►
Description
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/purpose-2-0-endgame-clean-money-and-nuclear-energy/18421
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/viridian-cluster-introduction/18332
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/spring-cluster-introduction-and-proposal/18398
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/crimson-creator-cluster/18241
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/tiedai-creator-cluster/18369
A
A
Look
for
is
to
see
whether
we
have
anybody
at
the
the
arrangers,
the
the
you
know,
the
published
announced
participants
of
the
protectors
since
I.
Think
that's
going
to
be
an
obvious
thing
to
talk
about,
doesn't
seem
like
it
right
now,
but
that's
what's
happening
because
we
can
talk
about
it
without
them.
A
You
know,
of
course,
rather
than
Focus
too
much
on
like
the
specific
plans.
Necessarily
maybe
what's
more
interesting,
is
just
getting
a
sense
of
the
kind
of
the
the
high
level
framework
of
how
we
can
do
real
assets
from
kind
of
converter
maker
governance
perspective
through
the
the
the
two
protector
metadatas
will
have
initially,
and
then
these
clusters
that
are
that
are
already
set
up.
Thank
you
hoping
to
support
it.
A
Well,
yeah
actually
I
mean,
let's
just
do
it
as
kind
of
like
a
q,
a
I
think
to
kind
of
here
where
people
like
this
was
the
most
pressing
questions
or
stuff
that
people
want
to
hear
about,
whether
that's
about
purpose,
the
two
purpose,
2.0
post
and
all
the
nuclear
energy
stuff
and
all
that
charity
or
the
protector
clusters
protect
your
cluster
announcements
or
even
the
you
know.
Of
course.
Another
thing
that
could
be
pretty
relevant
is
like
the
practicalities
of
okay.
Now,
there's
a
bunch
of
cluster
announcements.
What
does
that
mean
foreign.
A
A
Yeah,
let's,
okay:
let's
talk
about
next
steps
for
the
classes
like
I.
Think
it's
great
to
you
know:
let's
get
into
the
let's
get
into
purpose:
2.0
charity,
clean
money,
but
I
think
it's
better
to
do
that
as
kind
of
as
an
extension
of
first
discussing
the
protective
clusters
and
some
of
the
practicalities
of
that
right.
A
A
A
How
do
you
bootstrap
a
community
from
scratch
right
and
that's
where
the
key
is
that
the
teams,
like
the
sort
of
the
internal
teams
or
the
core
teams
of
the
Melodies,
are
not
the
founders
of
America
right
lights,
sort
of
the
Reversed,
where
the
community
of
America
is
sort
of
the
founder
of
the
metadata
and
the
teams
which
of
these
Representatives.
These
cluster
announcements-
and
we
call
I,
mean
we
call
it
teams
clusters
because
that's
sort
of
what
they
are
before
they
become.
A
They
actually
get
approved
as
a
team
right
they're,
basically
like
a
bunch
of
people
that
get
together
and
sort
of
cluster
right,
which
is
this
process
of
like
getting
the
people
that
actually
want
to
work
together
and
have
some
kind
of
complementary
skill
sets
to.
Then
you
know
voluntarily
or
self-organized
into
small
groups
that
can
then
prepare
to
make
onboarding
proposals
too
many
dials
that
have
been
created
and
bootstrapped
through
yield.
Farming
by
maker,
so
you
have
this
token.
A
You
have
these
token
holders
and
then
they're
looking
to
onboard
a
team
to
do
work
for
them
and
that's
what
the
cluster
announcements
are.
It's
basically,
a
bunch
of
people
saying
look
we're
a
bunch
of
people.
We
think
it
would
be
cool
to
make
and
you
know,
make
a
proposal
if
they
gain
plan
passes
and
we
managed
to
launch
some
metabows
and
distribute
the
metadata
tokens
to
token
holders
so
that
they're
actually
our
token
holders
that
can
vote
us
in.
A
So
does
that
I
mean
am
I?
Is
that
clear
is
it?
Is
the
people
are
still
not
getting
like
getting
the
sort
of
the
basics
of
the
separation
between
the
team
and
the
cluster
and
then
the
men
about
itself
and
the
community
and
how
they
sort
of
two
different
things
in
a
sense
where
the
posts
are
simply
representing
systems
of
groups
of
people
that
are
basically
preparing
to
make
proposals
in
the
future.
A
Assuming
they're
in
game
plan
passes
so
I'll
assume
it
I'll
assume
if
nobody
sort
of
objects,
while
I'm
talking
about
these
things
and
I'll,
just
move
on
to
kind
of
the
nist
the
next
piece
of
it
right.
So
basically,
so
what
are
the
next
steps
right?
So
the
next
steps
actually
are
in
the
end
game:
approval
Maps,
there's
this
like
special
mechanism.
A
That
specifically
applies
only
for
the
what
I
call
the
launch
metadars
then
meaning
they
will
work
slightly
different
than
the
the
kind
of
the
permanent
or
not
the
permanent.
The
kind
of
recurring
metadatas
that
are
supposed
to
be
created
in
the
long
run
from
the
NBA
plan
through
a
mechanism
called
the
incubator,
which
is
basically
like
it's
a
smart
contract
that
like
periodically,
creates
entire
new
dials
algorithmically
with
no
human
intervention
right.
It's
completely
autonomous
system
that
launches
new
dinos,
but
the
launch
metadatas
are
different.
A
That
kind
of
make
created
manually
right,
they're,
like
they're,
they're,
sort
of
created
in
advance
and
and
all
launch,
either
simultaneously
or
in
some
kind
of
sort
of
sequence,
that
sort
of
pre-arranged
as
a
part
of
What's
called
the
in-game
plan
launch,
which
I
think
right
now
we
could
expect
what
happened
about
a
year
from
now.
If,
if
the
mips
pass
in
this
voting
cycle,
then
in
approximately
a
year
we
would
have
an
implant
launch
and
then
we
would
have
a
bunch
of
Meadows
Lodge
and
the
sort
of
these
metadats
at
launch.
A
And
then
the
Clusters
that
are
connected
to
them
are
are
have
a
special
set
of
rules.
That's
in
one
of
these
in-game
plan
approval
mips,
that's
called
the
recognized
launch
men
at
our
cluster,
MIP
I
think
it's
called
and
that's
basically
like
it's
a
pretty
it's
it's
a
relatively
Advanced
MIP
with
sort
of
internal
processes,
but
it's
also
like
a
one
one-off
map.
So
it's
only
meant
to
be
used
for
this
one
year,
there's
one
phase
of
preparing
for
the
metadata
launch,
so
the
launched
meta
towers
and
the
launch
metadata
clusters.
A
So
the
idea
is
basically
that,
while
in
the
long
run
the
whole
point
of
the
metadats,
is
you
don't
know
which
team
will
go
which
with
which
meta
now?
And
you
want
to
have
a
competition
between
teams
right?
So
it's
always
going
to
be
the
community
that
has
kind
of
the
upper
hand
and
gets
to
pick
the
team
they
want.
A
It's
like
the
community
gets
all
the
tokens
up
front
through
yield,
farming
or
sort
of
continuously,
and
especially
sort
of
upfront
right,
like
the
only
way
to
get
tokens
initially
is
through
deal
following
to
the
community
and
then
once
they
sort
of
have
settled
down
and
have
some
kind
of
governance
Dynamic
going
where
they
can
vote
for
stuff.
Then
they
get
to
pick
what
team
they
actually
want.
A
So
it's
sort
of
the
it's
the
other
way
around
compared
to
something
like
Aptos,
but
we
don't
want
that
Dynamic
for
the
launch
metadatos
and
the
reason
why
we
don't
want
that
Dynamic
for
the
launch.
Metadas
is
just
because
it's
you
know.
We
want
to
launch
a
lot
of
metadata
at
once
and
the
reason
why
we
want
to
do
that
is
because
we
have
a
giant
giant
Workforce
in
maker,
and
we
need
to
basically
restructure
it
and
save
money
right
and
ensure
that
we're
not
spending
money
on
stuff.
