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A
And
we'll
find
the
notes,
so
this
chapter
is
the
first
one
talking
about
analyzing
institutional
failures.
So
far,
we've
been
seeing
a
lot
of
successful
examples
and
she
mentions
this
in
the
beginning
of
the
chapter.
How
important
it
is
to
mention
successful
examples,
because
most
of
the
literature
only
talks
about
the
failures.
So
we
don't
have
so
many
examples
of
things
that
actually
worked.
A
A
The
first
ones
are
bodrum
fishers
and
bay
of
izmir
and
they
are
both
in
turkey,
so
they
are
somehow
related
because
they
share
the
same.
They
are
under
the
same
national
institution
and
they
have
some
constraints
coming
from
that.
A
So
so
the
bodrum
fisher
was
was
a
case
of
a
small
in
inshore
fishery
that
were
very
successful
and
they
were
very
close
to
the
open
sea
fishery
that
the
small
fishers
didn't
have
control
of
the
big
open
sea.
A
So
so
the
problem
that
came
with
it
was
that
the
government
started
to
incentivize
large
trawling
vessels
that
were
those
huge
boats
to
fish.
A
In
the
open
sea
and
also
closer
to
the
inshore
fishery,
so
there
was
initially
a
three
mile
block
like
a
law
that
that
didn't,
allow
the
big
boats
to
come
closer
to
the
inshore
fishery.
But
then
that
only
wasn't
that
that
not
only
wasn't
respected
but
also
was
incentivized,
the
opposite
by
the
government.
A
Do
you
guys
have
anything
to
add
to
this
part
of
the
chapter.
B
Yeah,
I
think
that
a
important
aspect
that
I
really
liked
about
it
you
know,
because
we're
covering
the
failures
were
before
we
were
covering
you
know,
sustainable
cpr
settings
is
that
you
had
issues
that
were
rising
because
of
basically
scaling
like
you
know.
You
have
a
lot
more
interested
parties,
whether
it
be
market
or
population
growth.
B
Where
you
had,
you
know,
the
system
that
was
relying
on
subsistence
at
first
is
now
open
to
the
public
to
take
advantage
of,
and
so,
as
you
had
more
people
coming
and
more
different
participants
with
different
incentives.
You
had
these
different
strains
on
the
external
internal
rules
of
the
of
the
game
itself,
and
so
failing
to
adjust
to
those
scaling
properties
is,
is
one
of
the
big
obstacles
when,
when
governing
any
type
of
common
or
cpr
setting.
C
I
really
liked
this
this
section
of
chapter
five.
I
thought
that
it
was
almost
more
interesting
to
study
the
failures
than
it
was
to
study
the
these
successes.
C
There
was
so
much
more
drama
and
murder
and
like
complicated
scenarios,
so
I
actually,
I
smiled
quite
a
lot
as
I
read
this
actually,
because
you
can
almost
see
the
the
failure
of
where,
where
humans
fail
to
self-organize
and
the
reasons
behind
it,
sort
of
like
as
cautionary
tales.
For
for
what
not
to
do
would
what
jake
said.
I
mean
sorry,
but
what
nate
said
about
sort
of
external
factors
resulting
in
these
failures,
or
at
least
exacerbating
these?
C
These
failures
was
also
a
really
good
point
to
note,
because
it
seemed
as
if
the
the
the
way
that
these
these
fisheries
in
bodrum
and
izmir
were
able
to
sustain
themselves
was
something
that
was
successful
until
there
was
a
swell
of
population
or
in
one
case
you
know,
the
price
of
certain
fish
increased
fourfold,
attracting
other
people
come
profit
from
that
price
increase,
so
it
seemed
like
you
know.
C
It
was
sort
of
external
factors
that
that
forced
really
complicated
rulings
rule
structures
that
were
then
not
enforced,
so
you
could
almost
see
every
as
every
decision
is
being
made.
