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From YouTube: What Happened to the American Dream
Description
This session was held Aug. 9, 2017, at NCSL's 2017 Legislative Summit in Boston.
he American Dream mean different things to every American, but one of its defining ideals is the equal access to opportunity. The ideal is that any American can reach economic stability through hard work, and that children will have a higher standard of living than their parents. Researchers as Stanford and Harvard have found this is no longer true. Just 46 percent of 30-year-old’s today are making more than their parents did at age 30. Additionally, research from the Economic Innovation Group finds economic dynamism, or the rate of churn in the American economy, is at an all-time low. What are the causes of this changing landscape, and what are the policy options available to broaden access to the American Dream?
A
Good
morning
and
welcome
to
you
all,
my
name
is
Kathy
shell
I'm,
a
fiscal
analyst
in
the
Minnesota
House
of
Representatives
and
I.
Welcome
you
today
to
this
session
entitled
what
happened
to
the
American
dream.
I
would
like
to
remind
everyone
that
this
is
a
livestream
recorded
session,
and
so,
if
you
have
one
of
these
devices
close
by
that
beeps
or
buzzes,
could
you
please
put
it
on
stun
that
will
make
things
go
a
little
bit
better?
A
We
are
glad
that
you
chose
to
be
here
this
this
morning,
the
first
session
of
the
day
to
talk
about
the
American
Dream
over
other
sessions
in
this
time
slot.
Maybe
to
start
this
session,
we
should
pick
a
favorite
song
about
the
American
dream,
for
you
boomers
out
there,
the
Nitty,
Gritty
Dirt
Band,
had
such
a
song
or
for
something
more
contemporary
check
out
mkto
on
youtube.
They've
got
a
great
song
as
well,
but
hang
on,
we've
got
something.
What
other
something
else
in
mind
this
session
will
last
for
approximately
75
minutes.
A
We
are
excited
to
have
two
dynamic
presenters
with
us,
each
of
whom
will
speak
about
15
to
20
minutes.
In
addition,
we'll
be
seeking
your
input,
yes,
audience
participation
in
real
time
through
the
use
of
poll
everywhere.
When
I
ask
a
question
we'd
like
for
each
of
you
to
text
an
answer
to
two
to
three
three
three
and
then
your
collective
responses
will
show
up
on
the
screen
last.
A
B
A
A
A
Well
hold
on
to
those
thoughts
because
we
are
about
to
explore
the
American
dream.
Actually,
the
American
dream
was
first
outlined
here
in
Boston
on
July
18th
1776
from
the
balcony
of
the
old
Statehouse.
When
Colonel
Thomas
crafts
read
the
Declaration
of
Independence,
proclaiming
that,
among
other
things,
all
men
are
created
equal
with
certain
unalienable
rights,
including
life
liberty
and
the
pursuit
of
happiness
for
each
of
us.
The
American
dream
may
mean
different
things.
Some
have
learned
the
dream
to
be
that
if
you
work
hard,
you
can
live
a
happy
and
prosperous
life.
A
Others
have
envisioned
the
dream
to
provide
equal
access
to
opportunity.
Most
would
agree
that
it
is
the
ideal
that
any
American
can
reach
an
economic
stability
through
hard
work
and
that
children
have
a
higher
standard
of
living
than
that
of
their
parents.
However,
researchers
at
Stanford
and
Harvard
have
found
that
this
no
longer
holds
true.
Today,
just
46
percent
of
30
year
olds
today
are
making
more
in
real
terms
than
their
parents
did
at
age
30.
A
Additionally,
research
from
the
economic
innovation
group
finds
that
economic
dynamism
or
the
rate
of
turn
in
the
American
economy
is
at
an
all-time
low,
having
serious
implications
for
our
local
and
state
economic
vitality.
The
goal
of
this
session
is
to
number
one
to
explore
the
impacts
of
the
changing
landscape.
That
is,
the
back
drop
of
the
American
Dream
to
to
examine
the
implications
of
research
findings
relative
to
our
business,
workforce
and
education
systems
and
three
to
same
to
brainstorm
policy
options
for
state
legislators.
A
What
actions
would
help
to
broaden,
not
limit
access
to
the
American
Dream?
We
have
two
speakers
today.
Robert
madman
dukkha
is
a
PhD
student
in
sociology
and
social
policy
at
Harvard
University.
His
research
focuses
on
regional
economic
development
and
the
implications
of
changing
income,
distribution
for
people,
cities
and
regions
through
the
equal
or
excuse
me
through
the
equality
of
opportunity.
Project
Robert
is
a
co-author
along
with
Raj
Chetty
David
grew
ski
and
Maximilian
he'll
of
Stanford
Nathaniel.
A
He
dronov
Harvard
and
Jimmy
Narang
of
UC
Berkeley
of
the
newly
released
paper,
the
fading
American
Dream
trends
and
absolute
income
mobility
since
1940.
He
is
also
native
of
Rochester
Minnesota
Minnesota,
my
home
state,
and
additionally,
we
have
Kenan
sikri,
who
serves
as
the
manager
for
research
and
policy
development
for
the
economic
innovation
group,
a
bipartisan
public
policy
organization
that
combines
innovative
research
and
data-driven
advocacy
to
address
America's
most
pressing
economic
challenges.
A
Prior
to
joining
me,
I
G
Kenan
was
a
senior
policy
analyst
and
associate
fellow
at
the
Brookings
Institution's
metropolitan
policy
program.
There.
He
was
responsible
for
conceptualizing
and
executing
a
wide
array
of
economic
research
and
policy
projects.
An
expert
in
place-based,
Economic,
Analysis
Kenan,
has
also
considerable
experience,
advising
state
and
local
officials
on
economic
development
and
regional
competitiveness
competitiveness
strategies.
A
Kennan
has
also
served
as
a
consultant
with
the
World
Bank
Group's
of
competitive
cities.
Team
and
Kenan
has
obtained
his
master's
degree
in
local
economic
development
from
the
London
School
of
Economics
and
his
bachelor's
in
international
relations
and
economics.
At
American,
University
I
will
now
pass
the
microphone
to
Robert,
who
will
start
with
his
presentation.
C
All
right,
Thank,
You
Kathy
for
the
wonderful
introduction
and
thank
you
all
for
coming
and
for
having
me
I'm,
really
excited
to
be
here
at
NCSL.
So,
as
was
mentioned,
I'm
going
to
be
talking
about
economic
mobility
and
the
American
Dream,
and
we
already
got
some
of
your
input
on
what
is
the
American
dream.
C
But
that's
sort
of
the
question
that
my
co-authors
and
I
have
been
interested
in
and
they're
trying
to
study,
I
thought
I
would
start
the
presentation
by
bringing
in
some
authorities,
and
specifically
some
recent
presidents
to
look
at
what
they've
said
about
the
American
Dream
and
so
starting
with
Ronald
Reagan.
This
is
a
quote
from
his
announcement
of
the
presidential
candidacy
in
1979,
and
so
when
he's
asking,
when
he's
telling
people
why
he
was
running
for
president,
he
said
you
know
people
these
days.
C
They
tell
us
that
we
must
learn
to
live
with
less
and
teach
our
children
that
their
lives
will
be
less
full
and
less
prosperous
than
ours
have
been
and
I.
Don't
believe
that
and
that's
why
I'm
running
for
president
so
he's.
You
know
very
concerned
that
that
is
becoming
accepted,
that
children
might
be
might
grow
up
to
have
a
lower
standard
of
living
than
their
parents,
and
that's
what
he
wants
to
fix
by
running
for
president
when
he
declared
moving
forward
a
bit.
C
We
have
Bill
Clinton
on
speaking
on
Labor
Day
in
1993
he's
describing
the
sort
of
the
American
ideals
that
were
instilled
in
us
by
our
parents,
and
one
of
those
is
that,
if
you
work
hard
and
play
by
the
rules,
you
should
be
rewarded
with
a
good
life
for
yourself
and
a
better
chance
for
your
children.
