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From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 35
Description
The theme for this call will be 'Demand/Supply Imbalance'.
- Steven is on a panel at NY Blockchain week at this time and won't be joining us.
- Rich will discuss myths, memes, and misconceptions around governance and voting.
- Cyrus will walk us through the state of Risk.
- Vishesh will present his analysis.
Matthew Rabinowitz will present his Weekly Narrative.
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Thread: https://redd.it/bp7inm
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours) : https://github.com/makerdao/community/tree/master/governance/transcripts
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-38625f514101
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 2: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-fc8939f3d4e9
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundatio...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 3: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-part-3-7a4c620f4077
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
Well,
Rowan
welcome
to
the
may
16th
edition
of
this
scientific
governance
and
risk
meeting.
We
have
lots
to
go
over
today.
I
say
that
even
with
her,
you
know
before
I
consider
whether
we
do
or
not-
but
it's
usually
true.
So,
let's
just
stick
with
it:
we're
going
to
mix
up
the
the
agenda
of
its
its
New
York
blockchain
weak
people
are
busy
and
on
panels
and
running
to
and
fro
and
in
light
of
that,
Steven
won't
be
joining
us
today.
A
He's
on
a
panel
right
now,
I
believe
we're
going
to
skip
the
thought
of
the
week
and
move
immediately
into
my
section.
Then
we'll
talk
about
risk
for
a
bit
and
we
have
a
special
guest
today
after
a
voice
is
going
to
give
us
a
recap
of
his
weekly
thoughts
about
the
system
and
we'll
also
hear
from
the
shesh
and
then
cyrus
will
set
some
context
for
us.
A
I'll
also,
we
have
a
very
important
discussion
thread
that
goes
along
with
these
calls.
The
general
context
here
is
that
we
have
one
hour
to
discuss
a
lot
of
really
important
topics.
One
hour
isn't
enough,
so
the
idea
here
is
that
we
set
some
basic
assumptions.
We
have
some
interesting
debates,
we
surface
a
few
ideas
and
then
we
continue
this
longer
discussion
in
the
subreddit
and
then
act
on
them
from
there.
And/Or
bring
the
results
back
to
these
calls.
A
A
All
right
so
I
want
to
talk
about
some
things
today
that
are
largely
related
sobota
ng,
and
we
had
some
interesting
drama
with
the
voting
infrastructure.
Over
the
last
couple
weeks,
there
was
an
exploit
discovered
in
the
contracts
we
updated.
The
contracts
we've
migrated
to
a
new
back-end
that
has
the
same
feature
sets
feature
parity
with
the
old
contract
with
the
function
removed.
But
in
order
to
make
that
happen,
we
had
to
get
people
out
of
the
old
contract
and
into
the
new
contract.
A
That
was
a
hiccup
because
voter
apathy,
he
is
something
that
we've
been
dealing
with
since
launched.
We
had
begun
just
gained
some
some
good
momentum,
getting
people
back
into
there,
getting
people
into
the
system
and
voting
with
their
maker,
that's
interruption
to
the
contract
and
with
everybody
being
in
New
York.
This
week,
voter
apathy
is
now
reared
its
head
and
I
want
to
point
out
something
which
I
think
is
fascinating,
but
also
equally
alarming.
A
A
Participation
was
down
and
if
you're
interested
in
finding
a
faltering
the
chat
for
this
troll,
you
can
join
us
in
chat.
I'll
make
it
down.
But
we
were
in
a
situation
where
literally
one
person
was
going
to
set
the
stability
fee
for
all
of
us.
Happily,
somebody
came
in
and
last
10
hours
or
so
and
deposited
another
chunk
of
maker
into
the
2
percent
decrease
option.
A
So
this
is
a
slightly
better
situation,
but
in
my
books,
not
much
better
because
now
we're
in
a
situation
where
two
people
have
decided
with
the
stability
feeds-
and
that
raises
a
lot
of
questions
at
this
point.
Is
that
engagement
low,
because
people
believe
that
these
these
large
maker
holders
are
they
know
better,
then
than
they
did
and
the
issues
not
to
participate?
Is
it
because
they
believe
there's
too
much
friction
in
the
system
and
they
just
can't
be
bothered?
Do
they
believe
that
they're
the
amount
of
makeup
that
they
hold?
A
It's
not
going
to
move
the
needle
and
therefore
it's
a
waste
of
time.
There's
there's
a
lot
of
questions
that
need
to
be
answered
here,
and
so
this
is
where
I
want
to
get
into
the
myths
and
misconceptions
part
of
the
talk
right
now,
because
we
have
a
lots.
The
governance
is
hard
in
general,
it's
a
capital,
H
heart
problem,
and
it
doesn't
matter
whether
you're
in
crypto
space
or
whether
you're
in
the
geopolitical
space,
the
real
world
space.
It's
a
very,
very
hard
problem
and
the
way
that
voting
systems
have
evolved
over
time.
A
Sort
of
this
brute
force
best
efforts,
kind
of
solution
which
we,
which
actually
works,
people
walk
to
a
location.
They
show
some
ID
that
proves
they
are
who
they
are.
They
go
into
the
booth
and
there's
a
reason
why
they're
curtains
around
those
booths
and
they
drop
a
piece
of
paper
into
a
box
and
then
other
human
to
read
those
pieces
of
paper.
It
sounds
ridiculous,
but
there's
a
reason
why
representative
voting
systems
look
like
that,
which
is
a
long
discussion
we
should
go
into
today.
A
Maker
doubt
is
not
a
representative
voting
system.
It's
not
a
representative
democracy.
It's
it's
morosely,
it's
more
akin
to
a
shareholder
vote
in
a
publicly
traded
company,
and
that
is
a
very
well
understood
mechanism
as
well.
People
I
already
know
how
that
works.
There's
there's
expectations
and
paradigms
that
go
along
with
that.
One
of
the
the
challenges
that
we
have
in
this
space
is
that
people
are
still
confused
by
the
word
vote
and
we
have
a
lot
of
people
that
are
engaged
in
this
system.
A
That
may
not
be
familiar
with
the
traditional
business
world,
and
so
they
think
ok,
I
have
a
vote.
That
means
that
it's
it's
one
person
one
vote
and
we
should
all
be
equally
able
to
move
the
system
in
the
direction
that
we
want,
and
it's
important
for
people
to
realize
that
that's
fun,
not
the
way
that
the
system
was
designed.
A
It
specifically
designed
to
not
be
like
that,
so
the
the
the
way
that
this
system,
the
parameter,
is
looking
sorry
the
way
the
risk
parameters
work
in
this
eco
system
is
designed
by
people
with
the
most
skin
in
the
game
getting
out
staking
their
maker
and
making
the
will
understood.
And
if
people
don't
do
that,
then
we
have
problems.
A
That
sounds
like
a
lot
of
maker.
It
is
a
lot
of
maker,
but
it's
absolutely
inconsequential.
When
you
look
at
the
rest
of
the
circulating
maker
that
is
available
to
be
used
to
vote,
it's
fantastically
low.
There
is
more
than
enough
circulating
MKR
right
now
to
easily
swamp
the
two
people
that
did
choose
to
vote,
and
so
it's
not.
We
have
tendency
to
worry
about
plutocracies
and
Wales
in
this
space
and
those
are
very
valid
concerns,
but
we
need
to
make
sure
that
we
understand
what
the
definition
of
a
whale
is
some
in
some
contexts.
A
A
whale
is
somebody
that
owns
so
much
of
a
token
that
there's
literally
nothing
anybody
can
do
about
it.
There's
some
other
projects
in
the
space
recently
that
have
run
into
this
problem,
where
somebody
who
owns
from
on
camera
balloons,
46%
of
all
the
outstanding
tokens,
has
come
in
and
just
sort
of
had
their
way
with
another
project,
we're
not
in
that
spot.
There's
nobody
in
our
ecosystem
that
owns
so
much
maker,
that's
five
or
six
other
holders.
