►
From YouTube: Meet Your Delegate | Ep.14 ft. Chris Blec
Description
Chapters:
0:00 Introduction
0:22 Chris Blec
14:41 Open Questions
⬇ About ⬇
Welcome to the (announcement for the) twelfth episode of Meet Your Delegate, where MKR holders and the broader community get to know their delegates.
For this episode we will have two delegate candidates presenting their platforms and holding a Q&A session:
@ChrisBlec - Recognized Delegate
@prose11 will be doing the hosting
⬇ Resources ⬇
Chris Blec Platorm - https://forum.makerdao.com/t/chris-blec-delegate-platform/15544
Forum post - https://forum.makerdao.com/t/meet-your-delegate-14-chris-blec/15585
A
All
right,
hello,
everyone
and
welcome
this
is
the
meet
your
delegate
number
14
already
we're
here
with
chris
black
and
yeah,
we're
going
to
be
going
over
a
quick
platform
update
and
then
an
open
question
and
answer
session.
So
first
off
huge
welcome
to
you
chris
thanks
for
for
doing
this.
Thank
you.
B
B
B
You
know,
and
all
the
stuff
going
on
in
between
that
you
don't
really
understand.
So
that's
always
been
my
my
stance
on
defy
and
in
2020
I
started
to
uncover
some
centralization
issues
in
d5
that
were
really
I
considered
to
be
the
wrong
kind
of
trade-offs.
So
I
spent
the
last
two
plus
years
trying
to
educate
people
about
that
and
I'm
talking
about
specifically
like
admin
keys
and
centralization
and
dows,
as
far
as
like
token
manipulation
and
vcs
sort
of
manipulating
votes,
and
things
like
that.
B
I
want
to
call
it
centralized
but
sort
of
add
complexity,
and
when
I
say
methodically,
I
mean
it
not
in
a
negative
way.
I
mean
this
in
a
way
that
I
I
see
is
a
lot
of
acceptable
trade-offs,
so,
like
a
lot
of
people
might
think.
Okay,
if
you're
into
decentralization
trustlessness,
you're
hardcore.
You
only
see
this
utopian
world
where
everything
is
completely
trustless
and
that's
not
really
true.
B
For
me,
I
see
the
world
as
a
set
of
trade-offs
and
the
trade-offs
have
to
be
acceptable
and
finding
that
line
of
acceptability
is
is
tough,
it's
kind
of
subjective,
and
that
subjectivity
is
what
I
hope
to
add.
As
a
delegate
and
I've
spent
years
now
sort
of
trying
to
define
that
for
myself
and
when
I'm
talking
about
trade-offs
with
maker
down
talking
about,
I
mean
everything
from
just
the
way:
governance
works
with
core
units
to
psm
to
real
world
assets.
B
So
it's
but
but
those
same
people
like
maybe
very
risk-averse,
and
maybe
if
they
knew
about
some
of
the
the
questions
that
we're
facing
in
governance,
they
would
rethink
the
way
they
engage
with
dye.
I
think
that's
important.
I
don't
think
we
should
be
in
the
business
of
just
selling
dye
to
the
world.
You
know
and
trying
to
push
it
like
crack
like.
I
think
we
should
be
in
the
business
of
responsible,
methodical
growth,
that
that
really
amplifies
decentralization
number
two.
B
I
have
trust
minimalist
and
when
I
say
that
what
I
mean
is
minimizing
the
trust
that
mkr
holders
die
holders
and
basically
anybody
in
this
ecosystem,
because
it's
it's
legos
right,
everything's
connected,
so
reducing
the
trust
that
they
all
have
to
have.
The
retail
users
have
to
have
in
core
units
specifically
and
in
governance
in
us.
You
know
as
delegates
and
also
in
other
maker
holders.
You
know,
as
far
as
how
they
might
use
their
influence
to
change
this
system.