You're
you're
sort
of
watching
you're
waiting
for
the
grand
failure
of
some
of
these.
A
Yeah,
I
think
one
interesting
thing
that
connected
all
of
the
examples
was
the
complexity
they
presented
and
the
the
the
lack
of
ability
that
each
one
of
these
cases
had
to
deal
with
the
complexity
and
and
in
the
in
the
bottom
fissures.
They
said
that
at
some
point
there
was
six
groups
of
of
fisheries
with
distinct
interests
competing
for
the
same
fishery
and
similarly
in
the
bay's
bay
of
izmir.
A
There
were
similar
fishery
subgroups,
except
that
izmir
had
a
another
layer
of
complexity,
that
it
was
a
large
urban
center
with
a
high
demand
for
fish.
So
the
fish
started
to
be
very
expensive
and
then
more
people
would
jump
into
fishing
and
then
at
some
point
it
was
many
fishermen
chewing
chasing
a
few
fish
and
both
of
them
they
had
cooperatives
that
tried
to
mediate
the
case
and
bodrum
case.
A
There
was
a
cooperative
that
failed
completely
on
mediating
the
case
and
eventually
it
was
dismantled
like
it
didn't
exist
anymore
and
in
the
bay
of
izmir
there
was
two
large
cooperative
cooperatives
and
several
other
smaller
cooperatives
operating
nearby,
but
they
weren't
connected,
and
they
were
all
represented,
distinct
groups
of
fishers.
So
the
lack
of
collaboration
resulted
in
no
operational
rules
and
there
was
no
conflict
reduction
and
no
control
access
to
the
fisheries.
A
A
C
Yeah
that
was
an
important
point
and
just
before
she
goes
on
to
describe
that,
she
uses
this
phrase
benign
neglect
and
it
was
to
sort
of
encapture
that
there
were
there
were
licenses.
C
You
know
you
needed
to
be
a
license
to
fish,
but
there
was
an
unlimited
number
of
licenses
and
there
was
a
rule
around
what
was
it
the
number
of
miles
offshore,
but
then
there
was
no,
but
then-
and
there
was
a
authority
that
had
the
ability
to
monitor
that,
but
they
a
three
mile
zone-
that's
it,
but
the
coast
guard
didn't
enforce
it.
So
there
was
actually
a
structure
in
place
that
could
have
that
was
designed
to
prevent
rent
dissipation,
but
that
wasn't
respected
or
enforced.
C
And
I
like
that
phrasing
benign
neglect,
because
it
really
it
really
captures
that
really
captures
that
well.
B
That's
needed
to
be
managed,
rather
than
you
know,
protecting
particular
interests
and
then
other
other
interests
were
not
represented
within
that
government
structure,
and
so
I
think
the
failure
to
see
it
that
the
entirety
in
a
holistic
manner
that
it's
a
cpr
setting
was
a
significant
failure.
I
think
we
do
that
with
a
lot
of
cpr
settings.
B
B
So
yeah
it's
a
it's
a
common
pool
resource.
So
the
idea
is
that
you
have
a
commons
which
is
a
kind
of
this
public
good
that
we
all
kind
of
share,
whether
it
be
you
know,
water
air.
So
if
you
think
of
a
cpr
setting
as
a
common
pool
resource
unit,
so
you
can
measure
those
units
within
a
common
pool
resource
so
we're
all
sharing
it
we're
discussing
on
how
to
sustain
and
govern
these
settings.
D
Yeah,
if
that's
the
case,
then
yeah
I
definitely
agree
the
world
is.
It
is
a
cpr
sitting
just
given
the
nature
of
just
human
existence
and
basic
human
needs.
B
A
B
I
was
just
going
to
say
yeah
and
since
you're
this
is
your
first
intro
to
this
is
that
you
know:
we've
gone
through
this
and
we've
kind
of
analyzed
different
settings,
so
basically,
ostrom
is
taking
us
through
this,
this
process
of
analyzing
cpr
settings
and
saying,
okay.
