The Scottish Parliament Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, 26 Sep 2017

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From YouTube: Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee - Part II - 26 September 2017

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1. Decision on taking business in private: The Committee will decide whether to take items 6, 7 and 8 in private.

2. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: The Committee will take evidence on the delegated powers in the Bill from—
Professor Alan Page, Professor of Public Law, University of Dundee;
and then from—
Charles Mullin, Convener of the Constitutional Law and Human Rights Sub-Committee, Law Society of Scotland;
Michael Clancy, Director of Law Reform, Law Society of Scotland;
Kenneth Campbell QC, Faculty of Advocates.

3. Instruments subject to affirmative procedure: The Committee will consider the following—
Scotland Act 1998 (Specification of Devolved Tax) (Wild Fisheries) Order 2017 [draft]; Private Residential Tenancies (Statutory Terms) (Scotland) Regulations 2017 [draft]; Private Residential Tenancies (Information for Tenants) (Scotland) Regulations 2017 [draft]; Public Appointments and Public Bodies etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 (Amendment of Specified Authorities) Order 2017 [draft]; Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 (Supplemental Provision) Regulations 2017 [draft]; Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 (Supplementary, Consequential, Transitory and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2017 [draft].

4. Instruments subject to negative procedure: The Committee will consider the following—
Public Water Supplies (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/281); Teachers’ Superannuation and Pension Scheme (Additional Voluntary Contributions) (Scotland) Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/283); Individual Learning Account (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/288); M8/M73/M74 Motorways (30mph, 40mph and 50mph Speed Limit) Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/286); Notice to Local Authorities (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/295); Private Residential Tenancies (Information for Determining Rents and Fees for Copies of Information) (Scotland) Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/296); Private Residential Tenancies (Prescribed Notices and Forms) (Scotland) Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/297); Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 (Rural Housing Bodies) Amendment (No. 2) Order 2017 (SSI 2017/301).

5. Instruments not subject to any parliamentary procedure: The Committee will consider the following—
Health (Tobacco, Nicotine etc. and Care) (Scotland) Act 2016 (Commencement No. 2) Regulations 2017 (SSI 2017/294 (C.22)); Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules 1996 Amendment) (Publicity, Remedial and Remediation Orders) 2017 (SSI 2017/298).

6. Children and Young People (Information Sharing) (Scotland) Bill: The Committee will consider further the delegated powers provisions in this Bill at Stage 1.

7. Report on instruments considered by the Committee during 2016-17: The Committee will consider a draft report outlining the work of the Committee during the parliamentary year 2016-17.

8. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: The Committee will consider the evidence it heard earlier in the meeting.

Not before 01.00 pm
9. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: The Committee will take evidence on the delegated powers in the Bill from—
Professor Stephen Tierney, Professor of Constitutional Theory, University of Edinburgh.

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A

So agenda item nine, we're back on the European Union withdrawal bill will continue our evidence session on that. Can a welcome professor Stephen Tien, a professor of constitutional theory at the University of Edinburgh, professor Tina. We've had a couple of sessions on this earlier on and we'll go through more or less the same questions because you may well have a different take on the previous witnesses. So I'll ask the first one. The bill confers wide powers on UK and devolve ministers to correct retained. Eu law is the broad scope of those powers appropriate and necessary.

B

It's a difficult question: I mean I, think we we do need to preface that the discussion, as you see by the bite just outlining how extensive the powers are, and this first set out, who causes seven to nine of the bill, are extremely extensive. The give powers to ministers to.

B

Use delegated powers to correct deficiencies in retained EU law, which is a very broad category itself, but they also contain broad Henry, the eighth's powers which allow this to be done, but by the correction of primary legislation in terms of appropriateness and necessity.

B

The UK government does justify this in the delegated powers memorandum, which comes with the bill, and they put forward three reasons as to why these powers are necessary.

B

The first one is that the government estimates there are twelve thousand over twelve thousand EU regulations and over six thousand EU directives in force across the EU. So the first reason is that simply to address this by exit D, the government requires latitude.

