►
Description
Introduction: @juanjuan
Presentation 1 ([0:01:05]): Introduction to Kleros
Presentation 2 ([0:47:15]): Kleros/Maker Fellowship
Agenda and Discussion:
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/agenda-discussion-collateral-onboarding-call-fellowship-edition-thursday-october-22nd-17-30-utc/4825/3
Governance Forum:
https://forum.makerdao.com/
Disclaimer: These calls and the summaries are produced and hosted by MakerDAO community members. Content produced by the community are not the statements or views of the Maker Foundation.
A
Hi
everyone
welcome
to
another.
Oh
I
I
do
consider
it
collateral
boiling
call,
since
it
has
to
do
with
the
with
the
fellowship
that
the
maker
foundation
and
the
claires
have
announced
recently.
A
B
Oh
yes,
now
I
can
okay
here
I
go
so
thank
you
very
much
for
for
inviting
me
to
present
here
so
yeah
very
excited
about
the
fellowship,
and
let
me
give
you
first
after
an
introduction
to
to
clear
us,
so
you
people
know
what
cleros
does
and
then,
specifically,
I
will
speak
about
the
fellowship
so
clairos
is
you
have
to
understand
errors
in
the
context
of
people
building
this
web
three
ecosystem
with
all
the
centralized
platforms
that
we
hope
will
replace
a
number
of
web
2
centralized
applications
that
we
use
every
day
and
some
of
these
dubs
we
are
building.
B
They
just
have
what
we
call
complete
contracts,
they
they
are
fully
automated
and
everything
can
be
read
by
machines,
and
you
know
you
don't
need
humans
for
for
anything,
but
in
other
situations
there
there
are
things
that
are
open
to
interpretation,
and
then
you
need
some
humans
to
make
some
decisions
about
the
the
workings
of
these
dubs.
B
This
is
very
obvious
in
the
case
of
like
e-commerce
platforms
or
like
work
platform,
freelancing
bounties,
where
you
need
some
human
judgment
to
define
what
a
smart
contract
should
do,
and
the
problem
is
that
smart
contracts-
they
are
very
smart
for
self-executing
a
program,
but
they
are
very
bad
at
assessing
subjective
situations
right.
B
So,
let's
imagine
alice
and
bob
she
hires
bob
to
make
a
website,
or
some
software
development
or
whatever
so
alice
can
use
a
dub.
We
made
that
clairos
some
escrowed
up
where
she
can
make
an
agreement
with
bob
and
they
both
agree
on
some
contract,
and
then
a
payment
is
done
into
the
smart
contract
and
if
there
is
a
dispute
in
this
this
contract
because
she
claims
that
bob
didn't
deliver
what
was
expected
or
whatever
so
cleros
is
going
to
resolve
this.
B
Who
is
right
on
on
this
case
see
this
is
the
interface
that
the
jurors
use
for
for
voting
and
for
yeah
for
working,
so
jurors,
analyze
the
evidence
they
vote
and
then,
in
this
case
they
vote
for
alice
and
then
the
smart
contract
that
held
the
funds
in
escrow
sends
back
the
money
to
alice
and
that's
how
cleros,
as
a
decentralized
court,
can
solve
a
problem
that
this
this
escrow
smart
contract
wouldn't
solve,
because
he
didn't
know
if
the
website
was
done
according
to
planned
or
not.
B
So
how
do
you
select
jurors?
Well,
let's
imagine
this
woman
is
a
designer,
I
know
from
vietnam
or
whatever,
and
she
wants
to
make
some
money
by
being
a
arbitrator
into
the
tethers
platform
for
doing
this.
She
needs
to
have
a
token
called
pnk.
B
The
name
comes
from
the
name
of
the
token
that
the
ancient
athenians
used
for
selecting
jurors
for
the
popular
trials.
They
had
this
bronze
plague
with
the
name
of
the
of
the
people,
and
they
had
to
to
put
it
into
an
allotment
machine
and
they
were
randomly
drawn
so
clearly
is
loosely
inspired
and
in
the
greek
chords.
This
is
something
rc20
tokens
that
if
you
want
to
be
a
juror,
you
need
to
stake
into
a
chord
and
then
keros
has
lots
of
chords.
B
B
The
number
depends
on
the
contract
can
change,
but
these
guys
are
going
to
have
the
right
to
analyze
the
evidence
and
vote
and
depending
on
what
they
vote,
their
the
money
is
going
to
be
sent
one
way
or
the
other
right
so
and
how
do
we
make
sure
that
these
jurors
make
a
honest
job?
No,
they
don't
have
to
kyc.
B
They
don't
have
to
prove
their
expertise
in
doing
this
about
this
job,
so
clearness
relies
exclusively
on
economic
incentives
for
having
the
users
behaving
the
way
that
they
are
expected
to
behave
and
for
this
it's
it's
based
on
this
concept
called
shelling
points
developed
by
first
by
thomas
scherling,
that
was
noble
price
in
economics
2005
and
in
this
book
of
solution
of
conflict,
he
proposed
naturally
points
that
what
they
were
called
focal
points
back
then
actually
and
then
just
a
very
quick
introduction.
B
So
this,
if
you
have
different
people,
that
independently
have
to
choose
one
of
these
numbers
so
and
they
can't
communicate
so
typically,
people
will
choose
1000
right.
They
have
to
independently
choose
one
and
they
are
incentivized
to
choose
the
same
as
the
majority
and
because
1000
seems
like
special.
I
think
you
think
that
I
will
think
that
you
would
think
that
this
is
going
to
be
picked
by
you,
so
we
all
like
coordinate
into
this
place.
B
So
if
we
put
a
number
of
jurors
to
analyze
the
same
evidence
in
this
case,
the
software
development
contract
and
they
have
to
to
vote
and
try
to
coordinate
with
the
majority
in
their
vote,
typically,
the
focal
point,
the
most
distinguished
point
in
which
they
will
agree
on,
is
going
to
be
the
let's
call
it
the
truth
about
the
dispute.
B
This
is
that,
if
you
want
the
consensual
truth
of
what
the
community
believes
that
the
right
decision
would
be
in
this
in
this
specific
case
and
then
the
token
remember
that
was
take
to
be
drawn.
So
there
is
a
distribution
of
tokens
that,
in
this
case,
bob
who
loves
the
dispute,
the
money
he
takes.
He
puts
forward
for
for
solving
the
case.
It's
sent
to
the
jurors
who
voted
in
the
same
way
the
majority
way
and
nyasi
who
had
the
staked
token
for
being
drawn.
B
B
They
get
a
part
of
ignacy
token,
and
then
they
get
arbitration
fee
from
the
loser
of
the
district
right,
and
this
creates
the
incentive
for
users
trying
to
gain
the
system
to
to
lose
money
on
average
like
if
you
vote
randomly,
you
may
be
in
the
majority
sometime,
but
over
time
you
are
more
likely
to
be
in
the
minority
and
then
lose
token
you
stake
and
then,
if
you
keep
playing
this
again,
you're
going
to
lose
money
and
eventually
exit
the
system.
B
And
if
you
are
a
honest
juror
that
you
take
your
token
to
the
court,
where
you
have
the
right
expertise
and
then
you
do
an
honest
work
of
analyzing
the
evidence
and
voting,
then
you
are
more
likely
to
be
coherent
and
incoherent.
So
over
time
you
will
tend
to
make
to
make
money
right.
You
may
be
on
the
minority
side
sometime,
because
there
are
some
subjective
matters,
for
your
opinion
would
be
different
and
to
the
majority,
but
over
time,
if
you
keep
playing,
you
will
tend
to
to
make
money.
