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From YouTube: W61 Softgov WG: Cultural side of the proposals
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B
C
I'm
in
the
process
of
writing
out
my
thinking
around
the
advantages
and
disadvantages
of
all
of
them,
and
I
mean
I
feel
like
there's
some
that's
ruled
out
and
then
no
I
mean
it
feels
like
of
all
of
them.
Probably
goldilocks
will
get
my
vote,
I'm
just
really.
I
mean
the
main
disadvantage
I
have
with
that
is,
I
don't
believe
people
are
going
to
vote
to
increase
the
exit
tax,
but
of
all
the
other
disadvantages.
C
I
feel
like
that
disadvantage
like
I'm
trying
to
take
this
like
advantage
disadvantage
I'll,
probably
post
it
on
the
phone
after
I
finish,
writing
it
out
and
it's
like
of
all
the
advantages
and
all
the
disadvantages,
I'm
trying
to
weigh
them
all
against
each
other.
I
feel
like
that's,
probably
not
the.
E
Hey
yeah,
I
kind
of
liked
goldilocks
and
bolshevik's
gambit
the
most,
and
I
think
I'm
leaning
bullshfix
just
kind
of
what
what
tam
was
saying.
F
E
Baking
into
the
proposal
like
future
votes,
I
I
kind
of
lean
towards
like
the
way
bolshevik,
just
kind
of
sets
it
and
lets
it
go
with
those
exit
and
entry
tributes
and
those
two
are
fairly
similar.
Except
for
that
I
think
so
that's
what
I
was
going
with
I'll
pass
to
edu.
If
here
I
go.
G
Yes,
thank
you
events.
I
think
I
will
lean
also
towards
call
the
logs
really
it's
more
about
for
me,
certain
parameters
that
I
saw,
and
I
felt
it
was
the
the
most
balanced
to
the
purpose
originally
submitted
like
a
while
ago.
So
I
really
like
that
one
so
yeah.
I
have
not
much
to
develop
on
that.
I
will
pass
it
on
to
lauren.
D
I
was
just
distracted
in
this
moment
and
now
I've
immediately
forgot
the
question.
The
question
was:
which
proposal
are
we
supporting?
Which
one
do
we
like
right
and.
D
Yeah
I
mean
well
bolshevik's
gambit
is
really
similar
to
goldilocks.
I
put
that.
As
my
my
second
vote.
I
I
mean
it's
it's.
It's
got
really
similar
parameters
for
everything.
Similar
reserve
ratios
similar
opening
price,
similar
amount
of
funds
going
to
the
compost
similar
dow
voting.
It's
pretty
good.
I
think
goldilocks
is
like
a
little
bit
better,
which
you've
probably
heard
me
debate
about
why
but
yeah.
If
I
didn't
vote
for
goldilocks
I'd
vote
for
bolsheviks
I'll,
pass
it
to
vince.
H
Hi,
sorry,
I'm
just
here
to
listen
to
go
ahead.
Someone
else.
H
I
don't
I'm
still
learning
for
me,
it's
more
of
like
I'm
here.
My
free
will
and
my
time
is
valuable
and
I'm
investing
it
in
people
more
so
than
learning.
What
all
this
stuff
is
that
I
can't
participate
in
so
that's
kind
of
kind
of
where
I'm
at
I'm
not
sure
if
you
could
pass
it
to
that
hasn't
gone.
Just
as
my
brain.
I
Yeah,
thank
you
libby.
I
really
like
austrian
baby
and
boscavic
gambit.
I
I
also
like
like
goldilocks,
but
then
possibly
garbage
is
kind
of
the
same,
but
with
lower
tribute
right.
I
like
lower
tribute
so
yeah
yeah
back
to
you,
libby.
B
J
I
was
having
connection
issues
but
yeah,
I
I
am
very
excited
about
ostrom's
principles
and
I
I
cannot
believe
that,
like
I
designed
a
proposal
that
is
there
in
the
runoff
and
that
yeah
I
I
feel
that
I
have
learned
a
lot
of
just
by
being
in
the
token
engineering
and
participating
in
the
in
the
params
debates
and
parties.
So
that's
really
cool.
B
Awesome
so
yeah
just
to
have
some
time
for
some
solid
time
for
the
debate.
I
will
I'll
start
it
off,
and
this
is
not
like
a
super
formal
debate
to
defend
all
the
proposals
and
to
explain
all
of
them
in
depth.
But
it's
more
to
get
into
these
questions
that
I
think
are
interesting
for
us
to
think
about
and.
B
C
I
just
wondered:
is
the
ques?
Are
we
going
to
have
a
more
open
conversation,
or
is
it
going
to
be
just
the
just
the
people
one
person
defending,
I
mean
one
person
sort
of
answering
the
question,
or
is
everyone
going
to
participate.
B
C
Okay
yeah,
I
don't
I
don't
want,
then
sharing
my
perspective
on
these
questions
with
respect
to
420,
but
would
also
be
very
keen
to
hear
other
people's
perspectives
as
well.
C
B
So
I
share
them
in
softgov
and
oh
nick,
I
just
saw
your
message:
how
can
newcomers
participate
in
voting?
Unfortunately,
only
only
participants
of
the
hatch
can
can
participate
in
voting
now
after
the
commons
upgrade,
then
everyone
who
has
tec
tokens
can
participate
in
voting,
but
for
now
it's
only
people
who
were
in
the
hatch.
B
Yeah,
so
I
have
three
questions
that
I
would
like.
