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From YouTube: ETHDenver Presentation | MakerDAO: Endgame - Restoring Balance to a Decentralized Workforce by Retro
Description
Talk Description:
In October '22, MakerDAO Governance approved the Endgame Plan. A comprehensive DAO restructuring to accomplish better alignment of capital to work and workforce. MakerDAO is currently in the midst of enabling this restructuring which will manifest SubDAOs - fully independent, token-based voting Governance Systems for specific classes of work within Maker. This talk will provide the public one of the first looks into the Endgame Plan's development, exploring the effort invested into reorganizing token holders into Decentralized Voter Committees (DVCs), Core Units into SubDAOs, creating opportunities for more organizations to work with MakerDAO as ecosystem actors, and the introduction of SubDAO tokens and the Elixir Wars.
A
My
journey
to
the
Dow
has
basically
been
playing
in
data
centers
and
trying
to
solve
business
problems
with
technology.
It's
also
coordinating
Freight
on
the
the
global
scale
and
these
days
I
work
and
play
in
dows
again
one
more
little
break
here.
Some
disclaimers
these
views
are
my
own.
I
do
not
represent
all
of
maker.
This
is
definitely
not
Financial
advice.
This
definitely
is
not
legal
advice,
but
for
anybody
that's
experiencing
similar
problems
in
daredevs.
A
This
may
be
mental
health
advice
again,
just
a
summary
of
how
the
talk
today
will
be
broken
down
and
to
start,
we
have
to
appreciate
again
that
the
Dow
originally
started
as
a
foundation
that
looked
to
hand
over
ownership
of
this
protocol
to
a
decentralized
organization
that
really
hasn't
been
done.
A
ton
before
and
within
the
last
year
of
operating
as
Adele
we've
kind
of
learned
some
problems.
A
The
first
one
starts
at
the
the
the
very
top
of
the
governance
layer,
which
is
the
the
mipset
the
maker
Improvement
proposal,
MIP,
set
that
we
use
to
direct
the
organization,
as
well
as
the
evolution
of
the
protocol.
The
unexpected
addressable
fields
of
governance
really
relates
to
what
is
and
isn't
allowed
in
maker
and
how
it
works.
An
example
would
be
imagine
a
green
field
with
a
concrete
slab
dropped
in
it
and
there's
about
10
rules
about
what
could
be
built
there
from
there.
A
The
organization
may
rise
straight,
but
in
a
decentralized
environment.
It
kind
of
branches
out
due
to
various
different
reasons
that
we'll
get
into
a
little
bit.
The
main
takeaway,
though
from
using
the
mipset
over
the
past
year,
is
that
there
was
way
too
broad
of
categories
of
work
and
strategy
that
needed
to
be
passed
through
the
framework
to
reduce
that,
then
we
have
to
find
some
way
to
scope.
A
The
addressable
work
that
we
want
the
governance
layer
worrying
about
and
answer
some
of
these
questions,
maybe
a
little
bit
more
autonomously
about
how
we
can
do
certain
things
or
can
I
do
certain
things.
Does
that
really
need
to
go
up
to
a
token
holder
vote
when
everything
has
to
go
up
to
a
token
voter
who
a
token
holder
vote?
What
we
started
to
see
was
voter
apathy
both
due
to
the
complexity
as
well
as
the
volume
and
the
impact
that
token
holders
could
actually
have
on
the
protocol.
A
A
But
on
that
concept
of
something
that
you
truly
care
about,
the
contributors
were
then
put
in
a
situation
to
run
the
Dow,
because
in
situations
where
proposals
needed
a
wide
consensus,
only
a
couple
holders
would
show
up
over
the
course
of
the
Year.
There
were
various
attempts
to
solve
this
problem,
such
as
introducing
delegates
which
allowed
a
token
holder,
who
is
the
main
stakeholder
in
the
Dow,
to
give
their
voting
ability
to
somebody
else
who
is,
is
being
paid
to
spend
their
time
in
the
Forum
to
participate
in
those
conversations.
A
The
contributors
also
had
the
opportunity,
then,
to
prioritize
pet
projects
that
isn't
necessarily
a
bad
thing,
because
we
wanted
to
innovate
within
the
industry
and
within
the
organization,
but
going
back
to
that
addressable
field
of
governance.
Again,
the
bureaucrats
necessarily
didn't
want
to
promote
this
expansive
Evolution
and
introducing
more
teams
and
growing
the
workforce.
It
was
more
about
making
sure
that
their
slice
of
the
universe
that
they
were
playing
in
was
more
protected.
A
Part
of
that
as
well,
is
also
hiding
the
complexity
of
work.
So
you
have
a
group
of
token
holders,
a
group
of
empowered
delegates,
then
that
are
responsible
for
voting
and
a
group
of
people
doing
the
work.
Putting
this
up
to
a
vote
and
saying
go
at
it.
On
the
Forum
have
fun.
