►
From YouTube: Open Decentralized Voter Committee | June 09, 2022
Description
The Voter Committee Calls are designed to invite MKR stakeholders to help the community agree on an overall top-down structure of categorizing the activities and strategic initiatives of MakerDAOs decentralized workforce to create more specialized voter committees that cover each category.
More Information: https://forum.makerdao.com/t/open-decentralized-voter-committee-tuesday-5pm-cest-join-if-you-are-an-mkr-holder/15330
A
I
plan
to
post
it
on
the
forum
before
this
call
and
then
do
a
bit
of
sort
of
a
pr
for
the
call
almost
and
get
some
people
to
join
with
the
context
of
having
the
document
ready,
but
unfortunately
this
couldn't
get
it
ready
in
time.
So
instead
I
guess
we.
This
will
be
the
first
view
of
this.
This
updated
version.
A
So
it's
basic.
It's
a
document
and
it's
sort
of
a
you
know
it's
a
it's
content
that
has
been
circulated
in
the
past
on
discord,
but
there's
been
some
minor
upgrades
to
it
and
and
then,
of
course,
like
the
the
graphics
or
whatever
that
are
in
these
slides.
That
will
go
on
the
on
the
forum,
so
this
is
actually
a
good.
I
think
it's
actually
a
good
approach,
because
that
means
I
can
get
some
feedback
from
this
call
and
then
possibly
update
the
messaging
before
I
put
it
on
the
forum
room
hey.
A
This
is
thomas.
I've
made
you
co-host
if
you
have
slides
that
you
need
to
share
all
right
thanks.
So
first,
let's
see
if
there
any
mpl
holders
present
now.
A
A
single
thing,
yeah
I
mean
I
used
to-
I
used
to
use
the
name
npr
mafia,
but
I
I
didn't
seem
to
catch
on,
so
I
guess
people
thought
that
was
a
little
cringe.
Maybe
you
know,
I
think
the
pure
mkl
holders
definitely
sends
a
wrong
signal
to
use
that
kind
of
term.
A
Missionaries
works,
yeah,
okay,
our
missionaries,
yeah,
it's
called
independent,
empty
hours,
but
yeah
I
mean
I'm
just
clicking
through
the
the
attendee
list
and
it
does
look
like
this
is
a
pure
delegates
and
co-units
and
what
I
call
the
ecosystem,
actor
or
sort
of
counterparty
called,
which
was
makes
sense.
I
mean
we
just
talked
about
last
time
right
that
everyone's
here
has
some
reason
to
be
here
and
then
there's
me
who's,
like
the
crazy
guy
doing
this
work
for
free.
A
But-
and
this
is
that
like
this
is
this
is
fine,
because
it's
being
recorded
and
I'm
here
sort
of
representing
mk
elders
and
basically
you
know.
Obviously
everyone
here
can
can
be
very
helpful,
in
fact,
probably
better
than
the
average
independent
care
holder
and
asking
questions
and
sort
of
getting
more
information
about
the
content.
A
But
it
would
be.
I
would
I
hope
that
maybe
someone
who
watches
this
who's
an
independent
care
holder,
you
know,
watches
the
recording
afterwards
or
reads
the
post
or
something
will
will
provide
some
feedback
as
well,
because
that's
really
what
I'm,
what
I'm
most
interested
in
is
validation
or
feedback
from
the
people
that
this
whole
plan
is
sort
of
meant
to
to
serve
right,
which
of
them
care
holders.
A
Okay,
but
this
is
definitely
very
relevant
for
all
the
people
are
present,
because
this
is
all
about.
How
do
we
can?
How
do
we
organize
delegates
and
coordinates
and
counterparties
for
success
right,
so
that
mko
holders
can
just
sit
back
and
relax,
and
you
know
occasionally
check
in
on
voter
committees,
but
then
other
than
that
just
be
able
to
to
chill
and
know
that
the
dow
works
autonomously
and
everything
is
gonna,
it's
working
as
intended,
and
it's
all
decentralized
and
everything
all
the
checks
and
balances
are,
you
know,
are
properly
designed.
A
And
that
should
be
more
than
enough
time
to
go
through
part
three
of
the
game
plan
and
then
get
into
some
some
deeper
discussion
that
can
sort
of
that
can
sort
of
add
on
to
the
discussion
yesterday.
A
There
we
go
change
the
order
a
little
bit
in
the
document,
but
it
didn't
show
up.
It
didn't
change
the
table
of
contents,
yet
okay,
but
so
my
plan
is
basically
that
some
really,
you
know
as
I've
released
this
endgame
playing
document.
A
I've
been
talking
about
it
in
a
for
a
long
time
in
advance,
and
now
we
set
up
these
recurring
thursday
meetings
that
are
really
about
digging
into
the
in-game
plan
and
sort
of
get
last
sort
of
the
final
round
of
feedback
and
changes,
or
just
sort
of
clarity
on
the
content
leading
up
to
what
will
basically
be
a
kind
of
announcement
where
my
plan
is
to
make
this
sort
of
short
form,
video
that
that
gives
a
broad
overview
and
basically
tries
to
hype
it
up.
A
As
you
know,
all
the
for
for
the
value
that
it's
creating
and
then
following
that,
do
a
signal
request,
which
will
then
determine
whether
I
will
basically
be
pushing
for
the
in-game
plans,
implementation
going
forward
right
and
so,
but
before
we
get
to
that
before,
we
have
the
point
where
we
can
do
things
like
a
signal
request.
A
We
need
to
really
sort
of
work
the
way
through
all
the
content,
because
there
is
a
huge
amount
right
and
what's
been
posted
so
far,
just
part
one
and
part
two
and
then
today
we'll
go
through
part
three,
which
is
focused
on
the
the
the
you
know:
the
decentralized
workforce
design
that
I've
worked
for
for
worked
on
for
multiple
years,
basically
and
then
next
week,
we'll
talk
about
metadata
and
sort
of
metadials
examples
and
just
try
to
really
make
crack
open
that
concept
and
hopefully
get
a
better
understanding
of
it.