A
You
can't
overwhelm
that
vote
so
we
have
large
holders,
but
we
don't
have
whales
that
are
kicking
both
manipulating
the
system
right
now.
So
if
people
are
sitting
out
and
letting
those
those
large
holders
set
policy,
then
that's
it's
more
of
a
choice
and
an
unavoidable
outcome.
So
the
message
here
is
that
we
desperately
need
everybody
to
lock
up
their
maker.
If
we
don't
need
to
break
down
numbers,
there's
people
here
I'm.
A
A
I
alluded
earlier
that
there's
problems
in
voting
structures
and
those
problems
are
universal
and
they've
been
around
since
the
dawn
of
time,
and
the
poor
of
that
problem
is
that,
if
you're
a
person
who
thinks
that
your
vote
doesn't
matter
in
this
system,
then
that's
a
self-fulfilling
prophecy,
because
people
who
do
believe
that
their
vote
matter,
their
vote
does
matter
because
they're
actually
voting.
And
so
if
people
stay
on
the
sidelines
because
they
think
that
they
can't
move
the
needle
people
that
believe
they
can
move
the
needle
will
control
the
system.
A
So
if
this
is
a
common
issue
that
is
universal,
but
we
need
to
solve
this
problem
with
communication
and
organization
and
campaigning,
and
it's
the
community
that
really
needs
to
help
us
out
on
this,
because
we
we
need
to
be
as
agnostic
as
we
possibly
can
from
the
foundation.
But
if
community
members
believe
that
they
need,
they
have
a
very
strongly
believe
that
the
vote
should
head
in
Direction
X.
A
Then
the
community
needs
to
self-organize
and
begin
to
campaign
for
X
and
to
organize
delegate
systems
for
X
or
sub
downs
that
collect
votes
for
X
with
them.
There's
a
lot
of
ways
that
the
voting
system
can
be
optimized,
but
it's
we're
reluctant
to
make
the
system
more
complex
than
it
already
is
because
we're
running
into
a
situation
where
we
have
this
friction.
A
We
have
basically
a
two
or
three
click
voting
process,
but
we
already
have
friction
where
people
aren't
engaging,
and
so,
if
we
add
threshold
and
delegating
and
liquidity
or
liquid
democracy
or
holography
or
or
any
of
the
other
future
Keys
future
keys.
I,
don't
I
said
about,
but
if
we
had
any
one
of
these
enormously
complex
mechanisms
on
top
of
it,
we're
going
to
be,
you
know,
increasing,
friction
exponentially
and
then
we're
going
to
see
increasing
drop
off.
A
A
Not
recently
is
that
we
have
a
series
of
the
most
highly
engaged
stakeholders
with
the
most
skin
in
the
game,
choosing
long
term
success
of
the
project
over
short
term
gain,
and
that's
something
that
we
need
to
ensure
that
people
understand
that
nobody.
Nobody
immediately
makes
money
when
the
stability
of
heat
goes
up.
A
A
A
See
else
did
I
want
to
get
into
today.
I
think
that
will
probably
cut
it
off
there.
Just
as
a
general
overarching
theme,
it's
very
important
for
people
to
reengage,
with
with
the
voting
portal,
stake
your
maker
and
make
sure
that
you
follow
the
calls
and
look
at
the
discussion.
Threads
look
at
the
shushes
graphs
and
make
sure
that
your
will
just
heard
in
the
system,
because
otherwise,
your
controls
from
chat
will
determine
your
face
and
nobody
wants
that.
A
B
A
Be
happy
to
spend
like
a
minute
or
two
talking
about
this.
If
people
are
interested
because
we've
we
had
another
post
in
the
subreddit
that
suggested
finding
the
average
between
the
two
largest
options
were
finding
a
median
at
this
in
the
polls.
My
concern
there
is
that
yeah
I
don't
know
if
I
have
a
concern.
It
feels
a
bit
weird
to
me
that
perhaps
we
have
one
person,
listen
if
by
the
model,
one
person
votes
a
thousand
and
one
for
negative
for
one
person
votes.
A
C
A
Thought
those
discussions,
but
it
comes
back
to
something
that
I
think
that
people
might
feel
is
a
bit
simplistic
and
maybe
on
the
surface,
makes
it
appear
that
I'm
missing
the
point
here,
but
one
of
the
things
I
want
to
reiterate
the
work,
we're
a
very
complex
space.
We
have
a
lot
of
really
cool
ideas.
This
is
crypto,
so
we're
going
to
reinvent
an
engineer
our
way
out
of
every
problem
that
human
nature
has
ever
had.
That
sounds
awesome.
A
Let's
give
it,
let's
give
it
our
best,
but
we
have
there's
some
significant
issues
involved
with
complexity
and
if
we
have
a
polling
system
and
that
polling
system
requires
people
to
read
a
page
and
a
half
of
documentation
and
algorithms
to
understand
how
that
works.
I
have
concerns
about
the
success
of
an
operation
like
that
people
don't
like
to
read.
D
A
Precisely
is
that's
a
great
point
Josh
because
it
ultimately
comes
down
to
civil
protection.
These
things
and
every
almost
every
solution
to
the
problem
of
governance
has
to
do
with
lists
somehow
get
its
identity
onto
the
blockchain
or
the
other
solution.
It
is
especially
just
lost
it.
Oh
yeah,
sorry,
this
good
identity
onto
the
blockchain.
A
That
makes
everything
easier,
but
you
know
that's
a
huge
problem
in
itself
or
listen,
sent,
advise
people
to
vote
and
that's
a
huge
problem
as
well,
because
I'm
as
far
as
I'm,
aware
and
I
say
this
a
few
times
but
I'd
love.
Somebody
to
correct
me.
There
is
no
robust
in
ironclad
identity
solution
on
I
know
that
there's
some
really
great
ones
and
some
I'm
a
fan
of
some
of
them,
but
I
I'm,
not
unaware
of
rock-solid
identity
solution
on
the
blockchain
and
I
am
completely
unaware
of
any
incentivization
model.
A
A
This
is
where
I
have
a
tendency
to
I.
Don't
want
to
say
things
too
outlandish,
because
Christine
is
here
and
she's
gonna
do
a
poll
Club,
but
I'm
I,
don't
necessarily
think
the
clue
time.
She's
hurt
bad
thing.
First,
for
layer,
two
layer,
three,
this
is
an
application
right.
It's
skin
in
the
game,
he's
a
highly
engaged.
It
goes
at
the
protocol
level.
I
think
it's
an
absolute
disaster,
but
as
far
as
what
I
would
like
personally
I
think
it
would
be
nice
if
we
had
enough
of
a
distribution
in
the
voting
system.
A
That's
I,
don't
know
40
60,
70
percent
of
the
people
that
turnouts
have
more
MKR
than
the
30
percent
of
the
largest
holders.
Possibly
so
so
we
know
that
this
isn't
just
the
ship
being
steered
by
two
or
three
accounts.
If
we
knew
that
there
was
enough
people
agreeing
and/or
being
able
to
have
way
the
top
5
holders
or
something
I
think
would
be
a
healthy
place
to
be,
but.
D
A
A
That's
people
that
have
increased
the
fee
and
I
know
that
a
lot
of
people
weren't
happy
with
that,
but
that
that
fee
increased
in
my
opinion,
stabilized
or
helped
to
increase
the
stability
of
the
peg
and
make
our
holders
in
general
took
a
haircut
because
of
that
because
they
understood
that
their
incentives
aligned
with
every
other
actors
in
the
systems
and
senses
whether
they
may
be,
whether
they'd
agree
and
or
believe
it
or
not.
It's.
A
B
A
B
So
ruinous
period
some
say,
I
wrote
in
the
chat
rooms
previously
stated
that
turnout
itself
is
not
important.
As
don't
necessarily
know
whether
majority
is
voting
for
the
quote.
