Hyperledger Foundation Security, 5 Aug 2020

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From YouTube: Identity Working Group: IoT Security Enabled by MPC

Description

While the benefits of IoT are unlimited, the reality is that the proliferation of blockchain based connected devices, systems and services that compose the IoT ecosystem has introduced risk directly into the physical world, blurring the border between virtual threats and utilities, devices and critical infrastructure. In this session, we will discuss how MPC can be used to enable every IoT device to have an embedded root of trust, while preserving the zero-knowledge proof of other devices’ data. Furthermore, we will examine a few use cases, some that can be associated with a public blockchain and some that are more common within the boundaries of a permissioned blockchain.

https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/IWG/2020-08-05

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A

I think we're going to start soon, um but before the main event.

A

I want to go over a couple of administrative items in uh hyperledger identity working group. The first thing is, we are bound by the anti-trust policy of linux foundation and hence.

A

Anybody who is joining this call is expected to abide by that as well. The details can be found in the agenda. The second thing is, we have a code of conduct which says that we uh treat each other with respect, even when we are disagreeing with each other or even when we are agreeing with each other.

A

It doesn't matter.

A

Please respect the other participants.

A

And uh treat them as you would be treated yourself.

A

So before we start, I mean I, it looks like there are still people coming into the room. uh You know there are already 14 participants, so I would rather wait just one more minute and I see some familiar faces, some who are not familiar.

A

In any case, I'm going to talk I'm going to drop the agenda link in the chat so that people can put in their names on the.

A

On the meeting uh notes as having attended so that's important because uh we want to keep a track of um people here, I mean you know, of course, if you don't want to be uh on the on the list, please uh let me know.

B

A

Anyway, so I wanted to take this opportunity to welcome rebecca or ribby um absol aspla. I think I'm saying it right. I hope.

C

A

um And she is here as a project. A director of project management from unbound unbound is well known for being the pioneer in mpc, because yehuda lindel, who I occasion to listen to did present. uh You know in several contexts uh the greatness of mpc for custody and transfer of assets, especially in an enterprise setting, but I believe it can be useful also in other settings, because it allows some amount of delegation and.

A

So ribby is going to talk uh about many of these aspects. You got the email, so let's welcome ruby to do the presentation and uh hopefully she'll, share her slides and we'll get to record it and make it available. Thank you.

C

Thank you vipin, so much for the kind introduction.

C

um My name is rebecca, the abbreviation is driven so, as you feel comfortable, I'm uncomfortable with both thank you, everyone for taking the time to join good morning or good evening. Wherever you are. um I hope you will find value in this presentation. We will of course share it afterwards uh in an offline manner. I'm sure it will help me understand how I can share it with you guys um and assuming that you do see the slides, I will begin. If that's okay, can you see the slides.

A

C

Thank you uh we'll be moving on to a presentation mode uh and I do apologize on working uh from home as most of us, I think, are these days. So there will be background noises.

C

I do have a dog that is often barking, so apologies for that in advance, so we'll focus today on iot ecosystems, specifically blockchain type of iots, because there are different iotx systems and we'll talk about the challenges that this specific ecosystem is uh working with or is challenged by and how npc could solve these challenges, as opposed to say, I would say, a different method.

C

um But firstly, very briefly, I just two slides of thing about an bam, I'm very privileged to be working for these guys. These are professor yuda, linda and professor nigel smart. They have been the co-founders of the company. Both of them are academia people they have been working about uh or of multi-party computation for the last 30 years. So that's quite a lot of.

C

I would take a long time to work on something and have been able to get through a performance type of um breakthrough about six years ago being able to shorten the performance time of multi-party computation from minutes time to milliseconds time.

C

Therefore, opening the door to application- I would say, usage of npc their initial id by the way- was to secure airplanes with mpc, but we found together for the last six years that the use cases are very numerous uh starting from you know, even uh creating a vhsm virtual hsn, which is more secure than hardware, the same going through code signing protecting digital assets and today, we'll vote specifically on the use case of blocking specifically out of the kind of ecosystem uh unbound. This is uh it's brief history.

C

I wouldn't dive into this today, just to let you know that we've been around for about six years now, growing day after day, uh very proud of the type of customers that have trusted their assets with us, whether these are data assets or financial assets. We have customers such as city bank, goldman sachs, ibm mcafee. These are just few of the names that I can mention. Liquid in the blockchain area, there are many more names that cannot be disclosed, but we're very proud of our enterprise, great type of customers.

C

One can only imagine that these types of customers run through uh very vigorously, I would say, pen, testing and security checkups before they sign with any type of company. So although the product is rather new, as as has been out there less than 10 years, the technology is very much trusted by those enterprise, creative customers.