B
B
B
Obviously,
I'm
gonna
have
conversations
and
hear
feedback,
and
obviously
I
want
to
be
representative,
but
I
also
won't
vote
for
an
executive
just
because
it's
an
executive,
I
would
now
obviously
there's
trade-offs
and
there's
negotiations
and
and
that
kind
of
stuff,
but
it
seems,
like
the
expectation,
might
have
been
that
executives
just
get
voted.
Yes,
because
we've
already
had
the
negotiation,
but
if
it
still
contains
something
that,
I
think
is,
is
against
my
better
judgment,
there's
a
chance
that
I
won't
vote
for
it.
I
would
provide
reasoning
for
that.
B
You
know
and
be
very
clear
about
it,
but
yeah
so,
and
I
was
asking
questions
in
the
governance
channel
yesterday
for
the
those
that
missed
it
about
how
delegates
are
incentivized,
you
know
and
it
at
first
it
appeared.
Okay
delegates
are
really
incentivized
to
just
rubber
stamp
executives,
but
since
then
it
became
clear
that
that's
not
the
case
that
a
vote
sort
of
in
opposition
to
an
executive
is
incentivized
to
happen
equally
with
a
yes
vote.
B
What
we've
already
discussed,
but
the
expectation
of
somebody
who
might
be
in
opposition
to
part
of
that
executive
would
rubber
stamp.
The
executive
makes
me
wonder
if
combining
those
two
roles
make
sense,
so
I've
just.
I
have
informed
opinion
fully
on
that,
but
I've
been
thinking
about
that
a
lot
the
past
day
regarding
specific
topics,
the
psm.
B
To
me,
it
feels
like
a
necessary
evil.
I
I
I've
always
thought
of
it
as
a
temporary
fix.
I
think
that
by
temporary
could
be
years,
but
you
know,
I
think
that
it
makes
sense
to
always
consider
it
as
a
something
that's
not
permanent
and
something
that
eventually
maker
dow
should
strive
to
eliminate,
mostly
because
of
I
mean
just
the
philosophical
reasons,
but
also
the
the
risk
that's
posed,
especially
with
all
the
stuff
happening
in
washington
dc.
Lately,
the
d3m,
I
said,
I
think
it's
the
wrong
kind
of
risk.
B
I
think
that
totally
relying
on
ave's
security
is
is,
is
not
a
good
trade-off.
I
think
that
also,
you
know,
especially
with
things
that
have
been
recently
disclosed
about
ave's
reliance,
then
on
other
third
parties.
You
know,
as
far
as
chain
link
goes
and
oracles
it's
just
like
this
daisy
chain
of
risk.
That
doesn't
seem
like
the
right
kind
of
trade-off.
Obviously,
it's
already
happened
so,
but
just
sharing
my
thoughts
on
that
and
then
regarding.
I
just
wanted
to
mention
real
world
assets.
I
I'm
not
opposed
to
real
world
assets.
B
I
I
I
think
that
slowly
methodically
adding
them
makes
sense.
The
first
question
I
would
always
ask
is:
how
do
we
liquidate
this?
How
do
we,
what
kind
of
risk
is
posed
by
the
third
party
and
the
core
unit?
That's
or
you
know,
I
still
have
to
learn
how
this
all
works,
but
as
far
as
you
know
how
these
things
are
being
handled
by
this
unit,
that's
responsible
in
the
real
world.
B
I
haven't
fully
gotten
educated
on
that
yet,
but
a
lot
of
this
stuff,
I'm
going
to
learn
as
I
go
along
and
but
I
I
am
a
skeptic
when
it
comes
to
that
stuff,
but
I'm
not
opposed
as
long
as
risk
mitigation
is
very,
very
clear
and
everything
just
makes
sense.
You
know
I
want
to
bring
a
lot
of
logic
and
reason
to
these
conversations
and
hopefully
that's
valuable
to
some
m
care
holders
that
are
interested
in
in
delegating
in
that
regard.
