►
From YouTube: Trust Over IP: Hyperledger Ursa, Indy, and Aries
Description
In this virtual meetup hosted by Hyperledger Toronto, Stephen Curran talks about three of Hyperledger's newest projects. This presentation covers Ursa, Indy and Aries - Linux Foundation's Hyperledger projects which will add the long-missing identity layer to the Internet. Stephen goes over the important new paradigm these projects enable, discussing verifiable credentials and why distributed ledger technology is crucial to establishing new ways of perceiving 'Trust over IP'. He covers how you can get started building on top of these projects and - if you want - how you can contribute to them.
For a primer before the webinar, see https://trustoverip.org.
More about the event is at: https://www.meetup.com/Hyperledger-Toronto/events/271056817/
----
Hyperledger – Open Source Blockchain Technologies
Hyperledger is an open source community focused on developing a suite of stable frameworks, tools and libraries for enterprise-grade blockchain deployments.
It serves as a neutral home for various distributed ledger frameworks including Hyperledger Besu, Fabric, Sawtooth, Indy, as well as tools like Hyperledger Avalon, Cactus and libraries like Hyperledger Aries, Ursa. Learn more about Hyperledger projects: https://www.hyperledger.org/use
Case Studies: https://www.hyperledger.org/learn/case-studies
Training & Certification: https://www.hyperledger.org/learn/training
Tutorials: https://www.hyperledger.org/use/tutorials
Webinars: https://www.hyperledger.org/learn/webinars
Events: https://www.hyperledger.org/events
Vendor Directory: https://www.hyperledger.org/use/vendor-directory
Subscribe to the Hyperledger Newsletter: https://www.hyperledger.org/newsletter
Follow-us on Twitter @Hyperledger
Learn about Hyperledger Membership: https://www.hyperledger.org/about/join
#Hyperledger #HyperledgerMeetups #Blockchain
A
All
right,
everyone
welcome
and
good
evening
welcome
to
the
hyper
ledger:
Toronto
Group,
June,
30th
event,
I
hope
everyone
is
safe
and
have
been
able
to
enjoy
the
warm
summer
weather
and
ready
for
Canada
Day
tomorrow.
My
name
is
Laszlo
Sandow
and
I'm.
One
of
the
co-organizers
of
this
meetup
group
and
I
have
with
me
Jonathan
and
carnism,
who
helps
me
to
manage
this
event
as
well.
This
is
our
second
event
of
the
month
and
with
that
I
think
we
are
one
the
most
active
group
in
hyper
ledger
community
and
really
proud
of
that.
A
At
the
beginning
of
June,
we
had
a
session
on
hydrology
fabric
for
specialized
marketplaces,
and
we
are
already
planning
on
planning
the
next
session
for
the
second
part
of
July
I
hope
you
will
be
able
to
join
in.
Please
keep
keep
checking
were
a
meet-up
website,
or
today's
topic
and
presenter
was
invited
to
respond
to
you
guys
were
members
requests
based
on
the
survey,
what
we
run
at
the
end
of
last
year,
where
many
of
you
showed
interest
in
decentralized
identity
and
typology
in
the
project.
A
Our
presenter
today,
who
I
met
a
few
months
ago
in
Phoenix
Arizona,
and
we
had
the
hyper
ledger
Global
Forum,
which
was
an
amazing
event.
According
to
me,
I
met
a
lot
of
active
members
of
the
community.
Amazing
presenters,
great
representations,
I
encourage
you
all
to
check
out
the
YouTube
channels
where
all
these
presentations
available
and
one
of
the
session,
which
I
was
the
most
proud
of,
was
actually
with
Steven
Curran,
and
now
we
have
him
presenting
today
and
he's
from
cloud
compassed
computing.
A
He
is
also
a
software
development
and
dev
ops,
veteran
who
don't
fall
onto
following
into
the
identity
on
blockchain
world
in
2017,
working
with
the
government
of
British
Columbia
Stephen
has
helped
define,
build,
build
and
learn
verifiable
organization
network,
which
is
a
product
production
instance
of
hyper
ledger
in
D
and
E
Ria's.
That
makes
public
information
about
organizations
in
BC
available
in
form
of
verifiable
credentials.
A
Steven
is
a
regular
contributor
in
the
indian
IRA's
communities
facilitating
collaborations
and
driving
interoperability.
He
is
also
a
co-author
on
hyper
ledger,
EDX
course
on
Indian,
Erie's
and
versa.
Also
high-quality
technical
ambassador
and
member
of
the
sovereign
foundation.
Technical
governance
board
before
just
giving
it
over
to
Stephen
I
like
to
remind
all
of
you
to
please.
A
If
you
have
a
question,
use
the
Q&A
function,
I
believe
it's
at
the
bottom
of
the
window
or
there
is
a
Q&A
button.
You
can
post
your
questions
and
at
the
end
we
will
have
some
time.
Wizard
for
answering
those
and
Stephen
is
nice
to
provide
us
the
slides.
So
we
will
post
a
URL
link
on
the
meetup
site
after
the
event.
So
having
that
said,
please
welcome
Stephen
Curran,
please
take
it
away.
A
B
Be
here,
okay,
so
what
it's
get
into
present
mode,
so
let
me
go
into,
but
make
sure
you
guys
can
see
the
screen
we'll
go
from
there.
Okay,
yep
all
right
economy,
scale,
digital
trust,
nice,
bold
statement
to
begin
with
it,
you
know
controversial,
as
can
be,
you
know
it's
in
red
and
everything
Trust
is
broken
on
the
internet,
not
actually
controversial
at
all.
Everyone
knows
that
everyone
feels
that
everyday.
B
This
1993,
this
New
Yorker
cartoon
was
published
and
it's
still
pretty
much
the
same
today,
27
argues
later
it's
still
used
on
every
trust
and
verifiable
credentials
slide
deck.