Correct
outcome,
also,
I,
don't
think
we
can
put
much
weight
towards
individual
address
participation
as
eventually
that
will
just
be
exploited
too
yeah.
That's
the
point
rich
was
making
earlier
more
important
is
that
there
is
always
sufficient
voters
ready
to
vote
for
emergency
shutdown,
yeah.
A
E
A
Yeah
and
I
agree
and
there's
it
also.
We
need
to
clarify
too,
and
this
is
sort
of
a
loaded
term
recently,
but
this
is
scientific
governance
and
whether
you
like
or
dislike
that
term.
But
the
point
is
of
the
point
of
it,
is
that
ultimately
we
get
to
a
space
where
opinions
don't
matter
and
so
there's
either
empirical
evidence
or
there's
no
empirical
evidence
that
one,
the
other
decisions
are
correct
and
once
we
get
into
a
model
where
we
have
that
sort
of
black
and
whites
as
much
as
possible
black
and
white
model.
A
To
look
at
it's
far
easier
to
find
outlying
opinions.
That's
would
expose
themselves
as
being
an
attack
on
government.
So
if
there,
if
we
spend
a
few
weeks
looking
at
these
Python
scripts
and
clean
datasets
and
graphs
that
clearly
state
that
X
needs
to
happen,
and
then
we
have
a
poll
where
there's
a
large
voter
comes
in
and
votes
for
a
Y,
and
that
brings
us
to
a
situation
where
we
can
start
looking
for
trolling
and
or
attacks
and
then
have
some
uncomfortable
conversations
about
what
governance
attacks
look
like
at
that
point.
D
A
A
Right
now,
yeah
we
have
a
new
version,
it's
coming
up
very
soon
and
has
far
more
flexibility,
but
unfortunately,
right
now
we're
in
a
position
where
we
can
only
have
one
active
vote
at
a
time,
and
that
includes
polls
and
that's
part
of
the
reason
why
the
cadence
looks
the
way
it
does.
My
hope
was
that
we
would
take
the
breathing
room
that
the
contract
up
great
update
provided
us
last
week.
Then
we
would
have
a
discussion
about
what
new
cadence
has
looked
like
this
week.
A
We
would
have
a
poll
from
monday
to
wednesday,
with
the
same
with
default
oxygen
Thursday
morning
to
Sandwell
default
options
and
then
immediately
we
would
kick
off
another
poll
that
would
discuss.
Do
we
want
to
alter
the
caves?
Do
we
want
to
think
about
executives
on
Monday
or
so
Tuesday,
Friday,
cadence
or
Monday
Thursday
kids?
Or
do
we
move
to
a
14
day?
Kids?
The
problem
is
that
the
voting
portal
right
now
doesn't
support
that
mechanism.
So
it's
going
to
have
to
wait
until
I
think
two
weeks
before
we
can
reevaluate
them.
A
But
the
problem
here
is:
there's
some
working.
That's
because
we're
kind
of
talking
about
three
different
issues.
One
issue
is
the
the
speed
or
the
the
length
of
the
cadence.
Is
that
do
we
have
a
seven-day
governance
like?
Oh,
do
we
have
a
14-day
governance
cycle?
The
other
issue
is:
do
we
start
executives
on
on
Monday
and
give
people
the
business
week
to
get
their
hardware
well
instead
of
storage
or
deal
with
their
custody
solutions
in
order
to
engage
with
the
system?
A
Because,
right
now
we
have
executives
on
Friday,
and
presumably
people
have
things
to
do
on
the
weekend.
Other
than
vote
on
maker
down
issues,
so
there's
the
which
day
we
kick
things
off
on.
Another
issue
that
we
wanted
to
address
it
is,
is
the
range
of
options
that
we
provide
in
these
polls
still
valid,
because
we
wanted
to
go
from
a
1%
in
increments,
from
negative
4
to
positive
4,
but
does
it
make
more
sense
to
do
two
percent
increments
and
then
simplify
the
UI
a
bit?
The
other
issue
that
we
had
was
around.
A
Oh
yeah.
Sorry.
The
other
issue
we
had
is
that
we
have
a
system.
That's
designed
around
continuous
approval
voting
and
what
that
means
is
that
in
the
executive
system,
we
have
a
quote
a
quote
that
has
been
accepted
by
the
maker
hole.
That
represents
the
state
of
the
system,
but
it's
basically
a
picture
of
all
the
stability
risk
parameters
locked
in
and
been
applied
to
the
system.
When
we
have
a
poll,
people
choose
an
option.
A
Didn't
move
from
the
old
executive
to
the
new
executive
all
weekend
and
we
were
in
a
position
where
we're
designing
or
writing
up
the
poll
for
the
following
week
and
we're
asking
ourselves
there's
a
poll
is
suggesting
four
zero
to
four
percent
increase,
but
increase
of
what
the
old
stability
feat
represented
in
the
old
executive
or
the
stability.
If
you
represented
in
the
new
executive,
which
hasn't
been
ratified
against
Republicans
so
poll,
without
an
understanding
with
the
state
of
the
system,
is.
A
Moving
from
relative
to
absolute
values
was
put
out
there
too.
We
still
have
this
issue
where
a
pole
could
where
an
executive
can
be
decided
halfway
through
the
length
of
the
polling
period.
So
if
somebody
says
okay,
sorry
so
I
guess
that
that
ties
back
to
your
absolute
solution
with
a
relative
solution
we
have
issue
:
could
still
executive
voting
could
still
be
happening
during
the
poll
which
raises
confusion.
A
B
A
Well,
that's
that's
what
I
mean
about
the
ambiguity,
so
we
have
this
situation
where
I've
been
calling
them
weak
executives.
So
we
we
have
an
existing
state
of
the
system.
We
have
a
poll
that
resides,
provides
us
with
a
new
potential
state
of
the
system,
a
new
executive
vote.
The
assumption
is
in
the
community
that
okay
well,
this
wait
until
the
large
paper
holders
ratify
this
thing,
and
now
we
know
what
the
stated
system
looks
like
that.
A
That's
the
situation
we
ran
into
in
the
during
that
weekend,
where,
for
whatever
reason
this
this
new
executive
didn't
get
ratified,
and
so
it
created
ambiguity.
We
had
this
weak
executive
vying
for
supremacy
in
the
system
and
the
assumption
that
we
have
to
start
asking
ourselves
a
bunch
of
questions
like.
Why
did
that
poll
succeed?
Why
did
the
new
executive
not
get
ratify?
What
is
it
about
the
old
executive
that
people
found
more
enticing?
B
B
Can't
actually
speak
to
that
I
have
kind
of
a
theory
so
like.
If
you
see
what
rich
called
the
weak
executive
vote,
where
there's
not
a
lot
of
people
piling
in
their
maker
so
as
to
you
know,
overwhelm
the
previous
hat
or
the
previous
proposal,
then
what
you're
gonna
see
is
because
the
previous
proposal
can
be
overthrown
by
like
a
lower
amount
of
MKR.
People
from
the
failing
proposal
will
actually
have
to
go
back
into
the
old
proposal
to
kind
of
strengthen
the
status
quo.
B
F
A
Had
threshold
eval
occur
isms
to
the
polls,
so
if
it's
less
than
X
percent
of
turnouts
or
less
than
X
percent
higher
results
for
one
option,
the
poll
doesn't
go
through
and
we
just
don't
have
an
executive
yeah.
Other
solution
that
was
mooted
for
the
executive
was
if
the
executive
doesn't
pass
if
the
new
executive
doesn't
pass
over
the
course
of
the
next
two
or
three
days.
Anybody
who
voted
for
that
executive
just
has
their
maker
returned
to
the
previous
option.
So
we
sort
of
clean
up
this
week.
Executive
idea,
so.
D
I
have
a
quick
technical
question
because
I
don't
understand
this,
about
the
system
or
about
the
voting.
If
are
all,
are
all
executives
always
active.