A
You
know
you
need
to
sort
of
get
some
some
context
right
in
order
to
really
understand
what
exactly
is
it
when
you
compare
it
to
something
like
a
coordinate,
for
instance,
although
actually
now
we'll
be
really
digging
into
that
and
help
understand
that,
because
a
big
big
part
of
understanding,
it
will
also
just
be
understanding
this
in
game
decentralized,
workforce
structure,
and
then
there
are
some
additional
parts
that
that
focus
on
the
the
this
sort
of
long-term
feature.
A
So
it's
like
finite
scope,
feature
list
that
the
the
game
plan
aims
to
to
implement
and
then
there's
some
possibly
some
more
stuff.
That
sort
of
focuses
on
things
like
I
mean
they're
they're,
not
even
on
this
list,
but
there
could
be
like
a
part.
Six,
that's
focused
on
like
specific,
real
life
ideas,
kind
of
so,
where
part
four
is
more
about
hypothetical
examples.
Part
six
could
be
about
some
like
specific
something
like
an
up.
You
know
like
m0,
obviously
that
we've
talked
about
that's
like
deco
and
whatever
random.
A
You
know:
random
low-hanging,
fruit
value
that
we
have
made
available
in
maker
now,
but
there's
a
lot
of
other
sort
of,
I
would
say
obvious,
but
they're
sort
of
good
bets
on
what
metadows
could
work
already
available
now,
including
things
like
something.
A
That's
optimism
focused
and
tries
to
synergize
with
something
like
synthetics
and
optimism,
governance
and
and
basically
tries
to
sort
of
tie
into
that,
and
there's
also
abe
and
polygon
focus,
and
basically,
this
process
of
sort
of
like
trying
to
to
to
get
some
things
together,
where
maker
can
interact
with
something
and
and
focus
on
a
particular
l2.
For
instance,
that's
this
process.
I
call
clustering
that
I
think
is
also
going
to
be
a
big
part
of
trying
to
make
finally
make
it
make
sort
of
more
sense.
A
A
A
And
so
my
plan
is
basically
every
thursday
we'll
just
keep
going
with
another
part.
Basically,
and
then
what
will
end
up
happening
is
just
like
today,
we'll
have
a
recording
where
I
will
go
through
the
slides
and
we'll
have
lots
of
questions
and
lots
of
discussion
and
and
clarification,
and
maybe
even
you
know,
changes
based
on
feedback
and
then
that
will
sort
of
relate
out
to
these
documents
that
get
posted
on
the
forum.
A
So,
let's
get
into
part
three,
the
decentralized
the
end.
A
A
The
point
here
is
to
just
sort
of
give
an
overview
of
the
complexity
that
that's
being
proposed
here,
like
all
the
different
bunch
of
different
sort
of
separate
roles
and
one
of
the
high
level
objectives
of
this
design
are,
first
and
foremost,
something
that
we
also
discussed
last
wednesday
last
week
right
this
thing
about
optimizing,
the
entire
flow
of
governance
and
the
the
operations
and
the
politics
and
the
processes
to
just
make
it
as
easy
as
possible
foreigners
to
have
kind
of
an
impact
and
be
a
part
of
it
and
sort
of
sort
of
slide
right
in
and
and
understand.
A
What's
going
on
as
much
as
possible,
and
that's
really
the
the
number
one
objective
of
this
design
is
to
to
try
to
make
the
structure
and
the
processes
explicitly
sort
of
you
know
the
way
that
you
want
to
sort
of
look
at
it
from
the
empty
holder
perspective
based
on
my
own
research.
Basically,
in
my
own,
you
know,
design
work
on
this
stuff
or
the
you
know,
since
the
start
of
coordinates
several
years
ago
and
then
sort
of
following
from
this.
A
Is
this
a
strong
focus
on
separation
of
powers
and
sort
of
enforcement
of
best
practice
again,
a
particular
separation
of
powers,
which
means
you
know
like
it's?
Basically,
separation
powers
basically
means
that
the
decentralized
workforce
should
be
a
decentralized
workforce,
right
of
like
decentralized
multi,
multi-polar
actors
right
that
sort
of
interact
with
each
other
in
a
sort
of
a
free
market
fashion,
almost
right,
rather
than
a
single
sort
of
a
centralized
entity.
That's
basically
like
a
management
team
that
mkr
holders
are
are
are
empowering
to
run
the
protocol
for
them
right.
A
It's
very
important
that
instead
we
have
this
separation,
so
that
so
that
mqa
holders
have
sort
of
the
ability
to
to,
to
kind
of
like
see
the
the
the
interactions
that
happen
between
and
sort
of,
and
even
monitor
and
measure,
the
interactions
and
the
outputs
that
happen
in
the
workforce
at
sort
of
the
level
that
they
they
occur.
A
In
a
sense,
maybe
that
compares
near
something
like
you
know
where,
if
you
look
at
like
a
regular
classic
bank,
what
they
do
is
they
give
a
kind
of
audit
statement
right
where
you
get
this
sort
of
finished.
You
know
they
sort
of
do
all
this
stuff
and
then
they
sort
of
review
it
all
with
their
internal
process
and
then
present
you
some
kind
of
document,
saying:
oh
here's
how
it
all
works
and
here's
what's
going
on
right
and
then
this
is
a
piece
of
paper.
A
That's
basically
trying
to
describe
what
happened
and
in
d5
you
don't
need
that.
You
don't
need
like
an
audit
right,
because
in
d5
you
just
go
and
look
on
the
blockchain,
and
you
see
the
actual
interactions
happening
right.
It's
not
sort
of
a
black
box,
and
then
you
get
some
kind
of
a
statement
saying
this
is
what
happened
in
the
black
box.