A
A
So
that's
sort
of
one
thing
right
that
we
want
to
make
sure
that
there's
a
place
to
put
like
that,
we
can
sort
of
more
directly
I
think
we
can
have
multiple
metadatas
and
we
can,
but
you
know,
and
the
re
and
and
so
that
there's
a
there's
basically
a
good
way
for
everyone
in
the
workforce
today
to
have
a
chance
to
kind
of
like
prove
themselves
and
actually
deliver
real
value
in
a
way.
That's
that
has
the
proper
feedback
loops,
rather
than
the
current.
A
That
gets
to
be
sort
of
a
big
metadata
right,
correct
like
that
that
that's
much
less
likely
to
basically
end
the
sort
of
polarized
political
Dynamic
that
exists
today,
whereas
if
you
have
a
bunch
of
men
at
the
house,
then
you
get
this
little
natural
and
build
checks
and
balances
to
some
sense
right,
where
they're
kind
of
like
a
check
on
each
other.
There's
competition,
there's
Alternatives,
there's
redundancy!
A
A
A
A
It's
going
to
be,
that's
meant
to
be
entirely
up
to
the
metabones,
but
in
the
for
the
laundromat
allows.
Basically
Mega
governance
first
creates
a
kind
of
a
short
list
of
clusters
through
this
launch
recognized,
launch
metadata,
cluster,
MIP
and
so
anyway.
So
the
whole
point
of
that
all
that
is
that
that's
kind
of
the
next
step
is
that
once
we
have
like
once
these,
these
cluster
announcements
have
been
made
and
there's
some
kind
of
iteration
or
whatever
sort
of
ideation
of
the
process
from
there
and
the
ideas.
A
Then,
basically,
the
next
step
for
the
the
Clusters
assuming
their
game
plan
passes
is
they
need
to
then
get
like
do
an
actual
proposal
to
get
them
onboarded
as
a
recognized
launch,
metadata
cluster
and
then
once
they're
on
board.
There's
a
recognized
launch
email
in
our
cluster
and
this
sort
of
like.
Basically,
what
then
happens
is
we
know
how
many
metadats
to
launched
right.
So
if
we
end
up
having
five
recognized
launch
metal
clusters,
some
means
we
need
to
learn.
A
We
need
five
launch
meta
virus
and
if
we
have
seven
we're
heading
last
metadata
clusters,
we
need
seven
meta
dials
at
launch
right,
so
that
we
ensure
that
we
like
that
everyone
that
actually
gets
approved.
We
make
governance,
gets
this
kind
of
job
security
and
only
gonna
like
spend
a
year
preparing
for
running
a
metadata
and
then
get
you
know,
lose
the
competition
and
and
not
actually
end
up
working
on
mental.
A
They
can
use
spf's
special
purpose
funds.
So
this,
like
special
process
to
that's,
also
kind
of
like
a
mini,
one-off,
core
unit
kind
of
construct
to
then
access
additional
resources
during
the
pregame
there's
like
one
year
period,
leading
up
to
the
main
Game
launch.
While
we
prepare
for
the
next
one
year
for
the
launch
of
these
metabows
and
then
basically,
they
spend
a
year
preparing
and
then,
while
doing
that,
they
also
kind
of
do
their
jobs
right
like
keep
doing
what
they
do.
A
So
something
like
the
protectors
right,
they'll,
just
the
clusters
for
the
protectors
they'll
just
be
doing
real.
Well,
assets
the
whole
time
and
it's
not
like
they
just
sit
around
and
wait
for
the
meta,
though,
rather
they
just
do
their
job
basically,
but
in
the
context
of
the
current
maker
Paradigm,
basically,
and
then
alongside
that,
in
parallel,
I've
also
been
prepared
for
the
actual
launch
of
of
the
metatars
after
original,
then
attempt
and
hopefully
onboard
into
the
metal
house
and
then
from
there.
A
A
Is
that
then
they
then
facilitate
the
metadata
governance.
Adoption
of
these
Rebel
asset
bolts,
so
that
way
maker
can
sort
of
do
a
bunch
of
Revolution
deals
now
with
this
sort
of
top-down
centralized
process,
but
it
all
runs
through
make
a
call
knowing
that
all
the
deals
that
maker
is
doing
today,
they'll
all
get
offloaded
to
Mana,
that's
in
the
future.
So,
even
if
it's
additional
complexity
today,
that
complexity
will
and
there'll
be
a
way
to
get
rid
of
it
in
the
future,
through
the
meta
does.
A
A
You
know,
they'll,
stop
referring
to
them
as
a
cluster,
because
the
cluster
is
more
like
the
informal
group
that's
preparing
in
a
sense
and
they
they
instead
called
teams,
Administration
teams
and
contribution
teams
and
then
they'll
get
a
bunch
of
tokens
during
this,
especially
during
the
early
phase
of
the
matter
now,
and
then
they
can
leave
early.
You
know
they
can
bootstrap
it
take
their
tokens
and
leave
or
they
can
stay
for
the
long
run
or
something
in
between,
and
you
know
the
The
Meta
that
will
then
just
keep
evolving
from
there.
A
A
Is
the
basic
start
of
this
with
two
metadows
one
being
the
protector
and
the
other
being
the
Creator
and
then
I
guess?
My
second
question
is:
do
for
the
operations
and
governance
work?
Scoped
teams
do
they
stay
on
as
core
units
yeah,
good
questions,
yeah
and
so
so.
First
of
all,
yeah,
basically
just
to
reiterate
on
the
clusters
right:
they
it's
basically
groups.
A
This
is
like
right
now
how
I
am
visualized
actually
there's
another
there's
a
kind
of
a
made,
a
new
version
of
this
that's
slightly
modified,
but
but
this
will
do
for
now
too.
You
know.
So
the
point
is
that
you
so,
first
of
all,
actually
let
me
take
it
in
reverse
right,
so
so
we'll
talk
about
the
coordinates
and
and
governance
process
and
so
on
right.
So
basically,
all
of
that
stuff
like
initially
well
in
a
sense.
A
You
know
all
that
stuff
Falls
over
here
right
and
what
a
like
this
is,
what
what
I
call
basically
the
Scopes
and
then
the
voted
layer.
So
that's
why
we
got
stuff
like
delegates,
you
know
decentralized,
voter
committees
and
then
all
these
like
functions
that
look
kind
of
like
core
units,
but
they're
a
little
bit
more
they're,
sort
of
top
down
defined,
right
and
they're
sort
of
very
they're,
very
specific.
So
you
have
like
protocol
engineering
designs
like
collateral,
realized,
collateral
growth.
A
And
basically
the
big
difference
is
that
today
these
the
wave
coin
has
worked
today.
Is
you
kind
of
you
would
have
a
coin?
And
you
know
you
have
something
like
the
protocol
engineering
unit
and
and
sort
of
the
whole
thing.
It's
like
self-contained
right.
Like
the
protocol
engineering
recorder,
they
do
everything
they're
just
like
it's
that's
just
like
they
do
everything
really
cool
to
protocol
engineering,
right
and
and
something
like
growth.
They
do
everything
related
to
growth
and
and
so
on
with
the
oracles.
A
Do
everything
really
is
Oracles
right
and
then
in
the
in
the
end,
game,
state
or
sort
of
the
you
know
the
in-game
decentralized
workforce,
Paradigm
right?
The
whole
point
is
to
have
enforced
separation
of
powers,
a
balance
of
power,
which
means
with
one
one.
A
key
key
element
of
that
is
basically
that
the
Scopes
they
don't,
they
don't
run
everything
in-house
in
a
sense
like
they're,
not
like
a
box
that
does
everything
it's
more
like.
A
They
are
like
they're
sort
of
the
management
layer
essentially
or
you
could
even
think
of
it
as
like
the
buyer
layer
or
like
the
maker
representative
layer,
and
then
they
go
out
and
they
get
the
meta,
tiles
and
ecosystem
actors.
