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A
I
I
shared
some
some
notes
in
the
in
the
governing
the
commons
channel
if
you
want
to
follow
like
what
I
highlighted,
but
I
really
liked
this
sixth
chapter
of
the
book
I
found
it.
It
was.
It
is
really
enlightening
and
for
me,
like
the
division
between
the
the
the
chapters
with
where
she
analyzes
the
situations
and
this
level
of
abstract
of
abstraction
that
then
she
like
analyzes
from
the
from
the
cases.
A
It's
amazing
because,
like
from
this
study,
she
is
also
developing
some
some
points
that
are
very
interesting
and
also
encouraging
and
encouraging
us
to
keep
researching
on
this.
A
I
think
that
is
like
the
the
end
message
that
she
gives
that
we
still
have
to
keep
researching
on
institutional
change
and
keep
polishing
frameworks,
and
I
I
think
that
that's
like
the
invitation
that
she
makes
in
the
end
to
like,
read
and
to
keep
studying
for
for,
for
making
our
our
best
decisions
and
to
try
to
improve
our
institutions
and
to
manage
ourselves
better
within
different
cpr
settings.
A
So
well,
I
am
going
to
start
with
the
part
of
evaluating
costs.
In
the
last
session
we
were
evaluating
the
benefits
and
then
now
she
starts
to
evaluate
the
costs.
I
am
going
to
share
screen.
Sorry,
okay,.
B
A
That
is,
transformation,
costs
and
also
the
the
it
makes
difference
between
ante
and
exposed
ex
ante.
Are
this
the
the
costs
that
we
should
take
into
account
before
the
institutional
change
and
exposed
are
the
changes
that
we
should
take
into
account
like
to
implement
and
to
have
legitimacy
on
the
on
the
institutional
change?
A
So
she
says,
like
information
about
costs,
is
also
strongly
affected
by
situational
variables.
A
A
A
A
Where
she
says
like
proposed
rules
with
positive
expected
benefits
and
low
transformation
costs
are
likely
to
be
adopted
before
rules
with
high
transformation
costs.
If
appropriators
start
with
low
cost
changes,
they
can
gain
experience
concerning
the
cost
of
changing
the
rules
in
their
settings
before
attempting
changes
that
will
require
substantial
transformation.
A
So
it's
it's
important
to
have
low
cost
small
changes
that
that
can
have
give
experience
to
the
to
the
cpr
to
change
the
rules
in
starting
from
small
and
going
big.
A
The
the
norms
that
individuals
share
concerning
appropriate
strategies
when
engaging
in
collective
choice
will
affect
transformation
costs
directly
and
indirectly,
when
individuals
adopt
confront
confrontational
ecstasy
strategies,
for
example,
transformation
cost
rise
sharply.
That
is
like.
She
also
is
talking
about
the
importance
of
a
political
regime
in
a
cpr
situation,
because
if
a
political
regime
like
adopts
a
confrontational
strategy
to
to
an
intent
of
making
a
cpr
that
would
make
the
transformation
cost
rise
sharply.
A
So
this
is
also
kind
of
a
mutual
monitoring
where,
when
the
appropriators
have
this
common
knowledge
of
restraining
opportunistic
behavior.
A
Is
is,
is,
is
more
healthy
and
easier
to
to
to
change
rules,
because
people
will
understand
that
the
net
benefit
of
them
is
is
higher
than
not
affording
that
not
going
with
them.
B
C
So
we
have
a
really
good
example
of
of
related
to
the
thing
I
was
talking
about
before,
where
you
have
a
a
person
in
in
the
percentage
of
steve
bannon
who
basically
spoke
to
you,
know
donald
trump
and
said:
yeah
just
go
ahead
and
ignore
all
the
norms
and,
of
course,
narcissists
operate
in
in
this
space
between
the
sort
of
norms
and
the
norms
that
the
generalized
society
has
and
the
assumed
sort
of
benefit
of
the
doubt
that
they're
given.
So
so
when
she
talks
about
norms.
C
Here
I
do,
I
do
think
in
my
head
that
it's
almost
like
a
dependency
in
a
way
we're
oftentimes
when
we're
organizing
we
sort
of
overly
rely
upon
norms
to
to
carry
us
through
you.
C
It
creates
a
kind
of
it
creates
a
kind
of
vulnerability
within
the
system
itself
if
we
overly
rely
upon
these
norms-
and
we
just
have
such
a
good
example
of
first
ignoring
those
norms
recently
that
I
wanted
to
just
kind
of
bring
it
up
and
and
show
how
that's
kind
of
another
example
of
how
people
who
are
have
a
certain
agenda
can
even
take
something.
C
That's
designed
to
be
inherently
flexible
and
almost
lubricating
and
making
the
wheels
of
power
kind
of
work
between
these
two
different
layers
and
subvert.
