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A
A
A
So
that
is
in
regards
to
institutions
for
me.
So
in
this
in
this
half
of
the
chapter
it
is
stocked
it
is.
There
is
many
other
topics
talked,
but
I
think
that
is
something
for
for
the
second
part,
so
I
really
don't
know
if
I
can
say
much
more
than
than
that
about
it.
A
A
So
I
would
like
to
make
to
use
the
questions
to
start,
maybe
talking
a
little
bit
each
intimidate,
I
I
didn't
modify
them
much
or
at
all,
but
I
read
them
so.
A
Yeah,
what
were
the
incentives
for
institutional
change
in
this
cpr?
So
I
can
tell
briefly
what
I
think
and
then
I
feel
like
just
saying.
Then
we
start
around,
but
she
manages
the
room
very,
very
amazingly
so
so
yeah
the
incentives
were
that
the
basins
were
about
to
be
like
we're
about
to
break
at
some
point,
because
if
the
water
levels
go
much
below
what
they
should.
A
C
So
if
you
over,
if
you
over,
extract
the
water
from
one
of
those
basins,
the
the
the
porosity
of
that
stratigraphic
layer
will
not
hold
water
as
much
anymore,
so
it'll
become
compacted
and
it
won't
be
able
to
hold
that
water.
So
you
reduce
the
storage
capacity
for
those
basins.
So
anytime
you
over
extract.
A
Yeah
so
then
what
is
amazing?
Well,
that
is
an
underwater
reservoir,
and
it
was
worth
noting
that
it
was
much
much
more
expensive
to
use
water
from.
I
don't
know
I
picture
like
tanks
or
I
don't
know
so
they
have
to
use
yeah.
A
A
A
So
we
can
talk
about
the
type
of
people
or
companies
interested
in
in
extracting
the
water
from
the
from
the
basins,
and
there
were
the
overlying
land
owners
that
that
are
the
guys
that
own
the
on
the
land
and
live
above
it
or
camp
and
the
appropriators
that
those
are
the
main
like
companies
that
that
sell
tell
the
water
to
like
they
somehow
private
privatize
it.
If
that's
a
word
in
english,.
A
So
yeah
and
the
big
problem
was
that,
according
to
the
law,
everyone
was
motivated
to
take
as
much
as
they
could.
They
were.
C
A
A
A
This
is
just
imagination.
I
I
don't
know
if
this
is
that
way,
they
could
like
pump
the
water
with
more
strength
than
than
the
land
and
the
landowners.
So
the
people
where
the
landowners
were
not
didn't
have.
A
D
I
think
one
one
of
the
one
of
the
things
I
really
liked
about
this
chapter
was
that
should
show
this
this,
I
think
three
or
four
example
of
water
basins
that
had
some
type
of
dispute
around
them.
So
there
were
multiple
parties
that
had
some
type
of
conflict
over
the
use
of
the
water
and
because
water
is
such
a
precious
resource.
D
Whenever
these
conflicts
would
arise,
people
would
really
go
forward
in
the
dispute,
so
they
held
those
very
complex
disputes
of
sometimes
like
ears,
like
what
18
years
that
other
groups
were
observing,
because
everyone
pays
attention
a
lot
on
what
is
happening
with
the
water,
especially
in
los
angeles
area.
That
is
an
area
with
very
scarce
amount
of
water
like
deserted,
like
desert
areas.
D
D
So
I
think
that
was
very
interesting.
This,
like
from
a
very
individualistic
perspective
and
incentives
to
have
to
have
this
like
over
consumption
and
then
the
conflict
and
the
fear
of
losing
the
resource.
And
then
the
organization
in
a
more
like
collaborative.
E
Manner,
I
I
think
one
of
the
things
that
struck
me
at
first,
when
I
read
this,
is
it's
how
different
it
was
from
the
previous
case
studies
that
she
studied
in
terms
of
duration.
These
are
all
relatively
recent
location,
urban
setting
in
america,
los
angeles.
You
know
as
compared
to
valencia
and
philippines
and
japan
mountain
sides,
and
then
the
third
thing
which
she
highlights
is
you
know
the
difference
between
here.
She
says
once
a
set
of
rules
is
in
place.
E
E
So
I
really
liked
that
about
this,
because
the
first
use
cases
were
very,
were
you
know
the
the
youngest
one
was
100
years
old
and
the
oldest
one
was
over
a
thousand
years
old,
and
this
is
all
within
the
last.
