►
Description
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/fixed-rates-strategies-and-mechanisms-in-the-decentralized-collateral-scope/18529
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/purpose-2-0-endgame-clean-money-and-nuclear-energy/18421
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/viridian-cluster-introduction/18332
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/spring-cluster-introduction-and-proposal/18398
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/crimson-creator-cluster/18241
https://forum.makerdao.com/t/tiedai-creator-cluster/18369
A
A
Welcome
everyone
to
the
first
yeah
one
of
us
that
I
wrote
on
the
Discord.
The
first
in-game
call
in
officially
taking
place
in
the
pre-game
face,
since
the
in-game
approval
mips
have
now
passed
so
now
that
it
really
changes
that
much
in
terms
of
how
this
conversation
I
mean
what
we're
going
to
be
doing
in
this
call,
which
will
just
be
the
usual
talking
about
so
whatever
random
things.
A
People
ask:
are
the
sort
of
the
latest
various
posts
that
have
materials
that
have
been
published,
but
maybe
there's
a
chance
that
there'll
be
a
few
more
new
people
joining
today.
Since
now,
there's
a
pretty
good.
You
know,
there's
a
pretty
good
reason
for
people
to
to
spend
some
more
time
learning
the
details.
A
B
A
A
A
A
Okay,
weird
I
just
gave
some
it
just
looked
like
it
was
working.
Is
it
working
now
yeah,
it's
working?
It
could
benefit
from
a
little
bit
of
Zoom,
though
yeah
we'll
we'll
zoom
in
once
well
I
mean
the
thing
is,
of
course,
all
the
texts,
and
so
on
doesn't
really
right
now,
there's
still
plenty
of
that
needs
to
be
updated,
I
mean
I.
Think
still.
The
key
thing
is
to
just
sort
of
learn
how
to
to
read
this
stuff,
so
so
I
mean
the
actual
content.
A
A
Where
I
was
talking
about
fixed
rates
and
basically
like
fixed
rates
and
and
retention
like
long-term
retention
of
users,
and
how
that's
like
you
know,
that's
basically
it's
something
that
is
kind
of
cool
enough
to
what
maker
you
know
needs
to
do
in
the
long
run
that
it
makes
sense
to
have
some
kind
of
like
an
official
strategy
for
it
right
and
I
put
and
I.
Then
I
wrote
about
two
specific
mechanisms
that
I'm
considering
right
now
right.
A
You
know
just
for
a
minute,
because
it's
always
great
to
attract
users
that
stay
longer,
but
also
because
there's
a
kind
of-
and
you
know,
there's
like
data
showing
that
if
a
user,
the
longer
a
user
is
able
to
prevent
the
liquidation
with
Bolt
the
more
secure
the
Vault
gets
like
the
lower
the
probability
of
future
liquidation
gets.
So
that
means
you
actually
have
like
a
material
reduction
in
Risk
right,
which
also
means
it's
economic
for
maker
to
actually
pass
on
more
disability
fees
to
the
metadatics.
A
They
can
attract
this
type
of
user
because
there's
just
less
like
you
need
a
lower
risk
premium.
Basically
and
then
in
turn
the
metadas
can
you
I
mean
either
they
can
just
use
that
additional
income,
just
as
like
a
reward
for
for
doing
good
work
and
generating
value
and
attracting
those
uses,
or
they
can
even
use
that
additional
income
to
you
know
specifically
try
to
Target
these
type
of
users
and
one
of
the
ways
you
can
do.
That
is
to
actually
try
to
offer
fixed
rate
products
or
sort
of
offer
stuff
that
can.
A
And
then
what
I
want
before
we
go
further
into
that
I
mean
we
can
keep
going
around
that
right.
But
then
what
I
want
to
sort
of
showcase
is
how
is
something
like
this
implemented
in
the
engagement,
because
that's
kind
of
the
whole
point
of
the
in-game
plan
right
is
that
something
like
this
should
be
kind
of
implemented
in
a
sort
of
systematic
way
right,
so
that
you
know
it's
not
some
kind
of
like
random.
You
know
fixed
rates.
A
Here
right
we
show
the
different
actors
right,
so
you've
got
the
got
the
voter,
the
voter
layer
right,
so
basically
the
the
address
that
represent
MPL
holders
and
also
many
sort
of
control
the
system.
And
then
you
got
sort
of
the
the
the
contributors
in
a
sense,
the
decentralized
workflows
out
here
to
the
right.
So
the
people
that
do
the
actual
work
on
behalf
of
the
voters
right
and
they
sort
of
sit
out
here
right
and
then
the
way
these
interact
with
each
other
is
through
the
Scopes
which
then
set
up.
A
These,
like
rule
sets,
for
you
know
for
all
the
different
kind
of
like
key
and
focused
areas
that
make
or
call
deals
with
in
name
game
and
actually
he's
allowed
to
deal
with
the
Navy
right.
Because
then
the
whole
point
is
in
the
in-game.
The
Scopes
are
completely
locked
down,
there's
not
going
to
be
any
other
stuff,
and
the
things
described
here
like
the
Scopes
described
here.
A
That
maker
can
do
right,
and
so
the
Constitution
itself
will
like
Implement,
that
you
simply
cannot
add
another
scope
or
change
the
scope
or
I
mean
split
up
a
scope
or
remove
a
scope
or
something
like
that.
It's
completely
fixed
and
that
then
prevents
you
know
like
sort
of
open-ended
complexity
spiraling
over
time
right,
because
you
you
have
this
kind
of
a
limited.
A
You
know
limited
set
of
things
that
the
Dao
is
even
allowed
to
to
do
and
focus
on
right.
So
you
can
never
get.
You
can
never
drown
in
complexity,
Beyond
sort
of
these
specific
things
that
the
Dow
specialized
in
doing,
and
then
we
got
the
primary
Scopes
which
focus
on
kind
of
like
the
actual
business.
A
The
point
is
that
fixed
rates
are
then
something
we
can
like
they're,
basically
implemented
in
the
decentralized
collateral
primary
scope.
Right,
because
that's
the
place
where
you
deal
with
you
deal
with
you
know
decentralized
right,
including
the
vaults
that
this,
the
the
you
know,
the
retention
bonus,
the
revenue
share
worth
it.
Let
me
see
how
it
said
this
phrase,
user
retention,
Revenue
share
bonus
and
then
the
fixed
rate
module
would
would
go
in
in
this
right.
A
So
so,
actually
like
I
mean,
and
so
then
let's
say
that
we
already
have
we
all
we're
sort
of
already
in
you
know,
post
in-game
plan
launch
right,
so
we're
in
the
early
game
right.
The
metadata
have
launched
the
Scopes
operational
takes
a
little
running
according
to
the
the
the
sort
of
the
operational
model
of
the
Scopes,
but
we
forgot
to
figure
out
how
to
deal
with
fixed
rates,
and
then
we
realize
okay.
A
A
So
you
can
still
you
know
in
include
like
sort
of
introduce
that
even
after
in-game
playing
launch
right
and
the
way
you
do
that
is
with,
as
with
everything
else
we're.
So
the
something
major
is
going
to
change
in
in
maker.
Is
you
you
modify
the
scope
framework
and
so
the
scope
framework
is
kind
of
like
the
Constitution,
for
this
particular
skill
right,
decent
articulator
and
then
what
we
would
add
is
something
I
would
add.
A
You
know
the
transfer
of
value
to
the
to
the
metadatas
right,
so
if
they
find
the
process
of
measuring
this
Revenue
share
bonus
and
then
sending
out
the
money,
because
that's
what
that's
kind
of
always
what
you
know,
that's
what's
gonna
create
a
real
effect,
because
if
there's
a
mechanism
that
can
be
counted
on
that's
written
into
the
scope
framework,
so
it's
actually
sort
of
enforceable
and
reliable.
Then
you're
going
to
see
real
behavioral
change
right
then
you'll
actually
see
metadatas
consider
this
as
like
a
reliable
source
of
income.
A
A
So
we
need
core
units
to
actually
read
and
interpret
the
scope
framework
that
describes
what
is
a
fixed
rate
module,
how
you're
supposed
to
use
it,
how
you're
supposed
to
gather
data
and
then
propose
some
kind
of
execution
on
this
system,
and
then
it
would
go.
You
know
you
would
actually
add
that
in
here
as
like
an
entirely
new
line
item.
That
would
be
something
like
you
know:
frm
parameter
adjustment
or
something
like
that
right.
So
that
means
now
we
we
Define.
How
do
we
want
to
Target?