You
can
actually
like
open
up
the
black
box
and
that's
what
this
ability
to
sort
of
you
know
actually
open
up
and
see,
what's
happening
and
sort
of
follow
the
interactions
that
are
happening.
A
The
ultimate
sort
of
thing
that
that
guarantees,
that
is,
separation
of
powers
and
so
that's
a
huge
focus
of
the
of
the
design
and
then
following
following
from
separation
of
powers,
you
get
public
interactions
right
because
that's
the
whole
point
is
that
you
have
these.
You
basically
have
many
different
roles
and
many
different
sort
of
actually
called
them.
A
Power
centers
so
basically
like
something
like
a
core
unit
or
a
delegate
or
any
sort
of
like
a
kind
of
like
a
what
could
almost
be
sort
of
like
a
centralized
actor
right,
but
but
then
put
into
this
this
decentralized
workforce
framework
and
with
strong
separation
of
power,
so
ultimately
they're
all
kept
in
check
by
each
other
and
then
the
way
they
interact
is
through
public
interactions
right,
so
all
the
different
actors.
A
They
always
do
public
interaction
and
you
don't
have
any
kind
of
like
hidden
undisclosed,
interaction
between
the
different
roles
right,
so
you
can
have
inside
a
cool
unit.
You
can
have
a
black
box
and
that's
what
we
know
happens
in
practice
now
right,
but
between
coordinates
and
between
coordinates
and
delegates,
and
so
on.
You
have
you
have
public
interactions
right,
which
is
quite
similar
to
how
it
works
sort
of
in
in
real
world
politics
right
where
you
have
a
lot
of
disclosure
around.
A
What's
what's
basically
happening
in,
you
know
you
have
and
you
have
like,
what's
it
called
freedom
of
information
and
these
kind
of
things
right
that
ensures
basically
that
the
way
decisions
are
made
is
possible
to
scrutinize
by
the
public
right,
and
this
both
means
that
governance
has,
you
know,
can
sort
of
verify
what's
going
on
and
that
everything
is
looking
good,
but
actually
also
in
a
doubt.
A
It
has
this
unique
twist,
where
this
also
means
that
it's
possible
for
volunteers
to
sort
of
jump
in
and
more
easily
participate
right,
because
you
can
actually
sort
of
follow
the
work
and
you
can.
Even
you
know,
everything
is
open
source.
Everything
is
transparent.
Everything
is
done
through
these
public
interactions,
so
there's
a
lot
more
sort
of
the
ability
to
just
jump
right
in
and
and
contribute
in
some
way
and
then
finally,
there's
this
focus
on
open
source
frameworks.
So
basically,
this
goes
back
to
this
concept
of
scope.
A
Maps
that
that's
that
was
mentioned
in
you
know
in
the
call
a
couple
weeks
back
now
right,
but
also
in
the
in
the
parts
one
and
two
of
the
endgame
plan
and
the
you
know,
and
the
and
the
the
wednesday
calls
wednesday
and
tuesday
calls
we're.
A
I
simply
can't
I
can't
figure
out
where
to
get
the
chat.
I
don't
see
any
in
the
chat
right
now,
all
right,
okay,
okay,
okay,
so
I'm
just
I'll
have.
I
think
I
can
have
this
like
open
like
here
and
then
people
can
just
you
know,
type
something
out
anytime,
then
I'll
just
keep
going
and
then
I'll
try
to
check
the
chat
regularly.
A
I
feel
like
google,
like
google
meet,
is
a
little
bit
more
convenient
for
screen
share
because,
like
this
is
oh,
my
god
for
some
reason,
I'm
having
a
yeah,
okay,
yeah,
okay,
yeah
I'll,
just
tap
in
and
out
and
check
the
chat,
occasionally
or,
if
I
forget
to
do
that-
someone
please
just
like
jump
in
if
there's
any
questions
and
I'll
I'll
keep
my
eyes
peeled
for
the
chat
too
awesome.
A
Okay,
so
this
is
sort
of
the
overview,
the
overall
concepts
and
now
what
we'll
do
next
is
we'll
sort
of
dive
into
to
to
the
different
roles
here.
Well
and
okay.
Maybe
one
thing
I
should
call
out
is
that
there's
you
know
there's
like
the
maker
level
and
the
metadata
level
and
on
one
hand,
there's
a
very
similar,
which
is
a
sort
of
recurring
thing
with
with
the
end
game
gameplay
in
the
metadata
paradigm,
that
the
metadata
is
all
about
reusing
as
much
as
possible
the
stuff?
A
That's
that's
already
developed
sort
of
being
figured
out
in
maker
and
then
applying
it
to
other
stuff
right,
but
then
also
that,
like
the
in-game
plan,
basically
creates
like
creates
a
situation
where
the
meta,
dials
and
maker,
and
this
and
the
way
that
workforce
works
is
that
they
really
become
it's
like
one
large
talent
pool
in
a
sense
that
both
opera
runs
maker
and
runs
all
the
metadata
right.
So
it's
all
sort
of
a
shared
yeah
talent
pool.
I
think
the
best
way
to
to
think
of
it
right
so
so.
A
This
is
really
a
an
approach
that
where
that
you
know
there
should
be
lots
of
opportunities
right
to
contribute
at
different
different
levels
and
an
easy
time
sort
of
like
jumping
from
working
a
maker
to
working
on
one
metadata
or
another
metadata,
because
it's
all
sort
of
following
similar
patterns
that
that,
once
you
sort
of
get
into
it,
it's
it's
really
optimized
for
higher
levels
of
flexibility
and
fluidity.
A
Peyton.
Excuse
me,
I'm
sorry,
room
peyton
actually
had
a
comment
in
the
chat
and
it
was
about
the
envisioning,
the
transition
process,
yeah
yeah,
that's
a
good
question,
and
it's
a
big
I
mean
how
it's
like
so
so.
My
intention
is
to
not
really
cover
that
until
this
I'm
just
talking
about
these
different
parts
and
not
like
so
there's
at
this
part.