You
know
the
beginning
of
the
last
century,
the
middle
of
the
last
century
and
very
urban,
and
then
I
I
like
the
way
that
she
compares
you
know
they
had
such
different
context.
You
know
the
first
one,
the
raymond
basin
really
had.
E
You
know
one
one,
one
producer
that
had
that
was
equal
to
the
other
to
the
other
30
producers
combined.
So
they
had
like
really
one
whale.
If
you
will
in
the
group,
whereas
the
the
next
one
had
about
500
parties-
and
you
know
there
was
no
dominance-
there
was
no
whale
in
that
group.
E
So
it
was
very
interesting
for
me
to
see
how
each
of
these
groups
had
to
find
different
solutions
based
on
the
I
don't
see
it,
the
ownership,
but
the
piece
of
the
pie,
how
the
pie
was
divvied
for
their
cooperation
or
their
comments.
C
Yeah,
I
think
last
night,
tonga
mentioned
it
about
the
raven
basin,
because
I
think
it's
one
of
the
the
most
awesome
forms
of
collaboration,
because
you
had
this
opportunity
for
the
landowners
and
the
appropriators
to
actually
combat
each
other,
but
the
in
order
to
do
that
they
had
to
go
through
a
legal
system.
That
was,
you
know
they.
They
did
not
know
how
they
were
going
to
rule,
and
so
you
had
this
kind
of
weird
game
theory
action
going
on
where
they
said:
okay.
C
Well,
if
we
go
to
war
with
each
other
from
a
legal
perspective,
we
don't
know
who's
gonna
win
and
we
both
hold
the
risk
of
absolutely
losing
this
battle
about
100
completely.
So
unless
we
collaborate
where
one
of
us
is
going
to
lose
and
if
we
do
collaborate,
we
can
find
some
kind
of
middle
compromise
and
that's
exactly
what
occurred.
C
And
so,
instead
of
going
to
the
to
the
through
the
legal
route,
they
decided
to
say:
okay,
we're
going
to
negotiate
a
settlement
and
and
and
hold
the
cutbacks
of
this
water
scarcity
equally
in
proportion
to
how
much
we
use-
and
I
think
that
is
a
really
good
example
of
collaboration
rather
than
combat.
So
it's
just
interesting.
B
I
think
that
something
that
differences
this
chapter
between
the
last
chapters
is
that
before
she
was
presenting
like
a
cpr
institution
and
during
cpr
institutions,
but
as
they
were
so
old,
she
didn't
have
like
information
on
on
how
they
were
born.
So
I
think
that's
why
she
studies
really
more
young
cases
more
recent
cases
than
the
than
the
studied
in
the
last
chapters
is
because
in
this
one
she
she
can
study.
B
How
did
they
organize
them
themselves?
What
was
their
internal
group
structure
who
initiated
action,
who
paid
the
cost
of
entrepreneurial
activities?
That
is
in
the
in
one
of
the
first
paragraphs
of
the
chapter,
and
I
think
it's
really
key
to
understanding
what
like
what
is?
What
is
she
trying
to
do
she?
She
said.
B
Okay,
these
are
the
guidelines
for
enduring
cpr
institutions,
but
who
wrote
that
guidelines
or
who,
in
each
case,
and
what
I
like
about
this
chapter-
is
that
in
in
several
of
the
of
the
basin
cases,
they
just
like
made
an
a
neutral
monitoring
agency.
B
That
was
the
one
that
that
helped
to
to
to
deal
and
to
and
to
sort
some
of
the
issues
that
that
the
parts
had
and
were
involved
and
a
really
key
concept
that
I
really
liked
about
this
chapter
was:
is
she
referring
of
quasi-voluntary
compliance
and
instead,
when
rules
are
reasonable
and
they
serve
for
the
people
like
people
voluntarily
go
with
them?
So
it's
not
some
imposement.
D
A
Makes
sense,
I
don't
know
if
we
should
continue
thinking
of
the
setup
a
little
bit
or
we
already
saw
all
the
incentives
and
all
the
the
participants
like
from
from
the
appropriators
or
landowners
point
of
view.
A
If
we
already
did
so,
we
could
maybe
look
at
a
bit
more
at
the
details
of
each
of
the
basins
like
maybe
in
surface
or
yeah,
as
you
named
the
in
the
in
the
rainbow
basin.
There
was
like
I,
I
marked
it
because
I
liked
it
the
position
of
a
dominant
actor
in
a
privileged
group.
A
A
So
what
what
for
me
was
really
interesting
was
the
the
city
that
in
the
west
basin
they
didn't
want
to
behave
like
the
like
the
others.