It.
A
A
Group
of
people
that
is
like
working
together,
we
sometimes
only
refer
to
the
government,
and
that
is
like
an
abstraction.
We
shouldn't,
like
only
refer
to
the
government
when
we
are
talking
to
like
about
a
country,
because
the
government
is
just
like
the
face,
the
institutional
faith
of
the
country,
but
the
country
is
not
the
government
and
sometimes
making
that
that
association
like
the
a
government
is
the
country
like
it
makes
it
harder
to
understand
institutional
change.
I
I
think
she.
C
A
No,
I
think
we
will.
We
will
go
in
in
that
in
a
moment-
and
it's
very
related
also
to
this
paragraph
that
says
that
highly
centralized
regimes
have
to
like
apply
the
same
operational
rules
in
all
locations,
and
that
makes
like
bureaucracy
and
things
very
difficult
to
move,
because
you
have
to
like
spend
a
time
waiting
for
an
answer
and
then
like
bribing
people
and
then
like
so
so
it's
it's
very
difficult
to
to
to
have
institutional
change
in
very
centralized
ratings.
B
D
Okay,
my
my
earplugs
went
down,
so
so,
yes,
that
she
states
the
the
importance
also
of
having
like
a
political
regime
that
that
enables
this
this
cpr
settings
and
she
talks
that
it's
more
important
to
have
like
nested
cpr
settings
than
than
having
like
just
one
big
cpr
setting
or
a
highly
centralized
regime,
because
she
talks
that
it's
very
important
to
have
tailored
rules
for
for
for
for
each
like
for
each
niche.
D
E
So
one
of
the
things
that
sorry
to
interrupt
that,
I
just
I
she
didn't
cover
too
in
depth,
but
the
talk
about
the
transformation
cost,
which
I
think
is
probably
one
of
the
most
fundamental
things
that
you
can
consider,
especially
when
you're
building
something
new,
and
I
think
you
know
you
know
it's
kind
of
fits
into
that
realm
of
lack
of
imagination.
Type
of
thing.
E
You
know
a
failure
of
imagination
because
the
transformation
costs
can
come
in
like
so
many
different
ways,
and
I
think
we
have
a
lot
of
modern
day
analogs
where
you
know
from
like.
If
you
look
at
the
you
know
certain
cities
like
if
you
look
at
your
own
city,
you
know
the
the
foundations
of
that
city
and
the
structure
the
the
way
the
roads
are
built.
E
E
You
know
mission
costs
on
a
larger
level
where
you
say
like
okay,
maybe
we
shouldn't
even
build
cities
below
sea
level.
You
know
like
that.
That
may
be
too
much
of
a
risk
in
the
long
term,
and
it's
these
acts
of
imagination
that
we
we
don't
envision
when
we
build
something
new,
that's
we
don't
take
into
consideration
and
that
have
huge
impacts
on
how
we
change
things
in
the
future.
And
so
when
we
talk
about
like
cpr
settings,
I
think
a
lot
of
these.
E
We
have
a
huge
transformation
costs
that
we
don't
consider
fully
and
how
to
properly
measure
them
at
the
time
when
we're
designing
these
systems-
and
I'm
not
sure
if
anybody
has
any
good
resources
or
ideas
on
how
to
measure
those
transformation
costs
at
this
time.
But
just
wanted
to
hear
people's
thoughts
on
that.
B
D
Well,
I
I
think
that
she
gives
like
some
some
some
ideas
on
this
in
in
the
in
the
figure
that
she
makes
that
are
like
the
number
of
decision
makers
had
their
own
idea
of
interest
rules
in
use
for
changing
rules,
skills
and
assets
for
lead
of
leaders
proposed
rule
past
strategies
of
appropriators
and
autonomy
to
change.
F
So
even
the
fact
of
considering
a
change
is
costly
and-
and
I
I
I
like
how
this
chapter
brings
so
much
of
the
behavioral,
the
behavior
of
the
people
using
the
cpr
and
how,
as
humans
in
general,
we
have
this
tendency
to.
F
To
see
what
is
worse,
like
what
might
go
wrong
is
heavier
than
the
benefits
you
might
have
from
a
change.
So
when
people
are
considering
a
change,
they
are
always
like
awaiting
to
to
what
can
go
wrong
rather
than
the
benefits,
even
if
the
benefits
were
like
way
higher
than
what
can
go
wrong
and
I
feel
like.
F
There's
always
this
like?
Oh,
if
it's,
if
it's,
if
it's
good,
if
it's
not
broken,
if
it's
not
broken,
don't
fix
it,
but
then
I
think
she
mentions
a
little
bit
the
the
amount
of
changes
that
could
be
beneficial
that
are
not
even
considered,
because
if
something
is
all
right,
then
you're
not
even
going
to
consider
a
change,
because
even
that
is
costly.