So
basically
that's
everyone
other
than
the
internal
stuff,
right,
meta,
dialysis,
or
met
analysis
and
ecosystem
makers
that
describes
literally
everything
else
like
any
company,
any
dial,
any
whatever
individual.
A
So,
while
you
know
today,
protocol
engineering
takes
care
of
everything
themselves,
in-house
kind
of
in
the
long
term,
in-game
decentralized,
Workforce.
Protocol
engineering
is
like
a
relatively
small
team
that
doesn't
actually
develop
anything.
Rather
they
make
decisions
around
who
to
fund
to
develop
stuff,
and
this
is
all
based
on
these,
like
pre,
like
a
pre-designed
processes.
A
What
do
we
mean
when
we
say
protocol
engineering?
What
do
we
mean
when
we
say
decentralized,
collateral
and
so
on?
Right?
You
can
see
sort
of
assuming
here
right
like
that,
there's
a
whole
bunch
of
processes
and
of
course
this
will
all
change
over
time.
We
will
we'll
refine
it
and
iterate
on
it,
but
then
one
day
it
will
likely,
you
know
permanently
stop
changing
because
we
just
arrive
at
kind
of
like
the
end
state
with
their
stuff.
You
know
like
this
collateral
like
there's
something
you
know,
there's
something
called
the
top-down
processes.
A
So
that's
stuff,
like
the
scope
deciding
to
do
a
collateral
onboarding.
So
then
what
they
do
is
they
go
out
and
pay
somebody
to
to
build
that
or
the
scope
deciding
to
do
a
risk
forever
adjustment.
So
they
go
ahead
and
do
that
or
you
know
or
changing
a
direct
deposit
module
parameter
for
meta
dials,
or
maybe
they
want
to
do
a
Security
review
like
a
technical,
Security
review,
or
they
want
to
change
stuff
related
to
the
protocol
and
Vault
and
there's
even
going
to
be
more
stuff
like
fixed
rates
related
stuff.
A
There's
also,
this
bottom-up
stuff,
we'll
just
ignore
that
for
now.
But
my
point
is
the
most
important
thing
is
that
each
of
these,
like
collateral,
onboarding
risk
parameter
adjustment,
DDM,
programmer
adjustment,
Security
reviews
on
all
of
those
are
like
extremely
well-defined
processes
and
in
fact,
in
the
endgame.
Not
only
are
they
processes
that
are
described
with
almost
like
a
kind
of
little.
You
know
like
a
mini
Constitution
or
something
right
that
is
like
this
is
the
how
we
do
collateral,
onboarding,
This,
Is,
How,
We,
Do,
risk-framer
adjustment.
A
But
the
idea
is
basically
to
have
something
kind
of
like
GitHub
in
a
sense,
or
maybe
more
like
an
Erp
software
or
or
kanban
board,
or
something
like
a
piece
of
software
where
you
click
on
a
button
saying:
hey,
I'm,
recording
it
I
want
to
do
a
collateral
onboarding
and
then
it's
like
okay,
well,
where's,
the
you
know
well
you're
supposed
to
do
all
these
steps.
So
how
do
you
do
that
step?
A
How
do
you
know
to
sort
of
sort
of
report
each
step
of
the
way
of
what
you've
done
and
then
like
there's
a
section
for
this
is
where
you
put
the
you
know
the
audit
reports,
and
this
is
where
you
describe
why
you
pick
the
supplier
that
you
pick
and
blah
blah.
So
it's
sort
of
it's
completely
standardized.
It's
completely
sort
of
rigid
and
the
basic
the
reason
for
that
is
basically
because
you
know
the
less
open-ended
the
process
is
the
less
probability
like
possibility.
A
Is
there
for
someone
who
basically
abuse
the
process
right
because
I
mean
and
one
of
the
most
obvious
things
that
then
game
plan
is
really
sort
of
focused
on,
is
just
dealing
with
things
like
you
know,
budget
waste
or
budget
abuse
right
so
that
it's
not
possible
to
like
spend
a
bunch
of
money
on
like
a
fake
collateral
onboarding,
because
you
have
to
leave
a
kind
of
paper
trail
and
it's
not.
You
can't
like
make
your
own
unique
documentation
for
it.
A
It
all
follows
this,
like
very
standardized
thing,
as
a
result
of
like
impossible
to
to
obfuscate
or
hide,
because
it
all
follows
the
same
form
and
it
will
completely
stand
out
and
then
basically,
the
idea
is
right
that
that
it's
kind
of
like
a
government
procurement
type
of
process
right
where
you
don't.
You
know
you
can't
just
be
like.
Oh
we're
gonna
do
something
and
we're
going
to
use
these
guys
because
that's
you
know
that
could
very
easily
be
a
sign
of
corruption
right.
A
Right,
so
what
is
it
when
right?
What
if
the
metadata
when
like,
is
chosen
by
the
scope
and
don't
do
the
work
or
don't
perform
well
and
so
on
and
that's
I
mean
that's
the
exact.
That's
the
scenario
that
the
in-game
plan
is
basically
optimized
for
in
a
sense
right,
because,
basically
we
you
know,
we
assume
that
not
only
are
they
not
going
to
do
the
work
well,
but
they're
like
hostile
right,
you
know,
so
we
so
so
I
mean
but
like
the
most
obvious
remedy
in
a
sense,
is
that
ultimately
like?
A
If,
if,
if
it's
and
and
so
basically
certain
like,
it
depends
on
like
the
the
scale
of
the
project,
because
certain
very
large
projects
can
only
be
done
by
metadata,
they
simply
cannot
be
done
by
exist
matters
and
the
reason
for
that
is
because
maker
has,
you
know,
sort
of
infinite
leverage
or
make
over
mailbox
right
so
maker
can
simply
say
you.
You
know
we
paid
you
one
million
to
do
a
collateral
onboarding
and
you
didn't
do
it
well.
A
So
the
whole
point
is
to
kind
of,
like
reverse
the
operational
risk
that
exists
today
right
because
today,
the
way
it
works
is
like,
if
I'm
careful,
if
they
vote
for
us,
we're
like
stupid
project
in
the
coordinates
and
the
project
of
total
failure
is
a
waste
of
time,
maybe
even
like
somehow.
Damages
causes
damage
to
system
by
creating
a
whole
bunch
of
drama
or
something,
and
then
makers
totally
on
the
hook
for
that
loss
right.
The
people
who
kind
of
like
proposed
it
the
people
who
failed
to
to
execute
it
correctly.
A
They
just
take
all
the
money
and
they're.
Basically,
they
can
just
go
and
do
another
proposal,
and
so
that's
reversed
with
the
metadats
right.
So
basically,
The
Meta
has
a
paid
better.
You
know
they
obviously
need
extra
resources
to
be
able
to
take
on
this
risk,
but
on
the
other
hand,
if
something
goes
wrong,
the
the
kind
of
the
the
you
know.
The
problem
always
lies
with
the
meta.
Does.
A
And
you're
saying,
and
so
that
David
says
that
isn't
Baker
still
in
the
hook
since
they
see
to
the
metadata-
and
you
can
I
mean
you
can
totally
like.
That's
that's
completely
true.
So
it's
more
like
you
could
say
that
it's
more
like
the
loss
is
completely
known
right,
like
the
maximum
risk.
We're
taking
is
totally
known
up
front
right.
A
A
We
we're
sort
of
putting
up
this
amount
of
capital
at
risk
and
then
we're
just
fine
we're
losing
all
of
that,
and
then
we
can
start
building
on
top
of
that
right
because
then,
of
course,
if
the
metadata
starts
growing
and
they're
starting
like
producing
their
own
value,
then
that
value
starts
becoming
kind
of
external
collateral
that
that
benefits
maker.
When,
when
doing
business
with
the
melodies.