There
is
so
today
would
you
buy
a
house
they
sold
and
the
information
provided
you
electronically
from
a
seller
not
from
others
around
the
seller,
but
the
seller
themselves,
applying
to
college
with
university
admit
a
student
just
based
on
the
information
that
the
student
sent
them
given.
B
You
know
all
of
the
fun
they
had
last
year
with
bribery
and
so
on,
in
getting
into
universities,
yeah,
probably
they're,
not
gonna,
trust
the
students
and
we've
all
received
these.
Would
you
help
out
a
Nigerian
prince
moving
30
million
dollars
for
a
30%
Commission,
it's
a
good
deal,
but
today's
technology,
you
probably
wouldn't
do
it.
So
that's
what
we're
going
to
talk
about
today.
These
relate
to
three
projects
in
hypervisor.
B
B
About
and
then
Ursa
is
it's
the
cryptography.
That
is
the
basis
of
the
other
two
projects.
So
again,
I'll
put
those
all
in
context
as
I
go
through
this
there's
another
Linux
Foundation
organization,
another
foundation,
yes
foundation.
We
talked
to
those
so
trust
over
IP
is
a
new
foundation
that
just
started
in
March.
B
That
is
looking
at
all
of
this
and
I'll
talk
about
the
trust
over
IP
stack
as
we
go
through
this,
but
it
is
another
place
where
somewhat
broader
than
just
the
in
the
Indian
Aires
parts
of
it,
which
is
the
technical
part
of
it
trusts
over
IP,
goes
into
further
places
to
enable
trusts
in
the
internet
and
again,
I'm
gonna
go
further
into
that.
But
just
start
on
the
conversation
I'll
begin
with
the
paper
credential
model
and
I
put
out
the
days
the
dates
when
it
was
most
used.
B
450
BC,
a
Persian
King,
gave
a
guy
named
Nehemiah
paper,
credential
a
piece
of
paper
that
he
signed.
The
King
signed
that
grant
him
safe
passage
across
the
lands.
He
was
traveling
across
Persia
and
he
needed
to
be
safe,
and
so
the
King
gave
him
a
note
and
signed
it
and
handing
it
over,
and
that
was
the
first
known
use
of
a
paper
credential
we
put
in
a
deadline
here
of
1970
where
paper
credentials
began
their
downward
spiral
and
that's
basically,
when
printers
became
readily
available
in
the
hands
of
people.
B
First,
it
companies
where
you
could
get
a
hold
of
and
use
the
company
printer
and
then
personal
printers
that
you
could
use
and
that
made
the
the
ability
to
use
paper
credentials
as
they
had
been
used.
All
that
time
it
began
to
drop
because
people
could
make
their
own
credentials.
So
well,
it's
the
strong.
What
a
pro
credential
model
is
so
you're
familiar
with
it
I'm
just
gonna
recount
it
so
that
you're
you're
thinking
about
it.
B
B
Often
used
for
in
banks-
and
things
is
your
address,
so
a
credential
could
even
be
just
simply
a
utility
bill
that
you
take
somewhere
and
show
somebody
those
are
giving
to
the
holder.
The
holder
uses
can
do
whatever
they
want
with
them
and
and
uses
them
and
with
verifiers
independent
of
the
issuer.
So
the
one
of
the
key
things
here
is
that
but
paper
credential
is
handled
over
and
then
the
whole
that
are
is
in
control
and
they
can
use
it
wherever
they
want.
B
They
give
it
to
a
verifier,
a
bank
to
say:
oh,
yes,
look,
this
is
my
ID
for
the
government.
This
is
my
driver's
license.
This
is
my
address
because
BC
Hydro
says
it's
my
address.
You
can
see
this
piece
of
paper
that
I've
got.
That's
got
my
name
and
my
address
on
it.
So
that's
the
paper
credential
model,
the
proof
given
in
a
paper
credential
model
is
who
issued
the
credential
some
way
are
on
the
credential.
B
There's
a
thing
that
says
you
know
issued
by
the
province
of
British,
Columbia
or
the
province
of
Ontario
or
the
Government
of
Canada
there's
something
that
binds
the
credential
to
the
person.
That's
handing
it
over
to
you
so
a
picture
on
it,
the
name
of
the
person
on
the
utility
bill,
something
like
that
and
then
the
fact
that
the
claims
are
unchanged
now.
This
is
where
you
know,
printers
getting
the
way
and
Photoshop
gets
into
the
way.
You
know
if
I
have
to
prove
my
address
by
showing.
B
Live
at
whatever
I
address
I
want
to
live
at.
So
the
fact
that
the
claims
are
unchanged
becomes
a
thing
that
the
verifier
has
to
determine.
They
have
to
be
able
to
look
at
the
document
in
the
experts
in
forgery,
detection
and
so
on.
What's
implied
once
you
do,
that
is,
though,
trust
and
Trust
is
an
important
term
here,
because
it's
who
are
you
trusting?
You
actually
are
not
necessarily
trusting
the
holder
themselves.
B
You
are
somewhat
trusting
them
that
they
presented
it
and
probably
the
claims
unchanged
piece
of
it
is
a
trust
of
the
holder,
but
more
your
trusting
who
issued
the
credential.
What
well
under
what
authority
do
they
have
to
issue
credentials?
So
we
can
look
at
it
like
this
there's
sort
of
two
parts
to
in
in-person
trust.
There's
the
technology.
Does
the
document
look
legitimate?
Does
it
have
what
all
the
other
you
know,
passports
have
and
make
it
look
like
it's
real.
Is
it
you
know
these
days?
B
B
Base
to
whether
you
trust
the
credential
and
then
there's
a
governance
base.
What
value
do
you
get
from
trusting
where
it
is?
So
you
know
the
money
piece
Bank
of
Canada
issues,
and
everyone
knows
that
the
Bank
of
Canada's
I,
don't
know
the
government,
so
you
know
it's
it's
trustworthy
as
long
as
I.
