►
Description
We got David Lancashire (https://twitter.com/dlancashi) from Saito, based in Hong Kong speak with our co-founder and CTO Illia Polosukhin (https://twitter.com/ilblackdragon) in the 23rd episode of the Whiteboard Session featuring Saito, a blockchain protocol designed to process terabytes of data.
------- About Whiteboard Series ---------
The Whiteboard Series with NEAR is a set of video interviews with Founders who are building scalable solutions for Blockchain. We deep dive into their story, what they're developing and how it is helping the ecosystem.
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A
A
And
what
you
now
is
your
Genesis
block
right
and
that
was
actually
we'd
be
chatting
with
people
and
they're
like.
Oh,
you
can't
do
that.
Why
can't
you
you
can't
the
problems
are
some
people
like
it
was
mostly
ideological
where
people
ever
you
need
it,
and
we're
like
well
tell
us
why
you
need
it
and
then
go?
We
need
it
because
you're,
my
eldest.
A
D
A
You
automatically
reformat
and
rebroadcast
the
tram
actions
with
the
consensus
lair
mediating,
not
only
the
rebroadcast
but
also
a
rebroadcast
fee,
and
you
do
this,
so
you
don't
only
broadcast
the
UTX
of
data
but
yuri
podcast
the
data
that's
used
in
the
transaction
as
well.
So
this
solves
a
lot
of
really
interesting
problems
because
the
transaction
fee,
let's.
A
Make
it
two
times
the
average
fee
of
new
transactions?
It's
something
really
wonderful
happens.
You
can
have
a
blog.
You
can
have
a
blog
chain
of
like
a
face.
It's
eyes
like
it's
one:
gigabyte,
blog
yeah.
Now
as
the
detail
on
the
chain
grows,
there's
less
and
less
space
available
for
new
transactions
right.
So
the
new
transactions
start
getting
crowded
out
by
the
old
transactions
because
you've
got
you
have
to
rebroadcast
the
old
you
don't
rebroadcast,
every
single
transaction,
no.
A
On
the
network
treats
that
block
is
valid,
so
you
know
you
can
you
can
have
people
attacking
the
network
that
you
would
be
a
51%
right
and
you
do
the
Bitcoin
anyway,
you
for
keyword,
movie,
Satoshi's
points.
The
really
interesting
thing
is:
is
the
space
for
new
blog
shrinks,
the
fees
for
new
blogs
go
up
as
the
fees
for
new
blocks
go
up,
the
fees
for
all
blocks
go
up.
More
you've
got
an
incentive
now
for
people
to
manually
rebroadcast
one.
That's
second
of
all.
A
What
you
move
is
you
move
towards
an
equilibrium
where
the
price
of
new
transactions
of
the
press
wall
transactions
moves
into
equilibrium
and
the
amount
of
new
data
that
goes
onto
the
blockchain
is
the
same
as
the
amount
of
old
data
its
perch
breath,
and
we
finally
have
an
economic
solution
to
blockchain
scaling
and
chain
management,
because
not
only
does
the
blockchain
stay
at
a
certain
size,
but
it
stays
in
a
certain
size.
Well,
you
can
guarantee
the
data
that's
attached
to
your
transactions
down
the
chain.
A
So
if
you
want
your
stuff
on
the
blockchain
forever,
you
can
actually
pay
for
it.
If
you
just
want
your
stuff
falling
off,
because
you
want
a
universal
broadcast
future,
you
paid
a
much
lower
fee
because
you
don't
need
to
pay
every
loop
and
something
else
happens.
There's
a
lot
of
cheating
Bitcoin
where
the
miners,
for
instance,
but
you
pay
your
fee,
there's
no
guarantee
that
there's
no
care
to
you.
A
A
A
A
It
well
one
is,
we
think
of
it
as
we
think
of
a
blockchain,
a
universal
propagation
network.
So
there
are
complications
where
you
want
the
author
terms
to
broadcast
it
and
most
block
chains,
because
they
don't
have
this
problem
solved.
They
go
to
this
position
where
it's
like.
No,
the
data
you
are
paying
you,
you
store
it
yourself.
There
are
situations
where
well
you're
paying
to
use
the
blockchain,
so
you
don't
use
them.
You
actually
want
you
to
sort
on
the
blockchain,
for
instance,
something
like
a
commercial
insurance
project.
A
B
But
like
why
do
I
just
started
as
a
part
of
state
like
never
been
something
use,
the
way
that
we
aspire
to
that
data
I'm
saying
just
the
story:
everything
as
far
as
state
there's
no
reason
you
can't
do
that
too,
but
then
I
don't
mean
to
like.
Then
you
can
purchase
without
any
problems.
That's
like
singing
eerily,
doesn't
user
service
and
your
play?
Don't
need
your
service,
but
it's
better
if
it
has
no
service.
So
if
you
have
drink
service,
you
can
provide
some
kind
of
services.
A
Services,
you're
not
able
to
do
like
move
sports
teams
right,
so
you
know
yeah.
This
is
this
is
a
solution
and
for
some
use
cases
this
is
better
than
that
right,
because
this
is
expensive
because
it's
actually
using
the
blockchain
for
a
certain
kind
of
storage
yeah.
On
the
other
hand,
it's
guaranteeing
certain
properties
of
that
transactions.
Correct
yeah,
like
there
are
some
things
like,
let's
say,
let's
say:
I've
got
a
name
card
yeah
and
my
name
card
has
a
bunch
of
stuff
on
it
like
this
is
my
PGP
key.
A
This
is
URL.
Here
is
where
you
can
fetch
my
distributive
Facebook
posts.
You
could
take
yeah.
You
can
add
that
name
in
the
card,
and
you
can
have
a
name
card,
certainly
long
now,
if
at
moment
of
broadcast,
somebody
needs
to
stick
it
in
the
database.
A
user
can't
come
along
two
years
later
and
then
collect
it,
because
well
known
ones
gone
and
you've
got
a
coordination
problem.
This
is
a
PSP
MongoDB
problem.
A
The
introduced
massive
coordination
problems
because
they're
like
okay
you're,
going
to
negotiate
separately
with
unright
he's
going
to
save
the
data
for
you.
If
you
pay
for
it
and
all
of
a
sudden,
like
you're
using
blockchain,
that
all
of
the
users
need
to
coordinate
on
which
access
point
to
use,
they
all
need
to
have
a
second
layer,
economic
situation.
A
With
this
everything
is
paid
for
by
the
feet,
so
the
coordination
issues
are
solved
because
every
node
on
the
network
must
have
the
data
all
you've
got
to
do
is
convince
someone
to
give
you
access
to
the
blockchain
and
you've
got
it,
but
it's
for
a
subset
of
use
cases.
It's
not.
You
know
for
most
use
cases,
but
if
you've
got
a
signed
message
from
someone,
that's
sticky
on
the
database,
then
you
pay
lower
fiend.
You
don't
mean.
B
The
rebroadcast
fee
is
going
to
be
more
expensive
than
stating
your
practice
scenario
like
as
far
as
what
I'm
saying
like.
Well,
that's
the
blockchain.
It
isn't
something
like
the
way.
I
look
at
ball
chain.
It's
a
database
like
was
the
way
you
synchronize
masters
and
slaves.
Yes,
by
sending
around
tobacco
bloggers,
I
mean
I,
said
what
Alexa
buggies
actually
matter,
because
this
is
a
database
that
everybody
needs
to
have.
Why
would
happen?
Well?
I
mean.
A
B
A
Is
it
sure,
but
I
mean
even
with
charging,
that
the
problem
isn't
how
many
shards
you
have
scharping
is
a
solution.
I
mean
I,
think
that
I
think
the
sharding
the
questions
charting
is.
If
the
shards
have
different
economics
yeah,
then
you've
got
coordination,
housing,
yes
right,
but
like
I'm,
not
on
target
yeah.
A
What
I'm
saying
is
I'm
saying
you
know
one
of
the
things
to
notice
about
this
is
the
only
way
you
make
it
work
is
it
becomes
like
follow
point
where
you
have
one
fee,
that's
all
to
pay
for
use
of
the
blockchain
now,
and
then
you
have
another
fee
that
is
extracted
for
for,
like
oh
there's,
a
month
of
rent
arrears
to
rent.
One
of
the
problems
is
okay.
Well,
how
do
you
set
that?
A
How
does
the
network
even
set
that
and
how
does
the
network
set,
that
in
a
way
which
is
secure
and
actually
market
driven?
This
actually
doesn't
so
one
way
to
think
about
this
is
that
it's
a
way
of
actually
determining
the
market
price.
That's
like
a
theory.
It
was
like.
Oh
we're,
gonna
have
rent
yeah,
but
are
they
designed.
C
B
A
Then
there
are
two
things
there.
You've
got
two
options,
one
you
either
you
can
fix
the
block
size
if
you
fix
the
block
size.
Therefore,
you're,
basically
you're
forcing
a
market
price
to
emerge
in
the
context
of
how
big
your
blocks
are.
Okay.
This
is
this
is
the
key
thing
here:
we're
forcing
all
transactions
and
new
transactions.
B
A
E
A
B
A
Why
we
do
2x,
because
we
assume
that
the
transaction
is
that
max
can
be
twice
the
size
of
the
original,
but
people
can
validate
this
developing
the
original
transaction.
But
what
you
can't
do,
is
you
can't
you're
gonna
validate
that
this
was
produced
by
the
you?
This
has
to
be
valid.
It's
produced
by
the
block
creator
right,
so
you
can't
say:
oh,
like
the
C's,
don't
work
unless
you
have
a
secondary
there
or
transaction
verification
validation.
A
B
A
Every
I'll
spend
you
TXO
I
mean,
maybe
you
can't
our
implementation,
everyone
spent
UT
EXO
becomes
in
your
transaction
and
if
the
unspent
you
check
so,
has
you
got
two
months
menu
TX
over
100.
This
is
no
98
say
this
is
now
98
and
when
they're
producing
the
block,
you
know
for
additional
units
which
are
included
in
the
fee
for
the
block
just.
A
A
Propagation
people
are
moving
towards
to
payments
yeah
and
the
problem
with
the
two
payments
approaches.
Well,
okay,
we
need
to
pay
for
bandwidth.
So
what
are
we
going
to
do?
The
only
market
solution,
for
that
is
three
panels
like
what,
if
I
need
to
broadcast
this
data,
but
I
wanted
to
go
on
in
the
archive
node
and
then
that
archiving
node,
like
its
website
well
I,
now
need
to
be
paying
only
for
storage
bandwidth.
What
happens?
Is
it
kind
of
mold
it
with
every
service?
You
expect
the
bar.
A
A
You
don't
have
that,
because,
basically,
all
of
this
stuff
reconciles
into
the
end
user
and
their
access
to
that
first
node
in
the
network,
because
is
that
first
node
in
the
network,
which
we
know
it
has
all
of
the
data
it
has
to
all
of
data,
and
it
decides
to
give
it
to
them
at
what
cost
and
it
decides
to
give
it
to
them
at
the
cost
of
what
are
the
fees
that
you're
paying
me?
So
what
one
of
the
things
that
saver
does,
because
we're
using
market
mechanisms
is
we're
taking
these
two
three.
A
B
A
A
C
A
C
C
A
D
A
In
fact,
the
IRA
is
it
the
bigger
the
blocks
get
now
any
kind
of
mass
market
like
there's
some
technological
possibilities
curve
and
maybe,
if
Wednesday's
bought
below
it,
it
will
be
able
to
grow.
But
even
then
there's
going
to
be
other
networks
that
come
out
with
lower
detectable
possibility.
Curves
and
usage.
C
To
the
transition
over
time,
that's
the
big
argument
is
the
only
case.
I
can
say
where
the
permanence
makes
sense
is
where
you
actually
get
a
value
from
all
of
the
previous
part,
so,
for
instance,
our
provenance
or
diamond
registries,
or
something
like
that,
where
there's
a
real
value
to
pay
for
that
storage,
to
get
it
now
hungry,
be
usable
yeah.
That's.
B
A
A
You
haven't
me
for
us.
We
this.
Actually,
this
isn't
even
a
really
special
part
about
Sato,
but
we
look
at
this
and
we
prepare
servers
right,
we're
like
look
unless,
unless
until
people
realize
they've
gotta,
the
problems
are
underlying
incentive
problems
right,
but
the
fundamental
problem
is
that
miners
have
an
economic
incentive
to
take
money
today
to
get
paid
today
and.
B
B
A
We're
not
we're
not
thinking
about
blocks.
What
we're
thinking
about
is
we're
thinking
about
it.
This
way
yeah.
So
the
reason
it
solves
the
problem
it
doesn't
is
that
you
have
the
structure
and
payment
in
time
now.
If
the
payment
happens
here-
and
it
happens
only
when
the
stuff
goes
into
the
database,
you
have
perverse
incentives,
because
it's
kind
of
like
vtc
well
we're
gonna
make
the
blocks
really
small,
we're
going
to
force
a
fee
market
and
that
way,
because
there
are
high
fees,
we
can
pay
for
forever.
A
No
thanks
for
correctly
you're,
just
even
that's
what
storages
and
professionally
yeah
yeah!
That's
not
what
this
is.
Yes,
tingling
start
again
that
solves
our
problem.