You
know
the
American
Dream
is,
has
always
been
a
better
life
for
people
who
are
willing
to
work
for
it
and
then
finally,
quote
from
Barack
Obama
who's.
C
Speaking
to
some
of
the
frustrations,
the
economic
frustrations
that
people
have
started
to
feel
in
recent
years
anything
that
these
frustrations
are
rooted
in
the
fear
that
people
kids
won't
be
better
off
than
they
were
and
that
America's
basic
bargain,
which
is,
if
you
work
hard.
You
have
a
chance
to
get
ahead.
If
is
no
longer
coming
true
as
much
as
it
once
was.
So
looking
at
these
quotes
from
these,
these
presidents
of
both
parties,
I
think
you
know,
are
my
co-authors
and
I.
C
We
would
agree
with
them
and
we
think
that
what
they're
getting
at
is
this
idea
of
economic
mobility
that
we
think
is
central
to
the
American
dream,
so
the
United
States
either
is
or
our
people
think
should
be
a
place
where
everyone
should
have
the
chance
to
move
up
economically
if
they
work
for
it
and
where,
if
you
you
know,
if
you
play
by
the
rules,
your
kids
should
grow
up
to
be
materially
better
off
than
you
were.
You
know
we
think
of
this
in
slogans
like
the
land
of
opportunity
right.
C
The
America
is
the
land
of
opportunity
or
the
place
where
you
can
get
a
better
life
for
your
children.
That's
often
what
brings
people
to
our
to
our
shores.
When
we
talk
about
economic
mobility,
there's
there's
two
different
concepts
that
I
think
are
both
of
which
are
important,
but
I
want
to
to
distinguish
here.
C
So
we
can
talk
about
relative
economic
mobility
and
absolute
economic
mobility,
so
relative
mobility
is
until
recently,
what's
drawn
most
attention
from
analysts
and
from
social
scientists,
and
this
is
mobility
in
ranked
terms,
and
basically,
this
is
measuring
that
the
extent
to
which
children
who
are
born
to
poor
parents
can
grow
up
to
become
rich.
So
it's
measuring
equality
of
opportunity,
essentially
the
extent
to
which
people
are
able
to
rise
beyond
their
situations
of
birth.
In
order
to
end
achieve
prosperity.
C
You
can
think
of
this
as
a
measure
of
how
open
or
how
fluid
a
society
is.
The
extent
to
which
you
know
anyone
can
achieve
their
dreams
or
anyone
can
rise
to
the
top.
The
one
caveat
about
it,
or
one
thing
to
bear
in
mind,
is
that
relative
mobility
is
zero-sum.
So
if
we're
talking
about
mobility
in
ranked
terms,
you
know
every
time
one
person
moves
up
in
rank.
Somebody
else
is
going
to
move
down,
that's
just
how
arithmetic
Liat
works,
or
you
can
think
of
this.
C
Also,
if
you're
thinking
about
you
know
the
top
1%
or
something
like
that,
only
1%
of
people
can
be
in
the
top
1%.
So
it's
zero-sum.
The
other
type
of
absolute
mobility,
that's
important
to
study
is,
is
absolute
mobility.
So
this
is
mobility
in
dollar
terms,
and
this
is
basically
measuring
the
extent
to
which
children
grow
up
to
be
better
off
there
than
their
parents
were
in
terms
of
their
their
overall
income.
So
how
much
money
they're,
making
their
material
standard
of
live?
C
To
help
you
visualize
these
two
concepts
we
have
illustrations.
So
when
economists
and
sociologists
talk
about
mobility,
we
often
like
to
use
metaphor
of
ladders
and
you
can
think
of
people
occupying
different
rungs
on
a
ladder
associated
with
different
positions
in
the
income
distribution.
So
when
you
think
of
relative
mobility,
this
is
the
picture
that
I
at
least
try
to
have
in
mind,
and
so
this
is
measuring
the
extent
to
which
people
are
changing
rungs
on
the
economic
ladder.
C
So
you
can
see
that
you
know
if
the
ladder
on
the
Left
represents
parents
and
the
one
on
the
right
represents
children.
You
can
see
that
in
this
case
there
is
a
fair
amount
of
relative
mobility.
Some
people
have
moved
up
to
the
higher
run.
Two
other
people
have
moved
down
and
some
people
stay
the
same.
So
there's
been
a
shuffling
of
positions
on
this
economic
ladder.
In
contrast,
absolute
mobility
is
better
represented
by
this
illustration.
C
So
here
again,
if
you
have
the
left
representing
parents
and
the
right
representing
children,
you
can
see
that
there's,
there's
no
reshuffling
of
ranks
everybody's
on
the
exact
same
rung
that
they
started,
but
the
entire
ladder
has
moved
up
such
that
every
single
child
is
better
off
in
real
terms
or
in
absolute
terms
than
their
parents
were
so
yeah.
So
I
think
you
know.
Both
of
these
measures
are
very
important
and
they
measure
of
different
things
about
societies
but
they're,
but
they're
distinct,
and
it's
important
not
to
confuse
them.
C
Ok,
so
why
do
we
care
about
mobility?
Well,
I
would
argue
that
we
care
about
both
types
of
mobility,
just
in
and
of
themselves
that
they're
measures
of
sort
of
the
societal
health
of
a
of
a
country
or
of
a
society,
but
in
particular
there
are
also
more
instrumental
reasons
to
care
about
absolute
mobility,
especially
so
there's
been
some
very
interesting
historical
and
psychological
research,
and
that
suggests
that
societies
with
higher
absolute
mobility
are
better
places
to
live
in
a
lot
of
ways.
So
you
can
think
of
these.
C
They
tend
to
be
more
open,
more
tolerant,
more
generous,
more
pragmatic.
More
committed
to
fairness
and
even
more
committed
to
democracy.
So
you
know
these
are
these
are
places
where,
on
a
broad
level,
most
people's
incomes
are
rising
over
time
and
they
tend
to
to
be
nicer
places
to
live,
and
you
know,
even
you
know
better
better
along
a
lot
of
different
metrics
that
are
pretty
widely
agreed-upon
all
right.
So
now,
I'm
going
to
tell
you
about
two
studies
that
have
come
out
of
the
equality
of
opportunity
project.
C
The
first
one
is
one
that
I
contributed
to,
and
the
second
one
is
one
that
was
done
by
some
of
my
co-authors
that
look
at
at
I
could
absolutely
relative
mobility
in
recent
years.
So
the
first
study
is
the
one
that
we
heard
about
earlier,
and
this
is
looking
at
trends
and
absolute
mobility
over
the
last
70
years
or
so,
and
the
question
we
were
asking
my
co-authors
and
I
was
basically
what
percentage
of
children
grow
up
to
be
materially
better
off
than
their
parents?
C
C
We
look
at
the
family
incomes
of
children
when
they're
about
30
year
old,
30
years
old,
and
we
compare
them
to
the
family
incomes,
the
real
family
incomes
of
their
parents,
also
at
age
30,
and
we're
asking
what
fraction
of
children
had
higher
incomes
at
age
30
than
their
parents
did
and
what
we
see
when
we
look
at
this
on.
This
is
the
result
for
1940,
and
so
the
way
to
read
these
graphs
is
across
the
bottom.
C
I've
put
a
parent
income
percentile,
so
going
from
the
left
is
the
poorest
parents
and
the
right
is
the
richest
parents.
You
know
dividing
it
into
100
percentiles
and
on
the
vertical
axis,
is
the
percentage
of
children
who
grew
up
to
be
better
off
than
their
parents
were?
So
what
you
can
see
in
1940
is
that
across
almost
all
the
income
distribution
up
to
at
least
the
80th
or
90th
percentile
come
you
know
more
than
90
percent
about
90%
of
children
grow
up
to
be
to
be
materially
better
off
than
their
parents.
C
At
the
very
top
of
income
distribution
that
number
Falls
a
bit-
and
you
can
think
of
this-
this
is
because,
if
you
are
born
to
the
single
richest
person,
for
example
in
the
country,
then
in
order
to
earn
more
than
them,
you
both
have
to
experience
economic
growth
and
you
have
to
stay
on
the
top.