E
Yeah,
so
is,
is
that
just
kind
of
incorporating
the
the
social
social
costs
of
basically
convincing
people
to
change
their
minds
on
how
we
operate
on
things
and
how
we
we
accomplish.
You
know
the
management
of
certain
systems,
because
you
know
outside
of
the
technical
infrastructures
that
that
I
mentioned
in
the
analog
with
the
cities
and
stuff.
C
Well
and
juan
just
posted
something
to
me
that
actually
goes
back
to
the
decolonization
talk
that
we're
having
where,
when
the
divided
way
of
doing
things
has
persisted
for
so
long,
the
individual
person
in
inside
of
the
organization
feels
so
detached
from
their
their
own
ability
to
act
autonomously.
They
always
feel
like
they're
turning
into
this
amorphous
government
thing,
which
he
sort
of
pointed
and
sort
of
beseeching,
the
king
or
the.
C
What
are
the
nameless,
faceless
amorphous
authority
figure
to
make
some
kind
of
change
because
they
themselves
sort
of
lack
the
power
to
do
so,
which
is
why
the
participatory
nature
of
what
ostrom
was
talking
about
is
sort
of
highlighted.
If
you
don't
have
participation
in
many
ways,
it
creates
this
kind
of
other
thing
and
then
results
in
far
higher
costs,
because
not
only
do
you
have
to
to
if
you
were
going
to
to
create
a
decentralized
autonomous,
flexible
decision-making
process.
C
D
Yes,
she
says
that
the
status
quo
rules
are
the
result
of
past
decisions
and
they
always
protect
some
individuals
and
expose
others.
So
we
need
to
understand
institutional
change
processes
as
historical
processes
and
with
that
she
like
wraps
the
the
evaluation
of
the
costs
of
ex-ante
costs,
and
then
she
starts
like
talking
about
exposed
costs.
That
would
be
like
the
costs
that
would
be
needed
to
maintain
the
institutional
change
or
to
like
in
in
place
and
to
have
legitimacy
on
the
on
the
on
institutional
change.
D
So
she
talks
about
the
monitoring
and
inform
and
enforcement
costs
that
should
also
be
taken
into
account
when
proposing
an
institutional
change.
We
are
proposing
an
institutional
change,
but
not
only
proposing
benefits
and
like
also
seeing
the
costs
that
it
could
in
core,
but
also
to
seeing
the
cost
of
maintaining
the
new
decision
that
we
are
that
we
are
proposing
and
she
talks
about
the
importance
of
monitoring
activities
and
enforcement.
D
Facilities
to
enforce
rules
also
involves
the
the
use
of
resources
that
could
be
utilized
properly
productively
for
other
purposes,
and
she
talks
like
about
the
the
difference
between
when
others
are
enforcing
the
rules.
Then
the
then,
when
the
same
appropriators
themselves
are
the
ones
that
enforce
the
rules.
C
D
And
that
also
relates
to
to
something
we
were
talking
before
in
soft
gob
and
something
we
are
all
doing
the
tc
and
is
that
shared
norms
relate
to
the
legitimacy
of
the
rules
and
the
imperative
that
they
be
that
they
will
be
followed,
will
reduce
the
cost
of
monitoring
because,
as
we
are
trying
to
have
these
shared
norms
and
make
them
legitimate
and
also
to
have
this
cultural
build.
D
That
is
also
going
to
give
us
like
to
reduce
the
cost
of
monitoring,
because
we
we
have
this
trust
and
this
mutual
monitoring
that
you
don't
want
to
do.
Bad,
because
you,
it
would
have
like
repercussions,
social
repercussions
and
because
everyone
is
behaving
good.
So
why
are
you
going
to
break
the
rules?
D
And
this
is
important
also
for
transparency.
The
availability
of
low
cost
facilities
for
the
recording
and
disseminating
information
about
regulating
activities
will
also
decrease
monitoring
costs,
because
if,
if
we
have
a
lot
of
information
and
recording,
then
it
will
be
more
easy
to
to
have
more
information
when
we
have
a
certain
conflict
that
so
that
we
can
study
and
we
can
have
like-
have
a
bigger
picture
on
what
happened
and
also
collect
evidence.
So
it's
also
something
that
is
reducing
our
our
monitoring
costs
and
she
says
that
rules
that
bring
together.
D
Those
who
temple
to
cheat
and
those
who
would
be
particularly
harmed
by
such
cheating
are
also
easier
to
monitor
than
their
than
our
rules.
That
are
depend
on
accidental
discovery
of
a
rule
breaker,
but
by
someone
who
may
be
only
indirectly
harmed
by
the
infraction.