B
So
this
is
in
a
nutshell:
how
cleros
incentive
system
works?
It's
a
bit
more
complex
than
this.
If
you
want,
we
can
discuss
a
bit
more
later,
but
this
is
more
or
less
how
it
works
and
how
the
incentives
are
set
up,
and
so
the
vision
is
all
of
these
web
three
platforms
that
we
have
now
being
built.
That
requires
some
assessment
of
subjective
situations
like
the
e-commerce
situation.
We
mentioned
social
media.
B
B
If
you
want
oracle,
that's
going
to
assess
the
comment
against
the
rules
and
then
decide
if
this
needs
to
be
accepted
or
not,
so
you
can
already
imagine
all
of
the
potential
use
cases
that
require
some
type
of
decentralized
code
in
order
to
work
right.
So
cleros
is
basically
if
you're
building
one
of
these
platforms
you
just
plug
into
claros,
and
you
send
the
cases
to
claros
and
clero
sends
you
back
the
decision
made
by
the
jury
in
this
decentralized
and
honest
way,
good,
the
the
most
successful
case
of
claro.
B
So
far,
the
one
having
more
traction
is
related
to
d5,
and
you
know,
lots
of
people
are
starting
to
build,
centralized
exchanges
and
other
decentralized
applications
regarding
the
finance,
and
one
of
the
problems
that
you
have
is
that
some
malicious
actors
try
to
send
fake
tokens
into
like,
for
example,
uni
swap.
That
was
a
very
big
problem
a
couple
of
months
ago
and
for
and
so
how
do
you
as
a
different,
centralized
financial
application
deal
with
this
like
either?
B
You
like
have
to
have
your
team
internal
team
like
assess
which
tokens
you
need
to
accept,
which
is
not
decentralized,
of
course,
or
you
build
yourself
a
dispute
resolution
or
a
curation
system
that
will
deal
with
this.
But
you
know
if
you're
building
a
defy
platform.
Maybe
you
don't
want
to
spend
your
time
in
building
a
curation
platform,
because
it's
a
completely
different
business,
so
at
claros
we
built
something
that
can
help
for
this.
So
the
question
that
this
defy
exchanges
or
applications
of
all
kinds.
B
So
how
do
you
decentralize
the
decision
of
of
which
tokens
which
crypto
assets
to
accept
right
and
in
cleros
we
developed
a
dab
called
tokens,
and
this
is
a
list
where
people
can
submit
their
crypto
assets
and
the
community,
based
on
a
number
of
rules
like
with
the
type
of
incentives
that
claros
has,
can
define,
can
curate
which
ones
comply
or
not,
with
the
with
the
required
guidelines
so
like.
If
you
want
to
submit
a
token
to
this
list,
then
you
have
to
type
the
name
type.
B
The
contract
address,
put
the
ticker
and
then
submit
a
logo
as
well
and
then
the
rest
of
the,
and
then
you
you
submit
this
to
the
list
with
this
form
and
you
make
a
deposit
and
then
the
other
users
can
see
your
submission
and
they
can
check
if
it
complies
with
the
guidelines.
For
this
token,
to
be
accepted
right,
so
there's
a
number
of
guidelines
and
anyone
can
see
the
submission
and
decide
that,
if
the
token
complies
or
not
so,
if
the
token
complies,
if
no
one
complains.
B
So
you
have
the
token
accepted
into
the
list.
And
you
get
your
deposit
back.
Okay,
but
now,
let's
say
alice,
submits
a
token
that
is
not
compliant
right,
so
the
community
members
or
all
the
users
can
see
the
submission
again
and
now,
since
they
think
that
there
is
some
topic
that
where
it
doesn't
comply,
they
can
challenge
the
submission
making
another
deposit
right
and
after
this
deposit
is,
is
done.
So
the
item
is
challenged
and
then
there's
going
to
be
a
trial
where
a
cleros
jury
is
going
to
decide.
B
This
is
the
evidence
that
the
challenger
sends
and
why
he
claims
the
token
should
not
be
accepted,
and
then
a
jury
is
going
to
to
make
the
decision,
and
then,
in
this
case
let's
say,
the
jury
claims
that
the
token
was
not
compliant
and
then
it's
removed
from
the
from
the
list
and
the
challenger
gets
deposit
of
the
submitter
okay,
and
this
creates
a
situation
where
you
have
like
lots
of
people
looking
for
submissions
and
seeing
which
comply
and
which
doesn't
don't
comply,
and
this
creates
a
very
high
quality
list
of
of
tokens.
A
Federico
one
one
quick
question:
what's
what's
the
what's
the
incentive
for
the
person,
that's
making
the,
I
guess
a
deposit
or
that's
proposing
a
new
token,
what's
their
incentive
to
do
that.
B
They
said
it
comes
from
the
fact
that
being
in
the
list
have
some
valuable
thing
for
the
submitter
like
in
this
case.
If
you
want
to
be
in
uni,
swap,
for
example,
you
need
to
be
accepted
first
in
this
list.
If
you
wanted
to
like
to
be
listed
in
exchange
x
and
that
exchange
decides
okay,
we
want
this.
Only.
We
will
only
display
tokens
that
are
created
by
claros.
So
then
you
have
an
incentive
in
order
to
to
make
the
submission.
Okay,
so
there's
something
valuable
that
you
might.
B
B
If
you
want
to
be
in
the
in
uniform
list
here,
you
have
clerus
and
you
have
to
make
the
submission
of
your
token
and
then,
if
it's
accepted,
then
you
are
you,
you
are
partying
or
you
know,
okay,
so
this
is
a
very
basic
list
that
makes
sure
that
the
token
is
not
malicious.
It
doesn't
have
the
wrong
contract
address
or
etc,
but
then
there
are
other
like
more
sophisticated
applications
that
are
badges.
So
you
can
so
you
make
the
submission
of
a
token
it's
accepted,
and
then
you
may
want
to
so
talking
to.
B
You
may
want
to
certify
that
the
token
also
complies
with
some
higher
level
requirements
and
then
so,
if
you
want
to
to
make
this,
so
you
go
to
a
token
and
then
you
request
adding
a
batch
of
this
token
and
there
are
different
types
of
badges.
One
of
them
is
the
erc20
badge.
So
if
you
want
to
say
okay,
my
token
is
a
erc20
compliant
token.
B
Then
I
can
say:
okay,
I'm
going
to
make
another
deposit
and
claim
that
this
token
is
20
and
other
members
of
the
community
will
check
this
and
if
they
think
it
complies,
they
will
let
it
go
to
the
list.
If
not
they
challenge
it
and
it
works
exactly
as
the
previously
another
badge
is
a
stable
coin,
say
you
want
the
your
token
to
be
accepted
as
a
stable
coin.
B
Token,
then,
if
it
complies
with
this
number
of
guidelines,
then
the
number
so
you
make
a
submission
and
other
people
from
the
community
are
going
to
check
it,
and
if
it's
accepted,
then
it
earns
the
stablecoin
badge
guide
saves
one
batch.
Okay,
one
very
interesting
thing
we
did
starting
last
year
is
working
with
phoenix.
You
know
the
exchange
that
was
part
of
bitfenix,
and
then
we
created
a
bitfenix
xynx
batch
where,
if
you
wanted
your
token
to
be
listed
at
phoenix,
you
have
to
first
earn
this.
B
This
batch
right-
and
this
was
a
very,
very
like
comprehensive
number
of
items
where,
like
you,
the
token
had
to
prove
it
had
to
comply
with
some
legal
aspects,
like
the
token,
was
not
allowed
to
produce
dividends.
