►
From YouTube: Issue Discussion | #2: Fixed-Rate Vault Solutions
Description
Join us for our Issue Discussion call #2 as we discuss the differences and potential collaboration between different fixed-rate vault proposals for MakerDAO.
Term Lending Module (TLM) MIP43: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip43-term-lending-module-tlm/6153
Pairwyse Proposal: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/discussion-pairwyse-as-a-solution-for-fixed-rates-on-makerdao/10145
Deco Core Unit: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip39c2-sp23-adding-the-deco-fixed-rate-core-unit/10224
TLM (Allan Niemerg):
Forum - @Niemerg
Email - allan@yield.is
Website - https://yield.is/
Pairwyse (Akiva):
Forum - @Akiva
Email - Akiva@AkivaCapital.com
Website - https://dapp.akiva.capital/authorization/log-in
A
All
right,
hey
everybody,
welcome
to
october
12th
issue.
Discussion,
calls
so
issue.
Discussion
calls
are
a
new
series
that
we
are
piloting
at
maker.
We
we
use.
These
calls
to
kind
of
bring
together
broad
stakeholder
participation
to
kind
of
focus
in
on
an
issue
and
and
really
depending
on
what
it
is,
try
to
nail
it
down,
and
so
today
I
have
the
pleasure
of
hosting
this
wonderful
call.
A
That's
focused
on
the
fixed
rate,
solutions
that
have
come
about
at
maker
and
just
as
a
brief
intro
to
those
solutions.
There
are
currently
three
and
they
are
at
varying
stages
of
the
governance
process
at
maker.
The
first
one
is
the
term
lending
module.
This
is
associated
with
yield
protocol
and
alan
niemerg
is
here
as
our
guest
representing
yield
and
tlm
actually
was
already
ratified.
I
believe
it's
mid,
43
or
46.
A
His
solution
for
fixed
rates
is
in
the
middle
of
rfc
for
actually
doing
it
through
a
core
unit,
so
where
the
term
lending
module
was
proposed
as
a
sort
of
technical
proposal,
deco
is
being
proposed
as
a
whole
development
effort
with
its
own
independent
team
and
then
the
third
and
final
fixed
rate
solution
that
the
maker
protocol
is
considering
is
the
pairwise
solution,
which
is
in
the
pre-mip
pre-core
unit
phase.
A
It's
still
in
the
in
the
discussion
phase,
basically
and
yeah,
and
the
question
is
the
theme
of
this
call
really
is.
Let
me
actually
read
it
because
I
wrote
it
very
carefully:
comparing
solutions
figuring
out
what's
best
for
the
maker
protocol
and
its
end
users.
So,
ultimately,
you
know
the
tlm
exists
right.
It's
on
the
backlog.
A
There
is,
in
theory,
a
path
for
maker
to
take
to
implement
a
fixed
rate
solution,
but
then
there
is
these
other
other
two
that
are
in
the
process
of
of
also
being
considered
and
so
to
start
off.
The
call
I
kind
of
want
to
give
the
guests
who
are
alan
niemerg
from
from
yield
and
akiva
dubrovsky
from
pairwise
this
open
question:
what
are
the
properties
that
are
most
desirable
for
maker
in
this
fixed
terms,
fixed
rate
solution?
A
Actually,
that's
I'm
sorry,
I'm
not
phrasing
it
exactly
how
I
want.
Let
me
rephrase
it
which
approach
you
know
what
let
me.
Let
me
approach
it
differently.
How
about
this?
I
I
think
the
original
plan
for
the
call,
let
me
stick
to
that-
was
actually
to
give
each
of
our
guests
about
five
to
ten
minutes
to
really
do
a
brief
overview
of
their
solution.
So
yeah,
let's,
let's
do
that
so
alan.
A
Do
you
want
to
start
us
off
with
the
term
lending
modules,
since
you
have
the
the
voters
already
on
your
side.
B
Sure
sure
I'm
happy
to
talk
about
the
tlm,
but
first
I
wanted
to
say
thanks
david
for
having
me
on.
I
I'm
really
excited
to
get
to
talk
about
about
fixed
rate
lending
and
how
it
can
improve
maker,
maybe
maybe
it's.
This
is.
B
Let
me
start
by
this
by
saying
this,
I
actually
don't
think
the
tlm
is
a
fixed-rate
solution
for
maker
vaults,
so
on
on
one
level
before
we
even
begin,
let
me
just
say
that
it's-
maybe
maybe
not
even
what
we're
discussing
here
today
and
I
can
talk
about
why.
What
I'd
like
to
do
is
just
talk
a
little
bit
about
yield
protocol
and
the
tlm
and
how
it
works.
Just
so
that
that
you
can
understand
the
history
of
how
we
sort
of
proposed
it
as
a
fixed
rate
solution.
B
But
then
I
think
also
what
what,
with
a
little
bit
of
time,
we
kind
of
understand
better
about
about
what
it
is
and
actually
its
real
potential.
If
you
don't
mind.
A
I
don't
mind
at
all:
I
think
that's
a
brilliant
idea
and
I'm
really
fascinated
so
so
yeah,
let's
do
it,
but
I'm
gonna
set
some
ground
rules,
so
you
have
from
right
now
it's
1207!
You
have
10
minutes
at
10
minutes.
I
will
do
a
very
non-aggressive
sound
like
this
and
that
will
signify
to
you
that
you
have
about
a
minute
left.
So,
okay.
C
B
So
so
yield
protocol
was
was
created
with
the
idea
of
bringing
fixed-rate
collateralized
fixed
rate
borrowing
and
landing
gt5.
That
was
our
goal
and
that's
what
we've
been
building
towards
and
we
started
by
by
trying
to
solve.
I
think
a
very
the
simplest
problem
that
we
saw
in
that,
or
maybe
a
limited
problem
which
is
okay.
We
want
to
be
able
to
do
fixed
rate,
barring
and
lending
die
using
each
collateral,
and
so
so
that's
what
we
built
in
in
what
I
would
call
yield
protocol
version
one.
B
B
I
guess
in
the
sense
that
or
maybe
not,
but
it
involves
a
user,
depositing
collateral
minting
a
new
kind
of
token
against
that
collateral,
where
that
new
kind
of
token
has
properties
like
a
zero
coupon
bond
and
which,
specifically,
the
properties,
are
it's
a
token
that
at
some
future
date
becomes
redeemable
for
for
an
underlying
or
base
asset
like
die,
that's
it
and,
and
the
power
there
is
what
you
can
do
with
with
with
that
system,
is
you
can
do
fixed
a
fixed
rate?
B
Borrowing
because
you
put
the
collateral
you
mint
that
token
and
you
sell
it
for
the
asset
that
you
want,
the
fixed
rate
borrowing
and
you
sell
it
at
a
discount
to
the
face
value
of
that
token,
and
the
discount
that
you
receive
implies
an
interest
rate.
B
So
if
you
sell
the
you
know,
if
your
token
matures
in
a
year
and
you
sell
it
at-
like-
you,
sell
your
fi
token
at
95,
nine
well
.95
die,
for
example,
right
you've,
effectively,
gotten
an
interest
rate
of
five
percent,
a
fixed
rate
bar
and
of
five
percent,
and
so
that's
that's
just
the
general
vision
of
what
yield
protocol
is
and
how
it
works
and
for
version
one
we
built
it.