C

Moving on so now we dive into the stuff, no more, I would say, marketing of the company itself, so behind the scenes npc- and this will be the foundation of our talk today and you'll- see in a minute. Why so behind the scenes? Npc is pretty much taking okay, pretty much it's not that simple, uh but it's pretty much taking a key and generating it from scratch in a distributed manner.

C

So the key does not exist as one entity all over its life cycle through generation to usage to suspension to relocation, and the number of shares could be unlimited. In this very simple example, we could see five key shares. You can see that the key shares could be on any type of device could be mobile, device could be a laptop could be a server where platform, agnostic, we're device agnostic and therefore the possibilities.

C

You can start imagining what you can do with such, I would say an ecosystem of multiple key shares that could be leveraging their power together to sign. One transaction distance transaction could be signing data transaction financial transaction, uh it doesn't matter. The whole thing is that the key does not exist as one entity.

C

This is uh evolution-wise representing, I would say the next step as to if one would know with blockchain specifically for the context of this call, starting with one key that was once kept or still is kept in hsms.

C

Moving on to multisig, which are multipack, is shared with different parties, but with their full manner, keys full entity, keys onto mpc, meaning key shares, and it is not me saying so, but actually garner is saying so that mpc is going to be the main, I would say best practice in the type of security means in the next five years, so for blockchain applications. So this is really interesting, not my words, but actually uh guardian report now diving into iot uh and specifically boxing iot. So this is where we'll start diving more into the details.

C

So the starting point, of course, is the fact that we're surrounded by these wearable and devices that are sending data and receiving data all over the place. uh There's a projection of 10 billion, more devices coming online in the next four years, and lots of data flowing around all over the place. Now this has been. This is very different from the situation. uh There was ten years signals for me from the situation that will be ten years ahead.

C

uh This is interesting because many of the devices that are out there already are brownfield in the sense that they operate with very minimal power or processing power and still one has to secure them or rely on them once uh trying to operate now. Obviously, attackers will exploit and are exploding. These, I would say, vulnerabilities- and here are just you know, a few examples of what you can do in order to attack an iot device.

C

This is not the focus of our talk to date of vulnerabilities themselves, but the way to protect them, but you can see here different types, and I think this is the important thing, maybe to emphasize various types of security vulnerabilities, that an organization or a blockchain infrastructure of iot ecosystem must take into account when uh designing such an infrastructure.

C

Now the type of protection that you need could be defined using these four types. If you could look at it, so you have the need to secure the devices themselves. The hardware you need security, the communication between the devices, remembering these devices and data from one to another, specifically in a blockchain use case where data should flow between each peer to another peer.

C

There's, of course, the secure cloud where data goes on to and from to and from uh the cloud to the device itself and, of course, the lifecycle management of the data itself. Now the little key icons were not actually on the original image that I have found. You can see the iot analytic source credit is to them.

C

But, interestingly, many of these security, I would say protection requirements- do require security key to be able to work them in a secure manner or move them around move data secure data, whether it's data at rest, whether it's data transit, whether these are authentication of the devices themselves, uh the identity of them or whether these are authorizations of messages moving around from one device to another device to a cloud to servers wherever it is now how these keys are being protected.

C

Today, this is becoming more interesting, because uh today, most of the iot devices don't have secure elements. You can actually distinguish between weak iot devices and secure iot devices. Interestingly, I don't know if you recall a few years ago, there was a very interesting attack on one of the largest hotels in las vegas. I don't remember its specific name and the data of the various gamblers, etc was stolen.

C

A lot of data, one can imagine and interestingly the way that they got to the it to the servers on which data was was through the terminators of the. um Where do you keep the fish? I don't remember just now the words like those big fish tankers in those large uh las vegas casinos, so uh those terminators are weak, iot devices for that matter and the hackers were able to reach the cloud servers the data I the it, the data of the various gamblers and the casino data through the terminators of these fish tankers.

C

So we can see that there are weak, iot devices and these are actually the majority of them. There are, of course, the secure iot devices, but the ecosystem is the one that we should care about, because wherever you go into a home, a city, you have to deal with both types now: uh the weak ones, don't have secure elements, uh they're, actually working on very low batteries or very modest processing power, and their battery is expected to last at least two years. So you don't have to replace those one.

C

Can you imagine how difficult it would be to replace batteries all over cameras for that example, so uh one would have to create a cryptographic type of security that is powerful enough, but then again uh not heavily consuming processing power. Now this is uh very interesting is the fact is that uh currently observe observations or techniques are considered relatively weak, so one cannot use those, but the strong alpha isms are actually the ones today usually need more processing power, which is not the case as one can see, as mentioned before.