They
were
the
I
think,
foster
they.
They
thought
they.
They
were
rights
where
were
superior
to
the
ones
from
the
industries
like
they
were.
They
didn't
want
to
give
up
in
how
much
they
were
pumping,
so
they
thought
for
many
years
they
kept
they
kept
doing
it.
C
A
Think
that
these.
A
A
A
This
lawyer,
that
was
in
so
many
litigation
by
that
time,
is
my
internet.
Okay.
Now,
can
you
hear
me.
A
A
Yeah
now
I
I
moved
to
yeah
to
the
west
basin.
Kenneth
wright
was
the
lawyer.
A
A
C
Yeah,
so
it's
just
kind
of
the
lawyer.
He
was
advocating
for
collaboration
rather
than
going
through
the
legal
aspects
of
it
and
the
and
the
interesting
thing
about
the
west
basin
was
that
you
had
to
face
saltwater
intrusion
which
would
destroy
the
basin
if
you
over,
extracted
near
the
coast,
especially
the
wells
near
the
coast.
And
so
basically,
if
the.
If
people,
the
appropriators
inland,
wanted
to
over
extract,
it
would
destroy
the
wells
of
members
to
the
to
the
west,
and
so
it
would
dry
up
their
wells
and
they
would.
C
It
would
cause
salt,
water
intrusion
and
force
them
to
not
be
able
to
extract
that
water
anymore.
And
so
this
is
a
classic
case
of
of
a
common
scenario
where
you
have
people
over
using
a
resource
and
it
it's
to
the
detriment
of
somebody
else.
And
so
when,
when
you
see
that
occurring,
you
have
to
figure
out
a
way
to
illustrate
that
to
the
rest
of
the
appropriators
or
landowners.
C
And
in
this
case
it
was
very
difficult,
because
the
information
that
we
had
about
the
capacity
of
these
storage
basins
and
the
amount
of
water
being
used
was
basically
unknown.
And
so
trying
to
figure
out
basically
who
were
going
to
be
in
charge
of
monitoring
these
systems
and
who
was
going
to
enforce
it.
Them
was
all
new
concepts,
is
new
territory
for
everyone,
and
so
within
the
west
basin.
C
Especially,
you
had
a
different
type
of
scenario
that
you
did
not
see
in
the
central
basin
and
the
raymond
basin,
because
you
had
that
saltwater
intrusion
threat,
and
so
that
lawyer
was
trying
to
get
a
system
of
mutual
prescription
which
basically
was
just
a
form
of
collaboration
and
a
legal
sense
to
make
sure
that
everybody
doesn't
go
through
a
pumping
race
or
basically,
people
who
are
going
to
pump
now
in
fear
that
they
won't
be
able
to
pump
tomorrow.
C
So
they
pump
as
much
as
they
can
as
much
as
they
can
as
much
as
they
can.
And
so
everybody
who
is
ready
to
pump
is
just
over
they're
just
racing
to
destroy
this
basin.
And
so
you
have
this
really
dangerous
scenario,
where
the
detriment
of
all
is
dependent
on
the
financial
and
economic
interest
of
the
few
who
are
involved,
and
so
mutual
prescription.
C
Basically,
just
says:
hey
we're
going
to
say,
put
this
the
beneficial
use
any
surplus,
the
appropriators
can
use,
and-
and
that
was
very
difficult
from
a
legal
perspective
as
well,
because
defining
what
surplus
was-
and
the
capacity
like,
I
said,
was
very
very
unknown
information
at
the
time,
and
so
they
had
to
figure
out
who
was
the
monitors
and
who
was
in
charge
of
regulating
that?
C
C
Well
that
you
had
absolute
pure
rights
over
that
water,
and
then
we
came
with
the
the
appropriators
who
are
able
to
take
that
water
from
basically
your
land
as
a
landowner
and
say
we're
going
to
use
it
for
our
own
own
uses,
and
we
can
we're
able
to
do
that
by
pumping
over
here
off
of
your
land.
But
it
still
comes
from
your
water
resource
and
having
that
situation
occur
it
it
became.
C
Well,
we
provide
a
lot
of
water
for
everyone,
and
landowners
are
saying:
well,
we've
always
had
the
rights
to
this
water
and
you're,
not
stealing
from
us
and
so
and
and
it's
just
it's
it's
a
dynamic
that
is
still
plaguing
the
united
states
between
almost
all
states,
and
it's
left
to
you
know
different
different
mechanisms
by
each
state,
like
we
see
in
the
raymond
basin
and
other
basins,
and
these
case
studies
that
they
have
associations
now
and
water
boards
and
water
districts
that
manage
these
things
now.