You
can't
slide
down
in
relative
terms
at
all,
so
that's
why
those
numbers
are
lower,
but
essentially
for
for
the
year
1940,
almost
all
children
to
be
better
off
than
their
parents.
C
If
we
play
this
forward,
we
can
see
so
in
1950.
It
started
to
decline
a
little
bit,
especially
sort
of
in
the
top
half
or
so
1960
it
declines.
Quite
a
bit
more
1970's
holds
holds
a
little
bit
study,
only
a
small
decline
and
then
finally,
for
people
who
are
born
in
1980,
so
people
who
turned
30
in
2010.
You
can
see
that
it's
declined
by
almost
half
it's
much
lower
than
it
than
it
used
to
be
and
that
the
decline
has
been
largest
for
the
middle
of
the
middle
class.
C
This
is
just
looking
at
the
same
data.
This
is
a
trend
year
by
year
showing
the
overall
absolute
mobility
rate
and
basically
the
finding
is
that
you
know
in
people
born
in
the
1940s
about
90%
of
them
grew
up
to
be
better
off
than
their
parents.
There's
a
very
steady
decline
over
the
following
25
30
years
and
a
slight
upswing
in
the
late
for
people
born
in
the
late
60s.
C
C
We
were
trying
to
be
good
social
scientists.
So
we
did
a
lot
of
sensitivity,
analyses
with
this
and
we
basically
find
that
the
the
key
result
that
there's
been
a
very
sharp
decline
is
is
extremely
robust.
So
it's
best
to
using
different
measures
of
inflation,
post-tax
looking
at
income
after
taxes
and
after
transfers
measuring
income
at
age
40,
rather
than
30
using
individual
income
rather
than
family
income
and
adjusting
for
changes
in
household
size.
C
So
these
alter
the
overall
the
final
rate,
especially
for
later
cohorts,
but
they
don't
alter
the
trend,
hardly
at
all,
okay
and
then
the
so.
The
question
that
we
may
be
asking
is:
what's
behind
this
decline
in
absolute
mobility
and
I:
don't
have
time
to
get
into
the
methods
we
use
but
I'm
happy
to
discuss
that
during
the
Q&A.
C
But
basically,
as
far
as
we
can
tell,
it
looks
like
the
decline
in
absolute
mobility
is
primarily
due
to
wage
stagnation,
since
the
1970s,
so
about
30
percent
of
the
decline
is
due
to
slower
economic
growth,
so
the
economy
grew
more
quickly
in
the
1950s
and
the
1960s
than
it
did
than
it
has
in
recent
decades.
But
much
more
important
than
that
about
70
percent
of
the
decline
is
due
to
the
fact
that
incomes
have
not
kept
up
with
the
economic
growth
that
we've
had.
C
C
Well,
you
see
is,
if
you
look
at
the
the
Series
in
gray,
which
is
looking
at
the
the
thirty
years
leading
up
to
nineteen
eighty,
you
see
that
first
of
all,
the
income
growth
was
was
high.
It
was
about
two
percent
on
average,
but
it
was
also
very
broadly
shared.
So
as
it
was
high
for
almost
everyone
and
in
fact
it
was
highest
for
the
people
who
started
out
poorest.
C
This
meant
that
the
entire
society
was
getting
richer
and
that,
even
as
everyone
was
getting
richer,
the
people
who
had
started
out
at
the
bottom
we're
catching
up
tabi
one
else
and
that's
very
different
from
the
picture
that
you
see
in
2014,
which
is
in
red.
So
here
you
can
see
that
the
overall
rate
is
lower.
C
Their
incomes
have
grown
on
average
6%
of
year
a
year
for
the
past
34
years,
so
I
tried
to
do
the
calculation
is
something
they've
gone
by
something
like
five
hundred
five
to
six
hundred
percent
during
a
time
in
which
the
overall
economy
has
got
only
grown
by
about
fifty
percent,
so
the
economic
growth
that
we
have
had
it's
been
very
skewed
towards
the
wealthy.
That
gives
you
a
sense
of
how
you
can
have
incomes,
failing
failing
to
keep
up
with
a
with
economic
growth.
C
Alright.
So,
just
summing
up
the
first
study,
so
basically
a
two
main
takeaway,
so
one
race,
race
of
upward,
absolute
mobility,
have
fallen
from
about
ninety
percent
for
people
born
in
the
nineteen
forty
birth
birth
cohort
to
about
fifty
percent
for
young
adults
today,
and
that-
and
second
this
is
primarily
due
to
wage
stagnation
since
the
1970s.
C
Alright,
now
I
want
to
talk
briefly
about
a
second
study.
This
is
not
one
I
contributed
to
so
I'm,
going
to
do
my
best.
Looking
at
the
geography
of
relative
mobility.
Where
is
the
land
of
opportunity?
They're,
clever,
with
titles
I
think
so,
if
you
only
call
relative
mobility
as
mobility
in
ranked
terms
so
looking
at
where
you
you
versus
your
parents,
are
in
the
income
distribution
in
percentiles,
and
this
graph
shows
relative
mobility
for
the
overall
for
the
United
States
for
the
cohort
born
in
1982
1982.
So
a
couple
of
couple
birth
cohorts
combined.
C
C
You
have
the
average
rank
of
children
born
to
parents
in
that
percentile,
and
so,
if
there
were
perfect
relative
mobility,
this
would
be
a
flat
line
would
be,
you
know,
would
be
50
for
everyone,
and
if
there
were,
if
there
were
zero
relative
mobility,
then
it
would
be
a
45-degree
line
with
a
slope
of
one
so
where
your
your
parents,
income,
exactly,
determines
your
your
own
income
rank
and
the
the
empirical
result
for
the
u.s..
Is
that
there's
a
slope
of
about
0.35?
C
C
However,
this
varies
a
lot
across
the
country,
so
these
are
two
two
lines
showing
the
relative
mobility
rates
for
Salt,
Lake,
City
in
blue
and
Charlotte
in
red,
and
you
can
see
that
the
Salt
Lake
City
line
is
much
more.
It's
about,
there's
quite
a
bit
flatter
than
the
line
for
Charlotte,
and
this
indicates
that
relative
mobility
is
is
substantially
higher
in
Salt
Lake
than
it
is
in
in
Charlotte
and
and
it's
a
meaningful
difference.
C
So,
if
you
think
of
the
average
child
born
to
the
twenty-fifth
percentile,
so
the
you
know
the
bottom
quarter
of
society
in
Salt
Lake
those
those
kids
end
up
on
average
at
the
46
percentile,
so
almost
at
the
median
of
the
country,
whereas
in
Charlotte
they
end
up
at
about
the
35th
percentile.
So
you
know
about
a
third
lower
third,
smaller
in
terms
of
the
mobility
that
they
experience.
C
C
And
basically
these
researchers
determines
using
a
lot
of
very
impressive
and
advanced
statistical
and
social
science.
Modeling
determined
that
much
of
this
is
actually
a
causal
effect.
So
I'm
going
to
just
show
you
what
the
map
looks
like,
so
they
were
able
to
estimate
the
causal
effect
of
livig
of
growing
up
in
different
parts
of
the
country
and
and
what
they
show
is
that
if
you
look
at
this
map,
there's
wide
geographic
variation,
and
so
they
this
is
showing
light.
C
Colors
are
areas
that
have
higher
upward
relative
mobility
or
higher
relative
mobility,
and
dark
areas
have
lower
relative
mobility
and
so
they've
estimated
that
on
average,
the
effect
of
growing
growing
up
somewhere
like
Minnesota
or
Nebraska
Wyoming.
These
sorts
of
places
that
are
that
are
white,
the
that
are
lightly
colored
on
they
have
on
average.
C
If
you
took
a
child,
I
ran
down
and
had
them
grow
up
there,
they
would
on
average,
earn
about
20%
more
than
the
average
child
with
their
background
in
the
country
and
then,
conversely,
the
places
that
are
that
are
more
red
colored
on
this
map.
