►
Description
Cori Faklaris is a 4th year Phd candidate in Human-Computer Interaction at Carnegie Mellon University. Her thesis-directed research lies in the human factors of cybersecurity, in two parallel tracks: (1) understanding people’s security attitudes and behaviors (such as predicting whether they will update software or explaining ignorance of UX cues to “fake news”), and (2) empowering people to keep themselves and their networks secure in a social context (such as defining needs and creating tools to better enable account sharing by couples or workgroups). This work is informed by her years of experience as a journalist and IT analyst and in managing social media accounts. Her two feline pandemic co-workers like to unexpectedly show up and join in during her remote talks. She, and they, live in Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
Date: 11/05/20
Presenter: Cori Faklaris
Institution: Carnegie Mellon University
A
A
First
off
the
carnegie
mellon
workshop
in
social
cybersecurity
is
november
19th
and
20th
you
should
be.
You
are
able
to
currently
join
that
to
register
for
etc.
If
you
have
questions,
please
contact
myself,
kathleen
carley
at
used
in
order
to
get
additional
information,
but
it
will
be
focusing
in
on
disinformation.
A
In
times
of
in
times
of
crisis,
there
will
be
both
a
lot
of
panels.
You
can
just
attend
and
join
it
or
there's
still
time
to
submit
papers
if
you're
submitting
a
paper.
At
this
point
we
just
need
a
title
and
a
short
abstract.
You
know
anything
up
to
a
thousand
words.
You
know
if
you
have
something
longer
feel
free
to
send
that,
but
we
don't
need
you
know
we
something
shorter
is
perfectly
good.
A
So
today
our
speaker
is
corey
fuckflorus
and
I'm
butchered
her
name
as
usual.
No,
no
it's
fine,
so
corey
is
has
a
really
fabulous
background.
She
actually
has
a
communications
journalism
background
in
addition
to
a
human
computer
interaction
background,
and
she
brings
these
factors
together
to
look
at
human
factors
in
cyber
security.
A
A
Her
current
project
is
looking
at
applying
social
influence
and
gamification
techniques
to
boost
adoption
of
end
user
security
tools
and
best
practices,
and
we'll
be
talking
a
little
bit
more
about
that
with
us
as
we
go
along
so
again,
the
this
is
corey,
flores
and
she'll
be
talking
to
us
in
our
data
hub
corey.
Take
it
away.
Okay,.
A
A
B
Okay,
great,
I
just
wanted
to
check
hi.
So,
yes,
thank
you
so
much
for
the
great
introduction
kathleen.
Yes,
as
she
said,
my
name
is
corey
faklaris,
I'm
a
phd
student
at
carnegie,
mellon,
university
and
so
I'll.
Just
talk
about
some
of
my
recent
findings
in
these
areas
of
end
user,
cyber
security,
attitudes
and
behaviors.
B
I
just
want
to
note
and
thank
the
people
that
support
me:
the
national
science
foundation,
I'm
also
part
of
the
human
computer,
interaction,
institute's,
social,
cyber
security
lab
and
then
I'm
also
funded
by
scilab
and,
of
course,
by
the
cmu
ideas
center.
Where
I
am
a
night
fellow
this
year,
so
now
I
need
to
click
okay,
so
the
major
takeaways
from
this
talk
will
be
three
things.
B
I
am
have
had
a
really
interesting
resume
that
I'm
a
fourth
year
phd.
I
have
actually
a
master's
degree
now
also
in
human
computer,
interaction
and
hope
to
be
on
the
job
market
next
fall,
so
I
just
started
just
putting
out
the
word
early,
but
also
I
spent
my
industry
career
in
news
and
design,
mostly
at
the
indianapolis
star
and
some
related
properties
for
gannette,
and
I
like
to
joke
no
matter
what
my
actual
title
was.
I
had
several
throughout
my
career.
B
I
always
was
the
doer
of
things.
No
one
else
wants
to
do,
but
that
happily
led
me
to
social
media,
and
so
I've
also
spent
a
lot
of
time
in
my
career
as
a
social
media,
editor
and
consultant,
and
so
yes
in
my
research
at
carnegie
mellon,
I
am
very
focused
on
the
human
factors
of
cyber
security,
and
so
that's
in
two
parallel
tracks,
one
in
understanding,
people
and
their
needs
and
the
other.