This
is
what
has
been
proven
to
work
in
history.
D
A
And
this
is
another
aspect
of
it
that
any
any
type
of
trying
to
enforce
the
rules
that
were
that
were
being
provided
were
always
done
by
external
agents
like
the
government.
A
So
the
government
had
no
incentive
to
do
that,
and
we've
seen
that
in
many
examples
that
the
local
people,
the
the
the
ones
more
involved
to
the
issues,
are
the
ones
that
have
the
incentive
to
fight
for
it
or
to
want
to
enforce
the
rules.
So
in
this
case
the
rules
weren't
enforced
and
that's
what
what
created
most
of
the.
A
C
Oh,
it's
just
good
to
say
it's
very
myopic
to
to
think
that
the
time
and
effort
to
invest
in
something
is
not
going
to
have
long-term,
rework
or
rewards.
I
think
it
was
sort
of
like
people
didn't
want
to
take
the
time
today
for
something
that
would
be
there
for
them.
In
you
know,
a
year,
two
years
or
three
years.
C
A
typical
high
time
preference
you
know
that
not
seeing
not
seeing
the
value
of
the
effort
that
they
could
put
together.
A
So
the
next,
the
next
example
she
gave
was
california
groundwater
basins
of
san
bernardino
county,
and
for
this
also
the
main
issue
was
size
and
complexity,
because
san
bernardino
is
the
largest
county
in
the
united
states
and
it
actually
grabs
like
weird
portions
of
the
country
like
hawaii
new
jersey,
and
I
don't
know,
I
couldn't
even
understand
how
that
practically
happens,
but
it's
a
whole
region
with
multiple
bases.
A
A
Just
an
overview
is
that
they
try
to
address
this
multiple
bases
as
one
basin,
as
they
were
doing
with
other
similar
basins
in
in
los
angeles
and
in
other
places
of
california
that
were
successfully
before.
But
then
this
time
trying
to
treat
such
a
large,
large
and
complex
situation
as
if
it
was
a
small
basin
brought
all
of
the
all
of
the
failure.
B
Yeah
and-
and
we
touched
on
the
the
central
and
west
basin
issues-
I
think
in
the
last
one,
but
this
was
interesting
because
the
complexity
of
managing
that
system,
where
we
created
these
associations
basically
and
to
to
manage
these
water
basins,
the
the
more
the
more
complex
we
made
them,
the
more
conflict
that
we
created.
Among
you
know,
political
leaders,
experts
and
the
the
most
important
stakeholders
and
that
the
more
complex
it
got
and
the
more
dire
the
situation
became.
B
The
more
conflict
that
ensued
and
people
started
to
question.
Well,
who's
got
the
decision-making
power
over
these
certain
issues
and
these
certain
issues
and
these
certain
issues
and
to
to
figure
out
who
who
had
the
rights
to
make
that
decision
was
a
very
difficult
task
and
led
a
lot
of
different
internal
failures.
E
For
me,
it's
it's
been
also
interesting
to
connect
some
dots
with
another
readings
that
I
have
done,
and
I've
read.
E
A
writer
that
whose
name
is
abdullah
okalan
and
he
is
incarcerated
by
the
turkish
government
like
since
the
year
2000.
E
So
for
me,
it's
it's
also
interesting
to
see
how
this
political
environment
can
be
hostile
for
for
at
the
efforts
of
of
of
self
govern.
As
as
libya
was
was
saying
in
the
self
organization,
as
slivya
was
saying
that
this
has
really
high
costs
and
it's
important
to
have
a
political
regime
that
that
allows
it
and
the
other
dot
that
I
am
like
connecting
with
this.
E
With
this
chapter
and
with
readings
that
are
very
actual,
an
article
that
matteo
shared,
that
is
called
credible
neutrality
as
a
guiding
principle,
and
it
talks
a
little
bit
about
how
legitimacy
can
can
come
from
from
the
the
the
credibleness
of
certain
guiding
principles.