Don't
think
this
is
a
forgery.
I
can
trust
that
if
I
get
$20
I
can
take
it
to
the
bank
and
get
it
cashed
in
or
I
can
take
it
to
them.
B
I
don't
know
wherever
I
can
pay
the
government
with
it
and
things
like
that.
All
of
that
represents
the
governance
of
the
issuer
and
then
what
that
allows
you
to
zoo.
So
things
like
a
driver's
license
comes
from
the
the
province
of
British
Columbia,
their
authority
comes
from
legislation.
It
allows
them
to
do
that.
We
work
a
lot
with
BC
registries
on
organisations.
Bc
registries
is
the
thing
which
registers
companies
and
organizations
partnerships
and
so
on
their
authority
comes
from
legislation.
Again.
The
government
says
BC
registries.
Your
job
is
to
register
every.
B
And
until
BC
registry
says,
oh
yeah,
your
organization,
it's
registered,
it's
not
registered,
it
doesn't
have
a
legal
standing
if
you
will
so
in
person,
trust
a
combination
of
technology
and
government.
So
what
about
a
digital
credentials
model?
What
does
it
change
when
we
are
presenting
data
over
the
Internet
in
the
model
we've
had
up
till
now?
The
way
we
present
the
data
is
we
type
it
into
a
box
on
the
screen
we
type
it
in
ourselves.
B
B
Prove
your
age,
you
don't
want
the
liquor
store,
then
going
back
and
saying:
hey
government.
Is
this
person
really
this
age
and
having
them
confirm
it?
We
want
to
continue
with
that
paper
credential
model
where
it's
independent
of
the
issuer,
the
verification
process.
The
way
we
do
that
is,
we
use
the
blockchain
and
so
we'll
talk
about
where
the
blockchain
comes
in.
What
is
it
done?
Is
the
data
goes
on
the
blockchain,
so.
B
About
four
more
times
as
I
go
through
this,
the
data
is
still
given
to
you
on
a
credential
the
equivalent
to
you
know
the
issue
to
the
driver's
license
or
whatever.
What
goes
on
to
the
blockchain
is
cryptographic
material
necessary
to
prove
the
components
of
what
we
want
to
prove
with
credential
witches
who
issued
the
credential?
Who
was
at
issue
to
have
the
claims
been
unchanged
and
and
because
we
can
do
this.
B
You
can
also
say
three
things
that
we
test
in
the
paper:
credential
model
we
test
in
the
digital
credential
model,
and
then
we
add
is
fourth.
The
nice
thing
here
is
that
using
cryptography,
those
things
that
we
prove
1,
2,
3,
&
4,
are
are
as
long
as
we
trust
that
the
underlying
cryptography,
those
are
rock-solid.
There's
none
of
this
trying
to
guess
if
the
license
that
I
was
handed
by
this
student,
who
goes
to
the
University,
is
a
real
one
or
one
that
they
bought
off.
The
internet.
B
I
actually
can
look
at
all
of
these
cryptographically,
and
no
it's
not
to
know
that
these
are
true.
What
remains,
though,
is,
does
the
issuer,
but
does
the
verifier
trust
the
issuer
so
that
that
trust
model
comes
into
place?
This
really,
this
use
of
digital
credentials
really
takes
out
of
whether
you
trust
the
holder
or
not.
You
can
totally
trust
the
holder,
because
all
of
the
cryptography
says
that
what
the
holder
is
presenting
is
absolutely
true.
The
challenge
becomes,
do
you
trust
the
issue
or
under
what
authority?
B
B
A
A
A
B
B
A
A
B
A
B
So
here's
what
I'm
gonna
do
in
this
demo
is
I'm
going
to
show
I'm
sort
of
a
wallet
which
is
an
app
I
can
run
on
my
on
my
phone
I'm
gonna
show
an
issuer.
That's
gonna
verify
my
email
address.
It's
going
to
give
me
a
credential
based
on
that
and
then
it's
good
and
then
I'm
going
to
use
that
credential
at
another
site
to
verify
my
identity
and
okay.
It
just
spun
around.
That's
all.
It's
gonna
keep.
A
B
On
me,
okay,
I'll
start
with
any
e-mail
verification.
So
this
is
a
service.
British
Columbia
runs
in
the
I've,
got
a
link
to
how
you
can
run
this
demo
yourself,
download
the
the
mobile
app
and
so
on.
So
the
service
works,
like
you,
would
expect
an
e-mail
verification,
service,
I
started
up,
I
submit
my
email
address
and
it
sends
me
an
email
that
I'm
going
to
use
to
pop
up
another
screen
which
demonstrates
that
I
have
control
over
my
email
address.
B
B
B
There
we
go,
we
can
see
my
cell
phone
again
so
I'm
going
to
go
to
an
app
called
trinsic,
which
is
a
wallet
whoops
that
run
so
I'm,
spinning
up
the
trinsic
wallet
and
I.
All
I've
done
is
initialized.
It
installed
it
and
initialized
it.
So
I
don't
have
any
credentials
but
I'm
going
to
scan
a
code.
It's
gonna
ask
me
to
do
that
and
I'm
going
to
spin
and
I'm
gonna
whoops.
B
B
Man,
I
am
just
not
having
fun
I
just
lost
the
screen.
It
was
on.
Okay,
scan
it
one
more
time
and
we'll
try
that
once
more
there
we
go
so
I've
got
an
accept
auction.
So
what
it's
doing
is
saying:
hey.
Do
you
want
to
connect
to
this
service?
So
we
can
offer
you
a
credential,
so
I'm
going
to
accept
that
so
it's
accepted
it
and
then
I'm
going
to
wait
for
a
second
and
it's
going
to
offer
me
a
credential.
B
So
it's
saying
hey:
this
is
the
e-mail
verification
service
and
I'm
gonna
offer
you
a
credential
that,
because
you've
proven
you
control
this
email
address
now
think
of
this
as
something
like
what
would
happen?