A
A
Instead,
what
we're
doing
is
we
sort
of
we're
basically
creating
a
kind
of
a
set
of
instructions
for
the
coordinates
to
then
follow
right,
because
that's
what
the
then,
what
the
coin
is
basically
doing
right
just
like
today,
it's
just
with
a
lot
more
sort
of
rigor
around.
What
exactly
are
they
supposed
to
work?
How
are
they
supposed
to
get
the
data?
A
You
know,
that's
always
just
a
matter
of
figuring
out
what
works,
because,
basically,
the
more
flexibility,
the
better
on
one
hand,
but
on
the
other
hand,
you
have
things
like
corruption,
or
you
know,
failure
to
coordinate
sort
of
the
the
reason
why
you
wanted
more
lockdown
or
even
incompetence.
Obviously,.
A
A
So
that's
the
point
that,
like
the
Scopes
themselves
right
so
they're
like
the
12
scopes,
they're
locked
down
through
the
Constitution,
essentially
so
like
attempting
to
change
the
Scopes
you
know
would
result
in,
for
instance,
like
a
delegate
losing
its
recognized
status
or
a
DVC
losing
its
recognized
status
for
instance,
and
like
this
so
This
sort
of
really
strong
penalties
against
changing
the
things.
You're,
not
you're,
just
not
allowed
to
change,
but
the
scope
Frameworks
are
like
those
are.
A
The
the
units
like
those
are
the
places
where
that's
where
change
is
supposed
to
happen.
So
those
are
the
ones
that
sort
of
specifically
are
not
locked
down,
and
so
we
start
off
and
and
there
and
they
are
exactly
like
their
myth.
Each
of
them
are
I.
Think
is
like
the
best
way
to
just
think
about
this
right.
So
another
way
to
think
of
it
is
that
in
the
end
game,
we
simply
we
like
we
cut
off
the
ability
to
make
new
mips.
A
We
create
the
maps
that
we
need
and
then
we
follow
processes
within
those
mips
and
change
those
mips.
But
we
completely
restrict
the
ability
to
create
any
new
mips.
Once
we've
reached
a
certain
point,
basically
right
and
so
actually
I
mean
so
first
we
in
the
pre-game
we
create
all
of
these
myths
right.
So
we
in
the
pre-game.
We,
you
know
we
over
the
next
year
right
before
2024.
A
A
They
don't
interfere
or
sort
of
actively
do
day-to-day
work,
but
instead
their
job
is
to
be
the
ones
that
kind
of
like
are
the
official
advisors
for
how
to
change
the
scope
framework
and
then
every
single
quarter.
They
basically
come
with
a
new
proposal,
or
maybe
even
multiple
different
potential
proposals
for
how
to
update
the
scope
framework
based
on
the
sort
of
the
knowledge
gathered
the
preceding
quarter
and
then
the
idea
is
that
you
know
every
every
single
week.
There's
a
call
like
this
right.
A
So
this
is
a
DVC
call,
right
and
and
or
support.
Well,
that
was
sort
of
the
thinking
right
that
this
would
be
that
these
are
the
Proto
DVC
calls
right.
So
every
single
week,
or
rather
every
quarter,
every
single
DVC
will
have
12.
At
least
12
subcommittee
calls
so
basically
12
calls
per
quarter
which,
which
fits
with
about.
A
This
quarter
right,
so
they
will
be
you're
basically
like
so
basically,
the
the
voter,
the
MPR
holders
you
know
organized
into
their
particular
group,
will
then
get
together
and
be
like
okay.
This
week
we're
talking
about
protocol
engineering-
and
we
are
look-
you
know,
there's
two
different
major
proposals
for
for
how
to
change
the
scope
framework
and
one
proposal
is
all
about
increasing
the
the
weight
of
the
singularity
engine
in
terms
of
prioritization.
A
So
so
we
want
to
start
focusing
more
on
expanding
to
L2
and
the
other
is
I
mean
well
and
the
other
one
is
about
instead
increasing
the
prioritization
of
synthetic
acid
deployment.
So
it's
all
about
yeah,
it's
I
mean.
Maybe
it's
like
this.
Maybe
it's
like
reacting
to
some
specific
opportunity
in
you
know
stable
coins
for
more
stuff
or
something
that
suddenly
has
a
clear
product
or
whatever.
It
is
right,
and
sometimes
it's
something
very
specific
other
times.
A
And
then
David
is
asking:
when
are
the
scope
councils
forming
any
idea
about
the
membership?
You
can
basically
I
mean
they
will
sort
of
gradually.
You
can
think
of
them
as
core
units
separate,
coordinates
in
a
sense
and
and
in
practice
they
will
just
gradually
form
and
they'll
be
voted
in
right
by
mkh
elders
and
initially
we
should
like.
Initially,
we
don't
need
them,
so
we
can
like
so
something
I
mean
I.
I
also
wrote
a
little
bit
about
this
in
the
post
right,
but
something
like
the
decentralized
collateral
scope.
A
Initially,
that's
just
something
where
very
neatly.
The
risk
core
unit
today
fits
in.
It's
just
like
basically
like,
like
I,
mean
basically
playing
the
role
of
both
core
unit
and
Council,
and
then
maybe
they
can
internally
split
up
and
have
some
of
them
at
this
Council
and
have
some
of
them
act
as
a
coordinate
and
even
further
split
up
where
some
of
them
then
also
act
as
a
you
know,
become
an
ecosystem
actor.
If
you
want
this
further
separation
of
house,
but
we
don't
need
none
of
that
stuff
needs
to
be.
A
Yeah,
well,
let
me
just
talk
for
a
second
more
about
the
fixed
region
right,
so
so
these
I
mean
so
then
we
put
it
we
put
in
this
like
so.
Basically
what
I'm
proposing
is
that
from
the
start
right
so
by
the
time
we
we
start
drafting
the
first
decentralized
collateral
scope
framework
MIP
we
already
put
in
these
like
at
least
the
two
fixed
rates
mechanisms
that
I've
proposed
so
far,
and
maybe
even
something
more.
If
we
can
come
up
with
more
that,
that's
in
the
same
way,
vein
of
kind
of
like
expanding.
A
A
A
You
know
whatever
they
get
rejected
for
some
reason
or
anything
like
that
right,
then,
these
rules
are
I,
mean
they're,
completely
sort
of
universal
right
and
they
don't
even
need
to
they're,
not
necessarily
needed.
Initially,
their
point
is
just
their
their
vital
part
of
endgame
state
right
and
the
so.
The
the
use
of
retention
remedy
share
bonus
that
actually
doesn't
even
really
that's
not
directly
related
to
fixed
rates
right.
So
that's
actually
like
a
bonus.
A
That's
available
to
all
metadats
and
all
front
ends
that
figure
out
a
way
to
attract
more
long-term
users,
because
we
just
know
that
those
users
are
more
valuable
to
us.
So
we
can.
We
can
pay
higher
Revenue
share
if
you
get
those
types
of
uses
for
us
right,
I'll
make
a
call
can
do
that.
If,
because
this
is
an
operational,
can
make
a
call
to
to
pay
more
for
more
for
higher
value
uses
and
then
the
fixed
rates
module.
That's
a
different
story
right.
That's
like
more!
A
That's
specifically
about
tabbing
into
these,
like
fixed
rate
system
with
sort
of
The
Deco
protocol.
As
like
the
first
like,
like
the
first
thing,
that's
actually
compatible
Mega
coins
or
in-game
compatible
and
would
be
possible
to
control
through
the
decentralized
collateral
scope,
but
then
I
mean
and
in
in
all
cases,
with
The
Deco
protocol
available.
A
By
simply
defining
what
kind
of
behavior
we
want
to
see
right
and
then
defining
what
I
mean.
We
basically
Define
the
behavior.
In
terms
of
you
know
we
would
like
term
loans.
We
would
like,
as
a
premium
fixed
rate
positions
and
maybe
even
some
kind
of
weird,
like
reverse
fixed
rate
stuff,
where
we
can
exit
the
position
and
the
user
can't
but
I
mean
the
point,
is
weekends
I
believe
we
can
just
Define
what?
If
we
see
something
like
this,
then
we're
gonna.
A
You
know
we
we're
basically
instructing
a
coordinates
to
then
take
steps
to
you
know,
make
a
vote
available
to
them,
can't
hold
us
to
then
deposit
money
into
it
or
some
sort
of
like
deposit
collateral
internal,
basically
take
sort
of
use
it
essential
right
and,
of
course,
also
what's
really
really
important.
Is
we
need
to
Define
security
characteristics
of
this
kind
of
stuff
as
well?
A
But
so
then,
it's
kind
of
like
so
the
scope
framework
in
that
sense
can
also
be
seen
it
it's
kind
of
like
a
you
know,
it's
also
like
a
handbook
for
the
entire
ecosystem
for
them
to
figure
out
what
other
opportunities
available
to
me
like.