B
I
will
I'll
ask
this
question
to
the
people
who
are
representing
the
proposals,
but
also
I
want
to
have
a
brainstorming
that
of
everyone
else
that
understands
pieces
from
different
proposals
to
give
their
opinions.
B
So
I
find
it
very
important,
this
three
topics
incentive
alignment,
participation
and
sustainability,
so
by
incentive
alignment,
meaning
how
our
proposals
aligning
the
tc
mission,
vision
and
values
with
the
financial
incentives.
So
we're
talking
a
lot,
of
course,
with
the
bonding
curve
about
how
the
market
is
gonna
interact,
how
how
people
are
gonna.
What
are
what
are
the
motivations
for
people
to
join
the
community?
Are
they
financial
motivations?
Are
they
culturally
based
and
if
they
are
financial,
were
they
aligned
with
our
mission?
B
B
Yeah,
so
in
the
design
of
a
420,
the
general
design
it
our
participants,
how?
How
do
we
want
how
how
do
the
parameters
influence,
participants,
alignment
with
the
culture.
B
So
are
they
joining
because
I
asked
for
421st
because
there
is
a
high
market
incentive,
so
it's
probably
the
proposal
that
is
most
attractive
to
to
people
who
would
be
like
only
looking
at
the
financial
aspect
of
it,
for
example,
and
then
is
there
something
in
the
proposal
that
also
balances
that
with
with
the
culture
or
how
do
you
see
that.
C
Okay,
I'm
gonna
take
a
shot
at
answering
this,
so
I
think
when
we
are
saying
the
financial
incentives
and
what
I'm
interpreting
this
to
mean
is
the
financial
security
of
the
of
the
tec.
C
So
the
you
know
the
north
star
of
supporting
projects,
that's
so
that
the
fans
took
in
engineering
right
so
like
how
do?
How
does
it
align
with
the
north
star?
What
we
want
to
achieve?
I
think
in
a
few
ways.
The
first
way
is
the
long
freeze
and
thaw-
I'm
really
I'm
really
doubling
down
in
this
low
time
preference.
C
You
know
you
you
raise
capital
and
then
it
takes
time
to
build
what
you're
building
and
now
we
have
the
opportunity
to
do
the
building,
and
I
think
that
the
low
time
preference
allows
actually
a
more
durable
will
allow
us
to
actually
build
better
things
than
if
we
start
to
see
exits
from
the
the
exits
from
the
tec
earlier.
C
I
guess
the
second
thing
is:
it
has
a
high
market
cap,
so
it
has
the
highest
market
cap
again,
there's
like
unintended
consequences
from
that
which
we'll
talk,
I
think
in
the
next
one,
but
the
the
the.
I
think
that
it's
a
fairer
value
for
the
what
the
tec
has
the
intellectual
capital,
the
know-how,
all
the
skills
and
all
of
the
community
in
the
in
the
tc
now
and
will
be
more
possibly
my
speculation.
C
I'm
speculating
that
the
speculators
will
find
it
more
attractive
and
will
become
more
interested
in
speculating
in
the
tech
and
with
that
and
the
relatively
I
mean
the
stable
but
relatively
high
in
terms
of
the
tributes
that
speculation
will
profit
from,
because
the
speculation,
the
the
low
reserve
ratio
will
have
a
perception
of
volatility.
C
The
speculators
will
be
trying
to
capitalize
on
this
volatility.
The
volatility
this
the
speculators
will
be
funding
the
commons
pool
so
growing
the
commons
pool
so
that
we
have
more
capital
to
fund
projects,
so
I'd,
say
the
low
time
preference.
With
the
I
mean,
if
I'm
going
to
recap
this
low
time,
preference
high
market
cap
interesting
to
speculators
and
then
capturing
the
output
of
the
speculation
by
increasing
the
commons
becomes
commons
pool.
B
That
was
very
well
elaborated.
Thank
you.
Does
any
other
proposal
wants
to
answer
that
question
or
is
there
anyone
else
who
who
has
a
thoughts
on
this
point
too?.
A
A
A
You
know
what
what
is
it
that
we're
doing
creatively
or
new
that
that
no
one
else
is
doing
and
for
for
this
to
to
align
with
the
mission
of
the
organization
we
need
to
be
able
to
generate
funds
for
the
common
pool,
that
fund
t
public
goods
and
so
looking
at
the
proposals
you
know
which,
which
one
of
these
proposals
does
that
which
one
accomplishes
generating
the
most
funds
for
the
common
pool
and
it's
daily
operation
and
a
lot
of
them.
A
You
know
they
have
the
assumptions
yeah,
we
will
have
a
lot
more
speculators
and
that
may
have
impact
with
culture,
but
the
engine
of
the
economy
is
is
very
important
and
so
for
me,
when
I
look
at
420
and
mathematics,
anything
with
a
kind
of
a
lower
reserve
ratio
it.
It
is
very
attractive
just
for
the
fact
that
that
volatility
will
encourage
interaction
with
the
augmented
bonding
curve
from
from
arbitrage
opportunities.
A
Since
that's
you
know,
what's
going
to
be
the
the
biggest
driver
for
like
that
common
pool,
so
that's
my
thoughts
around.
D
Thanks
monka
yeah,
so
I
think
that
I
mean
we
want
to
be
generating
a
lot
of
funds
for
our
common
flu
like
this
is
like
the
main
thing
that's
going
to
be
driving
the
tc
on
its
on
its
mission.