You're
describing
it
has
a
sign
of
fact
that
this
is
like
37
will
be
like
it
solves.
It
solves
the
problem
here
it
doesn't
solve
the
problem
where
it's
actually
cost.
It's
a
data
management.
A
A
solution
on
the
technical
level
and
it's
a
better
one
than
so.
What
I'm
saying
is
what
is
the
actual
incentive
problem?
If
we
can
fix
this
problem,
we
fix
the
scaling
issue.
The
incentive
problem
is
miners:
have
incentives
with
data
on
the
chain
because
they
get
paid
today
for
I
mean
they
get
paid
for
it
immediately.
It's
a
crutch.
You,
the.
B
A
A
But
what
I'm
saying
is
you
don't
need
to
have
this
arbitrary
technical
solution?
If
you
can
fix
the
incentive
solution
and
the
question
is
what
is
the?
What
if
the
incentive
problem
you
look
like?
It's
fixing
the
incentive
problem
means
miners
will
not
put
data
on
the
chain
unless
it's
paying
enough
to
do
everything
that
it
needs
and
that's
what
this
does,
because
no
the
payment
happens.
Why
do
you
get
paid
you
get
paid
for
block
to
get
paid
for
block
10,001?
A
You
need
to
have
done
all
of
the
work
already,
so
the
payment
doesn't
come
first
and
then
the
work
happens,
the
payment,
the
work
happens,
and
then
the
payment
comes
so
the
the
situation
traditionally
a
blockchain.
You
need
to
solve
it
this
way,
because
you
need
to
basically
be
regulating
technically
the
size
of
the
stack.
You
saw
an
incentive
layer
because
the
person
who's
producing
this
block
doesn't
collect
enough
money
to
cover
their
entire
cost
of
operation.
B
B
B
B
A
Answer
your
incentive
to
enter
the
network
at
any
point
in
time
is
driven
by
the
profitability
of
priests
applause
now
so
the
historical
cost
of
producing
blocks
is
paid
for
the
historical
blog
production.
So
you
can't
say:
oh
but
I
haven't
done
this
work
for
fifty
years,
because
you're
not
being
paid
for
the
past
thirty.
B
A
B
A
Is
the
fee
for
this
period?
The
fee
for
this
period
is
pushed
into
market
equilibrium
by
the
desire
to
store
data
on
the
chain,
which
is
where
this
posture
so
I
mean
you're
right.
If
you're
saying
people
keep
coming
in,
people
can
leave
like,
but
you're
leaving
after
ten
thousand
blogs,
you
have
to
do
a
full
Genesis
period
of
work
before
you
can
produce
the
next
one.
B
And
then
I'm
going
to
put
stuff
in
transaction
writing
the
you
get
the
new
feet
here
and
you
get
to
rebroadcast
technically
they're
collected
in
the
same
block.
So
just
just
moved
to
understand.
Let's
say
let's
say
we
have
like
a
very
simple
example:
we
have
one
guy
who
for
10,000
blocks,
may
produce
new
books
and
then
really.
We
just
only
had
one
collection.
B
A
B
A
So
you
pay
for
that.
You've
got
to
find
somebody
to
you,
the
data,
the
nice
thing,
but
it's
a
there.
It
is
how
do
I
convince
you
to
give
me
the
data
I
start
giving
you
money
now.
I
knew
that
two
ways
I
can
pay
you
explicitly
or
I
can
start
feeding
you
transactions
so
for
nodes
and
the
rebbe
network.
This
is
why
the
ribbon
and.
A
Will
get
it
the
other
way,
if
your
expectation
is
that
a
blockchain
is
getting
cuter
exabytes
of
data
for
free,
but
you
may
as
well
be
on
record
and
say,
like
I'm
gonna
build
in
database,
and
then
all
of
the
data
is
going
to
be
in
there
we're
just
going
to
get
users
it
for
free,
like,
of
course,
the
economic
software.
The
economics
don't
work
as
he'll,
just
their
cost,
like
the
difference
is
in
other
blog
chains.
They
assume
that
the
mark
it's
gonna
sort
it
all
of.
A
One
of
the
reasons
you
want
to
be
paying
for
it
right,
yeah
as
long
as
you're
paying
for
reading
as
the
reading
notes
start
getting
as
they
start
bringing
more
transactions
its
network.
Well,
you
know
the
people
that
are
moving
exabytes
of
data
as
core
network
nodes,
and
you
do
have
market
competition
between
them
because
they've
got
the
blocks.
They've
got
the
data,
they
want
the
transactions
for
driving
those
because
that's
how
they
make
money
yeah.
So
what
you've
got
is
you've
got.
Data
is
pain.
A
A
You
negotiate
a
separate
payment
which
is
a
market
that
forms
at
the
edge
of
the
network,
and
the
network
does
not
specify
the
terms
of
that
economics
and
one
of
the
reasons
that,
like
PSP
and
these
other
networks
are
going
to
have
severe
economic
problems
or
like
rent
and
stuff
like
if
you're
letting
your
economic
conditions
be
determined
by
code.
That's
in
the
system
like
if
the
reality
differs
from
that
you
either
have
pricing
attack
vectors
or
you
have
free
writing,
say,
though
we
don't
actually
care
in
terms
of
access
to
the
network.
A
We
say
as
long
as
the
network
is
supporting
itself
and
the
network
is
paying
for
the
transactions
that
are
coming
in
you're,
going
to
have
a
guaranteed
point
of
entry,
because
the
network
always
has
an
incentive
to
give
you
a
point
of
entry
like
if
you
want
to
say:
okay,
there's
one
node
well,
that's
kind
of
like
Bitcoin.
If
Bitcoin
had
one
server,
why
would
they
share
their
blocks
with.
B
B
B
A
A
B
D
B
A
Not
view
data,
yes,
when
there's
a
when
the
network
is
tiny
and
storage
bandwidth
is
free.
No
one
cares.
When
the
network
is
operating
the
next
byte
today,
the
core
network
I,
think
level
3
think
their
actual.
This
is
network
period
and
that's
cherry.
There
is
an
exchange
of
value
when
these
cost
money
people
say:
oh
well,
big
one
works
this
way.
It's
like
whoa,
okay,
big
point
in
2009
I
could
run
it
on
the
Raspberry
Pi.
This
is
not
a
model
for
scalability.
So
the
answer.
A
B
B
B
A
A
A
They
probably
work
with
their
probing
and
ask
me
to
pay
for
it.
If
you
talk
to
be
as
be
people
all
of
the
rage
on
Twitter,
is
that,
like
archive
notes,
yeah,
the
idea
is
that
oh
well,
we
accept
that
the
nodes
in
the
network
will
do
this.
There's
a
separate
note
that
will
pay
for
it.
The
problem
is
again:
it's
like
well,
ok,
the
coordination
costs
and
why,
if
I'm,
using
a
blockchain,
because
I
don't
want
to
pay
more
nation
costs
is
one
network.
A
So
all
of
a
sudden
I
have
two
people
that
are
having
those
and
I've
now
about
two
payments.
Not
only
do
I
have
two
payments
using
the
network
usage
archive.
All
of
my
users
now
have
payments,
so
we've
now
got
four
payments
instead
of
one
pan
and
we've
got
coordination,
costs
of
which
are
piping,
nose
ribbon.
Paying
for
part
of
the
value
of
the
system
is
that
this
is
a
ridiculous
system.
A
The
only
reason
people
think
that
this
is
is
sensible
is
because
they
haven't
solved
the
problem
at
the
underlying
sense
Claire
and
going
back
to
where
you
said
this
is
a
viable
solution.
I'm
not
trying
to
criticize
this,
because
this
needs
better
on
when
I'm
trying
to
heaven.
Isn't
it.
If
you
have
a
system
that
solves
things
in
the
incentive
layer,
you.
B
B
A
B
A
Unity,
that's
not
the
problem
say
resolves,
say:
let's
see
if
it
doesn't
solve
you
for
someone
sets
of
a
sign
that
says:
hey
like
hey
I'm,
a
big
point:
node
I
can
send
you
the
blockchain
and
it's
gonna
cost
50,000
bucks,
because
it's
huge
you
go
after
that
archiving.
You
know
you
pay
the
money
and
they
send
you
fake
data
yeah
like
yeah.
That's
not
a
solve
problem.
That's
not
a
soul
problem
in
a
blockchain
shares!
A
Well,
I
mean
you
know,
there's
smart
ways
to
do
it
like
you
find
out
what
the
actual
hash
is
at
the
table
of
the
chain
and
you
sync
the
chain
backwards.
That's
one
solution!
You
still
need
to
actually
yourself
figure
out
what
the
last
passions
yeah.
So
what
you
would
do
that
in
big.
This
isn't
the
problem
that
we're
worried
about.
Okay,
the
problem
that
we're
going
there
look,
let's
move
on
you're,
saying
that
less
as
soon
as
they're
going
to
give
you
the
data.
Okay
and
honestly,
assuming.
B
A
Users
I
had
this
off
chain
private
economy
right,
so
I'm
gonna
collect
on
PayPal
and
use
like
three
bucks.
Three
bucks-
and
this
got
some
nice
guy,
maybe
five
or
maybe
negative,
and
so
I'm
my
profits,
dollar
and
hey
I
mean
I'm
in
the
business
of
this.
This
is
the
traditional
internet
curing
arrangement.
At
every
point.
In
the
network
you
have
people
making
off
internet
exchanges,
development
pains.
So
this
is
making
me
and
my
ISP
I
pay
my
minus
P
three
bucks.
A
month,
I'm
gonna
spend
fifty
bucks
a
month.
A
A
This
no
one
gets
paid
for
redirecting
the
data.
Yes,
sir,
you've
got
the
transactions
that
have
fees,
and
so
the
fee
is
paid
for
by
use
of
the
data
and
the
date
that
comes
back
through
what
this
guy
has
to
do.
Is
he
basically
collects
the
money
sentence
and
networking
he
gets
paid
for
them?
So
economically?
What
you've
got?
Is
you
better
replacement
of
kind
of
commercialized
pieces
that
have
these
private
ratios
for
people
with
essentially
a
uniform
cost
of
Internet
access,
where
market
forces
basically
make.
E
A
A
Of
the
ways
this
improves
is
this
guy
at
small
scale,
and
he
does
not
need
extra
bytes
of
data
sure
because
maybe
he's
giving
these
guys
like
blocks.
So
maybe
he
only
needs
a
third
of
the
blockchain
so
because
he
only
needs
a
third
of
the
blockchain.
He
can
actually
pay
to
get
cryptograph
verifiable
after
launching
that's
good
enough
for
the
users,
because
they
can
verify
that
the
data
is
solid,
which
means
that
the
cost
here
is
not
the
same.
A
That's
getting
the
full
X
by
the
data
and
what
you've
actually
got
by
subsidizing
revenues
and
economic
structure
where,
in
addition
for
paying
for
log
production,
they're
also
playing
for
light
block
production
so
and
that's
like--that's,
CPU
intensive,
so
you
actually
servicing
users
there's
a
reason
for
these
notes
to
exist
independently
of
these
notes,
because
these
guys
they're
moving
masses
of
data
and
they're
focused
on
that
they're
focused.
It's
like
you
know,
level,
3
level.
3
does
not
want
to
give
you
individual
access
to
the
internet
because
that's
not
their
business.
A
Well,
these
guys
there's
space
in
the
system
for
them,
because
what
they
can
do
is
they
can
focus
on
okay,
well,
you're,
a
light
client
but
you're,
not
really
a
heavy
client.
You
don't
make
any
demands,
so
I'll
accept
transactions
from
you
that
made
this
fee
as
long
as
these
acts
per
month
and
the
whole
thing
becomes
systematized
in
the
end,
numbers
is
blotching,
so
you
know
I
mean
basically
everything
that
is
sort
of
arbitrary,
but
the
big
point
system
in
terms
of
these
and
submarino's
because
becomes
streamlined
any
economics
at
the
blockchain
itself.
A
Instead
of
people
having
to
arbitrarily
decide
whether
data
flows
cost
the
fact
that
it
is
a
data
flow
means
that
it
has
money
and
that
reconciles
the
economic
issue
it
also
the
guarantee,
provides
a
net
neutrality.
Is
that
you've
gotta
realize
that
the
transactions
that
are
profitable
to
this
guy
or
just
as
profitable,
you've
no
more
problem.
A
Yes,
this
guy,
so
this
guy
mm-hmm
he
didn't
switch
over
here
if
he
doesn't
get
good
turns,
and
we
actually
do
drive
down
to
utility
pricing
for
community
before
for
this
sort
of
read
event,
this
can't
happen
in
Bitcoin
in
Bitcoin.
Well,
this
guy's
got
to
get
the
full
blog
and
or
he's
got
a
negotiate
stuff
off
channel.
It's
but
like
here
you.
B
A
Finding
software
is
insecure,
yeah,
so
letter
K,
oh
yeah,
yeah,
there's,
there's
no
reason
that
any
blockchains
purifying
software
is
less
secure
than
others.
You
know,
that's
not
that
it's
not
a
viable
criticism.
It's
kind
of
like
saying
yes,
but
gravity
is
hurting
your
plane,
but
my
gravity's
hurting
every
plane
when
someone
figures
EV
a
solution
to
gravity
like
you
know
any.