And
it's
like
to
to
review
these
institutional
rules
that
that
construct.
Our
mechanisms,
that
designed
our
mechanism
and
to
see
how.
E
How
can
we
make
them
and
resist
and
and
to
like
realize
their
purpose,
and
one
thing
that
that
the
article
mentions
is
not
just
neutrality
effect.
Efficacy
also
matters,
and
I
think
that
maybe
when
we
try
to
make
these
efforts
of
self-organization,
sometimes
we
try
to
make
things
a
little
bit
complex
and
first,
we
need
them
to
like
work
and
then
start
polishing
them
and
improving
them.
E
But
it's
important
to
like
to
to
to
to
do
what
we're
doing
of
studying
and
to
try
to
propose
alternatives,
but
to
have
a
clear
mind
of
that
of
what
are
the
the
the
practical
and
like
things
that
that
we
we
want
to
to
solve
and
and
propose
easy
ways
to
to
to
do
that.
So
it's
like
what
I
want
to
say
is
that
sometimes
we
we
tend
to
make
things
more
complex
and
more
complex
and.
E
Just
by
by
by
having
legitimacy
on
agreements
and
by
like
thinking
on
this
institution
and
on
this
organization
in
this
cpr
environment,
we
we
can,
like
others
very,
very
practical
issues
that
from
from
the
ones
that
that
we
can
then
build
better
systems.
D
E
E
It
should
be
something
very
practical
that
we
can
like
agree
on,
and
we
can
all
believe
we
can
all
like
yeah,
be
represented
by
by
these
mechanisms
and
and
how,
like,
with,
with
these
technologies,
that
we
are
using.
We
can
connect
all
these
dots
about
organizational
and
institutions
and
design
and
mechanisms
with
the
the
purpose
of
of
of
making
neutral
agreement
on.
How
can
we
improve
for
the
good
of
of
everyone
in
in
the
cpr
setting
that
we
are
talking
about.
A
I
I
wonder,
if,
like
how
would
a
dow
situation
solve
something
like
an
ocean
like
open
sea
fishery
like
things
that
are
really
big
and
and
that
that
neutrality
is
so
important?
But
does
that
even
exist
like?
Is
there
any
government
that
actually
has
some
type
of
neutrality?
That
would
like.
A
D
Well,
I
mean,
I
guess
that
kind
of
alludes
to
you
know
federal
state
and
like
municipal
government,
as
as
we
see
in
like
a
lot
of
like,
like
the
united
states,
for
example.
So
I
think
there's
like
I
definitely
think
like
say,
like
fishery
there's,
like
specific
governance
model,
that
they
follow
there,
but
like
there's
like
other
overarching
laws,
that
kind
of
govern,
like
let's
say,
like
a
fisherman,
kills
another
fisherman.
D
B
Sense,
yeah
and
I
think
you're
gonna
you're
gonna
have
heterogeneity
no
matter
what
you
do
in
the
common
setting,
especially
if
you
want
to
scale
into
those
larger
areas,
and
so
you
know
it
it's
it's.
But
even
if
you
establish
legitimacy,
it
doesn't
mean
that
you're
going
to
be
very
effective
in
taking
your
example
of
you
know:
local
county
state
federal
governments.
B
You
know
the
federal
government
has
these
laws,
but
you
know
states
and
cities
can
divert
from
that
if
they
want
to,
because
at
the
end
of
the
day,
if
the
federal
government
wants
to
enforce
their
laws,
they're
going
to
have
to
go
in
those
areas
and
most
of
the
time
they
don't
have
the
ability
or
the
you
know
the
financial
capacity
or
administrative
capacity
to
go
enforce
those
things.
And
so
I
think
you
see
that
in
a
lot
of
areas
where
trying
to
link
these
two
two
concepts
of
both
scaling.