B

Secondly, as a matter of practicality, it's simply not necessary to make all of these changes on the fee of the bill, so the bill itself couldn't possibly either remove or transpose all of these it's going to have to be done after the bill. The third is flexibility we up with the we're in the middle of dregs and negotiations. At this precise moment, there's also going to have to be a discussion between the UK government.

B

Other devolved administration's about how those powers that might be devolved are treated so for all of these reasons, the third justification for these powers is its flexibility. This is I, think a very plausible argument. I think the UK government, as a generality in this situation, complies ibly, make this argument. If you've got to have brexit what might think breaks it's a terrible idea, but if Greg's it's gonna happen, these regulations that the directives have to be dealt with, and it seems that this is a way to do it. I would also mention two other caveats.

B

There are limitations on the use of the powers which we can come back to within the within the act, so they're, not unlimited powers and, secondly, the Carey sunset clauses, so they can only be used for a certain period of time, so I think they're excessively broad and, as we drill down into some of the detail, we'll see that they're they're excessively broad and in just about any other statutes, they would look start by stoning.

B

But given the context here, it's hard to see another way to do this, but the powers I think could be more tightly constrained than they are.

A

Okay, so in what way could they be more tightly constrained, I.

B

Think one of the real difficulties is the fact that the powers are themselves contingent upon the most significant provision within the bill, and the most significant provision within the bill is the bill that retains EU law.

B

That terrible itself is very, very broad and capacious. What is bad by retained? Eu law, which is set in the early clauses of the bill, is very, very broad and I. Do you know that we we don't have to concern ourselves with with a lot of in big you ''tis in that term.

B

But what am I leading to is the fact that the regulation powers relate to a terror, so very broad powers relate to a term which is itself odd and clear and win at Erebus itself unclear that invites the powers to be used in a very broad way. So that's the first difficulty course. Civil itself allows the regulations to be made to prevent remedy or mitigate any failure of retained, of EU law to operate effectively or any other deficiency. The maintained, EU law, so terms like operate effectively or deficiency are pretty broad.

B

So you know if you, if you give a minister of power to correct any deficiency and effectively make it a subjective test for the minister to do terrible what operating effectively means, what a deficiency means then you're giving a very broad power.

B

So on that basis, I think the they operate very broadly. That could possibly have been more limitations built into the you know. The limitations that are there under Clause, seven six are very narrow and I. Think one of the other issues that will come on to presumably will be the scrutiny. Do you know to what extent if you've got to give these very broad powers? To what extent are you giving power to Parliament or to Parliament's to to really get time to look at how these powers are being used?

B

And it looks as though that's that's not going to be the case? hmm I mean.

A

You mentioned ambiguities, and we discussed this earlier.

A

Some of those kind of vagueness of language is not something you think should be tightened up. It's.

B

My view of the my view of the bill is a may seem a little bit paradoxical I. Look at it at least look at these powers and they're very, very broad, and it raises real constitutional concerns. But then, when you ask yourself the other question, how would you go about it in a different way?

B

It's actually very, very difficult to come up with a concrete alternative which would be constitutionally better, but which would weakness manageable, because we are talking about a very short period of time and a massive body of law that is going to have to be dealt with. I'm, not just that. But it's a moveable feast.

B

You know, as the UK Maga CH with the EU, we don't know what kind of shape proto agreements are going to be taking as the UK moves towards the exit, D and so the UK, for example, can't plan to get rid of a whole swathe of law which might actually become part of a trade deal.

B

You know might be within the the the the the remit of a future trade deal which it would make more sense to to retain, or there might even be commitments to to to Motiti you law I mean there's talking over a fairly lengthy transitional period, where it might be that these powers will not be used at all. So so it's very difficult to see how the the skeleton of the of the bill could be very different from what it is. As your view.

A

Of the bill changed.

B

B

My view of the bill hasn't changed, I think there's a ways in which it can be tightened up, but I think it's very difficult to see how in fundamentally it could be, it could be done in a totally different way. Yeah.

A

So when you first look today, though, it's.