A
E
A
A
Our
own
futures,
my
disagreement,
you're,
saying
we'll
look
at
this
problem
with
this
problem.
We're
talking
about
Bitcoin,
yeah,
so
you're,
you're,
saying
look
the
problem.
Is
you
guys
in
your
system?
You
actually
pay
the
network
to
survive
and
it's
like
yes,
but
that's
the
entire
point
of
applause,
a
thank
you
any
money,
no
there's
no
separate
payments
and
say:
oh
you're,
just
the
payment
comes
in
to
the
fees
there's
a
little
new
payment.
A
Where
does
the
money
that
is
here
comes
from?
This
is
the
money
that
used
to
go
to
minors,
but
the
Bitcoin
network
you've
got
to
have
all
of
these
circuits
because
all
of
the
money
is
going
through
the
guy
in
like
since
young
who's
got
the
server
farm.
It
says
saying
the
money
that
used
to
go
to
the
miners
is
now
paying
for
the
network.
The
network
is
the
ASA.
A
C
C
A
Of
it
this
way,
but
fundamentally
the
first
point
is,
and
it's
one
thing
many
people
come
to
say
to
have
the
misconceptions
or
misconceptions
not
going
to
say
it
was
watching
like
they
think
what
Bitcoin
does
is
for
free,
therefore
big,
when
we
do
this
for
free
at
ten
exabytes
a
day,
and
it's
like
no
big
point
does
this
refer
you,
because
I
get
I,
get
a
certain
emotive
right,
think
think
about
this
stuff.
This
US
server
has
its
own
economics.
Now
imagine
the
is
Bayonetta
state
or
whatever.
A
Now
you
get
a
lot
of
really
fat
users
in
China
they're
willing
to
pay
a
really
high
feeding
of
their
millionaire
country.
Okay,
that's
a
really
might
be.
These
transactions
are
worth
a
lot
of
money.
Now
you
can
get
a
know
starting
up
in
Hong,
Kong
yeah
and
when
I
see
him
note,
this
can
literally
be
a
guy
walking
across
the
border
with
a
number
memorized
in
his
head
and
the
transaction
that
he's
writing
into
the
system
are
very
few
yeah,
but
they're
really
fat
transactions.
A
B
A
B
A
They
say
you
know,
and
you
can
put
the
post
there
and
wait
in
the
transaction,
because
we
support
the
economics
of
scale.
You
could
also
stay.
Online
post
is
on
the
server
or
maybe
you've
gotten
a
name
card
circulating
around
the
block
chain.
That
says
this
is
where
to
go
for
it,
and
this
is
post
idat
settle
for
whatever
it
is
like.
There
are
lots
of
ways
in
which
people
want
data.
Other
block
chains
are
compartmentalizing.
A
A
B
Because,
like
what
I
think
of
data
from
watching
has
been
is
different,
yes,
it
means
my
getting
just
because
the
way
I'm
looking
function
is
a
database
yeah
little,
let's
just
say
key
meditativeness
that
is
shared
between
everybody
and
has
a
very
specific
rules
on
this
provision.
That's
how
I
think
about
team.
You
think.
A
About
a
very
different:
well,
we
were
the
like:
the
applications
are
going
to
use,
something
like
say
are
generally
in
broadcast
applications
right
like
so
you
know
if
you
want
the
stuff
stick
in
the
debate.
What
is
really
the
first
time
around?
Is
this
just
ordering
the
Transpac?
Okay,
if
you
start
leaving
well,
then
that's
a
database
application,
but
if
you're
gonna
use
a
database
application
you're
probably
would
want
to
tweak
the
broadcasting
fee.
The
point
is
that
this
stuff,
like
this,
is
this
isn't
safe
with
all
this
is
just
watching.
A
A
What's
special
about
Bitcoin
when
it
came
in
it's
your
day
basis
before
there
were
consensus
systems
before
what
was
special
is
it
was
the
first
network
that
supported
itself
financially,
so
it's
a
network
that
exists
with
every
number
where
there
are
financial
incentives
to
join
that
to
us
is
what
is
the
fundamental
definition
of
launching,
and
you
know
other
people
don't
think
they
they're,
like
oh
Bitcoin,
what
you're
going
to
connect
to
the
computer
network?
Well,
it's
like
well!
No
because
then
you
have
free
writing
problems
and
it's
scalable.
A
The
peer-to-peer
network
is
not
going
to
operate.
Exabyte
knows
so.
All
of
these
issues
would
like
to
pays
for
what
he
pays
for
what
that's
it's
sort
of
like
the
Bitcoin
or
the
old
block,
a
mindset,
because
the
old
block
chain
lines
in
at
scale.
The
only
way
you
can
convince
someone
to
do
something
is
having
a
separate
economic
agreement
off
chain
needs
to
be
mediated.
You
manage
the
Sato
system.
Is
all
of
that
stuff.
A
A
B
E
A
B
A
B
A
A
A
Like
well,
what
are
we
incentivizing?
What
were
incentive
lesson
is
this:
the
fee
goes
to
work
sliders
and
then
somebody
has
to
do
stuff
for
free,
and
this
is
the
this
is
like
a
hundred
and
ninety
nine
percent
of
most
people
were
tailing.
It's
they're
working
on
ways
to
push
the
cost
around
like.
Oh,
let's
get
bike
invest,
but
we
have
a
network
with
printing
money
fees.
B
A
This
is
gonna,
be
really
simple.
Really
simple:
I'm
gonna
leave
this
up
in
this
good.
This
is
for
structure
of
the
network
users.
You
don't
connect
to
the
log
producers,
no
connecting
to
the
real
life
yeah,
the
real,
a
let's
say:
he's
gonna
connect
to
blog
producers,
yeah,
that's
simplified,
because
the
real,
a
good
connection
of
the
real
I
could
catch.
One.
B
A
Usable
miners
will
service
the
users.
That's
that's.
The
Kreger
argument
of
miners
will
pay
for
Bitcoin
that
the
network,
because
if
they
don't,
they
don't
get
paid
yeah
and
so
people
are
like,
oh
well.
This
is
a
big
one.
People
think
this
is
Bitcoin.
Miners
will
do
this
because
they
don't
get
paid.
The
problem
is
there
are
free
rider
pressures,
I
understand
we
do
it.
Miners.
B
B
A
Okay,
just
and
the
miners
have
gotten.
So
let's
do
this,
let's
say
assuming
the
volunteers
disappear.
What
you're
really
asking
is
you're
saying
what
is
the
economic
problem
with
Bitcoin
or
what
is
one
economic
problem
with
it?
So,
let's
assume
we
have
a
Bitcoin
world
where
we
have
three
miners
and
these
miners,
because
the
peer-to-peer
network
vanishes
yeah,
the
miners
are
forced
to
spend
a
lot
of
money
to
service
users.
If
so,
the
users
give
them
fees
and
the
miners
give
the
users
transactions
okay
and
we're
going
to
replicate
this
ultra.
A
So
we've
got
miners
and
we've
got
users.
This
is
fundamental.
No,
you
go
back
to
Creek
right
and
he
says
the
first
job
with
miners
to
propagate
transactions.
So
Craig
Wright
sees
if
he
sees
like
a
small
network
where
the
miners
all
connected
together
miners
we
can
have
big
blocks.
The
miners
are
going
to
pay
for
this
high
throughput
bandwidth
because
of
course,
they
all
want
to
connect
to
each
other
yeah.
So
maybe
there's
ten,
maybe
there's
100.
Who
knows
somebody
I
know
this?
Is
we
got
the
feed
and
we've
got
the
data
yeah?
A
B
A
A
No
one's
gonna
send
me
stuff
because
I'm
not
producing
enough
force
to
actually
get
fast
confirmations,
so
the
economic
problems
in
Bitcoin
all
are
solvable,
but
they're
solvable
if
you
kill
the
openness
of
the
network
and
if
you
have
collusion
between
the
nodes
of
the
network,
because
what
happens
when
you
get
these
free
router
pressures.
Is
that
these
miners?
They
need
to
collude
with
each
other
to
make
sure
that
no
one
is
free
right,
yeah,.
D
B
A
A
That
means
is
the
market
share
of
you,
guys
arcade
they
get
even
bigger
and
the
marking
sure
the
guys
that
are
small
to
go
to
the
business.
So
you've
got
this
economic
situation
where
the
network,
the
network,
just
it
becomes
PayPal
I
mean
maybe
it
becomes
PayPal
through
people,
but
this
is
not
what
people
want
with
an
open
network,
so
I
absolutely
would
yeah
right
so
go
back
to
this
system.
This
is
the
system
you're
describing
you
said.
Well,
look
if
the
PP
minors
don't
give
data,
ok!
A
B
B
A
A
Yes,
so
I,
don't
care
who
hasn't
in
fact,
I
want
to
send
it
to
multiple
wad
producers,
because
I
want
competition,
including
my
transaction,
in
a
blog,
if
you
remember
the
mechanism
where
we
talked
about
the
Caribbean
stuff,
if
you
just
give
your
transactions
to
one
guy,
you
can
hold
on
to
the
deck
and
then
against
his
percentage
of
the
fee
starts
rising.
So
if
I'm
revving,
though
the
way
I
maximize
my
income,
is
making
sure
that
there's
no
monopolization
downstream.
That's
what
we
want
the
jerker
know
what
to
do.
B
B
B
A
You've
got
coordination
costs
the
user
of
the
network.
Yes,
they're
supposed
to
be
done,
it's
a
no.
The
user
makes
a
fee.
He
gives
it
on.
The
network
takes
care
of
all
this
we've
now
gotten
a
user
made
in
coordination
costs
because
the
user
needs
to
keep
track
of
who's
in
the
network,
send
their
transactions
to
all
of
them.
Like
that's
just
ridiculous.
A
B
Could
do
that
yeah?
So
what
I'm
trying
to
understand
is
like
how
like
this
loses,
openness
that
Gary's
Union
and
the
quartz
collusion
like
here
my
problem
was:
this
is
right
now,
when
you
pronate
his
transactions
as
well.
Producers,
at
least
as
far
as
I,
see,
don't
have
an
incentive
to
pretty
much
in
forums
where
they
know
those
user.
Why
why
you
might
need
a
sense
money
so.
A
E
B
A
A
C
B
D
B
A
Changed
people
are
going
to
do
all
this
work
for
free,
but
in
Sato
suddenly,
because
we
pay
for
reading
data
flow
software
backwards,
but
that's
just
that
just
doesn't
make
any
sense
to
me.
Every
other
blockchain
users
connect
to
a
node
mm-hm.
They
have
me
ya,
know
do
some
data
right
and
we've
already
noted
that
in
fact,
there
are
massive
problems
with
it
as
a
closed
solution
over
this.
A
What
you
want
to
do,
you
won't
say
yeah
like
I'm
disabled,
because
even
though
this
guy
he
wants
to
be
profitable
right,
how
the
hell's
he
service
the
user,
he
services
the
user.
Why
is
the
user
using
this
guy
cuz?
He
gets
data.
Why
is
this
guy
using
the
bot
producer
because
he
gets
data
the
flows
in
the
data.
A
Yeah
but
like
this
will
happen
because
the
reason
the
reason
Bitcoin
has
problems
is
because
of
this
and
then
the
archetype,
the
archetype
of
the
naturally
mining,
an
incentive
propagation.
The
reason,
the
collusion
and
the
incentive
problems
existed
because
there's
no
incentive
propagate
in
say
no
there's
an
incentive
to
propagate
the
one
of
the
fundamental
problems.
The
salt
is
this
guy.
Why
doesn't
he
just
world
all
the
transactions?
A
And
the
answer
is
because
he's
indifferent
to
whether
he
produces
a
water
or
whether
any
of
these
people
do
all
he
wants
is
the
most
efficient
path,
and
so
what
you're
going
to
get
the
economic
pressures
goes
towards
optimization.
Maybe
this
guy
says:
look
you're
asking
for
a
lot
of
data
you're,
not
giving
me
enough
money,
I'm,
not
gonna
service.
There
is
going
to
be
a
market
price
for
data.
A
The
point
is,
you
can
pay
the
market
price
off
chain,
which
is
what
every
other
block
chain
is
doing
because,
like
you
said
luck
with
realize,
oh
I,
gotta
have
a
separate
payment
for
I.
Can
separate
payment
for
this
or
I
can
go
through
the
effort
of
doing
all
this
manually,
which
is
it's
ridiculous?
Let's
say,
though,
the
fact
that
people
are
indifferent
means
you
just
pay
your
fee
in
the
incentives
encourage
openness.
A
The
big
challenges
is:
how
do
you
make
this
guy
anything
different
to
hoarding
things,
either
worth
money,
because
that's
one
of
the
big
point
things
it's
like
well,
if
I'm
paying
them
if
I'm
paying
for
money,
they're
like
and
then
I
think
when
people
like
big
pay,
people
don't
generally
see
the
problems
because
they're
used
to
how
it
works
now.
So
like
look
into
the
theory
with
insurer,
vitalik
just
wrote
this
really
long
piece
on
collusion,
I,
don't
know
if
you've
read
it.
A
Where
he's
talking
about
how
you
can
reduce
collusion
in
the
system
and
keep
the
system
honest
right
at
the
Stanford
blockchain
conference,
we
were
here,
I,
don't
know
what
you
heard
biggest
number
of
rooms,
ninety
percent,
but
it
seems
that
in
pure
at
least
maybe
percent
at
least
80
percent
of
network
traffic
yeah.