So
if
an
old
one
from
like
six
months
ago
happens
to
have
you
know
fifty
thousand
maker
in
it
and
the
newest
one
that
we
pull
only
has
you
know
forty
nine
thousand?
Does
that
mean
that
the
six
month
old
one
is
active.
A
D
D
A
The
executive
vote
is
a
set
of
configurations
for
a
program
and
that
program
is
maker
down,
and
so
we
can't
allow.
We
can't
revert
the
settings
on
a
system
that
might
have
been
upgraded
in
the
background.
Yes,
is
this
quick?
You
can't
apply
old
settings
on
a
new
system
and
so
there's
no
backwards
movement
here.
So
once
the
executive
has
been
approved,
you
can't
go
back
so.
D
A
Wasn't
expecting
so
much
engagement
because
usually
people
don't
care
about
this
stuff,
so
I'm
actually
quite
encouraged.
We
need
to
continue
this
conversation,
though,
because
I
just
realized
that
I've
just
neaten
up
ten
minutes
of
risks,
time
which
you're
not
going
to
be
happy
about.
If
people
want
to
continue
this
discussion,
please
click
on
the
maker,
gov
reddit
subreddit,
link
that
I
posted
in
the
chat
and
let's
just
try
and
figure
out
a
solution
to
this
problem
at.
C
F
F
F
So
as
far
as
eath
price
yeah,
I
mean
ii.
'the
price
has
come
up
to
and
over
the
peg.
So
there's
apologies
there's
a
24-hour
delay
on
these
stats,
but
I
do
have
the
the
fresh
stats
as
well.
So
essentially,
a
stability
fee
has
kind
of
come
up
and
up-
and
up
from
you
know,
11.5%
mid
april
up
to
nineteen
point,
five
percent
to
you
know
about
two
weeks
ago,
and
then
since
then,
we've
held
the
stability
fee
steady,
but
the
dye
price
has
sort
of
continued
to
come
up.
F
You
know
on
the
previous
call
in
terms
of
the
ratio
of
short-term
eath
price
to
long-term
eath
price
had
been
pretty
well
correlated
to
the
dye
price
that
had
been
primarily,
in
my
opinion,
as
a
result
of
kind
of
overall
bullishness
on
eath,
leading
to
a
lot
of
that
leveraged
behavior.
What's
interesting
is
that
it's
really
broken
the
pattern.
You
know
in
the
past
two
weeks,
given
eath
price
kind
of
skyrocketing.
F
F
You
know
over
600
and
then
come
back
down
a
bit,
so
that
tends
to
happen
around
eath
price
movements
is
you'll
see
here
the
collateralization
ratio
will
tend
to
spike
just
on
the
collateralization
ratio
will
tend
to
spike
and
then
come
back
down
a
bit
because
you
know
mathematically
goes
up
when
the
eath
price
goes
up
and
then
people
kind
of
stabilize
to
a
level
they're
comfortable
with
well
in
the
last
24
hours
or
so
that
had
shot
up.
You
know
way
over.
F
It
was
a
you
know,
like
four
hundred
and
forty
four
hundred
fifty
percent
that
had
shot
up
to
six
hundred
some
percent,
given
the
eath
price
change,
and
then
people
were
kind
of
comfortable
with
its
stabilizing
down
around
580
percent,
which
is
huge,
I
mean
that's
a
tremendous
collateralization
ratio.
I
think
that
is
evidence
of
some
deleveraging
behavior
so-
and
this
is
corroborated
with,
what's
been
going
on
with
a
lot
of
the
trading
volumes
in
the
past
24
hours,
or
so
you
know,
15
million
died
been
traded.
F
So,
and
you
know,
if
you
just
slid
that
24-hour
range
back
a
few
more
hours,
it
was.
You
know
something
like
20
million
so
what's
interesting
about.
This
is
tremendous
amount
of
dye
trade,
death
trading
volume,
but
usually
dice
trading
volume
is
associated
with
a
drop
in
dry
price.
What
we've
seen
now
is
dye
price
skyrocketing
with
tremendous
trading
volume.
F
So
what
that
actually
says
is
a
lot
of
folks
selling
eath
that
they
had
been
levered
up
on
cashing
out
some
of
those
profits
and
died
terms
and
then
not
immediately
selling
that
die
for
US
dollars,
which
is
a
like
an
extremely
positive
sign
for
maker.
In
that
people,
crypto
people
specifically
see
and
understand
the
value
of
die
as
kind
of
a
temporary
shelter
against
volatility,
but
also
given
its
stability,
a
good
unit
to
sort
of
take
those
profits
and
I
know.
F
There's
been
a
lot
of
discussion
around
whether
that's
for
tax
purposes
or
whether
those
people
are
kind
of
waiting
to
again
lever
up
and
I
think
we
can
only
speculate
as
to
the
reason,
but
definitely
a
positive
indicator
for
maker
as
a
system
I
think
people
are
showing
a
lot
of
confidence
in
the
system.
So
what
we
saw
was
in
the
last
24
hours
a
lot
of
this
trading
volume.
F
It
happened
on
Oasis
seats
to
die,
but
also
a
fair
amount
on
you
know,
swap
I,
also
bucketed
out
sort
of
at
what
prices
these
trades
were
happening,
and
you
know
how
many
of
these
traded
trades
were
happening
at
which
prices,
so
most
of
the
trades
have
been
around.
You
know
a
dollar
two
dollar
one
and
then
the
volume
it
weighted
average
is
like
you
know,
a
dollar
a
dollar
1.9.
F
What
is
going
to
be
interesting
is
I
know,
there's
been
a
lot
of
discussion
that
o
die
is
above
the
peg,
and
so
we
should
definitely
reduce
the
stability
fee.
A
lot
of
this
is
primarily
a
function
of
cashing
out
those
profits
and
not
having
taken
another
step.
After
doing
that,
I
think
it's
going
to
be
an
important
discussion
about
what
we
think
people
will
do
with
that
die
and
how
long
they
will
sit
with
that
guy.
F
So
what
we
initially
saw
was,
you
know
a
large
quantity
of
dye
being
minted
again
after
this
line
ends,
there
was
an
even
larger
quantity
of
dye
burn.
Bringing
the
supply
down
to
you
know
almost
81
million
the
circulation
of
debt
has
been
outstanding
recently
I
mean
a
large
quantity
of
old
debt
have
been
closed
out
and
a
large
quantity
of
new
debt
has
been
minted
and
then
subsequently,
a
large
quantity
of
new
debt
was
closed
out.
So
it
was
really
interesting
to
see
over
the
past
few
days.
F
The
age
of
debt
has
really
significantly
dropped
the
age
of
open
debt
compound.
So,
what's
been
going
on
with
some
of
the
secondary
lending
markets,
is
the
rates
kind
of
ran
up
a
little
bit,
which
makes
sense
in
terms
of
how
much
dye
demand
has
been
over
the
past
week
or
so
the
rates
ran
up
and
then
you
know,
dropped
down
a
bit.
I
think
this
makes
sense
in
the
context
of
you
know-
and
you
know
some
of
what's
been
going
on
with
new.
F
Oh
and
some
of
the
other
platforms
has
an
interesting
effect
on
compound,
but
effectively
as
these
secondary
lending
platforms
become
more
of
a
primary
source
of
dye.
For
you
know,
people
that
want
to
access
to
stable
coins,
I
think
that
there's
been
a
lot
of
discussion
about
whether
that
helps
tie
price
or
not,
but
it
definitely
gives
people
access
to
that
guy
without
changing
the
overall
supply.
F
A
E
Right
sure,
thank
you
yeah.
This
is
a
it's
an
iterative
academic
exercise,
some
of
it
all
of
its
some
of
its
empirical.
Some
of
its
will,
hopefully
logical,
logical
but
I
believe
it
to
be
true
and
I'm
we're
on
the
same
path
as
everyone.
You
know
the
pursuit
of
knowledge
you
know,
and
some
of
that
just
morphs
over
time
as
we
engage
differently
and
learn
different
points
specifically
to
me
learning
more
about
like
automation.