So
some
of
the
places
are,
you
know
many
parts
of
Mississippi
many
parts
of
North
Carolina,
including
Charlotte,
as
we
saw
also
Chicago,
also
parts
of
California
those
children
growing
up
there
on
average,
earn
about
9%
or
10%
less
than
their
peers
in
the
country
as
a
whole.
C
So
there's
you
know
this
is
a
fairly
substantial
variation
and
you
know
economically
meaningful,
certainly
and
then
what
they
did
is
they
looked
at?
What
sorts
of
what
sorts
of
variables
predict
the
a
extent
to
which
a
commuting
zone?
Air
metro
area
has
upward
or
downward
mobility
or
has
more
or
less
relative
mobility,
and
so
the
way
to
look
at
this
part
is
basically
they
looking
at
a
one
standard,
deviation
chains
in
a
given
metric.
C
So
this
first
one
is
the
is
a
common
index
of
racial
segregation
within
a
metro
area
and
they're
and
they're
controlling
that
a
1
1
standard
deviation,
increase
in
racial
segregation
decreases
relative
mobility
on
average
by
about
5%,
and
they
do
this
for
a
bunch
of
different
variables
of
interest.
So
some
takeaways
are
that
places
with
shorter
commute
times
tend
to
have
higher
relative
mobility
of
metro
areas
that
are
more
unequal,
tend
to
have
lower
relative
mobility
places
with
higher
test
scores
and
with
more
colleges,
tend
to
do
do
better
and
and
so
on
down.
C
C
Alright,
so
that's
all
I
have
for
you
prepared
I
want
to
thank
you
all
very
much
for
your
attention
and
for
coming
feel
free
to
email
me.
My
email
is
up
here
and
also
all
the
slides
and
all
of
the
data
that
I've
showed.
You
is
available
online
at
WWE
quality
of
opportunity
org.
So
thank
you
very
much.
I'm
really
looking
forward
to
the
conversation.
A
Thank
you
Robert.
Yes,
we
do
have
a
set
aside
time
for
Q&A,
but
I
wanted
to
give
a
quick
opportunity,
maybe
one
or
two
questions.
If
there
were
questions
related
to
any
of
the
slides
that
he
put
up.
And
yes,
sir
I,
see
one
question
down
here,
could
you
come
to
the
microphone
please?
So
we
can
all
hear
it
a.
D
C
So
that's
a
really
good
question
and
something
that
we
had
to
spend
a
lot
of
time
trying
to
think
about,
and
you
know,
we've
tell
you
what
we've
done
and
then
some
of
the
potential
weaknesses.
So
so
there
are
two.
There
are
two
sort
of
related
issues
that
you're
bringing
up.
So
one
is
sort
of
overall
purchasing
power
and,
like
you
know
the
fact
that
you
can
buy
more
at
on
a
given
income
now
than
you
could
in
the
past,
perhaps
or
something
like
that
and
I.
C
Think
we've
we've
done
I
think
a
fairly
thorough
job
of
controlling
for
that
by
using
many
different
measures
of
inflation
for
the
country
as
a
whole.
So
in
the
QA
I
can
show
you
some
of
the
different
measures
that
we
have,
but
we've
used
every
sort
of
every
one,
that's
common
in
the
literature
and
then
we've
done
ones
where
we
add
you
know
say
well
what,
if
inflation
was,
you
know
just
two
percentage
points
a
year
lower
just
to
be
sure.
But
the
second
question
is
differences
in
purchasing
power
across
the
country.
C
So
you
can
think
of
things
like
the
cost
of
living.
In
Boston,
for
example,
is
much
higher
than
the
cost
of
living
in
Minnesota,
where
I
grew
up,
and
you
end
that's
true
in
housing,
but
it's
also
true
for
different
types
of
of
goods,
and
we
can't
really
control
for
that.
So
you
could
imagine
that
these
numbers
might
be
overstated
a
bit
if
more
people
today
live
in
low-cost
areas,
then
or
a
higher
fraction
of
the
overall
population
lives
in
low-cost
parts
of
the
country
than
was
true
in
the
past.
C
I
think
it's
just
it's
very
messy
to
try
to
sort
that
out,
because
there's
not
super
well
agreed-upon
measures
of
of
purchasing
power-
and
you
know
even
with
things
like
housing
people
say
well,
you
know
part
of
the
reason
it's
expensive
in
certain
places
to
live
is
that
you
know
you're
getting
higher
amenity
values.
Maybe
people
value
the
weather
there
that
sort
of
stuff
so
I
think
it's
very
hard
to
sort
of
analytically
sort
that
out,
but
but
that
is
a
potential
concern.
E
E
C
A
F
Feet
please
and
your
name:
my
state
is
Charlotte
I'm
from
North
Carolina,
but
specifically
Charlotte
North
Carolina.
It's
interesting
the
comparison
that
you
made
with
Charlotte
North
Carolina
Salt
Lake
City
Utah.
Would
there
be
a
fair
assumption
that
when
you
compare
those
to
say,
Charlotte
started
off
all
law
and
economic
mobility
in
its
intergenerational
as
compared
to
Salt
Lake
City.
C
So
it's
I
can't
really
speak
to
change
it
to
trends
in
mobility
for
specific
places
over
time,
but
it.
But
it
may
certainly
be
the
case
that
so
when
I,
when
I
was
quoting
the
statistics,
those
we're
comparing
to
children
who
are
at
the
same
percentile
of
the
national
income
distribution.
But
it's
quite
possible
that
different
cities
have
different.
You
know
have
different
amount
percentages
of
kids
that
are
fall
in
different
places.
G
H
G
Yes,
perfect,
okay,
so
I
won't
introduce
myself
any
further
I'll
just
jump
right
in
so
the
American
Dream
is
inextricably
connected
to
the
American
economy
writ
large,
a
dynamic
changeful
ever-growing
economy
is
supposed
to
be
part
of
the
American
story.
You
know
ideas
and
ambition
are
supposed
to
be
all
it
takes
to
get
ahead
and
we
like
to
think
of
ourselves
as
the
most
dynamic
and
entrepreneurial
nation
on
earth.
G
So
the
trends
that
Robert
documented
toward
the
less
dynamic
society
are
parallels
with
an
inextricably
very
parallel
by
an
inextricably
bound
up
with
trends
towards
a
less
dynamic
economy.
So
people
seem
to
think
that
the
economy
today
is
plagued
by
too
much
disruption
and
too
much
change.
That's
leaving
people
behind,
but
I
think
that
that's
not
quite
right.
That's
a
false
impression
that
some
really
high
profile,
mostly
technology,
internet-based
companies
at
a
Silicon
Valley,
have
kind
of
made
pervade
the
ether.
What
we're
actually
experiencing
is
an
economy.
G
That's
seeing
too
little
change
and
the
economy
that's
growing
to
static,
and
that
has
impacts
on
individual
economic
mobility
as
well.
So
I'll
walk
you
through
some
of
those
trends
that
we're
seeing
to
document
the
case.
So
first,
the
US
economy
is
growing,
less
dynamic
in
really
any
way
that
you
define
the
term,
so
people
are
moving
less
often
than
in
the
past.
The
rate
of
moving
across
state
boundaries
has
halved
since
the
1980s
people
are
changing
jobs
less
frequently
too.
G
So
in
2015,
only
one
in
fourteen
positions
in
the
economy
turned
over
that
year,
and
that
means
that
fewer
people
are
moving
to
a
higher
wage
productivity,
enhancing
work
arrangements,
and
it
also
means
that
there
are
fewer
going
to
chain
reactions
of
job
hoppers
working
their
way
through
the
economy
and
at
the
end
of
every
one
of
those
chains,
is
typically
an
individual
on
the
margins
of
the
labor
force,
a
young
person
or
someone
who's
unemployed.
Looking
for
an
opening
to
step
into
and
those
those
aren't
appearing
like
they
used
to
so
the
word.