So
if,
if
you're
and
they're
not
profitable,
so
let's
say
most
of
that.
Second,
let's
say:
they're
collecting,
70
percent
of
network
fees.
How
do
they
make
money
from
having
70
percent
of
network
fees?
A
The
collusion
that
matters
is
the
collusion
between
the
person.
The
transactions
are
worth
money,
it's
the
collusion
between
in
fura
and
the
node
in
the
network.
Is
it
two
and
four
inferior
to
make
money?
This
node
in
the
network
needs
to
be
guaranteed
that
it
won't
make
money
too.
So
what's
gonna
happen
is
in
fear.
It
gives
the
transactions
this
node
in
exchange
for
the
payment
and
this
guy's
not
going
to
propagate.
That's
also
a
big
one
problem.
Just
look
at
Big
Bang
right,
okay!
A
Well,
you
know
it
pays
the
source
of
a
lot
of
transactions.
So
if
users
are
making
transactions
through,
they
pay
service,
why
doesn't
big
pain
say
were
lucky
we're
relating
them?
We're
gonna
send
dignity.
Why
will
we
send
binman
like
well?
Because
if
you
send
them
a
big
vein,
we
get
paid
yeah
and
big
maintenance
paid
right
again.
Inclusion
is
awesome
with
this
system
you're
guaranteeing
openness,
because
the
economic
incentives
are
driven
in
both
ways.
So,
yes,
there's
still
a
priced.
A
The
price
for
data
is
the
money
that's
made
and
the
individuals
can
make
their
well
judgments
fish
who
they
connect.
You
and
determined
look
at
my
making
money
in
the
system.
The
difference
is
say:
no
actually
incentivizes
efficiency.
If
I'm
a
block
producer
I
can
say,
look
I
will
keep
you
the
data
for
fewer
fees.
Well,
that's
actually
going
to
make
me
more
profitable
because
I'm
paying
less
for
the
data
that
I.
B
A
B
A
Maybe
I
don't
want
look
this.
This
transaction
fee
is
too
low
for
me.
They're
sending
me
those
transactions
if
it's
not
0.05
above
yeah
I,
don't
care.
Now
you
get
a
cheaper
barn,
produces
a
surplus
or
wants
fine.
All
of
a
sudden.
This
guy
can
go
to
these
users
and
say:
look
I
can
get
you
for
I
can
give
you
for
a
50
price
yeah,
because
the
you
know
the
way
the
savings
actually
pass.
The
efficiency
pass
passes
through,
but
yet
fundamentally
is
a
fee
for
data
exchange
at
every
point.
A
They
don't
know
how
to
have
the
same
person
give
the
data
where
they're
turning
their
network
into
able
Saito's
figure
it
out,
because
they
don't
knows
how
to
make
both
this
person
and
this
person
you
know,
wait
we're
law
producers.
The
way
they
make
money
is
more
competition
about
rayless
and
the
way
relays
make
money.
Is
more
competition,
more
block
reducers?
So
there's
this
like
every
note
in
the
network
you
want
like,
there
really
is
going
to
send
his
transaction
to
two
people,
because
that's
that's
faster.
B
C
B
A
A
C
B
D
C
D
C
I
will
put
in
one
of
these
in
my
building.
I.
Have
this
piece?
Would
you
like
that
for
me,
when
you
get
to
these
guys,
the
B
Block
reduces
in
the
middle,
they
couldn't
negotiate
like
ISPs,
do
now
or
like
ISPs
now
like
rent
space
on
their
cables.
He
is
in
the
Bronx
and
they
hold
options
and
stuff
yeah
and
they
make
bilateral
agreements
to
say.
Look
you
owe
your
excess
with.
You
have
a
veteran,
that's.
D
A
Us
yeah
to
two
points:
one
break
them
all,
because
the
mall
the
people
were
thinking
about
is
the
Bitcoin
Bowl,
which
is
where
the
cognitive
difference
is
conferred,
because
the
cognitive
differences
really
are
pretending
that
this
model
is
them
all
over
the
same
people
to
get
the
money
in
the
data.
That's
where
the
free
rider
problem
comes
that.
The
first
point
is
that
this
doesn't
need
to
be
another
loop,
your
network.
This
gave
me
an
application
check
so
like
in
Sato
one
of
the
things
we
had
to
evaluate
our
like.
A
D
A
D
A
The
fee
pardon
attended
of
you,
so
there
are
different
models
like
if
you,
if
the
users
don't
care,
if
I
want
to
use
the
VA
system,
then
the
EA
system
is
using
a
block
chain
because
he
wants
to
collect
my
tokens.
Remember:
I'm,
getting
them
from
an
advertising
network
right.
The
advertising
never
was
buying
tokens
for
the
block.
Reducers
you've
got
if
you
can
create
that
first
pop,
that's,
not
an
edited,
you
can
make
lovely.
A
On
the
other
hand,
if
users
are
really
concerned,
they're
like
well,
you
know
actually,
what
cheaper,
maybe
they
make
the
channel
work
through.
The
other
really
interesting
thing
is
note
that
in
the
state
of
mechanism
moment
didn't
go
into
it.
The
depth
of
block
provocation
depends
upon
the
probability
of
the
fee,
essentially
the
measure
of
work.
A
So
if
you
pay
a
really
low
fee,
your
fee
mind
over
here
and
if
that's
a
block
producer,
that's
okay,
but
it
might
take
12
hours
for
them
to
get
enough
work
to
produce
a
block
if
you
pay
the
equivalent
of
$5,
it
rips
through
the
network
and
it
gets
divided,
because
this
is
a
high
value
transaction.
So
you've
got
this
wonderful
property
where
the
higher
fee
means
deeper
network
printers
out
there.
So
keep
your
network
print.
A
You
know,
that's
faster
confirmation
or
you
do
the
work
or
inferior
broadcast
you,
but
you
know
a
lot
of
these
guys.
They're,
probably
going
to
be
a
lot
of
those
are
probably
not
going
to
be
public
as
things
like
funding
revenue,
exabytes
of
data
I,
don't
want
to
deal
with
individual
user
connections.
I
want
to
deal
with
people
and
aggregate
them.
It's
like
the
internet.
You
know,
so
is
the
economic
model
that
takes
this
and
it
turns
it
into
you.
A
A
Of
be
real
in
there,
what's
the
price
of
mining
they're
actually
problems
with
that.
But,
like
you,
don't
have
a
market
price
for
things
and
say
no.
You
have
a
market
price
for
transactions
and
propagation
of
these
storage
across
the
whole
network.
Is
one
feet
you
don't
need
to
no
need
to
worry.
Like
I
mean
you
use
Bitcoin
like
Bitcoin
free
estimation
is
better
yeah,
but
now
we're
introducing
a
couple
of
fees
and
separate
fees
and
who's
setting
them
in
the
marketplace.
It's
like.
A
We
haven't
gone
into
how
Co
solves
this,
but
everything
is
actually
a
mermaid
feed,
because
at
every
point
in
time
you
check
another
competition,
the
blog
producer.
You
connect
you.
If
there's
someone
who's
pulling
a
ton
of
data
and
they're,
giving
you
no
fees.
Well,
that's
the
definition
of
the
civil
right,
a
civil
note.
A
We
don't
connect
to
these
people,
we're
gonna
be
a
lot
more
profitable
and
what
that
does
is
also
means
that
usage
is
cheaper
for
users,
because
the
user
can
get
faster
confirmation
and
deeper
law
propagation,
and
you
know
that's
just
fancy
way
of
saying
Bitcoin.
The
variable
of
these
other
networks,
whose
literally
people
wanting
centralization
there's
no
incentive
for
decentralization
and
there's
no
incentive
for
network
efficiency
say
go
at
least
we
incentivize
both
you
know.
If
you
value
T
centralization,
you
can
pay
a
higher
fee
injure.
A
A
A
You
know
and
they
don't
need
to
broadcast
the
whole
network.
They
can
pick
another
block.
Reducer
or
you
know.
Maybe
they
have
a
long-term
agreement
where
it's
like
we're
going
to
permit
you
to
have
a
probability,
because
the
blockchain
does.
Let
you
monitor
right
now.
Well,
you're
gonna
be
a
little
bit
of
launching
and
figure
out
very
very
quickly.
You
know
what
percent
of
the
value
of
the
transactions
I'm
standing
in
a
finger
buddy!
That's
key
difference
between
trying
to
fix
this
versus.
B
A
E
A
Just
said:
well,
let's
assert
that
this
is
network
to
broadcast
while
miners
the
economic
incentives
that
network
node
is
not
broad
s
wall
miners,
because
this
network
notable
is
getting
paid,
but
it
can
form
in
the
old
two
of
them
or
one
of
them.
If
you
can
get
away,
you
know
it's
about
money,
it's
gonna!
What
is
its
incentive
these?
The
sentence
are
not
to
actually
do
what
we've
asserted
that
it's
supposed
to
do
and
that's.
A
A
A
Let's
start
with:
let's
start
with
this
tool:
let's
start
with
the
civil,
a
single
system
and
we're
sending
transactions.
You
really
knows
yeah,
let's
say
there
really:
no
to
sending
it
to
a
simple
walk:
breeze,
mmm-hmm,
okay
and
the
block
producer
says:
if
you
only
send
it
to
me,
I
am
going
to
get
that.
So
what
you
need
for
this
to
make
sense
is
you
need
this
to
be
profitable
for
the
laundries
or
do
we
need
it
to
be
profitable.
A
It
needs
to
be
probable
for
both.
Actually,
we've
got
a
fun
little
issue
because
the
transaction
has
a
feel
of
it
has
it
is
as
a
fee
of
a
sort
of
masculine
sense.
Let's
say
it's
worth
a
dollar
yeah.
So
how
do
we
right
now?
The
right
now
the
noes
are
being
paid
for
the
amount
of
work
that
you're
doing,
but
in
a
two
hot
network.
Let's
say
it's
dollars,
you
like
nothing,
cute,
it's
a
tense,
a
turfy
for
virginity,
so
the
first
note
is
10.
The
second
note
gets
five
yeah.
A
D
A
He
produces
a
blog
statistically
on
an
aggregate
he's
still
gonna
produce
one
money,
so
this
is
how
it
works.
Now,
if
this
is
under,
let's
say
the
kind
of
report
system
you're
paid
proportionately,
you
might
have
work
you've
done
what
stator
does
with
its
roaming.
Algorithms
is
we're
basically
providing
a
way
to
securely
and
then
cheetah
bleep
generate
work
from
their
network
reading.
This
is
what
we
have
cryptographic
signatures.
So
what
exactly
are
we
thinking
is
going
to
happen
because
the
way
this
guy
makes
more
money,
is
he
says?
Okay,
look?
A
Will
you
send
it
to
me?
If
you
send
it
to
me,
I've
still
done
the
same
amount
of
work
for
the
transaction,
but
because
I
can
delay
block
production,
then
let's
say
the
burn
fees
here:
yeah,
because
I
can
delete
long
production
bit
I'm,
not
that
worried
about
competition
instead
of
producing
a
block
at
this
point
in
time
later
right,
I'm,
gonna,
produce
it
here
or
I'm
still
going
to
priest
at
that
time,
but
like
that,
some
extra
resources
yeah,
no,
no
the
amount
of
work
that
this
payment
describes
is
the
reading
portion.
A
This
portion
is
just
into
the
block
produce
right
away
yeah.
Now
what
that
means
is
this
feed
work
if
the
block
is
produced
right
of
the
line,
this
guy's
going
to
get
a
ten
Sato
times
two
thirds
and
this
guy's
gonna
get
ten
Sato
times,
1/3
a
burden
on
an
average
as
soon
as
we
start
delaying
well
all
of
a
sudden.
This
is
eight
and
all
of
a
sudden.
This
is
a
two,
because
a
certain
percentage
of
the
fees
is
being
eaten
away
directly
by
the
blockers.
So
we
get
8
times,
10
52.
A
How
much
does
a
block
producer
have
to
pay
the
Remy
node
for
this
to
even
eviler,
both
of
them
and
the
short
answer
is:
it
can
never
be
a
better
deal
for
both
of
them
because
there's
only
ten
bucks,
so
you
can't
divide
the
10
bucks
in
a
way
that
they're
both
better
off.
So
the
block
producer
Evie
de
ladies
he's
delaying
by
impoverishing
really
good,
so
a
separate
payment
to
bribe
it
works
in
situation
works
in
the
Syrian
situation.
It
doesn't
work
in
Samuel
because
the
payments
are
already
optimized.
A
The
only
way
to
make
one
person
better
off
the
worse
off
is
to
actually
change
the
way
work
is
calculated
in
the
system
and
that's
a
heart
for
it,
because
it's
already
good
for
video
safari,
so
side
payments
I
mean
you
could
do
them,
but
it's
you
would
either
be
less
profitable
for
this
guy
or
less
profitable
for
this
guy.
If
the
blog
producer
tries
to
screw
to
really
know
that
really
no
it's
going
to
be
like
below.
A
We've
got
an
economy
here,
one
thing,
but
the
real
I
know
is
concerned
about
is
he's
concerned
about
exactly
that.