For
example,
it
had
to
comply
with
a
number
of
team
conditions
like,
for
example,
none
of
the
team
founders
had
to
have
criminal
records.
Well,
you
haven't
seen
all
of
this
like
checklist,
which
is
very
comprehensive,
and
so
after
you
submitted
your
token,
it
got
accepted
to
the
list
you
submitted
them
to
the
infinix
badge.
B
Then
you
were
allowed
by
finex
to
enter
into
the
final
voting
round,
where
the
pool
of
tokens
that
were
sent
to
voting
by
the
community
were
previously
embedded
by
by
cleros
right,
so
this
removed
from
the
phoenix
listing
process
a
number
of
like
due
diligence
or
just
didn't
remove,
but
it
helped
them
speed
up
and
make
the
new
deletions
of
the
tokens
that
should
be
sent
to
the
to
the
final
voting
round
to
have
all
this
previous
vetting
situation.
B
That
made
sure
that
the
tokens
that
got
to
the
final
round
were
voting
was
done
were
much
higher
quality.
Okay,
let
me
just
give
you
two
cases
for
so
you
know
how
this
actually
works,
so
you,
you
can
have
a
better
grasping.
So
there
was
a
token
called
buyer
chain
and
this
was
submitted
and
then
to
the
athenex
badge
and
someone
from
the
community
challenged
it,
and
they
claimed
that
this
this
guy
called
scott
bingley.
Apparently
he
for
being
the
cto
of
a
big
project.
B
He
didn't
have
like
enough
youtube
talks
or
social
media
presence,
so
they
started
digging
and
they
saw
that
this
guy
claimed
to
be
a
part
of
a
blockchain
group
at
oxford
and
some
juror
even
called
oxford
and
asked
about
this
guy,
and
they
told
him
that
yeah,
we
don't
know
this
guy
and
we
don't
have
really
a
blockchain
group
in
oxford.
So
that
was
a
way
in
which
the
community
discovered
this
potentially
malicious
and
non-compliant
behavior,
and
this
token
was
rejected
from
from
the
list.
B
And
then
there
was
another
case.
It's
greek
plus
case,
which
is
a
it's
a
great
project.
But
there
was
one
of
the
conditions
that
were
put
forward
for
being
part
of
the
list
was
that
there
needed
to
be
a
third-party
audit,
and
what
happened
is
that
the
third-party
audit
condition
so
grid
plus
was
part
of
consensus
which
had
done
the
the
third
party
audit.
B
So
it
was
discussed
if
a
a
third-party
audit
made
by
the
same
parent
company
or
another
europe
of
the
same
parent
company
complied
or
not,
with
the
condition
of
being
a
third-party
audit
and
in
the
end,
gridlock
was,
was
not
accepted.
In
the
list,
because
of
this,
so
this
system
of
community
vetting
is
extremely
extremely
efficient
in
finding
lots
of
things
that
would
be
probably
missed
by
a
centralized
due
diligence
process
right.
B
So
I'm
just
going
to
stop
here
for
a
while,
because
I'm
sure
you
have
some
questions
and
then
I'm
going
to
address
specifically
the
the
fellowship.
So
hopefully
that
was
clear
enough
for
you
to
understand
how
this
works.
A
You
mentioned
the
name
of
p
and
k.
What's.
B
So
the
original
name
was
pinakion
and
it's
actually
the
name
of
the
this-
a
bronze
plague
that
athenian
citizens
had
in
order
to
be
selected.
It
was
like
your
old
ancient
id
of
athens
and
you,
if
you
wanted
to
be
a
jewelry,
a
trial,
you
went,
and
you
put
your
your
bronze
plaque,
your
pinnacle
into
a
machine.
This
size
called
clegoterion,
which
means
like
the
altar
of
luck.
B
It's
a
random
selection
machine
and
then
you
put
every
citizen
put
their
pinaki
on
their
plate
in
there
and
then
in
a
slot,
and
then
some
member
from
the
justice
system
threw
some
black
and
white
dice
20
face
dyes
on
a
tube
on
a
side,
and
if
you
had
on
yours
on
your
drawer,
you
had
a
white
dice.
You
went
to
the
jury,
you
had
a
black
dice,
you
went
home,
so
it
was
a
mechanism
to
prevent
the
collusion
and
corruption
in
the
in
the
athenian.
B
Justice
system
and
cleros
is
like
loosely
inspired
in
in
how
this
works.
So
the
name
of
token
pinaccion
is
comes
from
that
name.
We,
the
community,
has
decided
kind
of
not
to
use
pinakion.
They
just
call
it
the
clearer
token
and
the
ticker
is
still
p
and
k,
but
that
was
the
the
first
yeah.
That's
where
it
comes
from.
D
Yeah,
hey
federico
so
on
one
of
those
slides
you
showed
the
possibility
of
disputing,
maybe
travel
or
I
do
a
crowdfunding,
and
you
know
I
get
gaffled
for
my
crowdfunding
dollars.
So
how
does
that
work?
How
do
I
dispute
a
travel
or
some
crowdfunding
that
I
participated
in.
B
Yeah,
so
the
the
people,
so
if
there
is
a
dispute,
so
other
people
can
like
if
they
think
that
there
are
two
parties-
and
I
think
that
bob
is
right.
I
think
because
I
analyze
the
evidence
and
I
can
like
help
bob
pay
for
the
for
the
the
the
the
fee
for
the
educational
fees
that
parties
need
to
pay
and
then,
if
bob
wins
and
then
I
get
back
a
part
of
yeah
of
money
earned
by
by
the
party
that
one
which
is
bob.
B
So
this
is
basically
a
tokenized
decentralized
version
of
how
litigation
funding
works
in
the
in
the
like
mainstream
world.
You
know
people
fund
litigation
because
of
they
think
it's
basically.
B
That,
potentially,
if,
if
you
are
right
about
the
about
your
idea
of
who
will
win
it's
an
asset
that
will
generate
a
revenue
flow
in
the
future
and
if
you
have
money,
you
can
bet
on
that.
If
you
want
and
that's
how
litigation
works,
cleros
takes
that
to
the
decentralized
world
and
for
like
lower
value
type
of
disputes.
B
So
that's
that's
a
really
interesting
feature
because
it
helps
the
party
which
is
like
less
wealthy
to
actually.
If
this
party
is
right
and
doesn't
have
the
money
to
pay
for
a
regulation
fee,
it
can
pull
the
community
to
help
her,
like
yeah,
have
its
chance
in
court
right.
So
that's
that's
a
cool,
a
feature
of
claros
which
can
help
like
democratize,
access
to
justice
and
put
both
parties
into
the
same
footing.
B
So
it's
it
depends,
I'm
having
william
william
you're
of
research,
and
so
he
can
give
you
like
a
more
specific
yeah
data,
how
much
it
cost
and
and
and
the
times.
Maybe
you
want
to
answer
that
one
william.
E
Sure
so
the
amount
of
time
that
it
will
take
the
case
to
finalize
is
somewhat
variable,
because
claris
has
an
appeal
system,
part
of
the
way
that
we
balance,
having
sort
of
small
groups
of
people
judge
these
cases
that
don't
like
overly
duplicate
too
much
effort
versus
still
getting
like
a
result.
That's
representative
of
the
broader
community
is
that
there's
a
possibility
to
appeal
potentially
several
times.
E
So,
if
you're
not
happy
with
the
like
decision
that
the
three-person
pound
I
come
up
with,
you
can
appeal,
you
get
a
seven
percent
final
appeal
again
up
to
up
to
some
limit
until
you
have
something
that's
very
likely
to
be
statistically
representative
of
the
whole
community.