My
point
has
totally
shifted
on
that
over
time.
So
that
said,
let's
just
jump
in
so
like
the
stability
fee.
E
You
know
it
is
where
it
is.
It's
19
and
a
half.
The
poll
now
shows
it
decreasing
by
two
percent.
We
have
seen
that
rally
that
we
just
talked
about
in
the
underlying
collateral
base
and
dye
has
gone
up
right.
There
is
a
risk,
however,
of
the
price
being
squeezed
at
the
point.
I
brought
up
is
a
really
good
one
of
what
will
people
do
now
that
they're
in
dye
will
it
take
before
they
sell
back
into
eath?
It's
an
excellent
point.
E
That
also
being
said,
we
also
probably
cleared
out
most
of
the
market
makers
inventory
and
in
doing
so
where
the
price
is
right.
Now
we
also
take
the
exact
chance
that
the
price
actually
can
elevate
much
higher
right
now
in
any
more
increases
for
that
same
reason.
So,
for
those
kind
of
reasons
backing
off
the
stability
fee,
which
I
only
saw
the
poll
20
minutes
ago,
looks
like
it's
going
to
happen
or
now
it'll
be
a
vote.
E
That's
a
good
thing,
though
I
guess
the
basis
where
we
always
start
on
this
is
that
CDP's
in
general,
for
the
most
part
rightfully
should
be
acting
on
their
selfish
behalf.
They
should
always
be
out
for
their
own
interest,
so
they'll
take
out
a
loan
only
if
they
gain
value
from
it.
The
stability
fee
is
too
high,
economically
they'll
contract
their
exposure.
Conversely,
if
they
can
make
money
by
taking
out
that
loan
with
a
lower
rate
or
any
rate,
they
will
all
things
being
equal,
they
don't
care
about
the
system
as
a
whole.
E
Nor
really
is
that
their
objective
they're
just
an
end
user,
that's
the
basis
for
what
we
start.
The
foundation
of
like
kind
of
the
understanding
of
why
people
would
act
in
a
certain
way,
so
we
see
the
rally
in
eath
and
the
outstanding
die
rally
as
well
and
then
back
down
kind
of
means
that
we're
the
blended
rate
of
a
return
of
an
people
using
eath
she's
me
using
the
system
for
leverage
on
eath.
E
The
blended
return
for
those
participants
if
the
die
is
continuing
to
contract
means
that
their
return
is
probably
really
close
to
the
stability
fee,
if
not
slightly
below,
because
that's
why
this
the
outstanding
die
is
continuing
to
contract.
So
I
mentioned
this
in
some
other
post.
Some
are
it's
a
little
bit
like
ski
slaloming.
You
know
you
wait
to
start
pivoting
our
weight
in
this
case
the
stability
fee
earlier
to
try
to
not
to
overcorrect
not
to
have
too
much
of
that
be
emotions.
E
But
when
we
see
these
other
empirical
data
points
coming
up,
we
want
to
make
sure
we
try
to
stay
on
the
peg,
not
move
after
the
peg
is
moving
after
us.
That
makes
sense
so
falling
on
that
thought.
Running
out
of
die.
Inventory
is
a
bad
thing
for
market
makers
not
too
much
not
too
little
just
the
right
amount,
so
we
should
lower
the
stability
fee
accordingly
and
just
slightly-
and
that
looks
like
that's
in
in
in
our
future.
E
So
if
they,
if
they
truly
run
out
of
inventory-
and
you
know,
I
have
to
yield
to
market
makers
to
comment
on
that,
we
really
need
to
watch
that,
because
that
that
that
was,
you
know
it's
kind
of
the
converse
thing
that
Joe
mentioned
one
time
about.
You
know
when
you
see
icebergs
in
trading
where
you
know
it
looks
like
there's
no
more
inventory
and
then
somebody
just
keeps
putting
blocks
of
trades
in
at
a
certain
price
and
it
feels
like
it
never
ends.
E
We
might
be
at
the
very
end
of
that
and
if
we're
at
the
very
end
of
that,
that's
a
really
bad
thing.
Now
everything
I
just
outlined
that
really
only
makes
sense
kind
of
in
a
single
collateral
structure
so
kind
of
on
to
the
future
of
where
what
I
understand
the
DSR
and
multi
collateral
die
to
be,
and
that
is
absolutely
an
educational
moment
for
me,
because
I
am
learning
because
I
don't
know
the
technical
roadmap
I'm
only
using
from
what
I've
determined
thus
far.
E
So
the
DSR
throws
much
of
what
I
just
outlined
out
the
window.
It's
just
a
critical
tool
for
us
to
implement.
So,
let's
just
take
a
moment
and
a
shout
out,
everybody
who
designed
it
wrote
it
and
developed
it,
because
it's
going
to
help
us,
please
everybody
volunteer
or
do
something
to
help
make
that
a
reality
can't
happen
soon
enough,
and
it
is
still
quote
coming
soon
right.
E
So
why
is
it
so
important?
Because
we're
going
to
be
establishing
effect
of
a
direct
transfer
of
value
from
the
borrower
to
the
sabre?
We're
now
going
to
be
implementing
both
aspects
at
the
core
of
economics
and
that's
that
incentives
work
further.
It
will
address
the
vocal,
the
vocal
few
that
believe
that
maker
has
elevated
rates
to
further
enrich
themselves.
It
provides
direct
evidence
to
contradict
that
that
thesis
all
right.
E
E
E
So
so
then,
what
in
a
multi
collateral
world
some
of
the
collateral
will
have
an
end
use
that
is
going
to
be
on
chain,
but
some
of
it
will
be
off
now.
I
I
struggled
a
long
time
and
I
still
do
with
this
multi-dimensional
component
about
how
some
of
the
capital
will
be
taken
off
chain
and
which
directly
degrades
the
price
have
died,
US
dollar
somewhere.
E
So
it
would
get
rid
of
the
emotion,
get
rid
of
the
naysayers
and
just
focuses
on
the
empirical
math,
and
the
question
also
turns
into
what
we
were
talking
at
the
very
beginning
is:
do
we
have
weekly
voting
or
does
the
algorithm
change
the
out
change,
components
of
the
dsr
or
the
stability
fee
on
a
weekly
basis,
a
daily
basis
or
I?
Actually
more
of
an
advocate,
for
you
know,
even
at
a
all
the
way
down
to
the
level
of
one
dies
being
minted
or
burned,
and
not
only
that
with
an
aspect
right.
E
If
you're
going
to
mint
3,000
died,
it's
very
different
than
if
you
want
a
mint
30
million
died,
then
further.
It
makes
a
difference
if
you're
planning
to
take
that
off
chain
or
on
chain
depending
on
these
are
the
risk
teams
that
are
gonna,
hopefully
include
this
concept
of,
if
you're
doing
it
for
real
estate,
which
is
clearly
off
chain,
the
there
will
be
an
impact
on
the
price.
The
question
will
just
be:
what
will
it
be
if
we
follow
this
concept
of
having
an
algorithm?
E
E
That's
going
to
be
a
perpetual
question
to
me,
it's
much
more
in
a
turn
into
voting
to
tune
the
algorithm
over
time
and
then
ultimately
vote
if
we
don't
like
the
output,
all
right
so
I'm
for
clarity,
I'm,
not
here,
to
tell
the
maker
team
or
anybody
how
to
do
it.
This
is
just
like
my
thoughts.
What
I
believe
makes
sense,
and
ignorance
is
really
bliss,
because
I
have
no
quote
inside
information
on
the
technical
roadmap.
So,
there's
always
going
to
be
a
concern
about
how
a
PID
system
or
any
system
for
that
matter.
E
How
folks
could
quote
game
the
system
that
concern
will
never
disappear
ever
well?
How
it
will,
however,
be
able
to
make
some
folks
an
arbitrage
profit,
that's
true,
but
then
over
time,
other
folks
will
figure
out
how
to
front
run
the
initial
folks
to
get
rid
of
it
at
some
point.