You
can
turn
on
giving
you
the
blocks
and
because
you're
not
moving
as
quickly
as
you
can
you're
delaying
and
that's
also
where
the
meta
efficiency
of
the
network
comes
from,
because
it's
like
think,
if
there's
not
enough
block
producers,
then
if
there's
not
enough
water
using
the
blog
reviews,
you
can
afford
to
wait
because
they
had
a
lot
of
competition.
C
A
And
I
mean
that
if
the
thing
is
it
works
the
same
in
Reverse
right
and
the
waiter
doesn't,
is
it
because
you've
always
got
competition
between
them
to
the
network?
So
the
rebbe
knows
the
rating
knows
want
30
a
lot
of
competition
to
bloggers
because
that's
how
they
maximize
their
share
of
network.
The
blog
producers
want
maximum
competition
between
rellenos
because
starting
the
block
precision
want.
They
want
to
Anam
peláez
the
traffic
group,
because
then
there's
a
lot
less
competition
like
you.
A
C
B
B
A
C
A
Transactions
are
coming
from
other
sources
as
yeah
right,
but,
like
the
economics
of
the
network,
also
mean
that
the
competition
is
between
log
producers
that
are
competing
with
the
same
pool
of
fees.
So
you
can
have
a
situation
where,
like
in
the
United
States
setting
on
the
network,
is
super
cheap
and
efficient.
It's
really
easy,
which
means
that
these
guys
and
we
can
think
of
them
like
we're,
paying
the
peer-to-peer
network
and
anyone.
No
one
owes
I'm
paying
well
state-o,
basically,
but
it's
so
easy
to
do.
A
It's
super
easy
to
find
an
access
point
and
fees.
You
pay
are
essentially
the
precedent
as
soon
as
we
have
a
system
like
someone
needs
to
walk
across
the
border,
either
Hong
Kong
or
walk
across
the
border
to
North,
Korea
or
like
I
need
my
I'm
in
ISP
and
I'm
literally
rolling
in
a
fiber
optic.
There's
no
competition!
Well,
you
know.
If
he's
gonna
hire
so.
C
A
Theoretically,
what
you
get,
but
you
can
take
a
look
at
this-
if
you
think
of
this
as
proof
of
work,
I
think
it
gets
a
lot
easier
because
people
are
collecting
work,
but
the
work
is
worth
different
amounts.
What
makes
work
worthwhile
well,
what
is
really
work
is
proximity.
The
transaction
flows,
the
transaction
in
flows
modified
by
your
volume,
collecting
them.
If
you're,
the
first
guy
generating
use
of
the
network,
then.
D
B
B
A
C
A
A
A
Networks
optimizing
towards
value
because,
where
does
infrastructure
get
deployed,
infrastructure
gets
deployed
where
people
are
willing
to
pay
fees
to
use
than
ever?
So
you
know
it's
kind
of
the
opposite
of
a
network
designed
to
be
chocolate
idea
like
ipfs.
What
else?
Because
theory
about
the
network
is
designed
to
optimize
around,
whoever
will
pay
for
the
stuff
you
can
get
away
with
pushing
and
freeloading
off.
That's
not
scalable
Network,
because
freeloading
is
on
the
scalable
business
wall
right.
A
D
B
C
A
And
there's
a
table,
guess
what
what
you
can
you
can?
That
is
actually
one
of
the
problems.
You
can
reverse
the
chance
to
fees.
Another
example
with
proof
of
stake.
This
is
like
it's
a
really
common
issue.
Like
we
talked
to
we
talk.
Something
is
very
well-known
in
Silicon
Valley
about
this
and
and
they
were
like
well,
you
know
it's
very
secure
because
you're
not
what
do
you
say?
They're
like
you
need
to
buy
up
all
of
the
tokens
and
that
drives
the
price
up,
which
is
the
cost
of
the
attack?
A
A
The
network
is
just
like
Bitcoin,
you
invest
applause
or
you,
invest
it
no
expectation
of
profit
and
what
you'll
do
is
you'll
drive
down
the
return,
and
then
you
know
by
driving
down
the
return,
the
people
that
are
stating
very
good
going
to
go
elsewhere
and
they'll,
take
their
investment
income
earning
assets
and
we'll
sell
them
all
yeah
yeah.
So
like
the
problem
with
that
is
it's
like
it's
just
a
fundamental
misunderstanding
where
security
comes
from,
so
the
fundamental
question
is
not
fundamental.
A
Question
is
not
do
transaction
be
secure
than
ever,
but
that's
what
like
90,
90,
plus
percent
of
people
who
approach
booth?
Actually
they
deserve
like.
He
feels
insecure,
because
estate
will
be
secured
by
money.
But
they're,
like
you,
know,
perfect
state
of
mind
and
that's
secured
by
something
like
really
strong
and
in
fact.
B
B
B
B
A
A
A
D
A
Blocks
so
what
he's
gonna
do
is
he's
gonna
forward
into
another
node
and,
let's,
let's
imagine
for
simplicity,
sake,
that
this
is
another
rule,
a
node.
So
this
is
a
small
town,
so
you
configure
town
not
a
lot
of
fees,
not
a
lot
of
transactions.
What
standard
does
the
first
thing
we
do
is
that
on
the
cryptographic
there,
when
transactions
are
stuck
around
the
nose
that
are
sending
and
receiving
they
cryptographically
add
data
to
the
transaction.
A
A
The
two
block
producer-
and
this
gets
to
point
five,
so
this
guy
is
a
2.5,
so
the
thing
we're
doing
is,
you
can
think
of
it
as
kind
of
a
form
of
proof
of
work
where
the
work
were
measuring.
Is
the
work
you've
done
taking
this
transaction
moving
it
into
the
network?
So
what
we're
really
valuing
is
we're
volume
two
feet:
flush
collecting
money
for
the
network
is
the
kind
of
work
that
you
do
and
the
first
thing
I
want
you
to
notice
is
we're
gonna,
basically
say:
okay,
so
the
total
amount?
A
A
2.5
over
75
and
we're
going
to
explain
one
of
the
challenges
with
Sato
is
other
block
chains.
The
person
that
produces
a
block
gets
all
of
the
money,
and
the
result
of
this
is
that
blockchain
designers
they're,
focusing
on
making
block
production,
difficult
or
random,
but
they're
really
solving
two
problems.
Once
she's
doing
work,
network
she's,
collecting
money,
what
we're
actually
doing
is
we're
separating
payment
for
the
work
from
the
edge
of
the
block
production
and
that's
the
difficult
problem.
The
SATA
sauce.
The
first
thing
I
wanted
to
know,
though,
is
we've
right
away.
A
A
Everybody
makes
more
money
right,
this
guy's
ten
magic
thirds
disgusting
one-third.
Everyone
in
the
network
is
better
off
because
we
kicked
out
of
this
node
it
is
it's
not
not
doing
meaningful
work
so
the
way
to
you
the
way
you've
justify
your
existence
in
the
state
of
network
is
by
doing
work.
That's
of
value
right
and
the
reason
it
matters
is
because
the
fundamental
economic
problem,
if
it
sounds
abstract
like,
but
what
can
be
value
well,
the
problems
with
Bitcoin
and
proof
work
or
my
mistake-
is
that
the
stock.
A
Is
different
from
the
stuff
that
needs
to
do
to
run
the
number,
so
what
we're
doing
is
we're
turning
payment
for
rating,
and
you
know
the
data
flows
back
the
other
way,
but
we're
turning
that
into
because
that's
what
we
measured.
That's
what
we
encourage
that
sense
of
us.
So
one
of
the
interesting
things
is
the
way
you
attack
the
state
of
our
system.
Is
you
have
to
spend
a
lot
of
money
just
like
Bitcoin.
A
A
Let's
explain
actually,
first
of
all
how
you
block
producer,
produces
a
block
and
then
we'll
go
to
the
network
and
once
your
that
search
ok,
so
what
happens
is
in
Sato?
We
have
something:
that's
called
a
barfi
and
what
that
barfi
is
is
whenever
a
block
is
produced.
The
consensus
algorithms
basically
say
this
is
a
measure
of
the
amount
of
work
that
we
need
to
include
in
a
block.
D
A
A
Like
you
know
there
a
lot
of
their
estate
or
class
versions
of
Bitcoin,
where
you
can
make
the
amount
of
work
variable
by
pushing
the
work
these
transactions.
We
call
that
hash
hash
right.
Well,
that's
what
a
play
I
know
days.
Yeah
kind
of
I
mean
in
the
problems
with
that
approach.
If
you
don't
pay
for
the
network,
so
you're
back
to
square
one
but
yeah.
A
So
this
is
time
and
that's
work
and
what
you
do
is
we
set
the
burn
fee
and
burn
few
goes
down
over
time,
and
what
that
means
is
that,
even
if
the
network's
not
really
being
used
at
any
point
in
time,
they
may
see
to
attack,
but
you're.
Never
gonna
have
a
crush,
so
the
situation
in
Bitcoin
you
can
have.
You
have
attacks
on
the
networks.
A
The
mining
power
goes
away,
somewhat,
turns
it
off,
and
things
go
Helen
that
that
never
actually
is
gonna
happen,
a
Bitcoin
at
the
Saito,
because
you
know
if
nobody
produces
a
blog
for
a
while,
it
gets
cheaper,
intrusive
law
and,
what's
actually
going
to
happen,
is
the
difficulty
of
the
burn
fees
can
with
just
upwards
or
downwards,
to
keep
block
time
possible.
But
what
you
have
is
in
any
blockchain.
With
these
coming
in
we've
got
we've
got
things.
We've
got
another
curve,
moving
in
the
opposite
direction,
and.
D
A
D
A
We're
not
going
to
let
one
of
the
problems
is
that
were
earned.
There
are
a
lot
of
block
chains
to
talk
about
there
any
stuff.
There
are
a
lot
of
things
where
someone
has
to
talk
and
not
get
a
burn,
a
lot
of
Bitcoin,
it's
very
confusing.
We
call
this
a
burn
fee
for
very
specific
reason,
because
what
we've
got
is
rebound
cost
an
attack
in
order
to
do
that,
we
kind
of
find
a
way
to
force
attack
first.
The
first
thing
to.
D
A
If
transaction
fee
Boeing
goes
up,
it
gets
more
difficult
to
attack
the
network
right
because
it's
cost
goes
up
and
we
can
actually
adjust.
We
never
really
get
constant.
So
an
interesting
thing
is
if
we
can
make
it
in
order
to
attack
the
network,
someone
needs
to,
they
need
to
do
more
work
and
they
need
to
pay
more
money.
This
is
theoretically
the
same
kind
of
security
that
we
get
in
proof
of
work
and
produce
tape
systems
directly.
A
If
you,
the
goal,
is
we've
got
a
cost
associated
with
work
and
you've
got
to
do
more,
so
we're
gonna
get
to
the
same
place
that
Bitcoin
does,
but
we're
going
to
need
to
solve
a
separate
problem
because
work
is
related
to
money.
So
the
fundamental
challenge
in
Sado
is
not
how
to
make
it
difficult
to
produce
blocks,
because
you
can
just
spend
money
to
produce
loss
as
the
trends.
That
is
the
amount
of
money.
This
needs
to
prove
slog
Rises
the
expense
of
attacking
or
arises.
A
A
A
A
form
of
work,
that's
measured
in
fees,
so
in
the
Bitcoin
system.
We
can't
do
this
because
it
doesn't
make
sense
it's
like
well,
it
costs
you
money
to
attack
the
network,
we're
going
to
take
that
money,
we're
going
to
put
it
in
the
block
you
produce.
So
when
you
attack
the
network,
your
attack
pays
for
itself.
It's
kind
of
like
you,
take
all
of
the
money.
B
A
Is
that
if
all
of
the
money
goes
to
the
person
who
builds
blog
if
they
get
their
money
back,
there's
no
cost.
So
this
is
where
the
word
virtue
comes
it
right,
because
if
we
take
this
money
and
we
just
burned
yeah,
then
the
network
has
the
same
security
properties
as
Bitcoin
sure
the
problem
is,
if
we
burn
it,
if
we
start
with
21
million
tokens
and
we're
constantly
burning
tokens.
A
So
it's
like
the
network
that
can
be
secured.
The
problem
is
that
we're
making
it
useless-
and
you
know
for
a
scalable
network
that
we
want
to
support
itself.
That's
that's
the
issue,
so
it
kind
of
it
kind
of
feels
like
we're
back
to
square
one
with
zeros
as
long
as
we're
destroying
the
tokens
were
secured,
but
if
we
do
that,
we've
got
a
bigger
problem,
yeah.
So
the.
D
A
Is
there
is
a
there
is
an
improvement
here
because
nobody
changed
the
problem.
We've
actually
stepped
back
to
a
problem
that
the
original
Satoshi
Hume
had
where
there
are
kind
of
two
problems.
The
first
problem
is:
how
do
we
make
it
difficult
to
produce
walks?
Because
if
it's
not
difficult
furnished
blocks,
everyone
doesn't
write,
but
the
second
problem
is:
how
do
we
make
sure
that
the
distribution
of
money
into
the
system
doesn't
enable
further
attacks
on
the
system?
Proof
of
work
solves
this
by
centralizing
things
in
the
hands
of
minors.