But
that
means
that
if
you're
unlucky
enough
to
get
into
a
case
that
has
like
a
long
series
of
appeals,
it
might
be
a
while,
before
your
case,
totally
finalizes.
E
So
while
most
cases
finalize
quite
quickly,
you
know
might
take
several
days
for
the
jurors
to
reach
a
decision.
Maybe
you'll
have
a
decision
by
the
you
know
like
within
a
week.
You
know
it's
possible
that
if
you
have
the
case
that
it
feels
like
three
times
it
might
be
a
month
or
something.
D
Got
it
and
my
last
question
is
as
an
american?
The
last
thing
I
want
to
do
is
do
jury
duty.
How
do
you
get
over
that
hurdle
to
incentivize
people
to
want
to
participate
in
in
a
trial.
B
B
Then,
at
each
time
you
participate,
you
will
tend
to
be
on
the
right
side
of
the
majority
and
then
you
will
tend
to
make
money
and
then
this
job
for
you,
like
typically
duty
like
in
the
traditional
court
system
like
people
yeah,
it's
pay,
it's
not
very
well
paid,
let
me
say,
and
yeah
and
people
don't
want
to
do
it
because
they
are
also
they
don't
do
it
voluntarily.
They
some
of
them,
see
it
as
a
juror
as
a
duty
to
the
republican
etc,
but
not
all
of
them.
F
Yeah,
so
just
a
question
to
to
federico.
Could
you
cover
a
little
bit
more
in
detail
the
the
listing
part
of
kind
of
your
registry
there
and
how
how
that
process
actually
works?
I've
covered
that
with
the
ecnx
a
little
bit
quickly,
I'm
just
yeah.
F
B
Yeah
sure
so,
first
there
is
at
least
a
general
list
where
you
have
like
you.
Can
you
can
actually
go
there
if
you
want
now,
so
you
can
see
how
it
looks
like
now
and
then
you
will
have
a
number
of
tokens
that
are
in
different
status,
so
one
of
them
is
in
the
register
status.
That
is
okay.
This
token
was
submitted.
It
was
not
appealed,
it
was
not
challenged
or
it
was
challenged,
but
then
it
won't
so
it's
accepted
and
it's
part
of
the
list.
B
Now
then
other
tokens
are
in
the
pending
status,
so
they
were
submitted
and
now
they
are
waiting
for
people.
There's
a
number
sometimes
for
people
to
to
see
if
this
company
or
not
with
their
with
their
guidelines,
and
so
they
are
there
and
they
can
be
challenged
by
anyone
that
thinks
that
this
the
token
doesn't
comply
with
the
guidelines.
B
So
then
there's
other
tokens
that
are
in
the
state
of
are
rejected
because
they
were
submitted
and
then
the
so
it
was
challenged
and
then
it
lost
the
case
at
claros
and
then
there
are
others
we're
sharing
the
crowdfunding
stage
where
people
can
chip
in
to
to
defend
the
case,
the
the
part
they
want
and
that's
well
what
we
mentioned
before.
B
So
you
want
your
token
to
be
in
uni,
swap
right
and
then
okay,
you
have
the
token,
and
then
you
can
you
have
this
submitted
token
on
the
top
right
and
then
you
have
to
fill
this
form,
the
name
of
the
token
the
address
the
ticker
and
then
the
image.
And
then
you
have
to
make
a
deposit
that
will
stay
locked
there
until
the
token
is
either
accepted
or
rejected,
and
then
so
you
make
this
deposit
and
then,
if
it's
accepted,
so
the
token
goes
from
the
pending
stage
to
the
register
stage.
B
You
get
your
money
back
and
the
token
is
part
of
the
list.
Now,
if
you
submit
a
token
that
is
not
compliant
so
now
it
can
be
challenged.
So
these
guys
say
hey
this
guy
submitted
something.
That's
not
compliant,
so
I'm
going
to
challenge
this
guy,
and
so
I'm
going
to
make
money
by
with
this
challenge
right.
So
he
makes
a
deposit
and
he
writes
the
reason
why
it
doesn't
comply.
So
it
could
be.
B
The
logo
doesn't
comply
with
the
being
a
png,
transparent
or
the
control
address
is
wrong
or
the
ticker
address
is
wrong
or
whatever
so
and
then
this
is
going
to
go
to
the
jury
and
the
jury
is
going
to
to
decide
who
is
right
about
this
right,
so
they're
going
to
have
the
the
submission
they're
going
to
have
the
arguments
of
the
challenger
and
then
they're
going
to
vote
with
the
assist
with
the
type
of
incentives
that
I
mentioned
before.
B
So
if
this
token
is
so,
if
it's
rejected
so
they
you
can
provide
a
small
justification
of
one
why
they
voted
that
way
and
then
the
token
is
sent
to
the
rejected
status
and
you
lose
your
deposit
and
the
guide
takes
your
deposit
right.
So
let's
say
that
now
your
token
is
in
the
list,
and
now
you
want
this
to
be
at
phoenix
right
because
you
want
to
be
listed
into
this
exchange.
B
So
you
what
you
want
to
do
is
so
first,
you
read
carefully
all
of
the
guidelines
to
earn
the
batch
of
athenex.
So
you
will
see
this
are
a
bunch
of
bad
guidelines
because
I
finished
was
quite
strange
and
in
what
they
wanted
to
to
do,
and
they
want
to
filter
out
a
lot
of
tokens
that
were
not
good
enough
quality.
B
So
so
you
read
this:
you
carefully
check
that
your
token
complies
with
the
with
all
of
this,
and
then
you
go
to
the
again
to
the
interface,
and
then
you
go
to
this.
You
do
your
token
and
then
you
put
add
phoenix
batch
right
and
then
you
will
be
required,
a
deposit
in
the
similar
vein,
as
was
previously
mentioned,
but
this
was
this
time.
The
deposit,
I
think,
was
william
washington,
something
like
that.
E
I
think
so
remember
you
know.
Ether
was
worth
somewhat
less
at
that
time,
but
it
was
something
a
lot
over
here.
B
So
this
creates
the
incentive
for
lots
of
people
in
the
community
to
check
very
carefully
whether
this
complies
or
not
and
then
after
so
and
then
again,
your
token
is
not
challenged
or
is
challenged
and
you
want,
then
you
get
to
get
phoenix
badge
and
or
it
was
challenged
and
you
lost,
and
then
you
get
your
deposit
removed
and
then
you
are
not
accepted
into
the
infinite
batch
right
and
then,
after
you
have
the
internet
back.
B
So
this
yeah
at
finnex,
like
in
their
own
governance,
turf,
they
decided
to
make
a
voting
of
all
of
those
tokens.
They
could
decide
whatever
governance
rules.
They
want
to
do
with
this
private
pool
of
tokens
done
by
claros
right
so
but
cleros
provided
the
thinnex
look.
This
is
a
pool
of
tokens
that
comply
with
the
guidelines
that
you
wanted
for
for
your
yeah.
For
for
your
process,
right,
that's
how
it
works.
I
hope
it
was
clear
now.
F
Yeah
yeah,
it's
it
is
I'm
actually.
My
kind
of
my
question
was
oriented
towards
also
some
comparison
of
other
frameworks
operating
in
this
space.
So
I
don't
know
how
familiar
you
guys
are
with
the
cryptocurrency
rating
council,
which
actually
I
learned
not
too
long
ago,
which
kind
of
like
rates
rates
like
the
cryptocurrencies
in
terms
of
their
their
propensity
to
be
like
a
security
or
not,
and
that's
at
the
back
of
that
is
actually
used.