So
it's
like
most
of
the
proposals
are
putting
a
million
dollars
in
the
common
pool,
which
I
think
is
really
good
and
then
the
thing
I
really
like
about
the
goldilocks
proposal,
that's
like
in
line
with
this
incentive
alignment
alignment.
D
I
am
like,
like
it's
not
incentives,
there's
no
incentives,
but,
okay,
theoretically
speaking,
people
want
to
come
into
the
tc
in
the
early
days,
because
they're
going
to
experience
profit
by
the
the
token
volatility
by
the
token
price
going
up-
and
I
think
that
I
mean
the
goldilocks
proposal-
achieves
this
like
right
balance
with
having
the
20
reserve
ratio,
because
you
still
have
the
token
volatility,
so
people
who
are
coming
in
the
early
days
are
still
very
likely
to
profit.
I
think
it's
like.
D
We
only
need
to
sell
40
000
tokens
every
month
in
order
for
people
to
be
making
like
at
least
four
percent
and
and
then
therefore
having
more
of
an
incentive
to
come
in
earlier.
Even
if
we're
reducing
the
entry
tributes
it's
so
it's
like,
but
also
with
the
goldilocks
proposal.
There's
this
22
entry
tribute
so
we're
bringing
in
people
who
are
adding
to
the
common
pool
when
the
augmented
bonding
curve
is
open
and
then
there's
not
these
secondary
markets.
D
So
it's
like
it's
like
people
are
able
to
take
advantage
of
the
token
price
being
like
quite
low
in
the
early
days
so
coming
in
early,
but
then
we're
also
funding
those
funneling
those
funds
into
advancing
token
engineering,
which
I
think
is
like
super
critical
and
important,
especially
like
at
the
beginning
and
then
like
as
time,
goes
on
with
the
goldilocks
proposals.
It's
like
decreasing
the
entry
tribute
and
increasing
the
exit
tribute
and
like
overall
still,
the
tribute
that
tribute
like
span
will
be
smaller.
D
Like
the
total
tribute
added
troop,
it's
added
together
will
be
smaller
so
over
time
we're
getting
less
funds
in
there,
but
the
people,
our
bots,
are
more
likely
to
be
using
the
augmented
bonding
curve
than
like
actual
people.
So
then
we
can
actually
still
take
advantage
of
the
entry
tributes
and
the
exit
tributes
to
be
bringing
more
funds
into
the
common
pool.
I
think
that's
really
important.
J
Yeah
that
one
of
the
alignments
that
austrian
baby
have
with
the
values
of
the
tc
is
that
we
are
operating
from
a
perspective
that
prioritizes
the
sustainability
of
our
token
engine
of
our
system
over
short-term
profits,
because
we
are
raising
the
the
the
opening
price
and
lowering
the
reserve
ratio
will
give
short-term
profits
but
can
affect
the
sustainability
of
the
of
the
token
model
in
the
future.
So
yeah,
that's
one
of
the
things
that
we
were
trying
to
be
aligned
when
designing
austrian,
prince
ostrom's
baby.
B
K
Yeah
sure
true
well,
first
of
all,
I
I
will
stand
there
with
the
with
the
long
vesting
and
long
flow
which
doesn't
affect
directly
the
the
bonding
curve.
But,
yes,
I
think
it's
yeah
well.
It
makes
sure
that
the
people
who
are
already
in
are
aligned
with
the
mission
of
the
tc
and
kind
of
gives
us
a
safety
net
at
the
beginning.
K
I
I
also
agree
with
lauren
that,
in
at
the
end
of
the
day,
most
of
the
of
the
transactions
will
be
with
the
bonding
curve
will
be
from
artbots
and
arbitrage,
bots
and
yeah,
and
I
think
there
it's
important
that
we
or
what
I
think
is
good
about
the
the
lower
reserve
ratio
of
the
of
mathematics
is
that
since
it
gives
the
the
token
well,
as
I
said
other
times,
I
think
it
gives
the
token
it
stabilizes
the
price
of
the
token
at
the
level
where
I
think
we
should
aspire
to
and
doesn't
cut
us
short
in
a
way
and
with
this
higher
price
and
higher
market
cap
comes
more
visibility.
K
It's
a
bigger
project
gets
more
more
eyes
on
it
and
probably
will
be
listed
on
more
exchanges
and
have
these
are
bots
just
because,
since
it
is
everywhere,
this
artwork
will
take
the
yeah
we'll
be
connecting
to
the
bonding
curve
to
to
keep
the
the
price
table,
and
that
will
this
volume
will
generate
revenue
for
funding
funding
public
goods,
because
I
think,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
what
what
is
going
to
fund
the
commons
pool
is
the
volume
it's
not
just
the
price
in
itself,
but
how
much
people
buy
and
sell.
K
B
K
A
Do
you
think
22
is
is
still
really
like
too
high,
but
I
do
I
do
like
the
strategy.
A
D
I
think
that,
like
with
the
goldilocks
proposal,
I
don't
know,
if
you
guys
have,
I
showed
it
in
the
last
debate,
but
the
what
is
it
convert
convert.tcoms.org.
You
can
actually
see
like
how
it
looks
so
when
people
are
actually
buying
tc
tokens
they're,
not
like.
Oh
there's,
this
tribute
percentage
that
I'm
putting
in
there
it's
like
a
tooltip.
They
only
really
just
see
the
price
and
then
so.
It's
like
also
the
price
that
they're
buying
the
tokens
at
which
includes
the
entry
tribute
contributes
to
the
market
cap.