B

Not so much my view of the bills, changed I think it's one looks at the bill and thinks this is a deeply constitutionally problematic right, so the government is taking to itself very broad, pose to change the law through delegated powers, most often through negative procedure, often Henry the eighth power so to change the law eat with negative procedure. All of this in any other bill. It's simply that the the problem is not so much. This bill is the project that the bill is having to serve.

B

The bill is having to serve a massive constitutional change that has to happen very quickly yeah, so the bill is deeply problematic, but it's it's almost an inevitable consequence of the kind of process for which is about to serve ok.

A

B

C

Ok, professor tell me just you mentioned there in terms of the transition deal and was if the transition deal lasts for two years, but then be important or crucial, but the that the laws are all transported to you. Key legislation before the transition deal or if the transition deal as two years or three years or four years without them provide an additional period of time to get these was in trance wasn't ridiculous. There.

B

Would be two different ways to do it if the transition deal came with a subsequent another piece of legislation that, in effect continued the effect of EU law? That would be one way to do it to actually go around the provisions of this bill and to treat exit as though it were not in fact exit for that period of time.

B

That would presumably be pull it problematic for the government, the UK government, if that's not the case, I'm exit, the is not only formally exit D, but also the D in which EU law ceases to apply, then this bill would would carry on as it where and all of these laws that would be kept would be, would be retained.

B

What would happen in that case? So if this bill carries on as it where what I think we would see, rather than any new piece of legislation, is simply that the delegated powers wouldn't really need to be used very much, except simply to you know, block transfer, EU law into UK law as a going concern for the transition period. It would also give parliamentarians and the government the UK government much longer to then plan for 21 rather and 19, or whenever that the period would end.

B

So this is the sort of rush that we envisage here could be postponed so as to ways to do it. One would be effectively not to leave for two years. The other would be to leave, but it would be almost a symbolic leaving for two years in which the the obligation would be just to continue to be bowed by EU law. Government ministers would probably come under the sauna constraints.

B

The Scottish institutions come under at the moment of you know not one not acting in compatibly with EU law that you need some kind of provision like that that you key level. Okay,.

C

That's just a there's been you mentioned. The transition deal, no more thing. I thought of it was the creation also a minute. The bill never provides a a choice of three legislative routes to exercise the powers of the of connection, but a coalition is made by UK ministers, regulations made by the devolved administration's totally regulations made jointly by UK and evolved and the what challenges do you see arising from having that choice of logistics, yeah.

B

So they, the UK, has the general plenary unlimited powers, and this first you know the the the the default will be when they use those powers in reserved areas. That's what we anticipate but you're talking about when they use them in devolved areas.

B

There I mean I think having those three roots is itself very complicated and it would depend on on whether there were attempts to use the first of those roots and why? So, if the UK were simply unilaterally to use delegated powers in devolved areas, there would be political questions as to why that were the case when whether this had devolved matter there are there.

B

There are provisions in the in the bill for joint delegated power making in in devolved areas so similar to the section 30 procedure that we see under the 1998, though that starts the for scouting is a thought category that you're just kind of talking about I think those are the two over which that would there will have to be walking out of where the UK does it alone and when the UK does it with the devolved administration's I would imagine the default would be to try and do cooperatively, but you know under the principles of the devolution settlement, though, and to be the case.

B

The the middle one is an interesting one. Is this this not a reference under Clause 10 to the powers that will remain with the Scottish Parliament to meet a delegated legislation in areas where they already have that power? You know we don't really know, we've we've drilled down. You know people asking about this, and but my understanding of that is that the Scottish Parliament will acquire or the Scottish Government will acquire this power to continue to act in areas of EU law which are devolved at the moment.

B

I can use the delegated powers in the new act to to change EU law. That's firmly within devolved competence in suffice to correct deficiencies and so on so I think that's the least problematic again Road the borders, but the the more problematic would be the UK doing unilaterally stuff in devolved areas, and then you know how that would worry up with the the shared delegated power. We could certainly.