If
you
went
to
your
driver's
license
bureau,
you
would
prove
who
you
are
and
then
the
driver's
license
bureau
would
present
you
to
offer
you
a
credential
that
you
could
accept.
So
it's
the
same
sort
of
scenario
I'm
trying
to
simulate
here.
B
A
Stupid
if
this
service
would
be
actually,
as
you
mentioned,
a
driver
license,
and
if
this
British
Columbians
service
would
be
you
know
issuing
you.
A
digital
version
of
the
driver
license
yeah
going
through
the
same
process.
What
you
just
presented
with
the
email
at
the
end,
in
my
wallet
there
would
be
a
digital
driver
license
what
I
can
bring
my
bank
or
president
to
whoever
needs
me
for
verifying
my
identity.
Is
that
correct.
B
Correct,
that's
exactly
right,
yeah,
so
and
and
we've
got
proof
of
concepts
in
British
Columbia
to
do
exactly
that.
We
see,
has
a
digital,
you
know
digitally
enabled
driver's
license
program,
and-
and
so
we
offer
sort
of
an
hola
version,
I
think
it
is
of
driver's
license.
We
actually
use
that
to
prove
who
we
are,
and
then
we
can
get
a
digital
credential
like
this,
so
I
I
now
have,
in
my
wallet
a
email,
verification
service
credential.
B
So
now
what
I'm
going
to
do
is
I'm
going
to
go
to
this
second
website
that
you
can
see
I'm
going
to
connect
to
it
and
what
you're
gonna
see
is
hey.
Look
at
that
another
one
of
these
things,
so
I
will
scan
the
code
and
this
time
I've
connected
again.
This
service
now
wants
to
connect
me,
so
this
is
a
what's
called
it
verifies.
So
this
is
the
verifier
side.
So
what
it's
going
to
do?
B
Is
it's
going
to
get
me
to
verify
my
email
address
and
then
once
it
has
it's
going
to
offer
me
a
credential
to
say
that
I
attended
a
conference
in
this
case.
So
in
this
case
now
what
it's
doing
it
says:
I've
received
a
request
for
proof
of
credentials.
So
it's
asking
me
for
proof
of
my
verified
email
address
and
it's
asking
me
to
expose.
You
know
to
hand
over
that
information.
So
this
is
the
old
school
in
the
old
school
way.
B
I
would
type
this
in
and
then
they
would
have
to
figure
out
if
they
could
trust
that
email
address.
They'd
have
to
do
something
with
it
in
this
way,
because
they
trust
the
issue
or
the
e-mail
verification
service.
In
this
case,
which
you
know
how
much
did
would
trust
that
but
I'm
able
to
present
my
credential
now
that's
gone
off
and
communicated
back
to
this
service,
and
this
service
is
now
going
to.
B
Offer
me
a
credential,
so
now
it's
going
to
get
me
to
type
in
some
information.
In
this
case
it's
just
self
attested
information.
It's
going
to
say:
I
went
to
hyper
ledger
global
forum,
so
this
is
again
just
an
example.
I'm
going
to
submit
that,
but
it's
intended
to
show
you
know
the
interface,
the
the
interchange,
that's
going
to
happen
between
a
if
you
were
the
holder
being
the
wallet
and
then
a
verifier.
So
now
this
this
and
I
timed
out.
B
That
was
one
of
the
worst
demos
I've
ever
done
of
this,
but
hopefully
it
got
the
point
across
of
this
model
of
the
equivalent
to
paper
credential
an
issuer
issues
to
holder
the
holder,
then
then
can
present
that
information
to
a
verifier
and
the
verifier,
assuming
they
know
who
be
the
issuer,
is
or
can
find
out
who
the
issuer
is
and
then
decides.
If
they
can
trust
that
issuer,
they
offer
some
sort
of
service
to
the
person
whatever
the
business
utility
is
around.
That.
B
The
so
a
credential
consists
of
multiple
claims.
The
idea
here
that
we're
trying
to
achieve
is
that
you
get
an
identity
credential
from
the
BC
government,
in
the
context
of
say,
a
services
card
or
a
driver's
license,
but
another
use
case
that
we
have
that
we're
actually
implementing
right
now
is
the
Ministry
of
Justice
has
a
system
that
they
only
want
lawyers
to
be
able
to
use.
How
do
you
prove
you're,
a
lawyer?
B
One
way
to
do
that?
Is
you
get
a
membership
card
from
the
Law
Society
of
British
Columbia?
What
if
the
Law
Society
of
British
Columbia
gave
you
a
credential?
That
said,
yes,
you
are
a
fine
upstanding
member
you're,
a
lawyer,
and
then
you
then
can
go
to
this
government
system
and
prove
your
lawyer
and
nobody
else.
People
that
are
not
lawyers
would
not
be
issued.
That
credential
would
not
be
able
to
use
it.
What
it
allows
is
anyone
can
be
an
issuer
and
if
people
trust
them,
their
credentials
can
be
used.
B
So
it
allows
a
much
finer
grained
sense
of
what
identity
is
in
the
context.
It's
important
in
a
government
service
you're
trying
to
obtain.
Maybe
your
government
ID
is
important,
but
if
you're
you
know,
if
you're
a
doctor,
the
health
system
would
care
that.
What
are
your
credentials
as
a
doctor,
if
you're
signing
plans
for
buildings,
the
the
planner
would
want
to
know
that
you're
an
engineer.
So
all
sorts
of
contacts
come
out
where
you
could
prove
that
you're,
a
member
of
whatever
group
it
is
you
want
further.
B
All
of
these
membership
cards
are
sitting
in
your
wallet
just
like
your
paper.
Ones
are,
and
you
can
choose
when
to
when
to
present
them
and
when
not
to
present
them
and
we'll
get
into
this
in
a
bit.
What
parts
of
the
credential
you
want
to
present.
So
that's
the
power
of
this
model.