B
I
want
to
empower
people
to
be
an
active
partner
in
cyber
security
defense
and
also
just
keeping
keeping
our
online
spaces
secure
and
private,
and
to
do
that,
I
examine
not
only
people's
individual
differences,
but
also
think
about
how,
as
social
animals
we
humans
construct
our
understandings
of
the
world
socially,
either
through
interaction
with
each
other
or
through
our
social
context
of
use,
and
so
my
work
so
far
has
fallen
into
three
major
buckets.
So
the
first
would
be
empirical
or
observational
where
I've
done
work
on
romantic
cyber
security.
B
So
thinking
about
couples,
if
you
have
a
romantic
partner
households,
you
have
a
lot
of
shared
cybersecurity,
needs
and
pain
points,
but
then
also
today,
I'll
talk.
A
little
bit
about
a
work
group,
cyber
security,
where
we've
done
survey,
work
and
interviews,
I'm
also
really
excited
about
some
of
the
theoretical
and
modeling
work
that
I've
done,
which
I'll
also
talk
about
today
and
then
I've
also
done
some
technical
and
design
work,
such
as
creating
simple
social
nudges.
B
We've
developed
a
plugin
called
safesee
that
sits
over
the
top
and
can
help
you
navigate
your
facebook
privacy
settings.
For
instance,
we've
developed
a
game
called
apps
versus
hackers,
that's
a
take
off
on
the
plants
versus
zombies,
a
popular
online
game
and
then
also
we've
done
work
to
create
social
authentication
tools.
B
So
they
examined
this
idea
that
sometimes
the
problems
in
your
security
network
are
not
coming
because
you
have
somebody
who's,
malicious
or
intending
to
leak
things.
Somebody
who
the
attacker
is
just
targeting,
because
they
know
it's
a
lot
easier
to
trick
an
end
user
into
letting
them
into
the
system,
then
trying
to
get
in
through
sometimes
the
very
good,
very
elaborate
technical,
cyber
security
defenses
or
trying
to
trick
system
administrators
people
that
have
more
expertise.
B
It's
also,
of
course,
super
important
that
people
are
alert
for
scams
and
hoaxes,
whether
that's
phishing
emails
or
false
news
spread
on
social
media
and
then.
Finally,
all
of
us
me
included
sometimes
fail
to
use
long
and
unique
passwords,
but
that's
also
a
really
important
point,
so
my
work
builds
on
some
some
key
related
work
and
usability
in
cyber
security
that
I
want
to
mention.
B
So
first,
is
this
idea
that
these
humans,
in
the
loop
really
are
our
key
partners
in
cyber
security
and
users,
are,
in
my
view,
trainable,
and
you
can
create
new
and
better
tools
for
them
to
help
them
help.
You
keep
the
network
safe,
and
so
one
key
paper
was
sassy,
brostoff
and
weinrich,
where
they
described,
transforming
the
so-called
weakest
link.
That
would
be
humans
through
usable
and
effective
security.
B
The
other
idea,
that's
really
important
for
our
lab,
is
how
important
it
is
to
think
about
social
psychology
when
we
look
at
people's
security,
behaviors
and
so
a
previous
student
chavec
das
who's.
Now
a
professor
at
georgia,
tech
has
talked
about
in
his
work
the
effect
that
social
influence
has
on
people's
so-called
security
sensitivity,
which
is
their
awareness,
motivation
and
knowledge
of
how
to
engage
in
these
methods,
such
as
two-factor
authentication.
B
B
And
so
for
these
surveys.
We
define
this
concept
of
account
and
device
sharing.
That
is
when
more
than
one
person
uses
the
same
username
and
password
to
access
a
work
resource,
and
so
usually
systems
are
not
designed
to
have
more
than
one
person
use
this
username
and
password.
But
we
already
know
from
other
work
that
people
often
will
do
this
when
they're
in
a
work
group
situation
and
they're
in
it's.
B
They
see
this
as
necessary
to
get
their
work
done,
and
so
indeed,
in
the
survey,
though,
we
were
able
to
document
widespread
account
sharing
by
people
on
these
sites,
who
were
employees
at
other
companies
as
well,
and
they
reported
sharing
accounts
and
devices
for
two
basic
reasons,
one
to
collaborate
with
each
other
and
then
also
to
lower
costs.
And
so
they
said
you
know
from
this
from
this
surveys.