C

When I posed the question to one of the earlier panels, the fears, the fears that they used was believed that the joints goostin it aside, they consider that to be unknown startled. So it's interesting to hear you know. Yes,.

B

That might be the case. I mean it could well be that the joint Spurs, because the bill anticipates that the joint powers will mostly be used for the transfer of powers. So you know to put it crudely. The the bill like envisages the UK transposing all of the EU law in devolved, unreserved areas back almost into the eat, the U key box, and then, by way of joint order, making gradually read evolving it as it were so I think. That's probably what the you know. That's what the joint power is typically envisaged for so yeah.

B

It's probably the case that when it comes to simply the task of repatriating as it were, that will be done fairly, utilize really I. Would it's one would anticipate okay.

C

And you think it'd be possible for two legislators to ash to pass valid but conflicting legislation, an exercise of the polls and the bill.

B

Some very interesting I mean this has always been I can say I'm from of mine. From a practical point of view, that's the.

B

The Scottish Parliament has competence in EU areas, if so far as their devolved, that the barrel guarantees that that continues.

B

Certainly the bill is attempts to get Road that potential problem by removing competence in routine to you law, and it depends how broadly that is read, but I think that is a that is a potentially very broad provision that restricts the power of the devolved administration's to modify retained, EU law. So that would seem to to prevent that risk stroke opportunity, the pendejo, what approaches it, but that would that would seem to me to be the the purpose of the bill and I. Imagine a court, for example, dealing with a competence.

B

Disputes would probably read that it'll as the purpose of cost and Clause 11.

C

Okay, also, there are limitations and restrictions and on the collecting pearls in shared or too much apply to the devolved authorities, but not to the UK ministers under that equivalent pearls examples include a more limited power to sub delegate than is available to UK ministers and the requirement to obtain consent of leukemia cells and certain circumstances are these additional limitations and Scottish Ministers appropriate. And what do you take? What sort of what do you take of the Scottish Government's proposed amendments to remove these restrictions? I think.

B

They're not hugely significant and I and I think a symbolic level. I mean one understands that the approach the UK has taken here, I'm aware that this is a very delicate area and I and I'm not defending the overall approach of this bill, but it is what it is, and they've decided to do it by full-scale transposition and then having said that there there are ways in the bill which could be more sensitive to devolution and I.

B

Think the examples you've alluded to are examples where it doesn't seem to me that there would be a pressing need for those sorts of fairly minor limitations.

B

My sense is that this is probably unnecessary. I mean I overall, an overall theme, which I think is far more important than the technicality of a lot of this.

B

These provisions is their absolute need for healthy, inter governmental relations and I know I've talked about this before and then people say well, you know it's a truism and of course it's a truism, but but ought not to be forgotten and the reason I say that is because maybe some of these more provisions which raise the hackles of people who feel they're outside the spirit of devolved settlements, are not conducive to reaching intergovernmental agreement on the bigger issues that really matter so I I, don't think those made-up provisions are particularly necessary and I think the perhaps show an excessive lack of trust in devolved administration's, which is not healthy.

B

C

A gr, vocal opening, certainly also an exercise of the powers devolved authorities, may not modify retained, direct EU legislation or make provision inconsistent with a modification of retained, directiy legislation made by key ministers, and do you foresee any difficulties with these restrictions?.

B

That's the general gist of the bill, which is that we have this body of law which is retained. Eu law, which is you know, has within it many sub elements, and essentially that's the law that that is either EU law that directly affects us, which is still Brussels log.

B

We bring people to bring that in what is law that the UK has has made into you, you into UK law from the EU, and all of that is going to be transparent into the status of retained, EU law and the approach of the bill is that the devolved administration's cannot evade that until that is sifted and what is devolved. What ought to be devolved is then partial doubt there could not be another way to approach this bill. There could be other ways to approach this bill.

B

This is one way to do it and I don't actually see I can see it as a problem of principle from a devolved perspective, I get that I think the invasion that it poses to devolution, because it's not it's just not Kagura with the principles we've hired for demolition over the nearly two decades, I completely get that, but given that this is the approach that has been taken, that is correctable by what or it's potentially correctable by the other commitment in the government's explanatory notes to to seek a rapid, daily devolution of the powers.

