
true
usd.
Maybe
we
do
that
with
pax.
I'm
not
sure.
Just
maybe
wanted
to
open
see
what
what
people
were
thinking,
and
maybe
someone
can
start
like
I'm
getting
sterling
hold
on.
C
Maybe
someone
can
think
of
it.
I
can
hear
you
yeah,
oh
you
can.
Okay,
maybe
my
audio
is
fine
when
it
tells
me
that
yeah
so
just
you
know,
maybe
to
create
like
a
signal
thread
or
something
about
exactly
what
we
want
to
what
governance
wants
to
move
into
a
psm
style
format.
Once
we
know
that,
then
we
can
liquidate.
C
C
H
Yeah,
so
I
I
may
add
here
that
there's
basically
four
sorry
six
stable
coins,
so
usdca
is
going
to
bsm
liquidated
to
psm,
which
exists
for
usdca
for
usdc
we
have
used
dcb,
which
is
totally
unutilized.
Fc
link
is
to
zero.
I
think,
there's
I
don't
know
600
hours
of
depth
so
doing
anything
with
with
it
will
cost
unchained
more
than
you
know.
If
you
want
to
liquidate
it
or
anything,
I'm
not
sure,
but
the
same
goes
with
tusd.
H
H
I
don't
know
20
30
percent
slippage
on
chain,
so
I'm
not
sure
about
bsm
here,
but
the
solution
where
you
basically
only
allow
you
know
certain
amount
of
their
ceiling
demand
is
liquidated,
makes
sense
to
me.
So
I
would
probably
propose
this
and
similarly
goes
to
t
usd
the
launch.
Liquidity
is
better,
but
there
was
this
governance
vote
to
to
limit
debt
ceiling
to
zero
because
of
that
acquisition.
H
So
we
can
do
the
same
with
you,
use
the
switchbacks
usd
so
introduce.
We
can
introduce
these
two
psms
limited
and
and
then
there's
usd,
which
is
the
only
one
left
and
probably
probably
one
of
the
most
prospective
ones
currently
at
least
looking
from
the
on
chain
activity-
and
you
know
just
different
farming
type
of
activity,
but
it's
not
under
collateralized,
so
we
cannot
put
it
into
psn.
H
G
H
C
Yeah,
I
think
if
we
were
going
to
have
an
active
one,
I
think
that
would
that
would
definitely
be
the
case
would
be
to
limit
collateral
risk,
but
there
there
is
this
sort
of
benefit
like
this
is
a
a
much
cleaner
type
of
liquidation.
If
we
need
to
liquidate
these,
we
basically
don't
take
any
like
pricing
risk
or
slippage
risk.
If
we,
you
know-
and
we
also
have
this
like
syncq
problem.
C
So
the
alternative
is
you,
throw
it
into
a
psm
with
a
zero
debt
ceiling,
and
people
can
just
come
along
and
grab
it
whenever
they
need
liquidity
and
then
eventually,
it
trends
to
zero.
So
I
think
that
I
think
it's
it's
beyond
just
like
diversifying
collateral
risk.
It's
like
the
psm
is
in
a
way
actually
like
a
liquidation
mechanism,
so
yeah.
A
Yeah,
so
I
guess
we're
a
little
we're
running
a
little
on
time,
but
I
was
kind
of
interested
to
know
if
any
of
the
community,
I
guess,
have
like
strong
opinions
about
any
of
the
stablecoin
options
right
beyond
usdc
like
is
there
anything
like
anybody
thinks
we
should
definitely
have
psms
for
or
anything
that
people
any,
that
people
think
we
definitely
shouldn't
have
psms
or
right.
I
think
these
are
like
the
things
we're
trying
to.
A
B
I
mean
it
also
offers
like,
especially
if
we're
allowing
both
ways
on
on
some
of
them
like
income
source.
That's
that's
not
tied
to
to
the
market
market
fluctuations,
so
I
like
that,
and
it
also
adds
stability
to
the
d5
ecosystem-
dies
truly
at
a
dollar.
If
you
can
redeem
it
for
all
these
other
dollar
coins
at
any
time,
so
just
in
general,
I
would
think
is.
B
A
H
H
A
H
D
H
Well,
that
won't
happen
really
really
soon.