We
documented
these
workarounds,
such
as
account
and
device
sharing,
are
actually
the
norm
in
in
these
workspaces.
B
Is
you
know
thinking
how,
with
cyber
security
and
collaboration
impacted
by
this
widespread
shift,
we've
all
been
living
to
remote
work,
and
so
we
are
really
pleasantly
surprised
to
find,
at
least
at
our
university
when
people
do
share,
and
they
do
share
a
lot.
They
do
it
relatively
safely,
and
so
we
found
that
74
percent
of
our
participants
did
report
sharing
accounts.
B
Now
some
of
them
are
using
a
device
called
an
enterprise,
random,
password
manager,
and
so
this
would
be
the
people
who
are
involved
in
information,
security
specifically
or
other
types
of
it
tasks,
and
so
this
is
a
great
commercial
product
that
actually
is
functions
like
your
individual
password
manager.
Might
but
it
helps
an
organization
to
create
really
strong,
secure
passwords
that
are
hard
to
break,
but
then
also
you're
able
to
share
these
accounts
and
share
these
passwords
through
the
password
manager,
and
so
that
was
a
really
nice
thing
to
see.
B
Individuals
also
reported
using
a
commercial
password
manager
designed
simply
for
themselves
or
for
their
families.
That's
also
really
great
to
see.
I
highly
recommend
that
for
everybody
who
is
listening
to
this,
other
people
used
ad
hoc
methods.
You
know
I
mentioned
before
the
sticky
note
attached
to
monitor.
B
That
gets
you
into
a
lot
of
things
if
you're
a
university
member,
and
so
I
would
also
point
out
a
couple
other
results
that
I
think
are
interesting,
and
so
we've
seen
this
before,
that
users
see
really
little
downside
to
circumventing
cyber
security
mechanisms
such
as
the
one
account
one
user
design
and
so
for
from
their
perspective.
They
have
some
constraints.
They
really
need
to
get
around
in
order
to
get
their
work
done.
B
So,
for
instance,
say:
you've
got
two-factor
authentication
on
an
account,
but
it's
tied
to
the
mobile
phone
of
a
team
member
and
now
they're
not
near
you,
because
you're
working
away
from
the
lab,
or
even
if
it
was
before
covid,
they
said.
Yes,
people
leave
work
when
and
maybe
you're
working
you
need
to
get
into
a
resource.
You
need
some
to
send
that
two-factor
push
to
get
you
into
the
resource.
B
In
fact,
somebody
from
I.t
remarked
I'm
not
sure
that
they
should
trust
each
other
that
much
or
they
shouldn't
trust
me.
But
people
all
will
just
write
out
of
the
blue.
Tell
me
their
password
if
they
need
me
to
help
with
something,
and
so
I
actually
think
that
kind
of
speaks
well
of
our
community
too.
B
Maybe
even
we
could
consider
account
sharing,
as
maybe
a
negative
predictor
of
intentional
insider
threat,
thinking
that
if
you
have
a
trusting
organizational
culture
culture
where
morale
is
pretty
good,
at
least
at
the
time
of
the
sample,
you
know
you're
less
likely
to
create.
You
know
an
intentional
insider
threat.
B
I
think,
even
if
you
have
written
notes
in
private
spaces
protected
by
locks
to
me,
that
seems
more
secure,
sometimes
than
electronic
networked
resource
that
could
be
hacked
the
other
thing
we
we
definitely
found
evidence
of
was
so-called
shadow
security.
So
that's
when
a
work
group
say
kind
of
takes
it
upon
themselves
to
be
their
own
I.t
department,
and
you
have
somebody
who's,
not
part
of
the
official
I.t
organization,
who's,
helping
really
to
manage
accounts
and
devices
and
to
troubleshoot
issues
without
their
knowledge.
B
And
so
you
know,
the
issue
is,
I
think,
maybe
they
don't
always
know
what
the
policy
should
be
or
they're
not
doing
that
following
some
procedures
that
maybe
I.t
has
in
place
for
good
reasons.
So
we
see
an
opportunity
here
to
designate
say
so-called
security
buddies,
and
so
we
know
people
are
turning
to
their
peers
in
work
groups
now,
especially
in
the
work
from
home
situation.
So
maybe
just
lean
into
that
have
a
security
buddy
assigned
from
I.t
for
the
work
group,
maybe
vice
versa.