All
of
the
arbitrage
folks
for
the
most
part
end
up
putting
themselves
out
of
business,
but
what
they
did
in
doing
so
inserted
something
amazing,
which
is
efficiency
and
market
depth,
something
right
now
we
we
sorely
need.
E
So
what
is
interesting
is
that
if
anyone
wants
to
game
in
the
system,
they
can
actually
do
that
right
now,
because
we
are
live-streaming
this
and
for
folks
that
want
to
change
the
stability
fee,
they
can
act
accordingly
right
that
they
can
actually
take
those
decisions
depending
on
how
much
maker
they
have
so
in
an
in
an
ironic
world.
We
may
actually
want
to
have
a
PID
tool
and
want
people
to
gain
the
system.
It
sounds
counterintuitive,
but
it
may
end
up
helping
us
what
we,
because
we
desperately
need
the
liquidity
and
market
depth.
E
As
for
the
chart,
really
that
the
notion
behind
it
was
that
the
DSR
initially,
you
know
as
we
implement
it,
it
is
raw
alpha,
but
it
does
something
that's
really
different,
where
it's
directly
removing
the
dye
supply.
So
during
the
last
three
four
months
of
these
calls,
as
we've
tried
to
increase
the
stability
fee
to
cause
the
reduction
in
supply,
the
DSR
does
it
directly
just
simply
because
of
the
save
aspect.
In
doing
so,
we
will
find
you
know
when
we
start
off
at
a
hundred
basis
points
capturing
that
data
is
just
essential.
E
We
will
find
I,
don't
know
what
the
top
point
of
the
DSR
will
be,
but
it
will
get
to
the
point
where
it
will
just
be
silly
for
hedge
funds
not
to
participate
in
just
raw
alpha,
but
once
we
do
that,
once
we
can
control
the
the
DSR
by
incrementally
decreasing
it
than
the
stability
being
going
back
and
forth
one
than
the
other.
So
we
can
identify
that
signal
between
the
two
we'll
be
able
to
hone
and
pull
both
of
them
back
down
into
a
realm.
What
I
call
the
the
sweet
spot
over
the
next?
E
A
E
D
E
Everything
precisely
yeah
ovens,
thermostats
that
would
be
BP
in
PID.
That's
just
proportional!
It's
really
on
and
off!
So
imagine.
If
you
were
in
your
car
going
down
a
lane
and
you
hit,
you
know
autopilot
mode
and
it
just
pinged
back
and
forth.
It
would
drive
you
crazy.
No
one
would
want
to
use
it,
but
in
a
true
PID
controller
and
I
mean
this.
This
is
Raspberry
Pi,
dorg
right,
so
this
site,
using
an
autonomous
car
that
they
have
sample
code
on
here
that
we
can
use
or
anybody
could
use
for
that
matter.
E
The
point
is
that
you
start
using
integral
and
derivative
control
to
then
tough
to
dampen
the
oscillation
back
to
hone
in
to
the
ultimate
target.
So
for
me
the
ultimate
target
is
to
get
back
down
to
those
two
percent
one
and
a
half
percent
numbers
that
I
showed
on
the
previous
PDF
and
a
PID
would
allow
us
to
do
that.
E
The
question
would
be
just
tuning
it,
and
that
is
not
an
easy
that
they
working
group
needs
to
be
set
up
in
my
respectful
opinion
to
help
start
to
develop
this
and
use
it
on
these
governance.
Call
based
on
the
data
we
get
then
ultimately
migrate
that
code
and
tune
it
tune
it
off
chain,
bring
it
on
chain
and
continue
to
vote
on
the
tuning
equation.
The
tuning
variables.
D
E
D
E
Well,
it's
it
definitely
would
be
definitely
be
the
dye
price.
That's
obvious
that
that's
an
Oakland,
that's
a
no-brainer,
but
it
would
also
be
the
amount
of
the
debt
that
died
stability
fee,
the
amount
of
dye.
That's
in
that's
the
amount
of
dye,
that's
locked
up
the
amount
of
the
current
stability
fee.
The
amount
of
dye
outstanding
I
mean
those
first,
four
or
five.
A
E
D
Yeah,
like
I,
am
a
controls
engineer
by
trade
programmer,
so
I've
used
peds
lots
there,
there's
probably
one
within
20
feet
of
everybody
in
this.
You
know
chat
right
now,
but
basically
they're
they're
used
on
every
motor
and
machine,
but
it's
basically
you're
proportional
gives
you
your
error.
Correction.
That's
like
a
fixed
multiplication
amount.
So
if
the
die
price
is
down
10
cents,
then
you
know
you
do
10
cents
times
some
value
which
would
set
stability
fee.
The
integral
I
can't
remember
what
that
does
exactly,
but
derivative
is
air
over
time.
D
So
the
last
you
know
thousands
samples
are
basically
interpreted
so
that
you
don't
get
a
dead
band
so
that
the
the
stability
fee
isn't
like
fluctuating
or
flickering
for
no
reason
week
to
week,
because
the
air
goes
to
zero
or
something.
So
if
it's
at
a
dollar
you
don't
start
dropping
the
stability
fee.
A
Okay,
that's
great
context.
Actually,
the
reason
I
asked
is
because
I
wanted
to
I
assumed
it
wasn't
the
same
thing.
I
knew
from
electronics,
but
apparently
it
is
that's
good.
That's
good
feedback!
I
want
to
touch
on
something
that
you
mentioned
at
the
at
the
beginning
of
your
you
talk
Matthew,
but
the
impact
of
empty
inventories
from
market
makers
might
have
when
and/or.
A
If
we
see
that
people
are
going
to
start
flooding
the
market
with
their
there's,
like
the
safety
diet
that
they're
collecting
right
now
and
the
general
consensus
seems
to
be
or
the
question
I'm
getting.
Is
that
this
that
you
think
that
there
might
be
something
that's
going
to
happen,
then,
because
inventories
might
be
depleted
at
that
point,
but
isn't
there
a
counter-argument
that
we
might
be
looking
at
a
more
healthy
price
discovery
system?
E
Yeah,
yes,
and
no
right
I
mean
you
could
make
the
opinion
right.
It's
a
good
point.
You
could
also
take
the
view
that
the
when
you
have
kind
of
an
artificial
amount
of
supply
hanging
out
there
that
somebody
has
to
buy
up
before
you
have
real
price
discovery.
We
didn't
have
it
before
and
if
we're
getting
past
one
right
now,
then
in
if
the
price
keeps
going
up,
that
means
stability.
Fee
is
artificially
too
high
because
we
had
to
chew
through
that
supply
to
get
there.
Okay,
so.
F
F
So
if
you
have,
you
know
a
highly
illiquid
dye
market,
then
there's
kind
of
the
dye
price
at
which
the
trades
are
occurring
and
then
there's
kind
of
a
realized
dye
price,
which
is
you
know,
based
on
a
certain
amount
of
volume
that
you're
looking
to
trade.
What
actual
price
would
you
be
able
to
get
overall
and
that's
you
know
a
function
not
only
of
what
the
most
recent
dye
price
is,
but
also
how
liquid
that
that
price
is.
F
That
being
said
like,
if
the
goal
is
management
of
the
system
and
you
know
sort
of
clear
signals,
etc,
it
is
good
to
have
a
more
liquid
market
so
that
you
truly
know
what's
going
on.
But
if
we're
just
talking
about
dye
price,
it's
not
necessarily
bad
for
the
dye
price.
For
there
to
be
low.
Market-Maker
inventory,
because
that
illiquidity
is
more
than
anything
likely
to
drive
up
the
price,
so
it's
kind
of
like
what
goal
you're
talking
about
there,
but
illiquidity
is
not
necessarily
a
bad
thing.
D
E
Yeah,
we
I
think
that's
a
good
good
thing
for
us
to
chat
about
in
a
reddit
area.