A
It
says
if
you
produce
a
block,
we're
going
to
give
you
all
the
money,
but
we
know
the
payments
fair,
because
long
production
is
essentially
random
based
on
cash,
so
the
the
qualities
that
we
wanted
to
prove
work,
which
is
that
it's
difficult,
which
is
that
you
make
proportionally
the
amount
of
money
that
you're
doing
work
those
properties
in
Bitcoin.
They
create
sort
of
problems
because
they
force
us
to
give
all
the
blockers
Insano.
A
Well,
we've
got
rid
of
that,
but
we've
introduced
a
secondary
problem,
but
we
still
preserve
difficulty.
So
the
challenge
chefs
and
the
challenge,
isn't:
how
do
we
make
a
difference?
Boss,
that's
proof
of
work,
that's
produced
aid,
they're,
introducing
these
side
activities
that
are
difficult
and
then
have
their
own
properties
and
then
essentially,
our
attackable
with
money.
People
try
to
pretend
that
they're
not
and
we
have
a
separate
problem
and
the
separate
problem
is
okay.
A
We're
charging
you
money,
two
three
slaughters.
We
want
to
pay
you
for
the
work,
but
we
need
to
find
a
safe
way
to
do
that.
If
we
can
find
a
safe
way
to
pay
you
for
the
work,
then
we
we
have
these
security
properties.
The
problem
is:
if
we're
paying
you,
how
can
we
pay
you
for
the
work
in
a
way
where
you
can't
do
what
we
like
to
call
it?
We
call
it
a
fee.
Recycling
attack.
B
A
This
is
why
it's
what's
one
of
the
reasons
they
claim
has
to
one
person
attacks
the
position
produced
blocking
it
off
money.
The
solution
to
this
is
well
what
if
we
can
find
a
way
to
guarantee
that
you
can't
get
100%
of
your
money
back
again?
What
if
you
would
only
get
50%
your
money
back?
Would
the
network
be
secured?
A
The
answer
is
what
we
could
figure
out,
what
it
costs,
because
now
our
cause
is
no
longer
our
cost
of
some
longer
this,
but
we
still
have
a
cost
of
this,
and
this
is
kind
of
the
property
of
it's
the
security
property,
it's
fundamental
to
Bitcoin,
but
it's
also
fundamentals:
data
isn't
Bitcoin,
you
said:
well,
it's
the
cost,
essentially
of
renting
51
versus
the
half
shower
or
building
that
which
is
it
cost
attack
and
what
Saito
says
it:
citizens
well,
the
cost
of
attack.
The
state
of
network
is
whatever
percentage
of
money.
A
B
B
A
Yeah
so
like,
if
an
attacker
and
if
an
attacker
is
one
of
the
lovely
things
if
an
attacker
produces
a
walk
or
they're
two
things
if
they
put
all
of
their
transactions,
if
they
steal
transactions
from
your
blog,
important,
Network,
I'm,
actually
still
will
potentially
get
hated.
So
even
the
tapper
tax
network.
There
are
two
things
that
you
do.
B
A
Maybe
we
can
kind
of
explain
how
it
works.
I
mean
basically
what
it
boils
down
to
is
knows:
you're,
positioned
in
the
network
and
the
flow
of
money
comes
in
to
them
from
the
transactions
filtering
to
the
network.
So
if
you
really
want
to
cause
problems,
what
you're
talking
about
is
a
blog
flooding
attack
and
then
the
question
becomes
have
our
deal
with
Waka
Flocka
tax.
Most
damaging
thing
you
do
is
try
to
encourage
a
lot
of
other
people
in
the
network.
D'cruz
possible
pays
well
because.
E
A
In
the
problem,
because
the
costs
of
block
production,
you
determine
what
the
cost
is
now.
What
that's
saying
is
that
same
for
you
for
your
specific
note,
yeah
that
has
the
potential
to
produce
two
logs
right
now,
the
cost
of
the
blog,
for
you
depends
on
the
cost
of
producing
a
blog.
The
fundamental
property
is
that,
if
you're
in
honest
mode
and.
D
B
A
B
A
A
Just
like
any
other
blockchain
like
bedrock
right,
if
you
want
security
security
scales
with
the
number
of
confirmations,
and
so
if
you
are
making
a
pain
to
me
and
you're
a
blog
producer,
the
cost
of
attacking
network
is
different
for
different
nodes
in
the
network.
So,
if
Google
is
collecting,
30
Google
is
producing
30
percent
of
the
box.
Yeah.
B
B
E
A
Kind
of
getting
to
the
central
attack
cuz
you're,
jumping
to
the
attack
vector,
that's
fine!
The
point
is,
if
you're
an
honest
node.
What
are
you
doing?
You're
helping
users
take
their
transaction,
take
a
fees
and
you're
moving
them
into
the
network
and
that's
the
measure
for
work
if
you're
an
attacker?
Well,
you
can
take
them.
How
do
you
fake
that?
You
think
that
by
making.
B
A
Sure,
of
course,
the
what
you're
doing
is
I'm
not
worried
about
the
confirmation
stuff
because
there's
it's
kind
of
like
wilfer
user,
accepting
the
transaction.
What
we've
got
is
we've
got
a
system
that
says
producing
a
blog
for
various
people
has
cost
yeah.
So
if
you're
paying
me
a
15
cent
transaction
and
the
cost
of
a
blog
production,
but
so.
B
A
Not
economically
in
San
Tomas
so
and
the
network
incentives.
Actually,
what
basically
happens
is
the
consent.
Salir
says
yeah
if
you've
got
a
relationship
with
other.
So
if
you
produce
one
blogger
yeah,
if
you
produce
another
block,
you
can
produce
ten
thousand
blocks.
If
you
want,
you
can
send
them
to
your
peers.
Yes,
the
peers
are
not
going
a
problem.
You
don't
think
pass
the
first
law
if
you
want
your
peers,
but
I
need
by
consensus.
If
you
convince
them
to,
they
can
protocol
protocol
doesn't
do
it,
so
you
didn't
want
them
to
propagate.
A
A
If
you're,
just
talking
about
confirmations
like
a
double
spend,
the
answer
that
is,
we
calculate
the
cost
of
the
law
because
of
the
block
depends
on
whether
you're
attacking
it
and
how
many
transaction
fees
you
have
for
other
people,
and
you
take
that
cost
and
you
multiply
it
by
the
number
of
blocks
and
that's
your
security
and
that's
the
same
as
in
Bitcoin.
If
bid
main
has
forty
nine
point,
nine
percent
of
the
network,
and
they
only
need
to
do
a
tiny
bit
of
work.
A
E
A
Humans
is
walk.
He
will
not
accept
it
in
the
same
way,
the
cost
of
attack
scales
with
the
number
of
logs
the
same
money
can
potentially
be
used
in
different
chance.
So
there
are
two
questions
here
that
the
first
fundamental
question,
which
is
the
security
one,
is
noticing
that
we're
providing
the
same
Security's
Bitcoin
in
these
other
networks.
In
the
sense
myth
you
can
calculate
the
cost
of
tackle
mini-jack.
A
A
B
E
B
B
A
E
D
A
A
Okay,
so
you're
getting
5,000.
This
blog
is
gonna
cost
you
another
5,000.
This
block
is
gonna
cost
you
another
5,000,
and
it's
the
same
here
now
your
initial
payment
yeah,
if
you
can,
if
you
want
to
attack
the
network
by
doing
this,
split
like
that,
you
can
that's
a
it's
a
block,
flooding
attack,
but
on
this
chain
as
well.
If
you
want
to
do
it
another
flight,
okay,
you
want
to
do
another
5k,
you
can
create
them.
You
could
create
a
third
chain.
A
You
can
try
and
get
the
network
to
accept
that
as
well
and
we're
saying
that
the
cost
meaning
the
amount
of
money
you
lose
if
you
work
really
hard
and
you
manage
to
recover
50
percent
and
that's
not
actually
viable.
But
what
you
can
see
is
that,
whatever
chain
you
try
to
maintain
we're
still
maintaining
the
properties
that
on
any
chain
were
on
any
chain,
there
is
a
cost
to
the
length
now
the
question
so
for.
D
A
That's
like
I
can
rent
hash
power
and
whatever
the
longest
chain
is
the
attacker
that
matters.
It
would
be.
The
block
flooding
attack,
which
would
be,
could
I
use
this
to
produce
50
different
blocks.
That
would
saturate
the
network
and
cause
the
network
before
it
get
on
the
50
chains,
and
there
would
be
so
much
power
back
and
forth
that
it
would
be
a
problem
for
the
network.
A
A
You
need
to
do
if
you
remember,
is
all
of
the
nodes
in
the
network
are
competing
together.
We'll
share
right.
So,
if
you're
an
attacker
and
it's
assumed-
let's
take
a
pure
example-
you're
not
doing
anyone
mm-hmm,
so
the
cost
to
you
is
generating
the
amount
of
work
that
the
network
considers
valid.
It's
like
Bitcoin,
there's
a
cost
to
producing
a
block.
We
can
measure
the
cost
of
using
blocks
and
for
an
attacker.
It's
like
ranking
up
half
power
to
produce.
B
A
A
E
A
D
B
B
B
A
A
Consejo
is
different
than
work
difficulty
chain
confirmation,
because
each
of
these
Forks
there's
going
to
be
there's
going
to
be
a
cost
because
there's
a
cost
of
law
production,
so
you
can
spend
the
cost
of
block
production
and
sure
you
can
produce
any
number
of
chains
what's
actually
going
to
happen
in
the
real
world.
In
this
situation
it
is
the
u.s.
is
just
burning
its
reputation
no
month
Kentavious
long
seriously
and
if
it
becomes
a
problem,
China
you're
over
mr.
A
Cordell
thanks
but
think
you've
been
the
big
pointer
for
work
example
where
let's
say
these
are
two
blocks
that
are
produced
by
two
people
who
produces
the
next
block.
Well,
the
u.s.
is
produced
a
block
and
it
now
has
zero
work
sure.
So
if
the
United
States
wants
to
produce
another
block
on
either
of
those
chains,
it
needs
to
pay
out
of
its
own.
B
B
A
Longest
chain,
why
don't
you
build
off
that?
This
is
big
boy,
you
have
two
nodes
that
produce
a
block,
and
then
someone
builds
on
it.
They
probably
a
nerve.
Doesn't
you
I
mean
if
you're,
if
you're,
describing
a
model
of
the
network,
we're
the
us
consent
dated
the
china-us
consent
dated
europe
and
the
network
doesn't
ever
communicate?
That's
like
reversion
bitcoin
is.
It
doesn't
make
any
sense,
but.
A
B
B
D
A
A
This
is
Bitcoin,
other
people
on
the
network
will
build
on
the
longest
chain.
So
what
I'm
trying
to
get
you
see
is
that
there
are
two
issues
here.
The
first
issue
is
if
the
US,
like
China
you're,
going
to
build
on
what
they
think
isn't
longest
trainer
yeah.
So
if
it
costs
the
u.s.
money
improves
blocks,
the
US
can
keep
it
like
China.
Your
can
do
this
and
then
us
approval
these
blocks.
B
B
A
Is
exactly
the
same
in
Bitcoin
as
the
US
just
producing
a
single
block
like
a
chain,
they're
kind
of
creatively
coming
up?
You
know
the
fundamentals
need
to
notice
actually
is,
and
this
is
where
it's
a
radical
improvement
of
Bitcoin
note
that
in
Bitcoin
in
Sato
you've
got
to
in
this
kind
of
situation,
the
US
needs
to
pay
100%
of
the
cost
of
reducing
block
in
Bitcoin.
A
The
US
needs
to
pay
51%.
So
there's
actually
something
really
interesting.
People
have
difficulty
with
it
and
I
think
the
reason
people
have
difficulty
with
it.
It's
why
the
blog
flooding
attack
is
more
interesting
because
a
lot
of
flooding
attack,
yes,
more
interesting
people
have
kind
of
a
kind
of
cognitively
have
difficulty
wrapping
their
heads
around
it,
because
what
see
who
does
is
it
puts
a
price
on
attacking
the
network,
but
that
price
is
slightly
different
for
everyone
else.
So,
like
you
know,
if.
B
A
D
A
You
can
take
other
people's
transactions
insured
logs.
You
can
steal
them.
If
you
do
that,
though,
the
people
that
grow
in
your
your
ability
to
get
the
money
from
the
blog
shrinks.
So
if
I'm
an
attacker
on
the
network
and
I
put
100
percent
of
our
money
in
the
network,
the
the
challenges,
maybe
there's
a
way
I
can
engineer
to
pay
50
percent
if
I
start
included
train
if
I
start,
including
transactions
that
were
included
from
China
Europe.
A
Oh
I,
don't
do
that,
but
then
I
can
only
get
10%
in
five
or
something,
and
so
what
you
get
is
you
get
a
situation
where
the
US,
which
is
trying
to
it's
a
revisions?
Of
course
you
know
if
the
u.s.
is
pulling
at
this
attack,
it's
got
two
choices.
What
if
it
doesn't
include
any
work
from
Europe
and
China?
What
happens
is
the
amount
of
work
on
the
network?
A
This
is
actually
is
really
interesting,
because
in
Sato
what
happens
is
the
fact
that
the
work
can
be
transferred
between
chains
like
this,
that
eliminates
the
51%
of
tacit
an
interesting
way?