That
is
something
that
durga
was
saying
we
should
have
also
like.
We
should
also
learn
from
the
people
trying
to
explode
the
see
to
exploit
the
system
like
otherwise
we
we
are
not
like
contemplating
that
possibility,
and
by
contemplating
that
possibility
we
are.
C
I
have
a
perfect
example
for
this,
which
might
bother
you,
but
in
star
wars
I
hold
yoda
directly
responsible
for
the
fall
of
the
republic,
and
so
the
thing
is
he
was
a
bit
of
a
flight
side
fanatic
and
he
sort
of
ignored
the
fact
that
this
dark
thing
was
creeping
up.
All
this
time
and
being
900
years
old
and
training
20
000
jedi,
his
own
blindness
is
going
to
then
propagate
to
everyone
else.
He
trained
and
therefore
it
directly
resulted
in
the
fall
of
the
the
the
republic.
C
So
so
that's
what
you
you
actually
can't
just
have
to
be
like
hey,
I'm
awesome
yoda.
You
have
to
actually
not
be
sort
of
blind
to
your
own
underbelly
or
whatever.
So.
F
I
think
rules
are
very
rules
and
norms
are
very
connected
with
choices
and-
and
I
think
we
are
now
living
in
a
system
that
so
many
of
those
choices
are
invisible,
because
we
don't
have
a
direct
relationship
with
them,
or
they
are
historical
choices
that
others
took
for
us,
and
we've
just
been
following
the
status
quo
norms
without
questioning
it.
I
used
to
have
to
host
a
workshop
for
self-sovereignty,
and
one
of
the
things
we
would
do
was
to
understand
what
was
governing.
F
What
is
governing
me
like
what
are
all
of
the
forces
which
passive
to
or
non-consciously
active,
and
she
talks
about
transforming
rules,
and
it
made
me
it
made
me
question:
what
are
the
rules?
Do
we
need
to
transform
in
the
sense
of
what
are
even
the
rules
like
the
rules
are
not
necessarily
so
explicit
and
in
the
first
non-violent
communication
workshop
I
I
went
the
guy
that
was
teaching
us
said
that
violence
stems
from
choices.
You
didn't
know
you
could
make
from
like
the
things
you
didn't
know.
F
You
could
act
on
so
that
made
me
think
of
like
this
deeper
relationship
with
rules
and
norms
that
sometimes
we
see
them
very
in
the
surface
and
it's
like
a
an
automatic
rebellious
action
against
them.
But
it's
probably
because
there
are
many
underlying
norms
that
are
not
even
being.
D
Yes,
yes,
I
I
love
that
she
like
in
the
last
page.
She
she
gives
like
four
problems,
that
she
think
that
social
scientist
like
tends
to
use
when,
when
analyzing
cpr
problems-
and
she
says
like
first-
the
individuals
using
cprs
are
built
are
as
if
they
were
capable
of
short-term
maximization,
but
not
long-term
reflection.
D
Second,
these
individuals
are
viewed
as
as
this
if
they
were
in
a
trap
and
cannot
get
out
without
some
external
authority
imposing
a
solution
so
that
that
is
like
the
state
nation
state
is
a
trap
and
it's
a
trap
that
they
tell
us
that
we
cannot
go
out
from
them
from
that.
But
it's
a
trap.
It's
it's!
It's
a
meant.
D
D
These
institutions
is
a
trap,
but
yes,
that
that
is
in
in
in
the
last
page
and
says
also
that
the
institutions
that
individuals
may
have
established
are
ignored
or
rejected
as
indifferent,
without
examining
how
these
institutions
may
help
them
acquire
information,
reduce
monitoring
and
enforcement
costs
and
fourth,
the
solution
presented
for
the
government
to
impose
are
themselves
based
on
models
of
idealized
markets
or
idealized
states.
D
This
is
so
interesting
also
of
what
we
are
doing
here
in
the
tc,
because
we
are,
we
are
also
building
like
economies
and
resilient
economies
and
and
like
building
commons
and
and
and
digital
commons.
So
it's
it's.
D
It's
very
interesting
also
that
she
she
says
that
appropriators
should
live
near
to
the
cpr,
and
here
we
are
not
near
to
the
cpr,
because
the
cpr
is
not
like
in
a
place,
but
we
interact
with
each
other
in
many
situations,
so
that,
like
we,
have
these
strong
norms
and
strong
that
convey
mutual
expectations.
D
So
like
it
is
good
for
for
for
us
to
to
engage
in
other
relationships
in
other
things,
other
than
just
work,
because
that
makes
this
cultural
burning
so
important
and
that
we
also
like
celebrate
christmas
and
stuff
like
that.