E
Yeah:
okay,
okay,
thanks
duncan
you
know,
the
west
basin
actually
had
some
like
really
interesting,
plot
twists
and
turns
which
would
almost
make
a
great
movie.
You
know.
Originally
everyone
agreed
that
there
would
have
to
be
some
sort
of
curtailment
of
of
withdrawal
of
water
and
when
the
person
was
hired
to
examine
the
water
sauce,
the
engineer
was
hired
to
examine
the
water
sauce.
They
realized
that
the
situation
was
far
worse
than
they
thought
and
his
recommendation
of
I
think
it
was
a
two-thirds.
E
A
two-third
reduction
in
groundwater
production
was
almost
was
opposed
by
everybody,
although
I
think
they
did
actually
end
up
implementing
it
because
it
didn't
need
to
be
done,
but
we,
it
goes
back
to
like
how
to
get
people
to
agree
to
curtail
their
production
by
such
a
large
amount
without
being
sure
that
everyone
else
will
do
it,
and
it
ended
up
being
that
you
know
this.
This
idea
of
being
a
sucker
comes
back.
E
You
know
that
theme
is
revisited
in
this
in
this
section,
because
there
was
essentially
an
agreement
that
that
what
is
it
that
people
would
commit
to
the
undertaking?
Only
if
the
largest
water
producers
also
committed
to
the
action,
so
nobody
wanted
to
commit
to
this
without
a
large
percentage
of
the
other.
In
this
case,
I
think
there
were
500
appropriators
or
land
over
landowners.
E
That
was
interesting
too
and
then,
like
the
third
plot
third,
seemed
to
be
self-serving,
but
they
actually
had
a
philosophical
disagreement
with
the
reduction
in
water
that
I
found
super
interesting
and
it
was
even
though
they
refused
to
curtail
their
water,
taking
their
their
grounds
was
that
they
were
providing
water
for
a
municipality,
whereas
the
other
appropriators
were
for
were
taking
water
for
profit,
and
that
you
know
the
city
municipalities
should
take.
You
know
it
should
be
ethically
higher
than
the
the
profit
for
for
these
water
rights.
A
Yeah
yeah,
the
the
part
when
there
were
500
parties
involved,
was
a
bit
like
not
a
big
problem,
because
19
producers
accounted
for
about
like
85
percent
of
the
total
water,
so
yeah.
That
was
like
that
big.
C
So
one
of
the
things
that
I
I
didn't
I
couldn't
really
find
was
you
know
when
all
this
first
started
happening
like
who
I
couldn't
figure
out,
who
was
responsible
for
developing
all
the
infrastructure
that
was
required
for
for
all
of
this
to
occur
in
terms
of
of
monitoring-
and
I
mean
I
know,
government
was
heavily
involved
in
a
lot
of
it,
but
I
couldn't
figure
figure
out
like
who
was
responsible
for
for
for
developing
the
wells
and
and
for
the
appropriators
and
all
of
that
stuff.
So
I'm
just
curious.
D
I
I
think
she
mentions
that
most
of
the
infrastructure
was
was
governmental,
but
there
was
also
private
companies
involved
and-
and
I
think
the
way
I
understood
who
were
the
players
were
the
government,
the
landowners,
the
direct
appropriators
and
the
companies
that
were
appropriating
to
sell
to
third
parties,
and
I
think
all
of
them
were
involved
in
the
in
the.
A
D
A
D
A
C
E
Thought
restarting
would
help,
but
I
really
like
the
question
number
10
and
11..
You
know
what
design
principles
that
osterministered
in
the
previous
chapter
were
present
and
what
design
principles
were
absent.
E
I
think
you
know
it
sort
of
at
the
second
to
last
page
of
the
the
first
part
of
this
chapter.
She
talks
about
the
water
master
and
operating
as
a
neutral
monitoring
agent
and
how
they
were
really
responsible
for
transparency,
not
for
imposing
sanctions
and
that
there
was.
I
found
it
very
interesting
that
the
role
was
so
successful
because
it
was
strictly
you
know,
making
visible
the
you
know
the
the
data
points
of
how
much
water
had
been
withdrawn
and
then
leaving
the
sanctions
up
to
like
sort
of
litigious
parties
for
those
who
were.