B
B
Like
olivia
said,
I
don't
I
don't
know
if
it's
it
can
be
done
on
on
a
scale
through
through,
like
a
dow
type
of
mechanic,
because
you're
going
to
have
to
have
some
form
of
coordination
that
extends
well
beyond
a
local
level
and
and
really
illustrating
to
the
stakeholders
that
you
know
not
only
when
dealing
with
commons
you're
dealing
with
you
know,
large
time,
scales
of
of
destruction
and
but
you're
also
dealing
with
geographical.
B
You
know
abstraction
so
fishermen's
in
this
area.
He
doesn't
really
see
the
damage,
that's
being
done.
Five,
you
know
five
ten
miles
down
the
road
and
the
diversity
and
type
of
and
trying
to
manage
that
and
from
a
political
perspective,
is
very
difficult.
A
D
Exist
yeah
at
the
end
of
the
day,
it
really
does
come
down
to
to
communication
because,
like
there
just
needs
to
be,
I
guess
a
consent
like
I
guess
so
describe
it
as
a
consensus
in
a
sense
that,
like
this
is
how
you
know
you
do
a
certain
thing
on
this
land
and,
like
you
know,
this
is
how
you,
how
you
fish
and,
like
you
know,
obviously
there's
the
the
fragments
of
of
different
types
of
governance
at
the
higher
at
the
federal
level,
which
is
maybe
related
to
other
things
and
there's
just
like
you
know
anyway,
yeah
you
get
what
I'm
saying
like
there
just
needs
to
be
clear
communication
that
you
know
of
like
specific
governance
models
for
specific
cpr,
like
resources
in
general,
so
yeah.
A
So
the
final
statement
of
the
problem
she
brings
in
this
one
is
that
individuals
who
do
not
have
similar
images
of
the
problems
they
face,
who
do
not
work
out
mechanisms
to
disaggregate,
complex
problems
and
choose
subparts
and
who
do
not
recognize
the
legitimacy
of
diverse
interests
are
unlikely
to
solve
their
problems,
even
when
the
institutional
means
do
so
are
available
to
them
because
unlikely
the
first
examples.
They
had
access
to
institutional
change.
A
So
in
turkey
they
didn't
have
access
to
creating
their
own
rules
in
a
in
a
in
a
legitimate
way,
but
in
california
they
did,
and
even
so
they
failed.
So
that's
what
she's,
bringing
that
it
was
because
they
didn't
have
a
full
picture
or
a
shared
image
of
the.
A
A
So
quick
overview
of
the
sri
lankan
fishery
is
is
another
example
of
anticipation,
and
this
is
actually
really
exciting
and
I
think
that's
what
that
was
the
one.
You
were
mentioning
tim,
but
it's
like
an
action
film.
A
lot
a
lot
happening
here,
mostly
I'll
I'll,
try
to
do
it
but
feel
free
to
cut
me
or
add
things
to
it.
So
there
was
this
local
fishers.
A
There
was
20.
There
was
these
local
fishers.
They
were
fishing
in
that
same
place
for
a
long
time
and
they
created
a
system
for
all
of
them.
That
was
working
really
well
and
for
a
long
time
and
they
lived
in
a
very
violent
place
and,
despite
being
a
violent
place,
the
system
they
created
was
working.
So
well,
nobody
was
fighting
about
it.
It
was
all
great,
so
the
system
basically
was
every
family
of
fishers
or
a
few
fishers.
A
They
had
the
net
and
doesn't
that
was
the
the
one
they
would
like
fish
a
lot
of
it
catch
a
lot
of
fishes
and
in
each
one
of
those
nets
eight
eight
men
were
needed
to
catch
all
of
the
fish
back.
A
A
So
they
divided
the
fishery
itself
into
into
columns
or
layers
or
different
sections
where
they
had
a
rotation
method
that
each
one
of
them
would
at
some
point
be
in
the
most
efficient
location
where
they
would
have
the
biggest
catch,
and
that
was
working
for
them.