It
really
changes
how
you
would
go
about
doing
these
transactions
and
and
how
you
would
accept
the
data
as
a
verifier
can.
A
B
B
Those
models
are
not
used.
The
literal
goes
into
here.
It's
encrypted,
it's
signed
and
it's
controlled
by
the
holder.
The
protections
on
its
use
are
all
of
the
phone
protections.
You
know:
biometric
protection
to
access
the
the
wallet,
so
your
fingerprint
checking
or
whatever
is
necessary.
So
that's
the
control
there,
the
part
of
the
protection
of
privacy.
Is
you
now
control
who
you're
going
to
share
them
with,
because
the
data
can
be
trusted.
The
relying
parties,
the
the
people
that
are
asking
for
your
credentials,
don't
have
to
collect
over
collect
data
about
you.
B
They
can
just
collect
what
they
need,
knowing
that
they
can
trust.
What
do
you
provide
if
you're
able
to
provide
it?
If
you're
able
to
provide
proof
that
you're
a
citizen
of
British
Columbia,
because
you
have
a
card
or
a
resident
of
British
Columbia,
because
you
have
a
card,
they
don't
need
to
know
anything
else
about
you.
They
just
need
to
know
that,
if
that's
the
case
is
so
hopefully.
B
Backups
are
necessary,
so
there's
work
going
on
with
a
so
like
how
you
back
it
up.
Trinsic
allows
you
to
back
it
out
and
then
what
you
do
in
the
back
for
those
familiar
with
blockchain
it's
it's
similar
to
like
other
methods,
which
is
you
want
to
put
the
backup
somewhere
encrypt
it,
and
then
you
want
the
key
to
the
backup
put
somewhere
else.
Keep
those
two
apart
until
you
need
to
restore
something,
but
the
wallet
can
be
restored
in
in
different
ways.
B
B
You
know
brute
force
attacks,
but
yes,
there
is
a
need
to
have
the
wallet
backed
up
so
so
part
of
the
responsibility
of
the
wallet
app
is
to
make
sure
that
you
have
ways
of
recovering
it
and
there's
there's
various
ways
that
are
that
are
being
created
and
defined
for
how
that
that
happens.
But
basically
is
it's
like
a
Bitcoin
wallet
you,
you
need
to
have
the
key.
A
B
There's
a
other
link
that
I'm
going
to
provide
here,
which
talks
about
one
of
the
things
we're
doing.
Nbc
is
a
possible
concept
for
Koba,
19
tracking
and
basically
it
allows
people
to
create
a
physical
access
point
while
using
credentials.
It's
kind
of
replaces
the
you
know
the
visitors
record
book
that
you
see
here
on
the
screen
that
people
have
used
for
years.
B
This
is
really
not
going
to
cut
it
if
you're
trying
to
prove
you
know
that
person
is
an
essential
worker
that
they're
supposed
to
be
at
a
you
know
a
care
home,
for
example,
and
they
have
a
testing
status
code,
19
testing
status.
Something
like
that.
So
that's
what
this
safe
entry
BC
is
is
about
and
it's
linked
in
there.
So
you
can
give
that
a
try.
It
takes
you
through.
B
B
Yeah
there
you
go
so
what
I'd
like
to
now
come
back
to
so,
hopefully
that's
it
for
the
demos
and,
as
I
say
a
little
rough,
but
hopefully
you've
got
the
point.
What
I
wanted
to
come
back
with
is
this.
This
is
not
just
about
the
technology.
This
is
about
the
human
side.
I've
emphasized
that
a
few
times
through
this
there's
there's
technical
trust,
which
is
what
I'm
showing
on
the
screen
here,
which
is
you
know.
B
The
way
that
happens
is
often
through,
what's
called
a
governance
framework,
a
governance
framework,
sort
of
says:
okay,
verifier.
Here's
why
you
can
trust
the
issuer
when
it's
a
sum
of
these,
are
we
just
understand
it?
Because
it's
like
government,
you
can
trust
a
$20
bill
that
you
know
is
real
because
it's
got
Canada
on
it
and
you
trust
Bank
of
Canada,
because
you
know
they
can
print
money
anytime.
They
want,
and
you
know
you
can
trust
a
credit
card
from
sorry.
B
Of
a
governance
authority,
you
know
millions
of
people,
millions
of
people
have
credit
cards,
millions
of
merchants
accept
them
money
flows
as
a
result
of
this,
but
it's
because
there's
a
governance
framework
involved
that
says.
Okay,
if
you
follow
the
rules
as
a
as
a
holder
of
a
card,
you
pay
your
bill
on
a
regular
basis
and
you
stay
within
the
limits
we
set
and
so
on
will
allow
you
to
use
that
credit
card
and
as
a
merchant.
B
As
long
as
you
follow
the
rules-
and
you
know
you
don't
abuse
the
card,
we'll
make
sure
we
pay
you
on
a
regular
basis
for
the
money
you
collected
by
a
credit
card.
So
it's
all
based
on
a
governance
Authority
and
all
the
participants
are
agreeing
to
a
set
of
rules
and
following
it
that's
what
a
governance
framework
is
and
that's
kind
of
where
this,
how
all
of
this
works
in
a
in
a
digital
scale.
B
The
trust
over
IP
stack
is,
and
I
mentioned,
the
trust
over
IP
foundation
that
this
is
the
organization
that
is
trying
to
formalize
what
both
the
technology
stack
looks
like
on
the
on
the
right
side.
There
and
then
the
governance
stack
looks
like
on
the
left,
so
those
are
the
two
pieces
that
have
to
come
together
to
enable
this
trust.
B
You've
got
the
technology
piece,
the
blockchain
at
the
bottom,
the
agents
that
you
know
I
both
it's
showing
here
both
of
our
agents
that
are
mobile
but
I
showed
you
agents
a
mobile
wallet
plus
an
enterprise
agent
is
an
issue
or
in
a
verifier.