G
So
the
United
States
today
produces
half
as
many
new
companies
as
a
share
of
all
companies
in
the
economy
that
it
did
in
the
late
1970s
and
you
know
in
the
1980s,
the
economy
was
half
as
large
as
it
is
today,
but
each
and
every
year
we
produced
about
500,000
new
companies
in
the
US
economy.
Since
the
since
2010
that
numbers
fallen
to
400,000
new
companies
and
again
that's
an
economy,
that's
twice
as
large
as
just
a
few
decades
ago.
G
So
if
you
look
at
these
trend
lines,
what
changed
or
the
Great
Recession
really
marks
a
turning
point.
The
top
line
is
the
start-up
rate.
The
bottom
line
is
the
rate
at
which
firms
closed
and
the
Great
Recession
is
the
first
time
that
those
two
lines
crossed
and
that
actually
represents
a
bit
of
a
neck
and
a
bit
of
a
transformation.
G
So,
for
the
first
time
in
the
United,
States
more
companies
closed
and
open
in
any
given
year,
and
it's
important
to
remember
as
you're
thinking
about
these
Tran
that
you
know,
apart
from
a
spike
in
2009,
the
closure
rate
has
not
increased
so
despite
the
retail
apocalypse
and
manufacturing
troubles
throughout
the
economy.
What's
really
underlying
this
transformation
that
we're
seeing
is
that
new
companies
are
coming
online
at
a
far
slower
rate
than
ever
before.
G
Also,
one
more
thing
I'd
like
to
say
on
this
slide.
So
if
you'd
have
one
takeaway
from
this
session,
I'd
like
it
to
be
that
the
policy
imperative
is
to
boost
the
startup
rate
back
towards
where
it
used
to
be,
and
that
is
going
to
call
for
a
fundamentally
different
set
of
policy
proposals
than
if
you
instead
wanted
to
batten
down
the
hatches
and
say
you
want
to
insulate
your
economy
from
waves
of
economic
change.
So
this
chart
essentially
shows
in
a
different
way
the
gap
between
those
two
lines.
G
On
the
previous
page,
it
says
the
net
annual
increase
in
firms
in
the
US
economy
each
each
year,
and
you
can
see
that
the
Great
Recession
really
knocks
the
country
startup
engine
almost
completely
inert,
and
now
you
know
it's
it's
a
huge
transformation
that
we're
barely
producing
a
new
company
for
everyone
that
closes
in
the
United
States
today.
So
this
is.
These
are
uncharted
waters
now
here
my
beginnings
as
a
geography
geographer
are
going
to
show
through.
G
So
these
national
trends
are,
of
course,
the
aggregation
of
things
happening
place
by
place
across
the
United
States
today.
So
this
chart
shows
the
number
of
metropolitan
areas
in
the
u.s.
that
are
in
which
more
firms
are
closing
than
opening
in
any
given
year.
So
prior
to
the
Great
Recession
that
never
really
rose
above
20
percent
of
metro
areas,
totally
spiked
with
the
Great
Recession,
and
it's
stayed
elevated
ever
since
so
now
about
60
percent
of
metro
areas.
G
The
latest
data
is
for
2014,
but
even
then
five
years
into
a
recovery,
we're
still
kind
of
suffering
from
eroding
portfolios
of
companies
and
their
local
economies
and
again
I
want
to
reinforce
that.
It's
not.
This
trend
is
not
driven
by
closures.
It's
driven
by
depress
start-up
rates,
and
it's
not
just
retail.
That's
driving
these
trends,
so
this
graphic
shows
visually
from
the
transformation
that's
set
in
across
much
policy
in
America,
so
each
dot
here
represents
a
metro
area
and
the
y-axis
is
the
startup
rate
over
five,
the
average
over
different
five-year
periods
reflecting
equivalent.
G
So
long
because
I
think
it
has
incredible
symbolic
importance
and
explanatory
power,
for
you
know,
as
we
try
to
dig
into
what
happened
to
the
American
dream,
and
this
is
because
you
can
just
look
at
the
impacts
that
startups
have
on
various
aspects
of
the
economy.
So
for
workers,
a
less
dynamic
economy
means
that
there
are
fewer
companies
out
there
competing
for
their
labor.
G
That
means
it
means
that
there
are
fewer
opportunities
to
switch
jobs
and
find
someone
offering
that
higher
wage,
and
it
essentially
means
that
there
are
fewer
chances
to
climb
the
ladder
of
opportunity
that
Robert
was
documenting,
so
four
markets.
It
means
that
a
less
dynamic
economy
means
that
markets
and
industries
are
becoming
more
concentrated.
So
since
1997,
two-thirds
of
US
industries
have
become
more
dominated
by
the
most
dominant
firms
in
their
markets,
so
competition
is
weakening
in
the
economy
and
profits
are
sky-high.
G
We
see
this
reflected
in
the
Dow,
and
we
see
this
reflected
in
all
sorts
of
economic
statistics,
but
especially
in
the
past
year,
a
whole
bunch
of
research
has
come
online.
That
says
that
these
are
not
profits
that
are
generated
from
no
genuine
innovations
or
like
they're,
not
tied
to
patents
or
intellectual
property,
they're
tied
towards
barriers
to
entry
towards
economic
rents
and
kind
of
undue
market
power.
Because
markets
have
you
know
fundamentally
transformed
in
our
less
dynamic
and
competitive,
so
for
regions,
a
less
dynamic
economy,
it
means
that
they
suffer
as
well.
G
It
means
that
the
pipeline
of
new
businesses
that's
supposed
to
be
populating.
The
map
is
drying
up.
It
means
that
there's
less
experimentation
going
on
all
across
the
country
where
you
know
entrepreneurs
are
trying
to
find
the
new
industries
of
the
future,
and
it
also
I
think,
contributes
to
a
relatively
backward-looking
economic
development
stance
in
too
many
places
where,
if,
in
an
era
of
diminished
dynamism,
your
left's
kind
of
fighting
over
just
a
scarce
number
of
pieces
on
the
chessboard
in
a
relatively
zero-sum
game.
G
G
So
instead
of
trying
to
preserve
the
past
as
long
as
possible,
so
to
paint
a
more
complete
picture
than
just
the
startup
right,
we
had
a
G
wanted
to
create
an
index
of
multiple
measures
of
dynamism
and
track
them
across
States
and
over
time.
So
data
availability
meant
that
in
1992
to
2014
was
the
period
that
we
looked
at.
G
We
waited
all
those
seven
metrics
there
equally
except
the
first
one
business
churn,
which
combines
a
start
up
right
in
the
closure
rate,
into
kind
of
a
single
gauge
of
churn
in
the
business
landscape
and
that
one
we
waited
EE.
And
here
you
can
see
the
results.
The
darker
states
are
the
most
dynamic
ones
there
at
the
highest-performing
quintile
and
the
lighter
states
are
the
least
dynamic
ones.
G
So
in
Nevada,
Utah,
Florida,
California
and
North
Dakota
lead
the
pack,
and
these
states
are
all
high
population
growth
states
and
it's
kind
of
intuitive
that
you
know
a
faster
population.
Growth
means
that
you're
creating
new
businesses
to
serve
a
growing
market,
but
they
also
have
high
foreign-born
shares
of
the
population,
and
immigrants
are
disproportionately
likely
to
create
new
businesses,
they're
also
generally
economically
diverse,
if
I'd,
relatively
new
have
knowledge,
economy
and
information
technically
Samak
states
which
are
clustered
in
the
Great
Lakes
and
then
kind
of
secondarily
in
the
lower
Mississippi
River
Basin.
G
These
places,
despite
many
kind
of
positive
stories
coming
out
of
the
region,
are
still
broadly
kind
of
struggling
with
legacy
industries
trying
to
find
new
economic
purposes
in
a
changing,
rapidly
changing
environment,
and
these
places
are
suffering
from
high
rates
of
out
migration
and
very
low
start-up
rates.
I
would
also
point
out
that
these
are
the
states
that
quite
conspicuously
determine
the
2016
election
I.
Don't
think
that
that
is
going
to
be
a
completely
coincidental.
G
So
some
of
the
bad
news
given
dynamism,
pervasive
decline,
is
that
the
four
seems
to
have
real
inertia.