But
then
there
was
a
moment
that
the
population
really
needed
labor.
A
There
was
not
enough
labor
and
then
some
families
were
encouraged
to
to
invite
their
their
sons-in-law
to
move
there
to
help
and
be
part
of
the
shares
of
the
nets
and
a
lot
of
people
started
to
move
to
malwa
this
town
and
they
had
a
70
population
growth
in
just
30
years,
and
a
big
portion
of
this
population
became
fishermen.
A
So
all
of
a
sudden
from
a
shortage
of
labor,
they
had
like
a
huge
amount
of
labor
and
our
nets
started
to
come
into
into
the
story
and
the
government
at
some
point.
Three
years
later,
limited
the
number
of
nets
and
codified
the
initial
local
criteria
that
they
had
for
act
for
accessing
the
water.
So
the
legislation
allowed
at
this
point,
individuals
who
did
not
inherit
access
to
the
fishery
to
purchase
chairs
in
established
nets
opposed
to
before
just
family
members
could
inherit
their
place
in
the
shares
I'll
stop
here
and
see.
B
It's
just
you
know
the
idea
that
they
would
establish
a
registry,
basically
to
say,
hey,
register
your
nets
and
then
we're
going
to
break
those
nets
up
into
shares.
In
that
way,
everybody
can
have
a
percentage
of
the
overall
catch
for
for
that
period,
but
yeah.
I
it's
an
interesting
approach
to
it.
That's
for
sure.
A
Yeah,
it
seemed
like
an
interesting
approach
if
the
government
made
their
part
to
ensure
that
what
they
were
doing
was
being
what
were
they
proposing
was
being
enforced,
so
they
basically
took
the
rules
out
of
the
fissure
hence
and
put
into
a
codified
actually
law
and
and
then
they
said,
okay
and
now
everyone
can
come
here,
but
they
didn't
limit
the
amount
of
nets.
So
a
lot
of
people
started
to
join
and
and
then
at
some
point
when
they
were
77
like
from
20
to
77.
A
There
was
not
enough
work
for
everyone,
so
a
new
petition
was
supported
by
everyone,
even
the
new
people,
to
join
that
joint
to
limit
the
number
to
77
nets
that
would
be
registered,
but
then
people
started
to
come
and
offer
the
things
to
the
officials
and
faction
members
started
to
appear.
So
there
was
a
whole
political
game
happening
and
different
types
of
incentives
going
back
and
forth
and
slowly
this
number
started
to
go
up
and
up-
and
it
was
it
was
happening
slowly.
A
But
then
there
was
a
certain
faction
member
that
came
and
he
brought
a
lot
of
nets
and
he
was
kind
of
like
didn't
ask
permission
to
no
one
just
stay
there
and
then
conflict
started
to
happen
and
the
government
to
refrain
conflict
from
happening
regulated
his
nets,
and
this
was
the
moment
that
they
started
to
not
be
the
fishermen
themselves,
but
they
were
hiring
other
people
to
do
labor
at
a
minimum
wage
and
then
they
would
like
over
profit
in
the
shares.
A
But
what
started
to
happen
is
that
those
fishermen
from
the
beginning
from
those
initial
20
nets?
They
only
had
one
share.
That
back
then
was
enough
for
them.
But
then
now
all
of
these
big
players
came
and
they
would
buy
like
five
shares
each
and
one
in
each
point
of
the
rotation
cycle.
So
they
would
always
have
fish
coming,
but
then
for
the
fishermen
that
had
only
one
only
one
share.
Sometimes
it
would
take
up
three
years
for
their
turn
to
come
to
fish.
A
A
At
this
point,
because
of
how
corrupt
the
government
was
in
exchanging
votes
and
bribes
to
allow
people
to
come
to
this
situation,.