Third,
so
there
are
other
options
here:
the
cost
to
the
u.s.
go
up
because
one
they
have
a
choice
between.
They
include.
A
They
include
the
other
transactions
right
so
like
they
steal
the
transactions,
like
china
produces
a
block
here
and
the
u.s.
endnote
your
transactions
are
here.
If
they
do
that,
they
they
stop
being
able
to
capture
50%
of
the
money,
because
the
transactions
that
they
include
force
the
money
basically
to
other
nodes
in
the
network.
So
you
can
either
have
help
producing
the
longest
chain.
You
can
either
stop
work
for
building
up
outside
your
chain
or
you
can
include
it,
but
if
you
include
it,
your
ability
to
recapture
the
money
goes
down
right.
A
So
I
mean
that
they're,
the
two
general
problems,
or
not
problems,
they're
kind
of
cognitive
things
getting
people
to
think
that
it
is
every
blockchain
is
secured
by
theis.
What
we
need
to
do
for
maximum
security
need
that
watching
that
can
process
massive
amounts
of
fees.
That's
what
that's!
What
we're
building,
because
the
biggest
blockchain
is
going
to
be
the
most
secure
one,
because
it's
going
to
be
the
most
expensive
to
notice
that
the
difficulty
is
different.
It's
like
yeah,
you
can
produce
it
the
the
challenges
challenges.
Yes,
how
can
we
lower
it
below
50%?
A
B
A
So
if
you
remember
we
did
this,
we
did
this
kind
of
that,
maybe
just
first
with
a
block
flooding.
What
you've
got.
You've
got
a
massive
massive
network
processing
care
about
your
X
plane,
and
you
know
if
your
node
you're
collecting
honest
transactions,
one
of
the
lovely
things
is,
if
you
start
attacking
the
network,
the
easiest
way
for
the
network
to
respond.
Is
we
stop
sending
you
fees,
so
you
can
substitute
attack
with
all
this
work
but
like
if
I'm,
a
user
and
all
of
a
sudden,
you
start
creating
Network
disruptions.
A
The
first
thing
I
do
is
I,
send
my
transactions
to
someone
else
and
remember
you
if
you're
like
us,
if
your
Google
or
something
and
you've
made
massive
investments
in
Internet
infrastructure
in
order
to
process
table
glass
blocks
and
all
of
a
sudden
like
people
stop
sending
you
transactions
because
your
attack,
the
network,
doesn't
love
it.
So.
A
Incentives,
so
you
you
could
try
with
a
blog
propagation
thing.
One
of
the
major
differences
is
that
the
incentives
on
the
rest
of
the
network
are
one
people
stop
sending
you
transactions
to
at
massive
scale.
You
don't
have
a
network
structure
where
Google
is
not
hutton
spoke,
it
is
Google
disconnected
driver,
but
Superman
can
even
pull
it
off,
because
the
main
block
producers
can
only
mean
maybe
managing
connections
to
12
or
13
other
knows.
Given
the
limitations
of
the
pipes.
Anyway,
we
were
going
to
talk
about
how
money
is
divided
up.
Yeah.
D
A
The
key
observation
is
well
we're
gonna
divide
up
the
money
right
and
notice
that
we
had
we
previously
did.
Things
were
resent
like
you
know
this
nodes
gonna
get
10
over
15
and
this
node
550
right.
What
happens?
We
mentioned
energy
before
so
as
soon
as
a
blog
has
produced,
the
burnfree
is
really
high
and
then,
as
time
passes,
the
consensus
algorithm
lowers
energy
at
a
certain
point
in
time,
someone
on
the
network
has
enough
work
in
their
many
pool,
they're
able
to
produce
a
block
mm-hmm.
This
is
where
the
fun
begins
before
we
do.
A
It,
though,
now
is
the
time
to
step
back
to
your
question:
why
isn't
everyone
producing
boxes
at
once?
The
reason
is
transactions
and
fees
are
flowing
into
network
work
is
flowing
into
the
network
at
different
places.
So,
if
you
are
the
United
States
you're
gonna
have
access
to
American
transaction
flows.
If
you're
trying
to
even
have
Chinese
transaction
flows,
Singapore
will
have
Singapore
transaction
flows
and,
what's
going
to
happen,
is
the
network
will
adopt
and
organic
round-robin
production
system,
because
as
soon
as
the
US
produces
a
block?
A
Well,
the
amount
of
work
it
has
an
S
Memo
goes
to
zero,
Chinese,
no
God
loves
singing
personalized
blocks
and
so
well.
The
United
States
is
building
up
work
to
produce
another
one.
Well,
these
guys
are
going
to
produce
a
block
and
the
network.
Basically
it
eliminates
people
who
are
in
close
proximity
to
each
other,
who
are
producing
wash
of
the
same
transaction
set
yeah.
But
anyway,
let's,
let's
move
on
to
the
questions,
so
we've
got
basically
two
kinds
of
pants
involving
the
production.
The
block
belong.
You've
got
already
knows
this.
This
thing
below.
A
D
A
There's
a
lot
of
block
producers
and
there's
a
lot
of
competition
for
long
producers.
Remember
the
revving
nose.
Runny
nose
has
an
incentive
to
give
multiple
block
producers
of
transaction
because
they
want
block
producers
to
be
producing
as
soon
as
they
possibly
can.
The
reason
for
that
is
if
the
block
producer
can
afford
to
wait
if
it
can
make
a
block
this
amount.
A
Well,
then,
this
this
goes
directly
to
the
blog
producer.
So
if
a
transaction
pays
a
fee
of
ten
bucks
in
this
example,
maybe
seven
dollars
would
be
divided
up
into
reading
those,
but
three
dollars
goes
directly
to
block
producers
and
what
this
is
doing
is
it's
creating
competition
between
blog
producers
and
revenue,
notes
where,
if
this
is
going
to
be
divided
up,
but
if
it's
really
profitable
to
be
a
blog
producer,
that's
going
to
happen
in
situations
where
there
aren't
enough
water.
Racers
right,
like
the
blockchain,
is
really
big.
A
You
need
to
make
a
real
investment
in
Google's,
Google
scale
infrastructure.
You
need
to
have
a
level
of
connection
level.
3
like
it's
super
probable.
You
can
afford
to
wait.
What
that
means.
Is
it's
a
tax
on
the
feet,
so
the
blog
producers
get
their
money
right
away
and
the
economic
incentives
plus
rather
behavior,
is
going
to
keep
that
at
what
the
market
prices
are.
Basically,
because
there's
a
return
on
setting
up
a
blog
correction
facility
so
that
basically
gets
taken
off
right
off
the
top.
A
D
A
A
When
the
variable
is
1,
it's
going
to
go
100
percent
to
a
group
of
knows
whose
purpose
is
to
hold
a
lottery
and
what's
gonna
happen
is
we're
separating
the
active
blog
production
from
the
active
deciding
who
gets
paid.
So
if
we
go
back
to
the
Bitcoin
example,
the
act
of
producing
the
blog
is
the
it's.
A
Would
say
them
so
eat
the
pay
slip
is
50%
say
because
we
can
do
dynamic,
Facebook,
let's
start
with
static.
So
if
the
piece
one
is
50,
the
cost
of
producing
the
vlog
is
a
hundred,
let's
say,
plus
whatever
the
law
producer
surplus
is
whatever
you're
going
to
get
if
you're
already
node
you're
eligible
for
fifty
bucks,
if
you're
a
lottery,
older,
you're
also
eligible
for
$50.
This
is
in
the
consensus
world.
It's
a
variable,
that's
managed
to
the
consensus
network,
so
you
can't
attack
the
network
and
suddenly
change
the
pay
slip.
A
So
how
does?
How
does
it
work?
A
block
is
produced
and
the
block
itself
in
the
sale
implementation
you
can
do.
You
can
do
like
an
already
ran
them
stuff?
We
use
mining
for
a
couple
of
reasons,
because
it's
simple
and
what
you
do
is
the
block
basically
has
a
hash
and
the
block.
Implicitly
the
hatch.
The
block
implicitly,
is
something
we
call
a
golden
tip.
A
Think
of
like
Willy
Wonka,
the
turbo
factor
and
the
reading
notes
and
the
block
producers
produce
a
lot
as
the
block
is
propagating
to
the
golden
ticket
is
available
for
everyone
on
the
network
to
look
at
and
right
now
it's
might
impose
on
simplicity
sake
and
if
a
locker
holder
finds
a
solution
to
a
golden
ticket,
what
it
does
is
it
takes
that
solution
and
it
propagates
it
to
the
network
in
the
form
of
a
transaction
and
that
transaction.
If
it
is
included
in
the
very
next
block,
the
laundry.
E
A
That
have
found
the
ticket
gets
a
tailor
and
a
variable
that's
associated
with
a
solution,
and
because
it's
a
cryptographic
puzzle,
it's
guaranteed
to
be
random,
that
random
variable
picks,
which
of
the
row
dinos
contained
in
all
of
the
transaction
in
the
previous
blog
gets
paid
as
well
so
and
it
doesn't
need
to
be
wanting
being
divided
through
ten.
The
main
point
is
that
the
randomness
from
the
lottery
is
used
for
the
distribution
of
life.
A
For
this
right.
So
remember:
the
distribution
of
money
here
for
the
block
reducer
is
it's
10
over
10
over
15
and
5,
or
so
for
a
to
hawk
production.
The
blog
producer
is
fantastic.
It
can
expect
a
lot
of
50
percent
payment.
It
can
expect,
on
average,
to
get
a
33
percent
of
50.
Bucks
equals
really
not
very
much
money,
or
is
that
that's
like
seventeen?
A
So
you
notice
in
the
earlier
examples
we're
talking
about
fifty
dollars
in
a
network
where
the
blogger
greasers
one
hop
away
from
every
transaction
they're.
In
fact,
gonna
capture
the
50%
pay
split
17.5
there,
and
so
the
cost
is
going
to
be.
Eighty
two
point:
five
percent
right
now
now
in
in
a
network,
that's
actually
more
distributed,
is
real
world
networks
are
going
to
be,
the
cost
of
attack
for
bloggers,
news
uses
can
be
higher
and
the
question
you
got
to
think
of
it
as
well.
A
We've
also
got
the
cost
of
attack
from
remaining
nodes
as
well,
and
this
is
the
nature
of
what
city
with
us
Sato
says.
Look
the
solution
to
the
problem.
Is
we
can
make
the
network
secure
on
fees
alone?
You
can
divide
up
the
fees
and
the
challenge
becomes
how
we
divide
up
the
fees
in
a
way
that
we
can
actually
calculate
weight
calculate
what
the
cost
of
security
is
right,
and
this
is
the
other
thing
like
remember,
because
we've
got
a
mining
puzzle
here,
producing
you're,
not
making
50%
in
prop.
A
If
you
produce
a
block,
if
the
next
block
is
produced
and
there's
no
solution,
nobody
gets
paid.
So,
in
addition
to
generating
an
attacker,
in
addition
to
generating
the
money
for
the
transactions,
it
needs
to
come
up
with
money
for
the
transactions.
It
also
needs
to
be
in
a
position
to
determine
the
water,
and
you
can
think
of
the
lottery
position
like
validators,
in
the
sense
that
you
know
if
you've
got
the
u.s.
in
our
earlier
example,
which
is
trying
to
rewrite
the
longest
chain.
A
A
A
Mean
if
I
know
we
go,
I
defended
my
mine,
USA
mine
too,
but
notice.
If
the
US
is
mine
to
do
it
know
what
it
like,
but
don't
make
me
fifty
bucks,
because
the
amount
of
profit
that
they're
making
from
this
the
problem
for
water
holders
is
actually
driven
by
market
forces
to
be
exactly
the
same
for
the
profits
for
recognize.
A
So
if
you
get
fifty
bucks
back,
will
they
probably
need
to
be
spending
forty
eight
to
forty
nine
dollars
just
to
do
that,
so
an
attacker
that
needs
to
co-op
Bothwell
if
you're
an
honest,
if
you're
using
mining
to
attack
the
network,
it's
only
really.
It's
only
really
feasible
if
the
profits
from
writing
are
way
higher
than
the
profits
from
reading
and
kind
of
vice
versa.
But
then
this
is
dynamic
pace.
What
the
example
we're
talking
about
is
just
were
saying:
okay,
she
remember
son.
A
The
main
point
is
that
know:
if
the
is
a
transactions
on
salt,
the
attackers
are
just
trying
to
use
money.
What
we've
done
is
we've
introduced
a
cost
based
system.
That
means
it's
no
longer
five,
it
so
under
five
thousand
per
block
right.
It's
five
thousand
per
block,
but
they're
getting
seventy
percent
point
five
plus
that's
their
profit.
A
D
A
Have
a
version
with
a
dynamic
pay
slit
and
what
that
does.
Is
it
changes
this
so
that
the
profits
from
reveling
in
the
profits
remaining
are
driven
by
market
forces?
The
the
first
version
is
just
like
thinking
about
this
one
way
to
think
there's
a
difficulty
to
mining,
and
let
me
maybe
explain
a
bit
because
it's
lovely,
we
basically
let
the
miners
vote
on
what
the
difficulty
of
the
puzzle
is.
Mm-Hmm
now
imagine
with
a
50%
pay
slit.