So,
on
the
one
hand,
Nevada
was
the
state
that
dominated
the
index
from
start
to
finish-
and
that's
you
know,
despite
the
tech
boom
and
bust
housing
boom
and
bust
financial
crisis
and
then
a
protracted
recovery.
So
that
shows
that
you
know
states.
It
takes
a
lot
to
move
the
state
or
dislodge
a
state
on
this
comprehensive
set
of
metrics
and
then
the
graph
on
the
bottom
right.
The
dotted
line
says
the
US
average
on
the
index.
G
So
the
slightly
out
of
order,
sorry
that
map
at
the
top
left
shows
the
states
that
are
at
their
lowest
kind
of
dynamism,
even
in
2014,
that's
five
years
after
the
Great
Recession
and
these
to
me
kind
of
capture
the
three
kind
of
problem
areas
of
the
economy.
Today
you
have
old
industrial
regions.
You
have
kind
of
deep
endemic
poverty
of
the
deep
south,
and
then
you
have
rural
places
that
are
kind
of
trying
to
find
their
footing
in
a
urban
age.
G
So,
as
dynamism
has
declined,
we've
seen
fewer
and
fewer
places
power
national
growth.
So
the
share
of
all
counties
matching
the
national
child
growth
rate.
Over
the
past
three
recoveries
has
fallen
to
28
percent.
It
used
to
be
in
the
1990s
well
over
half
of
counties
where
you
know
matching
that
top-line
national
job
growth
rate
and
only
a
quarter
of
counties
now
match
the
share.
The
rate
of
increase
in
business
establishments
that
the
national
economy
is
posting.
G
So
as
dynamism,
retreats,
I
think
the
takeaway
is
that
it
becomes
harder
to
generate
inclusive
growth
that
is
going
to
reach
more
people
in
more
places
and
give
them
opportunities
for
income
mobility.
So
the
American
Dream
is
realized
or
denied
locally,
where
people
live
and
work
where
norms
are
established.
You
know
on
the
streets
and
in
the
parks
and
in
the
schools
and
the
neighborhood
level
effects
that
really
feed
into
many
of
the
results
that
Roberts
research
teams
have
found.
Are
our
hyper
local?
G
You
know
community
by
community
effects,
so
the
last
major
piece
of
research
that
I'd
like
to
talk
about
is
our
distressed
communities
index,
and
this
looks
at
this
maps:
economic
well-being
at
the
zip
code
level
and
at
this
geographic
resolution,
where
I
think
that
the
disparities
in
the
American
economic
experience
really
come
into
starkest
focus.
And
so
this
material
is
a
preview
of
a
report
that
is
going
to
be
forthcoming
from
AIG
in
2017.
G
So
if
you
look
at
the
average
values
across
the
seven
indicators
in
those
quintiles
that
constitute
the
DTI,
you
can
see
some
really
astonishing
gaps.
Even
in
this
you
know
this
is
a
relative.
Vici
has
a
relative
metric,
but
it
captures
things
like
you
know
in
distressed
communities,
more
than
twice
as
many
prime
age
adults
are
not
in
work
as
in
prosperous
communities.
G
The
poverty
rate
is
more
than
four
times
as
high
and
more
than
four
times
as
many
adults
don't
even
have
a
high
school
degree,
and
that's
really
the
ticket
to
opportunity
in
the
economy
today
and
then
I
think
the
most
shocking
and
most
troubling
is
the
growth
gap.
So
the
two
statistics
on
the
right
change
in
employment
and
change
in
business
establishments,
so
the
distressed
communities.
You
know
the
places
that
are
most
desperate
for
growth
today
are
the
places
that
are
still
mired
in
a
deep
and
ongoing
recession.
G
So
it's
a
real
challenge
that
I
think
all
of
us
face
in
trying
to
nudge
growth
towards
these
places
that
they
left
to
its
own
devices.
It's
going
to
leave
behind
so
place
place
doesn't
just
affect
future
earnings,
but
it
affects
everything
from
educational
attainment
to
life
expectancy.
So
what
we
are
really
concerned
about
at
AIG
is
that
it
seems
like
trends
in
the
economy
today
are
towards
even
further
concentration
of
geographic
opportunity.
G
So
that
motivates
me
in
my
work
everyday,
and
that
makes
me
excited
to
be
here
with
you
all
thinking
about
ways
to
kind
of
rekindle
dynamism
at
the
grassroots
level,
because
the
the
American
Dream
is
realized
or
denied
neighborhood
by
neighborhood,
and
that
is
also
where
it
will
be
restored.
So
thank
you
and.
I
Thank
you,
ma'am
I'm
bill,
McKinley,
state
representative
from
New,
Mexico
and
I
guess
two
questions.
The
first
is
specifically
regarding
tax
policy
and
I
guess
this
could
be
for
both
of
you.
How
are
there
any
kind
of
connections
you
find
between
things
like
Earned,
Income,
Tax,
Credit,
progressive
income,
taxes,
more
reliance
on
regressivity
and
taxes,
special
breaks
for
big
corporations
in
regards
to
inequality
and
I?
Guess
the
second
one
is
more
of
a
best
practices
question.
I
So
what
we
hear
all
the
time
in
New
Mexico
is
broadband
availability,
workforce
training
and
access
to
capital
and
Finance.
Are
there
any
other
you're
dealing
with
a
bunch
of
policymakers
here?
Are
there
any
of
the
best
practice
in
terms
of
policy
that
can
increase
dynamism
and
decrease
at
quality?
Thank
you
sure.
G
Those
are
a
big
question,
so
if
I
don't
get
to
all
of
them
now
we
will
expand
on
them
a
little
more
in
the
Q&A
as
well.
So
with
respect
to
tax
policy.
I
think
that
it's
well
documented
and
agreed
upon
on
both
sides
of
the
aisle
that
the
EITC
is
a
real
best-in-class
program
that
does
measurably
increase,
increase
individual
earnings,
so
I
think
that
efforts
to
expand
that
and
improve
that
are
definitely
worthwhile.
You
know,
with
respect
to
I,
think
you
mentioned
incentives
to
big
to
big
companies.
G
Big
businesses,
I
think
those
are
going
to
be
state-by-state
considerations,
but
you
do
have
to
look
as
the
economics
that
you
know
it
is
a
budget
and
you
can
either
take
a
fraction
of
money
towards
investing
in
people.
Improving
schools,
improving
infrastructure,
improving
workforce
training
or
you
can
get
the
immediate
jobs
bump.
So
I
think
that
that's
a
kind
of
a
balance
that
most
people
in
this
room
are
keen
be
aware
of
and
with
respect
to
best
practices.
G
So
I
think
that
efforts
to
essentially
you
know,
make
sure
that
the
fabric
of
the
economy
is
strong
and
that
people
who
do
still
live
in
rural
areas
can
access
kind
of
market
information.
They
need.
Companies
who
work
in
rural
areas
can
access
the
talent
that
they
need
are
all
worthwhile
and
I'll.
Leave
it
there
and
and.
A
C
C
This
isn't
something
that
we've
gotten
into
as
much
so
I,
don't
think
I
can
talk
in
as
specific
terms,
but
I
would
say
anything
that
states
can
do
to
sort
of
encourage
companies
to
you
know
we
saw
it
just
saw
that
companies
are
actually
extremely
profitable
right
now
and
so
anything
that
states
can
do
to
encourage
companies
to
share
those
profits
with
consumers
and
with
their
workers
and
these
sorts
of
things.
So
you
know
profit
sharing
agreements.
J
Evan
Eric's
question
for
I
think
it's
Ken's
first
chart
whether
the
lines
cross.
Okay,
thank
you.
Can
you
tell
us
your
state,
please
I'm,
Stephanie,
barium
fiscal
staff
in
Vermont
and
I
couldn't
quite
understand
the
time.
I
couldn't
see
the
time
frame
on
that
charger,
so
I
wasn't
quite
sure
how
many
years
that
was.
