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From YouTube: TEC Presentation Lite
Description
This video is about TEC Presentation Lite
A
Welcome
everyone
we
want
to
present
you
the
work
we've
been
doing
on
initializing
the
onboarding
to
the
tec,
so
we
have
what
the
tec
wants
to
do,
which
is
the
creation
of
public
goods
within
the
token
engineering
community,
how
it
wants
to
do
that
through
a
token
economy
and
the
way
it
wants
to
to
execute.
All
of
that
which
is
in
a
responsible
and
ethical
way,
and
it
wants
the
project
to
be
open
source
and
collectively
governed.
A
B
B
B
B
B
We
want
to
share
with
you
some
of
the
profiles
that
we
we
create
the
d
logic
list.
We
define
attributes
role
in
the
system,
define
skills,
pain
and
fears.
It's
super
interesting
that
the
pain
and
fears
are
very
are
the
same.
Almost
the
same
for
all
different
stakeholders
like,
for
example,
the
et
culture,
decay,
that
the
t
fails
to
attract
funding
and
the
t
became.
B
Other
profiles
are
contributors,
there
are
no
funders,
but
they
have
a
leadership
leadership
roles
like
working
group
leaders
developers.
They
normally
are
reserving
their
own
areas
of
expertise.
They
have
empathy
and
kindness
and,
for
example,
their
desires
are
sharing
to
the
community
learning
and
have
positive
impact
in
the
community
and,
like
I
say,
the
pains
and
the
fears
are,
are
the
same:
the
ecosystem,
partner
or
stagna
external
partners.
B
B
C
Since
jonas
and
dulce
have
already
walked
you
through
the
te
commons
and
our
stakeholders,
I
wanted
to
focus
here
on
a
few
key
ecosystem
value
flows
that
we
thought
were
interesting
and
could
help
inform
design
moving
forwards.
For
our
presentation,
we
modified
the
visual
language
slightly
to
suit
our
thinking.
C
First,
you'll
notice
that
we
bundled
related
stocks
to
represent
relevant
groups
of
stocks.
This
helps
work
out
the
various
scales
of
behavior,
going
on,
for
example,
on
the
highest
layer.
We
split
stocks
into
stakeholder
and
te
commons
stocks
on
the
next
layer.
We
split
stakeholder
stocks
into
smaller
groups
of
tokens,
commitment
and
initial
parameters.
C
C
The
purple
stocks
represent
initial
starting
conditions.
For
example,
you
can
take
related
experience
here.
If
we
were
to
run
an
agent-based
model,
we
could
create
multiple
different
types
of
populations
with
different
distributions
of
skill
levels
such
that
we
could
test
the
t
commons
in
a
range
of
ecosystems
with
flows.
We
decided
to
simplify
in
this
initial
stage
by
focusing
on
relations
rather
than
the
policies.
C
C
Let's
look
at
a
few
examples.
First,
let's
look
at
maximizing
proposal.
Quality
proposal.
Quality
is
vital
and
depends
on
stakeholders,
knowledge
of
token
engineering
and
their
skills
to
improve
the
quality
of
proposals.
We
should
build
mechanisms
that
one
attract
as
highly
skilled
people
as
possible
and
two
invest
in
the
skill
sets
of
the
people
already
in
the
community.
C
The
token
engineering
academy
is
a
great
way
to
do
this
as
it
not
only
expands
skill
sets,
but
also
gives
community
members
a
better
idea
of
how
they
could
apply
themselves.
From
what
I
understand,
there
are
discussions
about
breakout
groups
that
will
work
on
modeling
in
cad
cad.
These
types
of
formal
and
informal
initiatives
that
keep
stakeholders
engaged
and
responsible
should
continue
to
be
a
key
area
of
focus.
C
C
C
C
However,
those
that
aren't
able
to
receive
funding
have
less
immediate
incentive
we'll
follow
up
on
this
in
more
detail.
Next
also
note
that,
without
running
simulations,
the
emergent
behavior
that
we
can
intuit
is
quite
bounded.
However,
these
value
flows
can
be
thought
of
as
the
foundations
for
an
agent-based
model
in
a
library
such
as
cad
cad.