B
B
Well,
we
built
it
on
top
of
makers,
so
we're
using
certain
parts
of
maker
in
the
back
end
and
after
we
did
that
we
sort
of
had
we
sort
of
found
that,
like
the
the
die
lending
market,
at
least
for
the
fixed
rate,
felt
very
illiquid,
that
is,
there
wasn't
necessarily
like
a
lot
of
people
out
there
that
were
looking
to
go,
buy
a
fixed
rate,
die
denominated
bond
and
and
and
that's
sort
of
what
led
us
to
to
build
the
tlm.
What's
like.
B
Well,
you
know,
there's
a
natural
party
here
that
actually
would
like
to
own
fixed
rate
bonds,
that
effectively
bonds
that
pay
and
die,
and
that's
maker
and
maker
has
potentially
several
reasons
for
doing
so.
One,
of
course,
is
that
it
actually,
you
know,
promotes
the
dye
ecosystem
to
create
liquidity
there.
So
so
that's
useful
another
powerful
reason
that
the
maker
might
want
to
to
buy
fixed-rate
bonds
in
the
spaces
you
know
to
to
manage
the
yield
curve
in
order
to
better
maintain
the
peg.
B
So
you
know
thinking
that
through
you
know
in
that
potential
there.
That's
that
that
led
us
to
create
the
tlm,
but
the
tlm
is
actually
a
very
broad
and
powerful
technology.
It's
protocol,
like
agnostic,
it
actually
isn't
tied
in
with
yield
in
any
particular
way
yield,
would
just
be
someone
that
could
or
or
one
sort
of
possible
use
case,
and
it's
really
flexible.
That
is,
you
know
like
as
long
as
you
create
a
a
zero
coupon
bond
like
token
that
that
meets
the
a
very,
very
simple
standard.
B
Your
token
could,
in
theory
be
bought
by
the
the
tlm.
So
so
it's
it's
very
open
and
extensive,
and
it's
also
just
very,
very
tied
to,
or
you
know,
promotes
makers,
objectives
over,
say,
yield
protocols,
objectives,
for
example.
Let
me
say
why
the
the
way
that
it
works
is
basically
maker
can
choose
which
funds
you
might
want
to
buy
an
ecosystem
or
bonds
that
that
correspond
to
to
that.
B
Excuse
me
interface,
and
you
know
it
can
choose
what
interest
rate
wants
to
buy
them
at,
and
then
you
know
how
much,
how
much
debt
it's
willing
to
take
on
to
to
buy
these.
So
it's
really
all
in
the
whole,
the
control
of
maker
governance.
You
know
they
can
decide.
Okay,
you
know
we're
we're
willing
to
buy.
B
You
know
five
tokens,
you
know
zero
coupon
bond,
like
instruments
for
die
at
five
percent
and
only
five
percent,
and
then
it
would
let
anyone
you
know
of
sell
those
to
to
the
to
maker.
You
know
of
you
know,
particularly
ones
that
it's
already
chosen,
that's
willing
to
buy.
You
know
at
that
rate
and
then
the
tlm
just
holds
it
until
maturity.
B
So
it
holds
that
that
bond
until
you
know,
becomes
redeemable
and
then
there
essentially,
what
it
actually
allows
is
for
somebody
to
come,
buy
back
out
of
out
of
the
tlm
at
face
value
so
that
anyone
can
sort
of
close
the
the
the
or
respectively
redeem
the
bond
on
behalf
of
maker,
and
that's
it
like
it's
really.
It's
really
simple:
it's
really
open.
It's
really
extensible
and
you
know
that
was
just
sort
of
an
easy.
B
It
felt
like
the
easiest
way
to
implement
it,
but
it
means
that
you
know
yield
protocol
is
just
actually
one
use
case
for
the
tln
and
others
could,
in
theory,
be
built
on
top
of
it.
So
you
know,
I
think
that
with
time
passing
since
we
proposed
it,
you
know
and
the
ecosystem
evolving.
B
I
actually
think
it's
there's
other
use
cases
that
might
ultimately
be
more
interesting
or,
or
you
know
interesting
in
addition
to
just
you
know,
you
know
the
yield
protocol,
so
I
think
that's
an
exciting
and
interesting
possible
thing
to
get
into
into
greater
detail
just
to
summarize
yield
protocol.
You
know
we're
building
fixed
rate,
borrowing
and
lending
we're.
B
You
know
we
think
dye
is
a
very
important
part
of
that
and
we
think
the
tlm
could
could
be
really
useful
to
to
sort
of
encourage
that
the
fixed
rate,
borrowing
and
lending
part
of
things,
but
also
a
bunch
of
other
use
cases-
and
you
know
so-
I'm
really
sort
of
excited
about
how
you
know
the
tlm
is
is
can
address
the
use
case.
B
We
want
to
talk
to
today,
but
also
awesome
anymore,
and
I
can
talk
about
that
a
little
bit
as
we
go
on
or
or
maybe
we
can
set
that
aside
and
sort
of
focus
on
the
the
agenda
we
have
for
today.
But
but
that's
my
basic
skill.
A
Yeah
sweet
and
you
you
hit
it
within
time
and
and
that
was
really
fascinating.
I
do
want
to
say
if
anybody
has
questions
feel
free
to
add
them
in
the
chat,
typically
like
we'll
hold
them
for
the
end
after
everybody
kind
of
has
their
moment
to
explain
their
their
protocol
their
solution
and
then
we're
gonna
transition
into
a
more
discussion
based
segment
for
the
rest
of
the
call.
So
yeah
definitely
add
those
questions
and
also
I'll.
I'm
happy
to
pause
here
just
for
a
moment
to
see.
A
B
Yes,
the
the
tlm
does
use
the
surplus
buffer,
so
the
tlm
buys.
As
I
said,
you
know
these
these
five
tokens
at
a
discount.
They
face
value
and
eventually
they
become
redeemable
and
so
a
surplus
is
generated
and
that
surplus
goes
to
the
surplus
buffer.
A
A
Got
it,
I
think,
also
like
his
question
was
from
the
context
of
potentially
needing
die.
Liquidity
behind
fy
die,
which
I
know
like
a
part
of
tlm's
model
is
actually
like
from
the
maker
protocol
standpoint.
It
takes
the
fy
die
in
series
and
it
generates
die
against
them
and
that's
where
you
get
that
liquidity
from,
and
so
you
kind
of,
and
you
actually
kind
of
solve
the
zero
coupon
demand
problem
by
just
letting
maker
be
the
the
liquidity
there.
B
That
that's
right
so
behind
the
scenes-
maybe
it's
a
little
bit
technical,
but
the
way
that
that
it
works
is
maker
approves
a
particular
type
of
flight
token,
a
particularly
zero
coupon
bond
that
it's
willing
to
buy
and
when
it
buys
those
it
goes
into
a
special
tlm
controlled.