B
B
I
think
it's
something
I
want
to
think
about
some
more,
but
I
I
think
that
the
level
of
complexity
we're
talking
about
here
and
the
the
risk
of
things
sort
of
spinning
into
a
situation
that
that
nobody
can
wrap
their
head
around.
I
mean
I
feel
like
maker.
Dao
is
already
in
a
place
where
it's
very,
very
difficult
for
one
person,
any
of
us
here
like,
as
you
guys
know
like
better
than
me,
probably
it's
very
hard
to
understand
everything.
B
That's
happening
all
the
time,
especially
when
there's
always
closed
door
meetings
and
things
going
on,
and
you
know
core
units
sort
of
going
off
and
doing
their
own
thing.
But
then,
when
you
add
additional
spokes
like
like,
is
being
proposed,
I
I
I
get
very
concerned
about
the
unknowns
there,
so
I'm
not
totally
sold
on
the
idea,
but
it's
it's
an
exciting
conversation.
I
think
that
it's
it's
worth
discussing.
B
I
think
that
I
I
I'm
really
a
believer
in
slow
and
methodical
growth.
I've
said
it
a
few
times
in
this
call.
I'm
not
a
believer
in
rushing
to
dominate
the
world
by
next
year,
or
I
don't
believe
dye
has
to
be
the
number
one
stable
coin.
You
know
by
2023
or
I
I
I
think
that
bitcoin
grew
the
right
the
right
way.
B
You
know
slowly
under
the
radar
but
prioritizing
the
right
things
and
making
sure
that
by
the
time
it
it
did
take
over
the
world,
it
was
battle,
tested
hard
and
had
a
a
shield
that
couldn't
be
penetrated
at
least
as
much
as
possible,
and
I
would
love
for.
I
think
dai
still
has
that
opportunity,
but
it
in
a
different
way.
Not
it's
not
going
to
be
bitcoin,
but
it
can
get
to
a
place
where
the
dow
is
impenetrable
to
a
point.
B
A
C
Hey
chris,
so,
first
of
all
a
warm
welcome,
and
I'm
really
excited
to
to
have
you
on
board
here
and
I
love
the
the
kind
of
thinking
that
you
bring.
That
I
think
is
is
slowly
fading
from
this
space
and
I
think
it's
very
important
and
a
very
important
aspect
of
also
what
brought
me
to
crypto
in
the
first
place
and
the
kind
of
speaking
about
incentives
so
glad
to
have
you
here.
C
I
just
my
question
is
I
want
to
understand
your
reasoning
behind
behind
the
executives
a
little
bit
better
because
for
me,
when
delegates
decide
to
not
vote
on
executives
that
contain
proposals
that
they
opposed,
it
just
adds
more
friction
and
actually
makes
the
system
less
stable
and
more
brittle,
and
I
kind
of
get
that
you
could
want
to
spin
that
out
and
actually
have
it
as
a
separate
function.
But
the
way
it's
now.
C
B
If
I'm
voting
yes
on
something
that,
I
believe
is
the
wrong
move,
and
I
have
the
the
voting
power
to
make
a
difference
then,
and
delegates
are
still
delegating
I'm
sorry
if
m
care
holders
are
still
delegating
to
me.
I
don't
want
to
put
my
signature
on
something
that
I
am
opposed
to
or
that
I
think
can
do
long-term
damage,
or
you
know
that
I
think
in
five
years
could
somebody
could
look
at
and
say
wow
who
put
this
thing
into
place?
You
know
so
I
understand
I
do
understand
how
things
have
been
working.
B
I
think
you
know,
as
far
as
like
delegates
have
a
duty
to
execute
the
will
of
what's
already
been
decided
in
in
the
forums
and
the
polls
by
governance,
but
at
the
same
time
you
know
to
ask
somebody
to
vote
against
the
way
that
they
think
things
should
go.
It
is
it's
still
a
vote.