A
Erin
there
was
this
one
other
question
from
Raphael
who
represents
Flipside
crypto
delegate,
so
he
was
wondering
who
are
the
scope
like
how
are
they
stabbed
and
how
are
they
evaluated
so
yeah
Raphael?
If
you
want
to
come
on
the
mic
and
like
clarify
the
question,
feel
free,
but
if
it's
clear
yeah
you'll
feel
free
to
answer
it
I
mean
that
that's
also
good
and
sort
of
very
simple
question
right.
So
and
it's
actually,
you
know
it's
actually.
A
The
one
change
I
have
yet
to
make
here
with
that
I
realize
I
need
to
make
is
to
change
these
things
into
circles,
and
so
the
reason
why
I'm
doing
that
is
because
actually
the
Scopes
actually
aren't
people
at
all.
In
a
sense,
the
Scopes
are
actually
these
sort
of
intersections
of
different
groups,
or
you
could
also
think
of
it
as
like
processes,
or
even
something
like
units
of
attention
or
something.
But
so
basically
there
are
really.
There
are
like
three
groups
that
are
particularly
involved
in
the
Scopes.
A
And
then,
and
then
there's
an
exception
initially
so
we'll
get
to
this
whole
exception
thing
in
a
second,
but
for
now
we'll
talk
about
like
the
long
run,
steady
state
of
end
game
set
up
right,
and
so
basically
the
Scopes
are.
Are
you
know
the
main
participants
discourages
first
of
all
the
decentralized
Builder
committees
and
really
the
Scopes
are
like
that's.
The
Scopes
are
optimized
for
the
centralized
product
communities
so
actually
like
each
like
yeah,
like
basically
the
key
aspect
of
a
of
a
so-called
like
a
recognized
decentralized
voter
committee.
A
A
So
in
some
sense
you
could
think
of
the
Scopes
as
almost
like.
These
are
the
areas
that
the
Builder
communities
focus
on
and
to
be
sort
of
a
fully
fledged
motor
committee.
You
have
to
be
able
to
consider
each
of
the
Scopes
because
the
Scopes
ultimately
like
they
cover
like
all
aspects
of
governance.
So
there's
like
no
decisions,
no
complexity,
no
details,
no
sort
of
knowledge
related
to
maker
that
that
falls
outside
of
the
Scopes.
The
Scopes
like
cover
100.
A
So
if
you
systematically
go
through
and
consider
each
of
the
Scopes,
then
you've
you've
covered
everything
and
you
know
there's
no
Gap
or
like.
No.
You
also
know
there's
like
nothing
going
on,
but
like
risk
that
you're
not
aware
of
for
something.
Of
course,
it
could
be
hidden
deep
in
the
scope,
but
but
more
like
horizontally
or
sort
of
as
like
as
a
gap
that
falls
between
some
of
the
Scopes.
A
That's
basically
not
meant
to
exist
and
and
the
Scopes
are
defined
and
kind
of
like
split
up
the
way
they
are
specifically
to
be
optimized
from
shareholders
and
like
major
governance.
So
the
whole
sort
of
structure
is
entirely
built
around
making
as
easy
as
possible
for
Mk
holders
to
like
to
most
importantly,
oversee
and
and
basically
attempt
to
detect
and
deal
with
corruption
and
then
also
like
participate
and
basically
sort
of
you
know,
act
as
a
dial
right
and
actually
collaborate
and
permissions
basically
support
the
operations
of
the
demo.
A
Is
that
they're
extremely
powerful
because
of
voter
incentives?
So,
unlike
now
where?
Basically
all
the
power
is
with
like
the
whales
right,
the
very
few
whales
that
are
active
in
the
end
game,
all
the
powers
with
the
delegates,
because
the
delegates
have
will
have
huge
amounts
of
voting
power
delegated
to
them
from
MPL
holders
that
are
mostly
just
doing
that.
A
The
voter
committees
are
kind
of
like
to
check
on
the
delegates,
because
the
delegates
they,
rather
than
being
these
like
independent
politicians
that
can
make
their
own
way
and
sort
of
like
push
their
own
platform
they're
more,
like
kind
of
you
know
more
to
call
it
I,
guess,
professional,
independent
or
even
like
objective.
You
may
be
even
detached
professionals
who
implement
the
strategies
that
the
decentralized
building
committees
design.
A
A
But
this
idea
of,
like
the
hawk
DVC
versus
the
dub
DBC,
is
basically
right
that,
like
the
like
most
average
voters,
if
they're
just
participating
because
they're
getting
voter
incentives,
you're
not
going
to
be
able
to
ask
them
some
like
complicated
question
around
what
they
think
about
decentralized
collateral
or
rival
assets,
or
do
you
think
the
U.S
is
safer
than
the
UK
or
do
they
think
whatever
we
should
spend
more
on
whatever
right
one
random
project,
another
random
project
like
at
best,
you
can
ask
them
some
really
really
simple.
Questions
such
as.
A
Should
we
have
lower
budgets
or
higher
budgets
right?
Should
we
count
more?
Should
we
focus
more
growth?
I
should
be
more
focus
more
on
consolidating
yeah.
You
know
resources
today
and
so
on.
Right
and
basically,
that's
really
like
that's
what
the
delegates
they
become
kind
of
like
the
conduit
for
that
right
for
people
making
these
simple
decisions
around
do
I
want
do.
I
want
to
you
know,
do
I
support
the
dove
strategy
of
spending
more
on
long-term
growth.
A
They
will
mostly
simply
follow
like
their
their
job
is
to
sort
of
faithfully
carry
out
the
kind
of
the
you
know,
the
you
know
the
strategy
that
corresponds
to
being
you
know,
a
dove
or
a
hawk
whatever,
and
mostly
that's
informed
by
the
decentralized
product
communities,
but
not
always
because
you
always
assume
every
every
actor
can
corrupt
right,
so
the
general
Community
can
corrupt.
The
delegate
can
also
corrupt
and
then
there's
like
a
bunch
of
different
checks
and
balances
to
keep
them
in
place.
A
I
think
I'll
wait
with
going
into
detail
on
that
now
because
then
we'll
just
like
endlessly
rabbit
hole
on
on
delegates,
and
but
this
is
I
mean
this
is
really
like
the
absolute
key
sort
of
critical
you
know.
Ultimately,
this
is
the
key
interaction
right
that
defines
everything,
but
we're
trying
to
set
up
a
system
that
can
actually
be
fully
decentralized
and
self-running,
because
we're
using
incentives
to
get
everybody
to
to
kind
of
right,
we'll
get
tons
of
people
to
vote.
A
And
but
very
freely
right
so
dvcs
they
have
some
Powers
over
the
delegates
and
the
delegates
have
some
Powers
over
the
dvcs
right.
So
one
power
is
that
the
dvcs
cannot
strip
delegates
of
the
road
weights
they
can't
like
like
so
the
delegate
contracts
are
not
really
meant
to
change
from
how
they
work
today.
So
all
the
all
the
control,
all
the
kind
of
Regulation,
rather
than
happening
on
the
Smart
Country
level,
because
we
don't
want
to
complicate
that
at
all.
A
We
want
to
keep
that
as
pure
and
sort
of
as
solid
as
it
is
today,
all
the
control.
All
the
regulation
happens
at
the
front
end
level
right
because
the
front
end
is
just
as
powerful
as
the
smart
contracts
right
and
that's
you
know.
Let
me
just
move
up
here.
That's
where
we
get
to
this
thing
called
the
home
front
right.
So
so,
actually,
that's
why
there's
such
a
focus
on
front
end
in
the
end
game?
A
It's
not
just
about
you,
know,
user
focus
and
user
friend
list,
which
is
of
course
also
extremely
important,
but
also
that
that's
a
part
of
the
security
like
it's
part
of
keeping
the
system.
Secure
is
regulating
front
ends
and
in
particular
nothing
is
more
important
to
regulate
than
the
delegation
from
it
like
the
whatever
like.