How
can
I
make
some
money
by
building
some
writings
in
particular
code
and
then
making
it
available
to
maker
and
knowing
that,
if
I
follow
all
these
objective
criteria,
then
basically
I'm
I'm
almost
guaranteed
that
I
will
then
get.
A
So
this
is
completely
unlike
how
you
know
a
real
company
would
work
right,
because
a
real
company,
like
the
sort
of
the
operations
of
a
real
company
and
the
process
of
the
real
company,
is
obviously
like
optimized,
for
the
team
and
for
the
CEO
and
for
sort
of
like
I,
mean
sort
of
the
centralized,
hierarchical
mode
of
operations.
Right
and
and
everything
is
designed
to
make
it
as
easy
as
possible
for
the
workers
to
deliver
the
best
possible
work.
But
in
a
dial
you,
the
problem,
is
you
don't
introduce
your
duty
right?
A
A
Beyond,
whatever
sort
of
Unchained
consequences.
The
Dao
can
can
grasp
right
because
the
doubt
doesn't
have
a
legal
presence.
It
doesn't
have
any
kind
of
legal
standing.
Any
ability
to
to
hold
you
accountable
for
some
like
promises,
you've
made
or
anything
like
that
right,
yeah,
corruption,
isn't
necessarily
the
perfect
word,
but
I
feel
I.
Think
it's
actually
it's
it's
good
enough
in
a
sense
right.
It's
like
corruption
is
just
sort
of
the
degradation
of
stuff
over
time.
Right
like
that.
A
If
you're
allowed
to
do
some
bad
things
and
like
pay,
your
cousin,
you
know
10
million
dollars
to
do
some
work
that
never
gets
done
and
you
found
out
you
you
get
you're
just
going
to
get
away
with
it
right
I
mean
your
reputation
will
obviously
be
ruined,
but
there's
not
going
to
be
any
consequences
beyond
that,
because,
again,
at
no
point
Did,
you
sort
of
Legally
interact
with
with
something
anyway
and
yeah
so,
and
it
was
right.
So
that's
the
point
I
mean.
A
So
that's
the
that's
really
the
underlying
kind
of
logic
of
why
the
entire
operations
and
governance
instruction
this
way.
So
it's
all
like
based
around
how
to
make
it
possible
for
mkr
holders
to
have
like
a
realistic
grasp
of
what
the
hell
is
going
on
right
and
a
realistic
way
to
actually
sort
of
impact
at
the
right
layer
right.
A
So
they
don't
micromanage
stuff,
but
they
ultimately
have
that,
like
full
control
or
what's
going
on
right
and
how
things
are,
are
checked
and
how
things
are
balanced
and
and
verified,
and
all
this
stuff
and
then
all
the
actual
operations
happens
out
here
right.
So
basically,
actually
at
the
top
here
you
have
the
governor
metadas,
which
are
the
metadatas
that
specialize
in
in
sort
of
and
operating
the
bureaucratic
layer
of
the
Scopes
like
the
professional
layer
of
the
Scopes.
So
basically
they
operate
like
so.
A
The
the
governors
are
the
ones
who
operate
the
councils
and
the
core
units
and
the
tribunals
which
are
really
just
like
combined
Council
and
core
units,
which
is
what
we
use
in
the
secondary
Scopes
and
tertiary
Scopes,
because
they're
much
smaller
than
the
primary
scopes,
yeah
and
so
Governors
operate
councils,
just
like
they
operate,
coordinates
and
all
the
sort
of
the
professional
layer
of
the
Scopes
right
and
the
main.
So
the
main
difference
between
a
council
or
a
core
unit
is
that
the
councils
consist
of
basically
representatives
from
all
the
government
meditons.
A
A
A
In
fact,
they
might
have
come
with
multiple
of
proposals
right,
so
they
all
agree
on.
This
is
a
valid
proposal.
They
don't
necessarily
endorse
one
over
the
other
and
they
could
do
that
individually
if
they
want
to
potentially
write
but
as
a
whole,
they
sort
of
work
together
right
and
holistically
produce.
These
scope
framework
change
proposals.
A
And
the
core
units
instead
are
all
operated
by
a
single
Governor
individually,
so
the
coordinates
are
like
way
more
flexible
right
because
they're
just
one
Governor
meta.
Now,
then
that's
a
runs,
one
team
that
they
are
responsible
for,
instead
of
having
sort
of
you,
know
a
shared
responsibility
for
the
entire
Council.
A
So,
like
a
council
like
you
know,
if
there's
five
minutes,
then
a
council
will
actually
have
like
five.
It
will
consist
of
five
units,
which
is
basically
a
unit
provided
from
each
metal
down
and
then
how
many
people
and
how
exactly
that
sort
of
underlying
structure
of
that
unit
or
the
team
is,
is
up
to
the
the
metadata.
A
Actually,
although
make
a
call
and
we'll
need
to
figure
out
how
exactly
this
will
work,
because
this
is
one
of
those
like
weird
procedural
and
sort
of
operational
questions,
that'll
run
into
a
ton
of
edge
cases
right,
but
like
make
your
call
has
some
ability
to
basically
say
you
know
we
don't
like
your
unit
right
now.
We
think
it
sucks
give
us
another
one
right,
but
make
a
call,
cannot
itself
sort
of
micromanage
and
decide
who
the
governor
has
to
you
know
use
to
represent
itself
with.
A
So
it's
really
the
governor
directly
that
sits
on
the
council
like
so
you
in
a
sense,
you
don't
have
individual
people
running
these
things.
You
have
entire
dials
interact
with
each
other
to
run
these
things
right.
So
a
core
unit
is
also
an
entire
dial
in
a
sense,
and
it's
represented
as
sort
of
certain
people
in
the
down
that
is
more
focused
on
the
work
of
the
core
unit,
but
ultimately,
The
Tao
as
a
whole
is
also
responsible
right.
A
So
over
here
the
people
who
hold
these
tokens
and
some
sort
of
organize
the
governor
internally.
They
basically
have
a
kind
of
a
proactive
incentive
to
ensure
that
you
know
the
the
coin
that
they're
ultimately
responsible
for
and
that
they
could
actually
res
you
know
get
penalized
for
if
some
bad
some
wrong
work
happens,
they
they
basically
will
proactively
constantly
be
trying
to
make
sure
that
that
doesn't
happen.
A
A
Yeah
yeah,
so
I
think
you
come
I
mean
so
David
a
governor
is
a
minute
now,
so
it's
like
a
Creator
or
protector,
so
the
the
term
Governor
means
basically
a
large
community
of
token
holders.
Who
then,
who
make
decisions
by
voting
with
the
tokens,
and
we
then
on
board.
You
know
the
metadata
equivalent
of
coordinates,
which
is
called
Administration
teams
to
then
like
sort
of
run
their
internal
operations.
A
A
But
if
the
token
holders
of
these
metadats
that
are
respond
like
that,
have
the
final
sort
of
responsibility
for,
for
instance,
participate
in
the
councils
right
and
and
and
following
the
coordinate
processes
and
so
on
and
they're
the
ones
who
will
be
held
responsible.
If
you
know
the
work
isn't
good
enough,
so
they
they're
completely
sort
of
taking
that
risk
and
then,
of
course,
they're
also
getting
the
upside
from
them
right.
A
So
they
get
a
kind
of
overhead
fee
for
basically
being
in
charge
of
it
and
and
the
the
outcome
of
this
is
as
I
explained
before.
Is
that
you
sort
of
reverse
the
operational
risk
right
so
today,
if
some
bad
work,
if
maker
onboards
are
coordinated
and
they're
supposed
to
do
a
and
then
they
just
do
b
or
do
nothing
or
steal
the
money
and
buy
a
Lamborghini,
so
something
right
and
then
today,
maker
just
takes
a
loss
right.
A
A
So
if,
if
the
same
thing
happens,
when
then
maker
is
completely
fine,
because
what's
just
going
to
happen
is
Mega
is
going
to
say:
well,
you
complete,
you
wasted
all
the
money.
You
you
had
your
team,
like
you,
didn't
do
what
you
were
supposed
to
do,
according
to
the
scope
framework,
and
instead
you
actually
took
the
money
and
paid
yourself
salaries
and
the
people
went
out
and
bought
expensive
cars
with
that
money.
A
A
Then
you
haven't
just
caused
a
loss
of
one
million,
because
you
wasted
a
million
die.
You've
caused
the
loss
of,
like
maybe
two
million,
because
you've
also
wasted
a
million
die
of
opportunity
cost
so
that's
kind
of
how
it
works
right.