B

If that is done fully and consistent with existing devolved powers, with a full commitment to to really partially go these powers in line with the nature of devolution settlement, then I think that problem of principle could partly be overcome, but it is the way the bill stands and really what's cool about is how that's, how those that have that position and how the power is related to that position. Plio in practice. That's what's really good about it.

C

Final question is: there is no equivalent for devolved authorities of the power and Clause 17 to meet consequential or transitional provision. Would it be you usual for a UK bill making provision within the Scottish Parliament's legislative competence to confer such a power on the Scottish Ministers.

B

It might well be one of them. What are the difficulties with this bill in terms of the delegated powers themselves? Is that most power and layered on power land on power? They don't you get to the consequential provision, you're almost wondering. Why is there the other powers are so extensive? You wonder what what an earth can be left here that you've not already provided a power to do so.

B

It seems to be a final catch-all poem. My view, I, think, looking at the nature of Clause 10 and its relation to schedule. Two is that the power of the devolved authorities to do anything in relation to retained EU law that they can currently do two things I wouldn't evolve, but it's should be. Rather, it should be rated as an all-encompassing power that would include transitional and consequential provisions. That would be my take on the exception.

B

That's built it too close to it, and that might be something to seek clarification off to seek clarification of the bill t-bar of the in the UK Parliament.

B

That is the case that, insofar as the Scottish Parliament still has powers in relation to imitate the EU law, those powers also encompass consequential, a transitional provision because there's no reason the principle why they ought not to as I can see. Okay.

A

D

The bill does not provide any mechanism for Scottish Parliament scrutiny of regulations made by you key ministers alone, irrespective of whether the regulations are a matter of significance for Scotland or of would have attracted the benefit of the sole convention. Had the matter been included in premier legislation. Does this present a gap in the parliaments, ability to scrutinize exercise of the bills in this power? Yeah.

B

I think scrutiny is a really crucial issue here. Maybe let's yeah I talked about the general problem of principle, which mr. McMillan was alluding to that you know this is bloc, moved to the UK and then redistribute and I've talked about how that can be corrected. You know devolution sensitive, we, but one of the really crucial areas of that will be how closely scrutinize those powers are, particularly when you, as you see, regulations are being made exclusively at UK level in areas that are going to affect devolved matters and I. I.

B

Think that something from this part we know as part of and this committee is thinking carefully about how scrutiny moves forward. But it's it's a real potential lacunae. Okay,.

D

So would you have any thoughts on how we could I.

B

Mean obviously if these regulations are being tabled, one of the big problems is that so much of this is going to be done by negative procedure.

B

So the kind of position you're talking about is constitutionally problematic because it's gonna affect this Parliament, but it's got to put it's being done at Westminster, but the practical problems gonna be done very quickly and it's got to be laid before Westminster and passed.

B

You know in a 21 day period unless there's the capacity in the Parliament to look at it, look at it quickly.

B

We simply don't know what volume we're going to be talking about here, but it seems to me we're talking we're likely going to be looking at a massive volume. Now there's the issue of principle, which is itself problematic.

B

Would it be a practical problem in terms of practice where the UK parliament to do this just thinking about if they wanted to use these powers, even in a devolved area, to to modify retained, EU law, presumably to bring matters into the purview of this routine EU law that would all still, even after those powers have been used.

B

That would all still be part of this vast body of law, which would be subject to the discussions about subsequent devolution of those powers of those areas, so that the problem of principle is a significant one, but it wouldn't be the end of the story in terms of what this part could do. I mean III think you need to be thinking about the extent to which you have the resources to be looking at legislation.

B

Draft legislation in a lot of chamber I think it'd be entirely constitutionally appropriate for this house to be looking at legislation, even if it can't directly influence it. But another option is that I don't know how far this can go, but it clearly it's a part. My cooperation seems to be to be a very important theme going forward. Thank.