You
know
join
or
you
know,
which
is
basically
just
a
bucket
that
those
those
those
bonds
go
into
and
then
but
it
can
borrow
die
at
face
value
against
it
or
but
or
I
guess
it's
not
face
value.
B
It's
at
the
it
borrows
die
at
the
interest
rate
set
by
maker
governance
right
it
generates
those
die,
and
then
it
gives
it
out.
You
know
as
the
purchase
price,
so
no
that
doesn't
come
from
the
surplus
buffer.
It's
just
that.
It
uses
the
core
mechanism
of
maker
in
order
to
generate
the
die.
That's
used
to
purchase
the
the
zero
coupon
bonds.
A
Yeah
all
right
cool
and
then
there's
one
more
question
from
frank
cruz.
What
would
happen
if
die
becomes
insolvent
in
yield
protocol
doesn't?
Does
it
mean
that
fyi
die
would
need
to
be
redeemed?
First
during
emergency
shutdown.
B
Well
this
this,
maybe
I
think,
raises
a
question
that
I
didn't
I
should
have
perhaps
explained
in
in
my
moment,
but
it
eluded
me
there's
you
know,
there's
the
existing
protocol
that
we
have
today
yield
protocol
v1,
which
is
built
on
top
of
maker,
and
you
know,
since
all
the
assets
in
yield
protocol
v1
are
held
basically
in
maker.
The
the
sort
of
emergency
shutdown
approach
that
we
had
in
mind
was
basically
like
maker
governance
figures
out
how
to
what
to
do
with
things.
B
The
thing
with
with
yield
protocol
version
one
is
it's
actually
a
limited
lifespan.
It
ends
at
the
end
of
this
year,
so
it
doesn't
live
much
longer
and
we're
about
to
launch
yield
protocol
v2,
which
is
actually
quite
a
bit
different
and
yield
protocol.
V2
we're
no
longer
built
on
top
of
maker
and
are
the
key
things.
We're
trying
to
do
is
permit
other
kinds
of
fixed
rate,
borrowing
and
lending
for
collateral.
B
So
you
could,
in
theory,
have
usdc
fixed
rate
bar
and
lending
vr
protocol
in
that
case
for
for
v2,
which
I
think
is
going
to
be.
You
know
which
we
think
is
the
future
of
the
yield
protocol,
the
it's
it's
quite
different.
I
mean
when
you're,
when
the,
when
maker
would
be
buying
phi
tokens,
they're
essentially
buying.
You
know
something.
That's
you
know
subject
to
the
control
of
the
yield
protocol
and
therefore
you
know
you
do
have
protocol
risk
right.
B
So
is
some
risk
that
the
fly
tokens
that
maker
buys
may
not
be.
You
know,
may
not
be
paid
back
because
there's
a
hack
or
something
in
yield.
So
you
know
that
would
be
something
that
that
should
be
sort
of
considered.
Whenever
you
know
a
governance
process
is
initiated
to
to
add,
say
a
yield.
Protocol
phi
token
phi
die
as
as
something
it's
going
to
buy.
B
That's
that
doesn't
actually
need
to
be
figured
out
in
order
to
launch
the
tlm
the
tlm
since,
as
I
said,
it's
protocol
agnostic
can
be
launched
without
you
know,
actually
even
thinking
about
the
the
risks
of
yield
protocol.
But
you
know
if,
if
you
decide,
if
maker
governance
decides,
you
know
hey?
Yes,
we
actually
do
want
to
buy
these
fidei
bonds
from
from
from
yield.
Then,
at
that
time
you
know
it
should
it's
entirely
reasonable
to
just
look
and
think.
B
Okay,
what's
the
risk
that
your
protocol
doesn't,
you
know,
can't
pay
back
this
diet
future.
A
Yeah
cool,
so
the
short
answer
to
that
is
that
during
emergency
shutdown,
there
is
some
risk
that
fidei
can't
cover.
So
just
for
the
audience
watching.
Emergency
shutdown
is
something
that
maker
voters
can
trigger
and
it
basically
creates
an
unwinding
of
the
whole
protocol,
so
die
becomes
cl.
A
You
know
all
of
the
oracle
price
feeds
freeze
at
that
moment
of
emergency
shutdown
and
dye
becomes
a
claim
on
a
pro
rata
portion
of
a
dollar
of
collateral,
so
that's
kind
of
what
happens
and
and
and
yeah
it's
it's
curious
to
see
what
kind
of
like
yeah
what
would
happen
to
phi
die
in
that
event,
like
presumably
everything
on
the
yield
system
and
die
like
nothing
really
would
be
broken,
it
would
just
be
the
price
would
not
be
par
and
then,
and
then
yeah
die
would
just
need
to
be
it
would
it
would
be
redeemable
basically
right.
B
Right,
I
would
have
to
give
this
more
thought,
but
my
my
initial
reaction
is
just
as
you
said
that
is
yield
protocol
should
continue
to
work.
Fine.
I
don't
think
it
would
break,
because
you
dye
would
still
be
an
erc20
asset
that
you
could.
You
know
freely
move
around.
You
know
it
would
just
no
longer
be
fixed
at
the
peg
that
that
shouldn't
have,
I
don't
think,
an
impact
on
yield
protocol.
B
A
All
right
cool,
so
let's,
let's
transition
here
and
let
me
give
over
the
mic
to
mr
akiva
dubrovsky
from
pairwise
and
feel
free
to
introduce
yourself.
D
So
I
wanted
to
say
thank
you
to
david
for
having
me
here
today
and
yeah.
Let
me
tell
you
a
bit
about
myself
and
and
what
I
think
maker
should
be
looking
for
in
in
fixed
rate
protocols
I
mean,
but
about
myself
I,
before
before
this
project
I
worked
at
kpmg
and
one
of
my
jobs.
There
was
to
actually
communicate
the
the
policy
to
the
partners
on
how
to
avoid
conflicts
of
interest
in
blockchain.
D
D
Conflict
need
to
be
searched
for,
and
conflicts
and
conflicts
of
interest
you
know,
are
an
impediment
to
good
business.
What
I
believe
is
that
part
of
part
of
that
is,
is
actually
very
well
understood
by
regulators.
D
D
You
know
originally
that
that
that
was
going
back
all
the
way
to
the
to
the
great
depression,
the
early
1900s,
when
commercial,
banking
and
investment
banking
were
merged
together
and
that
the
culture
of
investment
banking
permeated
into
commercial
banking,
which
allowed
for
the
low
cost
of
capital,
and
then
you
know
that
part
of
that
that
that
was
so
largely
created,
the
great
depression
that
that's,
what
created,
what
paper
imperium
was
pointing
out
in
the
forums
was
the
glass-steagall
act.
D
Now
you
know
that
now
what
we
believe
is
that,
even
today
regulators,
even
though
the
class
dialogue
was
repealed,
there's
there's
still
been
criticism
of
the
financial
sector
where
conflicts
of
interest
exist
because
of
commercial,
banking
and
investment
banking.
So
what
we
see
is
that
you
know
maker
maker,
we
just
we
describe.
We
see
it's,
not
a
bank,
obviously,
but
it
it
does.
Parallel.