So
that
means
everything
gets
more
expensive
for
maker,
but
suddenly
maker
doesn't
have
this
like
risk
of.
A
If
you
trust
the
wrong
person,
then
maybe
you're
going
to
lose
you're
going
to
waste
all
your
money
instead
we're
sort
of
we're
we're,
as
we
sounded
like
almost
like
buying
Insurance
in
a
sense
right
from
the
from
the
governors,
but
also
from
all
the
other
metadatas
and
how
they
operate.
And
that's
really
like
this-
that's
the
fundamental
principle
of
the
of
the
in-game
plan.
Right
now,
all
this
stuff
is
structured
is
that
all
the
risk
is
always
pushed
away
from
the
call
right.
A
So
the
core
is
like
simplified
and
has
to
deal
with
as
little
risk
as
possible
and
instead,
all
the
the
sort
of
the
the
intricacies
of,
like
the
risk
of
you,
know,
drama
between
particular
people
or
power,
politics
or
power
struggles
or
negligent
people
who
are
really
charismatic
or
whatever
right.
All
of
that
risk
sits
in
the
meadow
and
makers
completely
like
has
no
exposure
to
it
whatsoever
beyond
the
the
cost
that
goes
into
creating
the
metadata
in
the
first
place,.
A
A
Let
me
see
if
there's
some
other
yeah
and
then
I
mean
well
okay,
that
just
one
more
thing
to
talk
about
everything
is,
of
course,
who
then
does
actual
work,
and
then
there's
the
creators
and
the
protectors
right.
That
I
would
imagine
most
people
on
this
call
now
at
least,
will
are
familiar
with
with
what
they,
what
they
do.
B
A
You
know
where
we
would,
like
you
know
with
their
own
skin
in
the
game
right,
so
they
can
do
whatever
they
want,
but
maker
isn't
really
exposed
to
to
their
activities.
Beyond
again,
like
the
cost
of
creating
the
metadata
in
the
first
place,
and
then
the
protectors
there
oops
the
protectors
they
are
then
going
the
other
direction
right.
A
And
then
what
we
arrived
at
after
a
lot
of
feedback-
and
a
lot
of
you
know
consideration
of
how
to
go
about
this
right.
We
arrived
at
during
the
pregame,
we're
actually
only
incubating
creators
and
protectors.
So
initially
the
governors
will
not
oops.
Initially,
the
governors
will
not
be
created,
there'll
be
no
governance
at
the
end
game
plan
launch
and
instead
the
council
is
in
the
coordinates
and
so
on.
A
A
All
right,
so
next
question
is:
what
are
the
next
steps
for
the
pregame?
The
top
three
key
part
is
now
that
the
plan
has
officially
passed
yeah,
so
I
just
talked
earlier,
I
just
talked
about
defining
the
Scopes
right,
so
basically
defining
the
Scopes
is
kind
of
like
that's
kind
of
like
the
obvious
governance
work
that
needs
to
all
be
done
by
you
know
by
the
time
the
metadats
launched
right.
A
But
before
that
and
that's
you
know,
and
that's
the
thing
where
you
know
every
like
we,
you
know
we
have.
We
need
to
have
multiple
decentralized
motor
communities
and
then
they
need
to
every
quarter.
Consider
each
of
these.
You
know
each
of
the
Scopes
and
consider
whether
to
make
any
changes
to
the
scope,
Frameworks
and
and
then
also
there's
also
a
whole
bunch
of
other
things
that
have
to
be
sort
of
operationalized,
such
as
I
mean
initially
it'll.
Actually
not
like
a
lot
of
this
stuff
will
not
initially
be.
A
You
know
possible
because
we
want
to
have
the
governor
meta
dance,
but
basically
one
of
the
big,
like
the
really
big
things
that
are
going
to
happen
at
these
quarterly
kind
of
meetings
or
quarterly
processes
is
actually
not
so
much
necessarily
changing
the
scope
framework,
but
it
could
also
easily
be
about
enforcing
it.
So,
basically
applying
all
these
penalties.
I
was
talking
about
earlier
right,
so
basically
figure
out.
Okay,
let's
have
a
look
at
growth.
So
what
are
the
you
know?
What
are
the
kpis?
What
are
the
stuff?
A
That's
been
done,
what
are
the
budgets
that
have
used
and
then
are
there
some
situations
where
we've
had
a
governor
that
sort
of
abused
or
privilege
or
failed
to
deliver
obvious?
You
know
so
follow
the
framework
and
then,
in
some
really
obvious
cases
you
might
have
penalties
that
happen
immediately
when
that
happens,
but
also
in
many
cases,
rather
than
have
those
penalties
trigger
immediately
and
you
instead,
like
you,
you
have
to
actually
like
settle,
like
MPR
holders,
have
to
kind
of
like
settle
on
what
to
do
and
figure
out.
A
And
although
actually
I
could
still
also
then
be
seen
as
actually
changing,
this
I
mean
in
practice
that
might
still
actually
sort
of
operation
may
be
done
through
changing
the
skill
framework
itself,
because
then
what
you're
doing
is,
of
course,
you've
set
it.
You
know
you're
setting
a
precedent
right
so
in
a
way
you're
like
you're,
changing
the
scope
framework
to
say
like
well
in
this
situation.
A
If
somebody
does
a
b
and
c,
then
the
the
fair
penalty
to
apply
to
them
is
X
right
and
then,
if
you
put
it
completely,
you
know
if
you
have
this
like.
If
you
already
have
that
exact
example
put
into
the
scope
framework,
then
of
course
you
effectively
sort
of
ruling
that
this
is
how
we
should
handle
that
particular
a
case
that
happened
already.
A
So
that's
the
kind
of
stuff
that
I
mean.
That's
basically
like
I
mean
that's
really,
that's
the
fundamentals
of
you
know,
reaching
the
in-game
state
and
getting
this
sort
of
the
governance
equilibrium
of
the
in-game
plan
right
where,
ultimately,
then,
the
Dow
will
be
able
to
function
without
my
involvement
and
other
other
whales
involvement
right.
So,
instead
of
relying
on
like
so
individual
whales,
what
we
need
is
we
need
to
basically
train
sort
of
the
community
as
a
whole
to
follow
these.
A
You
know
like,
like
a
limited
processes,
basically
right,
so
someone
sort
of
simple
and
limited
processes
that
are
all
about
deciding
which
of
the
deciding
between
you
know
three
different
updates
to
the
scope
framework
and
then
especially
a
lot
of
like
deciding
on
penalties
deciding
when
is
something.
When
do
we
penalize
some
type
of
behavior
right.
A
And
then,
in
terms
of
like
the
order
of
creating
the
the
scope,
Maps,
the
scope
Frameworks
through
myths
right
so
the
scope
framework
bips
honestly
it
may
it's
not
necessarily
that
we
need.
We
want
to
do
it
in
exactly
like
the
order
of
like
protocol
engineering
first
and
then
it's
interest
collateral
and
so
on
so
we'll
see
I
mean
that's
just
that's
something.
You
know
I'm,
not
sure
exactly
how
we
would
determine
the
order,
but
I
guess
I
think
there
might
be
some
kind
of
logical.
A
You
know
that,
like
by
sort
of
digging
into
it,
we
may
start
to
realize
okay,
we
should
actually,
maybe
we
should
focus
on.
You
know
physical
resilience
as
number
one,
because
that's
about
legal
risk
and
so
on
and
the
number
one
thing
we
want
to
do
is
like
get
a
grip
around
the
the
legal
and
Regulatory
strategy.
A
So
as
soon
as
you
have
something,
then
you
have
something
you
can
have
an
opinion
about,
and
then
you
can
start
changing
it,
but
anyway,
so
actually
before
I
mean
so
probably
we
could
get.
We
will
probably
get
started
on
the
Scopes
as
the
first
thing
and
sort
of
get
started
on
this
like
very
quick
and
dirty
and
sort
of
parallelized
fashion.
A
A
I
mean
I
only
recently,
like
fully
sort
of
realized
that
this
is
the
right
way
to
sort
of
think
of
the
Constitution
right,
but
so
just
like
each
of
the
Scopes
usually
like
in
the
end,
what
we
will
end
up
finding
out
is
that
the
Scopes
are
all
about
basically
like
it's
all
like
it's
a
set
of
rules
and
then
it's
definitions
about
who
do
you
penalize
and
how
do
you
penalize
when
the
rules
aren't
followed?
Like
it's
very
much
about
you
know,
that's
I
mean
that's.
A
A
The
only
way
you
can
you
can
affect
anything
is
through
incentives
right,
so
they're
all
about
like
what
happens.