I
mean
it's
a
vote
for
a
reason
right.
C
B
Right
I
understand,
but
it
still
requires
a
delegate
to
use
their
voting
power
to
put
it
into
into
place
right
to
formalize
it
and
it's
the
same
delegate
that
was
either
for
against
it
in
the
in
the
forums
so
based
on
this
setup,
I
understand
the
expectation
I
do.
I
understand
why
you
know
people
are
looking
at
it
this
way,
but
what
I'm
saying
is
and
I'm
not
saying
that
anything
should
change
or
I'm
not.
B
I
guess
maybe
I'm
suggesting
something
should
change,
but
I'm
saying
for
me
as
a
delegate,
I'm
choosing
not
to
vote
for
things
that
I
would
stand
in
opposition
to
even
at
the
executive
level.
So
I
want
to
say
it
now
on
this
call
and
in
my
platform
and
every
so
that
if
anybody
delegates
to
me
they
understand
that
and
if
people
do
delegate
to
me,
I'm
assuming
that
they
are
on
the
same
page,
you
know
and
that
maybe
they
see
the
need
for
some
change
in
that
particular
system.
D
D
You
know
to
really,
I
guess,
I'm
at
a
loss,
maybe
to
be
very
eloquent
on
this
point,
but
I
think
just
what
I'm
saying
is
that
I
don't
see
a
conflict
in
most
of
the
things
that
I
may
have
voted.
No
on
that.
I
feel
very
strongly
about,
in
an
instance,
still
approving
the
executive.
That
went
against
my
way,
because
when
I'm
voting
on
the
executives,
as
people
have
said,
I
am
conceding.
D
That's
that's
that's
damaging
in
an
existential
way,
but
I
think
it's
quite
helpful
to
separate
subjective
views
on
individual
policies
or
votes
from
an
overall
systemic
like
conceding
that
okay,
the
whole
system
worked
the
way
we've
designed
it,
and
so.
But
but
you
know
to
your
point
as
well,
you
know
we
do
have
it
in
the
u.s
separate
function
right
where
the
executive
is
a
different
person
from
the
congress.
That's
passing
the
votes
right,
that's
signing
at
the
end
of
the
day,
so
I
mean
point
taken.
D
B
I
hear
I
hear
you,
I
I
I'm
very
opinionated,
you
know,
and
I've
developed
some
some
strong
principles
in
the
space
and
and
I
guess
I
guess
what
I'm
saying
is
it.
I
think
it
is
a
personal
decision
to
appoint
you
know
as
far
as
what
you
feel
comfortable
doing.
You
know
as
part
of
a
dow,
but
but
my
stance
has
been.
B
That
yeah,
if
my
name
is
going
to
go
on
it,
I
have
to
believe
in
it
now.
I'm
not
saying
I
would
vote
no
on
an
executive
just
because
it
contains
one
thing
out
of
like
seven
that
I
disagree
with.
I
might
still
vote.
Yes,
if
I
think
the
trade-off
is
acceptable,
and
I
would
provide
reasoning
around
that,
but
I
guess
what
I'm
saying
is
just
because
it's
an
executive,
it
doesn't
mean
that
I'm
immediately
gonna
gonna
vote
in
favor
of
it
and
that's
yeah.
B
I
mean
I,
I
do
understand
the
humility
aspect
and
sort
of
taking
a
step
back
at
that
level
and
you
know
doing
the
the
will
of
of
the
community,
but
it
still
is
a
it's
a
at
the
executive
level.
Still
from
a
distance,
you
look
at
it.
It's
still
an
it's
still
a
vote.
It's
still
a
personal
signature
by
each
delegate
or
m
care
holder
or
whoever
I'm
saying
that.
Yes,
this
everything
here
should
be
executed.
B
You
know
permanently,
so
it's
still
at
that
level.
It
is
still
a
decision,
it's
not
a
given
it's
just.