It's
actually
cons.
F
It
consults
a
lot
of
like
legal
people
and
is
used
by
a
lot
of
exchanges
to
actually
to
decide
whether
actually
they
are
listing
a
particular
token
or
not,
and
I
was
wondering
whether
you
guys
had
done
any
benchmark
of
how
this
works
or
how
this
is
better
or
improves
existing
framework
for
for
assessment
of
of
digital
assets
to
be
listed
on
exchanges,
because
it
kind
of
like
it
talks
to
likes
like
some
similar
processes.
But
it's
not
only
for
one
exchange.
F
Yeah,
like
coinbase
coinbase
binance,
I
think
there's
a
bunch
of
like
the
big
ones
that
use
the
cryptocurrency
rating
console.
So
I
was
just
wondering
whether
you
guys
head
on.
F
It's
actually
it's
it's
a
council
that
was
originally
headed
by,
I
think
coinbase
guys
and
then
and
then,
but
actually
they
have
done
this
over
several
iterations,
taking
like
legal
opinions
over
several
iterations,
where
they
would
kind
of
like
say
hi.
This
is
kind
of
like
all
the
compliance
checklists
that
they
have
to
do
and
they
would
kind
of
like
give
it
like
to
three
or
four.
F
I
think
legal
firms
and-
and
they
iterated
at
several
times
up
to
the
point
that
actually
they
could
get
more
or
less
like
the
same
kind
of
like
scoring
for
for
those
digital
assets
and
then
and
then,
after
that
they
started
kind
of
like
having
a
whole
governance
around
around
that
and
different
different
exchanges
actually
are
involved
in
the
process
nowadays.
F
Yeah,
I
I
that's
that's
the
thing
this
part
of
it
that
I
think
is
decentralized
in
this
part
of
it.
If
you
think
the
centralization,
from
the
point
of
view
of
like
being
fully
transparent
on
the
blockchain,
I
don't
think
that's
the
case,
but
in
terms
of
governance,
I
think
there's
this
a
little
bit
of
decentralization.
It's
not
only
one
organization
actually
making
all
of
the
calls
so
yeah.
B
Okay,
yeah.
I
I
need
to
to
to
to
study
that
I
don't
I
didn't
know
it
that
doesn't
look
to
be
the
same
use
case,
so
this
process
made
by
cleros
is
fully
decentralized.
It's
everything
is
on
chain.
So
I
think
it's
it's
a
bit
different.
I
would
have
to
to
see
what
use
cases
the
the
address.
B
I
don't
imagine,
for
example,
like
a
decentralized
exchange
or
decentralized
platform,
or
maybe
yes,
but
I
need
to
learn
more
using
a
centralized
process
for
for
doing
this,
because
it
would
like
bring
back
the
problem
of
this
central
single
point
of
failure.
B
D
D
B
D
Yeah,
okay,
hi
federico.
Thank
you
for
the
presentation.
I
have
a
question
regarding
how
judges
vote,
and
so
they
are
incentivized.
Judges
are
incentivized
to
vote
like
the
majority
right.
If
not,
they
lose
their
stake.
That
works
a
bit
different
than
traditional
courts
in
mid-space
work
right,
so
judges
don't
vote
because
of
their
convictions,
but
both
because
of
what
they
think
that
the
other
thing
right
to
try
to
achieve
this.
This
showing
point.
B
Yeah,
or
could
you
elaborate
if
I
am
understand
this
correctly
I'll-
let
william
answer
that
he
will
okay.
E
Yes,
that's
right
like
this
is
a
somewhat
different
model
than
than
traditional
carts,
yeah
and
people
like.
Don't
you
know
their
their?
Their
role
is
to
vote
what
they
think
the
sort
of
broad
community
consensus
will
be,
and
then,
if
the
rules
are
written
well
and
like
the
parties
provide
good
evidence
normally
that
will
be
represented
like
normally.
You
would
think
the
community
would
come
to
the
same
context
as
you.
E
You
would,
if
there's
like
an
argument
that,
like
you,
think
that
is
like
really
salient
that
you
think
that
people
would
like
you
know,
might
fall
into
a
trap
and
make
a
simplistic
judgment,
but
they
might
have
you
know,
but
if
they
had
this
better
argument,
then
they'd
realize
it
actually.
A
E
Right
there's
an
opportunity
for
that
argument
to
be
presented
as
evidence,
even
even
by
jurors
generally,
and
there
is
the
like.
There
are
mechanisms
in
place
to
try
to
like
push
the
like
what
you
would
think.
The
the
community
judgment
will
be
to
something
that
closely
resembles
what
your
actual
judgment
is,
but
then.
D
Okay,
but
how?
How
do
you
avoid,
like
I've,
been
extremely
interesting
this
this
mechanism?
But
how
do
you
avoid,
like
group,
think
how
do
you
avoid
it?
Could
it
could?
It
could
happen
that
the
collective
also
thinks
not
doesn't
see
just
doesn't
see
something
right
or
or
things
or
things
wrong
or
unjust.
So,
like
this
group,
I
find
extremely
fascinating.
I
was
a
way
too
foraging
to
consent,
consensus
and
aligning
collective
opinions
about
something,
but
I
I
still.
E
Yeah
that
can
happen,
I
mean
there's
also
the
risk
that
you're,
like
enlightened
judge
in
a
traditional
system,
could
be
wrong
too.
Although.
E
Right
like,
if
you
know,
if
you
have
some
like
super
specialized,
you
know
your
judge
on
your
supreme
court
or
something
you
know.
B
E
F
E
But
so
you
know
this
doesn't
necessarily
like
claros,
not
necessarily
cannot
necessarily
achieve
the
same
level
of
rigor
as
having
your
kids
go
to
buy
like
the
supreme
court.
D
E
In
we,
it's
our
experience
that,
in
the
vast
majority
of
cases
the
group
is
can
come
to
sufficiently
good
decisions.
Assuming
that
happy
policies.
D
E
D
Yeah
no
fascinating,
I
I
cannot
think
on
a
better
system
for
for
for
crypto
or
for
d5.
You
are
building
this.
This
compliant
decentralized
compliance
for
deep.
I
I
I
cannot
think
of
a
better
system
like
this.
A
traditional
core
system
is
yeah.
It's
it's
it's
in
another
universe,
that's
what
is
happening
by
now,
for
example,
super
interesting.
A
F
A
Okay,
federico,
I
wanted
to
ask
you
regarding
the
badges
the
way
it
was
phrased.
Originally
it
looked
like
it
was
more
like
an
oracle.
You
mentioned
a
stable
coin,
for
example.
So
would
that
be
like
an
oracle
providing
that
so
is
it?
Is
it
purely
code
or
is
it
the
same
system
where,
where
it's
jurors,
and
if
it
is
the
same
system
with
jurors
like
how
like
how
stable
is
a
stable
coin,
so
you
could
argue
that
I
don't
know
a
given
stable
coin
that
loses
spec,
for
example,
it's
not
stable
anymore.
B
There
are
like
guidelines
that
are
quite
specific
and
that
jurors
what
they
have
to
do
is
to
check
the
guidelines
against
what's
happening
like
here.
You
have
some
of
them.
I
can't
share
all
of
that.
I
don't
remember
exactly
what
were
all
of
them
now,
but
this
will
give
you
an
idea,
so
the
for
example.
It
requires
that
the
token
must
have
a
price
target,
be
it
usd
gold
or
whatever,
and
it
must
have
a
defined
mechanism
to
maintain
the
peg
like
as
it
collateralized
already
crypto.