If
you
know,
if,
like
the
council,
doesn't
even
propose
a
new
scope
framework,
update
or
scope
framework
report
for
the
next
quarter,
which
is
like
the
top
priority
right
well,
then,
in
all
the
government
of
the
house
get
a
penalty
of
a
hundred
thousand
die
each
or
whatever
right,
and
then,
by
putting
that
rule
in
place.
A
Well,
now,
you're
going
to
be
sure
that
there's
going
to
be
like
that,
this
sort
of
the
letter
of
the
rule
is
going
to
be
followed
right.
So
that's
kind
of
one
way
to
think
about
it.
It's
all
a
set
of
like
if
this
stuff
doesn't
happen.
What's
the
penalty
rather
than
like
here's,
the
rules,
here's
some
expectations,
and
then
we
just
leave
it
at
that,
because
we
trust
you
to
follow
them.
And
then,
if
you,
you
know,
if
that
trust
is
broken
well,
then
we
actually
don't
know
what
to
do.
A
I
mean
there
was
a
wing
it
as
we
go
along
right,
so
you
could.
You
could
also
think
of
it
as
like
trustless
operations
right.
The
way
you
do
trustless
operations.
Is
you
entirely
built
it
around
like
sort
of
fully
transparent
and
fully
understood
incentives
and
and
payment
flows
of
money
flows
essentially
anyway?
A
These,
like
pockets
of
of
you,
know
like
effective,
opaque
news
right
where
MK
will
assume
we
have
no
clue
what's
going
on
and
then
they
can
use
those
to
consolidate
power,
basically
right
to
consolidate
resources
and
then
eventually
use
that
to
consult
a
power
and
then
eventually
we
get
this
like
slippery
slope
towards
corruption,
centralization,
that's
kind
of
always
going
to
happen.
If
you
don't
build
these
very
strong
mechanisms
to
prevent
it
right,
and
so
that's
what
the
that's.
A
A
If
those
rules
aren't
followed
right
and
then
a
kind
of
like
like
sort
of
the
various
actors,
basically
involved
in,
like
keeping
that
equilibrium
right,
because
then
you
you
have
to
you,
you
can
actually
set
it
up
so
that
you
don't
have
to
trust
some
kind
of
end
Authority,
but
rather
they
can
have
like
multiple
authorities
keeping
each
other.
A
multiple
incentivized
groups,
keeping
each
other
in
in
Balance,
essentially
without
any
one
of
them
being
being
sort
of
the
authority
and
and
the.
A
But
basically
the
most
important
place
to
focus
is
then
on
the
decentralized,
broader
committees
and
the
delegates.
So
the
Constitution
is
sort
of
the
thing
that
creates
these
in
the
context
of
the
end
game
and
defines
them
right
so
and
then
it
and
then
the
main
thing
it
concerns
itself
with
is
how
they're
compensated
and
how
you
know
like
basically
what
requirements
they
need
to
follow
to
be
compensated
and
what
you
know
like
rules
that,
if
broken,
can
cause
them
to
lose
compensation,
and
then
you
build
into
that.
A
A
So
we
have
to
be
like
really
sure
about.
These
are
the
exact
Scopes
we
want
before.
We
completely
sort
of
like,
say
anybody
that,
like
any
delegate
that
votes
to
add
a
new
scope
or
something
right
will,
will
you
know,
lose
their
compensation
effective
immediately
right,
then,
if
you
define
something
like
that,
then
you're,
basically,
you
know
then
you're
just
gonna
have
a
very
hard
time
to
to
to
change
the
scope
of
around
the
menu.
A
Unfortunately,
what
will
happen
is
everybody
will,
you
know,
propose
all
sorts
of
changes
to
like
the
court
rules
and
and
the
incentive
that's
driving
them
to
make
those
proposals
would
just
be
getting
some
kind
of
personal
benefit
out
of
it
right.
So
in
the
long
run,
it's
just
the
natural
kind
of
like
Direction
that
the
Dow
will
will
take
if
it's
actually
decentralized
is
to
just
like
reject
any
kind
of
change
right
like
so,
and
so
basically
anytime,
there's
any
kind
of
doubt
about
any
particular
action.
A
A
Yeah
so
I
mean
so
David,
so
David
asks
what
is
the
changes
for
the
protocol's
benefit
and
not
personal
benefit?
So
the
problem
is:
how
do
you
determine
that
right,
like
the
oh,
like
the
pro
I
mean?
Basically
the
point:
is
you
can't
the
the
one
of
the
main
challenges?
The
end
game
plan
is
trying
to
address?
A
Very
few
people
care
at
all
right
so
like
once,
you
put
in
any
kind
of
real
requirement
for
for
change.
That
just
means
it
will
just
not
happen
like
those
like
quorums
and
and
super
majorities,
and
that
kind
of
stuff
will
just
in
practice,
they'll
just
never
ever
be
met,
and
the
only
exception
is
when
you
have
something.
It's
just
so
absolutely
like
blindingly
obvious
that
you
know
it's
just
like
it's
just
so
it's
like
a
force
of
gravity
or
something
right.
A
It's
just
so
clear
that
this
was
a
complete
oversight
and
you
just
simply
cannot
you
know,
make
any
like
there's
just
no
coherent
arguments
against
it.
Then
you
have
something
that
may
have
a
chance
of
kind
of
like
breaking
through
the
extreme
kind
of
you
know
cultural
aversion
to
to
to
making
fundamental
changes
right,
because,
basically,
what
we
were
doing
is
we
were
teaching
the
entire
entire
part
of
the
community
and
ecosystem
that
that
cares
at
all
about
governance.
A
They
will
be
constantly
24,
7
or
so
at
all
times
be
operating
in
an
environment.
That's
just
constantly
sort
of
reinforces
to
them
that
you
know
any
attempt
at
breaking
the
rules
or
changing
the
rules
is
corruption
right
right.
You
should,
by
default,
assume
that
that's
for
personal
benefit
right,
because
that's
the
that's
the
incentive.
A
That's
gonna
call
someone
to
to
to
attempt
to
do
that
right
unless
you
really
can
prove
without
the
shadow
of
a
doubt
that
there's
just
like
no
counter
arguments
against
them
right
and
then,
and
on
top
of
that,
just
always
feel
like
no.
You
know
the
whole
like
minority
stakeholder
protection
and
so
on
right
and
like
even
if
there's
something
that's
just
like
clearly
so
obviously
great
for
everyone,
but
there's
like
a
few
people
that
get
kind
of
screwed
over
by
it.
Then
you
kind
of
you
actually
want
to
have
that
situation.
A
Also,
if
you
like,
then
you
just
don't
do
it
right?
You
want
to
have
that
type
of
of
reliability
and
security
built
into
a
system
like
maker
in
the
long
run,
because
that's
the
kind
of
stuff
that
makes
it
viable
to
really
be
a
kind
of
a
new.
You
know
an
unbiased
world
currency
right
like
a
neutral
infrastructure
layer
that
everybody
can
trust,
and
you
know
you
don't
want
like.
A
If,
if
we
sort
of
signal
and
yeah
yeah
like
you
can
count
on
us,
but
sometimes
you
know,
the
welfare
of
the
few
maybe
need
to
be
sacrificed
for
the
the
welfare
of
the
of
the
many
right.
Then
that's
just
I
mean
that
might
actually
simply
have
been
open
to
that
possibility
made
by
itself
reduce
the
welfare
of
the
many
as
well,
because
it
just
results
in
much
less
growth
and
network
effect
of
the
system.
Right,
because
there's
going
to
be
unreliability
right.
A
A
The
in-game
approval
mips,
or
at
least
there
might
be
a
lot
more
participation
in
the
creation
of
like
the
Constitution
and
the
the
sort
of
the
the
delineation
of
all
these
like
limits
and
restrictions
and
locking
down
stuff
and
and
what
can
change
and
what
cannot
change
and
so
on,
and
it
could
even
I
mean
the
failure
to
put
the
constitution
in
place
in
a
way
that's
sort
of
compatible
with
endgame,
meaning
that
eliminates
open-ended
complexity
anywhere
in
the
system.
Right.
A
Just
be
like,
so
that
would
be
like
basically
a
break
then
game
right,
so
that
would
like
that.
Well
then,
whoever
manages
to
do
that.
Basically,
then
those
I
mean
that
group
of
Voters
with
an
effectively
being
controlled
in
the
protocol.
At
that
point,
because
I
mean
that's
kind
of
that's
how
the
end
game
works
as
well
right,
but
it
also
basically
assumes
that,
if
somebody's
able
to
change
the
end
game,
then
that
just
means
that
take
control
of
the
protocol,
and
then
you
can't
really,
you
know
like
you-
cannot
be
like.