D
D
Yeah,
I
thought
there
was
an
interesting
concept
too
of
tonka.
Can
you
mute?
Please
I'm
getting
some
feedback.
Thank
you.
I
thought
it
was
also
interesting.
She
mentioned
that
people
who
already
had
rights
they
didn't
they
didn't
want
to
have
new
agreements
that
would
take
off
the
rights.
D
I
mean
that's
very
obvious,
but
it
puts
in
perspective
the
how
serious
the
first
agreements
are,
because
if
you
give
too
much
too
much
rights
and
at
effort
at
first,
it's
gonna
be
really
hard
for
people
to
agree
not
having
those
rights
before
not
having
those
rights
anymore,
and
I
think
that
ties
to
the
amount
of
information
that
is
available
in
the
system
and
how
this
is
always
the
breaking
point
of
like
how
people
can
take
advantage
of
the
system,
because
information
is
not
clearly
available.
A
B
I
really
like
to
focus
like
on
on
on
the
strategies
they
they
use,
and
I
I
like
what
they
did
on
1944
that
they
established
an
ad
hoc
committee
to
consider
what
should
be
next
done.
B
So
for
me,
it's
important
to
sometimes
recognize
there
is
need
for
a
an
external
review
and
also
to
take
into
consideration
the
the
the
the
suggestions
that
a
committee
that
is
selected
from
the
parts
involved
can
make
a
towards
the
the
the
solution
of
of
an
issue,
and
they
made
three
suggestions
that
that
are
easy,
easy
and
that
they
were
really
impactful
and
one
was
that
the
permanent
application
is
created
for
all
all
the
water
producers
to
discuss
their
mutual
problems.
Possible
production
me.
B
That
means
a
lot,
because
that
is
somehow
what
we
are
trying
to,
that
a
technical
survey
made
of
source
area
and
that
water
producers
considers
initializing
legal
action
similar
to
the
action
just
completed
in
raymond
basins,
to
reduce
the
total
pumping
and
duration,
the
limited
water
supply
in
the
west
basin
amongst
all
water
producers,
so
yeah.
B
For
me,
it's
it's
really
clear
that
sometimes
to
manage
this
cpr,
the
the
monitoring
system
and
their
neutral.
The
neutrality
of
that
monitoring
system
plays
a
an
important
role
for
for
the
the
behavior
in
the
in
the.
C
C
Yeah,
I
I
agree
with
that.
The
neutrality
of
monitoring
is
extremely
important
and
it's
hard
to
get
those
types
of
checks
and
balances
on
it,
especially
when
it
comes
to
the
information
gathering
that
you
get.
You
know
having
a
neutral
party
who
you
know,
scientists
that
come
in
there
and
say
hey.
This
is
the
capacity
of
this
basin,
and
this
is
how
much
it
can
hold,
and
this
is
what
we're
using
like.
C
There
are
a
lot
of
different
moving
parts
to
that
monitoring
system
and
the
more
complex
the
monitoring
system
is
the
harder
it
is
to
stay
neutral,
and
so
really
the
design
of
that
type
of
system
is,
is
very
difficult
to
to
achieve,
and
one
of
the
interesting
aspects
of
this
entire
chapter,
like
I
find,
is
that
the
is
that
you
know
we're
analyzing
institutional
change.
You
know
before
all
the
the
use
of
the
basins.
You
know
there
were
very
few
landowners
who
would
actually
use
their
wells
and
pull
water
out
of
the
ground.
C
Not
many
appropriators
were
actually
utilizing
it.
Most
of
their
water
came
from
northern
california
through
colorado,
river
and
surface
water,
and
so
there
was
a
already
a
largely
a
huge
agreement
among
the
population,
in
los
angeles
that
our
water
comes
from
the
north
in
the
form
of
surface
water.
We
have
institutional
agreements
that
we've
already
created
through
decades
prior
and
then
they
said.
Okay,
well,
what's
the
incentive
for
change
and
they
say:
okay.
C
Well,
we
can
save
20
million
dollars
a
year
by
instead
of
taking
the
surface
water
from
northern
california,
we
can
actually
use
use
that
surface
water,
send
it
down
into
the
reservoir
our
basins
and
pump
it
from
there,
and
so
by
doing
that,
we
saved
28
million
dollars.
But
now
we
have
a
whole
slew
of
conflicts
that
occur
as
a
result
of
that
and
so
a
lot
of
it.
You
know.
I
question
whether
it's
like
you
know
you
know.