I,
don't
I,
don't
know
what
I
don't
know
exactly
what
components
we
would
all
put
inside
of
it,
because
it.
It
also
depends
again
when,
when
how
often
is
the
PID
algorithm
run,
that's
run
once
a
week,
you
can
make
it
really
comprehensive
and
really
really
thick
in
what
code
it
executes.
E
A
C
C
You
know
back
when
I
was
trading
like
96
97
cents
and
it
seemed
like
we
were
on
the
cusp
of
a
breakout
in
the
markets.
There
was
this
urgency
to
raising
the
stability
fee
so
that
dye
is
not
harmed
more.
But
now,
if
we're
just
gonna
kind
of
accept
that
it's
random,
then
does
that
mean
we
just
kind
of
ignore
this
correlation
in
the
future?
If
it's
gonna
be
unpredictable,
anyways
I
would.
F
What
I
think
has
happened
is
we
don't
actually
know
if
the
demand
for
leverage
has
necessarily
significantly
decreased,
because
what
I
think
is
more?
The
explanation
is,
there
is
a
larger
signal
that
is
definitely
out
weighing
that,
even
if
it
is
now,
even
if
it
is
potentially
positive,
and
so
that
larger
signal
is
just
the
tremendous
amount
of
eath
titrating,
particularly
people,
cashing
out
eath
and
then
holding
on
to
that
dye.
F
C
That
that
that
makes
perfect
sense,
but
that's
kind
of
the
two
things
one
is
it's
kind
of
backward
looking
right,
we
only
know
after
the
fact
whether
speculators
thought
eath
was
cheap
or
not
cheap
and
what
it
and
then
secondly
like
what
if
the
wrong
I
mean
what
if
they
think
they
if
they
think
that
eath
has
not
cheap
anymore,
but
then
eath
continues
to
rally
up
like
crazy.
How
does
that
affect
like
the
policy
tools
that
and
Carroll
voters
need
to
consider
yeah.
F
I
mean
a
hundred
percent,
then
this
is
why
it's
not
easy
to
manage
monetary
policy
and
and
why
I've
kind
of
cautioned
against
too
much,
like
short
timescale,
reactionary
changes,
because
that
time
can
be
our
friend
in
terms
of
helping
us
understand
what's
actually
going
on.
But
it
is
a
hundred
percent
by
definition,
backward-looking
and
I.
Think
a
lot
of
what
we've
been
doing
with
die
price
is
can
seriously
be
considered
backward-looking
in
that
when
eath
price
or
when
dye
price
suffers,
and
we
see
eath
price
going
up.
F
The
best
that
I
think
we'll
be
able
to
do
in
any
sort
of
like
reasonable
level
of
effort
that
we
can
implement
within
the
next
few
weeks
is
like
looking
at
a
better
function
for
what's
been
going
on
with
those
eath
prices
and
how
it's
been
related
to
the
dye
price
and
I
think
the
key
there
and
we're
never
going
to
be
able
to
like
properly
estimate
people's
perceptions.
But
the
key
there
is
probably
going
to
be
looking
deeper
into
the
relationship
between
short
and
long
term.
Beef
price
is
my
guess,
but.
C
C
On
I
mean
the
policy
I
mean
our
response
to
a
expensive
dye
price
is
not
necessarily
the
same
as
that
to
a
cheap
dye
price,
because
because
the
the
risk
profile
is
very
asymmetric,
soaking
up
excess,
but
trying
to
soak
up
dye
from
the
system
is
very
different
from
trying
to
create
more
of
it
and
obviously
right
now,
there's
about
20
million
dye
room
left
in
the
debt
ceiling
and
I
mean
they're.
I
mean
technically
there's
four
to
be:
there's
this
incentive
for
people
to
print
dye
right.
C
A
Well,
that's
a
great
question
to
you,
because
I
think
that
this
is
something
that
we've
been
wrestling
with
for
a
while
is
whether
I'm
part
of
the
part
of
the
system
design
was
CDP's
using
using
CDP's
for
a
dye
arbitrage
right.
Then
I'm
not
convinced
that
the
benefits
that
people
can
see
from
that
way
benefits
they
can
just
find
on
the
open
market
with
their
die
or
with
their
ease
and.
C
This
is
why
this
is
why
a
speculator
demand
for
leverages
is
so
important
if
we
could
forecast
it
because
then
we
could
forecast,
if
we
think
traders
or
market
makers
will
print
up
that
remaining
debt
ceiling
to
push
the
dye
price
down.
For
example
like
if
eath
was
at
$100
right
now,
they
would
probably
print
it
and
and
push
the
dye
price
down,
but
it
looks
like
I
mean
so
far
in
the
last
two
days,
they
haven't
actually
been
doing
that
dye
supplies
been
going
down.
We
saw
that
one
huge
wipe
a
few
days
ago.
F
Yes,
so
so
I
think
it's
a
really
good
point.
I
mean
and
I
know.
There's
been
a
lot
of
like
that.
This,
the
stupidest
simplest
formula
that
we
could
use
to
manage
monetary
policy
is
to
say
if
dye
is
above,
the
peg
increase
or
decrease
the
stability
fee.
F
dyes
below
the
peg
increase
said
I.
Think
what
we're
the
whole
point
of.
Why
we're
all
spending
so
much
time
and
effort
trying
to
work
on
these
problems
is
to
get
to
better
answers
than
that,
and
so,
like
I,
think
it's
an
extremely
important
point
to
consider.
F
That
maker
is
not
a
perfectly
symmetric
system
and
it
is
much
harder
to
bring
the
dye
price
back
up
than
it
is
to
bring
it
down
the
there
is
a
built-in
arbitrage
mechanism,
wind
dies
above
the
dollar,
and
everyone
is
incentive,
I'm
incentivized,
to
draw
dye
out
and
sell
it
and
dyes
above
$1.
The
only
case
where
that.
F
But
if
it's
so,
this
is
where
time
becomes
really
important,
as
it
depends
on
your
time.
Exposure
to
that
civility
fee
right,
so
it
could
theoretically,
not
matter
if
I'm
able
to
with
limited
transaction
cost,
take
that
dye
purchase
eath
as
I.
Take
that
dye
sell
it
for
eath
and
then
pay
back,
as
you
know,
sell
it
back
and
pay
back.
My
debt
I
can
effectively
just
collect
a
simple
arbitrage.
Profit
minus
some
transaction
cost
minus
the
time
that
I'm
exposed
to
price
volatility
and
I
think
that's
a
really
important
point
to
consider.
It's
like.
F
What's
the
liquidity
of
dye,
what
you
know
how
many
trades
are
on
the
order
book?
What's
the
potential
that
in
that
time
period,
I
am
exposed
to
significant
price
changes.
Just
to
answer
that
question
on
the
check
like
now,
I've
got
tiny
balances
on
everything
about
doing
anything
in
any
significant
volume,
but
yeah
I
mean
I.
F
Think
the
the
time
that
you
exposed
to
that
price
volatility
is
a
significant
factor
in
how
profitable
it
is
to
our
dye,
but
overall
I
think
like
by
and
large,
it's
going
to
be
profitable
and
so
at
least
for
most
people,
and
so
like
I,
do
think.
There
is
a
natural
mechanism
that
is
built
into
maker,
for
when
dye
is
above
$1
to
have
sort
of
a
downward
price
pressure.
F
This
week
is
kind
of
a
big
moment
for
maker,
because
what
I
see
is
a
lot
of
that
leveraged
behavior
over
time
now
kind
of
coming
out
people
cashing
out
on
a
lot
of
those
levers
and
paying
down
a
lot
of
that
debt
to
really
bring
down
the
dye
supply.
I
think
you
know
down
to
80.
81
million
was
a
significant
amount,
but
what
is
skin
a
minute?
Yes,.