A
So
then,
I
think
also
at
the
same
time.
That
means
that
it's
gonna
be
a
much
like
it's
going
to
be
clear
from
some
incentives
perspective
that
the
cost
of
you
know,
like
the
the
cost
of
trying
to
to
like
break
the
core
principles
of
the
in-game
plan.
Now
that
we're
actually
in
the
pre-game
will
will
increase
significantly
right
because
you
can't
really
sort
of
you
know
retain
like
well,
you
can
possibly
build
some
new
system
or
some
new
approach
that
retains
part
of
it
part
of
it.
A
But
there's
no
like
it's
not
obvious
how
that's
possible
Right
and
so,
as
a
result,
you'll
basically
have
like
I
mean,
but
yeah,
so
that's
gonna
be
like,
but
that's
that's
really
gonna,
like
I
think
so
the
Constitution
vote
that's
going
to
be
when
all
of
these
things,
like
so
the
reality
of
what
exactly?
Is
it
the
end?
A
A
B
A
I
don't
know
people
like
pseudo-legal
stuff,
but
then
with,
but
there
were
that
in
place.
Then
we
get
you
know
like,
then.
What
that's
going
to
create
is
like
this
very
clearly
defined
scopes.
For
you
know,
you
know:
protocol
engineering
and
decentralized
collateral
and
governance
security,
I
think
like
the
three
Scopes
that
are
really
relevant
for
kind
of
I
mean
for
smart
hundred
developers
and
that
that
creates
the
various
opportunities
that
will
exist.
A
A
Well,
it's
my
contracts
and
then
you
know
this
little
thing:
the
minute
out
fronted
that
are
bloggers
for
the
in-game
plan
launch.
So
they
are
the
stuff
that
has
to
be
done
before
2024
right,
because
the
menu
plane
launch
must
happen
before
then,
due
to
you
know,
upcoming
regulation,
right
and
and
yeah.
A
It's
basically
these
things,
and
so
there's
already
been
a
bunch
of
research
done
on
these
things
right,
and
it
turns
out
that
so
so
this
is
like
a
bunch
of
of
kind
of,
like
some
of
them
are
very
random,
because
so
weird
because
they're
they're
backend
pieces,
like
symbol,
back-end
pieces
that
that
users
won't
really
interact
with
right.
Then
you
have
something
like
a
metadata
front
end.
So
that's
this.
Like.
A
A
So
that's
like
that.
You
know
that's
basically
the
the
program
or
like
the
the
app
that
every
single
metadown
needs
to
have
their
own
version
of,
and
so
those
like
so
so.
The
way
to
build
that
is,
we
will
build
the
kind
of
the
you
know
we'll
build
this
like
wide
label
kind
of
shared
version
of
it
called
the
home
front,
which
is
like
the
the
reference
implementation
in
a
sense
and
then
every
meta
that
will
like
build
their
own
actual
like
sort
of
product
front-end.
A
On
top
of
it,
so
they'll
build
their
own.
Like
premium
features
they'll,
you
know,
maybe
they
wanna
expose,
you
know
Ave
or
other
protocols
and
basically
create,
like
you
know,
access
to
external
features,
but
then
also
they'll
all
contain
like
the
very
basic
features
in
particular.
The
farming
right
so
die
farming,
either
dive
wall,
farming
and
MPR
farming
and
then
as
part
of
their
farming.
A
A
Public
and
this
one
is
not,
you
know,
as
you
can
see,
there's
like
tons
of
garbage,
so
this
is
not
exactly
good
to
share,
but
I've,
already
I've
I've
published
a
bunch
of
this
stuff.
Like
the
you
know,
the
metanomics
diagrams
and
the
the
the
scope,
diagram
and
I'll
keep
publishing
more
stuff
as
I'm
able
to
prepare
it.
A
A
But
anyway
right
so
we
got
the
meta
up
front
and
then
other
than
the
metadata
front
end.
We
got
oh
well,
and
that's
part
of
that.
You
also
got
this
off
simple
off
Gene
building,
which
is
for
the
internal
use
of
metadatas
right.
So
it's
extremely
important
that
metadarius
immediately,
can
you
know,
vote
on
stuff
with
their
tokens
through
without
having
to
pay
guests,
so
that
you
can
immediately
like
form
and
sort
of
cluster
these
communities
that
can
create
a
distinct
identities
right
and
then
then
begin
running
their
own
simple
governance,
governance
processes.
A
Yeah
and
then
you've
got
the
this
thing.
This
is
actually
done
already
this
and
this
one
should
be.
You
know,
so
that's
the
in-game
plan
Improvement
and
then
this
instead
like
please,
you
know
then,
upon
you,
get
the
Constitution
which,
in
this
diagram,
is,
is
sort
of
a
part
of
the
launch
website,
but
in
practice,
probably
will
come
a
lot
more
like
in
between
right.
So
we
could
actually
have
that,
like.
A
But
other
than
than
these
things,
then
you
got
everything
else:
either
die
one
Elixir,
one
anti-reflexivity
mechanic
and
metadata
easy
20
tokens,
no
matter
our
phones,
The
Meta,
Alexia
one
and
then
the
metanomics
one.
All
of
these
features,
for
the
most
part,
are
like
extremely
simple
small,
smart
contracts
that.
A
That
basically
yeah,
like
have
already
many
of
them,
have
already
been
scoped
out
and
turn
out.
You
know
extremely
simple
right,
something
like
elixir
one,
that's
simply
creating
a
balancer
pool.
You
know
meta
Alexia,
one
that
is
creating
like
six
unit
swap
pools
after
launching
six
years
in
2010s,
which
is
also
simple
right.
That's
just
an
easy
25
one.
You
don't
even
need
to
develop
it
and
then
either
that
I
won.
A
A
And
metanomics
one,
that's
basically
it's
a
symbol
system,
but
of
course
it's
like
very
critical.
It's
it's
a
system
that
Taps
into
the
mkr
token
and
emits
70
000
MPR
per
year,
and
it's
completely
immutable
right.
So
you
you
absolutely
do
not.
You
know.
This
is
one
of
those
key
things
that
just
must
be
totally
locked.
I
mean
that's,
maybe
something
that
you
put
straight
into
the
con.
A
Oh,
no,
actually,
there's
I
think
in
in
the
I
think
the
the
in-game
plan
approval
mipset
actually
contains,
like
it
references
a
standalone
almost
like
Constitution,
like
Standalone
MIP.
That's
specifically
regulates
melanomics
and
and
locks
it
down
basically
and
prevents
that
from
being
anything
that
can
be
changed.
A
And
then
the
anti-reflexivity
mechanic,
that's
like
a
very
simple
like,
like
you
think
in
the
end,
it
turns
out
the
simplest
way
to
do
this
is
to
make
a
standalone
smart
contract
like
a
build,
a
new
Magic
from
the
bottom
up,
but
it's
like
an
extremely
simple
amm,
smart
contract
that
sells
tokens
at
a
linear
based
on
linear
function.
Right.
So
it's
like
it's.
A
And
then
so
what
you
basically
do
is
yeah
you
just
like.
If
the
price
goes
up,
you
just
start
massively
increasing
the
amount
like
you
start,
flooding
the
supply
in
a
sense
and
then
all
that
accumulated
capital
from
the
anti-perfectivity
mechanic
then
becomes
eternal
capital
of
of
the
metadata,
which
is
you
know
this
is
really
useful.
That's
this
is
a
thing.
That's
going
to
prevent
the
end
game
plan
and
launch
to
just
become
some
like
crazy
bubble
that
then
explodes
and
ruins
everything.
A
And
then
finally,
we've
got
the
farms
and
this
is
actually
the
most
complicated
problem.
So
the
the
dye
Farms
and
they're,
like
I,
mean
the
dive.
Farms
are
really
easy.
You
just
have
like
six
completely
standard
like
I,
don't
know
synthetics
Farms
or
whatever
the
sort
of
the
clip
cutter
or
maybe
like
a
sushi,
swap
Master
Chef
style,
a
single
contract,
Farms,
freeze,
20
terms,
so
this
is
like
the
the
die
Farms
like
the
simplest
thing
in
the
world.
Right,
it's
just
completely
standing.
A
A
It
immediately
like
forces
you
to
like,
as
you
deposit,
your
MPR
into
it.
You
have
to
also
delegate
your
account
and
if
you
don't
kind
of
do
and
do
you
know
a
valid
delegation
as
a
part
of
your
attempt
to
do
positive
care
into
the
them
here
from
then
you
can't
do
it
right
and
that's
this
thing
of
like
the
voter
incentives
right
they're
like
you,
you
can't
Farm
MPR.