D
K
D
Well,
what
it
doesn't
matter
if
it's
showing
goldilocks
or
bolsheviks
gambit,
like
the
point,
is
really
here.
I
I
I
managed.
I
can
oh
thanks,
olivia
I'll
share
my
screen
too,
so
that
I
can
convert
as
well
convert
dot,
t
commons.org
so
like
whether
it's
showing
bolsheviks
or
sewing
whatever
proposal.
All
of
them
have
some
degree
of
entry
tribute
and
like
really
all
you
see
is
okay,
I'm
coming
in
here
I
want
to
buy
tec
tokens
and
then
you
just
like.
Oh,
I
guess
I
have
to
connect
my
account.
D
D
But
you
see
that
if
you
kind
of
like
look
here
and
you're
like
okay,
there's
part
of
it
going
to
the
common
pool
so
like
even
people
who
are
like
coming
in
in
the
early
days
aren't
really
feeling
the
entry
tribute
so
explicitly,
and
actually
it
does
like
benefit
us
in
this
kind
of
like
oh,
the
market
cap's
higher,
because
it's
like
the
public
price
includes
the
entry
tribute
so
for
goldilocks,
the
public
price
is
1.77
and
then
a
times
the
total
supply.
You
end
up
with
the
market
cap.
So.
D
It
it
has
it
as
the
tool
tip,
but
that's
the
oops.
It
does
show
it.
It
shows
the
entry
tribute
here,
but
it's
the
same
as
like
yeah,
it's
the
same
as
like
buying
into
I
think.
Like
any
anything
I
mean
you
know
with
the
hatchers
like
the
goldilocks
tribute
is
69,
so
69
percent
of
the
funds
that
hatcher's
put
on
go
into
the
tc
common
pool
like
we're
like
okay
cool,
like
take
70
percent
of
my
funds
and
put
it
to
the
toc
to
advance
token
engineering
initiatives.
D
So
I
think,
like
the
22
exit
tribute,
is
like
much
smaller
than
what
the
hatches
are
paying,
and
so
it's
like
encouraging
value
on
people
in
the
early
days
and
then
it's
also
not
really
deterring
people
from
coming
in
because,
like
speculators,
who
are
just
looking
to
buy
the
tc
token
aren't
seeing
like.
Oh,
I
would
have
got
this,
but
then
they
put
this
entry
tribute
and
yeah.
And
then
I
think,
like
with
the
with
the
discussion
like
around
the
votes
and
it's
like.
D
Oh,
are
people
going
to
really
vote
to
increase
the
exit,
tribute
or
decrease
the
entry
to?
But
in
this
in
the
in
the
process
like
is
set
up
for
goldilocks
for
every
month,
you
decrease
the
entry
tribute
by
four
percent
and
increase
the
extra
tribute
by
two
percent.
I
I
think,
like
a
really
important
question,
is
just
to
like
ask:
if
I'm,
if
you
would
like,
would
you
vote
to
increase
the
exit
tribute
and
decrease
the
entry
tribute?
D
Because
we
have
our
trusted
seed
like
we
have
the
hatcheries,
which,
at
the
early
days,
are
holding
a
huge
percentage
of
the
tokens?
And
so,
if
that's
the
way
that
we
decide
that
we
want
the
economy
to
go
forward
like
it's,
it's
within
our
power
to
make
it
happen.
B
I
think
that's
a
good
segue
to
the
next
question.
That
is,
how
are
proposals
addressing
governance
and
especially
number
of
token
holders
versus
active
voters.
B
So
do
you
think
that
by
choosing
the
parameters
like
that,
that
is
an
incentive
for
voter
participation,
because
the
economy,
the
way
it
is,
is
influencing
token
holders
in
a
certain
way,
and
then
they
have
an
incentive
to
be
active
to
switch
to
a
different
direction,
because
that
will
also
affect
them.
D
Yeah
I
mean
I
think
this
was
interesting
in
the
last
last
debate.
That
was
something
that
danny
bell
had
said.
She
was
like,
oh
within
with
the
goldilocks
proposal,
it's
actually
like
setting
it
up
to
encourage
people
to
participate
in
governance
further,
because
we're
going
to
be
having
like
active,
dow
votes
and
and
the
way
like
we're
like.
Oh
we're,
passing
this
proposal
to
increase
the
exit.
Tribute
decrease
the
enter
tribute.
D
Then
we
share
this
with
the
community
and
then
like
even
new
people
coming
in
are
able
to
like
start
using
their
tokens
and
participate
and
yeah.
I
think
that,
like
with
I
don't
know,
and
adding
to
that,
I
think
something
really
good
about
the
goldilocks
proposal
is
that
the
the
reserve
ratio
isn't
too
low.
So
new
people
who
are
buying
tokens
aren't
like
inflating
the
price
so
quickly
that
they
can
never
compete
with
the
amount
of
tokens
held
by
the
hatchers.
D
It's
like
new
people
coming
in
are
able
to
get
like
a
good
amount
of
tokens
in
order
to
participate
in
governance,
and
then
we
also
have
this
opportunity
where
there
are
dow
votes
being
being
presented
and
being
available,
and
then
people
can
come
in
and
vote
and
we'll
be
encouraged
to
come
in
and
vote,
and
I
think
that
this
brings
more
people.
It's
also
like
in
alignment
with
our
mission
to
advance
token
engineering.