In
this
thing,
it's
called
like
the
easy
vote
in
front,
because
that's
the
process
you
must
go
through
if
you
want
to
farm
tokens
with
your
MCAT
right.
A
It's
like
a
computer
game
right.
It's
a
gamified,
you,
like
you
know,
you
pick
a
delegate
which
is
kind
of
like
pick
your
character
or
something
like
that,
and
then
you
pick
your
strategy
which
is
sort
of
like
pick
your
specialization
right
and
then
let's
say
you
know
so
this
example
here
you
know
so
like
and
and
actually
the
delegation
it
would.
It
might
probably
look
something
along
these
lines
and
I
don't
want
to
go
too
much
into
detail
of
like
why
the
design
is
this
way.
A
A
That's
the
you
know
more
spending,
more
growth
and
then
the
this
thing,
the
purple
thing,
that's
the
what's
that
called
a
rhombus
or
something
what
a
square
that's
on
its
side
or
whatever
that
thing
is,
you
know,
cut
spending,
focus
on
amassing
Capital
right
and
then
what
we
really
want,
because
one
of
the
things
we're
most
main
thing
we're
worried
about
with
delegates
is
power.
Spiraling
so,
basically
like
delegates
trying
to
kind
of
like
consolidate
the
power
right
and
we've
already
seen
stuff
like
that,
like
in
maker.
A
Like
you
know,
it's
called
The
Iron
law
of
bureaucracy.
Basically
it's
just
like
it's
such
an
extremely
natural
process
that
you
would
get
a
consolidation
of
power.
If
you
have
someone
that
you
know
you
have
and
the
fact
that
you
can
sort
of
use
power
to
accumulate
more
power
right
and
the
only
way
to
check
that
is
with
even
more
power
right.
So
so
it's
yeah,
it's
very
natural
right
and
yeah.
A
But
if
you
have
two
conflicting
DVC
strategies,
you
have
to
be
objective
to
be
successful.
Basically,
and
then
you
know
so
that
means,
for
instance,
this
guy
right,
delegate
C.
Here
you
can
sort
of
assume
that
there's
much
less
risk
of
someone
like
this
power
spiraling,
because
ultimately
they're
able
to
you,
know
they're
able
to
implement
two
completely
opposing
strategies
which
means
that
they
can't
really.
You
know
they
can't
get
into
polarized
politics,
because
then
they
were
just.
They
were
obviously
alien,
one
of
the
one
of
the
dbcs
right.
A
A
Yeah
and
then
there's
this
like
there's
this
question
of
like
how
do
we
know
that,
don't
just
research
and
like
how
do
we
prevent
them,
just
everyone
just
like
picking
stuff
randomly
and
doing
no
research
right
and
basically
mostly,
we
can't
really
prevent
that.
So
we
have
to
assume
that
that's
mostly
what
happens.
A
But
if
there,
if
some
encounters
are
motivated
to
basically,
you
know
think
about
the
good
of
the
protocol,
rather
than
just
you
know,
like
their
most
sort
of
Base
short-term
interests,
then
they're,
basically
going
to
you,
know,
review
the
performance
of
delegates,
review
the
performance
of
DBC
strategies
and
they'll
either
vote
according
to
what
they
reviewed.
What
sort
of
the
read
initially
or
they'll,
even
chase
their
votes?
A
If
they
see
something
wrong
or
even
better,
they
will
actually
try
to
like
rally
people
to
change
their
votes
in
response
to
some
kind
of
Scandal
or
failure
or
something
right.
And
then
you
have
kind
of
one
like
the
one
place
in
the
entire
end
game
kind
of
plan,
or
this
kind
of
in-game
equilibrium
where
you
have
a
very
strong
self-reinforcing
kind
of
like
what's
called
like
self-conserving
or
maybe
even
just
like
a
conservative
feedback
loop
or
something
like
that
right.
A
That's
basically
right
here
in
the
ranking
of
the
dvcs,
because
that's
like
the
one
place
where
whoever
is
an
incumbent
gets
an
advantage,
because
this
is
a
place
where
dvcs
are
shown
with
their
information,
ranked
based
on
how
much
voter
support
the
current
have
right.
So
whatever
is
the
most
popular
voter
strategy?
That's
the
thing:
that'll
show
up
the
first
when
you
you
know
you
read
about
what's
going
on.
A
If
you
want
to
learn
about
what
are
the
different
motor
strategies
and
then
that
means
that
there's
a
you
know,
there's
a
higher
likelihood
that
the
dvcs
that
I
actually
know
what
the
hell
are
doing.
They'll
go
to
the
top
here,
because
people
will
move
their
votes
towards
them
and
then,
if
that's
the
case
and
and
they
actually
legitimately
make
sense
and
they're,
not
some
kind
of
for
some
real
reason.
It's
something
that's
bad!
A
They'll
still.
What
they'll
try
to
do
is
they'll
just
try
to
get
through
the
user
flow
as
quickly
as
possible,
and
then
what
they'll
do
is
they'll
look.
You
know:
okay,
I
need
to
click
on
some
buttons
or
something,
but
how
I
don't
I
need
to
make
sure
I
click
the
right
place,
so
I
can
move
quickly
move
forward.
The
loop
over
here
will
be
like:
okay,
I
can
click
on
that
thing.
That's
the
square.
A
Okay,
I
click
on
the
Square
and
then
I
can
move
on
right,
and
so
then,
even
if
you
assume
totally
random,
like
the
most
delegators,
are
delegating
completely
randomly.
You
have
this
kind
of
feedback
loop,
where
the
few
voters
that
do
actually
think
about
how
to
vote,
and
they
get
to
kind
of
have
a
you
know
they
get
to
influence
them,
the
ones
that
are
not
thinking
about
other
books
but
indirectly
right
so
not
directly
because
it's
it's
not
like
you
can,
like.
A
You,
can't
click
over
here
and
vote
directly
for
the
DVC,
because
then
you
get
that's
too
dangerous
right,
then
you
have
a
very
hard
time
getting
rid
of
like
a
shitty,
DVC
and
and
the
delegates
are
no
longer
really
able
to
be
a
check
on
the
DVC,
yeah
and
and
so
on,
and
there's
a
lot
more
to
it.
But
that's
basically
a
bit
like
this.
Actually
this
actually
works
in
a
sense
that
you
have
this
like,
like
a
kind
of
like
it's
like
a
snake
eating
its
own
tail.
A
In
a
sense,
you
have
like
a
system
where
it's
decentralized
and
it's
keeping
it
like
people
are
keeping
each
other
in
check.
But
there's
no
like
single
point
where
you
could
say
that
the
somebody
sort
of
like
there's
a
top
of
hierarchy
and
then
well
and
then
there's
one
really
important
point
to
make
right,
but
that's
kind
of
like
what
can
you
know
so
the
delegates?
A
The
dvcs
can
then
ban
the
delegate
from
supporting
that
strategy,
and
so
Banning
the
delegate
from
supporting
a
strategy
doesn't
mean
they
can
remove
the
votes.
It
simply
means
that
the
you
know
like
let's
say
it's
the
you
know
this
thing
right.
So
this
guy,
he
got
a
bunch
of
votes
for
this
for
the
the
purple
one,
but
he
didn't
follow
the
he
didn't
actually
like
the
people
in
the
DVC.
A
Don't
think
that
he
actually
followed
the
strategy,
so
he
was
basically
lying
to
his
to
the
people
delegating
him
and
then
he
responds
they
banned
his
use
of
that
strategy.
And
then
what
basically
happens
is
that
all
the
votes
he
got
into
this
strategy,
they're
no
longer
considered
votes
for
that
strategy.
They're
kind
of
considered
independent
votes
for
this
delegate,
which
is
what
this
little
icon
here,
means
right.
So
you
can
also
just
you
can
also
choose
to
vote
for,
delegate
and
simply
be
like
give.
A
The
delegate,
just
like
you
know
like
have
them,
write
their
own
platform
and
then
be
like
okay.
