►
Description
Timecodes:
00:00 - Natesuits do a quick intro
03:00 - Livi brainstorm about What are the benefits produce from the community?
10:00 - Examples on clear example of boundaries
14:14 - Congruence between appropriation and provision rules
21:47 - Individuals affected by the operational rules
25:40 - Reducing the cost of managing the commons
30:40 - Monitoring and graduated sanctions
44:54 - Design principles of conflict resolution mechanism
53:20 - Raffle
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A
I
think
we
should
all
discuss
and
talk
about
one
by
one,
because
I
think
that's
probably
the
best
way
to
do
it,
and
I
think
it
gives
us
a
really
good
tool
to
to
start
developing
this
kind
of
commons
mindset.
When
we
look
at
commons
what
we
think
about
how
we
think
about
what
the
resource
units
are,
who
the
actors
are,
and
so
the
more
we
do
this,
and
I
think
you,
if
you
put
it
into
your
own
words
and
to
your
own
experiences,
you
know
it
can
be
something
as
easily
as
like.
A
You
know,
looking
back
on
your
first
apartment
with
somebody
that
you
shared
a
department
with
and
looking
at
the
food,
that's
coming
in
and
saying:
okay,
these
are
my
resource
units,
and
how
do
I
set
up
these
design
principles?
How
would
I
design
this
to
make
it
more
sustainable
for
all
of
us
to
live
here,
and
so
just
putting
these
types
of
design
principles
and
setting
it
into
your
own
experiences?
I
think,
can
help
you
develop
that
type
of
mindset
that
commons
mindsets.
A
Please
please
share
so
we'll
go
for
the
first
one,
which
is
clearly
defined
boundaries,
and
these
clearly
defined
boundaries.
That
ocean
discusses
are
not
only
of
the
system
itself
but
of
the
appropriators
who
use
that
system,
and
so,
if
anybody
has
any
thoughts
on
the
first
design
principle,
please
go.
A
C
C
A
But
it
has
to
also
include
you
know
the
the
rights
that
are,
you
know,
they're
the
operational
rules
associated
with
those
rights
according
to
new
members
and
and
how
they
are
introduced
into
the
to
the
community,
which
is,
I
don't
know.
It
goes
on
to
some
more
of
the
other
design
principles
that
she
has
as
well.
D
I'll
jump
in
so
I
like
this
her
her
clear
description
of
boundaries.
Boundaries
is
something
we
all
deal
with
in
relationships,
and
you
know
in
geographical
space
and
in
in
every
in
every
aspect
of
our
lives,
and
it's
it's
intuitively
clear
that,
in
order
to
manage
or
govern
something,
you
need
to
know
what
it
is
that
you're
governing
and
who
has
access
to
it.
D
E
So
it's
the
tough
question
in
there
is
where
to
set
the
red
line
where
to
set
the
limit
on
how
much
you
are
using
or
when
is
too
much
when
you
are
not
benefiting
or
when
are
you
taking
from
the
others
when
you
shouldn't,
so
that
distinction
can
get
really
complicated
to
distinct
and
and
that's
why?
I
think
she
she
makes
the
the
difference
that
every
context
or
every
problem
has
its
own
way
to
solve
an
issue.
C
A
A
F
I
mean,
I
think,
in
a
lot
of
the
examples
outlined
there
were
rules
that
only
the
locals
could
you
know,
participate
or
if
you
were
from
the
outside
coming
in,
you
had
to
agree
to
the
local
rules
before
you'd
be
allowed
in,
I
think,
with
one
of
them.
In
the
philippines
like
that
was
required
before
you
could
buy
land,
I
think
with
the
swiss
one
as
well.
There's
a
requirement
around
that
around
how
land
or
rights
access
was
passed
down
through
generations.
F
A
It
is
yeah
because
a
lot
a
lot
of
the
you
know,
especially
in
this
first
design
principle.
You
know
when
we
think
about
this.
You
know
most
participants
within
the
system.
They've
inherited
these
things.
You
know
not
many
of
them
had
the
opportunity
to
consciously
say:
okay,
let's
define
the
boundaries
of
the
system
and
the
boundaries
and
the
rights
of
the
individuals
or
the
groups.