The
commercial
banking
world
where
die
is
almost
like.
It's
not
a
deposit,
but
it's
similar
to
deposit,
and
what
we
see
is
that
you
know
we.
D
I
know
what
I
wanted
to
say
is
that
my
background
is
really
is
really
focused
on
on
scooping
out
conflicts
of
interest
and
maintaining
proper
integrity
in
business.
So
as
to
avoid
that
you
know
about
my
project
work.
Our
entity
is
separate.
We're
not
we're
not
planning
on
re
on
asking
for
any
money
for
make
or
dial.
D
You
know
our
product
is
a
fixed
rate
product,
it's
a
floating
to
fix
product
that
that
solves
asset
liability
issues
for
maker,
we're
on
main
net
with
a
small
amount
of
money
and
we're
going
to
continue
to
go
to
market
over
the
next
few
months
and
plan
to
scale
up
now,
like
I
said,
we're
we're
not
we're
not
asking
for
money
from
makered
out
we're
we're
not
even
asking
for
anyone
to
change
any
pieces
of
code.
D
D
We
we
did
notice
like
ellen
said
that
there
is
the
the
demand
for
fixed
rates
is
not
as
strong
right
now
for
a
number
of
reasons.
One
is
that
if
you
approach
people
who
currently
have
vaults
open
but
they'll,
say
okay
well,
why
do
I
need
to
worry
about
a
fixed
rate
if
there's
a
if
there's
a
three
billion
dollar
surplus
buffer?
D
You
know
if
there's
billions
of
dollars
in
the
surplus
buffer,
that's
almost
like
a
protection
against
the
dsr,
because
the
dsr
can't
move
while
the
surplus
buffer
is
there.
So
we
we're
we're
sort
of
we're,
not
planning
such
an
aggressive.
D
You
know
marketing
or
launch
for
the
time
being,
partly
because
we
just
want
to
get.
You
know
low
millions
on
the
platform
and
then,
as
as
the
dsr
starts
to
move
over
the
coming
months
or
the
coming
years.
That's
when
we're
going
to
look
to
scale
and
that's
that's
the
strategy
which
we've
had
really
for
quite
some
time.
Now,
that's
what
we
plan
on
pursuing
you
know.
I
think
I
think
that
gives
a
good
summary.
D
You
know
we
focus
on
minimizing
conflicts
of
interest,
minimizing
we're
preventing
the
the
formation
of
cartels
by
keeping
separate
pillars
of
investment
dealing
in
commercial
banking,
we're
we're
funded
independently
of
maker,
and
the
last
thing
is
that
we
we
own
the
intellectual
property
for
converting
floating
to
fix
on
maker
down.
That's
been
granted
in
japan
as
of
a
few
months
ago,
and
it's
pending
in
more
countries
as
well
and
after
that,
I'd
like
to
open
it
up
to
questions
see
if
anyone
has
anything
to
say
about
it,.
A
Thanks
akiva
for
that,
for
that
synopsis,
yeah
really
interesting,
I'm
gonna
give
it
to
anybody
else,
because
I
heard
somebody's
mic
flutter.
Anybody
have
any
questions.
C
I
was
just
curious
if
the
speaker
saw
any
benefit
and
like
there
being
multiple
fixed
rate
solutions
within
the
protocol.
Like
you
know,
do
you
see
any
interactions
between
the
the
different
ones
we
presented
here
and
like
just
more
philosophically
like
good
thing,
bad
thing?
What
do
you
think.
D
Yeah,
I
think
I
think
I
think
yeah
so
money
supply
hit
it
pretty
well
on
you
know,
we,
I
think
the
tlm
is
a
great
addition
to
me
here.
I
am
a
big
fan
of
the
tlm.
D
I
think
I
think
who
knows
maybe
one
day
I'll
be
using
my
pro
the
pairwise,
the
the
pairwise,
the
pairwise
product
will
use
the
tlm.
Who
knows,
I
think
the
tlm
is
good.
D
I
think
it
can
work
well
with
what
I'm
doing
and
to
answer
frank's
question
does
pairwise
use
the
circle
filter,
so
we
don't
touch
the
surplus
buffer
other
than
the
fact
that
the
revenues
from
the
vaults
go
into
the
surplus
buffer
so
seen
that
so
we
don't
really
touch
it
so
much
but
yeah
and
down
to
monet
supplies
like
I
think
we
could
potentially
put
like
fra
bonds
into
the
cert
into
the
tlm.
That's
that's
a
great
solution.
Yeah.
B
Yeah
I'd
like
to
answer
that
as
well,
but
first
to
keep
it
just
to
close
your
thought
out,
the
tlm
probably
could
work
with
with
with
your
as
a
system.
I'm
not
I'm,
not
super
familiar
with
it.
So
I'm
happy
to
take
a
look.
I
mean
it's,
but
we've
we
tried
to
make
it
as
as
sort
of
as
I
said,
protocol
agnostic
as
possible,
so
it
it
it
is.
B
If
you
have
something
like
a
zero
coupon
bond,
it
could
probably
be
made
to
work
in
terms
of
the
question
about
having
multiple
fixed
rate
solutions.
I
think
it
absolutely
makes
sense
to
have
multiple
solutions
in
the
ecosystem.
B
For
sure
I
mean,
I
think
that,
like
having
lots
of
people
trying
different
ways
to
make
die
great
is
valuable.
Like
that's
that's.
I
think
one
of
the
amazing
things
about
about
decentralized
protocols
is
that
you
can
you
know.
Not
only
can
they
do
cool
things,
but
then
people
can
build
on
top
of
them
and
do
cool
things
so
so
really
immediately.
B
I
think
that
the
the
right
answer
is
just
you
know
what
makes
maker
better
honestly,
if
there's,
if
there's
a
reason
that
you
need
to,
and
I
don't
think
you
need
to
integrate
fixed
rates,
borrowing
and
lending
to
make
into
the
maker
protocol
natively
to
make
it
great,
but
I
know
that
there's
definitely
a
lot
of
interest
in
doing
so
and
if
it
solves
you
know
key
problems
for
users
for
maker.
To
do
that
then
great,
I
think
that
that's
that's
fantastic.
B
I
don't
think
we
should
do
it.
You
know,
I
think
one
thing
I
was
thinking
thinking
about
this
and
just
this
problem
that
I'd
like
to
key
on
is,
I
don't
think
the
decision
should
be
like
you
know,
or
the
way
to
think
about
it
is
oh
well
maker
needs
fixed
rates.
Therefore,
we
need
to
integrate
something
in
there
or
you
know
just
because
we
need
it.
You
know,
therefore,
we
should
build
it
into
the
protocol.
B
That's
probably
not
a
great
consideration
and
could
lead
to
to
a
poorly
designed
product
and,
second
of
all,
I
don't
think
that
it
should
be
done.
Just
like
oh
well,
you
know
this
would
be
a
way
to
raise
the
the
tvl
of
maker.
I
think
that
that's
that's
a
poor
way
to
think
about
what
maker,
like
makers
succeeding.
B
You
know
one
of
the
great
things
about
stable
coins
about
maker.