It's
like
we
want
to
have
participation,
participatory,
sorry,
collaborative
economics
where
people
are
participating
in
the
governance
structure.
B
Yeah,
that's
a
that's
a
good
point,
thank
you.
So
for
the
proposals
to
have
a
lower
reserve
ratio
like
mathematics
and
420,
do
you
think
that
could
also
incentivize
governance
somehow,
because
people
were
paying
more
attention
to
the
volatility
of
the
tokens,
so
they're
more
engaged
with
the
community
or
you
think
that
just
works
in
it?
That
is
independent
of
the
of
the
voter
behavior
that
it's
more
like
a
market
strategy.
C
I
would
say
that,
based
on
empirical
data,
we
will
have
no
shortage
of
votes.
There's
going
to
be
probably
a
covenant.
We
need
to
rewrite
to
take
into
account
this,
like
male
fans,
on
on
the
conviction,
voting
or
potential
male
fans
on
convention
money.
I
think
we'll
have
a
lot
of
voting
to
do
so.
I'm
I
guess,
I'm
less
concerned
about
having
enough
votes
to
make.
C
I
don't.
I
guess
I
would
say
the
big
thing
here
right
is
the
governance
like
the
the
ability
for
entrants
into
the
tec,
who
don't
currently
hold
tec
to
acquire
a
proportional
amount
of
governance,
and
I
think
this
is
the
big
point
and
there's
on
getting,
and
I
had
to
sign
the
exchange
on
the
forum
actually
and
around
around
this
as
well,
and
the
you
know
like
as
I
like,
as
I'm
imagining
like.
Oh,
how
can
like
there's
just
one
thing.
C
You
know,
I
think
that
we're
when
we
look
at
the
numbers
for
proposals
that
have
a
lower
market
cap-
and
you
know
something
like
wonka-
I
want
to
I'm
sorry-
I'm
going
to
point
this
out,
but
like
the
the
six
million
dollars,
so
it
would
only
take
six
million
dollars
to
basically
have
a
hostile
takeover
of
the
tec
with
ostrom's
baby
and
it
seems
like
six
million
dollars,
isn't
actually
that
much
money.
C
So
for
me,
that's
actually
a
big
risk,
and
so
in
tweaking
this
sort
of
like
how
do
we
get
that
a
little
higher
so
that
it's
like
less
less
interesting
to
try
to
take
over
the
entire
economy
from
hatchers
just
felt
like
an
unintended
consequences
was
like?
Oh,
no.
Anyone
who
comes
into
the
tc
isn't
going
to
have
proportionate
governance
rights
now
and
when
I
was
looking
when
I
was
thinking
about
like
well,
how
do
we
solve
this?
Okay?
C
Well,
maybe
you
turn
off
the
bonding
curve
like
what
are
the
out-of-the-box
thinking
solutions
for
this
kind
of
situation?
Maybe
it's
you
turn
off
the
bonding
curve
and
then
the
token
supply
stays
flat
right.
We
don't
it
doesn't
go
up
or
down
unless
we
we
decide
as
a
community
to
print
more
tokens.
C
Now,
it's
sort
of
you
know
under
our
own
control
and
in
zargham's
fireside
chat
last
night
he
made
a
convincing
argument
on
why
it
wouldn't
be
so
great
to
turn
off
the
bonding
curve
and
that
even
in
a
stable
economy,
the
bonding
curve
would
kind
of
be
impotent.
C
You
know
it
just
wouldn't
be
activated
because
there's
no
volatility
and
interest
in
the
arbitrage
from
primary
and
secondary
markets,
so
that
was
super
interesting
and
new
insights
all
the
time,
and
then
I
you
know
I
was
like
well,
what
is
the
ideal-
and
I
was
like?
Oh
my
god,
the
ideal
is
exactly
what
the
community
has
already
passed
and
proposed
to
do,
which
is
have
a
governance,
only
token
that
has
an
infinite
vesting
period.
C
That
is
never
going
to
be
a
price
token,
and
that
way
we
could
reward
people
who
are
participating
in
our
economy.
I
mean,
in
our
community
and
in
our
economy,
with
governance,
tokens
proportionate
to
governance,
that
hatchers
have
and
pay
them
a
forever
market
price.
In
terms
of
the
tec
tokens,
but
we
don't
have
it
so
in
my
mind,
that's
like
that's
the
deus
ex
machina
that
comes
and
fixes
everything
at
the
end.
We
we
don't
have
that
solution,
and
I
understand
there
is
sufficient
technical
challenges
to
having
that.
C
So
I
guess
I
guess,
if
anything
420
would
want
like
market
participants
would
realize
that
they're
out
whales,
unless
they
were
able
to
put
in
dozens
of
millions
of
dollars
into
the
economy
and
the
token
like
it's
a
commons.
It's
you
know,
we
want
open
source
software
and
research
and
and
and
education
it
doesn't
seem
like
you
know,
somebody
would
want
to
put
in
that
much
money
in
order
to
take
over
the
economy
with
with
a
mission
such
as
ours.
C
I
don't
know
if
that
answers
about
voting,
but
I
don't
I
don't
know.
I
think
the
I
think
that
we're
going
to
see
similar
to
what
we
see
now
and
with
voting,
and
it's
just
that
the
people
that
are
active
will
participate
in
voting
and
the
people
that
are
really
focused
on
other
things.
Will
delegate
and
the
key
to
a
successful
participation
is
going
to
have
active,
active
delegates
and
yeah?