A
Basically
one
of
the
later
parts
will
really
focus
on
like
this
thing
about
like
practically.
How
do
we
do
something
like
m0?
How
do
we
practically
do
something
like
a
metadata
that
collaborates
with
abe,
for
instance,
and
there?
I
would
also
then,
really
focus
on
like
practical
steps
on
for
sort
of
all
the
different
moving
p
pieces,
including
the
decentralized
workforce
but
also
other
stuff,
like
features
and
so
on,
but
yeah.
Basically,
a
cornerstone
of
the
plan
is
that
it
has
to
be
a
kind
of
a
smooth
transition
right.
A
So
it's
you
know
so,
basically
the
end
game.
These
I
mean,
but
I'll
just
go
over
it
quickly.
I
don't
have
a
slide
for
it,
but
basically
the
idea
is
that
this
structure,
the
end
game,
decentralized,
workforce
and
actually
a
way
you
could
just
you
could
you
could
try
to
show
it
is
that
you
could
have
a
sort
of
an
additional
level.
That
is
something
like
legacy
level
or
something
like
that
right.
A
So
the
idea
is
that
this
should
be
able
to
run
in
parallel
with
the
way
things
currently
work,
so
that
you
don't
get
a
kind
of,
so
you
don't
get
like
what's
called
a
false
transition.
Instead,
what
you
get
is
a
transition,
that's
actually
incentive
driven.
Basically,
so
it's
basically
that
you
get
some
benefits
from
switching
to
this
paradigm.
A
It'll,
take
time
to
sort
of
build
up
the
the
ability
to
really
produce
results
with
this
paradigm
right.
So
it's
like
we
wanna.
We
want
to
to
start
getting
that
momentum
going,
of
course,
as
quickly
as
possible,
but
the
right
way
to
have
it
to
make
it
work
is
to
incentive.
A
You
know
to
use
carrot
rather
than
stick
right,
and
so
so
for
that
to
be
a
possibility,
you
have
to
be
able
to
sort
of
run
it
in
parallel
right
and
then
like
people
sort
of
switch
on
their
own
on
their
own
time
kind
of,
of
course,
it
like
they're
still
going
to
be
there's
going
to
be
interactions
with
things
like
budgets,
right
and
and
overall
sort
of
like
headcount
and
and
scope
of
the
workforce,
and
so
on
that,
where
the
way
I
I
view
sort
of
the
the
end
game,
decentralized,
like
the
in-game
plan
and
the
metadata
and
and
in
in
that
context,
is
basically
that's
a
way
to
kind
of
justify
keeping
budget
higher
than
people
might
otherwise
want,
for
instance,
right
because
you
know
it's
like
I
mean,
but
by
by
by
basically
putting
creating
new
positions,
new
places
where
resources
can
be
allocated-
and
you
can
expect
some
kind
of
you
expect
some
kind
of
upside
from
it,
because
it's
a
part
of
bootstrapping
the
workforce
right,
but
fundamentally
I
mean
it
would
obviously
be
really
a
really
bad
idea
to
say
be
something
like.
A
Oh,
let's
go
to
the
engineering
team
that
is
doing
all
sorts
of
highly
you
know:
critical
security
work
and
and
delivering
complicated
products
and
then
be
like
oh
shut
everything,
down,
go
reorganize
and
whatever
right
and
then
do
this.
And
that
and
some
you
know,
micromanage
this
in
that
way.
A
And
then
you
just
get
a
super
messy
transition
right
and
instead
what
you
want
is
provide
an
incentive
to
transition
to
to
this
structure
and
then,
basically,
when,
when
the
time
comes,
people
do
it
themselves
because
they'll
want
the
money
right.
Because,
although
what
the
tokens-
because
I
mean
ultimately
that's
that's-
how
the
workforce
works
in
in
the
first
place
right
that
we
get
people
that
are
passionate
about
working
for
maker
and
then
we
provide
them
with
the
right
incentives
and
then
they
organize
the
way
we
want
them
to
organize.
A
But
to
reiterate,
and
put
it
very
briefly,
it
needs
to
be
a
very
smooth
parallel
transition
right.
That
minimally
disrupts
what's
currently
happening,
at
least
from
like
in
principle
that
that
really
needs
that
needs
to
be
how
it's
designed
from
the
from
the
call
right
this
kind
of
overhaul
of
the
of
the
workforce
structure
and
also,
and
and
finally,
I
also
think
it's
you
know-
we
need
feedback
from
the
code.
A
I
mean
right
now
we're
still
talking
about
this
at
the
theoretical
level
right
and,
and
it
would
take,
it
would
be
quite
a
long
while
before
we
would
even
be
able
to
execute
on
any
of
these
things
and
before
then
we
would
need
to
have
some
very
you
know,
practical
and
specific
feedback
from
coordinates
right
on
on
specific
issues,
to
look
out
for
and
and
potentially
both
changes
to
the
end
structure,
but
then
also
changes
to
the
sort
of
the
the
thinking
around
how
to
do
a
transition.
A
If
yeah
so
painting
this,
I
guess
what
I'm
wondering
is:
do
we
try
to
apply
these
structures
where
they
fit
in
with
the
current
process,
or
is
that
not
a
good
use
of
energy
things
like
voting
committees?
Delegates
are
pushing
for
true
metadata
to
apply
as
accordingly
yeah
so
well,
so
maybe
we'll
get
a
better
understanding
of
what
I
meant
like
you
know,
so
so
yeah.
The
problem
is,
it's
still
so,
like
there's
still
uncertainty
around.
A
This
is
it's
very
similar
to
the
way
things
work
today
and
it's
more
about
inserting
different
incentives,
basically
into
into
sort
of
the
basic
structure
of
how
things
already
work.
A
And
then,
finally,
how
to
organize
to
make
it
in
reality,
I
mean
like
that's
what
I
said
earlier
is
that
we
need
input
from
like.
Obviously
this
is
where
the
workforce
itself
has
to
come
with
all
the
practical
input.