B
So
so
did
you
have
a
number
of
guidelines
and
it
if
at
some
point,
the
asset
stops
complying
with
some
of
these
guidelines.
It
can
be
asked
for
removal,
which
is
a
very
important
thing
also
because
you
may
have
this
asset
that
was
compliant
at
some
point
and
stops
being
compliant,
and
now
it
puts
the
defy
community
at
risk
and
it
there's
there
must
be
a
mechanism
for
removing
that
which
the
token
created
registry
also
provides.
D
Yes,
I
have
some
questions,
so
I
guess
I'll
start
off
with
with
federico.
Would
you
engineer
using
a
system
like
cleros
to
approve
collateral
types.
B
If
I
imagine
merker
using
using
something
like
this,
I
I
totally
imagine
maker
using
something
like
this
to
be
studied
to
be
define
exactly
what
the
mechanics
should
be
and
what
the
guidelines
should
be.
I
totally
think
that
this
is
a
good
solution
for
for
the
maker
dog
community
to
to
bring
more
speed
and
more
decentralization
to
to
to
yeah
to
how
that
works.
I
will
speak
about
that
in
the
second
part.
If
you
want,
I
can
you
can
ask
me
the
question
later.
D
Okay,
all
right,
just
another
question:
does:
does
the
clero
solution
have
the
capability
to
easily
apply
its
decision
making
process
to
other
protocols,
as
in
like
would
you
be
able
to
pull
like
a
random
set
of
jurors
from
the
maker
community
to
gauge
their
responses
rather
than
pnk
holders?
Because
I'd
imagine
you
know,
the
incentives
are
aligned
more
for
maker
community
members
to
decide
on
collateral
types
rather
than
cleros
community
members.
D
E
Conceivably,
like
I
mean
you
know
the
claros
jurors
they
you
know
they
expect
to
be
drawn
as
jurors
as
part
of
the
role
of
them
as
token
holders.
If
you're,
if
you
apply
to
a
different,
you
know
sort
of
token
pool,
you
know
that
doesn't
have
quite
the
same,
like
structure
and
tradition
of
drawing
people
to
ask
them
questions.
Maybe
you
won't
get
like
a
high
participation
rate.
Maybe,
like
the
community
norms,
won't
be
the
same.
You
can't
necessarily
expect
them
to
react
in
the
same
way
like
it's
conceivable.
E
You
can
do
something
like
that.
The
idea
behind
using
claros
like
that,
an
idea
of
using
sort
of
claros
as
is,
is
that,
even
if
this
is
even
if
the
incentives
of
the
sort
of
claros
juror
community
aren't
perfectly
aligned
with
the
incentives
of
of
the
maker
community,
the
claros
juror's
role
is
to
evaluate,
like
a
system
of
rules,
to
look
at
like,
for
example,
these
these
stable
coin
bad
guidelines
and
judge
based
on
the
rules,
whether
something
complies
with
the
rules
or
not.
So
it's
not
necessarily
like
that.
E
They
have
some
incentive
to
try
to
produce
good
rulings
because
otherwise
clairols
will
lose
credibility,
but
it's
not
so
much
a
question
of
whether
their
individual
incentives
align
with
like
the
goal
of
whatever
the
rules
are
trying
to
produce.
D
Could
you
okay,
sorry
go
ahead,
go
ahead,
I
was
gonna
say.
Maybe
you
could
use.
F
B
B
E
Depends
a
lot
from
one
project
or
the
next.
It
depends
on
sort
of
how
hard
it
is
to
like
tight
sort
of
lists
where
you
expect
challengers,
to
have
to
sift
through
very
like
a
lot
of
correct
submissions
to
find
like
a
rare,
incorrect
submission
need
to
be
rewarded
higher,
for
example.
So
when
you're
contaminating
the
juror
fees,
you
you
judge.
E
Okay,
if
you
put
a
case
before
someone
how
how
much
would
you
need
to
pay
them
for
them
to
reasonably
do
this
work,
whereas
the
challengers
have
a
sort
of
different
role,
because
they
have
to
like
sift
through
a
whole
bunch
of
things
to
try
to
find
challengeable
submissions?
So
both
we
try
to
reward
both
roles
for
the
amount
of
effort
they
have
to
put
in
which
can
vary
from
one
product
to
another.
A
B
The
one
with
more
traction
is
the
talking
registry.
This
is
when
we
started
clairos.
We
were
like
thinking
more
about
the
escrow
kind
of
use
case
that
we
I
mentioned
at
the
beginning,
but
the
truth
is
that
which
had
more
traction
is
that
this
curation
of
defy
assets,
so
we,
of
course
we're
still
pursuing
the
other
one.
Terrorist
is
a
general
purpose
decision
system
that
can
be
used
for
lots
of
different
things,
but
the
one
which
is
more
successful
as
for
now
is
the
the
token
registry.
A
B
Good
and
then
I
can
stay
as
long
as
you
want
answering
questions,
so
no,
no
problem.
So
in
2018
we
launched
at
claros
a
program.
We
called
the
cleros
fellowship
of
justice
to
bring
people
who
were
interested
in
researching
different
applications
of
players
in
different
fields,
so
to
do
a
program
six-month
program
remote
and
have
the
support
of
the
team
to
research.
Some
specific
type
of
use
case
that
they
cared
about
lots
of
them
are
lawyers
like,
for
example,
dimitri
studied,
the
connections
between
claros
and
the
new
york
convention
of
arbitration.
B
He's
a
lawyer
from
russia.
Abeer
is
a
lawyer
from
india
in
the
uk
and
he
is
an
arbitrator
and
he
studied
the
use
of
cleros
in
oil
and
gas
contracts,
which
is
the
field
where
he
specializes
and
he
proposed
clearly
for
a
type
of
disputes
or
long-term
contracts
in
the
oil
and
gas
industry.
Then
we
have
a
for
example.
B
Let
me
see,
mauricio
is
a
lawyer
and
he
studied
the
application
of
claros
into
the
peer-to-peer
energy
distribution
industry.
There
are
different
disputes
in
that
industry
and
he
thinks
that
cleros
is
appropriate
for
solving
them
and
he's
an
expert
on
that.
B
And
so
all
these
guys
are
experts
in
their
kind
of
things
and
they
see
different
use
cases
of
clairols
where
we
don't
know
them
right.
So,
for
example,
mauricio
who
is
on
the
top
left
he's
from
mexico
and
he's
researching
I'm
actually
implementing
a
use
case
of
clerus
in
the
traditional
mediation
industry.
There
then
we
have
robert
dean,
is
a
construction
arbitrator
and
he's
working
on
the
user.
Criticism
construction
is
arbitration
for
construction
disputes.
B
So
all
these
guys
come
from
different
backgrounds,
most
of
them
law,
but
but
typically
yeah,
but
they're
interested
in
how
to
use
kerosene
into
their
field
and
this
produce
for
cleo's
a
very
important
knowledge
base
that
we
use
for
for
addressing
new
use
cases
right,
and
so
that's
how
I
had.
The
idea
was
okay:
how
how
could
we
from
clairos
contribute
to
to
the
maker
dow
collateral
on
boarding
process?
So
we
already
have
this
very
successful
token
list
that
we
that
it's
it's
actually
working.
It's
used.
B
It
has
more
like
500
tokens
so
and
for
a
long
time
I
I've
seen
like
maker
dao
community,
potentially
being
interested
in
some
application
of
clerus
into
improving
or
decentralizing
their
collateral
onboarding
process
to
make
it
faster,
more
decentralized
and
more
secure.