F
Yeah
totally,
and
I
think
somewhere
like
towards
95
or
somewhere
around
there.
She
actually
talks
about
this
because
she's
like
hey,
you
know,
one
of
the
things
with
the
cprs
is
that
it's
really
helpful
when
communities
come
together
to
make
the
rules
themselves,
the
people
using
the
thing
and
monitoring
the
thing
help
manage
the
thing.
But,
as
you
mentioned
like
on
a
lot
of
these
cases,
people
inherited
it.
They
weren't
there
to
create
the
rules
in
the
first
place.
F
F
So
they
care
about
participating
and
then
also,
I
think
she
mentioned,
like
the
social
norms
around
it
in
that
like,
even
though
the
fines
and
penalties
generally
weren't
super
high,
because
there
was
a
social
aspect
around
it
with
reputation
and
stuff
and
because
the
rules
were
slightly
lenient
based
on
you
know
the
circumstance
at
the
time
dictated
by
the
people.
People
were
more
likely
to
participate
just
out
of
the
the
cultural
norms
and
being
part
of
that
you
know
local
tribe
and
then
thinking
long
term
about
that
tribe.
A
Sorry
about
that,
the
congr,
the
second
design
principle,
is
the
congruence
between
appropriation
and
provision,
rules
and
local
conditions.
So
essentially
it's
just
saying
that
there's
appropriation
rules
that
are
associating
the
time
and
place
and
and
and
technology
of
the
resource
around
how
you
provide
and
appropriate
that
cpr
unit
and
so
yeah.
F
F
That's
really
helpful
in
these
cprs
is
that
everyone
has
a
view
of
the
system,
like
they
kind
of
know
the
information,
and
they
know
that
everyone
else
knows
the
rules
and
then
they
all
together
in
some
way
do
the
thing
together
or
at
least
in
some
kind
of
close
contact,
so
that
there's
you
know
constant
information
exchange
between
all
the
players.
That
seemed
to
be
a
recurring
theme
across
the
different
cpr
examples.
I
think.
B
D
A
I
think
that
happens
a
lot
quite
quite
often,
especially
when
water
management
systems.
When
we
talk
about
the
you
know,
inconsistency
of
of
the
supply
of
water
from
year
to
year,
and
so
the
local
conditions
will
have
to
dictate
how
the
not
only
the
the
process
but
the
technology
we
use,
how
much
water
we
consume.
Who
consumes
it,
how
we
budget
it?
A
It
dictates
a
lot
of
things,
and
so
we
have
to
take
local
conditions
into
context
when
designing
a
cpr
setting
or
looking
at
how
successful
cprs
have
existed
in
the
past,
and
they
all
have
the
ability
and
the
flexibility
and
the
adaptability
to
change,
to
changes
within
their
local
environment.
And
I
think
that
that
is
a
huge,
huge
impact
on
on
whether
it
sustains
generation
after
generation
and
teaching
those
those
those
ability
to
adapt
to
each
generation
is
a
very
difficult
thing
to
do.
A
F
And
then
you
have
the
like
kind
of
commons
governance,
which
is
how
you
know
a
region
or
a
village
or
whatever
might
manage
a
thing
and
you've
got
the
individual
level
where
how
people
interact
and
so
like.
You
can
have
kind
of
the
higher
level
rules
for
for
the
system,
but
then
for
actual,
like
decision
making.
It
gets
more
granular
and
pushed
to
the
edges.
F
C
I
just
thought
there
was
a
cool
point
that
ties
with
principle,
five
of
graduate
extensions,
that
the
rules
should
take
in
consideration.
This
equilibria
of
the
system
on
how
like
there
is
a
balance
between
everything
that
it's
being
provided
to
everything
that
it's
being
taken
and
and
then
in
principle
five.
C
She
talks
like
how
all
adult
male
patrolled
the
dikes
every
night
in
mutual
surveillance
until
the
emergency
was
over,
and
that
made
me
think
that
recognizing
an
emergency
state
might
be
useful
since
the
stage
of
making
the
rules
for
when
something
like
this
happens.
There
is
a
like
there
is
a
collective
agreement
that
everyone
should
be
acting
and
pro
off
the
system
existing
in.
In
that
moment,.