We've
attempted
different
things
like
orchestrating.
Community
calls
really
unearth
and
increase
the
literacy
and
education
of
the
stakeholders
in
the
Dao.
A
But
work
was
hard
to
prioritize
and
when
that
occurs,
the
the
movement
tends
to
slow
down
a
little
bit,
something
that
was
identified
during
the
initiatives.
The
onboard
more
real
world
assets
is
that
we
truly
needed
experts
in
their
field
in
traditional
Industries
to
come
and
contribute
to
the
Dao.
In
the
current
core
unit
organizational
model,
these
experts
would
be
have
to
be
hired
by
the
contributors.
A
There
would
be
minimal
oversight
by
governance,
then
about
what
defines
an
expert
and,
at
the
end
of
the
day,
it
was
basically
just
more
contributors
working
on
the
wrong
problems.
There
was
poorly
defined
projects
and
that
resulted
in
misaligned
outcomes
when
we
start
to
try
to
explore
solutions
to
the
problems
that
occurred.
We
want
to
make
sure
that
the
dependencies
required
to
fix
the
problem
are
inherent
in
every
level.
A
If
you
look
back
to
the
four
slides,
what
I
was
basically
talking
about
was
a
strategy
layer,
a
consensus
layer,
a
coordination
layer
and
an
execution
layer
to
the
operations
of
a
doe.
So
if
we
start
to
try
to
determine
solutions
to
the
strategy
layer,
the
first
step
is
really.
How
do
you
define
what
is
best
for
the
Dow
and
what
rules
should
be
made
to
make
the
process
better?
A
One
example
that
we
learned
a
lot
from
was
again
the
onboarding
of
real
world
assets
where
originally
it
started
out
as
an
application
process.
Somebody
was
submit
an
application.
There
would
be
an
initial
review
done
by
this
independent
team
and
from
there
there
was
a
whole
ton
of
politics
about
if
the
work
was
good.
If
this
is
opportunity
is
good
in
in
every
direction.
A
Once
you
have
a
strategy,
though
it
has
to
be
empowered,
you
can
write
it
down.
You
can
talk
about
it
all
day,
but
unless
you're
in
a
position
to
actually
act
on
it,
then
where
is
it
going
to
go
to
do
this?
We
want
to
both
empower
the
strategy,
but
then
also
contain
the
politics
and
contain
the
politics
really
appreciates
and
accepts
that
the
Dow
requires
humans
to
operate.
A
We
really
want
the
strategy
to
develop
from
this
organic
place
and
then
allow
the
consensus
to
occur
across
the
entire
governance
layer,
though
maybe
not
necessarily
contributors,
but
we'll
get
to
that
in
a
minute
from
there.
What
that
really
breaks
down
into
is
that
we're
establishing
a
class
of
governance
only
for
strategy
and
we're
separating
the
politics
of
agreeing
on
that
strategy
to
a
different
function,
there's
a
little
bit
of
a
preview,
it's
basically
the
delegates
again
but
restructured
and
the
Del.
A
Lastly,
again
for
the
hidden
complexity
of
work,
we
believe
that
entrepreneurs
are
the
real
answer
to
this.
Underneath
the
current
core
Unit
Model,
the
independent
teams,
receive
funding
or
or
paid
funds
for
their
expenses,
but
they're
not
really
put
into
position
to
drive
profit
they're,
not
managing
a
p
l,
it's
it's
the
core
units
expenses
and
the
Dallas
profit,
and
this
was
a
great
experiment
and
we've
learned
a
lot
that
will
lead
into
the
the
end
game
portion
of
this
presentation.
A
Autonomy
is
the
ability
to
do
what
you
want
within
a
certain
set
of
constraints.
Free
Will
is,
is
more
of
that
green
shield
exercise.
So
if
you
really
want
to
be
a
Dao,
the
decentralized
part
is
is
there
and
it
could
be
better.
The
a
really
needs
to
be
developed
and
the
organization
is
going
to
represent
the
culmination
of
those
two.
A
So
we've
identified
some
problems,
We've
identified
some
solutions
or
some
areas
that
have
alleviated
those
problems
now
I
think
it's
time
to
introduce
endgame
so
end
game
may
sound.
A
little
scary
may
have
some
negative
connotations,
but
the
main
focus
of
the
concept
of
an
end
game
is
to
put
things
in
a
process
so
that
things
are
just
done
more
consistently
from
learnings
and
using
the
Frameworks.
The
best
example
of
this
is
chess
back
in
the
1950s.
A
When
computers
were
first
getting
started,
Grand
Masters
would
use
these
Frameworks
to
basically
programmatically
follow
the
first
five
moves
to
put
themselves
in
a
better
position
to
win
over
time.
These
days,
Chester
Nimitz
can
see
15
20
25
moves
following
the
same
process,
so
think
about
that
from
an
entrepreneurial
standpoint
of
if
you're
wanting
to
start
a
business,
you
have
a
rule
book
here
and
you
just
have
to
go
out
and
do
what
you
are
best
at
within
the
system.