Those
are
talking.
Those
are
communicating
across
a
trusted
channel
next
layer,
up
data
exchange
protocols
where
you're
doing
these
issuing
credentials,
holding
credentials
and
verifying
credential.
So
all
of
that
that
triangle
that
we've
talked
about
and
then
on
top
of
that
you've
got
apps
that
are
running.
B
These
you've
got
an
app
that
operates
off
a
conference
and
issues
a
truck
I
attended
this
conference
credential
you've.
You
know
all
sorts
of
things
that
allow
you
to
do
this,
so
the
Law
Society
use
case
is
a
digital
trust
ecosystem
between
the
Law
Society,
the
lawyers,
the
Ministry
of
Justice.
But
we
can
extend
that
out.
Lawyers
do
land
sales.
Well,
the
land
title
company
can
use
these
banks
can
use
these
to
trust
that
a
lawyer,
a
lawyer,
is
in
good
standing
and
therefore
can
have
a
trust
account
and
so
on.
B
B
Inde
contains
some
pretty
powerful
pieces
which
are
kind
of
cool
they're,
called
zero
knowledge
proof
and
a
zero
knowledge
proof
is
basically
saying:
I
can
prove
something.
I
can
prove
something
without
telling
you
I
can
prove
I
know
something
without
telling
you
what
that
basic
information
is,
and
so
I'll
give
it
an
example
of
that.
But
there's
there's
a
couple
of
ways
that
it's
used.
B
One
is
that
you
can
prove
a
credential
without
a
unique
identifier
for
yourself,
so
I
can
prove
my
eye
that
I
have
a
BC
card
without
proving
exactly
who
I
am
because
if
that
doesn't
matter
for
the
use
case,
you
don't
need
to
know
that.
So
you
don't
need
to
know
this
unique
identifier
for
me,
so
that
which
can
constrain
the
correlation
economy,
the
surveillance
economy
that
we're
living
in
right
now.
B
Selective
disclosure
means
that
when
I
present
a
credential
I
don't
have
to
expose
all
of
the
information
in
the
credential
I
only
have
to
expose
what
is
necessary
for
this
business
case.
So
when
I
go
to
a
bar
I,
there's
no
need
for
them
to
know
my
home
address
my
you
know
my
phone
number.
What
color
my
eyes
are
things
like
that
in
a
paper
one.
B
It
because
it's
all
on
the
piece
of
paper,
but
on
a
reference
place
in
a
online
use
case.
I
can
do
this.
So
what
I'm
presenting
this
in
person
I
would
present
that
you
know
who
issued
the
credential,
maybe
a
picture
of
me
so
that
binds
it
to
me,
but
I
don't
have
to
expose
any
other
information,
and
the
second
piece
are
called
predicate
proofs,
and
this
is
a
version
of
a
zero
knowledge
proof.
So
I
can
prove
that
I'm
older
than
a
certain
age,
I'm
older.
A
B
B
Provable
digitally
signed
data,
that's
what
a
verifiable
credential
is
tricky
word,
the
tricky
part
is
provable
and
we
want
to
prove
it
not.
By
going
to
ask
the
issuer,
is
this
all
correct?
We
want
to
do
this,
independent
and,
and
so
the
way
we
do,
that
is
we
use
a
block
chains,
so
the
block
chain
holds
basically
the
public
keys
that
are
used
to
sign
the
various
credentials.
That's
one
part
of
it.
B
It
also
holds
the
metadata
about
the
credentials
themselves,
the
names
of
the
fields
and
so
on,
and
it
also
contains
a
pointer
back
that
did
the
decentralized
identifier
of
the
issuer
and
that's
the
mechanism
that
allows
me
to
know
who
issued
the
credential.
So
I
can
know
with
certainty
who
issued
it.
I
do
have
to
figure
out
who
who.
B
Here's
a
bunch
of
use
case.
I've
talked
about
most
of
these,
the
two
that
I'll
highlight
easy,
reliable
data
integration
through
the
citizen
and
with
consent.
So
one
of
the
challenges
of
integrations
across
the
world
suppose
is
that
you
you
each
each
participant
has
to
somehow
be
identified
and
integrate
in
some
way
to
collect
data
so
inside
the
government,
for
example,
we
have
this.
B
What
what
is
the
privacy
impact
on
the
citizen,
how
they
can
correlate
or
not
correlate
the
data
across
other
programs,
and
things
like
that,
so
there's
a
lot
of
work
done
to
ensure
that
the
data
is
used
in
a
reliable
way.
That
plain
does
not
scale
to
the
entire
economy.
No,
there's
no
way.
We
could
do
that
same
integration
with
every
bank
and
every
business
and
every
employer
across
the
province,
let
alone
across
the
world.
B
But
if
we
can
give
the
citizen
the
data
just
like
we
give
them
a
paper
one
and
let
them
decide
how
to
share
that
data
and
where
to
use
it.
That
does
scale
so
the
internet
that
does
scales
with
the
digital
economy.
So
that's
really
good
selective
disclosure
and
Kruse
privacy.
You
don't
have
to
expose
all
the
information
you
just
have
to
prove.
B
Then
we
make
decisions,
grab
them
a
service.
So
that's
what
a
bank
goes
with
the
KYC.
They
collect
a
bunch
of
information
to
make
sure
you're
trustworthy
and
then
grab
that
if
they
can
collect
less
data
because
they
can
actually
trust
what
you
tell
it
where
they
trust
what
you
tell
them
without
having
to
do
due
diligence.
B
Now,
that's
a
win
for
everybody
and
then
the
second
one
I
wanted
to
go
hack
data
becomes
worthless
right
now,
when
you
have
to
submit
your
social
insurance
number,
you
type
it
into
a
form,
and
the
original
idea
was
because
only
you
would
know
your
social
insurance,
nobody,
nobody
else.