A
I
think
it
goes
together.
The
design
principle
of
monitoring
and
graduating
sanctions
that
you
have
this
design
of.
Where
you
know
the
most,
the
the
the
person
who
is
most
vulnerable
is
the
one
who
is
watching
out
and
monitoring
the
people
that
are
taking
it
before
them,
and
so
this
is
a
design
of
setting
of
time
and
place
where
the
farmer
says
the
the
person
who
is
getting
water
after
you
is,
is
having
to
monitor
you.
And
so,
if
you
take
too
much,
then
they're
gonna,
they're
gonna
call
you
out.
A
They
have
an
incentive
to
call
you
out
because
you're
taking
away
water
from
them
and
if
you
they
want
to
encourage
you
to
leave
early.
So
you
want
to
take
the
amount
of
water
that
you
want
and
need
for
yourself,
and
so
this
kind
of
balanced
design
within
these
common
pool
resources
are
really
interesting
because
they
each
build
on
top
of
each
other.
These
design
principles,
and
so
the
third.
The
third
design
principle
that
we
would
talk
about
is
the
most
individuals
affected
by
the
operational
rules
can
participate
in
modifying
the
operational
rules.
A
A
H
I
want
to
participate,
but
the
idea
that
I
have
is
not
punctually
on
on
the
principle
number
three
that
we
are
addressing.
But
it's
like
a
connection
of
some
ideas
that
I've
had
like
during
the
week
and
on
saturday
we
had
a
a
friday.
We
had
a
really
good
talk
with
sam
and
he
like
explained
us
with
a
very
allegorical
language.
H
A
Tech
yeah,
I'm
I'm
extremely
excited
about
bonding
curves
and
their
application
into
the
common
setting.
I
think
they
are
phenomenal
and,
and
they
they
touch
onto
each
principle,
and
I
think
the
third
one,
especially
because
the
third
one
is
especially
is
simply
about
you-
know
reducing
the
cost
of
managing
the
commons.
How
do
we?
How
do
we?
You
know?
How
do
we
keep
things
easy
and
for
for
things
to
change
for
in
like
individuals
like
yourself
or
anybody
who
wants
to
participate
in
the
commons
to
actively
manage
and
influence
the
commons?
A
B
F
Yeah
so
quick
plug
on,
I
guess,
bonding
curves
and
gardens
and
etc.
So,
like
the
the
bonding
curve,
is
awesome
because
it
creates
that
like
barrier
in
that
permissionless
entry
exit,
but
one
thing
that's
kind
of
different
from
that
verse.
The
cprs
that
we're
exploring
here
is
that
bonding
curves
are
permissionless
and
cprs
are
permissioned.
F
So
in
the
cpr
like
there's
like
a
local
context
and
to
participate
in
that,
you
have
to
be
part
of
the
village,
you
have
to
agree
to
the
rules.
It's
like
a
whole
thing
right
with
bondi
curve.
It's
I
mean
it's
cool,
but
it's
like
more
like
a
shares
in
a
company.
Anyone
can
buy
them.
Then
you
can
vote.
F
So
if
you're
going
to
have
like
a
more
cpr
style,
bonding
curve
garden
situation,
you
probably
want
to
incorporate
reputation
so
that
there's
a
mix
between
assets,
you
know
similar
to
how
people
have
land
or
cows
or
whatever
and
reputation,
meaning
like
your
lineage
in
that
community
and
the
amount
that
you've
like
shown
up
and
contributed.
So
that
way,
it's
not
just
based
on
who
has
the
most
collateral
to
throw
around.
F
So
that's
one
of
the
things
in
the
cprs:
it's
like
external
people,
couldn't
just
come
in
and
buy
up
all
the
land
they
had
to
play
by
this
rule.
These
rules
that
were
governed
by
the
local
community,
which
was
based
on
their
lineage
and
reputation
and
social
norms
and
et
cetera,
so
something
to
think
about
the
context
of
building
digital
comments.
G
G
This
group
I
got
connected
through
aaron
saskin
and
I'm
planning
to
also
join
the
call
tonight
about
the
federalist
and
anti-federalist
papers,
but
like
on
this
point,
you
know
for
again
you
know
taking
taking
my
my
lack
of
understanding,
which
actually
question.