But
my
question
is
when
you
looked
at
that
chart
and
where
it
crossed
in
the
Great
Recession,
but
you've
seen
it
over
time.
J
J
G
I
think
that
you
know
when
we
look
at
I
think
we
can
talk
more
about
inequality,
but
if
you
look
at
quality
a
lot
of
that's
driven
by
the
superstar
companies
that
have
really
mastered
global
supply
chains
that
have
mastered
these
extremely
complicated
technology
systems
are
now
seeing
kind
of
the
excess
returns
on
those
investments,
and
those
are
really
hard.
Barriers
to
entry
are
really
high
barriers
to
entry
and
really
hard
things
for
startups
to
replicate
and
be
able
to
compete
against.
G
So
I
think
that
companies
that
have
mastered
those
things
are
have
a
real
advantage.
I
also
think,
though,
that
you
know
so
states
can
so
I
think
sometimes
state
policies
do
look
to
protect
incumbents
or
subsidize
incumbents,
or
you
know
they
there's
a
an
externality
every
time
that
you
know
a
subsidy
goes
to
an
existing
company
that
a
start-up
is
not
going
to
share
or
have
that
subsidy
I
as
well.
So
it's
going
to
be
harder
for
them
to
compete
against
the
other
company.
C
I
just
like
to
tacko
a
couple
of
these
things,
so
it's
definitely
true
that
these
specifically
globalization
and
technology
have
been
major
forces
affecting
the
economy
and
affecting
the
country
and
probably
contributing
to
many
of
these
trends.
But
one
thing
to
keep
in
mind
is
that
the
u.s.
actually
at
least
on
the
wage,
stagnation
and
inequality,
metrics
and
I'm
more
familiar
with
the
US,
has
fared
substantially
worse
than
most
of
our
pure
nations.
So
it
can't
be
entirely
these
global
changes
and
one
thing
that
many
scholars
are
yeah.
C
The
scholars
are
looking
at
and
think
it's
contributing
is
that
we've
actually
changed
over
the
past
30
or
40
years.
We've
altered
the
rules
by
which
our
economy
function,
so
we
it's
been
sort
of
affirmative
change
in
many
cases,
so,
for
instance,
one
example
of
that
is
the
sort
of
that's
been
getting
a
fair
amount.
Attention
in
the
news
recently.
C
Is
that
the
the
way
in
which
the
government
approaches
antitrust
work
has
shifted
since
the
1970s
and
the
the
concerns
that
the
government
has
the
things
that
it
weighs
when
it's
deciding
whether
to
take
action,
have
actually
changed,
and
so
that's
been
a
action
by
the
government
that
has
I
think
affected.
That's
been
sort
of
unique
to
the
United
States
compared
to
pure
countries
that
is
affected.
What
one
might
be?
One
reason
why
we've
sort
of
been
uniquely
affected
by
some
of
these
developments.
E
A
B
K
Anderson
Connecticut
a
robber,
you
kind
of
answer,
one
of
my
two
questions.
Just
now:
a
father
of
Western
democracies.
Other
pure
nations
have
not
experienced
this
decline
in
the
middle
class.
Could
it
possibly
be
related
to
the
fact
that
labor
unions
are
really
suppressed
in
this
country
and
that
in
other
Western
democracies,
workers
have
more
bargaining
power.
C
A
G
I'll
add
to
nothing
to
unions
specifically,
but
I
think
that
many
stay
or
there's
been
kind
of
a
kind
of
shift
in
policy
towards
you
know
they're
away
from
protecting
workers.
So
one
area
is
non-compete
agreements.
There
was
a
really
good
article
in
The,
New,
York,
Times
recently
and
I
don't
want
to
pick
on
any
states,
but
one
western
state
strengthens
their
non-compete
agreements
at
the
same
time
or
their
provisions
around
non-compete
agreements
which
essentially
make
it
illegal
for
a
worker
to
go
work
for
a
competitor
or
even
start
their
own
business.
G
So
that's
a
real
I
mean
to
me.
That
makes
no
sense
at
all
unless
you're
just
trying
to
protect
your
incumbent,
as
is
because
your
it
means
that
even
low-wage
workers,
and
including
in
some
fast
food
chains,
are
now
prohibited
from
going
to
work
for
competitor
for
a
little
bit
extra
money
it
gets
on
offer
or
they
can't
spin
out
and
start
a
new
a
new
company
in
the
same
business
line
as
their
prior
employer.
G
A
Okay,
I
see
a
question
here
and
maybe
one
coming
as
you
approach
the
microphone.
Sir
I
will
ask
another
question.
You
know:
we've
talked
about
perhaps
and
adjusting
the
tax
code
and
taking
a
look
at
our
policies
for
businesses.
State
legislatures
state
legislatures,
have
great
oversight
of
the
education
system,
so
kind
of
think
about.
Maybe
a
response
to
that
will
go
with
your
question
and
then
bounce
back
to
that
thought.
Go
ahead,
sir.
H
Thank
you,
steve
McCarter,
state,
rep
pennsylvania.
Is
there
anything
in
the
research
that
indicates
those
states
in
terms
of
taxing
policies
and
how
they
impact,
whether
you
tax
your
way
to
more
Dyne
ISM
or
you
cut
your
way
to
more
Dyne
ISM?
What
policies
and
so
forth
seem
to
be
more
successful
in
terms
of
the
states?
Is
there
anything
that
can
add
to
that?
No.
G
G
That
might
be
worthwhile,
but
so,
on
the
other
hand,
some
states
like
Colorado,
they
have
difficulty
funding
their
education
budget
and
they
benefit
from
being
a
net
importer
of
talent
that
they
had
to
grow
their
own
talent
might
not
have
kind
of
a
strong
enough
education
system
to
be
as
competitive
as
they
are
today.
So
there
are
some
I
think
unique,
state-by-state
considerations.
There
I
believe
that
you
know
Connecticut
is
one
of
the
least
dynamic
states
in
the
Northeast,
and
that
could
come
down
to
a
variety
of
factors
might
not
just
be
taxed,
but
I.
C
H
L
Go
ahead,
thank
you.
I'm
Joyce,
Elliott
from
Arkansas
and
I
live
in
Little
Rock
specifically,
and
we
have
quite
a
history
that
some
of
which
we're
not
very
proud.
So
my
question
is
really
kind
of
place-based
about
the
south
and
particularly
Robert
since
you're
interested
in
sociology
I
was
Arkansas.
Is
one
of
the
states?
That's
the
least
dynamic
I
noticed,
and
it
seems
that
in
the
south
we
are
caught
between
two
cliffs
of
hyper
segregation.
We
started
out.
L
L
There
was
a
direct
correlation
between
that
desegregation
and
upward
mobility
and
I
am
living
proof
event
and
one
of
those.
But
when
we
got
to
a
certain
point,
as
we
are
now,
we
are
resegregate
encoder,
echt
correlation
between
that
resegregate
and
the
downward
mobility.
When
it
comes
to
particularly
people
of
color,
I
can
tell
by
concentration,
so
I'm
wondering
if
you
know
any
place,
base
things
as
anybody.
L
L
G
I
think
that
I
mean
you
do
have,
especially
that
the
south
is
low,
pistol
ability.
Today
we
see
in
all
these
maps
and
I
think
where
you
have
these
kind
of
concentric
circles
of
disadvantage,
where
you
have
people
segregated
by
race
and
by
income
level,
and
it
becomes
even
harder
to
break
down
the
walls
and
kind
of
create
just
one
kind
of
smooth,
cohesive,
American
polity
that
rises
or
Falls
together.
So
it's
I
mean
have
to
be
front
and
center
and
all
the
work
that
you
all
do
but
I
don't
know
anyone.
L
I
don't
mean
to
just
pick
on
the
south
I
just
picked
this
that's
where
I
live
because
I
I
am
well
aware.
It
happens
right
here
in
Boston,
Chicago
and
everyplace
else.
Well,
since
I
didn't
get
an
answer
that
question
behavior
another
quick
one
and
I've
been
wondering
if
we
are
maybe
need
to
rethink
how
we
define
the
Americans
or
is
it?