B
B
But
you
know
it's
six
items
which
is
really
short
compared
to
some
other
scales,
but
I
still
heard
some
complaints
from
some
researchers.
They
would
say
well
what,
if
I
only
used
a
couple
of
the
items,
is
that
possible
and
I'd
say?
Well,
we
didn't
validate
it
for
a
couple
items.
We
validated
it
for
six,
so
I'm
not
sure
I
can
recommend
that,
but
I
have
some
sympathy
for
researchers
in
these
situations.
B
You
know
so
that
led
to
the
first
research
question
say
you
did
have
a
very
long
survey,
you
only
with
other
measures
in
it
can
we
shorten
sa-6
and
still
retain
its
desirable
psychometric
properties
and
so
specifically,
for
instance,
if
you're
testing
something
regarding
the
theory
of
reasoned
action
here.
This
theory
basically
sets
forth
that
attitude.
Intention
and
behavior
are
interrelated,
and
so
maybe
you
also
are
using
cebus
to
measure
intention,
and
you
also
have
a
measure
for
behavior.
B
It
would
be
really
nice
if
all
of
these
were
as
short
as
possible,
but
the
other
question
this
also
prompted
was,
I
wonder,
then
also
can
we
enhance
sa-6
with
some
measures
of
different
assets,
aspects
of
attitude,
so
thinking
specifically
say
I
want
to
persuade
people
to
engage
in
specific
security
behaviors.
I
want
to
follow.
Maybe
a
persuasion
model
that
might
have
a
factor
such
as
hesitation
to
act
or
desire
to
change
behavior
as
intermediate
stages
before
we
even
form
an
intention
to
engage
in
that
behavior
and
so
to
answer
the
first
research
question.
B
Yes,
we
did
find
that
if
we
shorten
sa-6
just
to
this
engagement
scale
of
just
three
items,
we
can
still
preserve
many
of
the
desirable
psychometric
properties
of
the
six
item
scale,
and
so
those
three
items
would
be.
Generally.
I
diligently
follow
a
routine
about
security
practices,
I'm
often
interested
in
articles
about
security
threats,
and
I
seek
out
opportunities
to
learn
about
security
measures
that
are
relevant
to
me
and
so
that's
these
items.
All
of
them
would
be
rated
on
a
bidirectional
scale.
B
One
being
strongly
disagree
to
five
strongly
agree
and
then
the
other
three
items
also
sort
nicely
into
another
scale
called
attentiveness,
and
so
you
know
this
named
after
the
lead
item
here.
I
always
pay
attention
to
expert's
advice
about
the
steps
I
need
to
take
and
that
would
also
include
measures
such
as
I'm
extremely
knowledgeable
about
all
the
steps
needed
to
keep.
My
online
data
account
safe
and
then
I'm
extremely
motivated
to
take
all
of
these
steps
that
are
drawn
specifically
from
javik
daws's
work
about
the
influence
of
social
or
social
influences
on
security
sensitivity.
B
So
now
I'm
going
to
expand
the
scale
to
answer
research
question
two
with
an
additional
seven
items
to
create
something
new
called
essay
13.,
and
so
this
adds
two
more
scales.
So
four
items
will
form
a
resistance
scale,
and
so
those
items
would
be
items
such
as
I
will
not
use
security
measures
if
they
are
inconvenient.
B
I
am
too
busy
to
put
in
the
effort
needed
and
also
I
have
much
bigger
problems
than
my
risk
of
a
security
breach,
and
so
this
scale
performed
very,
very
well
and
displayed
very,
very
good
psychometric
properties
in
the
test
that
I've
run
so
far,
and
you
know
I
think
there
are
lots
of
times
in
my
work
and
maybe
in
yours,
where
I
know
that
I
might
be
researching
a
problem
where
I
would
like
to
know
you
know,
regardless
of
whether
somebody
is
actually
engaging
in
security
behavior.
How
do
they
feel
about
it?
B
Are
they
resisting
it,
because
that
could
create
problems
down
the
road
or
maybe
indicate
that
we
need
to
redesign
some
of
the
tools
that
are
causing
them
issues
and
then,
finally,
the
last
three
items
for
sa-13
sort
of
rounded
out
with
this
concernedness
scale,
and
so
this
would
be
for
the
stage
in
between
say
resistance
or
maybe
wholehearted
acceptance
of
security
measures.