I
can
come
with
sort
of
the
theoretical
cornerstones
for
for
how
to
set
something
up
in
a
way.
A
That's
very
you
know
I
think
very
resilient
and
sustainable
in
the
long
run,
but
then
how
to
practically
make
that
reality
and
sort
of
give
it
the
right
momentum
right,
get
the
sort
of
snowball
started
and
rolling
in
the
right
direction.
That's
going
to
take
a
lot
of
practical
knowledge
from
from
people
that
are
that
are
in
the
trenches
right.
A
That's
not
something
I
can
possibly
design
myself,
but
now
I'll
just
get
into
talking
about
the
different
roles
right,
so
first
we
got
the
maker
goblin
zoo,
you
know,
so
we
have
like
the
maker
level
and
the
maker
level
is
then
also
split
up
into
two
more
stuff.
So
first
we'll
talk
about
the
maker
governance
level,
and
this
is
kind
of
the
level
yeah.
This
is
like
the
level
of
I
don't
know.
A
So
voter
committee-
and
we
kind
of
talked
about
this
yesterday,
for
instance
right
a
voter
committee-
something
anyone
can
can
start
that
and
they're
again
making
a
vote
of
committee
doesn't
even
necessarily
mean
anything,
so
you
just
doesn't
automatically
grant
you
some
kind
of
legitimacy
to
to
have
a
voter
committee
because
again
something
anyone
can
can
do
right.
Just
like
anyone
can
be
a
delegate
and
then
there's
this
budgeted
allocator
role
I'll
get
into
that
in
a
second
right.
But
it's
that
follows
the
same
principle.
It's
like
a
delegate
or
or
a
voter
community.
A
It's
something
that
anyone
can
do,
and
these
are
the
only
sort
of
maker,
true
sort
of
maker
rules
where
someone
is
like.
You
have
an
individual.
You
have
a
company,
that's
directly
acting
at
the
maker
level.
A
So-
and
this
is,
I
think,
it's
a
very
important
distinction,
because
it
means
that
you,
you
get
no
actors
that
are
sort
of
people
or
companies
that
are
chosen
by
maker
governance.
So
you
don't
have
you
don't
have
a
sort
of
a
sort
of
dow
to
individual
relationship
right?
This
is
more
like
a
permissionless.
A
You
have
a
bunch
of
people
coming
together
in
all
of
this
right.
You
have
vernal
committee,
a
bunch
of
people
coming
together
in
in
the
ecosystem.
Right
delegate
is
a
bunch
of
employer
holders
delegating
to
to
to
a
person
and
budget
allocators
is
sort
of
the
same
works
similar
to
a
delegate,
so
it
it
it
creates
the
you
know.
It
means
that
you
no
longer
have
this
problem.
A
We
have
today
that
there
are
certain
people
that
seem
to
represent
me
right
where
you
have
this
sort
of
legitimacy
that
exists
today,
where,
if
you're
an
elected
like
facilitator,
for
instance,
that
gives
you
some
kind
of
like
status
in
the
in
the
in
the
ecosystem
right
another,
that's
sort
of
a
a
problem
by
itself,
but
it's
it!
It's
a
it's
a
you
know.
It
helps
with
overcoming
the
relationship
problem
right
that
you,
you
don't
get
confusion
around
other
someone
has
been
sort
of
elected
to
represent
maker,
basically
an
endgame
plan.
A
Let's
see
if
that
makes
sense.
Otherwise
we
can.
We
can
talk.
We
can
just
talk
about
this
later,
but
I
think
it
will
maybe
make
sense
once
we
get
into
these
other
roles
right
and
so
voter
committees
are
sort
of
the
entry
point
for
regular
encounters
right.
We've
been
talking
about
that
already,
and
this
is
a
place
where
the
volunteers,
the
sort
of
the
the
spark
goes
right.
So
basically
a
dow
can
only
function.
A
Ultimately,
if
there's
some
people
trying
to
look
out
for
the
project
as
a
whole
right,
you
can't
just
have
everyone
only
looking
out
for
their
own
economic
interests
or
they'll
just
try
to
extract
value
out
of
the
system,
but
virtual
committees,
that's
sort
of
the
place
where
we
want
that
that
energy
to
go
right,
that
as
long
as
we
have
voter
committees
that
are
acting
in
the
best
interest
of
mkr
and
and
and
the
maker
protocol
and
the
maker.
A
Now
as
a
whole,
then,
actually
all
the
other
access
can
be
completely
selfish
right,
so
delegates
can
be
completely
selfish.
Budget
allocators
can
be
completely
selfish
because
they're
being
kept.
Ultimately,
the
these
things
have
been
kept
in
check
by
the
fact
that
they're
someone
who
are
our
missionaries
or
whatever
we
call
it
right,
independent
and
and
and
driven
by
spark,
essentially
right,
driven
by
or
semi-altruism.
A
That
are
active
on
the
voter
committees
and
from
there
it's
possible
to
negate
any
kind
of
potential
for
corruption
build
up
or
just
like
nefarious
incentives
that
otherwise
will
occur.
You
know
you
know
well
in
any
workforce
and
in
any
bureaucracy
or
time,
but
especially
a
decentralized
workforce
and
decentralized
bureaucracy.
Right
and
then
you
have
the
delegates
and
they're
sort
of
in
the
middle
here
because,
as
I've
said
before,
delegates
in
end
game
plan
are
super
super
powerful,
because
then
game
plan
revolves
around
heavy
voter
incentives
and
specific.
A
You
know
delegation
incentives
even
right,
so
that
means
delegates
will
be
getting
huge
amounts
of
votes
right,
and
many
of
these
votes
will
be
these
random,
sticky
votes
that
are
not
really
that
don't
really
react
to
what
the
delegates
does
they
just
the
delegate
just
gets
those
votes,
and
then
they
basically
get
to
go
nuts
with
them.