Is
you
know
it's
not
tvl
is
not
really
important.
You
know
maker,
I
think
maker.
Success,
I
think,
is
when
the
maker
ecosystem
make
her
economy
perhaps
grows.
You
know
I'd
like
analogize
it
to
like
gdp
of
a
country
right
like
what
you
want
to
see
is
lots
of
die
out
there
being
used
and
turned
over
by
lots
of
people.
B
That's
success
for
maker,
not
tbl,
not
how
much
is
in
maker's
maker
properly
it's
you
know,
having
make
a
die
out
there
and
having
that
diabetes,
and
that
can
be
done.
You
know
that
can
be
improved
by
yeah,
a
core
part
of
maker
being
okay.
Now
we
have
fixed
rate
pulse
and
you
know
lots
of
people
using.
That
could
be
one
way
that
you
get
there
or
it
could
be.
You
know
we
have
we're
supporting
community
built
solutions
to
do
that
through
many
different
ways.
B
So
so
with
that
in
mind,
you
know
with
that
I
think
form
of
success.
I
think
multiple
ways
to
do
fixed
rates
in
space-
you
know,
can
be
really
really
great.
The
limiting
factor,
obviously,
is
probably
things
like
you
know:
do
we
have
the
dev
resources
to
do
various
things
you
know?
Do
we
have
the
mental
bandwidth
that
you
know
core
units
have
the
mental
bandwidth
to
get
various
things
done?
B
Which
is
something
you
know
beyond
my
ability
to
comment
on,
but
I
think
that,
in
terms
of
you
know
what
is
the
maker
success
case?
Look
like
yeah.
I
think
it's
probably
like
supporting
lots
of
different
ways
where
you
know
you
have
different
solutions
that
have
that
address.
Different
users
needs.
A
Yeah,
actually
just
to
tack
onto
that
one.
One
interesting
comparison
piece
between
actually
pairwise
and
the
other
two
solutions
is
that
unpairwise
you
can
have
like
custom
fras
so
like
otc,
you
can
kind
of
agree
on
custom
terms,
whereas
the
other
two
solutions,
kind
of
have
more
fungible
pricing
strategies
or
like
market
discovery,
pricing
strategies.
So
like
I
can
imagine
a
world
where,
on
the
one
hand,
like
a
pairwise
fra,
is
one
tool
that
could
be
used,
but
also
you
know,
a
more
standardized.
A
Fixed-Rate
solution
can
be
too,
and
really
it's
just
whether
you
want
to
set
a
custom
rate
with
a
was
with
a
specific
client
or
if
you
want
to
kind
of
buy
into
the
to
the
market
set
rate
or
the
governance
set
rate,
whatever
it
is,
but
yeah
just
thinking
out
loud.
E
Hey
everyone.
I
have
two
questions,
probably
for
each,
so
I'm
curious
so
for
the
pairwise
as
much
as
I
understand
where
these
two
proposals
differ,
is
that
tlm
depends
on
maker
dao
being
the
counterparty,
so
basically
maker
dao
is
the
is
the
lender,
whereas
it's
pairwise
as
much
as
I
understood
there
are
external
lenders.
Basically,
so
there's
probably
question
for
akiva
and
I'm
curious.
E
You
mentioned
that
you
know
the
borrowing
fix
would
be
as
appealing
right
now,
but
I'm
also
wondering
what
about
the
landers
right,
because
you
have
this
yield
farming
going
on
the
davids
are
pretty
pretty
high
nowadays
or
maybe
now
they're
lower,
but
definitely
10
and
higher,
who,
on
the
landing
side
as
an
external
part
and
not
maker,
would
actually
be
be
willing.
You
know
how
big
is
actually
this
market
to
find
lenders.
You
know
landing
gets
two
or
three
percent,
for
you
know
six
months
or
12
months.
E
So
that's
that's
one
question
I
have
for
kiwi
and
the
second
one
for
alan.
You,
you
mentioned
the
the
protocol
risk
this
maker
would
face.
E
So
there
are
dependencies-
and
I
guess
same
holds
for
pairwise
as
well,
but
I'm
curious,
you
know,
what's
the
what's
the
magnitude
of
this
risk
or
dependencies
right,
so
is
there
as
much
as
I
understand
the
tl,
the
tlm,
the
maker
that
I'll
buy
sloanes
from
from
yield
protocol,
so
we'd
actually
need
to
evaluate
you
know
every
single
aspect
of
field
protocol
so
how
the
auctions
work.
You
know,
how
do
you
set
up
parameters?
Is
there
a
governance
token,
all
this
kind
of
thing?
E
So
that's
that's
kind
of
crucial
here
as
well,
so
yeah
these
are.
The
main
questions
probably
have.
D
So
I
yeah
so
for
from
my
side
I
can.
I
can
address
that.
I
think
I
think
you
know.
I
think
the
two
questions
are
even
somewhat
connected.
I
think
you
know
with
all
defect
protocols
you
do
there's
always
the
smart
contract.
You
know.
Smart
contracts
are
are
not
always
perfect,
but
I
will
say
that
we
recently
just
engaged
peck
shield,
which
is
one
of
maker.
Does
auditors
and
they're
going
to
be
auditing
our
smart
contracts
over
the
next
few
weeks?
D
So,
and
I
wanted
to
say
on
the
other
point
about
about
lenders,
so
you
know,
that's,
that's
actually
a
good
question,
it's
a
very
good
question
and
the
way
I
see
it
is
that
we
we
are,
we
are
trying
we
are.
We
have
relationships
already
with
crypto
investment
banks
and
we're
developing
more
of
those
relationships
so
that
we
can
target
lenders
and
or
corporate
treasuries
who
are
who
want
to
who
want
to
secure
some
yield
and
aren't
as
interested
in
yield
farming.
D
So
the
way
I
see
it
is
that
yield
farming
is
a
very
attractive
for
some
people
because
of
very
high
yields.
There's
also
credit
risk
in
yield.
Farming,
you
know
there
have
been.
There
have
been
issues
there
have
at
times
been,
you
know,
very
sharp
drops
and
in
some
cases,
they're
having
credit
losses.
D
It's
been
not
that
common,
but
some
people
can't
risk
the
credit
loss
and
the
way
we
see
it
is
that
is
that
on
when
we,
when
we,
when
we're
sourcing
those
lenders
at
like
you,
said
those
low
interest
rates,
those
lenders
all
have
the
benefits
of
the
surplus
buffer.
So
this
ties
back
to
the
surplus
offer.
D
D
What
led
me
to
do
this
was
I
asked
could
could
I
could
I,
you
know,
put
the
surplus
buffer
to
good
use
and
put
put
maker's
credit
worthiness
to
good
use
and,
and
what
we
see
is
that
you
know
we
we
want
to
source
lenders
who,
like
the
fact
that
they
have
the
surplus
buffer
backing
them
up.
You
know
as
a
credit
support
and
credit
enhancement
system,
so
you
know-
and
it's
not
just
that
we
we
plan
on
collaborating
and
we
already
are
collaborating
with
makerdale's
ecosystem
to
source.