I
made
a
post
on
forum
like
there's:
there's
there
is
the
800
millions
of
dye
drained
on
curve
first
and
then
psn
starts
draining,
so
there's
like
1.5
billion,
which
is
okay,
not
an
hour's,
probably
lower,
but,
like
I
don't
know,
one
third
or
20
percent
of
the
supply
yeah.
I
don't
believe
that
can
happen
really
soon.
L
We
decide
to
support
with
the
psm,
and
I
think
that,
unlike
vaults,
that
have
you
know
a
stability
fee
with
a
risk
premium
priced
in
psms,
they
have
the
toll
fee
in
and
out,
but
I
don't
know
if
that
is
considered
from
a
risk
perspective
like
since
we're
holding
on
to
whatever
you
know:
800
900
million
usdc
like
okay,
that's
usdc,
it's
relatively
safe,
but
you
know
I
don't
know,
maybe
we're
okay
with
doing
busd
for
50
million
or
25
million.
If
that
goes,
you
know
what's?
L
G
Yeah
just
to
expand
on
the
context
of
that
right,
like
when,
like
putting
something
in
a
psm,
is
very
different
from
just
onboarding
it
as
an
asset,
because
when
you
onboard
a
collateral
type
right
like
let's
say
the
knc
token
right,
if
the
price
of
knc
drops
right,
you
know
we
liquidate
and
that's
how
we
kind
of
get
our
money
back
with
psm
right.
It's
you
know
we,
we
own
those
tokens
and
we're
taking
on
that.
G
You
know
price
that
we
just
have
complete
exposure
to
those
tokens
and
the
only
way
to
really
limit
the
additional
exposure
we
take
on
right
is
for
a
jet
ceiling
for
for
that
psm
right.
But
if
the
thing
goes
to
zero,
like
we,
that's
we
take
that
as
a
loss
right,
and
so,
if,
if
the
thing
fails,
we
should
basically
expect
the
entire
debt
ceiling
that
we
allocate
to
this
thing
to
just
be
filled
up
by
people
who
are
just.
You
know,
trying
basically
arbitraging
right.
G
I
But
if
they
start
to
care
about
us
and
we
have
1
million
usdc
in
a
world,
they
might
start
to
lobby
at
washington
or
somewhere
else
to
try
to
blacklist
this
psm
and
that's
the
issue
by
having
only
one
option.
If
we
have
many
options,
even
if
you
don't
feel
them
at
least,
we
have
the
option
to
quit.
The
credon
party
risk
of
usdc.
L
G
B
I
G
I'm
almost
wondering
if
there's
some
kind
of
like
pre-configured
way
we
can
authorize
to
like
liquidate
the
entire
usdc
psm.
If
we
needed
to
do
it
like
in
a
hurry
right,
like
almost
some
way
where
you
can
have
like
a
pre-signed
transaction,
and
then
you
just
put
it
in
a
bot
which
is
checking
the
mempool
and
you
try
to
front
run
any
blacklisting
and
so
obviously
right.
G
Whoever
is
running
that
bot,
it's
kind
of
dangerous
because
you
could
potentially
just
you
know,
liquidate
the
psm
anyway
right,
even
if
there
wasn't
a
blacklist
transaction
but
yeah.
I
don't
know
I'm
kind
of
just
thinking
out
loud
here,
I'm
not
sure
if
that's
even
viable,
but
just
just
something
to
think
about.
C
Yeah,
like,
like
you,
you'd,
see
the
transaction
instantly.
Flash
mint
like
the
equivalent
of
dye,
create
an
lp
token
and
then
just
drop
it
in
like
an
lp
pool
exactly
yeah,
it's
no
longer
in
the
psm.
You
didn't
take
any
like
market
slippage.
You
probably
are
going
to
earn
fees
from
the
lp
anyway.
I
I'm
thinking
on
the
fly.
I
get
myself
in
danger
when
I
do
that,
but.
G
L
Of
blacklisting
sorry
long,
I
know
you
want
to
wrap
up
this
call
just
one
last
comment.
I
am
curious,
like
hope.
Maybe
we
could
talk
about
it
next
week
or
on
the
forum
or
something
but
yeah.
I'm
curious
about
the
design
decision
from
you
know:
protocol
engineering
about
potentially
adding
blacklists
to
like
things
like
psm
preemptively,
so
that
if
there
is
like
some,
you
know,
eth
address.