Where
maybe
you
want
to
change
your
security
behaviors
or
even
you
worry
that
you're
not
doing
enough,
and
so
this
is
probably
the
scale
that
is
performing
less
well
in
my
tests.
B
But
when
it's
all,
combined
into
a
composite
sa13
as
a
whole,
also
performs
very,
very
well
and
has
a
lot
of
desirable,
psychometric
properties,
and
so
we
have
a
handout
at
our
website.
Socialcybersecurity.Org
for
essay
13.
If
you
want
to
download
it
and
and
use
that,
but
of
course
this
has
not
been
published
yet.
B
We've
got
in
the
data
set
of
security
behaviors,
which
was
technically
called
the
recalled
security
action
scale
that
I
also
published
in
2019
at
soups,
and
so
using
this
measure
as
a
proxy
for
security.
Behavior
sa13
is
accounting
for
30
percent
of
the
variance
in
the
security
behavior
scale.
So
that's
a
really
nice
indication
that
essay
13
could
be
used
to
measure
attitudes
and
also
that
that's
somewhat
strongly
predictive
of
whether
that
can
be
used
to
indicate
somebody.
B
You
know
in
the
process
of
changing
their
behavior
or
receptive
to
changing
their
behavior,
so
how
to
use
the
security
attitude
scales.
There's
a
couple
different
reasons.
I
can
think
of
why
I
wanted
these
scales
and
you
might
too.
I
want
to
answer
practical
research.
Questions,
for
instance,
such
as
how
attentive
to
security
advice
is
a
certain
group
like
likely
to
be
also
say
you
created
a
new
awareness
campaign
or
usability
tool.
B
Does
it
help
or
hurt
the
overall
attitudes
towards
expert
advice
or
other
security
measures,
especially
at
scale
it's
nice
to
have
something
that
can
simply
be
deployed
in
a
survey
as
opposed
to
having
to
interview
people
which,
as
much
as
I
love
talking
to
people
as
a
former
journalist,
it
is.
It
involves
quite
a
bit
of
time
and
resources
to
do
that
and
to
crunch
that
data
and
then,
of
course,
for
academics.
B
B
There
are
related
models
such
as
the
technology
acceptance
model
that
are
in
use
in
hci,
but
also,
if
you
might
want
a
proxy
for
motivation,
there
are
some
items
in
here.
I
think
indicate
it
could
be
used
to
measure
motivation,
possibly
even
to
measure
coping
appraisal
and
protection.
Motivation.
Theory
which
I
know
is
very
very
highly
used
in
cyber
security.
B
This
fall
and
so
there's
a
couple
different
ideas.
I
want
to
test
in
this
experiment.
So,
first
of
all,
I'm
really
intrigued
by
this
idea
that
maybe
in
psychology,
I've
seen
some
literature
that
weight
as
a
as
a
physical
factor
can
also
cognitively
transfer
to
weight.
As
a
metaphor,
and
so
I
want
to
just
see
like
if
I
weighted
devices
differently,
can
I
replicate
a
study
for
this
condition.
Where
say
you
expose
people
to
different
types
of
real
news
and
false
news?
Are
they
more
likely
less
likely?
B
But
there's
an
alternate
explanation.
I'd
also
like
to
follow
up
on
so
when
we
have
a
smartphone
oftentimes,
we're
not
just
focusing
on
what's
right
in
front
of
us
on
the
screen,
we're
probably
multitasking
and
so
say,
you're
more
likely
to
be
in
a
context
where
you're
cognitively
overloaded,
such
as
you're
walking
people
are
talking
to
you,
you're
thinking
about
a
lot
of
things,
apart
from,
say,
the
email
that
just
popped
up,
maybe
you're
shopping,
you're,
trying
to
judge
prices
or
qualities,
and
then
you're
also
scanning
your
facebook.
B
A
B
B
So
when
you
create
a
new
tab
on
your
google
chrome
browser,
it's
going
to
prompt
you
with
a
very
quick
question
just
to
review
a
couple
of
your
facebook,
privacy
and
security
settings,
and
then
it
will
also
show
you
say
some
social
context
say
survey
results
or
also
what
your
friends
and
family
have
as
the
setting,
and
so
these
can
be
really
really
good
interventions.
But
I
have
to
say
for
forever.