D
D
You
know
there
has
to
be,
there
has
to
be
places
where
they,
where
they
can
get
die
users
from-
and
you
know,
I
think
I
think
part
of
that
is
sourcing
guy
users
who
want
to
have
the
the
good
credit
worthiness
of
maker
dial
and
at
a
fixed
rate,
and
you
know
I
think,
when
the
dsr
was
first
announced,
which
was
in
the
summer
of
2018.
B
Yeah
and
I'm
happy
to
also
answer
that
question
I
mean
first,
you
you
had
the
question
of
you
know:
who'd,
be
the
lenders
at
two
percent
to
three
percent.
You
know
with
all
this
yield
farming
who
wants
to
lend
at
that
level
and
and
and
actually
that's
exactly
what
led
us
to
create
the
tlm.
B
I
mean
we
were
seeing
when
we
launched
your
protocol
d1
that
there
wasn't
a
strong
interest
at
that
time
to
be
a
lender
at
what
was
considered
a
relatively
low
rate
like
people,
people
were
looking
for
yield
farming
to
receive
returns
of
like
20,
or
something
like
that.
B
You
know
quite
high
and
and-
and
so
you
know
just
thinking
that
through
well
like
who
actually
can
land
in
this,
you
diet
at
two
percent,
three
percent,
five
percent
or
whatever
you
know
makers
maker
can-
and
actually
I
think
is
the
is
is
at
least
you
know
has
it
makes
a
lot
of
sense
for
it
to
do
so,
because
you
know
that
grows.
You
know
total
total
diet
usage
in
the
ecosystem,
so
I
mean
exactly
that
logic.
Who's
who's.
B
The
lender
is
what
led
us
to
create
the
tlm,
because
maker
really,
I
think,
makes
a
lot
of
sense
as
a
lender
in
this
ecosystem.
It
can
really
sort
of
grow,
the
the
the
diet
or
it
has
an
incentive
to
grow
the
diet,
lending
ecosystem,
even
at
rates
of
like
you
know
that
that
are
considered
low
by
by
yield
farming
standards.
B
So
so
you
know,
I
think
that
question
totally
ties
in
with
why
we
created
the
tlm.
On
the
second
question
regarding
protocol
risk,
you
know
I
mean
I
think
it's
absolutely
essential
that
you
know
whenever
you
you
you
you
know,
do
something
that
that
ties
with
another
protocol
that
you
do
look
at
the
protocol
risk.
That
makes
total
sense.
You
know
in
three
yield,
of
course,
we're
doing
all
the
the
the
things
you
would
expect.
Like
you
know,
we've
had
two
audits
for
our
protocol
version.
B
Two
our
first
protocol
had
had
at
least
one
and
maybe
maybe
more,
the
the
tlm
has
been
audited.
You
know,
and-
and
you
know
for
for
yield
protocol-
we're
of
course,
holding
collateral
for
all
the
loans
that
that
were
issuing.
So
all
of
the
all
the
phi
die
would
be
backed
by
by
collateral
held
in
system
and,
of
course,
we
would
have.
B
We
have
a
liquidation
system-
that's
not
terribly
different
than
makers
own
liquidation
system,
but
you
know
you
know
all
those
things
said
you
know
there's
still
risk
and
I
think
the
way
you
manage
that
risk,
especially
with
the
tlm,
is,
is
through
the
the
debt
ceiling
mechanism.
Right,
like
you
limit
how
much
exposure
you
know
maker
has
to
any
particular.
B
You
know:
zero
coupon
bond
or
at
least
to
any
particular
protocol
via
zircon
combines,
and
then
you
raise
that
perhaps
over
time,
as
you
feel
more
and
more
comfortable
with
with
your
counterparty,
I
mean,
I
think,
that's
that's
a
very
simple
and
effective
mechanism.
That's
built
right
into
the
tlm
and
in
truth
the
tlm
doesn't
actually
require
at
least
to
put
the
tlm
in
place,
which
we
haven't
done
yet
like
the
basic
module.
B
We
don't
even
have
to
look
at
yield
protocol
risk
because
the
basic
model
itself
isn't
tied
to
yield
protocol.
As
I
said,
it's
a
very
open
and
and
extensible
piece
of
software
you
know,
can
be
used
by
five
tokens.
I
I
notice
you're
you're
raising
hand
I'll
wrap
this
up.
You
can
use
my
five
two
events
from
anyone,
so
you
know
we
can
launch.
We
can
launch
the
tlm
without
having
to
do
some
big
risk
assessment
deal
protocol.
It's
really
just
looking
at
that
individual
code.
Later
you
could
decide.
B
You
know
if
you
decide
to
add,
yield
protocol
to
the
tlm,
then
you
know
that
decision
could
be
made.
E
Sorry,
just
just
one
before
you
go
david
when
I
was
referring
to
protocol
risk,
I
was
smart
contract
risk
is
of
course
important,
but
I
was
more
referring
to
to
governance
risk.
So
how
are?
How
are
your
two
protocols,
you
know
being
governed?
So
what's
the
execution?
Is
there
a
community?
Is
there
a
token
this
kind
of
things.
B
Yeah,
I'm
happy
to
answer
for
that
for
yield
protocol
for
version
one.
We
had
no
governance,
the
smart
contracts
were
designed
to
be
deployed
on
chain
and
then
just
to
run
until
they
till
december.
You
know,
I
think
this
year
and
then
and
then
you
know
expire
basically
for
yield
protocol
version.
Two.
We
don't
you
know
we're
all
right.
First
for
launch
the
immediate
launch,
we're
gonna
have
like
fairly
relatively
tight
control.
Over
from
the
devs,
I
mean
we'll
have
a
time
lock
in
place
so
that
we
can't.
B
You
know
just
like
run
off
the
money
with
the
money
instantly,
but
at
first
devs
will
be
able
to
make
changes.
Then
we
intend
to
slowly
transition
to
a
multi-sig
and
then
you
know
transition
on
to
even
more
more
governance-based
ownership.
B
Community-Based
ownership.
Excuse
me
hi.
A
C
Okay,
sorry
so,
following
up
on
that
question
by
like
primoge
good
questions,
how
important
do
both
of
you
think
it
is
for
maker
to
to
have
a
monetary
policy?
You
know
to
be
in
control
of
fixed
rates
right.
Do
you
guys
think
it's
important
at
all
or
deep,
so
yeah,
it
kind
of
falls
to
what
pretty
much
you're
saying.
So
I
guess
I'm
just
wondering
it
just
popped
into
my
head.
C
A
Yeah,
I
would
can,
I
actually
add
to
frank's
question
so
so
it's
it's
interesting
because
tlm,
pairwise
and
deco
have
different
methods
of
of
like
rate
discovery.
So
so
actually
I
actually
go
for
it
allen.
You
can
answer
the
question,
as
is
second.
B
Yeah,
I
mean
so,
I
think
I
think
thinking
about
maker's
monetary
policy
is
super
important
and
in
the
tlm
we
sort
of
put
that
in
makers.