That
is
very
important
because
they
we
interact
with
each
other
and
get
to
know
more
than
if
we
were
like
completely
like
an
unknown
one
from
each
other.
F
Open
open
space
for
hey,
miran
seth,
welcome,
if
you,
if
somebody
that
hasn't
spoke
yet
wants
to
pitch
in
also
or
we
can
keep
going.
F
D
That
this
is
a
a
very
interesting
part
that
she
started
talking
about
the
process
of
institutional
change,
and
this
is
the
the
quote
that
I
said
in
the
in
the
soft
answer
that
is
like
we
use
this
theoretical.
D
Models
that
use
this
static
equilibria
and
have
this
like
static
like
variables,
and
they
tend
to
abstract
things
too
much,
and
sometimes
we
just
like
follow
by
economic
profit
and
she's,
saying
that
if
economic
profit
is
just
taking
into
account
one
variable,
that
is
not
that
cannot
measure
the
the
whole
succeed
or
failure
of
a
cpr
situation.
D
So
she
says,
like
a
market
and
and
profit
does
not
enable
a
theorist
to
predict
which
firms
are
more
likely
to
survive
or
to
predict,
innovate
or
to
predict
innovative
technology
or
institutional
changes,
and
she
says,
like
simply
following
short-term
profit.
Maximalization
in
rece
to
the
market
price
of
a
resource
unit
may,
in
a
cpr
environment,
be
exactly
the
strategy
that
will
destroy
the
cpr,
leaving
everyone
worse
off.
So
it's
just
like
making
a
cpr
is
not
just
profit
making.
D
I
I
think
that
is
like
something
that
that
is
also
a
an
insight
that
we
have
learned
from
from
icos,
because
when
we
let
too
much
people
like
get
into
the
cpr
just
for
profit
making,
they
will
not
engage
with
the
project
for
a
long
period
of
time.
So
we
we
just
need
not
to
to
see
cpr
situations
as
as
profit,
but
as
a
a
a
situation
that
makes
that
take
us
to
to
to
to
a
better
state,
and
she
says
non-monetized
relationships
may
be
of
importance.
D
It
is
not
thus
not
a
a
judicious
theoretical
strategy
to
presume
that
choices
about
rules
are
made
to
maximize
some
single
observe,
observable
variable.
That
is
talking
about
money
and
see,
and
she
says
instead
of
viewing
decisions
about
changing
changes
in
rules
as
mechanical
calculation
processes,
a
better
theoretical
stance
is
to
view
institutional
choices
as
processes
of
making
informed,
informed
judgments
about
uncertain
benefits
and
costs.
I
love.
C
A
D
Okay,
so
she
says
the
propensity
of
political
leaders
to
discuss.
D
Cpr
problems
in
terms
of
crisis
is
far
more
understandable
once
one
takes
into
account
that
individuals
weight
perceived
harms
more
heavily
than
perceived
benefits
of
the
same
quantity,
so
she's
she's,
saying
that
sometimes
to
make
institutional
changes
is
difficult
because,
like
to
having
to
like
people,
see
more
the
costs
that
they
that
they
will
have,
that
the
benefits
that
they
will
see
more,
the
the
immediate
costs
that
they
will
have
than
the
benefits,
long
term
that
that
they
may
have
so
it's
it's.
It's.
E
Difficult
all
right,
so
I
have
a
hard
time
with
this:
the
concept
of
institutional
change,
because
it
you
know
you,
you
can
have
different
governance
systems
for
a
cpr
setting,
whether
you
take
it
from
like
a
local
level
or
state
level.
Maybe
it
spans
multiple
states
and
you
can
have
complex
relationships
that
manage
a
a
cpr
setting.
E
That
say,
you
know
this
is
the
system
is
not
representative
of
what
who
we
are
as
a
as
a
community
as
a
state
as
a
city
as
a
county,
whatever
group
you
have
and
therefore
they
will
rely
upon
the
only
conception
that
they
have
as
a
representative
body,
and
that
is
your
local
government,
that
is
your
state
government
and
that
change
will
always
be
limited
to
an
extent
and-
and
so
I
I
don't
know,
I
have
a
hard
time
imagining
how
institutional
change
occurs
on
levels
that
become
a
little
bit
larger
than
just
the
small
local
level.
C
Well,
it
also
seems
like
within
within
a
given
system.
What
people
tend
to
do
is
expand
their
entire
idea
of
what
the
world
consists
of
to
be
whatever
system
they're
most
actively
participating
in.
So,
for
example,
if
I
work
at
couch
and
tribes
and
my
work
life
and
the
number
of
hours
that
I'm
using
I'm
going
to
te,
I'm
going
to
tend
to
expand
my
consciousness
into
imagining
the
various
levels
of
hierarchy
that
I
have
to
sort
of
punch
through
in
order
to
elicit
a
change.