Would
nobody
could
be
impersonating
you
and,
of
course,
that's
completely
bogus,
but
if
the
only
way
a
verifier
would
accept
your
social
insurance
number
is
via
a
credential
issued
by
services,
canada,
then
a
hacked
social
insurance
number
and
expose.
What
is
you
is
worthless.
B
This
is
the
organizations
that
are
involved
in
standardizing
this
technology,
w3c
and
def,
and
obviously
hyper
ledger.
Trust
over
IP
foundation
is
now
a
big
part
of
this,
and
so
I
added
that
to
this
screen.
This
is
the
hyper
ledger
piece
of
this.
This
is
the
green
house
for
the
hyper
ledger.
It
shows
where
the
indie
is,
which
is.
It
is
a
blockchain.
It
is
not
slick
like
fabric.
B
B
Indy
is
a
dip
utility,
it's
a
it's
a
place
where
the
blockchain
elements
are
stored
and
then
Hindi
also
provides
the
verifiable
credential
model
that
exists
at
layer
3.
So
that's
indeed
Aries
is
basically
the
wallet
is,
is
the
wallet
level,
the
agent
level
that
allows
you
to
communicate
between
trusted
parties?
So
it
allows
you
to
establish
peer-to-peer
communication
between
agents
that
are
implemented
in
Aries
and
then
lets
you
on
top
of
that
run
protocols
to
do
things
like
issue,
a
credential
which
is
a
protocol,
verify
a
credential.
B
So
at
layer
3,
so
what
you
build
on
top
of
Ares
is
the
applications
and
that's
what
we're
doing
right
now
in
British
Columbia,
and
that
we
we
provide
all
sorts
of
services
which
is
you
can
do
Glocks
with
it
lots
of
protocols
and
then
Ursa
is
the
cryptography
behind
both
of
these.
So
there's
all
sorts
of
cryptography
or
encryption
so
that
end-to-end
encryption
for
message
saying
the
the
signatures
on
the
on
the
credentials,
the
proving
of
the
signatures
on
the
credentials
and
so
on.
All
of
that
is
based
on
cryptography.
B
A
A
A
A
B
So
with
the
credential
I
mentioned,
revocation
is
a
possibility,
so
revocation
is
often
seen
as,
as
you
know,
Oh
my
driver's
license
has
been
rescinded.
I
had
you
know,
points
taken
off
and
still
my
driver's
license
has
been
revoked.
That's
one
method,
but
actually,
if
you
just
change
the
data
on
a
credential,
you
can
revoke
it.
If
a
citizen
as
a
credential
that
they
that
has
you
know
their
access
to,
that
credential
has
been
compromised.
B
That
credential
can
be
revoked
when
a
credential
is
revoked,
a
that's
an
operation
done
to
the
blockchain,
so
it
occurs
independent.
The
issuer
can
do
it
at
any
time
and
then,
when
the
credential
goes
to
be
verified,
they
the
verifier
would
determine
that
the
credential
has
been
revoked.
So
that's
probably
the
number
one
way
as
well.
B
You
know,
I
can
make
money
on
volume.
You've
got
no
volume
and
being
able
to
break
into
these.
So
now
it
becomes
you're.
Actually,
potentially
you
know
targeting
an
individual,
but
there's
lots
of
protections.
You've
left
there.
You
know
you've
got
physical
protection
of
the
device,
and
things
like
that
in.
B
B
B
You
know
see
the
data
as
it
crosses
the
internet
and
be
able
to
decrypt
it
in
any
way,
because
the
only
keys
that
are
available
to
access
it
are
on
this
device
and
the
device
I'm
talking
to
there's
no
keys
or
anything
at
back
doors
or
anything
that
would
be
available
anywhere
else.
So
privacy
is
pretty
solidly
available.
I
see.
A
And
one
of
the
member
or
viewer
question
is
that
and
I
think
you
covered
it.
What
I
would
like
to
reiterate
that
so
in
some
cases,
for
instance,
in
Europe
or
insulate
yo,
that
I
believe
he's
riding
from?
If
you
present
your
plastic
ID
to
to
enter
a
casino
which
has
a
chip,
they
will
actually
have
potentially
access
to
all
the
data
which
is
stored
in
the
card,
which
ya,
don't
necessarily
have
rightful
access
to
it,
because
we
just
need
to
validate
your.
B
Very
quick
answer
that
is
absolutely
not
because
you
actually
are
messaging
back
and
forth
with
the
two
parties.
Nobody
is
getting
access
to
your
system.
They
are
sending
a
message
saying:
hey:
can
you
prove
these
credentials
they're,
sending
you
a
message,
you're
constructing
a
message
and
then
sending
it
back
to
them.
So
there's
no
access.
They
have
physically
to
your
device
there.
The
better
the
most
they
can
do
is
send
you
requests
for
information,
and
then
the
protocols
allow
you
and
the
protocols
enable
control
over
how
the
answers
come
back
to
the
user.
B
Hey
this
person
is
asking
for
this.
Other
entity
is
asking
for
information.
Do
you
want
to
share
it?
Yes
or
no,
so
you
have
full
control
over
it
and
in
fact
you
can
prove
things
without
actually
exposing
the
data,
and
if
that's,
okay
with
the
verifier,
you
don't
even
have
to
expose
the
data.
So
all
of
that
back
control
is
way
more
in
this
case,
so
they
don't
they're,
not
accessing
anything
on
your
system,
they're,
not
accessing
the
chip
or
anything
like
that.
A
B
Absolutely
this:
this
is
what
enables
that
it
allows
you
to
do
digital
transactions
beyond
just
buying
things
that
are
trusted
because
they
know
your
credit
card
and
they
know
where
they're
shipping
this
stuff
to
that's.
Basically,
how
why
that's
trusted
so
there's
enough
mitigation
there.
But
you
know
tons
of
high
value
transactions
become
possible
because
you
can
have
a
way
to
actually
trust
the
identity
or
the
information
being
provided
by
the
other
party.