D

You is that a rule for formal Scottish, Parliament consultation, our consent to the exercise of powers by you key ministers, and, if so, should that rule concern the exercise of parish relating to matters within the parliaments, legislative competence or matters which would be within legislative competence. Notwithstanding the requirement of compatibility with the EU law, or should it be something wider, such as the exercise of powers and areas of interest and importance to Scotland? How would you define that? No.

B

You've rightly said: Miss Harris, that Sue it doesn't apply to delegated legislation, and that is we know. We know seen just how big a deficit that is in terms of into parliamentary relations.

B

It's not inconceivable. New conventions should develop.

B

That's how conventions avarage of conventions dawn well, sometimes that invented by politicians.

B

But you know the soil to some extent was an invention which then, but but it's not inconceivable, that if the government, the UK government is serious when it talks- and it talks a lot in the explanatory notes and then they've delegated Paris memorandum about the need for consent about its commitment to consent without made sure that Searle in relation to delegated powers, it's not inconceivable that our practice, and certainly the devolved administration's can press I would absolutely, on the basis of constitutional principle, for practices to develop and practices can become conventions whereby exactly those kind of avenues that you're talking about so right.

B

We don't have the right to veto this delegated legislation. We don't the right to you know we if we passed a motion here that wouldn't fit within the civil convention. We get all that. But let's talk about other conventions emerging here. If we're, if we're seriously moving forward with Briggs, it we're looking for a common approach across the UK, we'll try to build common free, more we'll try to do this by consent, then, let's think about avenues through which a semi-formal form of consent should be required by this chamber.

B

Are the other chambers for delegates for the use of delegated powers that are for square in devolved areas? So III think it's a perfectly legitimate constitutional move to try to make.

A

E

Come here we're telling a bit more to scrutiny. Do you think that the bill has an appropriate split between matters that require the affirmative procedure and matters that respect approach? There's a choice between the affirmative and negative procedures?

E

B

Bluntly no I mean I think that I was very surprised. The convener has defied my end of the pill and I think I was I was maybe I think you get worn down. After all, my health I was AB, still I still find it constitutionally problematic. There's no doubt about that, and one of the areas that is really problematic is the the very limited range of matters for which affirmative procedure is expressly required.

B

Given the vast swathe of areas that are good to be the vast waves of policy areas involved, what would have expected to see I think a far broader use of affirmative procedure once again, you know to to you. The other argument is simply the practical one. Look when you're talking about these many many thousands of regulations and directives to lay for Parliament for active affirmative consideration.

B

Each of these you know it does beg that you said it's very hard to see what a parliamentary time could come from so I know it sounds a bit ambiguous, I mean I I, don't think it's appropriate Bonnie all had I, don't see how she could do it. The problem comes back to the project lots of the bill in a sense.

E

Do you think that there's weight discretion given regarding the choice of negative and affirmative procedure, and is that discretion appropriate and how can Ministers be held to account in respect of a choice all.

B

Right there is, there is a very open approach, be given the self, so little is reserved to you definitely use what use affirmative then it's open to minister. My sense is, if you give me this as a choice, to use negative if we're going to use negative, so they are what you have to build it. Here's there's a third scrutiny procedure here, they've made affirmative procedure, which is effectively no scrutiny procedure which the minister can activate in an or in the case of urgency.

B

So this is that this is an innovation in the bill. It's an opportunity for ministers to make delegated legislation in in pressing circumstances which would become law without parliamentary scrutiny of any kind. No safeguards are built into that it would require to be reassessed with Allah month and so on, but that in itself is, is left entirely to the as I can see it entirely to the discretion of a minister to determine if the circumstances are sufficiently origin to require that so yeah.

B

The this bill vests enormous trust in ministers and enormous trusted the robustness of the UK Parliament in particular, but other Parliament's, to really follow very very closely. What they're gonna do with this stuff.

E

You've partially answered the question of our task already, but let me ask it anyway: is there a role for strengthen scrutiny, for example, to enable Parliament to be consulted on regulations laid in draft prior to final regulations being laid, and if so, which areas should be prioritized.