C
And
then
that's
really
just
my
local
sphere
of
concern
and
there's
almost
no
way
I
can.
I
can
have
any
visibility
into
any
of
the
other
things
that
might
be
happening
at
the
regional
or
the
national
level,
so
that
I
can
feel
like
I'm
empowered
to
to
do
that
so
by
reflexively,
creating
hierarchies
with
our
divided
mind.
It
seems
like
it
really
contributes
to
this
thing,
and-
and
it
seems
to
me
that
if
we
had
a
cultural
context,
that
would
create
more
decentralized
systems
like
we're
trying
to
create.
C
That
would
then
create
more
barriers
for
us
to
punch
through
in
order
to
make
more
change
and
so
on.
So
I
don't
know
why
I
said
all
that,
but
it
seemed
relevant
to
the
situation.
F
I
just
want
to
add
on
that
that
I
I
agree
with
on
the
lines
of
what
durgady
said
I
think
like
now.
We
see
the
government
as
this
big
enemy,
because
or
I
mean
speak
for
myself,
I
see
the
government
as
this
a
big
enemy,
and
how
can
we
get
changes
that
arrive
close
to
this
huge
thing
if
we
are
so
small,
but
I
think
this
only
happens
because
they
have
too
much
power
now
over
the
rules
that
govern
things
that
we
do
in
the
everyday.
So
if
we
start.
F
Slowly,
if
this
starts
to
spread
their
power
over
the
choices
we
can
make
is
going
to
start
to
be
lower.
So
so,
even
if
they
are
huge-
and
we
are
small,
the
power
and
the
influence
they
have
will
be
smaller,
because
people
created
a
more
robust
foundation
to
organize
themselves
and
get
what
they
need.
E
Yeah
so,
like
I
agree
with
what
you
say
said
olivia,
and
I
I
want
to
put
that
in
the
context
of
one
of
the
examples
that
ostrom
did
earlier
with
the
water
basins
in
california,
where
they
collaborated
to
create
an
association
and
that
association
was
independent
for
a
very
very
long
time,
but
it
wasn't
too
long
before
it
became
almost
like
an
appendage
of
government
that
was
kind
of
this
public
private.
E
You
know
mesh
that
you
couldn't
really
distinguish
between
the
two
and
then
all
sudden,
you
know
to
the
population,
it
just
becomes
government
and
I
think
that's
really
hard
to
to
do,
because
we
have
that
type
of
view
of
government,
and
I
agree
like
it.
I
think
it's
like
the
enemy,
but
it's
like.
Even
if
you
create
a
new
solution.
It
has
this
potential
to
be
just
kind
of
appropriated
by
by
that
managing
body.
C
Yeah
like
I
bought,
I
bought
a
ring,
video
doorbell,
and
I
did
it
because
they
weren't
owned
by
google
or
amazon
or
microsoft
or
anyone
and
next
thing
you
know,
they're
bought
and
then
I
bought
a.
I
bought
a
nest,
learning
thermostat
and
a
nest
camera
because
they're,
not
in
control
of
google
or
amazon
or
microsoft.
Next
thing
you
know
they
got
bought
so
now.
I've
got
two
systems
that
I
specifically
chose
for
a
benefit
I
wanted
and
they
just
got
appropriated
so.
E
E
It's
your
values
and
your
community,
but
still
has
the
overall
goal
of
managing
a
commons
responsibly,
I
think
is,
is
something
that
can
be
used
as
a
method
to
undermine
institutional
power.
Grabs
in
that
situation,
because
you
say
no
we're
independent,
we're,
independent,
we're,
independent,
we're
independent
and
whether
or
not
you
know
you're,
not
an
entire
association
or
centralized
entity
or
just
a
bunch
of
small
communities.
Organizing
and
communicating
with
another.
C
I
have
a
question
when
I
first
came
into
this.
I
learned
about
sort
of
fungibility
versus
non-fungibility
and
it
seemed
to
me
that
if
I
was
to
set
something
up
where
I
would
have
like
some
fungible
token,
that
could
be
distributed
across
different
sort
of
governance
structures,
but
those
governance
structures
themselves
were
organized
locally
in
a
kind
of
non-fungible
smart
contract
sort
of
situation
that
that,
in
fact,
was
the
primary
architectural
benefit
to
this
entire
approach.
Am
I
wrong
about
that?.
C
Obviously,
south
king
in
general,
like,
for
example,
a
long
tail
financial
insurance
company
works
with
this
company
called
spirit,
coin
and
you're,
creating
a
coin
and
and
that's
kind
of
the
fungibility
aspect
where
different
native
populations
around
canada
can
exchange
tokens.