C

Many of these also have a brownfield kind of equipment out there, meaning they don't even have any uh thing to work with cryptographically speaking and one would need to sign transactions, sign messages, uh decrypt data, encrypt data, so the challenge become, I would say, becomes more apparent now. Iot blockchain use cases uh quite new for the last five years and becoming more and more apparent in the market.

C

I didn't put here any market slides as far as the what the market is uh adopting, but interestingly gartner has found that there's an eighty percent growth cagr year over year of the iot adoption rate. This is very interesting. It's very similar to the ones that we see in the digital assets area.

C

One can imagine the fact that cars are being very much driving this industry, even though a lot in the lab, but still cars and all the equipments around that.

C

So here you can see that there are two types of ecosystems. One is the decentralized iot system and one can say this is not really an ecosystem of blockchain because it is centralized, but we'll see in a minute that it is uh in those private blockchains, the one that we tend to consider. A real blockchain is the fully distributed one meaning peer-to-peer, no central server.

C

But what we see is the fact that you have these various types of blockchains. So, of course, there's the centralized one which is not a blockchain. This is a centralized database somewhere where we all know these. uh These are the typical organizations that we all work with. uh There's the decentralized and, of course, the distributed one to there.

C

We're going to focus mostly on this one, because this is what we see with the enterprise creative customers, meaning they do need blockchains, because they are creating ecosystems where they do work with customers with suppliers and service providers with partners and consumers, and therefore they need to be able to move data and approve transaction and authenticate devices uh between various types of them and certainly a lot of them.

C

But it's not a fully peer-to-peer kind of ecosystem, but there is the central server somewhere, wherever it is, and still there's uh for several cloud servers that do create like a magnificent mighty database, blockchain enabled so the data is shared in an anonymous manner between the various types of mini ecosystem.

C

So, let's see a few examples, so a smart home example. Of course all of us has have or will have smart home type of environment where we.

B

C

Many iot devices, so it could be even the shades the light. Of course, we talked about thermometers, air conditioner, etc, garage doors, so there's the ecosystem within the house of various types of iot devices that have to communicate with each other. There should be, of course, an in-home server.

C

One can imagine that these are different manufacturers, of course, and still the data must flow securely between the various types, regardless of the manufacturing, I would say party, but you can also start imagining the additional layers of ecosystem, so it could be an in-house in building in complex. You can imagine like a bosch, for example, as a manufacturer, requiring data from all the laundry machines in a certain location in a certain complex in a certain country.

C

You can think of consumers, uh exchanging data between them, let's say to get recommendations, specific company machines, etc. So the security challenges would uh involve provisioning, authentication, protecting data address data, transit and, of course, transaction of data proving data between uh various types of iot devices, or even you know, turning on learning of different devices etc.

C

Examples of what could go wrong in this case would be several uh opening door safety wise or I can imagine what could happen if it is at home when someone is able to privacy. You do not want to share the data with someone you have not approved, sharing the data with, and uh even less but less I would say frightening but still concerning uh is, is energy turn on and off. Let's say you come home and everything has been turned on.

C

uh It may not be scary for the first time, but maybe for the third time it is, and certainly a waste of damage, any questions so far.

C

Moving on another example, this is a smart city. This is a more complex example. As far as uh what could go wrong, uh I think some of the examples within are probably outdated. They have their own use cases. Still the connectivity parking uh autonomous uh vehicles pollution there has been even just a few uh months ago, uh um israel by the way, and there has been attack, an attack which no one really knows where it came from.

C

One can only guess on the water supply of israel, so someone messed up with the water supply coming in to most of the israeli homes, from, I would say, one lake or one source of water and then the amount of floride that was injected into the water had been had. The attack had been successful would have been dangerous to consume simple drinking water. So this is not anymore, like you know, just saving energy, but could really be quite dangerous.

C

If one could know where to mess up with the data, you can think of train going out of function or going much faster than they should so many, I would say dangers that could be inflicted on various iot devices. The ecosystem here is again very interesting. Blockchain wise, you can think of the various types of iot devices you can think of the areas that would collaborate on data.

C

You can think of manufacturers all around the world trying to get data, let's say from a specific type of track, doing something so many things to analyze a whole different kind of use case but uh analytics of this. uh But this is very interesting and starting to gain momentum, and this is something that uh unbound has been fortunate enough to take part in uh without those descriptions too much data.

C

But this is a public slide of toyota, uh which has its own blockchain lab and it's building something really cool in the sense that they're building an ecosystem of manufacturers, service suppliers, dealers, retailers and consumers to be able to consume, share data and work in a blockchain environment uh with uh various parts of toyota, cars and toyota services. Even the entertainment system within toyota, cars, so they're, building a really cool, blockchain type of environment and again they have to address security challenges such as the ones that are written here.