It's
still
a
decision
now,
if,
if
people
think
that
the
executive
shouldn't
be
a
decision
at
that
level,
then
maybe
the
mechanics
need
to
change.
You
know
but
again
like
if,
if
I'm
the
only
one
that
thinks
this
way
then
nobody's
going
to
delegate
to
me.
B
B
A
dow
is
nothing
without
aligned,
incentives
and
everything
maker
doubt
does
is
based
on
incentive
alignment
every
core
unit,
every
module.
Everything
is
based
on
incentives.
So
in
this
case
I
think
you
know
the
incentives
as
long
as
a
novo
is
not
financially
disincentivized.
Incentives
are
aligned.
If
we
get
to
a
point
where
novo
it
or
an
abstaining
is
financially
disincentivized,
then
the
system,
I
think
is,
is
it's
either
you
can
look
at
it
two
ways:
it's
either
broken,
or
it's
manipulating
incentives
to
encourage
a
specific
outcome.
B
B
A
E
The
reason
why
I
actively
blocked
is
because
I
saw
the
psms
as
a
spread
manager
that
I
thought
should
have
multiple
tiers
with
liquidities
and
fee
spreads
in
the
loosest
sense.
It
should
be
a
liquidity
maker
of
last
resort
right,
and
so
that's
why
I
didn't
just
not
vote.
I
actually
sat
my
maker
on
a
previous
executive
to
try
and
block.
I
knew
it
wouldn't
work.
It
was
just
a
statement,
but
there's
some
key
differences
between
those
three
activities.
Chris,
I
just
want
to
say
I
really
appreciate
you
being
forward
on
that.
E
E
E
You
know
whether
you
have
comments
more
a
little
bit
more
on
the
centralization
forces
of
like
the
psm
and
and
and
the
existential
risks,
and
how
to
approach.
That,
generally
so,
and
thank
you
everything
you
said,
I'm
like
welcome
brother,
maybe
I'll,
have
an
ally
on
some
topics.
Okay,
so
I
appreciate
you
coming.
B
B
B
You
know
and
serves
a
great
need,
because
it's
only
focusing
on
one
form
of
collateral,
but
I
I
came
to
terms
with
the
fact
that
it's
not
about
what
kind
of
collateral
you
use
it's
about,
what
your,
what
your,
what
level
of
risk
you're
you're
allowing
and
where
that
debt
ceiling
is,
and
those
are
the
kind
of
trade-offs
that
I
have
appreciated
from
maker
dow.
You
know
which
taught
me
something
about
when
it's
time
to
sort
of
take
a
look
and
and
start
to
realize
trade-offs
aren't
always
terrible.
B
They
can
serve
first
as
great
experiments.
If
you
just
start
out
slow
and
then
you
know
you,
you
can
increase
your
level
of
risk
as
you
feel
more
comfortable,
but
regarding
the
psms,
I
I
think
that
I'm
not
totally
knowledgeable
enough
right
now
to
know
if
it's
at
the
right
level
of
risk.
I
think
it's
like
you
know,
looking
at
I'm
a
big
fan
of
looking
at
worst
case
scenarios
that
goes
to
the
adversarial
thinking.
B
I
think
the
worst
case
scenarios
should
be
acknowledged,
always
the
d3m
worst
case
scenarios
chain
links,
multisig
gets,
hacked,
ave
gets
completely
wrecked
and
all
that
dye
is
lost
right
and
then,
where
does
that
risk
get
passed
on
to
okay
like
what
would
happen,
then
you
know
so
it's
when
it
comes
to
the
psms
worst
case
scenarios
is
blacklisting
is,
is
you
know,
regulatory
interference?
You
know
on
the
centralized
front,
what
could
happen?
How
would
that
go?
How
would
that
affect
the
protocol
and
maker
holders?