C
Was
it
a
good
idea
in
the
first
place
to
to
utilize
these
basins
in
the
way
that
they
did,
rather
than
just
keeping
with
the
institutional
rules
that
they
had
set
beforehand
and
the
incentives
for
change,
but
we're
strictly
monetary?
But
could
you
have
avoided
that
entire
scenario?
If,
if
you
were
just
to
say
we're
just
going
to
rely
on
surface
water
now,
you
probably
wouldn't
be
able
to
expand
your
population
at
the
rate
that
los
angeles
did
because
of
these
decisions.
C
The
the
second
order,
collective
dilemma
yeah,
I
think
so,
but
yeah
yeah,
that's
exactly
right,
because
I
mean
you
know
I
think
she's.
She
mentioned
it
in
this
chapter
like
at
one
point
of
like
you
know
the
the
the
problems
that
it
was
designed
to
resolve
and
of
itself
created
a
new
problem
and,
and
now
you've
got
a
you've
got
to
solve
for
that
as
well,
and
it's
just
interesting
because
I
think
this
is
really
prevalent
in
almost
all
cpr
settings
that
we
we
look
at.
C
C
D
Yeah,
exactly
and
and
and
it's
interesting
that
you
said
like
it's
so
hard
to
achieve
neutral
monitoring,
because
there's
always
some
type
of
advantage
that
the
monitor
has,
and
in
the
last
chapter,
she
talks
that
one
of
the
incentives
for
for
monitoring
is
that
they
would
have
an
advantage
in
the
information
of
that
system
like
by
being
a
monitor,
you're.
Looking
everything
much
closer
than
everyone
else.
D
Therefore,
you
will
have
like
a
privilege
as
a
first
mover
type
of
thing,
or
you
have
a
privilege,
because
your
decisions
will
be
more
informed
in
relation
to
the
whole.
So
it's
kind
of
puzzling
that
we're
looking
for
neutral
monitoring,
but
the
incentive
for
monitoring
is
that
you
won't
be
neutral
because
you
have
more
access
to
information.
D
So
it
feels
like
the
the
solution,
for
all
that
seems
kind
of
utopian
is
that
everyone
is
equally
informed
and
that
people
can
access
their
own
risks
and
benefits
before
participating
in
any
system
and
having
that
clear
for
them
and
then
identifying
the
the
black.
The
blind
spots
still
need
to
be
communicated
based
on
the
self-assessment
that
each
person
has
about
what
they
still
need
to.
C
And
it's
interesting
because
it's
my
my
first
trade
was
in
geology
and
into
and
to
notice.
You
know
the
the
way
experts
have
you
know
they
have
unusual
access
to
this
type
of
information,
but
they're
also
the
people
that
are
relied
upon
to
design
policy
and
and
when
it
comes
to
those
decisions,
they
have
all
this
information
to
dictate.
A
I
don't
know
it
was,
I
think,
some
water
association
or
something
that
it
just
needed
to
inform
the
other
all
the
people
that
didn't
have
to
participate
and
at
all
they
were
they
needed
to
be
more
as
neutral
as
possible,
and
then
they
did
at
some
point
informed
some
misbehavior
and
that's
very
good,
a
bit
mad.
I
can't
find
it
right
now,
but
I
don't
remember
the
names.
A
Yeah
we
have
like
six
minutes
left.
Do
you
guys
have
anything
to
do
to
say
about
the
central
basin
litigation
that
was
the
bigger
one
and.
A
A
A
E
Oh,
I
was
just
gonna
say
yeah.
They
had
the
advantage,
a
huge
advantage
of
being
able
to
look
at
the
precedent
cases
of
two.
You
know
very
similar
cases
in
which
they
could
you
know
see
you
know,
study
the
the
negotiations,
study,
the
results
and
then
shape
their
own
case
and
their
own
agreements
based
on
what
has
and
hasn't
worked
with
the
previous.
D
D
B
Yes,
to
take
these
minutes
also
to
talk
about
if
who
is
going
to
lead
next
session
and
we
are
going
to
make
a
pass
for
the
holidays.
D
Yeah
I
was
going
to
mention
that
too,
so
we
will
make
a
pass
until
let
me
confirm
in
the
calendar.
D
A
A
A
A
E
I
love
it.
I
I
read
it
though,
like
the
night
before
and
in
fact
last
night,
I
I
read
it
to
one
of
my
my
eight-year-old
child
to
put
her
to
sleep,
it's
fantastic.
How
well
it
works.
E
E
B
D
A
No
thank
you
so
much.
I
I
was
talking.