C

I would say that the automative car is a much more complex one compared to the smart home one. Whenever it comes to regulation, uh each car has several, I would say ecus. They call them mini servers within that have to be protected and it takes about 10 years to be able to get something into each of these ecu units. So it is happening.

C

It is moving slowly, partly because of regulation, and I think we should all say thank you for them to move slowly in such a cautious manner, because none of us would like to drive a car. A car that has been taken over by, I would say, a hacker.

C

So the current status quo as far as iot blockchain security is these are the various types. I was very much surprised to know that these are still the ones that are uh protecting most of the iot devices.

C

It is not surprising from where we started the conversation in the sense that many of them don't have secure elements or have very poor processing power, but it is interesting that many of these authentication tools and security tools are pretty much evolutionary-wise, the ones that were popular 20 years ago and not much advancement has been done since then.

C

So uh what are the challenges with current authentication tools? uh Many of them one can imagine our platform dependent. Even though there's a lot more. uh There are many more types of iot devices compared to let's say 20 years ago, uh they're manufactured by a various uh by a huge area of uh hi tco.

C

We had one customer with which we wanted to work two years ago and, interestingly, that customer said you know for me to be able to put uh it, doesn't matter which key, whether it's mpc share or full key on my old iot devices, they're spread all around.

C

That would cost me two million dollars, because I have to get dedicated teams moving now around the country to be able to implement those whatever it is on those very old iot devices, so they were very much uh sorry to say they would not be implementing not npc, but nothing else taking. I would say the risk that something would happen and managing that risk because they cannot afford to put any type of security means out there.

C

uh So in their case, without this disclosing their names, uh their name they're simply managing the risk of something happening, and we all do that on a daily basis. You know we're not protecting everything with the best, I would say security means, but we manage the risk for that resources. uh Constrained devices.

C

We've just talked about these types, uh many of them actually most of them out there, whether these are weak devices or old devices and of course, what just we've just talked about the fact that they're, not security, authentication tools, they're very much outdated, have been around for at least 20 years, where the most of the hackers are not even 20 years old. For that matter, any questions before we move on to empty okay, so uh going back to this specific slide.

C

So if this is how npc would work as far as creating a key in a split manner, sharing it between the various signers and using it in its distributed manner, now one can imagine the various use cases. So this is the smart home example.

C

Just in one case, we've talked about the smart home example and what could go wrong, but now can you imagine a situation where each of these devices has a key share and the key share is the very, I would say, lean and mean type of data, a very small file, uh just kill byte size in the sense of uh sizing, and uh it could be put on whatever iot device that you want to work with as long as it has like even a mini server with some processing power.

C

So you can now start imagining what you can do. It is important, maybe to emphasize that the minimum authentication that would be required would require at least two key shares. So you would have one key share on the client side. For that matter, the endpoint is an example: the door lock and one key share on the server side. Now this could be more t-shirts, let's say five, but honestly one would not.

C

You know if I want to open my home door, I wouldn't want now, my uh I don't know life partner or kid to jointly sign such a transaction with me. I just want to open the door right, so I would authenticate uh using probably multi-factor- or at least two-factor authentication. Let's say my fingerprint using a mobile device and using another key shared that would be on the server side. I would be able to open up the door boom same one. Can you imagine falater turning on an air, conditioner, etc?

C

You know the the examples are very various. Now the authentication could be done uh using two clients for that matter. One could be, let's say, on the mobile device and one could be on a mobile device such as a phone. So the examples are various as far as what you can do with it, but the principle is pretty much the same.

C

At least one key share on an end point. At least one key share on the server side, and as long as you have at least a pair of key shares, you can create this uh secure boundaries as far as we call it any questions up until now,.

C

Okay, moving on well.

B

This is uh jonathan, um I'm just curious. So you're are you using is like p256k one in store signatures. So are these separate private keys that you're doing like m of n, or these like? How are you combining the split into shares into either a signal, signature or validating the multi-signature in mfn.

C

So, thank you very much for this question, so uh it is in the direction in the sense that there is an encrypted signature behind the scene. Since then, uh the various key shares actually decrypt the encrypted signatures. So as soon as you reach an m of n decrypted or k material, you can able to release the enquiries or decrypt the encrypted signature. So it's not multi-signature in the sense, though, of full keys but actually m of n, exactly as you mentioned, where the m of n have to decrypt the encrypted signature.

B

Okay, so so there's a private key on the iot device in order to un encrypt, you need to m of n from dispersed other keys in order to for that key on that device. In order to for the function.