B

This to some extent, this depends upon what these powers are going to be used for.

B

The government has committed, as far as I read it, to not using these powers to make significant policy changes. The idea is that this is just to correct deficiencies to make legislation fit for purpose in the act of bringing it into UK long.

B

Various parliamentary committees here and Westminster before the bill was even laid put forward various recommendations for heightened scrutiny, procedures of the cage, you're talking about, or provisions analogous to clause to schedule, civil of the Scotland Act 1988, which has the whole list of the different types of delegated power making procedures. That would involve the joint agreement of of this, this house and the UK Parliament, the more various innovations that were that were put forward recommending this the government has responded.

B

Simply is that you know, for example, the provisions of the legislature have been regulated a for my 2006, which NATO extensible Oh super affirmative procedures. The government's response to this is simply that we start the team as far as I can read it that we just have to get this done, and this would take too long. It's just not feasible if it were to be done.

B

I think a stronger suit to play would be to hold the government to the promise that big policy is not gonna, be done with these powers and to hold to the line that, if you've got to make big policy, you need primary legislation.

B

So this is I mean this is not gonna. The only bill. The boudreau bill is the first of bill. There will be other bills in each one assumes that's about my understood in a number of discreet areas of EU competence, law and I. Think time might be better spent. Targeting primary legislation on big matters of policy when a through Westminster scrutiny will apply and be Winsor would apply the Stars chippers conserved. You.

E

Touched briefly on the super affirmative process: is that specifically a load under this bill? It's.

B

Not provided for I mean the funny thing about Parliament I always made it slightly odd. The government is putting forward a bill telling Parliament how to scrutinize legislation. Yeah I mean it's always been my view that Parliament suits you might well say to the parliamentary drafts. Well, thank you very much. She looks good of you to tell us how to how we're going to do our job, but in fact this is how we're gonna scrutinize this.

B

So to be honest, it's for people here liaison with people like you with your parliamentary equivalents at Westminster and see these are the kinds of procedures we want to see until here.

B

Of course, the government, if it's drafting a bill is, is gonna minimize, the extent to which that bill is gonna be scrutinized, but if, if there's a feasible argument that super affirmative shoots applied relation to see matters that Miss Harris was talking about the hit would devolved areas and then that argument should be should be made through one parlor talking to another and seeing this is. These are the kind of amends we want to see. You.

A

What areas or categories of changes to EU law should this Parliament seek to prioritize in its scrutiny?.

B

Well, our be obviously areas effects it affecting the vault, but it serves these. That I was like just a given list that will you be looking but I mean to me: it's clearly areas, so the the crucial stuff that we all know about environment agriculture for sure. So it would seem to be that be very important. But you know, having said that, you know it's a train point and an obvious one that I'm making. But if we are now talking about a UK, that's gonna be outside of the he.

B

You just does that devolve legislation is coming into for Etan Scott likes new 2016 list. The wheels like 2017, you know we're. The middle are a lot of different change. We aren't really watch out the Beaudry's I've devolved reserved competence coming out for 2016 act.

B

You know if you look at there's so many areas in the Scott, like 2016, of shared of shared powers between Scotland of the UK, in all cases vanish from welfare to Transport Police to other areas of transport, and what a beginning out now is that there are many areas that are reserved butters that are going to be impacting on Scotland in ways they may not have done like five years ago so directly.

B

So so I think this part not to just be focusing on very traditional areas of devolved competence, but may be thinking well, wait a minute! That's yeah! That's a reserved matter. Let's go back to Westminster, but the UK could be using that power in a way that affects see welfare or transport or taxation, or you know things that are no at the margins of devolved reserved competence. So it's gotta, be there's gotta, be new areas to look to in light of the scope like 2016, that's, maybe not being fully thought through you, okay,.

A

Do any members have any other questions.

A

Well, professor teeny, thank you for your time. It's probably felt like a whistle-stop tour, but I think we've covered a lot of ground. So thank you once again pleasure.

B

Thank you, okay. Thank you.

A

And we'll close the meeting.