A
A
So
we're
really
talking
about
superpowering
delegates
in
this
in
this
paradigm,
because
ultimately,
that's
going
to
be
necessary
right
because,
as
we
can
see
now
right
on
this,
like
lone
whale
and
it's
very
hard
to
to
activate
mkl's
in
general
right
and
then
we
have
the
budget
allocators
that
are
basically
these
budget
focused
actors
and
there
I
won't
describe
them
in
more
detail
until
we
get
to
the
the
in-game
product
list
where,
because
they're
sort
of
they're
based
around
a
technical
solution,
basically
that's
all
about
trying
to
make
budgeting
way
more,
smooth
and
and
sort
of
reactive
and
but
also
sort
of
marginally
determined
than
it
is
today
right.
A
So
today,
it's
kind
of
like
the
majority
guess
who
said
determine
all
budgets
today
and
budget
allocators
create
this
possibility
for
kind
of.
Like
I
mean
it's
something
I
think
a
lot
of
people
are
talk
about
this
and
can
think
about
a
system
like
this
intuitively
already
right
of
like.
A
But
with
budget
allocators
you
can
create
a
dynamic
where
then
30
of
the
overall
budget
would
go
towards
whatever
the
30
percent
wants
and
70
of
the
overall
budget
goes
to
what's
what
the
70
want
and
and
yeah,
and
then
you
have
a
specialized
role
for
that
and
a
reason.
Big
reason
why
it's
a
specialized
role
is
actually
to
check
the
power
of
delegates,
because
this
also
means
that
delegates
get.
A
Mode
of
the
system
is
that
delegates
would,
you
know,
would
spend
a
lot
of
the
time
trying
to
spend
budget
on
things
that
they
can
use
to
sort
of
appeal
to
their
constituents
right
and
and
by
having
a
sort
of
an
extra
filter
in
a
sense
for
that,
then,
at
least
you
can
you
can
you
can
create
separation
of
powers
here
where
delegates
they
get
to
focus
on
the
high
level
decisions,
but
you
have
other.
A
You
know,
there's
a
very
clear
sort
of
like
difference
in
who
gets
to
to
focus
on
the
more
sort
of
direct
operational
decisions.
Right,
and
this
again
is-
I
mean
yeah
separation
of
powers,
and
it's
it's
also
the
same
kind
of
principle
as
something
like
that.
The
split
between
the
european
council
and
the
european
commission
right
where
you
want
to
have
you,
want
to
have
different
institutions,
handling
higher
level
decisions
and
and
and
more
operational
decisions.
A
There's
a
wise
budget
allocation,
a
permissionless
position
and
not
baked
into
a
coordinate
first
question:
I
don't
know
if
there's
one
yeah,
but
so
basically,
it's
also
baked
into
a
core
unit.
So
it's
just
like
different,
I
mean,
and
so
that
like
budgeting
is
such
a
massive.
A
You
know
basically,
in
the
in
the
end
game
plan,
the
question
of
budgeting
becomes
95
of
all
governors
decisions,
maybe
not
95,
but
it's
close
to
that
right.
It's
so
much
big
ends
up
becoming
we.
We
always
have
to
pay
a
whole
bunch
of
money.
Even
when,
when
everything
is
locked
down
and
scope
is
locked
down,
we
need
to
pay
a
lot
of
money
to
keep
the
system
running,
basically
right
to
keep
the
secure,
maintain
security
to
to
keep
growing
to
new
l2s
and
new
blockchains
and
so
on.
A
And
basically
my
number
one
concern
is
that
you
could
have
the
protocol
the
you
know.
The
basic
scope
super
well
defined
and
worked
perfectly
for
the
next
hundred
years,
the
next
thousand
years
right.
A
But
it's
such
a
like
it's
such
an
obvious
failure,
mode
that,
what's
going
to
happen,
is
going
to
be
something
like
the
defense
industry
in
the
u.s
right
or
pharmaceutical
industry,
or
something
like
that
right
where
over
time,
the
overhead,
the
the
basically
the
stuff
that
gets
skimmed
by
the
the
the
admin
you
know
the
administration
of
of
these
basic
things
that
should
be
relatively
basic
are.
Is
you
know
it's
going
to
to
there's
going
to
be
a
very
strong
sort
of
force?
A
That's
going
to
try
to
you,
know,
that'll,
make
the
overheads
and
and
sort
of
the
waste
of
the
of
the
budgets
over
time
go
up
right.
So
so
that's
from
my
perspective,
it's
like
there
needs
to
be
a
lot
of
checks
and
balances
here
right.
It
needs
to
be
that
you
know
you
have
all
of
you
and
you've
got
voter
committees.
You
got
delegates,
you've
got
budget
allocators,
you've
got
administrative
coordinates
we'll
get
to
that
in
a
second.
A
All
of
these,
in
some
sense,
are
all
a
part
of
this
sort
of
chain
of
like
a
very
explicitly
defined
checks,
and
essentially
I
mean
I
form
a
very
explicit
overhead.
A
That
then
makes
it
very
clear
exactly
what
is
the
overhead
and
exactly
what
are
the
checks
and
balances
of
how
the
budget
flows
instead
of
something
like
concentrating
all
that
power
into
the
coordinates,
and
then
they
get
to
sort
of
construct
something
similar,
but
in
a
black
box
instead
and
then
you
have
it,
you
have
a
very
hard
time
measuring
whether
it's
even
necessary
and
and
whether
it's
competitive
and
so
yeah
like
so
actually
like,
like.
I
could
go
more,
you
know.
A
Maybe,
if
we
get
through
all
this,
we
can
go
back
and
talk
to
the
budget
allocators,
because
it's
like
a
huge
the
huge
innovation
of
the
in-game
plan.
It's
like
and
it's
something
that's
that's
really
been.
I've
developed
based
on
a
mission
by
wilder
actually
from
from
scs,
but
ultimately
it's
yeah.
It's
like
a
it's
kind
of.