C

There is no full, there is no full private key there's only a key share.

C

The key share would be wrapped by an authentication key, which would be a full key, but the this is just a full key to wrap the key share, but there is no full key as far as the decryption of the encrypted signature in order to let's say, approve a transaction or or sign a message: no, no full key. Whatever the the phase of the uh communication is whether it's a message with whether it's a transaction there is no full key ever.

B

Okay, so is it, but it's no extinguishers.

C

uh This could be schnorr signatures. Yes, this could be eddsa ecdsa, nor we're pretty much agnostic as to the type of signature that has to be created with cryptoagile. This is one of the advantages I think of having it on a software, meaning you know, schnorr is new. I don't think it was two years ago, I'm not sure, but but we support it now.

C

So we don't know what will be out there in two years. From now.

B

C

This is, this is more challenging, I would say, for the iot environment, regardless of rundown, the fact that this market is moving so fast. You know you cannot replace iot devices every two years out. There.

C

Okay, uh tesla example. This is a real example, the vulnerability one, not the protection one. uh So uh two years ago there was a relay attack where uh someone was able to steal a tesla car model- s, I'm pretty sure, they've changed it from now. So I do apologize for the fact that I'm uh giving tess as an example still today, but it is.

C

It is a nice anecdote for that matter uh in at least two years ago, they authenticated the uh transaction of opening a car using a key that was fully kept on the phone app. It was actually stored in the app's, sandbox folder and therefore uh vulnerable to malware, I'm pretty sure they have changed it since then, but this was the situation then I think this is another testimonial of why, when this is very, I would say, expensive type of asset and the car is the first such type of asset.

C

One would not want to rely on full key on the app of the end user. This is the case by the way, with the self-managed. Also software and keys wherever identity is being discussed. Let's say with hyper ledger indie, just as an example, so this is very useful when you're speaking of let's say exposing one's age when you're trying to get into a restaurant or a bar, but I wouldn't want to be able to open a car using a key that would be stored on my device in its full state.

C

It's full entity state, but this was the case with the tesla model, 5 or model s case a few years ago. uh This is I'll. Show you now an example of how this situation could have been addressed. Using mpc uh keys could have been split between the car owner and the server on the tesla car. We just talked about a few minutes ago.

C

The fact that each car today, regardless of one bound, has many ecu's within so one could leverage one of those ecu's to be able to open up the car where one key share would be on one of those ecu's servers within the car and one would be on the mobile device of an end user and making sure that nothing can happen.

C

Let's say if even the device was stolen or has been cloned just as an example, one would have to use multi-factor authentication, let's say a fingerprint, just as an example, but could be more than that, even an otp, etc. To be able to reach a car or to open a car. Sorry, so uh one can imagine just even convenience wise, regardless of the security thing.

C

uh Just you know, reaching the car with my mobile phone uh and being able to open the car without moving around with a hardware token for that matter, which is the old-fashioned key that we still all do all using in one way or another. um So this is a great example of how npc could be leveraged to do that uh home door example.

C

We talked about that, so the key could be split and shared between a mobile app and a server side could be on the phone itself and the uh home lock door uh could have a mini server on it. So this is already happening in few hotels worldwide.

C

So it's really interesting as far as moving around, but one can imagine an entire ecosystem blockchain wise. As far as creating let's say, complexes of vacations- hopefully we'll all start sorry there- she goes to open doors in in complexes of vacation houses, etc, and going back to the toyota example, this is becoming more interesting, because now we don't talk anymore about one, let's say key. That is not even there, but still being shared between two parties.

C

As as we've seen here say, you always have this pair with the toyota case, we're actually starting to make use of the fact that the key could be distributed between n parties, and you need m move n to be able to sign a transaction.

C

So one can imagine a toyota, let's say consumer, a buyer go into one of their dealer houses wanting to buy whatever it is. They want to the car and you have the supplier. You have a customer and a dealer on the other side. You want to order to be aware of this information without disclosing the uh let's say. Even the private details of the consumers themselves, and one can imagine the various advantages of such a blockchain type of scenario. You can manage better the supply chain.

C

You can manage uh the amount of equipment that you have moving around the world in different ports and different manufacturing houses, so much more efficiency. So much on demand, I would say, supply to the specific point of of supply to the end consumers. We have such an example with walmart, even though it's not uh an iot use case, but I think it's a very interesting one, because walmart now buys uh vegetable and all types of fresh produce from their local retailers.

C

Just you know on the tip of supply requirements or demand requirements, I would say so they don't need to keep tons of tomatoes just as an example in warehouses getting them. You know less fresh day after day, because they can get messages from the super. Look local supermarkets using blockchain to be able to address uh demand in a much more faster manner than before, so with toyota, cars and equipment.