That's
that's
what
I
think
is
going
to
actually
be
most
important,
then
trying
to
get
everyone
to
vote.
B
J
Like
yeah
it
it,
it
could
be
possible
to
have
that
a
hostile
takeover.
If
someone
bad
intention
places
6
million
inside
the
bonding
curve
just
in
a
buy,
but
also,
I
think
that
hatchers
are
going
to
participate
also
in
the
bonding
curve.
So
that's
why
I
think
that
the
governance
of
hatcher's
will
be
increased
with
the
bonding
curve
and
also
yeah.
J
I
think
that,
from
the
ethics
of
the
of
the
project
like
at
collaborative
economics
and
like
avoiding
to
create
a
technocracy
yeah,
the
this
scope
also
allows
not
only
bad
intention
people,
but
also
good
intentional
people
to
participate
in
the
project.
J
I
I
always
think
of
someone
like
me,
someone
who
just
have
like
one
year
actively
participating
in
a
dao
and
someone
who
maybe
can
come
new
and
make
a
an
impact
with
his
participation,
his
or
her
participation,
and
I
think
that
yeah
they
should
be
rewarded
and
also
yeah.
The
other
thing
that
that,
for
me
is
is
very
triggering
is
the
behavior
of
the
price
when
hatcher's
tokens
are
sold
and
yeah.
J
That's
something
that
that
also
concerns
me
and
one
good
strong
thing
about
ostrom's
baby
is
that
hatcher's
cancel,
half
per
half
of
of
of
their
tokens
and
the
price
of
the
token
wouldn't
be
cut
to
half,
but
in
other
proposals,
if
hatchers
sell
at
least
a
50,
the
price
of
the
token,
even
if
it
would
have
been
really
high
drops
below
one
so
yeah.
That's
that's
another
thing
that
that
scares
me,
and
this
is
more
related
about
sustainability.
J
F
A
comment,
thank
you
juan.
I.
I
just
want
to
add
a
comment
on
this
idea
of
like
what,
if
hatcher,
what
if
someone
comes
in
and
buys
six
million
dollars
worth
of
tokens
and
takes
over
the
dow.
F
F
But
while
this
takeover
is
happening,
if,
if
the
token
freezes
half,
if,
if
this
happens-
and
someone
takes
over
the
dow
and
the
people
who
are
in
it,
aren't
happy,
they
can
actually
go
and
start
another
comments.
Especially
this
comments.
I
think
we
could
spin
up
another
commons
and
just
add
a
smart
contract
line
that
says
this
guy
can't
do
it
or
we
add
a
little
fix
so
that
we
can
have
a
little
bit
more
control
over
who
what
whales
come
in
and
we
could
start.
F
I
A
Yeah,
and
with
with
with
the
with
the
proposals
that
have
the
low
reserve
ratio,
especially
if
you
have
somebody
who
puts
in
a
lot
of
money
and
this
this
fear
that
we're
we're
kind
of
preventing
newcomers
from
participating
in
the
governance
aspect
of
it.
I
think
that
I
I
have
the
assumption
that
you
know
if,
if
we
have
a
lot
of
money
coming
into
the
common
pool
or
the
the
economy
with
a
low
reserve
ratio
proposal
that
you
know
some
of
us
will
sell,
I
mean-
and
that's
totally
expected
and
that's
our
governance.
A
Power
will
slowly
decrease
over
the
long
term
and
that
distribution
of
governance
rights
will
be
spread
to
newcomers
and
over
over
time,
and
so
I
think
it's
a
it's
kind
of
a
sustainable
model.
In
terms
of
like
you
know,
we
see
the
return
on
the
gains
that
we've
gotten
in
terms
of
like
how
much
money
we
put
in
and
we
we
properly
and
slowly
gradually
distribute
this
governance
power
to
new
newcomers
that
are
participating
in
in
the
commons.
A
J
Also,
as
we
are
using
the
quadratics
like
yeah,
the
the
voting
power
of
whales,
get
gets
reduced
proportional
to
to
how
big
that
whale
is
so
yeah.
I
think
that
if
someone
buys
six
million
they
go,
they
won't
have
like
just
one
person
that
governance
it
would.
It
should
have
been,
or
it
should
be,
like
an
attack
of
someone
making
a
bunch
of
wallets
and
buying
and
being
like
an
able
mind
behind
a
lot
of
wallets.
C
J
Actually,
no
because
of
the
reserve
ratio
because
we
will
still
have
like
our
reserve.
So
that's
one
of
the
other
bad
things
of
of
having
a
very
low
reserve
ratio
that
the
there's
no
money
backing
the
the
token.
So
if
that
person
buys
and
then
tries
to
dump
a
lot
of
the
funds
will
stay
in
the
reserve
ratio
in
the
reserve
balance.
J
J
Actually
that
scenario
happens,
but
it's
really
easy
for
hatchers
to
take
all
the
funds
from
the
from
the
common
pool
with
a
low
reserve
ratio
and
that's
what
what
I
am
trying
to
say
that
if,
if
50
percent
of
hatcher
sell
the
price
of
the
trucking
below
goes
below
one
dollar
with
a
low
reserve
ratio.
K
K
On
one
hand,
this
would
give
us
a
lot
of
money
for
the
commons
pool
through
the
tribute,
while
granting
them
very
little
voting
power
because
of
this
low
reserve
ratio,
which
they
would
give,
they
would
get
relatively
little
little
tokens
while
still
funding
a
lot
of
money
for
the
common
pool
which
well
is,
is
an
option.