C
C
C
C
It's
also
important
to
note
that
any
crypto
economic
system
attempting
to
drive
behavior
implicitly
asks
two
questions:
first,
who
to
reward
or
punish,
and
second
how
to
do
so.
You
can
think
of
the
first
question
as
accounting
and
the
second
as
application
of
that
accounting
to
make
this
more
tangible
in
the
context
of
daos
on
ethereum.
C
C
C
C
This
has
a
few
great
properties.
First,
you've
made
your
system
extensible.
If
someone
has
a
great
idea
in
12
months
great,
you
can
build
it
then,
with
this
extensibility
comes
the
property
that
you
don't
need
to
create
a
perfect
spec
on
day
one.
It
doesn't
matter
if
you're
behind
schedule
on
some
voting
module,
because
you
can
just
implement
it
when
you
need
it,
want
it
or
have
the
time
and
resources
to
build
it,
and
maybe,
more
importantly,.
C
Of
decoupling
mechanism
design
from
accounting,
if
you
have
a
module
for
rewarding
contributors
decoupled
from
what
that's
used
for
you,
can
ditch
mechanisms
or
government
models
that
don't
work.
This
makes
the
system
much
more
robust
to
bad
design
and
also
lowers
the
risk,
as
well
as
the
barrier
to
entry
of
tinkering
and
trying
new
things.
C
C
C
The
open-ended
permissionless
design
of
mechanisms
over
a
credit
system
acts
also
as
a
possibility
for
future
value.
For
instance,
I
might
decide
to
hold
on
to
credit
instead
of
trying
to
get
funds
from
the
reserve
pool,
because
I
believe
there
may
be
better
ways
to
redeem
or
use
it
in
the
future.
Again.
This
provides
an
alternative
form
of
liquidity
that
eases
the
strain
on
the
reserve
pool.
C
C
C
C
C
C
The
te
community
already
has
a
credit
system
in
the
form
of
praise
which
gives
us
a
great
starting
point
to
work
from
currently
contributors
dish,
praise
to
each
other,
which
then
gets
checked
each
week
by
griff
and
livia.
This
has
worked
well,
but
obviously
has
scalability
limits
each
week
they
review
the
data
and
score
how
many
working
hours
the
praise
is
worth
depending
on
the
type
of
work,
which
of
course,
does
not
scale
elegantly
as
the
community
grows.
C
C
Unfortunately,
there's
no
elegant
solution
here,
however,
we
can
apply
our
design
principle
of
allowing
ourselves
to
be
lazy
about
decisions
by
keeping
an
account.
In
this
case,
we
should
keep
some
accounting
of
contributions
such
that
we
could
deploy
a
more
robust
credit
system
in
the
future.
This
is
where
the
existing
praise
infrastructure
helps
tremendously.
C
C
C
C
An
interesting
design
decision
is
whether
to
allow
negative
vote
casting
it's
not
strictly
necessary,
since
minting
credit.
Regular
regularly
would
dilute
those
who
aren't
being
rewarded
cred.
Another
question
is
whether
to
allow
voters
to
reward
non-community
members.
In
this
case,
we
could
reward
those
contributing
to
the
token
engineering
discipline
and
attract
them
to
the
te
community
itself.
C
This,
of
course,
could
have
many
positive
second
order
effects
from
the
cross,
pollination
that
would
emerge
from
this
new
relationship.
Please
note
that
this
is
intended
merely
as
brainstorming.
There's
no
need
to
rush
into
any
design
and
more
formal
research
into
the
praise
process
would
definitely
be
needed.
A
There
was
this
thought
process
kicked
off
by
this
tweet
from
elod,
which
said
thousand
token-based.
Governance
is
a
fantasy,
stop
emphasizing
talking-based
voting,
start
focusing
on
the
signing,
exact
executive
power
and
so
on.
This
started
a
discussion
in
the
ethereum
and
dao
community
and
got
a
lot
of
attention
and
internally
for
the
tec.
A
A
So
there
doesn't
always
have
to
be.
A
need
doesn't
have
to
be
a
need
for
these
fancy
mechanisms
if
there
is
already
a
strong
internal
motivation
coming
to
a
conclusion.
The
stakeholders
process
is
still
ongoing
and
we
will
continue
another
iteration
of
the
working
group
to
continue
the
stakeholders
process,
we're
still
doing
interviews.