I
would
be
curious
if
someone
could
at
least
fill
me
in
on
what
cpr
stands
for
in
this
context.
G
All
these
ideas,
with
an
eye
toward
like
what
is
actually
practically
implementable
today,
because
we
need
change
today
and
something
that
stan
like
strikes
me
about
quadratic
voting
is
just
like
it's
its
complexity
and
perhaps
the
difficulty
of
people
to
understand
it
versus
something
like
ranked
choice,
voting
which
even
that
some
people
think
is,
is
difficult
to
understand.
So
you
know
curious
if
you
know
what
people's
thoughts
are
on,
that.
B
Just
a
quick
definition:
cpr
is
common
pool
resource,
which
is
a
non-excludable
resource
that
is
rivalrous
where,
basically,
if
like
fish
in
a
in
a
lake,
if
you
fish
out,
no
one
can
stop
you
from
fishing
really.
But
if
you
take
all
the
fish,
then
you
know
everyone
else
suffers.
So
that's
what
cpr
is
well.
A
A
Yeah,
so
we're
gonna
move
on
to
the
fourth
and
fifth,
one
fourth
and
fifth
design
principle
that
ulstrom
sets
up.
These
two
are
kind
of
connected
in
a
lot
of
ways.
It's
monitoring
and
graduating
sanctions,
and
these
are
pretty
fundamental
to
designing
a
sustainable
cpr
setting,
because
without
monitoring
and
having
some
type
of
enforcement
or
teeth
to
that
monitoring,
people
are
gonna
behave,
opportunistically
and
so
that
that
is
kind
of
one
of
the
big
big
ideas
is
trying
to
figure
out.
A
The
incentives
for
people
to
you
know
think
about
longer
term
decision
making,
rather
than
behaving
opportunistically
and
living
for
that.
You
know
the
moment
so,
and
you
know
the
the
appropriators
who
who
violate
the
operational
rules
are
very
you
know
they
they're
not
necessarily
evil
people
they
just
they're
participating
in
a
system
that
allows
them
to
to
do
this,
and
we
see
this
all
the
time
within
the
cpr
settings
all
over
the
globe
right
now.
A
C
So
so
she
introduces
this
idea
of
the
quasi-voluntary
compliance.
That
basically
means
the
compliance
of
each
depends
on
the
compliance
of
the
others.
So
having
a
system
that
informs
a
lot,
and
that
makes
people
like
feel
like
they're,
always
on
the
same
page,
with
help
a
lot
with
mutual
accountability.
A
And
she
uses
taxes
as
an
example
of
that,
and
I
think
that's
a
a
really
really
good
example,
because
you
know
nobody
wants
to
pay
taxes,
but
we
pay
them
because
we,
you
know,
everybody
else,
pays
them
and
if
you
don't
you're
going
to
be
the
one
who
calls
you
know
who
doesn't
do
it
and
gets
in
trouble
for
it?
But
if
everybody
said
no
we're
not
paying
taxes.
A
H
And
I
also
want
to
like
emphasize
on
the
scope
of
the
graduate
sanctions.
I
think
that
the
scope
of
the
graduate
sanctions
is
not
punish
people
but
to
correct
behavior
it
here.
She
says
like
let's
put
ourselves
in
the
situation
of
someone
who
breaks
the
rules
and
is
like
informed
to
the
monitors
by
other
person,
so
she
says
like
one:
it
was.
H
A
Not
yeah
and
I
think
a
lot
of
it.
You
know
especially
monitoring
graduating
sanctions
when
we,
when
we
look
at
these
types
of
systems-
and
she
mentions
it
within
the
chapter
but
like
keeping
the
cost
down
of
almost
everything-
is
extremely
important
to
creating
a
sustainable
cpr
environment,
keeping
the
cost
down
for
monitoring
keeping
the
cost
down
for
enforcement,
keeping
the
cost
down
for
changing
the
operational
rules
of
the
system
itself.
A
You
have
a
insufficient
system
because
at
the
end
of
the
day,
what
good
is
the
law?
If
nobody's
there
to
enforce
it?