C

This is not, I would say, as sensitive as keeping tomatoes as fresh as possible, but one can imagine that the toyota related supplies or iot devices are much more expensive and therefore they do want to make it much more efficient.

C

So this is another example any questions before we dive into the threat model, or maybe we should stop here for a discussion.

B

uh Yeah jim may ask one quick question: one of the challenges I've worked on moby standards, which is for the mobility open, blockchain initiative on uh vehicles which includes tesla, toyota and all the other stuff, and in there we're looking at um security and keys with the challenges of trying to talk about everybody, talks about hardware, wallets and so on on the vehicles.

B

The bigger challenge for me has always been um about the practical, uh real world ability to recover keys and access when they're corrupted destroyed, stolen, whatever compromised, and I don't see anybody really addressing that well um and having experience you know to your point about autonomous vehicles.

B

One of the good reasons they're going slow is that many of the scenarios that do exist in the real world are not yet addressed in av driving uh scenarios for sure the same problem applies to, in a sense, uh any identity, access solution for sure, and I assume there's no difference with multi uh party computation, key management as well.

B

You still say: okay, if the, if you have in a sense this multi-party key, like you showed the example for the car, you say: okay, your phone is now destroyed or the ecu on the car has been destroyed, which is very easy to happen. um You know, can you still in a sense access the vehicle and the answer is probably not and what's the time to recovery.

B

So if you think about recovery models, we talked about rto and rpo recovery, point recovery, time objectives and I don't see any of that kind of stuff specified for in a sense, these types of solutions which maybe in many ayat cases, is not critical, but in certain ones like vehicle access and so on. um It would be critical for sure.

C

Yes, thank you very much for this question because uh very fortunate, unbound npc is addressing those issues uh with the fact that these key shares are being refreshed constantly and one can suspend or even revoke a key chair to be able to generate and uh enroll another key share. Let's say to another party, so just as an example, if one actually, it is um shown in the threat model that I'll show you in a minute. Let's say someone loses their phone or their phone is being stolen. So you can suspend or evoke that key share.

C

You can enroll another key share. Let's say if you bought a new phone and you want so yes, so it is addressed, um but.

B

Right if it would be helpful if you took like exactly the car access scenario and said, okay walk it through a recovery model which says: okay, the stone the phone is to your point stolen. So I don't have the phone. What is the recovery time objective that we achieve that we're going for? I should say um in that scenario: is it minutes hours days? You know what is the actual recovery time that you're talking.

C

About so so, let me address the the general scenarios general scenario: it's a matter of seconds. We've done so, uh even yesterday we had someone in another. I would say customer, not a car. I would say we're not working yet with cars, as I've mentioned, the automated car is moving so and- and I think we should all be thankful for that- but uh another customer, even yesterday a real life example. Someone bought a new phone wanted to upgrade the app that we're using with them.

C

Something went wrong and it was just a matter of seconds before we simply revoked the old phone and enrolled the new phone with with the new as simple as that. uh So this is a very I would say easy example. With that specific case, this was a digital asset type of management system. So the time frame is very critical. You cannot have any compromised key share whenever you're trading or safeguarding a million dollars like even much more expensive. You know than a tesla car for that matter.

C

I think that the more concerns uh when speaking of automative are actually not so much. You know stealing the mobile phone, but taking over a car. Something like that. So um I don't know how far the industry is. Is there, as far as taking over an ecu et cetera yeah?

C

um If, if we could dive into the threat model, I think you'll find some examples. You may find value in. uh So these are just a few, I'm not covering all those. You know. I showed you in one of the earlier slides about 30 of types of attacks, so these are the main ones as far as just you know, for our discussion today.

C

So it could be mobile traffic, the redirection and network anniversary, of course, uh very relevant where you're talking about, let's say, traffic jams, traffic lights, being messed around denial of service, of course, side, channel attacks and device cloning, which would be the case, let's say, with someone taking over someone's mobile phone in order to open a car.

C

If we address this specific example using this specific threat, so when focusing on the network, advisory or traffic redirection uh using mpc- and here I do have to go back in sense of do taking- I would say uh pride in the fact that I'm part of unbound- this is not generic npc protocols that we're talking about, but actually unbound solution uh for these types of challenges.

C

So with unbound solution, all messages are encrypted. uh There's a unique counter to prevent, replay attacks. uh An attacker can not learn anything about a message from the mobile phone. If you remember, these are key shares. These are simply data file messages, nothing really that can be this. This is this is not cryptographic information in the sense that one could steal it and you you use it in order to do something they have to break into all mobile devices and all servers.