A
Tonight,
I'm
beginning
to
wonder,
though,
if
the
stability
fee
is,
in
my
opinion,
the
stability
fee
is
the
primary
motivating
factor
and
I
think
that
we're
seeing
some
activity
right
now
where
people
have
been
watching
the
stability
feed
creep
up
and
this
Bull
Run
has
given
them
the
perfect
opportunity
to
get
out
of
a
CDP
that
they
don't
want
to
be
in
anymore.
So
if
the
Bull
Run
opened
the
door
to
allow
the
stability
fee
to
be
more
effective,
like
looking
at
this
from
a
naive
perspective,
where
does
that
make
sense?
I.
F
Mean
that
makes
total
sense
to
me.
It's
a
holistic
equation
right.
It's
not
like
any
one
thing,
and
this
was
kind
of
the
point
of
that
calculator
that
I
had
chaired
a
while
back
is
there's
an
overall
profitability
equation.
The
expected
increase
of
eath
price
from
where
we
are
currently
is
one
variable.
The
stability
fee
is
another
variable
and
something
that
I
didn't
capture.
E
And
the
question
also
will
be
once
we
have
the
die
savings
rate.
Will
there
be
a
corresponding
effect
because
I've,
my
humble
opinion,
is
the
DSR
will
be
a
far
more
potent
tool
than
the
underlines?
Then
then,
the
stability
fee
in
terms
of
getting
rid
of
outstanding
supply,
so
where
you
were
just
outlining
a
moment
ago
that
it's
much
easier
to
that
getting
the
price
of
dye
to
get
back
up
was
more
challenging
than
it
was
to
let
it
fall
back
down.
I
would
venture
to
bed.
F
Would
agree
with
that
I
think
the
the
dye
savings
for
you
like
fundamentally
changes
the
economics
and
is
a
like
economically
more
rich
counterpart
to
the
stability
fee.
The
civility
fee
is
kind
of
like
a
simple
interest
rate.
It
doesn't
actually
inherently
necessarily
have
the
effect
that
we
would
want
it
to,
but
the
dye
savings
rate
is
kind
of
like
a
bigger
and
better
lever.
If
you
think
about
it
that
way,
it's.
E
A
it's
a
lever
for
the
masses,
I
mean
the
the
stability
fee.
People
are
willing
to
endure
all
sorts
of
pain
because
the
underlying
collateral
can
generate
forty
percent
return
in
three
days.
So
if
you
had
to
pay
twenty
percent
a
year,
that's
not
really!
So
it's
just
an
annoyance
right
now.
It's
not
a
super
motivation
to
close
out
your
CDP.
It's
a
it's
an
annoying
as
hell,
if
you
don't
or
if
you're,
not
one
of
the
folks
that
are
generating
those
kind
of
returns
and
you
decided
to
buy
a
car
with
it.
E
F
D
Not
quite
going
back
to
the
PID
conversation,
but
you
can
have
simple
mechanisms
like
if,
if
die
is
99
cents,
then
you
can
sort
of
oppose
that
off
the
peg,
so
that
printing
it
you
have
to
have
you
basically
use
up
a
dollar
and
one
debt
denominated
and
die,
but
you
really
only
get
a
market
value
of
99
cents.
Out
of
that
that
basically
instantly
steals
that
penny
of
profit
away
from
a
CD
P
printer.
D
F
He
sorry
just
real
quick,
don't
want
to
necessarily
change
the
the
topic,
but
I
did
think
we
kind
of
skipped
over
one
item
was
regarding
the
current
state
of
things
and
like
how
high
the
collateralization
ratio
is
and
given
the
amount
of
dye
inventory
that
is
sort
of
sitting
with
all
the
different
traders
that
cashed
out
on
eath
like
to
me.
That
is
a
economically
precarious
moment,
because,
what's
what's
potentially
positive
about
the
high
collateralization
ratio
in
that
scenario,
is
that
people
are
confident
and
maker
dye
is
heavily
back.
F
You
know,
there's
been
all
these
beautiful
graphics
that
people
have
tweeted
out.
You
know
how
many
you
know
dollars
there
are
to
every
dye,
but
what
I
fear
is
that
there
is
a
significant
collateralization
ratio
within
the
system,
because
people
fear
drop
in
eath
price
and
they
don't
necessarily
want
to
get
liquidated,
and
so
what
I
think
to
me
that
actually
says
is
at,
and
this
is
where
there
was
actually
an
earlier
like
four
or
five
weeks
ago.
Conversation
about
what
can
we
learn
from
the
collateralization
ratio
that
could
be
cyrus?
F
What
you
were
kind
of
looking
for
in
terms
of
how
can
we
estimate
how
bullish
people
are,
is
kind
of
like
a
translated
or
an
adjusted
metric
of
the
collateralization
ratio
in
nominal
dollar
terms,
so,
like
sort
of
relative
to
each
price?
How
much
collateral
is
in
the
system,
and
maybe
that's
something
that
we
can
look
at
because
I
think
right
now.
E
System
I
would
I
would
take
the
other
side
of
that,
which
is
saying
that
the
reason
why
I
dyes
it
was
mentioning
before
about
like
the
blended
return.
The
reason
why?
Because
we
only
have
one
side,
the
stability
for
you
right
now
and
if
the
dye
supply
is
decreasing,
that
means
on
a
selfish
level.
A
sell
CDP
on
a
blended
level
is
not
returning
19
and
a
half
percent
per
year
right.
E
But
that
also
means
to
me
when
you
see
an
eighth
under
collateral
accelerate
and
you
have
higher
collateralization
if
we
were
and
I'm
discount
the
moment
for
what
would
happen
to
the
dye
price
for
a
moment.
But
if
we
reduce
the
stability
feat
today
back
down
to
1%,
just
as
a
gross
example,
I
think
we
would
see
dye
being
minted,
like
mad
I
think
the
challenge
is
right.
E
Think
if
we
had
the
other
side
of
the
equation,
the
savings
side
and
we
wouldn't,
we
could
have
a
way
to
control
the
price
that
that's
the
read
that
to
me.
That's
the
core
issue
right
now
is
what
would
happen
if
we
set
it
down
to
five
dye
would
be
minted
like
mad
today,
but
that
price
would
get
degraded
and
that's
not
what
we
want.
We
need
that
corresponding
component,
but
if
we
had
that
the
outstanding
dye,
in
my
opinion,
you
probably
just
add
another
zero
outstanding
Twitter
multiply
by
three
or
four.
B
F
Sits
right,
yeah
I
mean
that's.
I
had
mentioned
that
earlier,
I
think,
like
the
amount
of
dye,
that's
sitting
out
just
one
quick
thing
to
note:
the
diet,
like
a
lot
of
dye,
was
paid
back
in
the
last
24
hours
so
that
that
is
happening
and
that
it
is
reasonable.
Like
you
lever
up
on
the
8th,
you
draw
out
a
bunch
of
dye,
eath
goes
up
a
bunch.
You
pay
back
some
of
that
that,
like
that,
that
makes
sense.
F
Think
people
are
kind
of
at
least
a
significant
portion
of
CEP
holders
are
expecting
prices
to
go
down
a
little
bit
from
here
soon
or
at
least
kind
of
hedging
against
that
possibility,
and
so
like
for
the
capability
to
wade
out
that
scenario.
They
are
okay,
with
paying
with
a
current
stability
fee
as
well
is
another
way
to
look
at
it.
B
F
A
A
Want
to
thank
fish
and
Matthew
as
iris
and
all
the
rest
for
the
great
questions:
Thank
You
Josh.
In
your
face
this,
the
video
audio
video,
will
be
posted
to
this
I've.
Read
it
in
a
couple
hours
we'll
have
a
summary
of
all
the
most
important
points
that
were
discussed
and
once
again,
please
continue
the
discussion
there.
So
we
can
continue
the
conversation.
The
executive
vote.
Erin
is
going
live
tomorrow.
It's
4
a.m.
4
p.m.
UTC,
so
9:00
PST,
all
right.
Thanks,
I'll
see
you
next
week.