B
Hands
right,
because
maker
can
set
an
interest
rate
at
which
it's
willing
to
buy
loans
and-
and
so
has
absolute
control
over
that
in
theory,
you
could
you
know
a
future
version
of
the
tlm
could
allow
maker
to
sell
those
loans
at
some
at
some
rate,
to
perhaps
permitting
maker
to
to
use
the
process
of
buying
and
selling
term
loans
as
a
way
to
affect
monetary
policy,
and
I
think
that
that
to
me
is
a
really
exciting
future,
because,
first
of
all,
I
think
that,
like
you
know
it's,
I
think
it's
likely
that
the
the
the
denominated
debt
market
and
will
grow
and
will
grow
considerably
and
grow
on
chain
considerably.
B
It's
very
small
today,
but
I
think
it
will
be
very
big,
and
so
then
I
think
that
the
in
the
long
term,
the
you
know,
using
that
market
and
affecting
rates
in
that
market
by
you
know
trying
to
influence
them
or
setting
the
rates.
Perhaps
I
suppose
will
be
a
powerful
tool
in
the
toolbox
of
of
maker,
and
you
know
we
when
we
were
building
the
tlm.
We
were
especially
looking
forward
to
that
future
and
thinking
you
know.
B
How
can
we
build
a
tool
that
can
that
can
be
a
step
in
that
direction
and
and
can
at
least
start
to
give
deeper
insights
into
how
to
to
you
know,
use
the
setting
long-term
rates
as
a
way
to
to
better
improve
monetary
policy
maker.
D
Yeah
yeah,
so
the
way
I
see
it
is
that
actually
setting
fixed
rates
is
absolutely
essential
for
maker
dao.
It's
it's
a
pretty
simple
exercise.
You
know
you
can
just
go
and
talk
to
the
different
people
who
are
involved
in
the
rwa
stuff,
like
whether
it's
an
agent
who's
who's,
helping
facilitate
a
transaction
with
maker,
whether
it's
the
end
client,
who
has
a
lending
company,
it's
really
simple,
you
just
ask
them:
can
you
afford
dsr
exposure
and
the
answer?
It's
always
going
to
be?
No,
it's
it's
complete
now!
D
So,
as
far
as
I
can
tell,
there
is
almost
there,
it
is.
It
is
certain
that
no
no
nobody
who's
in
the
rwa
business
anytime
soon
can
accept
a
dsr
term
in
their
facility
in
the
credit
facility.
Now,
on
top
of
that-
but
I
would
add,
is
that
me
this
is
something
we've
been
talking
a
lot
about
in
the
forums,
and
I
and
I've
been
happy
to
see
some
good,
some
good
interaction
from
maker
to
to
respond
to
this.
D
So
you
know
if
maker
is,
if
maker
wants
to
set
fixed
rates?
That's
for
sure,
and
do
you
want
to
keep
the
peg?
That's
for
sure,
then
the
last
tool
you
can
use,
which
is
actually
a
tool-
that's
used
in
every
financial
institution
to
manage
the
assets
and
the
liabilities
is
to
control
the
tenors
and
the
maturities
that
you
have
with
your
clients.
D
So
if
maker,
if
make
baker
wants
to
set
peg
die,
that's
good
maker
wants
to
keep
it
decentralized.
That's
good
maker
wants
to
offer
fixed
rates,
that's
good,
so
in
the
final
tool,
once
you
really
once
you've
chosen.
All
of
those
three
is
to
build
is
to
build
an
adaptable
and
flexible
asset
liability
policy,
which
sets
tenors
and
maturities
to
allow
for
capital
flows
in
and
out
of
maker
dao
such
that
everything
can
be
maintained
in
equilibrium.
D
And
that's
really
the
result
of
a
lot
of
research
that
I
did
into
this.
That
when
I
first
started
this
project-
and
I
want
to
give
a
shout
out
to
maker
man
who,
in
the
forums
really
picked
up
on
this
as
being
and
also
in
the
calls
being
really
quintessential
to
everything
maker.
That
does,
and
that's
that's
what
we
see
as
being
the
solution
and-
and
I
think
I
think
I
think
it's
very
promising
to
see
the
future.
That
way.
A
So
I'm
so
as
a
a
person
who's
not
mega,
like
inundated
with
like
this,
this
knowledge
on
fixed
rate
protocols
and
all
this
stuff.
I'm
curious
like
for
the
rate
discovery
right
like
it
sounds
like
what
you're
saying
is.
Yes,
it's
important
for
maker
protocol
to
set
like
these
fixed
rates,
but
the
way
that
it
does.
It
is
not
by
setting
the
rates
directly,
but
it's
by
controlling
the
tenors
and
maturities.
A
Is
that
what
you're
saying
so?
Is
it
still
fundamentally
a
like
a
floating
like
market
discovery
like
rate
market
like
a
free-floating
rate.
D
Market,
you
have
to
offer
a
fixed
rate,
that's
for
sure
yeah,
the
maturities
and
the
tenors
are,
can
actually
be
used
to
control
the
pec.
So
what
what
banks
do
is
they'll
they'll
create
they'll,
create
a
lot
of
assets
and
liabilities.
It
looks
like
these
lines
that
are
overlapping
each
other,
and
in
doing
so
they
maintain
cash
flow
in
and
out
of
the
institution
in
in
a
stable
way.
D
Now
doing
that
actually
allows
you
to
maintain
the
peg
in
a
stable
way,
and
that's
that's
that's
what
we
see
as
being
the
answer
to
the
impossible
trinity
that
maker
is
facing,
where
you
kind
of
want.
You
have
your
cake
and
eat
it
too.
You
want
to
have
all
the
features
of
of
your
ideal
currency,
but
you
know,
but
but
you're
sort
of
faced
with
with
these
very
essential
drawbacks.
You
know
pretty
simply.
Let's
say
you
get
a
client
who
wants
to
open
a
vault
and
their
and
their
collateral
is
super
safe.
D
So
you
say:
okay,
I'm
going
to
offer
you
a
low
rate.
You
can
only
accept
the
fixed
rate
and
it's
super
safe
collateral,
so
you
charge
them
the
cheap
interest
rate.
So
you
do
that.
But
now
the
your
monetary
policy
goes
off
and
now
the
dive
head
goes
off
and
now
you
have
to
raise
the
dsr.
So
now
you
have
your
hands
tied
behind
your
back,
because
you
just
promised
your
client
a
fixed
rate,
because
their
collateral
was
so
safe
and
such
a
low
rate.
Meanwhile,
the
dsr
is
going
all
crazy.
So
how
do
you?
D
A
D
The
psm
only
works
when
the
dsr
is
at
zero,
so
so
so
so
pretty
much.
The
dsr
goes
to
zero
and
then
the
psn
kicks
in.
But
you
know
what
what
happens?
What
happens
if
die
drops
below
a
dollar
the
psm,
the
psm?
If
it's
already
been
cleared
out
all
those
billions,
then,
if
the
peg
drops
below
a
dollar,
you
can't
use
the
psm
anymore
to
set
the
peg
back.
So
the
pretty
much
maker
this-
and
this
happened
in
2019.
D
The
only
way
maker
can
get
the
peg
back
on
track
and
dive
drops
or
dollars
by
hiking
the
interest
rate,
and
it
has
to
be
aggressively
because
if
it
doesn't
do
it
aggressively
the
die
peg
break
people
lose
confidence.