Like
you
know,
you
can
have
as
many
rules
as
you
want,
but
if
there's
nobody
there
to
enforce
it,
then
it's
kind
of
pointless
and
I
think
that's
something
to
really
take
into
consideration
when,
when
we
think
about
design
principles
and
and
looking
at
cpr
settings
and
saying
okay,
what
are
the
incentives
here
for
others?
What
are
the
monitoring
costs?
What
are
the
enforcement
costs?
Are
they
congruent
with
each
other.
D
How
the
low
cost
can
be
achieved
by
the
motivations
of
each
of
the
participants-
and
you
know
your
if
your
motivation
is
to
make
sure
you
get
your
fair
share,
then
you
are
sort
of
monitoring.
You
know
the
the
other
people
in
some
context,
and
she
speaks
about
the
water
rotations
to
ensure
that
everyone
has.
D
A
E
In
that
sense,
I
believe
that
she,
in
some
points
mentions
that
a
strategy
is
like
a
needed
ability
for
everyone
in
the
system
to
have
for
the
system
to
be
actually
sustainable.
So
if
you
are
going
to
assume
the
the
role
of
monitor
and
appropriator
at
the
same
time,
you
really
need
to
have
the
strategy
to
to
know
when
to
not
be
a
soccer
and
to
know
when
you
are
actually
being
right,
so
in
a
in
an
example
of
our
current
society.
E
I'd
like
to
think
about
that
in
how
we
are
seeing
the
ethics
and
the
morale
in
general.
So
if
everyone
has
a
really
good
ethics,
maybe
the
morale
shapes
itself
with
everyone's
ethics.
So
in
this
system,
if
everyone
is
doing
things
right
and
the
system
is
looking,
benef
is
getting
benefits
from
it,
so
that
that
says
that
the
rule
is
actually
working.
E
But
if
the
system
is
actually
going
down
and
nothing
is
working,
maybe
the
rules
are
wrong.
Why
not
so
that
morale
can
be
shaped
into
the
efforts
of
how
everyone
is
actually
working
and
how
everyone,
maybe
is
stopping
being
a
soccer
and
maybe
trying
to
to
be
better
and
going
into
that
part
the
value
of
information?
E
She
says
that
the
high
cost
of
monitoring
and
and
giving
sanctions
is
that
the
perception
of
that
everyone
is
acting
rightfully
or
wrongly
can
make,
can
make
consequences
on
how
you
are
offering
value
to
the
whole
system.
So
I
I
like
to
that
that
chapter
in
particular
really
really
that
point
in
particular
that
principle
in
particular
made
me
think
a
lot
of
that
on
how
the
individual
positions
or
how
the
individual.
I
All
rules
for
every
commons
are
context
dependent
and
the
the
context
of
many
of
the
case
studies.
You
know,
thinking
about
filipino
irrigation
systems
and
people
monitoring
water
use
would
be.
The
monitoring
would
be
nested
in
a
very
strong
cultural,
cultural
situation
where
it's
not
just
people
looking
at
how
much
water
is
being
taken
and
used.
I
To
be
honest,
I
find
some
of
the
language
of
austrian
very
economistic
in
terms
of
like
appropriating
the
resource,
that's
all
very
nested,
in
a
social
system
where
it's
yeah,
I
feel
like
there's
a
different
social
context,
context
for
digital
commons,
which
is
important
to
really
consider
what's
what's
holding
the
monitoring
of
overuse
of
of
resources
or
commons.
In
that
digital
content.
A
Yeah,
no
thank
you,
and
I
I
I
agree
with
you.
I
think
we
we
often
look
at
comments
and
we
we
place
to
the
the
social,
the
social
context
of
comments
and
we
we
nestle
it
inside
the
economic
characteristics
of
the
commons.
Instead
of
vice
versa
and
a
lot
of
times,
we
kind
of
ignored
the
aspect
of
like
the
economic
is
nestled
within
the
social
aspect
of
it,
and
I
think
that
type
of
you
know
you
know
back
and
forth
is
very
important
to
to
really
acknowledge
when
discussing
this
and.
B
C
I
think
there
is
something
she
mentioned
in
the
last
chapter.