C
But
then
the
sort
of
governance
tokens
that
they
would
have
on
top
of
those
things
could
be
specific
to
each
individual
group
of
you
know:
bands,
depending
whatever
their
local
values
were,
and
that
that
that,
in
fact,
was
the
sort
of
large
value
proposition
that
these
kinds
of
governance
and
exchange
systems
were
set
up
to
solve.
Right,
which
is
seems
to
be
what
we're
talking
about
here
with
the
ostrim
thing
right.
B
Now
yeah,
I
would
just
say
that
it's
it's
surprising,
but
but
obvious
at
the
same
time
that
when
you
look
at
it,
the
allocating
funding
to
public
goods
is
actually
a
highly
sought
after
valuable
power,
powerful
position
and
it
has
value-
and
you
can
see
that
when
the
president,
when
it
costs
billions
of
dollars
in
marketing,
to
become
president
for
a
400k
a
year
job
and
basically
all
politicians
are
getting
paid
a
lot
less
than
what
it
takes
to
become
a
politician.
B
Are
they
doing
that
out
of
altruism
or
is
there
some
kind
of
value
in
actually
allocating
public
goods?
And
so
the
idea
that
I
mean
it's
a
general
challenge
to
that
qualitative
value?
B
It
can
be
quantified
and
it
has
a
quantity
even
though
it's
not
overt,
it's
qualitative,
and
that
is
governance
over
fund
allocation
is
one
of
those
things
where
it's
like.
Well,
there
is
value
there,
but
it's
not
easy
to
quantify
it's
different
for
every
person
like
a
certification,
there's
value
in
getting
a
certification
from
a
school
there's.
There's
a
lot
of
these
qualitative
values
anyway
pass
it.
Anyone
else
have
a
response.
D
I
want
to
say
that
when
I
was
reading
this
book,
also
like
I
connected
to
the
idea
that
I
was
expressing
last
week
about
conflict
as
a
mother
of
change
and
as
a
mother
of
transformation-
and
she
says
one
should
expect
rule
changes
to
be
made
after
a
seal
after
a
series
of
relatively
bad
yields
from
a
cpr,
but
not
to
be
made
after
a
series
of
relatively
good
years.
So
I
think
that,
right
now
we
are
in
a
series
of
relatively
badly
bad
yields
from
the
institutions
that
we
have
right.
D
Now
I
mean
we
have
this
pandemic.
We
have
like
an
an
economic
like
crisis.
We
have
like
this
thing
that
is
valuable
to
to
the
like
the
carbon
taxes
that,
like
you,
can
pay
the
to
to
to
pollute.
So
I
think
that,
right
now
we
are
having
as
a
series
of
bad
years
of
those
institutions
that
that
is
what
is
leading
us
to
an
institutional
change.
D
But
right
now
we
are,
we
are
like
in
the
tc
and
dao's.
We
are
exploring
the
the
benefits
and
the
costs
of
of
implementing
these
alternative
rules.
We
don't
have
the
answer
yet,
but
we
are
figuring
out.
How
can
we
like
organize
from
a
small
to
big
and
like
we
are
making
all
this
information
in
order
that
we
can
take
the
best
decision
and
decision
and
a
good
judgment
about
what
are
the
institutional
changes
we
are
proposing,
because
we
are
not
going
to
propose?
D
Yes,
let's,
let's
do
this,
and
then
we
didn't
like
evaluate
the
costs,
and
maybe
it
takes
us
to
a
bad
place.
So
we
are
now
like
experimenting
and
and
using
like
in
different
rules
in
different
in
different
dials
to
to
make
this
like
information
that
can
make
us
take
like
good
decisions.
D
So
I
I
think
I
think
that
the
dows
are
right
now
having
considered
travel,
experimentation
with
diverse
rules,
and
we
are
learning
from
that
different
rules
and
the
effects
that
they
had.
I
mean
yes,
that
experimentation
is
what
is
what
is
showing
us,
that
we
need
also
cultural
build
and
that
experimentation
has
also
led
us
to
understand
that
value
should
not
just
be
like
openly
distributed
to
people
who
is
just
wanting
profit.
D
So,
yes,
I
think
that,
right
now
we
are
in
this
like
experimentation
phase
of
of
this
institutional
change
that
we
are
proposing
of
this
through
decentralization.
D
But
I
think
that
there
are
some
deeper
changes
that
are
rooted
to
economy
cells,
that
that
are
harder
to
to
address,
and
I
am
going
to
go
a
little
bit
fast
on
on
these
last
ones,
so
that
we
can
like
end
like
in
the
hour,
so
benefits
and
cost
has
to
be
discovered
and
by
using
human
judgment
in
highly
uncertain
and
complex
situations
that
are
made
even
more
complex
to
the
stand
that
others
behave.
D
Extraterresting
and
she
says,
oh
further.