C

If you remember that uh toyota examples with at least five key shares, so one would have to break into all five devices and additional servers at the same second, because uh everything is being encrypted and all the key shares are being refreshed at uh after each operation and after intervals of time. So even in the unlikely event of a device being compromised, nothing can be learned about other devices. At the same time, this is to emphasize that the shares are random between the various parties.

C

It is not just as just as an example if the entire key is 100. This is an example. These are, and these are five parties. It's not that every party gets 20 20 20.. uh The shares are random, they're, being split in a random manner and after each refresh, every party gets a different random share.

C

So this is to address this type of adversary attack device cloning, which is what would be, I would say, more relevant for the uh car example.

C

uh So when you uh humans authenticate, it will require a multi-factor authentication uh with devices that have secure elements such as ios. We are using the I, the ios secure element to be able to store the key share itself uh and the authentication key, of course, uh that wraps that key share, the key shares are being refreshed continuously and if a clone device did carry out an authentication action before the legitimate device, the mpc solution protocols will detect the clone attack and raise a flag.

C

I would like to emphasize here, which is not written down, that unbound can very easily, and we don't have time today to show you an actual demo can suspend and revoke uh a device in in a matter of seconds, once we or the customer traces an issue and be able to re-enroll another device or the same device if it has been just suspended just in a matter of seconds as well uh backup-wise. This is something that is not mentioned here, but worth mentioning in light of the former uh discussion. Thank you again for the question.

C

uh Backup is also npc enabled, meaning the backup is being done using key shares or two full keys by the way rsa keys that could be, or should be used together in order to recover assets.

C

For that matter or data assets- um and this is also a unique capability of unbound- the fact that it's npc based publicly verifiable and could be used by the organization itself or even a third party.

C

Whether these are you know, just as an example with the toyota example, they could use a third-party consulting company such as kpmg or accenture, to be able to back up the information as a trusted. Escrow service side, channel attacks, as we all know them, take advantage of the affected, the same keys being used on the same machine, same processing, uh chips and and information such as timing, power, consumption, electromagnetic, even leaks or even sound, could be used to create side channel attacks. So with the case of unbound mpc.

C

The fact that these are random shares on the server side and the endpoint side mean that there is no four key to be able to steal or to attack and again that sharing refresh takes place every operation in every interval of time, and I think that the last attack that we may want to talk about today is denial of service.

C

So uh usually, the amount of service rely on the fact that there is some kind of a proof of work that the iot device has to do upon enrollment, but with npc, as we've mentioned. This is the breakthrough. It is done so fast as opposed to, let's say any type of other operation, or uh certainly uh uh npc, let's say 10 years ago, so the very verification would be so much faster than the proof of work that would be required in order to create the denial of service.

C

This is unrelated to the fact that, usually, you would create high availability, type of environment, a server side. You know using different clouds at the same time, creating some sort of redundancy between servers, etc, uh automatic industry, a whole different kind of story. You cannot create ecus or multiple ecu's for each function in the car, uh so much more complicated, a real challenge, and I am actually very much envious and admiring all the automated people that are working diligently today on these scenarios.

C

um So this is just to summarize npc. I think you got the hang of it as far as what's behind it, what it can do, the use cases it could be used for um and that's it as far as I am concerned. Thank you so much for your.

A

I have a couple of questions I think.

C

We have yes thank you.

A

I have a couple of questions. uh One is uh obviously you're talking about some kind of a ratchet protocol or something that uh refreshes the keys, so that would assume um connect connectivity right. I mean without connectivity that refresh cannot happen.

C

Exactly yes, you are absolutely right. Online uh connection is required for the refresh. Yes.

A

So, coming back to the question of, let us say, use of iot and blockchain. One of the uh more interesting ones is where you track the provenance or even the progress of material and also the temperature or the pressure like, for example, you can have an iot device inside a container that brings some sensitive material, but often this is at sea and it is very difficult to maintain connectivity throughout.

A

So uh you know so. Obviously there has to be some kind of protocol to to secure those iot devices and to be sure that whatever they're sending back is is good. You know good data that they cannot.

C

Yeah you, you are absolutely right. When these are offline uh servers or endpoints, the refresh becomes a challenge. I would say that it's much better than having no.

A

C

Say and say around because I would say the worst case is actually having a full key that is not being refreshed ever so it is an advancement, but yes, connectivity would be preferred in order to allow for that refresh to happen. I I would like to address a workaround around that that we are doing with uh various types of customers of us. Whenever one of the devices would be offline, we do recommend having a policy.