B
You
don't
even
you
not
necessarily
as
I
say,
trusting
the
other
party
you're,
trusting
the
issuer
to
the
other
party
and
whatever
that's
needed,
to
mitigate
the
risk
of
the
transaction
you're
trying
to
accomplish,
as
they
say
it's
it's
basically
the
equivalent
of
you
you're.
You
know
when
you
go
to
do
some
transaction,
you
type
in
a
bunch
of
information
on
the
screen
and
it's
just
text
and
you
can
type
anything
you
want
it
with
a
credential
you.
You
cannot
do
that.
You
can
only
present
the
credentials
you
have.
They
are
signed
by
the
issuer.
B
A
Basically,
if
I'm,
given
a
driver,
license
or
a
personal
identification
card
or
like
a
digital
version,
as
you
presented
and
I
up
in
the
liquor
store,
the
liquor
store
would
ask
the
issuer.
If
my
age
is
appropriate
to
buy
alcohol
and
the
issuer
would
ask
me
or
the
system
would
ask
me
if
I
want
to
share
that
data
with
with
the
liquor
store.
No.
B
A
B
B
B
I
mean
it's
something
in
in
the
groups
we
talk
about
all
the
time
is
what
are
you
know
every
time
we
propose
a
protocol
where,
when
we
change
the
cryptography
anything
like
that,
there's
a
full
vetting.
Okay,
what's
the
risk
involved?
What
are
the
attack
vectors?
No
doubt
there
will
be
more,
but
that
is
a
number-one
priority,
all
the
way
through
the
process,
because
we
would
like
to
make
this,
as
you
know,
as
a
way
to
trust
on
the
Internet
and
and
to
do
that,
the
attack
vectors
have
to
be
so
low.
B
I
mean
this
is
part
of
why
you
know
if
you
attack
a
single
person
well
that
there's
there's
not
a
lot
of
value
to
it.
It's
really
hard
to
do.
You've
got
to
get
physical
access
and
things
like
this
and
when
you've
done
it,
you've
hacked
one
person
you
haven't
hacked
thousands
or
hundreds
of
thousand
to
one.
Now
you
move
on
to
the
next
yeah,
there's
no
value
in
doing
it.
That's
what
we're
trying
to
do.
B
I
just
saw
a
comment
in
there.
I
got
I
gotta
say
simply
as
from
30
years.
They
will
use
PGP
keys.
This
is
actually
the
basis
it's
the
same
model
as
PGP,
but
PGP
had
never
figured
out
how
to
reliably
distribute
the
public
keys.
The
blockchain
is
the
magic
that
allows
you
to
reliably
publish
the
public
keys
necessary
for
it,
but
that
person
I
think
it's
Peter
just
nailed
it
exactly,
which
is
it's
exactly
the
theory
that
bgp
was
trying
to
do,
but
they
didn't
have
block
chaining
capabilities
back
then
that's
that's.
B
See
the
question
there
on
No,
so
the
answer
about
the
liquor
shop
will
verify
the
information
with
the
government.
They
only
verify
it
with
the
whole
there's
wallet,
but
the
holders
wallet
had
to
have
received
it
from
the
government.
So
when
they
verify
the
data,
they
can't
fake
the
ID
because
they
can't
fake
issuing
it
from
the
government.
The
liquor.
A
B
Will,
in
addition
to
checking
you
know,
the
data
hasn't
been
changed.
They
will
check
to
see.
Who
is
you
this
and
they're?
Gonna
know
what
the
government
of
British
Columbia
is.
Id
is
for
issuing
credentials,
and
if
they
see
that
that
credential
was
issued
by
someone
else
like
I
issued
it
to
myself,
they
would
immediately
recognize
that
so
there's
no
way
to
get
around
it
in
that
way.
B
A
B
So
the
data
that's
stored
on
the
phone
is
the
actual
credential.
Okay,
the
what
goes
on
the
blockchain
is
the
identifier
for
the
issuer,
and
that
is
also
here.
So
when
I
present
a
proof,
it
tells
the
verifier
who
issued
the
credential,
the
identifier
of
that
and
then
that
information
they
the
identifier,
is
on
the
blockchain
and
then
all
of
the
claims,
all
of
the
data
element
of
the
credential
are
signed.
All
of
the
public
keys
to
verify
the
signature
are
all
on
the
blockchain.
B
So,
for
example,
in
one
of
our
projects,
we
we've
issued
to
a
community
of
credentials
that
was
all
done
with
three
transactions
on
the
blockchain,
so
there's
only
three
transactions
on
the
blockchain
two
and
a
half
million
credentials.
All
of
those
credentials
are
in
a
wallet
and
they
all
are
secured
by
the
cryptography
referenced
in
those
three
blockchain
transactions,
and
so
nothing
about
that
credential.
An
individual
credential
goes
on
the
blockchain.
The
only
thing
that
goes
is
the
keys
necessary
to
verify
the
data
within
the
credential
I'd
say.
A
I'd
like
to
thank
you
once
again
to
coming
on
board
and
and
this
important
aspect
of
the
my
pro
ledger
projects
and
efforts
also
I,
especially
like
to
thank
to
everyone
who
showed
that
today,
I
know
it's
tempting
to
be
outside
in
the
summer
evenings,
at
least
what
we
have
in
Toronto
and
also
tomorrow,
Canada
days.
So.
B
A
Probably
a
lot
of
people
are
on
the
highway
right
now
and
trying
to
get
out
of
the
city
if
you
live
in
the
city.
So
having
that
said,
thank
you
so
much
Stephen.
Thank
you
for
John,
co-hosting.
It
and
I
wish
everyone
a
very
happy,
Canada
Day
hope.
You
hope
you
will
also
take
off
Thursday
Friday
and
have
a
five-days
weekend
how
it
should
be
always
and
obviously
happy
Canada
Day
too
us
last,
even
and
looking
forward
to
how
these
project
develops.