D
Well,
what's
interesting
about
that
scenario
because,
like
you
know,
the
idea
of
shares
is
like
you
know,
you
can
look
at
the
stock
market,
for
example,
and
modern
monetary
theory
in
general,
like
modern
monetary
theory,
is
when
government
government
essentially
prints
money
in
order
to
get
rid
of
insolvency.
D
However,
the
thing
is:
is
you
know,
bitcoin
was
created
in
2008
right
after
the
financial
crisis
and
it's
just
kind
of
interesting
to
see
how
how
the
system
of
like
share
based
systems
started,
playing
like
started
to
create
like
real
inequities
for
fishermen
like
people
that
are
physically
fishing,
simply
because,
like
rich
people
just
buy
everything
you
know
and
everything
and
then
cause
more
inequities.
C
Yeah
definitely,
I
also
found
it
interesting
that
they
referred
to
to
these
as
shares.
You
know
the
the
your
right
to
be
one
of
the
eight
people
to
hold
a
net
in
the
water
was
considered
a
share
and
in
some
ways
it's
analogous
to
labor
laws.
You
have
the
right
to
work.
You
know
it's
like
a
very
early
form
of
a
labor
law,
and
these
shares
were
so
were
private
property.
C
You
could
inherit
them.
You
could
give
them
away
as
a
dowry.
You
know
when
your
daughter
gets
married,
so
they
had
real
value
and
perhaps
even
some
were
swapped
or
traded.
Some.
You
know
under
some
olive
tree
somewhere
a
coconut
tree
somewhere
and
yeah.
I
just
I
really
liked
that
aspect
of
it
and
then
you
know,
as
as
because
these
were
actually
valuable,
tradable
shares.
C
There
were
people
who
sought
to
to
extract
as
much
value
as
they
could,
by
what
you
described,
owning
the
shares
and
hiring
laborers
to
do
the
physical
labor
and
the
people
who
are
doing
the
physical
labor
no
longer
were
I
mean
they're,
like
sharecroppers.
You
know
they're
they're
slaves
for
the
person
that
owned
the
the
va,
the
the
the
property.
In
this
case
it
was
the
right
to
work,
but
they
didn't
have
to
work.
They
could
hire
somebody
else
to
work,
so
it
was.
C
C
A
C
Some
there's
a
lot
of
parts
that
I
really
enjoyed
from
here.
There
was
one
part
that
I
just
able
to
key,
which
is
so
the
fishers
involved
were
aware
of
the
consequences
of
adding
nets.
It
was
not
a
case
of
individuals
being
incapable
of
devising
and
enforcing
rules
well
tailored
to
their
local
circumstances.
C
So
it
seemed
that
by
the
manipulations
of
the
local
politics
that
you
know,
the
the
local
community
could
no
longer
self-govern
that
that
agency
was
sort
of
taken
away
from
from
them,
which
is
an
external
force
of
this
community
of
the
cpr.
D
B
People
are,
you
know
you
get
too
many
people
trying
to
game
a
system.
Then
then
it
turns
in
on
itself
and
and
it
becomes,
you
know,
a
tragedy
in
itself,
and
I
I
wonder
you
know
because
they
got
to
like.
B
I
think
it
was
like
eight
at
84.85,
I
think,
and
they
decided
to
play
a
game
and
they
had
a
new
strategy
for
these
people
who
brought
in
new
nets
and
and
and
they
were,
it
worked
really
well
in
terms
of
the
cycle
that
they
were
going
on
until
it
conflicted
with
somebody
else
trying
to
game
in
the
same
way
at
the
same
time,
and
it
led
to
just
yeah
a
failure,
and
but
it's
interesting
to
see
you
know
when
you
design
a
system
like
that,
if
you
don't
take
how
people
are
going
to
game
game
it
into
account,
especially
within
the
local
context,
in
their
local
environment.
B
A
Setting
yeah,
I
really
like
this.
This
view
this
perspective,
you
you
brought
them
that
it
was
ownership
to
the
right
to
work
and
wow.
It
blew
my
mind
a
little
bit.