It's
not
necessarily
bad.
K
Well,
yeah,
maybe
depends
on.
On
I
mean
one
billion
is,
is
isn't
little
money
anyway,
but
the
risk
is
that,
with
the
low
with
the
high
reserve
ratio,
this
this
is
going
to
be
like
that
for
way
higher
market
caps,
because
the
price,
the
relationship
isn't
going
to
change
significantly.
So,
okay,
we
have
1
million
and
6
million
to
buy,
but
if
we
have
suddenly
30
million
in
the
in
the
reserve
balance
the
the
the
balance
will
be
the
same
and
suddenly
it
becomes
more
interesting,
so
yeah.
I
D
D
So
like
it's
also
something
to
consider
it's
like
with
the
low
reserve
ratio,
the
pump
and
dump
it'll
just
be
like
more
volatile,
even
for
the
person
just
doing
it
like
I
mean
if
they
pump
the
price
and
then
more
people
bought
tokens
and
then
they
held
their
tokens.
They
would
have
this
perceived
wealth
that
they're,
like
yeah.
I
got
so
many
tokens
and
then
they're
super
high
in
value,
but
if
they
were
to
dump
all
their
tokens,
then
the
price
would
drop
so
fast.
B
Yeah,
I
think,
yeah,
that
was
a
very
interesting
discussion.
I
think
the
sustainability
question
was
covered
with
all
that
has
been
going
around,
but
there
is
one
last
scenario
in
governance
that
I
wanted
to
hear:
what
the
proposal,
the
proposals,
how
are
they
addressing
it
or
how
they
think
about
it?
So
there
is
a
very
common
governance
failure
that
happened
in
the
maker,
dow
community,
that
many
dows
are
prone
to
that.
B
That
is
just
the
majority
of
people
who
has
tokens,
are
inactive
in
governance,
or
not
only
inactive
in
governance,
but
disconnected
from
the
mission
of
the
dao
and
the
core
contributors,
so
they
are
not
making
if
they
were
to
vote
their
decisions
were
not
aligned
with
the
people
who
have
been
contributing
more
closely
to
the
project.
So
how
do
you
think
we
could
avoid
something
like
that
from
happening,
and
is
there
any
proposal
that
is
addressing
that.
H
Oh,
my
god,
can
I
respond
to
that
without
any
proposals
or
anything
like
not
being
on
any
of
those.
It
just
made
me
think
of
being
in
the
military.
How
does
the
commander
operate
or
like
control
an
entire
organization?
H
H
We
need
to
be
like
presenting
somehow
the
operation
to
those
people
in
order
for
them
to
like
get
up
here
really
fast.
It's
about
situational
awareness
is,
like
my
theory,
that's
like
what
I
wanted
to
add
to
that
piece.
It's
like
totally
possible
and
we
just
don't
have
a
front
end
for
it.
Yet.
K
Malicious
can
I
can
I
take
the
word
yeah
yeah,
I
think
in
the
yeah,
like
you
said,
most
token
holders
just
don't
care
and
don't
really
get
involved
in
governance.
I
think
that
the
delegate
system
is
actually
the
the
most
realistic
solution.
K
We
have
a
very
involved
community
and
having
delegates
voting
on
the
on
the
tell
issues
which
are
maybe
a
bit
more
more
complex
is
going
to
be
what
it
what
ends
up
happening,
and
I
think
we
have
a
great
comps
team,
which
will
make
amazing
work,
communicating
everything
and
it's
great,
that
we
have
these
voting
extensions
and
this
quite
ending
periods
and-
and
so,
but
I
think
I
expect
the
community
to
get
more
involved
in
the
in
the
actual
garden
and
conviction
voting,
and
I
think
that
is
that
is
okay,
because
what
we
are
trying
to
do
is
mainly
is
to
fund
public
goods
and
and
set
projects
in
motion.
K
So
I
think
once
well,
with
this
guardian,
gardner's
dynamic
of
staking
on
a
proposal
and
you
and
which
mean,
which
is
makes
you
actively
involved
in
it.
It
evolves
emotionally
and
what
you're
funding
and
what
you're
voting
for
and
then
you
can
follow
the
team
and
it's
way
more
personal
than
just
some
abstract
down
parameters
which
which
we
are
maybe
changing
or
maybe
not,
which
I
think
can
be
delegated
to
the
to
the
to
the
core
team
and
and
the
stewards
which
will
change
and
which
are
accountable
to
the
community.
K
B
Yeah,
thank
you.
Maybe
just
a
clarification
to
that.
Then.
I
think
there
are
many
cultural
ways
of
addressing
that
problem,
but
I
was
curious
if
that
was
somehow
present
in
the
parameters
and
maybe
to
what
you're
saying
again,
the
delegation
period
could
have
something
to
do
with
that.
D
Just
taking
a
moment
for
nate's
college
to
get
you're
like,
oh
no,
oh
no!
I
have
a
few
things
to
say
I
mean
I
I
guess
like
with
the
well
first,
I
want
to
say:
did
you
guys
know
because
I
didn't
know
this
before
we
launched
the
giveaway?
That
delegation
is
only
valid
for
dow
voting
and
not
for
conviction
voting,
so,
okay,
cool
cool,
so
yeah.
I
think
that
you
know
yeah,
I
think,
for
dow
voting
having
the
well
okay.
D
I
could,
I
could
argue
goldilocks
here
I
want
to
just
say
in
general,
but
then
all
why
goldilocks
does
a
good
job
of
this.