You
just
want
to
really
feel
like
based
on
your
own
platform,
because
in
the
end,
all
delegates
do
that
in
a
sense
right.
They
always
because
they
have
to
be
a
check
on
the
dvc's
corrupting
and
then
the
reason
why
that's
very
bad
for
the
delegate
to
be
banned
from
a
DDC
is
that
if
they
only
support
two
dvcs
and
they
get
banned
from
one
of
them,
then
they're
gonna
lose
the
rank.
A
But
essentially,
if
you
have
someone
who's
proven
to
be
a
grifter
right,
then
very
quickly.
That
person
could
see
themselves
banned
from
all
gbcs.
Actually,
even
if
it's
not
like
straight
up
like
grifting,
because
there's
also
like
once
you,
if
you
have
a
delegate,
that's
like
straight
up
like
being
fraudulent
or
something,
then
you
have
even
more
powerful
escalation
mechanisms.
A
You
know
two
new
threat
like
give
them
a
new
strategy
and
then
have
two
of
those
that
are
independent
of
each
other,
so
they
have
two
independent
competing
strategies
that
they
came
up
with
and
then
they
come
go
back
to
the
regular
one.
So
it's
all
these.
So
that's
kind
of
the
crazy
thing
about
this.
It's
all
permissionless
like
nobody's
sort
of
gatekeeping
it,
but
in
practice
it's
this,
like
very
sort
of
conservative
and
and
sort
of
self-reinforcing
equilibrium
where
getting
out
of
line
is,
is,
is
problematic,
yeah
and
basically
like.
A
So
how
is
it
resistant
to
civil
attacks
right?
And
so
it
isn't?
It
basically
isn't
really
resistant
to
civil
attacks
directly
right
because
there's
no,
like
you
know
you
don't
like
UAC
or
anything
like
that
right.
In
fact,
it's
supposed
to
be
the
opposite,
like
in
fact,
you'd
expect
to
have
a
lot
of
sybils,
because
this
is
all
supposed
to
run
fully
anonymously,
but
instead
the
kind
of
the
resistance
basically
comes
from
how
the
compensation
is
structured.
So
it's
more
like
there's
not
really
like.
A
There's
just
not
really
meant
to
be
a
good
upside
for
doing
civil
attacks
and
which
is
basically
because,
first
of
all
the
dvcs
they
you
know
they
are
basically
they're
close
to
like
like
proceed
like
they
do,
receive
some
resources
potentially
and
exactly
how
that
needs
to
be
figured
out.
But
it's
still
like
it's
a
small
amount.
So
it's
just
like
it's
like
a
volunteer
thing.
A
Ultimately,
right
so
you're
never
gonna
like
nobody's
gonna
set
on
a
civil,
a
fake
civil
DVC,
because,
if
like
just
because
because
they
get
nothing
out
of
it,
so
so
in
practice,
you
can
count
on
most
qvcs
that
are
actually
holding
all
the
subcommittees
that
are
producing
all
the
materials
necessary
for
them
to
become
fully
fledged
regular
nice
dbcs
that
the
only
thing
that's
going
to
drive
them
to
do.
That
is
going
to
be
spark
right.
A
It's
going
to
be
that
they
held
nkr
they're,
actually
interested
in
the
well-being
of
the
protocol,
because
there's
just
nothing
else
for
them
to
milk
out
of
the
system
and
yeah.
So
then
Peyton
asks
on
the
creation
of
dbc's
permission,
or
can
any
group
of
delegates
make
a
new
DVC
with
a
new
purpose?
Frisco?
A
No,
so
they're
not
permission.
They
are
they're
permission
last
night.
Anyone
can
make
a
DVC,
but
you
do
have
to
go
through
this
like
recognized
process
right.
So
there's
a
check
on
the
dvcs
done
by
the
governance
scope
similar
to
the
check
on
on
recognized
delegates.
But
it's
not
like
it's
not
like
a
real
gatekeeping
right
like
it
is
right.
It's
like
sort
of
formalization
of
requirements
living
off
to
a
certain
sort
of
minimum
requirements
right
and
then
it
is
also
in
the
long
run,
I
mean
in
the
short
run.
A
We
want
to
have
the
resources,
but
in
the
long
run
it
will
be
doing
some
kind
of
basically
civil
resistance
check
to
basically
check
to
see
if
we
look
on
chain
or
something
or
look
for
any
data
we
have
on
this.
This
pseudonymous
identity
can
be
connected
to
a
delegate,
for
instance,
because
the
key
thing
is
dvcs
are
not
run
by
delegates.
They're
run
web
gallers
so
and
that's
the
key
is
like
a
delegate
cannot
like
delegates.
Do
like
a
DVC
cannot
exist
without
at
least
a
single,
authentic,
independent
mkholder.
A
A
You
have
to
be
genuine
as
well,
because
there's
nothing
driving
the
DBC
to
be
a
DBC
other
than
a
genuine
interest,
and
maybe
at
least
that's
sort
of
an
equilibrium
right.
So
if
so,
if
a
DVC,
that's
driven
by
people
that
actually
care
about
maker,
they
see
a
delegate
abusing
their
voter
strategy,
the
same
incentive,
that's
causing
them
to
run
the
DBC
in
the
first
place,
should
then
also
cause
of
the
band
delicate,
and
that
way
this
system
comes
out
of
sort
of
self-healing
right
self-policing
in
that
sense,
okay,
anyway.
A
So
I
think
that's
enough,
for,
like
I
mean
there's
still
there's
so
much
many
more
layers
to
this,
and
it's
it's
one
of
the
most
sort
of
crazy
challenges
that
you
know.
If
it
don't
solve
it.
The
whole
thing
falls
apart
right
because
the
status
quo
of
of
voting
is
on.
You
know
it's
untenable,
it
can't
last,
but
on
the
other
hand,
it's
kind
of
obvious
that,
as
soon
as
you
get
into
the
basis
of
voter
incentives,
you
can
pretty
quickly
see
how
it
can
just
spiral
completely
out
of
control
right.
A
So
it's
it's
kind
of
a
it's.
Oh,
it's
it's!
It's
yeah,
it's
a
delicate
business
to
try
to
set
up
an
actual,
stable
equilibrium
that
that
really
achieves
a
sort
of
end
game,
unchanging
state
anyway.
So
the
whole
point
is
you
have,
but
you
still,
you
know
delegates
and
voter
committees.
They
still
both
work
closely
together
and
they
basically
come
together
in
these
Scopes
right.
So
so
they
have
these
meetings
essentially
like
these
subcommittees
and
the
voter
committees.
Then
the
delegates
join
those
subcommittees
and
that's
actually
a
part
of
like
so
delegates.
A
Then
you
get
in
run
into
the
same
thing,
but,
like
the
delegates,
do
have
a
kind
of
a
boss
that
pays
them
out
and
those
are
the
the
volunteer
mplus
with
no
well
and
incentives.
Then
then
incentives
over
here
holders,
but
where
the
the
dvcs
and
the
sort
of
the
MPR
holders
their
job
is
to
kind
of
come
with
all
the
opinions
right.
The
delegates,
their
job
is
to
sort
of
come
with
all
the
the
objective
view.
A
A
A
You
have
like
the
you've
got
the
politicians
and
you
got
the
kind
of
the
staff
us
right
politicians.
They
don't
really
know
like
they
have
the
opinions
and
they
happen
like
the
vision
and
so
on.
The
staffers
they've
got
kind
of
the
experience
of
you
know,
working
with
certain
politicians
of
certain
types
and
what
they
kind
of
when
they
say
when
they
say
that
how
to
implement
that
in
practice,
how
to
make
it
practical
how
to
make
it.
A
You
know
actionable
right.