If
individuals
find
rules
well,
they
may
have
little
motivation
to
continue
the
costly
process
of
searching
for
rules
that
we
will
work
even
better.
If
it
ain't
broke,
don't
fix
it
apply
sma
as
much
to
institutional
capital
as
to
physical
capital,
so
yeah,
I
think
that
our
institutions
are
are
broken
and
that
that
is
what
is
leading
us
to
this
change,
and
she
also
gives
this
six
variables
that
can
also
increment
change
in
in
in
cpr's
settings.
That
is
like
most
appropriators
share.
D
A
common
judgment
that
they
will
be
harmed
if
they
do
not
adopt
an
alternative
rule.
I
mean
if,
if,
if
so,
that
those
are
things
that
motivate
change.
If,
if
people
know
that
they
will
be
harmed,
if
they
do
not
adopt
adopt
an
alternative
rule,
the
they
will,
they
will
like
comply
and
and
and
try
to
change
the
to
to
that
alternative
rule,
most
appropriation
appropriators
will
be
affected
in
similar
ways
by
the
purpose
of
the
proposed
rule.
D
Changes
like
the
rules
apply
to
everyone
most
appropriators
highly
value,
the
continuation
activities
from
the
cpr,
in
other
words,
they
have
low
discount
rates,
appropriators,
face
relatively
low
information.
Transformational
enforcement
costs
most
appropriators
share
generalized
norms
of
reversities
that
can
be
used
at
initial
social
capital.
D
The
group
appropriating
from
the
cpr
is
relatively
small
and
stable
and,
to
the
last
part,
she
says
that
a
challenge
to
scholarship
in
the
social
sciences-
and
this
is
what
durgadash
was
talking
about
since
for
the
the
start
of
the
of
the
reunion
and
what
I
and
this
is
the
phrase
that
I
used-
that
each
cpr
and
each
dow
can
be
viewed
as
a
niche
in
an
empirical
terrain.
D
So
this
is
also
very
related
to
to
to
down
to
that
relations
where
we
say
like
a
dao
is
an
isle,
an
iceland,
and
we
need
to
have
like
relationship
between
between
these
icelands
and
like
yeah.
D
Having
like
these
relationships
like
the
the
international
relationships
that
we
have
right
now
between
the
world,
but
the
house
between
nations,
but
with
between
those
and
she
is
like
criticizing
the
social
scientists,
because
they
she
says
that
social
scientists
tend
to
like,
say
that
everything
can
be
like
measured
between
between
money,
and
she
gives
this
four
like.
D
F
I'll
have
to
cut
you
here.
Is
there
like
a
10
second
wrap
up?
You
want
to
give,
or
it
was
a
good
stopping
point.
F
Yes,
this
is
the
time
for
the
for
the
pen
shuffling
and
wow.
We
finished
the
book.
That's
so
amazing!
Thank
you,
everyone
for
so
much
effort,
especially
quan
nate
tamara
zaptimus,
that
facilitated
sessions.
This
was
really
really
appreciated.
So
so,
let's
go
quickly.
Grief
number
one:
one:
two
olivia
three
nate
four:
together:
five
heavy
chains:
six
material,
seven
neuron,
eight
seth,
nine,
ten,
ten
and
septimus
eleven.
F
B
I
have
to
I
have
to
give
it
to
juan
carlos
I'm,
I'm
passing
it
I'd
like
to
give
it
one
carlos.
He
did
so
much
work
for
this.
You
really.
A
F
Okay,
awesome,
I'm
sad
that
nate
didn't
win
any
any
round,
but
maybe
we'll
have
a
we'll
have
a
spin
on
that
in
the.
A
E
F
Okay,
cool
and
really
quick.
I
know
we're
on
the
top
of
the
hour.
If
anyone
has
to
go,
please
go
thanks
for
joining.
I
just
wanted
to
quickly
leave
the
space
open
if
there
is
a
topic
that
wasn't
discussed
enough,
if
there
is
something
that
like
oh,
I
wish
there
was
more
time
for
that,
and
anyone
would
like
to
have
an
extra
session
for
us
to
discuss
the
remaining
discussions.
C
I
will
say
that
my
spiral
dynamics
group
is
going
to
have
a
forensic
look
at
ostrom
from
spiral
dynamics
lens
soon.
So
those
who
you
who
have
been
in
this
group
are
welcome
to
attend
that
as
well.
F
Okay,
cool
awesome
so
well,
the
the
invite
is
open
if
anyone
wants
to
use
the
same
space
same
hour
in
the
next
week
to
discuss
something
that
wasn't
covered
enough
just
post
in
the
in
the
channel
here
and
we'll
notify
everyone
and
make
it
happen.
Otherwise,
thank
you
so
much.