L
Are
we
putting
ourselves
in
a
bad
position
even
resource-wise?
If
we
continue
to
always
always
push
our
kids
to
be
more
upwardly
mobile
'ti
than
we
are,
can
we
sustain
that?
Should
we
be
more,
should
we
disaggregate
and
just
who
it
is
that
we're
talking
about
that
needs
to
be
moving
an
upward
mobility
way,
I'm
pretty
sure
if
my
son
lives
the
same
quality
of
life
that
he
grew
up
with
he's
going
to
be
pretty
damn
well,
okay,
so
I'm,
not
sure
about
that,
we
need
to
keep
pushing
that.
C
Sure
so,
on
the
latter
question
I
think
I
guess
I
would
say
that
I'd
I
think
we
have
to
make
sure
that
if
we're
going
to
so
I
I
think
we
should
be
pushing
for
a
you
know,
improvements
in
standard
of
living
and
especially
I
think
we
should
be
targeting
those.
Certainly
to
the
you
know
the
people
who
would
need
to
move
up
the
most
but
I
think
that
the
you
know
as
we
as
we
try
to
improve
our
standard
of
living.
C
We
should
definitely
not
make
any
sacrifices
in
terms
of
you
know,
making
sure
this
is
going
to
be
sustainable
and
I.
Think
you
know
that's
going
to
be
one
of
the
challenges,
but
a
very
I
believe
solvable.
One
is
how
do
you,
you
know,
have
increases
in
the
standard
of
living
that
don't
deplete
the
earth
or
don't
you
know,
pollute
our
environment?
Don't
and
you
know,
and
that
are
socially
sustainable
as
well
and
I.
C
Think,
that's
you
know,
I
think
we
have
to
make
sure
that,
when
we're
moving
towards
this
we
have
the
the
economy
set
up
in
a
way
that
we're
going
to
favor
those
solutions
that
are
long-term,
sustainable
and
I.
Don't
think,
there's
any
reason
why
we
shouldn't
be
able
to
do
that.
I
guess
getting
back
to
the
the
first
question:
I
guess:
there's
a
couple:
I,
don't
I
also
don't
have
any
you
know
magic,
poets
or
anything
like
that,
but
a
couple
of
sort
of
observations.
C
So
first
one
this
is
going
back
to
one
slide:
I
had
about
sort
of
characteristics
of
societies
that
have
high
rates
of
upward
or
downward
mobility.
You
know,
I
think
that
there's
definitely
a
feedback
process
here
where
you
know
places
that
wherever
you
want,
where
there's
broadly
shared
prosperity
where
people
are
moving
up,
you
know
becomes
much
easier
to
be
more
sort
of
generous
or
more
open-minded
all
that
sort
of
thing
which
in
turn
probably
tastes
the
next
round
round
of
upward
mobility.
C
So
so,
once
you
have
it
I
think
it
can
be
easier
to
sustain,
but
that,
of
course,
doesn't
solve
the
problem
facing
right
now.
You
know
one
one
aspect
that
certainly
comes
is
important
in
all
this
is
housing
and
access
to
quality,
housing,
access
to
affordable
housing
and
that
sort
of
thing.
So
certainly
this
is
something
that
states
and
cities
can
do.
B
A
B
Calendar
legislative
staff
from
Colorado.
My
question
is
on
the
lack
of
dynamism
and
new
startups.
Have
you
guys
or
anyone
else
controlled
or
just
the
factor
of
an
aging
population
in
that,
and
as
people
get
older,
they
become
more
risk-averse,
and
how
much
is
that
tied
into
the
distribution
as
well
can
be
simply
tied
to
age
of
a
population
in
a
given
area?
It.
G
Is
tied
in
yes,
I,
don't
remember
exactly
what
percent
of
the
decline
it
explains.
It
doesn't
explain
all
of
it,
but
it's
a
portion
that
so
yeah
as
our
Democrat
demography
kind
of
Ages
in
flows
that
that
the
start
up
rate
slows
as
well,
but
it's
involved,
but
not
not
the
entire
puzzle.
There
are
all
sorts
of
little
micro
explanations
that
start
to
explain
all
bits
and
bits
of
it,
but
the
kind
of
other
forces
working
in
the
background
as
well.
G
L
A
M
Name
in
your
state,
I
am
John
Jameson
I'm
from
Washington,
DC
and
I
want
to
talk
about
a
different
income
inequality
and
make
some
parallels.
I
was
at
Harvard,
Business
School
from
89
to
91
and
I.
Can
anyone
who's
old
enough
to
remember
that
time?
Every
week
all
we
heard
was
in
25
years.
Japan's
economy
was
going
to
be
bigger
than
America's
it's
laughable.
Now,
but
that's
what
people
thought,
but
even
there
was
this
guy
named
Robert
rice.
She
was
a
professor
in
the
case
COO
and
he
would
go
around.
M
He
would
ask
a
question
to
people
he'd
say:
would
you
rather
see
a
world
that
where
Japan
Grose's
say
5%
in
the
US
goes
at
3%
a
year,
or
would
you
rather
see
it
where
we're
both
the
same?
It
2%
and
a
lot
of
people
would
answer
that
emotionally
they'd,
rather
both
of
us
be
held
down
low,
even
if
it
even
if
it
meant
just
so.
What
so
us
would
continue
to
be
number
one,
and
this
makes
me
think
about
the
income
inequality
issue.
M
We
talk
about
income,
inequality
as
being
the
problem,
but
it's
really
not
a
problem
that
Jeff,
Bezos
or
or
Elon,
Musk
or
LeBron
James
makes
more
money
than
us
and
that's
what
inequality
is
it's
the
people
at
the
bottom
or
stagnant?
So
do
you
even
think
is
income
inequality?
Is
that
a
war?
Is
that
a
useful
word
for
us
to
use,
or
should
it
be
just
concentrating
on
how
do
we
lower
people
up
at
the
bottom.
C
Sure
so
yeah,
so
a
great
question
and
definitely
interesting
to
you,
know,
contemplate
what
we
expected
back
in
the
day
on.
So
as
far
as
income
inequality
versus
income
stagnation,
so
I
guess
two
things
so
one
I
would
say
I.
Think
I
would
agree
that
the
the
major
problem,
so
the
big
problem
that
over
the
past
40
years
in
the
United
States,
is
not
necessarily
who's
going
faster
than
who
else
it's
that
wages
have
not
grown
hardly
at
all
for
the
vast
majority
of
the
population.
C
So
so
that's
a
problem
of
stagnation
and
you
know
and
I
think
probably
a
source
of
much
of
the
anger.
Isn't
necessarily
that
you
know
my
income
is
going.
You
know
less
quickly
than
just
fees
owes,
but
rather
that
my
income
is
not
growing,
hardly
at
all
or
very
going
very
little.
So
that
said,
I
think
we
also
need
to
make
sure
that
we're
asking
when
we're
trying
to
evaluate
you
know.
How
do
we
feel
about
some
of
these
billionaires?
C
We
have
to
ask
sort
of
how
were
they
able
to
see
such
a
huge
income
and
and
to
the
extent
that
it's
do
two
things
that
you
know:
sort
of
protection
of
incumbent
firms
or
state.
You
know
clamping
down
on
competition,
that
sort
of
stuff,
then
I
think
that
those
are
causes
of
inequality.
That
I
think
we
ought
to
be
very
concerned
about,
because
they
are
also
directly
contributing
to
wage
stagnation.
I
think.
G
That's
where
I
land
to
that
it's
going
to
be
useful
as
long
as
it's
not
kind
of
the
result
of
pure
market
outcomes
that
we
can
all
say
like
yet.
That's
that's.
Fair
I
think
that
the
kind
of
professional
athletes
and
a
few
tech
billionaires
who
created
new
and
wonderful
things
or
who
sell
their
service
to
hundreds
or
billions
of
people
across
the
globe
are
used
to
kind
of
justify
income
inequality
that
does
not
have
as
kind
of
benign
origins
in
the
US
economy
today.