I
think
it's,
it's
a
really
cool
innovation.
A
It
also
relies
on
like
it
only
works
because
of
some
specific
attack
that
would
need
to
be
built
for
it
to
work,
but
ultimately
yeah.
It's
like
a
strong.
A
It's
a
way
to
to
you
know,
make
budgeting
budget
decisions,
and
especially
resisting
bad
budgeting
to
you
know,
make
that
a
lot
more
dynamic
and
a
lot
stronger
at
the
cost
of
you
know
adding
an
entire
extra
actor
right,
which
is,
of
course,
we're
adding
complexity,
but
it's
very
explicit
complexity
and
we're
doing
that
so
that
we
avoid
this
implicit
and
black
box
complexity.
That
would
otherwise
occur.
A
Okay,
so
so
this
is
the
sort
of
maker
governance
right.
So
these
are
the
permissionless
actors,
and
these
are
basically
the
ones
that
operate
sort
of
out
there
like
well
one
way
to
define
these
is
that
these
are
guys
that
are
that
are
compensated
mmkr
and
her
only
right,
oh
no,
I
mean
not
npr
only
but
well
rather.
Actually,
these
are
the
guys.
These
are
the
actors,
the
roles
that
do
not
get
metadata
tokens
or
our
part
of
metadials
or
do
any
metadata
stuff.
A
But
from
here
on
from
here
everything
moves
to
the
down-to-down
paradigm.
So
suddenly
everything
becomes
metadials
and
and
maker
only
interacts
with
the
metadials
from
here
on
out.
So
that's
also
another
way
to,
and
that's
another
way
to
think
of
these
three
rows
is
that
these
three
rows
are
basically
the
the
ones
that
are
sort
of
the
counter
parties
to
the
meta
dials.
A
So
then
we
look
at
the
maker
coordinates,
so
this
is
basically
the
what
I
propose
to
sort
of
the
replacement
for
the
current
coordinates
and
basically
it's
you
can.
In
most
cases
you
can
think
of,
like
the
current
coins.
There's
a
kind
of
implicit
idea
of
how
the
current
coordinates
should
work,
which
is
something
like
they
all
collaborate
based
on
sort
of
best
practice
and
open
source
frameworks
that
they
share
with
each
other.
A
A
We
kind
of
made
this
sort
of
put
the
core
into
concept
out
there,
and
then
we
kind
of
like
hope
for
the
best
and
thought
these
you
know,
natural
checks
and
balances
would
emerge
and
practice.
It
didn't
really
happen
right.
Instead,
you
got
just
sort
of
a
black
box
approach
right
and
you
even
got
this
sort
of
the.
A
Not
just
black
box
of
individual
coordinates
right,
but
even
got
like
lack
of
separation
of
powers
of
the
you
know
of
all
the
coordinates
right,
but
then
so,
basically
the
idea
is
to
go
in
and
then
not
only.
You
know,
first
of
all,
enforce
separation
of
powers
at
the
level
of
you
know
the
workforce
as
whole,
but
then
also
try
to
split
up
the
co.
A
The
structure
of
coordinates
that
exist
today
into
these
more
sort
of
you
know
explicitly
defined
structures
that
then
have
very
strong
potential
for
for
checks
and
balances
on
each
other
and
and
the
separation
of
powers.
A
But
first
of
all,
most
importantly,
is
that
the
co-unit
functions
is
like
they're,
no
longer
maker
sort
of
hiring
a
team
and
paying
a
team,
and
basically
like
being
responsible
for
for
the
you,
know
the
salary
and
the
compensation
of
some
humans
right
that
they
are
sitting
on
the
other
end
and
are
counting
on
maker
to
to
fund
their
their
their
lifestyle
right.
Instead,
it's
maker
hiring
a
metadata
to
provide
a
coordinate
service.
So
it's
almost
like
the
the
metadow
just
kind
of
simulates,
a
a
coordinate
service.
A
In
a
sense
of
doing
one
of
these
services
in
practice,
the
the
way
a
metadata
does,
that
is,
of
course,
then
actually
going
out
hiring
the
team
to
actually
doing
it.
But
it's
a
metadata
sort
of
establishing
the
relationship
with
the
the
actual
people
and
the
actual
companies
and
makers
just
establishing
a
relationship
with
the
metadata
and
the
most
important
difference
of
this
is
that
the
metadata
doesn't,
just
you,
know,
get
money
and
do
work
the
metadata.
A
Instead,
you
know,
provides
a
kind
of
an
a
projected
result,
essentially
sort
of
sells
a
result
it
with
something.
I
call
a
results
guarantee
right
so
and-
and
this
is
something
that
has
to
be
developed
alongside
some
of
the
frameworks
and
the
scope
maps
and
and
just
getting
a
lot
more
knowledge
around
how
to
organize
the
decentralized
workforce
so
in
the
in
the
beginning,
it
would
actually
be.
A
It
would
not
be
so
strict
because
we
just
don't
have
the
ability
to
do
this
stuff
yet,
but
the
basic
idea
is
to
something
like
you
think
of
it,
as
you
could
take
the
way
of
coordinates
work
today
and
then
you
could
take.
You
know
coins
today
they
set
kind
of
like
expectations
or
something,
but
of
course
they're
not
accountable.
A
For
the
I
mean
they
don't
have
to
deliver
those
expectations
because
they
can't
promise
that,
but
then
what
the
metadata
does
is
you
sort
of
put
the
metadata
on
top
of
it
and
then
what
happens
is
maker
pays?
I
mean
an
overhead
to
the
metadata
on
top
of
what
is
already
paying
the
coordinate,
which
could
be,
let's
say,
20,
that's
what
I'm
currently
leaning
towards
right.
So
you
increase
all
budgets
by
20,
basically
in
this
paradigm,
but
what
you
get
is,
if
the
expectation,
that's
being
you
know,
sold
to
maker.
A
Basically,
if
that
isn't
met,
then
now
maker
suddenly
has
a
claim
of
saying.