B
A
A
A
Some
variants
in
golden
ticket
solution
as
well.
So
it's
another
security
thing,
because
if
you
produce
two
solutions
and
you're
attacking
the
system
to
choose
it
yourself,
that
doesn't
benefit
you
at
all,
but
the
very
so
the
variants
above
doesn't
give
you
any
benefits
of
the
variants
below
only
imposes
cost,
so
even
an
attacker
that
can
match
100%
of
the
water.
It's
still
going
to
lose
money
just
from
statistical
variance
in
the
scale
of
the
mining
solution.
A
Anyway,
the
that's
basic
say,
though,
which
is
that
you
divide
up
the
money.
You
introduced
a
system
of
generating
a
random
number
to
decide
who
gets
paid.
The
detectors
can't
cheat
with
without
incurring
additional
costs,
and
you
use
that
to
basically
say
we
have
the
properties
of
Bitcoin
which
art,
which
is
there's
going
to
be
a
cost
from
producing
certain
blocks
on
network.
And
then
you
know,
the
larger
economic
scheme
is
saying
if
you're,
honest
node,
you're,
collecting
genuine
transactions
and
sharing
them
with
friends
and
then
other
nodes
on
the
network.
A
If
you're
an
attacker
because
everyone
everyone
who's
doing
anything,
is
scale,
that's
their
entire
economy
like
no
one
is
going
to
be.
If,
if
Google's
produces
20%
of
network,
if
they
start
misbehaving,
the
economic
incentives
for
everyone
is
literally
to
behavin.
We
were
fools.
Cost
of
attack
goes
way
way
out.
We
stopped
sending
them
transactions.
The
miners
know
if
they're
like
looking
you're
too
strong
the
network
we're
making
money
from
this
we're
not
going
to
support
you
and
basically
the
whole
thing
means
that
the
cost
of
attack
is
honest.
A
Nodes
do
work,
grabbing
work
and
they
get
paid
for
fruit,
dishonest
moves,
they
have
to
attack
the
network
and
it's
not
just
it's
not
just
50%,
it's
like,
because
if
you
it
becomes
exponential,
because
if
you
don't
include
other
people's
blocks,
the
amount
of
work,
this
is
building
up
outside
your
network
waiting
to
come
on
at
any
point
in
time.
Grouse
is
a
point
where
the
amount
of
work
you
the
amount
of
money
you
actually
need
to
spend.
Not
only
does
it
cost
go
up
because
you
recaptured
less
of
it,
but
the
wage.
A
A
B
A
B
A
B
This
case
it's
like
Lily's.
Let's
just
imagine
this
is
the
same
box
yeah
just
like
there's
one
difference
here.
That's
all
yeah,
so
you're
in
China
I
mean
they're
actually
not
in
like
motivation,
there's
not
malicious,
malicious
yeah.
They
just
like
not
really
following
protocol,
there's
just
like
well.
Why
not?
Why
not
I
haven't.
A
Even
have
an
easy
fix
for
this,
because
the
hatch,
the
blocks
is
gonna,
be
different.
You
just
have
a
consensus
model
that
says
which
one
you're
gonna
favor
be
favored
by
something
the
entire
random.
That's
not
controllable
by
us
right
like
what
you're
saying
is
you're
saying
the
attack
that
I
envision
is
that
all
of
the
you
know
all
of
the
core
nodes
in
the
network.
Yeah
it'll
build
off
all
of
the
possible
force.
Yes
and
well
we're
talking
about
it.
A
We're
talking
about
blockchain,
that's
moving
in
petabytes
of
data
a
day
because
we're
actually
paying
for
the
network
I
mean
first
of
all,
I,
don't
think.
That's
a
realistic
issue
is
the
economic
incentives
for
everyone
who
you've
got
an
attack
that
the
economic
it
sounds
generalize
like
we'll
look,
there's
an
attack.
The
real
question
is
well.
I
might
extend
another.
They
can
write
what
they
do,
because
if
the
network
becomes
useless
their
army
get
paid.
That's
like
saying
look,
you
know
everybody
will
kind
of
mind
separate
their
own
things
off.
Why
don't?
A
B
A
You
know
one
of
the
differences,
is
you
say?
Well,
what
is
the
network
structure?
You
know?
You're
gonna
have
a
series.
The
bigger
the
blockchain
gets
you're
going
to
have
a
series
of
people
that
are
specializing
in
infrastructure
right
you're,
going
to
get
Google
in
the
States.
You
know
by
doing
China.
You
know
the
costs
a
non-trivial
amount
of
money
to
be
running
in
that
area.
B
A
A
A
A
We're
designing
the
economics
of
launchings
or
actual
scale
yeah,
so
you
know
people
will.
You
know
in
2009.
Bitcoin
I
can
do
this.
It's
like
well
yeah,
but
we're
not
talking
about
I'm
making
my
every
ten
minutes.
We're
talking
about
I
mean
right
now.
We
think
the
limits
about
a
hundred
terabytes,
but
it
will
be
in
the
petabytes.
Now,
if
you
are
what
you're
going
to
get,
is
you're
going
to
get
these
core
nodes
in
the
network
and
because
we
pin
for
routing
what
you're
basically
doing
is
you're
creating
an
economic
incentive
where.
B
D
A
What
we
know
is
we
know
that
the
network
has
economic
incentive
towards
efficiencies
and
we'll
see
I
personally,
I
mean
I
think
is
gonna.
Happen
is
I,
think
that
if
people
can't
keep
up
with
a
main
Network
we're
right
now,
it's
30
seconds,
I'm
good,
that's
gonna
be
10
minutes.
If
people
can't
keep
up
with
a
big
network.
The
way
to
do
this
isn't
very
good,
because
why
do
you
run
reading
notes
in
the
full
note?
A
B
B
A
It
gets
down
to
like
it
gets
down
to
the
user
activated
software
stuff
one.
You
can't
compel
these
guys
to
propagate.
If
there's
a
blog
flooding
attack,
you
can't
compel
these
guys
to
propagators
you
they
cool
it.
You
could
convince
them
to
propagated.
The
network
protocol
has
certain
rules.
That
say
it
says,
for
instance,
when
you've
been
convinced
something
so
long
as
chain.
One
of
the
things
we
do
is
like
well,
if.
B
A
That's
okay,
you
know,
don't
don't
no
word
it
until
you're
convinced
it
is
yeah,
so
you
know
like
okay,
so
they
decide
to
attack
the
network,
and
these
guys
are
like
well.
I've
got
a
really
profitable
thing.
We're
not
because
it
is
is
profitable
for
everyone.
Yeah
what's
gonna
happen.
Well,
these
guys
are
gonna,
stop
sending
them
mmm-hmm.
The
cost
of
the
attack
goes
up
and
we're
basically
forcing
the
position
that
there's
a
cost
to
the
attack.
Yeah,
there's
more
advanced
stuff.
A
A
Mean
this
is
like
bidding,
you
know
like
well
what,
if
big
main,
starts
randomly
for
free
stuff,
what
you
know
in
the
big
one
group
of
workers
like
what
percentage
of
the
network
could
support
them
as
soon
as
you
pay
50
percent
you're
screwed.
With
this
there's
an
actually
note,
if
you
want
person
attack,
because
it
doesn't
matter,
if
you
do
51
percent
of
the
work.
D
A
Like
the
mining
system,
let's
say
you've
you've,
you've
rigged
it
to
you.
You've
got
enough.
Let's
say
you,
80
percent
work
and
you've
rigged
the
mining
system.
Well
enough
that
you
can
get
from
lumber
side
back
if
you've
done.
51
percent
of
the
work
and
you're
getting
paid,
51
percent
you're
still
losing
49
percent
of
the
cost
of
the
block
of
your
block,
and
you
know
honestly
in
that
situation.
One
of
the
major
differences
is
the
51
percent
of
khakis
incentivize
because
of
people
doing
the
attacker
making
money
in
this
system.
B
A
Know
one
of
the
you
know
what
is
that?
That's
like
it's!
It's
a
transfer
of
money
to
everyone
else
in
the
network.
If
you
do
that,
so
it
may
be
that
every
now
and
then
someone
will
attack
the
network
and
the
other
nodes
in
the
network
will
be
okay
with
it
because
they
like,
if
they
need
to
spend
so
much
money.
It's
a
transfer
to
everyone.
A
A
A
Well,
this
is
the
nice
thing
case
with
is
a
public
variable
that
hasn't
won
consensus
code.
So
there
are
things
like
in
Bitcoin.
Mining
who's
got
the
hash
power,
I,
don't
know
and
like
another
thing,
with
proof
work
that
nobody
talks
there
I've
heard
Craig
Wright
say
once
he
says:
well,
you
know
when
worst
law
ends,
we
have
a
problem,
the
you
know,
Bitcoin
security
people.
It
is
transaction
fee
volume,
but
you
use
in
addition
to
that,
because
they've
out
mining
as
a
difficulty
function,
it's
the
supply.
D
A
The
hash
I
produced
lately,
probably
the
only
questions,
have
you
disguise
it
right,
but
in
and
also
produced
a
given,
think.
Well,
it's
all
about
staking,
but
who
owns
the
stake
right?
How
do
I
know
that
the
network
be
securely
decentralized?
How
do
I
know
who
has
the?
How
do
I
know
who
was
attacking
the
block?
Difficulty
production
function
in
say?
No,
we
don't
have
this
knowledge
problem,
because
everything
that's
needed
to
figure
out
how
weak
the
network
is,
is
consensus
or
public
information,
so
it
pays
what's
really
high.
A
D
A
The
miners
are
also
like
the
lottery
holders,
but
they've
also
got
a
burn
tricity.
So
when
attack
still
has
money
right,
but
the
block
producers
still
collecting,
like
the
writing,
notes,
don't
get
paid
and
the
block
producers
don't
get
hit
with
reading
or
she
put
the
block
producers
there's
still
competition
with
each
other.
So
we
have
a
verb.
You
know,
even
in
this
broken
version
of
state,
oh,
it's
actually
better
than
Bitcoin,
because
you've
got
an
actual
way
to
pay
for
the
network.
A
B
A
A
Yeah
I
mean
it's
like
any
blockchain.
If
you
can
do
100%
of
the
work
attack,
the
difference
is
a
hundred
percent
of
the
workers
of
all
more
secure
than
51%.
Also
note
in
SATA,
like
a
Bitcoin,
we've
basically
got
okay.
The
way
you
attack
the
network
is
to
become
really
good
at
mining
and
say
to
them.
You've
got
one
function,
which
is
block
production.
Now
what
that
means
is.
A
It
means
you
want
to
be
specializing
in
yeah
right
friend,
like
we've
got
a
mining
lottery
function,
which
is,
we
were
a
different
kind
of
economic
activity,
but
the
third
one
is
also
there's.
Basically,
three
actors,
there's
also
the
users,
because
the
user
transaction
flows
coming
into
the
system
or
also
a
security
function.
But
if
the
users
see
anyone
was
made,
they
can
democratically
vote
transaction
by
transaction
to
them.
A
Yeah
and
I
mean
dynamic
pace
when
users
can
also
start
moving
around
the
pace,
so
it
can
be
things
like
if
the
network
comes
under
attack
and
it
looks
like
someone's
going
to
protect
it.
If
it
looks
like
it's
running,
though,
in
the
dynamic
version
cocido,
the
pace
player
can
actually
dynamically
increased
because
everyone,
but
the
attacker,
is
concerned
about
the
attacker.
Likewise,
if
you
have
centralization
of
mind
really
concerned
about
bid
made,
the
network
can
be
like.
D
A
The
scalability
trilemma
says:
there's
an
optimal
point
that
were
extended
for
security,
decentralization
and
security,
decentralization
scaling.
I
think
it
is,
if
you
think,
about
saving
you
think
about
the
way
it
works.
You
realize
it's
entirely
wrong,
because
security
is
subjective.
It's
your
position
in
the
network
and
what
you
can
have
in
Sato
is.
You
can
have
a
situation
where,
in
you
know,
the
pain
in
moving
the
payslip
20.4
provides
an
increase
in
decentralization
and
any
increase
in
security
and
an
increase
in
basically
the
through
the
network.
A
As
soon
as
the
the
basically
the
security
trilemma
comes,
it
flows
out
of
any
network
where
you
give
all
of
the
money
to
the
blockers.
If
you
do
that,
you've
got
the
problem
in
this
situation.
You
don't
because,
like
you
can
think
of
this
mining
in
some
ways
as
if
you
pay
miners
war,
the
network
becomes
more
expensive
to
attack
up
until
the
point.
The
miners
themselves
become
a
threat.
A
And
what's
a
good,
as
that
says,
we'll
look,
that's
not
the
problem.
The
problem
is,
we
know
that
they're
spending
money
to
produce
blocks.
You
can
money
in
staking
is
you're
just
decide,
you're
dressing
up
the
fact
its
money
and
that's
why
those
systems
are
vulnerable
because
they're
dealing
with
like
validators
and
you
know
all
sorts
of
clues
within
the
network-
they're
not
really
about
the
flow
of
fees
in
it,
which
is
what
they
shouldn't
worry
about,
but
as
soon
as
ensure
monetizes,
it's
it's
over
sato
says:
look,
that's
the
world
living,
it's
just
money.