B
And
I
can't
imagine
like-
and
I
would
love
this
to
happen-
having
a
maker
davao
badge,
where
it's
composed
by
a
number
of
things
that
may
be
ready
to
call
to
risk
profile
of
assets
or
to
legal
aspects
in
a
similar
way
to
what
it
was
done
in
the
in
the
finance.
But
this,
of
course
responding
to
the
needs
of
the
maker
dao
community,
which
would
help
vet
and
all
of
the
assets
that
are
going
to
be
to
want
to
be
part
of
the
maker
of
the
collateral.
B
So
I
can
imagine
a
process
and
this
answers
the
question
I
was
asked
before
first
to
go
through
some
previous
vetting
process
done
by
clairos
to
filter
out
a
number
of
tokens
that
are
clearly
non-compliant
with
what
the
community
wants,
as
potentially
being
part
of
the
of
the
diced
collateral
and
then
another
governance
vote
in
the
maker
community.
Among
all
of
those
assets
that
already
are
in
the
pool
of
potentially
acceptable
assets
right.
B
So
this
is
how
I,
how
more
or
less
the
finex
batch
works,
and
I
think
that
this
can
be
really
interesting
to
discuss
the
implementation
in
in
maker
dao
community.
So
that's
why
the
the
goal
of
this
work
we've
been
doing
with
the
with
amy
and
try
to
put
this
together.
So
how?
If?
B
B
That's
going
to
be
like
one
researcher
over
a
six
month
period
to
try
to
define
a
number
of
guidelines
that
crypto
assets
should
comply
in
order
to
to
be
acceptable
as
potential
collaterals
of
the
dye
right,
and
there
is
a
stipend
that
is
going
to
be
sponsored
by
the
boat
by
cooperative
claros
and
the
maker
foundation
of
3
000
die
a
month,
and
the
requirements
are
first,
of
course,
to
submit
a
very
high
quality
report
of
the
research.
B
Then
to
contribute
insight
to
the
merker
dao
forum
and
to
present
the
findings
in
the
maker.
Dawg
governance
and
risk
call,
and
so
this
is
more
or
less
the
structure
of
the
program
and
what
I
would
love
to
to
happen
in
the
future
and
and
so
this
is
a
a
really
good
way
for
yeah
to
see
how
I
think
maker
dao
can
potentially
use
claros
for
decentralizing
number
of
things
that
are
in
the
way
of
being
decentralized.
B
C
I
want
one
note
just
to
clarify,
so
it's
not
that
the
final
outcome
is
a
maker
doubt
badge,
but
that
is
federico
is
mentioning
that
could
be
a
possibility.
So
what?
What
with
the
foundation,
what
we're
funding
is
just
the
the
research
around.
How
do
we
assess
some
of
these
collaterals
and
that
could
inform
us
in
many
ways
as
we're,
seeing
with
a
lot
of
the
our
process.
A
D
B
The
the
the
the
course
of
research,
the
goal
of
this
research
is
to
improve
the
way
in
which
this
collaterals
are
assessed
and
not
improved.
But
you
know
more
like
formalized,
and
then
this
could
be
potentially
used
for
having
a
clairos
maker,
though
about
sinclairs,
which
I
would
love
that
to
happen.
But
then
other
people
would
also
could
also
take
this
and
make
some
system
which
is
better
than
clairos
and
then
maker
dog
community
deciding
to
use
another
system
which
I
wouldn't
like
that
outcome.
B
But
the
goal
of
this
is
purely
a
research
goal,
and
then
so
it's
not
that
this
is
going
to
result.
As,
as
me
mentioned,
it's
not
going
to
result
in
a
micro
batch
in
claros.
It's
a
research
that
could
potentially
lead
to
improving
how
the
how
the
system
works
and
yeah.
So
that's,
that's!
That's
the
goal
and,
of
course,
the
research
that
the
fellow
will
do
is
going
to
be
public
and
yeah,
no
ip
or
any
of
the
things
that
we
don't
like.
D
Yeah
and
then
one
last
question
specific
to
cleros,
not
so
much
the
fellowship,
but
what
would
prevent
someone
from
creating
multiple
accounts,
holding
pnk
to
crowd,
jury
pools
and
attempts
like
basically
bought
mining
judgments.
E
Okay,
so
so,
if
there
was
no
token
if
we
just
drew
random
people
that
had
like
that,
had
an
address
that
it's
admitted
to
clarisse
to
try
to
become
jurors,
you
could
do
that
without
any
restrictions.
You
could
just
create,
as
many
addresses
as
you
wanted.
You
kind
of
bought
that
so
the
point
of
the
token
is
that,
in
order
to
have
to
increase
your
weight
in
the
in
the
botnet
to
make
a
botnet
more
effective
than
just
having
one
person,
you
need
that
many
more
tokens.
E
D
Okay,
so
the
number
of
pnk
determines
the
weight
of
your
vote,
but
does
the
reward
for
each
judgment
also?
Is
that
also
dependent
on
the
weight
of
your
vote,
or
is
it
based
on
equal
distribution
on
number
of
those.
E
So
the
reward
is
it
scales,
so
it
is
possible
to
be
drawn
with
multiple
voids,
both
through
the
same
case,
if
you,
if
you're
like
a
large
enough
whale
and
there
are
a
large
enough
number
of
votes
being
drawn-
that's
not
ideal,
but
that's
the
consequence
of
having
this
sort
of
token
based,
simple
resistant
mechanism
and
it
if
you
draw
multiple
times,
you're,
you're,
rewarded
and
penalize
that
many
more
times.
E
So
if
you
try
to
attack
the
system
and
you
get
several
votes
in
that
attack
and
then
ultimately
you
lose
all
your
votes
were
coherent.
You
get
penalized
that
much
more.
D
Yeah,
it's
a
circling
back
to
the
fellowship
right
and
I
think
this
is
for
amy.
So
I
guess
the
ultimate
goal
of
this
is
to
one
day
have
a
maker
community
compliance
department,
so
to
speak
or
an
officer
where
that
individual
is
doing
the
risk-related
duties.
D
You
know
creating
and
maybe
coordinating
some
kind
of
like
reports
on
the
tokens
that
are
trying
to
get
listed
in
the
maker
dow.
Would
you
agree
with
that
amy
or
am
I
completely
off.
C
So
I
think,
there's
there's
kind
of
two
considerations
here
we
what
I've
seen
from
what
the
community
has
been
asking
for
and
where
we're
at,
especially
with
something
like
real
world
assets.
So
you
see
some
of
the
forum
posts
where
there's
a
lot
of
questions
about
legal
assessment.
C
So
in
the
end,
if
there
was
a
legal
domain
team
that
wanted
to
prop
up,
that's
certainly
something
that
I
think
a
lot
of
the
community
members
would
probably
appreciate,
but
we're
we're
not
really
in
the,
and
so
I
think
to
bridge
some
of
that.
C
That's
kind
of
why
one
of
the
ideas
is
we
wanted
to
like
collaborate
and
then
kind
of
contribute
to
this
fellowship,
because
the
research
itself
of
how
we
should
do
that
assessment
with
specifically
collateral
would
be
helpful
for
us
whether
or
not
there
is
a
legal
team
or
not.
Who
is
able
to
do
that?
I
think
it's
just
about
the
framework.
The
same
as
we're
doing
that
with
risk,
for
example,
and
risk
is
like
okay,
we
have
this
template
we're
coming
out
with.
C
I
think
you
heard,
as
mentioned
very
briefly,
just
some
like
more
of
a
documentation
on
how
collateral
onboarding
could
like
what
are
some
of
the
templates.