C

We call it of at least a few devices uh that would have to take part in in uh in a transaction some sort of a transaction. We are leveraging trusted systems where some of them are fully cold. Therefore not refreshing t-shirts and some are hot and both sides. Both systems are required in order to sign a transaction, let's say the cold one and the hot one. This is a much more, I would say sophisticated use case. I don't see it really happening for iot devices.

C

Unless these are very very, I would say, dangerous ones, let's say trains just as an example, but it is possible if one would really want to do so.

A

And uh what exactly is your product? Do you sell the libraries or do you sell the full solution.

C

The full solution.

A

Okay, because I had heard that you also allow people to to build something on top of the libraries you provide.

A

C

Actually, in the sense of we do have an mpc library, two-party, mpc library, open sourced, uh it's engaged, it can be found very easily.

C

We've spread it around actually as a means to educate, I would say, even the market when we started out five or six years ago, people were not very much aware of what mpc is or what it can do, so we simply released the two-party mpc out there, so these are libraries that anyone can leverage we support. Whoever wants to use them.

C

I wouldn't call it a solution. These are simply a very low level type of npc, two-party library.

A

But you also have another library that is multi-party, that is licensable right.

C

A

But not not, I mean I'm not talking about a full solution, just that and then you build on top of it.

A

To I mean um I think, it'd be useful to talk a very little bit on the difference between, um let us say multi-sig, which many people uh uh implement an mpc, because that is a striking difference and.

C

Yes, I don't know if sorry, if we have the time, I do have a a great slide specifically for that. If we can just spare uh two more minutes I'll find that slide open it up, and uh I could show you in just one slide the difference between multi-sig and mpc. Let me just find it.

A

Or we can, you know, continue that it's look. It's it's good, um you you can, you can show it. You know we can extend by one or two minutes.

C

A

Of course, we will remind you that we are also going to have the presentation of this in of something similar in the capital market sig, because we are talking about uh high value.

A

uh You know, transactions go go ahead,.

C

Yes, so this is just one slide and I'll finish with that. So thank you for the question uh mpc. We consider it next-gen multisig, because everyone knows full key type of old-fashioned kind of security means. This is what hsms do very strong for protecting keys challenge. Is that with blockchain, just safeguarding the key itself is not good enough, because one doesn't have to steal the key. They simply have to see the key in order to steal the assets.

C

So this is pretty much why multisig has evolved, so there are multiple keys that each and every endpoint or signer is holding actually being required to sign it and being accountable for that on chain. The cost of that is the fact that uh it does not support all ledgers. We just talked about schnoor. I don't think I'm not sure if snore is uh supporting multi-sig. We do know that there are many ledgers that do not support multi-sig, for example, the point of stake type of assets.

C

You have very limited quorum structures that you can create up to two out of three, and if you want to create more than two of three, you have to uh code very sophisticated uh uh scripts into that, and there you go into application security type of rules, inspire contracts which are very vulnerable on their own. It's hard to change approvers.

C

You have to decode them out code additional assigners in unlike the unbound solution, where you simply suspend or revoke and enroll a new type of signer and, of course, if you're dealing with heavily operation cost oriented type of uh organizations, the fact that you have more and more signers on the same transaction, meaning you're, paying higher fees uh with multi-party compensation.

C

None of this happens uh specifically with the unbound solution, which is multi-party as opposed to two-party. uh Everything is cryptographically still validated. You have distributed policy enforcement. This is really important. This is not a cert one server validating the policy, but each and every one of the signers is validating the policy.

C

Any ledger could be supported, no limitation as to the quorum size. We've been talking today uh a few times about five signers, but we have examples with 10 signers. Each of them holding just a key share. Approvers could be updated very easily. You could have offline approvers as we've talked about and you could have optional hardware integration.

C

So all of this is pretty much why gartner is saying that mpc is the next jane's next-gen security infrastructure.

A

Yeah, the main difference being that the uh signing takes place outside the ledger. uh Yes, the other, the in the multisig case of the signing has to be uh authenticated by the smart contracts which can get pretty complicated.

A

The complication in this mpc case is outside the ledger. So anyway, uh it's a very fascinating presentation by rebecca, thank you so much for showing up, and I hope you can share at least parts of these slides with us so that we can put them on the site. Obviously it will have all your you know your uh marks on it, yeah what you know. We are not going to alter anything.

A

uh So that's that's that and I'll put up the uh video of your presentation that I have already recorded and the audio as well, and you can use that for other purposes as well. So that's that's all for today, but rebecca will come back for the capital markets next week and we can talk about some of the high value, institutional type, custody or even the other types of custody, but basically it's a slightly different use case, but using iot devices. Thank you.

C

Thank you so much for everyone uh for taking the time to join. uh I know it's not. You know obvious so good morning, good evening, everyone hopefully we'll meet again next week.

A

C

C