So
that's
the
kind
of
role
they
play,
but
then
of
course,
finally,
neither
of
them
are
specialized
right
like
so
so
they
can
cover
many
things
like
delegates,
don't
I
mean,
of
course
they
usually
do
I
mean
they
do
specialize,
but
but
not
to
the
same
extent,
just
like
politicians
also
do
specialize,
but
also
at
the
same
time
you
have
to
kind
of
cover.
A
I've
always
got
to
be
ready
to
cover
a
broad
range
of
things
right
and
then
the
the
real
sort
of
the
deep
specialization
and
the
Deep
Professional
Knowledge
of
a
particular
scope,
and
that
comes
from
the
meta
does
so
that
comes
from
the
governor.
Specifically,
who
run
these
things
called
the
the
councils
for
the
primary
Scopes
and
then
the
tribunals
for
the
sporting
Scopes
and
those
are
basically
like
the
professional
advisors
for
the
delegates
and
the
decentralized
Builder
committees,
and
so
there's
a
council
or
to
a
funeral
for
each
scope.
A
So,
for
instance,
there's
like
a
decentralized
collateral,
Council
right
and,
as
it
says
right
here,
they
sort
of
they
have
a
very.
They
have
these
very
simple
tasks
right.
They
basically
propose
scope,
framework
changes
and
then
they
update
the
you
know
the
software
and
limitation
of
the
scope
framework
and
basically
the
scope
framework.
That's
like
the
entirety
of
like
this
is
how
voters
and
the
entire
like
this
is
the
the
interaction,
the
point
of
interaction
for
everything
that
happens
in
a
scope
and
really
in
the
design.
Flash
Workforce.
A
So
so
you
could
have
you
know,
so
it's
not
actually
that
you
have,
that
I
mean
so
the
assembly
use
earlier,
that's
actually
in
simplification
right
because
it
wouldn't
be
that
you
would
have
voters
sit
and
be
like
the
regular,
oh
time
to
spell
dude.
Let's
spend
two
million
dollars.
Let's
go
right
that
at
least
it
doesn't
happen
and
this
that
actually
does
happen
with
these
guys.
A
A
Have
that
happen
directly
because
of
course
you
don't
want
like
there
are
many
reasons
why
you
don't
want
that,
but
one
just
being
you
just
don't
want
micromanagement,
but
what
they
can
do
is
they
can
change
the
scope
framework
to
say
we
need
to
be
more.
You
know
we
need
to
redirect
like
we
need
to
prioritize
resources
away
from
I,
don't
know
Security
reviews
and
towards
you
know.
So,
let's
say
right.
We
need
to.
We
need
to
de-prioritize
this.
A
In
terms
of
you
know,
we
need
to
move
resources
from
this
to
this
right
because
both
of
these
things,
like
all
of
this
stuff,
that's
written
down
here-
that's
defined
in
this
thing
and
then
this
thing
is
expanded
and
saying
like
we
need
to
re-prioritize.
We
need
to
focus
on
you
know.
We
need
to
focus
Less
on
Fringe,
newcomer
l2s
that
we
don't
have
know
so
much
about,
and
we
need
to
focus
more
on
proven
l2s
with
clear,
metrics
and
clear
product
Market
fit
or
something
right.
A
So
you
can't
exactly
Target
optimism,
but
you
can
sort
of
describe
sort
of
the
the
characteristics
of
something
like
optimism,
but
you
would
also
catch
every
other,
similar
L2,
for
instance,
right
and,
of
course,
the
the
reason
why
they're
so
important
is
because
if
you
can
describe
exactly
put
that
collateral
onboarding
on
optimism,
then
people
will
not
vote
based
on
what's
best
from
care.
They'll
vote
on
based
on
what
their
other
coins
are
right.
A
Who
actually
are
the
experts
in
this
area,
so
they
in
the
end
I
mean
it's
like
it,
wouldn't
necessarily
mean
that
the
voter
committees
would
come
and
be
like.
Oh,
let's,
like
readjust
and
blah
blah
blah,
it's
more
like
these.
The
council
would
come
with
some
proposal
and
then
the
voter
families
would
kind
of
like
Wrangle
how
to
like
how
to
change
it
up.
So
it
fits
without
interests
better,
basically,
and
then,
ultimately,
it
comes
down
to
a
boat.
A
So
so
it's
about
finding
a
compromise
that
you
can
pass
through
a
vote,
so
the
voter
committees
with
low
voting
power
they
will,
they
will
get
to
have
the
largest
say
in
this
stuff
and
it
yeah.
It
does
go
like
far
beyond
that
and
and
a
lot
of
actually
you
we
want
to
avoid
the
process
I
just
described
to
like
you
know
we
want
to.
A
Ideally
that
process
isn't
even
used
too
much
and
and
mostly
you
know
the
less
you
use
it
the
better
because
of
course,
every
time
you
mess
with
that
there
is
a
bunch
of
conflict
interest,
there's
a
bunch
of
risks.
You
know,
and
you
can
focus
even
more
like
the
butt
you
know
when
it
comes
to
resources
and
all
that
stuff.
There's
like
a
specific
system
of
that
called
budget,
allocators
yeah.
A
A
So
you've
got
decentralizing
order,
communities,
you've
got
delegates
and
you've
got
Council
like
mandated
actress,
essentially
that
that
is,
you
know,
a
people
that
that
are
actually
work
from
the
for
the
metaphase
and
are
kind
of
like
represent,
like
the
met.
You
know,
are
basically
managed
by
the
metal
house
as
a
whole
specifically
to
governors,
and
they
then
sit
in
here
and
ultimately
they
don't
even
do
the
work.
They
just
make
the
decisions
and
then,
after
they
make
a
decision,
they
go
to
the
other
metadata.
A
These
types
of
metadats,
as
well
as
ecosystem
actors.
To
then
have
the
work
actually
be
carried
out.
So
there's
a
clear
separation
between
the
people
who
make
the
decisions
and
then
the
people
who
carry
out
those
decisions-
and
you
don't
want
that
to
mix
because
of
course
you
immediately
get
conflict
of
interest
right,
because
if
you,
if
the
person
who
like
gets
paid
to
onboard
the
collateral,
also
gets
to
decide
if
the
amount
of
money
spent
on
Automotive
collaterals,
you
could
up
and
down
they're
gonna
decide.
It
needs
to
go
up
every
time
right.
A
And
this
way
you
will
have
this
you'll.
Have
that
disconnected.
So
you
have
it's
much
better
like
much
less
principal
age
in
the
problem
and
then
now
we're
finally
able
to
get
to
what
I
was
trying
to
get
to
an
hour
ago
and
basically
right,
but
basically
looking
at
what
are
these
initial
metaphase?
Oh
yeah?
Okay,
no
we're
not
able
to
get
to
it,
because,
let's
talk
about
the
exception
to
Governors
for
a
second
right,
so
I
said
there
was
an
exception
and
actually
what
I
just
described?
A
That's
not
how
it
would
run
initially
and-
and
that
exception
is
that
we
will
not
launch
with
governance
at
all.
So
the
councils
and
the
coordinates
and
demanded
actors
they're
not
going
to
work
for
the
metadas
they're,
going
to
work
directly
here,
they're
going
to
earn
us
I,
don't
know.
You'll
almost
could
say
they're
sort
of
sitting
up
here
in
some
weird
way
that
they
sort
of
like
directly
picked
my
voters
basically
and
that's
fine.
Initially,
when
we
can,
we
can
really
trust
everyone
and
we
can
really
count
on
people
not
be
corrupt.
A
A
A
It
can
go
into
deep,
real
world
right
now,
so
I'm
out
into
the
real
world
right
and
so
creators
they're
the
ones
who
focus
on
going
the
path
of
deep,
crypto
and
protectors
focus
on
going.
You
know
going
the
path
of
the
real
world
and
they're
not
totally
the
same,
so
that's
they're,
more
creators
and
protectors,
because
there's
a
lot
more
need
for
more
Independence
and
more
creativity
and
more
experimentation
when
it
comes
to
deep
crypto
versus
real
assets
right
and
also
the
protectors.