A
You
know
as
a
basically
a
calculated
trade-off
in
the
in-game
plan,
where
we
basically
increase,
like
sort
of
you
know,
self-referential
risk
in
a
sense
right,
like
basically
exposure
of
MPR
in
return
for
more
decentralization
right,
because
then
you
can
use
mpr's
collateral
and
then
you
can
use
empirical
levelized
diet
to
basically
push
out
real
asset,
collateralized
diet
and
actually
the
consequence
of
that
is.
Then
we
also
need
to
gain
the
ability
to
to
devalue
diet.
A
Do
some
instant
devaluation
of
time,
which
I
actually
don't
know
how
I'm
not
completely
clear
on
how
you
would
do
so
that,
but
also
I,
don't
think
that
necessarily
the
like
a
module
or
something
like
that
doesn't
have
to
be
ready
immediately.
But
that's
just
like
a
that's
at
the
sort
of
the
Constitutional
level
right
so
in
the
Constitution.
It
has
to
be
like
one
of
the
things
I'll
go
into.
The
Constitution
is
that
the
mkr
backstop
basically
stops
being
like.
A
So
that
system
was
actually
tested
in
practice
and
then,
of
course,
the
reality
is
that
this
is
actually
not
mandatory.
So
this
is
actually
optional,
so
MPL
holders
can
actually
choose
not
to
do
that
like
they
can.
Actually
they
can
just
like
change
like,
even
if
there's
a
shortfall
they
can
simply
and
change
the
parameters
like
after
the
shortfall
occurs.
A
To
then
prevent
the
you
know,
the
actual
dilution
of
mkr
and
the
recapitalization
of
time
from
happening,
and
then
in
the
end
game
we
simply
like
we
sort
of
like
encode
that,
as
that's
actually
expected,
behavior
that
it's
optional
from
canvas,
whether
they
want
to
you
know
whether
they
want
to
recapitalize
stakeholders
with
environment
and
by
making
that
optional.
Then
now
you
make
it
possible
to
use
mkr
as
collateral
in
the
first
place,
which
I
think
I
mean
I,
basically
think
that
gets
so.
A
It's
realistic
for
making
a
fully
backstop
the
loss
of
that,
or
at
least
it's
more
realistic,
and
then
you
actually
reduce
the
likelihood
of
a
haircut
to
die
holders,
whereas
if
you
don't
have
this
kind
of
thing
in
place
right,
if
you
simply
assume
that
there's
going
to
be
like
there
will
be
full
recapitalization
of
Imperial
and
all
no
matter
what?
Then,
if
you
have
a
rebel
asset
sort
of
seizure
event,
then
there's
a
you
know:
there's
like
a
real
possibility
that
that
oh
well,
there's
always
a
real
possibility.
A
A
But
then
eventually
that
will
be
we'll
have
plenty
of
discussion
around
that
in
the
Constitution.
And
then
the
consequence
of
that
is
that
the
mkr
metadata
Farm
needs
to
be
built
to
support
die
generation
from
MPR
from
the
start,
and
that
means
that
it
probably
has
to
be
like
a
a
collateral
adapter
actually
right.
A
So
the
entire,
like
the
entire
MPR
firm,
is
built
around
that
you
take
your
immunity
deposit
into
a
collateral
adapter
and
then
that
collateral
adapter
is
also
able
to
to
delegate
and
is
also
able
to
farm
tokens,
and
then
maker
is
also
able
to
take
them
here
and
liquidate
it.
And
by
doing
that
knows
how
to
withdraw
it
out.
Like
knows
how
to
sort
of
stop
the
farm
and
knows
how
to
withdraw
it
out
of
litigation
and
all
that
good
stuff.
A
Yeah,
so
that's
the
and
it's
and
and
then
in
practice
how
we
do
all
this
I
mean
we
actually
need
to
make
mips
for
each
of
these.
It's
like
each
every
single
one
of
these.
They
need
an
in-game
product
map,
maybe
to
sort
of
simplify
it.
We
will
yeah
I.
Probably
we
should
just
like
we'll
just
literally
make
an
in-game
product
for
each
of
these
and
then
for
some
of
them.
They're
operatable
right
so
like
either
that
I
want
will
then
battle
later.
A
A
That's
how
we
were
sort
of
officially
agree
on
how
exactly
did
we
build
these
things
and
how
exactly
do
they
work
and
so
on
right,
because
that's
of
course,
a
key
Cornerstone
of
the
in-game
plan
is
that
we
have
like
total.
You
know
like
we
have
total
regulation
of
all
the
technical
pieces
of
endgame
playing
through
mips
right,
so
that
we
can
sort
of
agree
on
their
design
and
agree
on
their
requirements
and
events
and
there's
actual
like
governance,
participation
and
knowledge
of
of
what
the
protocol
does.
A
A
So
Frank
asks
sounds
like
the
current
Governor's
votings.
My
contracts
will
need
to
be
re-engineered
and-
and
the
answer
is
no,
so
that's
not
necessary.
So
amazingly,
it's
actually
a
lot
similar
than
it.
That
sounds
this
kind
of
stuff,
so
nothing
of
the
none
of
like
the
existing
stuff
needs
to
be
changed.
These
things
are
all
like
built
on
top
of
the
existing
stuff.
Like
they
delegate
contracts,
don't
even
need
to
change
it's.
A
All
of
this
is
like
new
stuff
that
we
add
on
top
of
the
existing
stuff,
which
of
course,
really
makes
it
a
lot
easier
and
and
less
risky
I
mean
basically
the
main
the
really
risky
stuff
we're
going
to
do
is
like
obviously
the
melodynamics
like
actual
NPR
emissions.
That's
a
that's
a
big
one,
even
if
it's
simple,
that's
just
like
you
know,
you
don't
really
want
to
mess
around
with
that.
B
A
Right,
there's
like
the
in-game
products,
which
is
like
finite
list
of
end
game,
product
mips
that
will
be
built
and
then
eventually
finished,
and
then
game
product
works
sort
of
stops
once
it's
all
done
and
then
there's
the
protocol
engineering
scope
down
in
the
down
here
right,
yeah,
okay,
I
really
should
clean
this
up
for
next
time,
so
I
don't
have
to
scroll
back
and
forth
like
that.
All
the
time.
A
Well
then
like
in
this
thing,
which
is
where
this
is
then
a
single
MIP
that
defines
all
the
sort
of
long-term
work
related
to
this
and
there's
actually
like,
there's
a
whole
bunch
more
there's.
Something
like
you
know,
Alex
here
and
modification
right.
If
you
want
to
add
more
multi-chain
liquidity
pools
to
the
elixir.
A
And
then
it's
useful
I
mean
this.
We
also
need
to
think
about
that
in
like,
in
the
short
run,
obviously
because
this
is
just
such
a
like
there's
such
a
crazy
thing
to
sort
of
think
about,
because
the
protocol
engineering
scope
literally
like
that
ultimately
becomes
like
the
complete
kind
of
restriction
on
what
can
the
mega
protocol
ever
sort
of
be
or
do
right
and
then
to
your
point
about
like
the
Constitution?
A
Is
that,
like
the
Constitution,
will
then
Define
that,
like
you
can't
like
mess
up,
you
can't
start
adding
random
stuff
in
here
right,
like
you,
can
only
add
you
can
only
you
know,
you
can
only
make
changes
to
the
scope
framework
that
kind
of
like
fit
in
with
with
the
you
know,
the
existing
details
of
it
right.
So
you
couldn't
just
add
like
a
new,
like
you
know
like
randomly
after
10
years,
you
suddenly
add.
Oh,
let's
build
a
you
know
whatever
I
can't
think
of
something.
That's
completely.
A
You
know
a
freaking
like
a
dice
game.
That's
the
most
ridiculous
thing!
I
come
in
right,
so
you
wouldn't
like
Suddenly
at
the
make
a
call.
They
will
be
like.
Oh
it's
time
to
yeah
build
like
a
dice
game
right.
It's
like
a
new
thing.
Now
we're
gonna
totally
build
that
way
like
that.
Would
that
would
be
I
mean
we
have
to
think
how
to
figure
out
how
the
hell
do
we?
How
do
we
create
language?
A
That's
going
to
help
us
achieve
what
we
want
like
the
goal
we
want
to
achieve
with
this,
which
is
to
really
create
that
sense
of
reliability
and
certainty
and
reduce
the
possibility
of
like
politics
and
complexity,
spiraling
and
all
that
stuff
and
then
do
that
in
a
way
where
we
don't
accidentally
create
some
like
huge
problem
for
ourselves,
where
we
run
into
to
trouble,
because
we
we,
you
know,
we
fail
to
see
some
flexibility.