B
B
They
they
don't
already
have
in
place,
because
I
think
you
know
we've
already
got,
for
instance,
some
really
good
types
of
training
available
for
cyber
security
awareness,
but
but
say
it's
really
expensive
and
also
just
anecdotally
talking
to
people
who
go
through
this
kind
of
training,
sometimes
they're
not
really
listening,
maybe
they
they
feel
almost
insulted
by
it
like
well.
Of
course,
I
know
all
this
stuff
already
so
it'd
be
interesting
to
think
about.
Are
there
differences
between
people
or
between
social
groups,
or
we
should
target
different
types
of
interventions
to.
B
Yeah,
I
I
I'm
a
big
fan
of
it,
even
though,
like
a
lot
of
psychology
work,
sometimes
I
think
to
myself.
Well,
I
wonder
if
there's
a
novelty
effect
at
play,
not
just
that
there's
an
actual
mechanism
that
works,
but
you
know
I
think
we're
starting
to
explore.
Are
these
some
of
these
ideas
replicable,
and
can
we
create
enough
of
a
sample
size?
So
if
they
have
a
small
effect,
we
can
still
see
if
there
is
an
effect.
A
B
No,
actually,
I
had
been
in
talks
with
the
company
right
before
covet
hit,
but
then
we
ceased
lucy's
talking
about
it.
At
that
point,
I
have
had
a
couple
companies
reach
out
to
me.
This
fall
to
try
to
make
contacts,
and
so
so
we'll
see
what
develops
with
that
but
yeah.
So
I
think
for
me
the
I'll
I'll
be
most
interested
to
see.
B
Second
of
all,
of
course,
because
it's
really
difficult
to
do
in-person
studies
now,
but
if
it's
something
that
we
can
deploy
remotely,
we
can
get
a
lot
of
scale,
but
then
also
work
but
work
within
the
constraints
of
this
moment
and
then
of
course.
Lastly,
I
would
just
like
to
see
some
of
the
things
that
we
develop
actually
make
it
to
the
to
the
to
the
outside
academia
market,
so
that
we
can
help
people.
A
B
Yeah,
that's
a
really
great
question.
I
I
think
there
is
some
applicability
because
any
time
that
we
have
any
kind
of
digital
identity
signature
that
people
are
sharing
like
that,
that
is,
that
is
a
potential
for
say
either
it
being
exposed
you
know
in
in
either
in
insecure,
transit
or
because
wherever
it's
stored
is
breached,
but
also
potentially
because
of
like
a
so-called
cross-site
attack,
so
say
like
my
threat
model,
for
instance,
for
some
data
such
as
my
shopping
list
is,
you
know,
have
at
it.
B
You
know
russia
come
come,
get
my
target,
you
know
or
amazon
wish
list.
You
know
who
cares,
send
me
stuff
please,
but
the
problem
is,
you
know
say
that
you
know
that
insecure
data
is
stored
using
some
sort
of
digital
id,
such
as
a
password,
but
it
could
also
be
other
types
of
identifiers
that
I'm
also
sharing
with
some
other
account
that
I
do
care
about,
such
as
my
investment
accounts.
B
And
so
that's
that's
that's
when
we
have
a
big
problem,
because
then,
if
that
insecure
site
with
my
insecu
with
my
low
risk
data
is
breached,
they
could
they
could
also
get
into
my
other
account
if
they
start
just
trying
credentials
one
by
one
they
might
hit
on
the
one
that
I've
actually
reused
yeah.
So
it's
it's
a
really.
It's
a
really
interesting
point.
B
B
The
fact
is,
this
is
a
file
that
could
probably
be
spoofed
or
hacked
and
the
real
problem
with
biometrics
is.
I
can't
change
my
fingerprint
like
I
can
change
my
password
if
it's
hacked,
so
I
actually
worry
more
about
biometrics.
I
actually
think
maybe
the
threat,
the
threat
to
the
threat
surface
is
different,
but
actually
the
consequences
of
a
breach
are
much
more
significant.
B
A
Again,
we
hope
that
you
will
send
papers
to
present
and
to
send
me
again
title
an
abstract
and
so
on.
There
will
be
there
will
be
publications
coming
out
of
that
there's
a
special
issue
of
the
journal
and
if
there's
enough
good
papers,
we've
also
got
a
contract
for
a
a
book
that
could
come
out
of
that
as
well.