It's
like
with
the
I
think.
The
delegates
in
the
goldilocks
proposal
have
good
power
because,
like
dealt
contentiousness
in
the
delegate's
vote,
can
trigger
the
quiet,
ending
extension
because
it's
like
so
there's
a
five-day
vote-
duration,
three-day
delegated
voting
period,
but
then
also
like
three-day
quiet,
ending
period.
So
there's
this
like
one
day
in
the
middle,
which
is
like
my
middle
finger,
it's
it
is
the.
D
It
is
the
day
where
the
delegates
can
flip
the
vote
and
then
so.
If
the
delegates
flip
the
vote,
then
there's
this
this
extension,
then
we
get
more
people
coming
in
being
like
oh
wow,
like
the
delegates
who
are
like
maybe
hatchers
or
like
people
in
the
community
who
are
really
active
like
there's
contentiousness
around
this,
and
I
think
that
this
is
like
then
attractive
to
to
bring
people
in
to
wonder
like
what's
happening
like.
D
Why
is
this
vote
contentious
and
then
and
then
I,
I
think
the
ability,
the
ability
for
the
delegates
to
trigger
the
quiet,
ending
extension
can
really
increase
like
more
people
coming
in,
but
in
general.
I
think
the
problem
with
the
voter
apathy
and
and
participation
is
like
something
that
is
like
the
same
for
for
all
the
proposals.
D
It's
just
like
you
know,
increasing
our
communications
and
and
and
like
trying
to
get
people
excited
about
what's
going
on
and
bring
people
as
active
members
in
the
community,
but
I
think
that
that's
valid
for
every
proposal.
C
Maybe
I'll
just
add
you
know,
of
course
I
think
it's
definitely
going
to
be
cultural
like
using
using
the
forum
is
a
great
way
to
get
people
to
see
things
that
are
that
are
happening
outside
of
these
calls
and
are
you
know
very
fast,
moving
discord
where
people
can't
really
catch
up,
and
then
I
think
you
know
the
there's
three
proposals
that
have
longer
vote
times.
C
I
think
giving
the
community
time
to
review
so
that
the
three
that
have
a
week
or
more
is
mathematics,
astrums
and
bolsheviks.
I
feel
like
giving
time
to
these
kind
of
proposals
also
can
encourage
more
participation
in
the
vote
so
trade-off.
You
know
it's
sort
of
there's
gonna
be
there's
gonna,
be
negative
consequences
to
slower
moving
votes
as
well.
L
I'm
just
curious:
you've
spoken
a
bit
about
treasury,
not
so
much
treasury
management,
but
like
attack
vectors
in
terms
of
sort
of
attack
via
sort
of
token
ownership.
L
You
mentioned
that
you're
doing
quadratic
voting,
so
you
know
I
assume
that
will
give
you
some
level
of
protection,
but
in
terms
of
your
treasury
distribution.
Is
that
all
in
your
own
token,
or
do
you
do
sort
of
treasury
swaps
with
other
dows?
Is
that
something
the
strategy.
L
It's
only
next
time
yeah
and
is
that
something
you've
ever
considered
then
sort
of
treasury
swaps,
sort
of
lining
with
other
dowels
and.
M
We
have,
we
have
set
up
a
multisig
actually
to
start
exploring
that
right
now
we're
focused
on
launching
this
thing,
but
it's
definitely
in
our
sights
that
we
would
like
to
do
token
swaps
in
the
future,
with
tec.
K
Cool,
thank
you
all
right,
sorry
go
ahead
and
again
yeah
I
mean
I
I
think
we'd
have
to
say.
Even
if
they're
the
treasury
of
the
tc
is
going
to
be
x-tie,
the
tc
will
own
a
substantial
amount
of
tc
tokens
which
we
will
buy
the
moment.
We
open
the
bonding
curve.
So
we
will,
we
will
have
them.
We
will
not.
We
don't
want
to
use
them.
B
Yeah
also,
the
rewards
from
the
reward
system
are
going
to
be
distributed
into
ec
tokens.
So
we
make
sure
that
people
who
are
participants
that
are
contributing
they
have
governance
power
from
there,
and
I
was
I
was
going
to
ask
griff
also
to
share
a
little
bit
about
how
conviction
voting
is
a
mechanism
that
somehow
fights
cebu
attacks
in
its
own
way.
F
Yeah,
it
mitigates
plutocracy
with
time,
so
it's
slightly
it's
different
than
quadratic
voting,
which
mitigates
it
with
identity,
but
with
with
quadratic
with
conviction
voting
when
you
vote
it
takes
time
for
your
power
to
build
so
whales
can't
just
pass
proposals
and
the
community
has
time
to
react
to
what
whales
do
and
yeah
it's
not
it's
not
adding
an
individual
perspective,
but
it
does
mitigate
plutocracy
with
time.
D
Oh
I'm
just
gonna
say
I
mean
to
this
point
of
like
with
the
initial
buy.
The
tc
is
gonna,
be
holding
a
bunch
of
tc
tokens
that
we
could
also
use
like
for
governance
and
for
participation.
It's
it's
there's
slide.
21
in
the
voters.
Pamphlet
actually
shows
the
amount
of
tec
that
each
proposal
is
getting
out,
and
you
know
they're
between
a
hundred
and
fifty
thousand
and
two
hundred
forty
thousand,
except
for
420,
which
is
actually
only
65,
000
gec.
Just
so.