We
were
going
to
need
in
the
future.
B
B
So
you
know:
we've
been
talking
about
the
dependence
on
governance
for
rate
setting,
maybe
things
like
oracles
white
lists
stuff
like
that,
that
ceiling
automation
modules,
where
do
we
stand
on
that,
is
that
critical
work
that
we
should
be
focusing
on
with
regards
to
you
know
regulatory
discussion,
but
also
just
pure,
you
know
optimizing
the
way.
Governance
Works
should
that
factor
into
this
as
well
or
should
we
really
be
prioritizing
these
Alex
here
and
metanomic
discussions
prior
to
that.
A
Yeah,
okay,
that's
a
good
question
like
I
mean
so
I
mean
so
first
of
all,
like
the
way
to
think
about
like
approach
that
is
I
think
through
the
Scopes.
Basically
right
like
that
would
be
as
we
like.
That
would
be
how
we
agree
on
how
and
and
what
should
we
prioritize
and
so
on
right
yeah.
So
something
like
how,
like
you
know,
rates
automating
rate
setting
that
would
be
like
that
would
actually
be.
A
Once
we
have
to
do
that
one
day,
if
we
ever
get
them
right,
but
then
up
here
this
is
where
we
would
deal
with
risk
premium
and
changing
risk
premiums,
and
so
on
and
I
think
I
mean
I.
Guess
it's
actually
missing.
Right
now,
but
you
could
also
have
something
like
you
know,
red
you
know
so
right
now,
there's
this
there's
this
line
item
called
you
know,
risk
parameter,
adjustment
right
and
that
could
also
be
risk,
parameter
or
lift.
A
You
know
it's
just
I
am
adjustment
right
change,
something
like
so
that
you
know
so
it
could
be
something
like
we
use.
We
put
create
a
bunch
of
items
and
stuff
for
the
record
and
IAM
is
yeah.
It's
called.
It
stands
for
instant
access
module
and
it's
I
mean
it's.
It's
an
automation
module.
Maybe
you
know
the
end
game
plan
is
a
good
time
to
rename
that
to
make
it
more
coherent
to
figure
out
what
the
hell,
what
the
hell
it
is,
but
it's
like
a
so
it's
some.
A
It's
like
a
system
that
can
automate
something
that
we
used
to
do
manually
and
the
basic
sample
is
dead.
Ceilings
right
that
we
used
to
manually
make
tons
of
debt
ceiling
changes
all
the
time,
and
nowadays
we
instead
use
these
IM
module
like
Iams
to
basically
automatically
increase
the
debt
ceiling
when
the
current
and
debt
ceiling
is
about
to
get
hit,
and
you
could
also
do
something
like
that
for
risk
premium.
A
For
instance,
you
could
say
if
we
start
to
get
like
billions
and
billions
and
billions
and
billions
of
you
know
wbtc
or
something,
then
we
kind
of
don't
want
that
much
of
it.
So
if
that's
going
to
start
happening-
or
maybe
just
like,
if
you
stop
doing
that,
it's
got
to
be,
you
know
risky
for
us
to
liquidate.
So
what
we're
going
to
do
is
we're
going
to
start
cranking
up
the
stability
for
you
automatically,
because
then
we'll
basically
be
compensated
for
that
additional
risk
and
we'll
we'll
it
will
disincentimize.
A
You
know
further
growth
of
it,
but
I
also
think
more
generally,
we
should
just
try
to
like
I
think
that
that
rates
are
changing
a
lot
right
now
in
in
in
maker,
I.
Think
and
I
think
we
we
should
try
to
like
I
mean
like
the
in-game
plan
is
like
the
in-game
sort
of
well
just
generally.
I.
Think
now
is
a
good
opportunity
to
start
doing
that
less
I
mean
I.
Think
there's
there's
still
like
legitimate
reasons
to
do
a
lot
of
it
for
Gathering
data.
A
And
then
meanwhile,
we
sit
here
and
make
her
with
decentralized
collaterals
and
basically
the
only
collateral
will
have
an
end
game.
That'll
actually
be
fall
under
detent.
Electric
metal
we'd
be
something
along
the
lines
of
like
like
regular
East,
Lido
steak
to
eat
either
die
mkr
and
then
the
metal
articles,
actually
initially
it
will
not
even
be
the
meta.com's,
probably
like
that'll,
probably
only
come
later,
with
some
more
advanced
melanomics.
So
we're
really
talking
about
each
state
eth
either
die.
A
Npr,
sorry
and
then
wbtc
like
in
the
long
run.
Wbtc
should
be
treated
like
a
like
a
real
asset,
but
I
think
we
should
have
some
kind
of
exception
that
basically
delays
that
and
at
first
keeps
that
and
make
a
call
just
because
it's
like
it's
it's
a
it's
a
big
part
of
the
the
business
right.
Now
still
so
it
means
it
will
have
very
few
level
types
and
all
the
other
collateral
types
they'll,
basically
get
either
they'll
get
off,
boarded
or
if
they're
lucky
or
you
know
like.
A
If,
if
they're,
if
they
have
some
potential,
they
will
get
adopted
by
a
creator
or
if
they're
like
absolutely
massive
and
just
have
massive
income
generating
potential,
then
they
can
actually
stay
under,
make
a
call
and
then
the
way
we
specifically
regulate
that
and
figure
out
which
ones
to
keep
is
Through
The
Descendants
collateral,
scope
framework
where
we
will
Define
them
like
characteristics
which
could
be
something
like,
and
you
know,
I
think
as
a
starting
point.
It
should
be
I
mean
a
rather.
This
is
what
I've
suggested
in
the
past
right.
The
requirement
should
be.
A
A
It's
just
not
doesn't
get
to
touch
maker.
Call
it's
just
too
much
complication
too
much
detail,
and
it's
not
it's
not
a
good.
You
know
thing
to
waste
MPL
hold
of
bandwidth
on
right.
It's
so
much
better.
Just
let
the
metadats
handle
it.
Let
them
figure
it
out
and
then,
if
we
observe
something
that
the
metados
are
doing
completely
exploding
and
and
just
getting
massively
popular
then
basically
make
a
call,
can
sort
of
can
basically
adopt
a
sort
of
like
I.
Don't
know
what
to
call
it
like.
A
Take
it
over
in
a
sense
and
then,
of
course,
we
want
to
make
sure
that,
in
the
framework
there's
some
kind
of
reward
for
metadals
for
like
finding
the
really
good
collateral.
That's
good
enough
to
go
in
to
make
a
call
and
proving
it
out
and
then
in
doing
that.
Yeah
like
get
some
kind
of
upside
for
for
that.
A
A
A
A
Like
we
would
not
have
like
one
call
like
this
anymore,
we'll
have
multiple,
because
we'll
have
multiple
dvcs,
that
we
try
to
bootstrap
in
parallel
and
then
we
will
try
to
to
focus
them.
You
know
we'll
we'll
run
them
as
like
DVC
subcommittees,
and
so
each
of
them
every
week
will
be
a
particular
food.
You
know
so
then
you
know
the
first
week
of,
and
maybe
it's
not
realistic
to
do
the
first
quarter.
A
So
maybe
the
first
quarter
of
20
and
2023
is
is
different,
but
then
let's
say
starting
from
the
second
quarter
of
2023
right
then
the
first
week
is
the
protocol
engineering
week
and
then
second
week
is
the
decentralized
collateral
week.
The
third
week
is
real
as
equilateral
and
of
course
it
could
be
a
different
order.
Like
we
talked
about
earlier.
It
could
be,
you
know,
maybe
we
want
to
start
with
physical
resilience
as
number
one
or
stability
and
liquidity
is
number
one
or
something.
A
You
know
completely
as
a
volunteer
right
to
just
like
work
through
with
all
the
different
stakeholders
and
all
this
different
stuff
right
like
it's
going
to
be
all
these
like
specific
stuff.
But
the
point
is
that
the
sort
of
the
like
the
real
kind
of
like
Cornerstone
of
everything,
will
be
the
DVC
subcommittees
and
those
those
will
also,
for
instance,
replace
the
governance
and
risk
meeting
right.
A
So
that's
another
thing
the
Constitution
will
do
is
like
it'll,
it'll
it'll
end
the
governance
risk
meeting,
and
it
will
replace
it
with
the
definition
of
dvcs
and
then
DVC
subcommittee
meetings
and
other
stuff,
like
that,
that's
really
going
to
sort
of
change.
The
kind
of
where
does
the?
Where
is
the
standard
place
you
go
to
get
like
all
the
sort
of
the
facts
and
the
the
sort
of
fact
checked
details
about
exactly.
What's
going
on
in
all
the
different
parts
of
the
town.