I
think
that
she
talks
about
when
someone
in
fact
goes
again
and
breaks
a
rule
of
the
system,
and
the
punishment
on
them
is
too
hard
that
might
make
them
feel
resentment
towards
the
whole
system,
because
sometimes
it's
some
type
of
emergency
that
they
went
through
to
act
in
a
way
that
goes
against
the
the
the
system
most
optimal
desires.
C
So
I
like
that,
she
says
here,
mechanisms
that
we
should.
We
should
have
mechanisms
that
will
allow
them
to
make
up
for
their
lack
of
performance,
and
I
like
how
it
comes
from
this
word
allowance
is
like
is
making
it
so
it's
in
their
desire
to
make
up
and
make
and
have
and
give
a
fair
action
to
the
system,
and
it's
not
seeing
as
like
punishment
as
something
that
is
severe
instead,
is
like
giving
the
opportunity
for
the
person
to
feel
good
with
the
collective.
F
Then
they
can
make
up
for
it,
and
I
think
it's
like
it
also
points
to
the
fact
of
like
having
the
community
itself
make
and
enforce
the
rules,
because
then,
as
long
as
the
community
feels
that
everything's
fair,
then
they're
generally
probably
going
to
be
okay,
you
know
it's
not
like
some
outside
force
imposing
on
them.
It's
like
they're,
all
together,
like
yeah,
okay,
this
this
seems
about
good
and
that
I
think
that
that's
really
important
kind
of
ties
into
the
other
principles
too.
D
I
think
I'm
going
to
add
to
both
what
olivia
and
bharata
said
actually,
because
you
know
she
also
speaks
about
how
a
lot
of
the
punishments
are
surprisingly
low,
as
is
the
words
that
she
uses
in
the
beginning
of
the
conflict
of
the
graduated
sanctions
section
and
it
caught
my
attention
and
then
later
in
this
later
in
this,
you
know
explanation
around
it.
She
talks
about
the
loss
of
reputation
for
reliability
and
in
cprs
there
has
to
be
trust
between
the
appropriators.
D
You
know
how
there
are
situations
where
in
fact,
infractions
are
tolerated
and
she
refers
specifically
to
I
want
to
say
it's-
the
the
the
japanese
villages
during
the
depressions,
where
infractions
were
just
tolerated
and
understood,
because
they
were
not
done
out
of
disrespect
to
the
commons.
They
were
done
out
of
desperation.
D
A
Yeah-
and
I
I
think
that
is
really
important-
to
acknowledge
the
we'll
move
on
to
the
next
two
since
we're
running
a
little
bit
low
on
time.
The
the
last
two
design
principles
are
the
minimal
recognition
of
rights
to
organize,
which
I
always
equate
to
this
can't
be
given
to
you.
It
has
to
be
earned.
A
This
is
the
idea
that
the
sustainable
commons
that
you
you
you
get
cannot
be
dictated
by
governments
or
laws
or
anything
of
that
nature.
It
has
to
be
earned
by
the
people
and
the
participants
within
the
system.
If
you
have
a
government
who
says
oh
we're
going
to
manage
this
ourselves
well,
you
know
you're,
taking
away
from
the
people
who
are
actually
using
that
system
on
a
daily
basis
and
they
aren't
actually
setting
their
own
rules
and
their
own
cultural
norms
and
on
their
own
social
behaviors
and
their
own
monitoring
systems.
A
And
so
this
kind
of
this
right
to
minimally
organize
is
saying
that
you
know
we
can't
have
outside
pressure
to
influence
the
the
rules
of
the
system
or
the
appropriation
rules.
On
behalf
of
the
the
participants
and
the
last
one,
of
course,
is
that
these
systems
are
nested
within
larger
systems,
and
so
acknowledging
this
is
very,
very
important
because
whatever
cpr
setting
you're
looking
at
it
is
definitely
going
to
be
nested
within
a
larger
system
of
use
and
of
appropriation.
A
F
B
C
D
If
we
could
split
chapter
four
in
two
parts,
yeah,
there
seems
to
be
something
I
haven't
read
it
yet,
but
there's
like
the
the
preface
and
then
there's
the
litigation
game,
and
that
goes
up
to
page
127
and
then
127
to
the
end
of
the
chapter
is
the
entrepreneurship
game.
It
seems
like
it
might
be
sort
of
a
natural
break
between
the
two
I
I
would.