B
But
I
hear
what
you're
saying
I
think
that
it's
right
to
have
these
concerns,
and
I
think
that
it's
important
that
I
think
that
looking
at
these
things
from
that
point
of
view
from
different
points
of
view,
shouldn't
be
seen
as
governance
attacks,
I
think
that
thoughtful
com,
anybody
who's
here,
contributing
to
the
conversation,
no
matter
what
the
point
of
view
is
obviously
cares,
because
this
is
a
this
is
a
doubt.
It's
very
complicated.
B
I
got
a
little
worried
yesterday
in
the
discord
when
we
were
talking
about
not
voting
on
executive
and
the
idea
was
brought
up
that,
maybe
that's
a
governance
attack.
You
know,
and
I
think
that
it's
important,
that
we
look
at
these
things
as
conversations
there's
so
much
at
stake
with
with
dye,
I
think
dai,
it
could
potentially
be
the
future
of
global
finance.
If
it's
done
right,
you
know-
and
I
I
think
it
goes
far
beyond
just
just
crypto
and
defy-
I
think
it
could
be
critically
important
to
the
world.
B
A
Awesome
thanks
guys,
I
know
we're
running
up
against
time
here.
There
was
a
one
more
line
of
questioning
from
kiang
I
wanted
to
squeeze
in
if,
if
you're
able
to
she's
asking
kind
of
on
codifying
disclosure
requirements
on
conflicts
of
interest,
I
want
to
know
if
you
had
any
thoughts
on
this,
whether
it's
for
delegates
or
proposal,
authors
or
just
in
general,
like
how
should
we
be
setting
ourselves
up
to
to
address
conflicts
of
interest,
as
as
they
pop
up.
B
Yeah,
it's
a
great
question,
it's
something
that
I
was
thinking
about.
Looking
at
some
like
the
real
world
asset
proposals
and-
and
things
like
that,
I
mean,
but
obviously
it
goes
for
delegates
core
units
as
well,
and
I
guess
when
we
say
codify
it's
like
I,
I
don't
even
know.
If
there's
clear
rules
in
place
currently
are
there
I
mean
as
far
as
like
when
I
was
asked,
are
there
conflict?
Do
I
have
conflicts
of
interest?
D
Yeah,
we
don't
have
much,
that's
very
specific,
or
you
know
whether,
whether
ownership
percentages
yeah,
we
really
don't
have
it's
a
new
conversation.
I
think
we're
starting
as
to
whether
we
need
to
have
more
formal
or
thought
or
or
engage
in
a
process
of
thinking
through
this
and
putting
something
more
specific
in
place
for
different
actors
and
different
scenarios.
B
See
this
is
where
it
gets
blurry,
because
this
type
of
stuff
is
not
even
supposed
to
matter
in
a
decentralized
world
right.
It's
not
supposed
to,
like
the
incentives
are
supposed
to
be
there
to
prevent
an
attack
because
it
is
basically
an
attack
like
a
conflict
of
interest.
That's
not
disclosed
is
is
like
a
governance
attack.
You
know
where
you're
you're
clearly
incentivized
to
do
something
else,
but
you're
here
contributing
in
this
way
and
you're
being
affected
by
that
other
incentive.
B
B
But
so
I
agree
that
it
could
be
an
issue,
especially
with
core
units
that
have
closed
door
meetings
and
who
you
know
they
might
have
17
other
jobs,
you
know,
or
for
somebody,
who's
proposing
a
real
world
asset
proposal
that
could
stand
to
make
them
a
lot
of
money
or
any
kind
of
proposal
right.
So
I
think
it's
it's
massive.
A
Thank
you,
yeah.
That
was
awesome.
Chris.
Has
this
been
a
a
great
dive
into?
You
know
some
of
the
things
you
you
mentioned
on
on
your
platform,
so
I
really
appreciate
you
setting
up
the
time
to
do
this.
Obviously
we'll
be
posting
recordings,
so
people
can
learn
from
this
and
obviously
would
encourage
everyone
to
engage
on
on
the
forum
on
your
platform.