A
They
don't
really
have
these
like
internal
differentiation,
there's
just
two
of
them,
and
the
reason
why
there's
two
is
because
it's
significant,
like
it's
much
better
to
have
more
protectors,
but
they
don't
really
need
to.
They
can
kind
of
do
in
theory.
Pretty
much
do
the
exact
same
thing
over
time.
A
They
will
absolutely
specialize,
but
when
it
comes
to
like
the
core
function,
which
is
doing
real
assets,
they're,
basically
doing
the
same
thing
and
they're
just
doing
the
same
thing
in
some
different
with
some
different
approach
right
and
then
that's
extremely
helpful,
because
then
they'll
be
competing
to
figure
out
the
best
Solutions
and,
in
a
sense,
they'll,
be
sort
of
extrapolating
and
actually
reading
the
mind
of
mkholders
figuring
out
what
they
want
without
them,
even
knowing
it
right.
So
the
protectors
will,
instead
of
engaged
having
to
like
design
the
perfect
system
of
rural
assets.
A
A
If,
if
that
game,
approval
maps
are
go
through
right
in
the
sense
that
I
mean
the
teams
are
very
solid,
the
people
are
very
dedicated
and
I.
Think
also
the
like.
The
people
involved
in
Rebel
assets
at
this
point
realize
that
this
kind
of
simplification
or
sort
of
like
separation
of
concerns
that
like
enables
a
different
structure,
is
necessary
because
of
how
extremely
political
and
complicated
Rebel
assets
got
when
you're
trying
to
do
it.
This
sort
of
top-down,
one
true
approach
way.
A
Like
independent
projects,
they
still
interact
deeply
with
maker,
because
the
main
thing
they
do,
like
all
my
other
Thanos,
is
still
marketing
right,
attracting
users
to
the
front
end,
but
but
but
they're
they
don't
really
like.
Do
work
for
major.
For
instance,
they
just
like
do
work
for
themselves
and
get
done
and
attract
users
and
experiment
with
smart
contracts
and
new
new
products.
A
And
then
we
have
these
more
service
focused
creators.
So
they
are
more
like
like
they
basically
are
focused
on
filling
a
need
like
they've
they've.
Take
they
attempt
to
take
advantage
of
and
need
that
exists
in
the
Scopes,
and
then
that
is
extremely
important
to
deal
with
at
launch
at
the
meta
and
basically,
the
end
game
plan
launch.
As
a
result,
a
huge
amount
of
resources
are
available
to
deal
with
these
challenges
right
and
basically,
that
is
the
front.
I
mean
very
assembly.
It's
it's
related
to
the
front
end.
A
The
creation
of
decentralized
front
ends,
and
so
one
of
them
is
kind
of
like
focused
on,
like
the
front
end
front
end
like
the
front
front
end
or
whatever
you
want
to
call
it
like
the
the
business
front
end.
So
like
the
the
pro
like
the
products
that
you
put
in
meta
front
ends,
you
know
how
to
design
like
make
it,
how
to
make
your
branding
and
marketing
and
all
that,
although
really
it's
like
more
than
anything,
it's
just
like
creating
the
actual
front-end
for,
like
the
like.
A
That's
for
like,
oh
rather
than
thinking
of
it
as
creative,
maybe
the
better
way
to
think
of
it
is
like
it's
an
opportunity
that
exists.
It's
a
giant
budget,
that's
available,
defined
at
the
scope
level
in
the
in-game
plan,
as
as
an
opportunity
that
a
metadata
can
tap
into
incentivizing
its
creation,
but
it's
not
guaranteed.
Of
course,
it's
possible.
It
will
not
actually
come
into
existence
and
then
another.
You
know
it
will
maybe
be
an
ecosystem
actor
or
something
that
would
do
the
work
instead,
but
the
other.
A
A
A
And
then
one
thing
is
really
important
to
point
out
that
that's
not
the
only
thing
these
creators
do
right.
Actually
they
still
their
main
business
is
still
actually
running
in
front
of
themselves
and
attracting
users
and
selling
vaults
right
and
getting
Revenue
share,
involves
and
and
building
new
products.
Maybe
adopting
Plug
and
Play
protocols
from
the
these
guys
over
here
that
build
a
lot
of
Labor
defaults
or
developing
their
own
protocols
or
expanding
other
ways
or
coming
up
with
new
creative
business
models.
A
So
so,
like
minute
house
always
do
a
bunch
of
stuff
and
and
but
they
just
have
a
sort
of
a
specialization.
That's
like
they're,
the
sort
of
the
cash
cow
or
they're
kind
of
like
the
defining
narrative
in
the
defining
Focus,
and
if
that
goes
really
really
well,
then
maybe
they
won't
even
bother
experimenting
with
those
stuff.
Let's
focus
on
that.
A
But
on
the
other
hand,
if
it's
not
going
so
well,
then
that's
when
they
might
have
a
you
know,
they're
more
likely
to
start
experimenting
with
random
stuff
and
then
potentially
find
something
that
that
seems
to
work
and
then
pivot
towards
that
or
just
like
develop
three
to
four.
You
know
three
or
four
cash
cows
that
just
all
are
generating
income
and
just
you
know,
focus
on
just
like
solid
income,
funnels.
A
A
Does
anything
is
only
defined
through
the
Scopes?
There's
no
like
process
outside
the
Scopes
and
like
the
SPF
construct
disappears
in
name
gameplay,
of
course,
in
the
in
interim
it'll
be
used
a
lot,
but
then
eventually
it
doesn't
exist
anymore
and
instead,
basically,
it's
kind
of
like
the
funding
essentially
comes
from
like
the
core
units
or
the
core
unit
equivalents
that
then
pay
for
it
right
and
then
there's
also
this
thing
in
the
budget
allocator.
A
A
A
Those
are
actually
at
a
higher
level,
so
they're
like
defined
at
the
scope
level
themselves.
So
that's
like
a
big
pile
of
money,
that's
like
built
into
the
in-game
constitution
in
a
sense
because
you
know
these
are
just
these
two
pieces
are
like
you
know
they
need
to
get
to
sort
of
a
b
1.0
for
the
in-game
to
sort
of
like
yeah
like
it's
really
de-risk.
Basically,
you
know,
because
getting
to
a
proper
decentralized
front,
end
is
kind
of
a
very
highly
prioritized
short-term
goal.
A
Okay,
I
mean
I,
think
that's
that's!
Basically
it
but
yeah
like
I,
mean
I.
Think
what
really
it's
clear,
what
we're
very
pretty
got
into
is
that
yeah,
like
the
exciting
thing
is,
like
you
know
the
politics
of
power
right
and
the
the
core
control
the
protocol
and
how
do
we
actually
hand
over
transition
power
from
the
whales
to
some
kind
of
amorphous
decentralized
like
mob,
in
a
sense
right
that
we
can't
entirely
trust,
but
we
can
sort
of
know
its
incentives
and
and
it's
aggregate
Dynamics
and
that's
exciting.
A
That's
like
the
next
big
Focus
for
me
right,
if
they
give
mips
pass,
is
I
will
write
out
that
entire
framework
and
get
it
to
the
Forum,
and
that's
going
to
be
like
the
next
big
thing
to
really
focus
on,
because
that's
gonna,
that's
really
going
to
like
change
a
lot
of
stuff
right.
That's
going
to
cause
a
very
direct
impact
on
the
kind
of
the
political
Dynamic
of
of
the
Dao,
and
if
that,
once
that
gets
passed
right
like
so,
of
course,
the
endgame
approvements.
A
And
then,
if
you
combine
the
delegate,
incentives
and
and
with
the
front
end,
you
know
the
front
end
project
and
then
voter
incentives
from
metadata
tokens.
That's
really
like
that's
when
it's
fully
logged
in
it's
like,
even
if
all
the
whales
got
together
at
that
point,
they
would
not
be
able
to
to
control
the
system
and
it
would
have
to
like
any
kind
of
change.