Everyone
goes
crazy,
so
so
well,
what?
If
you
need?
What?
If
you
have
that
2019
scenario
where
you
do
where
you
need
it,
where
you
need
to
where
you
need
to
get
a
little
bit
hawkish?
D
B
B
One
thing
is,
of
course,
maker
controls
the
rates
at
which
it's
it's
buying
via
the
tlm,
and
so
it
can
raise
those
rates
at
any
time
the
governance
process,
and
so
you
can
imagine
you
know
in
the
same
call
that
you're
deciding
okay,
here's
where
you
know
the
east,
a
rate
is
or
here's
what
the
dsr
is.
You
could
decide.
Okay,
what
is
our
rates
for
the
tlm,
so
you
can
you
can
change
those
and
and
raise
and
lower
those
as
appropriate
to
affect
monetary
policy.
It
doesn't
change.
B
You
know
the
rate
somebody
has
already
previously
locked
in
via
the
tlm,
but
it
would
change
all
all
future
range
which
is
which
is
a
powerful
tool
itself.
Then,
of
course
you
know
if,
if
in
perhaps
a
future
version
of
the
tlm,
you
know,
if
you
know
maker
wants
to
further
effect
rates.
B
It
could,
of
course
we
you
know
you
could
one
could
imagine
adding
a
feature
where
you
know
it
starts
selling,
perhaps
five
tokens
or
these
zero
coupon
bonds,
that
it's
bought
to
alter
interest
rates
in
the
ecosystem.
B
So
I
think
that
the
tlm
in
that
sense,
you
know
it
isn't
fixed
in
quite
the
way
akiva
was
talking
about.
You
know
if
you
just
had
a
fixed-rate
vault
that
you've
given
someone,
because
you
know
you
can
you
can
always
change
things
on
the
margin
you're,
just
not
changing
fixed
rates
that
have
already
been
locked
in
by
somebody.
A
You're,
basically,
only
you're
only
setting
the
rates
of
any
new
maturities
in
new
series
that
are
coming
out
as
they
come
out.
That's
right,
that's
right!
A
So
so
I
asked
the
question
like:
is
there
any
fundamental
problem
with
maker
setting
both
variable
and
fixed
rate
products
like
like
I'm
curious
like?
Is
there
a
way
to
because
there's
some
sort
of
conflict
of
interest
there?
I
remember
at
the
beginning
of
the
call,
like
akiva,
talked
a
bit
about
the
separation
of
of
certain
like
activities,
but
I
wasn't
sure
if
this
was
what
he
was
talking
about.
D
So
this
fixed
rate
of
variable
is
possible.
That's
a
lot
of
finance
the
institution
do
that.
What
we
see
as
needing
to
be
separate
is,
is
the
core
maker
down
business
and
and
a
separate
business
of
selling
fixed
rate
products
as
a
side
to
that
so
maker
can
offer
it
at
its
core
level,
but
the
actual
the
actual
sales
function
of
of
like
road
shows
and
and
sales
presentations,
and
that
that
that
investment
that
investment
dealing
process
needs
to
be
kept
separate.
A
Okay
got
it,
I
know
I
understand.
Thank
you,
frank.
Just
posted
a
thing
in
the
chat,
frank,
do
you
wanna?
Do
you
wanna
get
on
the
mic.
C
C
So
most
people
haven't
really
thought
about
the
the
technical
challenges
associated
with
such,
and
I
was
wondering
if
you
guys,
I
could
bring
up
anything
that
comes
to
mind
that
that's
in
reference
to
that
technical
challenges
when
integrating
with
the
maker
sandbox-
and
I
ask
because
some
will
say
that
you
know
vanci
former
foundation,
employee
and
also
pe
core
unit
team.
Member
probably
knows
the
system
better
than
most
of
us.
In
this
call,
I
think
I
haven't
checked
everyone
in
here
so
yeah.
Hopefully
you
get
the
drift
to
my
question.
D
Yeah
so,
but
there
are,
there
are
different
challenges
in
in
setting
fixed
rates,
technical
challenges,
aside
from
aside
from
the
business
and
and
monetary
challenges,
so
you
know,
one
thing
is
just
is
just
computing.
You
know
just
like
simple
computations
of
what
the
interest
rate
is.
You
know
maker.
Everything
is
compounding
on
an
instantaneous
basis,
so
there
are
some
challenges
there.
D
That
being
said,
we
we
have
engaged
the
best
developers
to
be
able
to
to
address
that.
You
know
mathematicians
and
whatnot
who
can
calculate
the
the
per
second
interest
compounding
you
know
there.
There
there's
also
technical
considerations
around
around
around
around
the
components
of
a
vault
interest
rate.
You
know,
that's,
that's,
that's
that's
a
challenge
when
we've
done
actually
to
address
that
and
to
actually
make
it
make
it
a
good
experience
for
our
clients.
D
D
A
Nice,
so
we
have
about
one
minute
left
to
the
top
of
the
hour.
This
was
a
very
fascinating
call.
We
we
hit
on
a
lot
of
very
like
related
but
spread
about
points,
and
I
think,
like
the
goal
of
this
call,
was
to
get
the
attendees
and
the
viewers
to
have.
A
You
know
to
get
a
little
bit
of
a
better
understanding
about
the
differences
and
the
kind
of
the
current
status
of
each
of
these
protocols
and
the
trade-offs
between
each,
and
I
think
like
for
me
as
the
host,
even
there's,
still
a
lot
of
open
gaps
in
my
understanding.
So
I
can
imagine
how
a
viewer
or
a
voter
is
also
approaching
this.
A
So
so
I
just
want
a
caution
with
if
you
are
voting.
If
you
are
considering
these
solutions,
don't
just
rely
on
this
call,
there's
a
ton
of
additional
resources
from
all
three
solutions
from
yield
from
pairwise
and
from
deco.
A
I
think,
as
we
progress,
we're
gonna
be
able
to
compare
and
contrast
the
solutions,
more
and
and
so
yeah.
I
hope
this
was
super
helpful
and
I'm
gonna
give
it
over
to
akiva
and
allen
just
to
give
their
final
contact
info
if
anybody's
interested
in
following
up
and
also
just
want
to.
A
Thank
you,
gentlemen,
thank
you
so
much
for
coming
on
the
call
for
taking
your
time
out
of
your
day
to
speak
with
the
maker
now
community
to
speak
with
us
and
to
dive
into
these
really
interesting,
complex
and
important
topics.
Thanks.
B
David
happy
to
give
a
place
for
people
to
find
more
information
about
us.
You
can
learn
more
about
yield
at
yield.
Http,
you
know
colon
slash.
Whatever
yield
is
soon
we'll
be
live
at
yieldprotocol.com.
D
A
Yeah
right
on
and
all
of
these
links
are
found
in
the
call
notes,
so
you
could
find
those
on
the
forum.
You
know
anybody
with
a
link
can
view
and
those
will
exist
in
perpetuity
so
yeah.
I
thank
you
guys
again
and
look
forward
to
our
next
interactions.