A
So
that's
what
endgame
is
and
let's
start
to
break
down
how
we
attack
the
problems
and
solutions
with
end
game
components.
The
first
one
is
the
maker
Constitution.
This
is
structuring
the
organization
at
every
level
to
follow
that
concept.
We
talked
about
of
strategy,
consensus,
coordination
and
execution
alignment.
Engineering
is,
is
the
overall
principle
that
the
constitution
attempts
to
tap
into
because
answering
the
question
of
what
is
best
for
the
Dow
needs
to
be
defined
somewhere.
The
Constitution
does
this.
A
The
purpose-driven
Dao
again
relates
to
the
unbiased
Global
world
currency
and
a
public
good
and
from
there
in
order
to
tap
into
more
of
these
powerful
Concepts
that
unlock
the
centralized
organization.
The
maker
Constitution
defines
those
concepts
of
separating
the
the
strategy
layer
and
and
putting
people
in
this
position
to
to
play
their
role
and
only
their
role
within
this
machine.
A
The
structured
Innovation
is
created
by
a
process,
oriented
approach
about
requiring
experts
to
contribute
to
the
building
of
new
processes,
but
then,
once
you
have
these
processes
that
really
leans
into
unleashing
competition
and
entrepreneurs
to
play
in
the
ecosystem
and
create
value
both
for
themselves
and
for
the
protocol
moving
from
the
Constitution,
the
the
the
first
group
that
needs
to
be
appreciated,
and
it's
a
difficult
concept
to
try
to
to
grasp
is
this
constitutional
voting
committee.
What
a
constitutional
voting
committee
is
is
a
collection
of
token
holders.
A
It
sets
the
strategy
for
the
organization
and
then
positions
delegates
to
then
support
strategies
today,
token
holders
give
their
tokens
to
a
delegate
the
voting
power
at
least,
and
the
only
tool
that
they
have
is
to
remove
the
delegation
and
give
it
to
somebody
else.
There's
no
alignment
mechanism
there,
the
Constitutional
novel,
gets
work
as
the
politicians
to
create
that
alignment
mechanism
by
setting
up
two
delegation
contracts
that
support
two
different
strategies
that
cvcs
create
from
there.
A
A
The
last
thing
to
bring
up,
then,
is:
what
do
we
do
at
the
workforce?
How
do
we
unearth
the
complexity
of
work?
How
do
we
enable
entrepreneurs
to
participate
in
this
system
in
a
truly
decentralized
and
autonomous
way?
The
solution
that's
been
brought
to
the
table
is
the
creation
of
sub-dos,
which
would
be
independent,
dials
in
their
own
right
that
contribute
and
are
holistically
tied
to
the
maker
core.
A
There
is
probably
an
hour-long
dissertation
that
I
could
give
about
the
tokenomics
and
how
the
incentive
mechanism
works,
with
replacing
the
burn
Engine
with
different
mechanisms
of
value,
accrual
and
and
management.
But
the
main
thing
for
this
talk
for
this
audience
within
the
Dao
is
that
it
structures
the
workforce
into
Innovation
teams
that
deliver
against
the
Frameworks
the
it
also
organizes
the
workforce
into
specialized
areas.
A
There's
three
classes
of
of
sub-dials
that
allow
the
teams
to
specialize
and
deliver
against
certain
Scopes
that
allows
again
another
layer
of
governance
to
participate
within
this
alignment
and
searching
mechanism
about
what
opportunities
are
the
best
to
deliver
to
the
Core.
Something
else
also
de-risked
the
core
and
remove
the
opportunity
of
personal
pet
projects
being
delivered,
because
the
tokenomics
require
certain
layers
of
insurance
penalties
that
would
be
assessed
if
work
wasn't
delivered,
as
well
as
opportunities
to
Leverage
The
Core
to
its
truest
potential.
A
The
end
game
plan
is
being
voted
on
this
cycle
in
March.
What
we
have
up
here
is
is
a
growing
ecosystem,
where
the
core
is
ossified
and
protected
by
the
three
rings
of
Scopes
and
there's
various
sub-dials
with
their
own
culture
and
incentives
and
and
desires
circulating
around
all
contained
within
the
gravity
of
the
maker
ecosystem.
A
So
if
this
sounds
like
something
that
interests
you,
if
you're
in
strategy
or
if
you're
another
project
that
wants
to
contribute
to
the
ecosystem,
start
paying
attention
to
the
forums,
if
you
have
maker,
there's
probably
the
biggest
vote
like
I
said
of
our
history
coming
up,
why
not
participate
in
in
signal
if
you
want
to
continue
to
participate
or
sit
on
the
sidelines,
but
thank
you.
Heath
Denver,
I'm
retro
from
maker
dough,
and
we
are
looking
for
designers,
content,
producers
and
governance
designers
as
well.