A
I
think
I
have
to
think
more
about
this
because
I
feel
like
so
much
of
our
how
our
how
capitalism
kind
of
got
built
is
on
top
of
this
idea
of
like
removing
people's
ownership
to
the
right
to
work,
but
then
buying
that
right,
buying
that
share
and
making
them
work
for
you
that
you
have
the
right,
but
they
they
have
no
choice
because
they
are
working
for
your
share
of
the
yeah.
That
was
really
interesting.
D
I
think
they
even
call
it
corporate
bondage.
I
think
that's
another
formal
term.
I
don't
know
if
corporate
bondage
is
exactly
how
we
describe
it
but
like
yeah,
you
know,
I
think
those
are
closely
related
to
that
topic.
So
that's
that's
good
to
touch
upon.
A
So
in
that,
in
the
last
in
the
sri
lankan
fishery,
the
one-liner
problem
was
that
it
does.
This
situation
illustrates
what
happens
in
a
dynamic
local
setting
when
appropriators
do
not
have
autonomy
to
make
and
enforce
new
rules
and
external
intervention
to
prevent
rule
enforcement
against
political
favorites
undermines
the
viability
of
common
property
arrangements.
A
D
I
I
think,
that's
not
a
bad
way
to
describe
it.
I
think
I,
I
think
the
major
thing
when
you
when
you
say
that
is
the
accountability
aspect
like
there.
There
needs
to
be
some
sort
of
like
mutual
assurance
that
you
know,
counterparties,
benefit
or
or
don't
benefit,
based
on
certain
outcomes
when
it
comes
to
any
like
cpr,
related
kind
of
topics
or
that
in
general,.
C
It
actually
gets
me
thinking
because
correction
sort
of
triggered
this.
You
know
it's
avarice
and
seeking-
and
I
think
and
correct
me
if
I'm
wrong,
but
I
think
in
the
cases
of
the
successful
cprs
it
was
all
you
know
the
the
cpr
people
would
take
what
they
needed,
but
there
were
no.
C
There
wasn't
cases
where
people
would
successfully
exceed
in
order
to
resell
and
or
profit
from
what
they
were,
what
they
were
taking
from
the
cpr,
whereas
in
this
case
it's
very
clear
that
the
intention
of
this
you
know
one
evil
character
in
in
this
play.
C
So
the
motivation
of
the
actors
plays
a
huge
part
in
the
success
of
the
governance
of
the
cpr
and
of
the
cpr.
E
Yeah,
I
agree
because
in
the
in
the
other
exam
the
monitors
are
the
appropriators
themselves
and
when,
when
the
monitors
are
not
appropriate,
there
can
be
like
this
corruption
associated
many
factors
that
one
can
be
like
a
sense
of
belonging
and
to
the
use
of
the
of
the
cpr.
E
We
can
see
that
in
this
case,
the
the
ones
that
are
extracting
the
most
from
the
cpr
are
not
the
the
the
people
directly
like
uses
or
or
profits
from
the
access
of
the
of
the
resource.
But
it's
benefiting
free
people,
but
it's
not
directly
need
needs
the
the
the
resource,
but
that
uses
the
record
the
resource
to
make
profit.
E
So
I
think
that
is
a
really
good
point
of
analysis
to
see
if
the
ones
that
are
using
the
resource
are
using
it
to
make
profit
or
if
they
are
using
it
to
to
operate
and.
E
Serve
from
from
from
the
resource
for
for
their
needs
not
for
their
benefit,
but
their
need.
A
We're
on
the
top
of
the
hour
and
we're
gonna.
Do
the
the
pen
raffling
spend
time
really
quick
and
meanwhile
you
guys
can
decide
who
is
gonna
lead
the
next
session
that
it's
the
other
half
of
chapter
five
alone.
We
do
a
rotated
facilitation
type
of
thing.
So
every
week
someone
picks
a
a
chapter
to
facilitate.