We
can
use
like
what's
the
handbook
so
that
anyone
in
the
community
can
do
it
and,
ultimately,
I
think
the
strength
that
we
have
is
the
more
people
who
are
like
auditing
the
work
and
it
knowing
what
the
process
is,
the
the
better,
the
stronger
the
network
we
can
have
so
we're
just
kind
of
contributing
to
the
fellowship
in
order
to
get
that
research
of
like
discovery
phase.
C
But
you
know
it
might
be
that
in
the
end
that
pers
it's
not
necessarily
that
that
person
has
to
be
the
representative
legal
for
maker
dow.
It's
just
that
they're
providing
some
research
around
a
potential
framework
that
could
happen
is
that.
D
Clear
yeah,
definitely
so
it's
not
like
a
compliance
officer
in
the
traditional
sense
of
it.
It's
just
someone
making
recommendations
and,
as
you
explained
it,
hopefully,
the
community
will
follow
kind
of
the
recommendations.
C
I
think
one
of
the
best
things
that
could
happen
is
if
they
come
up
with
the
framework
and
someone
else
in
the
community
who's.
Also
a
lawyer
like
says:
actually
you
know
this
can
be
improved,
or
actually
this
is
great
whatever.
It
is
again
that
redundancy
is
really
nice
for
us
to
have
so
that
we
have
multiple
like
lawyers
who
are
kind
of
commenting
on
it.
D
Cool
and
the
road
map
is,
this
is
going
to
be
a
six-month
search.
I
guess
and
then
we'll
vote
on
it
or
something
we'll
greenlight
it.
I
should
say.
C
Well,
I
think
that'll
be
up
to
the
so.
The
requirements
for
the
fellow
is
that
they
do
participate
in
our
in
some
in
the
forums
and
because
they
will
have
to
understand
what
how
maker
dell
as
a
community,
assesses
things
in
the
first
place
and
interact
with
the
domain
teams.
So
they
will
be
more
present
and
then,
in
the
end,
has
to
kind
of
submit
this
high
quality
report
and
claros.
C
Their
fellowship
has
done
this
before
and
and
the
reports
are
pretty
stellar,
so
we're
kind
of
like
having
high
hopes
for
that
one,
and
so
whether
or
not
that
the
governance
decides
that's
the
framework
we
want
to
use
it.
It
could
also
just
be
like
that
is
a
framework
that
we
use
kind
of
similar
to
how
like
there
could
be
several
types
of
risk
assessments.
It
doesn't
have
to
be
that
we
follow
one.
C
It
could
be
that
we
just
understand
what
types
there
are
and
that
we
decide
how
to
kind
of
work
around
that.
A
I
think
to
add
a
little
bit
on
that
and
the
voting
front.
I
think
that,
once
that
this
person
comes
with
the
with
the
potential
solution
or
framework
or
or
whatever
it
is,
it
could
potentially
lead
to
a
declaration
of
intent
or
mip
where,
where
some
change
is
proposed
and
then
the
maker
holders
can
vote
and
decide
to
move
on
with
with
the
stellar
solution
from
the
report
federico
one
question,
I
I
read
somewhere:
it's
not
hearing
the
requirements,
but
I
read
somewhere
that
there
were
like
monthly
check-ins
required.
B
D
Questions
yeah,
actually
just
real
quick.
When
I
go
on
uni
swap
I
get
that
claro's
list
and
it's
bombarded
with,
like
I
don't
know,
40
50
tokens
that
I
need
to
add
to
my
uni
swap
account.
So
did
the
uni
swap
also
do
a
fellowship?
I
mean:
how
did
they
pretty
much
pick
you
guys
to
do
this?
B
Is
what
picked
so
the
list?
I
first
mentioned
the
list
that
you
have
to
comply
with
the
name,
ticker
and
image,
and
that
so
basically
pulling
the
data
from
that
list
to
the
uni
swap
and
yeah.
We
work
with
them
a
bit
for
the
integration.
B
I
don't
run,
uni
swap
front-end,
so
I
can't
say
that
maybe
it
looks
a
bit
spammy
each
time,
you're
going
to
uni
swap
but
yeah,
but
that's
that
the
tokens
that
they
list
they
to
the
cleros
list.
They
pull
them
from
from
that
list.
That
is
done
in
the
tokens.oh.
A
There
you
go
we're
thinking
about
the
what
you
mentioned
about
potentially
having
a
maker
batch
and
there's
an
issue
that
I
see
with
that
and
again
this.
I
guess
this
could
be
solving
different
ways,
but
sometimes
when
I
try
to
get
projects
to
come
to
the
collateral
calls
it's
hard
to
find
someone
from
the
project
to
come.
So
it's
it's
that
someone
like
a
community
member
proposed
the
the
collateral
type
and
then
everything
is
very
organic
and
the
project
sometimes
doesn't
even
well.
A
A
B
Yeah,
so
of
course
I
I
can't
speak
for
the
baker
dog
community.
I
do
think
that
this
framework
that
we
expect
the
fellow
to
propose
will
inform
the
maker
dog
community
to
make
potential
improvements
into
the
token
and
into
the
collateral
process.
Onboarding
process,
that's
not
required.
Just
let
me
clarify
that.
It's
not
part
of
the
fellowship.
The
fellowship
goal
is
what
is
written
there
submit
the
report,
contribute
insights
and
representation.
B
Then,
when
this
report
is
done,
I
would
love.
I
I'm
not
going
to
lie
to
you.
I
would
love
to
make
her
dao
using
claros
for
for
this
assessment,
but
that's
a
decision
to
be
made
by
the
maker
dog
community.
That's
so
yeah.
A
Yeah,
my
my
question
was
more:
let's
say
that
I
don't
know
curve
or
or
uni
swap
once
their
token
listed
in
maker
dao,
and
they
want
to
use
this
potential
new
system,
so
they
could
stake
part
of
their
or
ether
or
their
token
or
whatnot
in
order
to
get
this
batch.
But
if
it
was
a
user,
I
guess
that
the
cost
would
be
much
higher
well
relatively
higher
to
a
user
than
than
a
company.
E
A
E
Yeah,
so
when
like,
if
you
eventually
use
the
maker
dial
badge
as
a
potential
solution,
you
have
to
think
about
how
people
are
incentivized
to
submit
that
to
that
bad
list,
and
if
the
projects
want
to
be
used
as
make
it
out
collateral,
then
and
that's
a
sufficient
incentive
to
be
on
the
list
that
makes
things
that
much
easier.
E
If
the
projects
aren't
that
enthusiastic
about
being
negative
out
of
collateral-
and
there
don't
have
a
strong
intention
to
be
on
this
list,
then
you
sort
of
have
to
think
about
that
when
you're
designing
a
list
like
how
are
we
going
to
incentivize
people
to
submit
this,
you
know,
that's.
You
know
an
extra
challenge
that
isn't
necessarily
unovercomable
that
you
have
to
think
about
that
extra
stuff.
A
A
Okay,
I
just
wanted
to
clarify
yeah
long
for
wisdom,
said
it
on
the
on
the
chat,
but
it's
actually
the
maker
foundation
funding
the
this
fellowship
with
clara's
and.
A
B
Great
it's
here,
that's
the
the
the
the
recruitment
page
of
the
fellowship.
So
I
will
leave
that
for
a
second
there
and
then
about
claros
and
let
me
okay,
you
took
the
picture
I'm
going
to
the
so
you
have
this
telegram
group
or
you
have
made
all
the
questions
you
may
have.
You
can
find
the
answers
here,
the
community
or
you
can
just
if
you
have
some
specific
question,
you
can
just
email
me
I'm
going
to
share
my
email
here.