Well,
there
was
supposed
to
be
a
collateral
onboarding
that
was
going
to
earn
us
two
million
dollars
within
two
years,
and
it's
now
been
two
years
since
it
was
implemented
and
we
only
earned
one
million
dollars
so
we're
actually
going
to
take
a
million
dollars
from
the
merida
as
a
sort
of
basically
as
a
as
a
kind
of
a
settlement
or,
like
a
you,
know,
a
claim
on
the
guarantee
that
was
originally
sold.
A
That
was
this
sort
of
20
overhead
or
whatever.
That
number
is
right,
so
what's
happening
is
the
metadows
are
like
taking
over
the
risk
of
the
core
units
right,
so
maker
no
longer
pays
a
budget
and
hopes
for
something
that
will
be
useful
rather
make
or
pays
at
a
higher
price,
but
in
return
gets
you
know
either
get
something
that
is
sort
of
measurably.
You
know
measurably
valuable
or
simply
gets
to
take
cold
hard
cash
from
the
metadata.
A
That's
sort
of
collateralizing
this
interaction
and
again
this
is
very,
very,
very
difficult
to
actually
achieve
some
of
this
right.
So
this
would
take
a
very
long
time
to
get
to
something
that
really
sort
of
you
know
works
out
in
this
way.
At
sort
of
the
you
know
the
level
of
sort
of
complete
the
the
dream,
like
scenario
right.
A
That
would
take
many
years
to
get
to
that
point,
but
one
of
the
things
that
it
would
immediately
do
is
it
would
immediately
because
one
of
the
you
know,
one
of
the
things
that
they
met
at
us
would
be
accountable
for,
and
we
try
to
enforce
is
just
separation
of
powers,
so
you
could
have
these
sort
of
very
you
have
these
basic
things
that
you
could
at
least
guarantee
that
the
metadata
would
enforce,
which
is
that,
if
separation
of
powers
is
broken,
meaning
you
have
a
you
know
secret,
you
know
deals
being
made
between
co-units
or
something
like
that
right
and
then
immediately.
A
You
can
hold
the
metadata
accountable
for
that
and
you
have
a
direct
way
to
sort
of
deal
with
that
right
by
simply
extracting
claims
from
the
metadata
which
today
is
like.
If
that
happened,
if
there
was
some
kind
of
I
mean
of
course
today.
This
is
kind
of
far-fetched
right,
because
this
is
a
long-term
thing.
That's
going
to
be
a
lot
more!
A
You
know
it's
much
more,
something
that
we
should
expect
in
the
longer
term,
when
this
initial
wave
of
highly
trustworthy
individuals
that
are
mostly
running
the
coils
today
right
when
they're
increasingly
replaced
over
time.
You
will
see
things
like
you
know,
like
you,
know,
sort
of
attempt
to
monopolize
things
right,
so
the
way
that
that
you
know,
especially
like
public
procurement,
right,
like
all
the
issues
that
exist
with
that
right,
would
start
to
manifest
in
maker.
A
But
in
the
current
paradigm,
it's
like,
if
you
catch
someone
doing
that,
then
your
only
choice
is
to
be
like
well
either
we
fire
the
entire
coordinate
and
basically
you
know,
sort
of
nuke
our
ability
to
even
do
anything
in
this
area
where
we
have
a
core
unit,
or
we
give
some
kind
of
warning
or
something
like
that,
and
then
hope
that
that's
gonna
make
their
behavior
change
right,
which
in
practice
is
like.
I
mean
it's
a
very
it's
like
it's
really,
it's
not
really
in
in
maker's
favor.
A
Basically,
writing
in
keala's
favor
right
now.
This
dynamic
right,
because
it's
so
incredibly
difficult
to
mobilize
and
gallows
against
around
anything
like
that
right,
especially
because
it's
like
a
very
dramatic
high
impact
and
sort
of
a
high
stakes,
kind
of
decision
that
has
to
be
made
and
the
easy
choice,
which
is
something
like
ooh.
That's
bad,
let's
give
them
a
warning.
A
A
So
let's
now
we
have
to
organize
around
taking
action
and
so
on,
because
you
can
simply
say:
oh
something
is
wrong,
that
we
don't
like
well,
we'll
just
take
some
money
for
that
right,
we'll
just
take
a
penalty
with
it
and
then,
if
it
keeps
happening
you
just
keep
taking
a
penalty
and
then
the
metadows
will
have
to
figure
it
out
right.
A
So
they'll
have
to
sort
of
give
warnings
and
decide
when
the
time
when
it's
time
to
act
right,
and
so
it
becomes
so
you
sort
of
you
know
so
it
becomes
the
the
metadata
have
their
their.
This
is
one
of
the
big
roles
that
they
play.
Is
they
sort
of
absorb
all
this
complexity
and
risk
and
and
the
difficult
decisions
around
you
know,
dealing
with
humans?
A
Basically,
in
a
in
a
in
a
large
organization,
that's
decentralized
and
flat
right,
which
makes
it
even
more
complicated
and
then,
with
this
framework,
you
basically
have
these
actually,
once
again,
let
me
just
check
the
chat
before
I
keep
going.
A
Sorry,
what's
the
what's
the
question
yeah,
we
had
a
couple
of
our
comments
in
the
chat.
Let's
see
I'll
just
read
through
it
I'll
see,
I
think.
Let
me
just
pick
some
okay.
What
does
an
operating
unit?
That
is
not
a
black
box,
look
like
how
does
putting
on
a
metadata
lead
to
an
increase
in
transparency,
so
it
doesn't
like
coordinates,
will
always
be
a
black
box
right,
but
the
difference
is
we
splitting
up
and
I'll
get
to
this
in
a
second
right,
but
we're
today
we
have
one
coin.
A
Doing
all
these
things,
sort
of
the
supporting
the
administrative
and
the
contributing
part.
That's
all
in
one
coordinate
today,
so
you
and
you
simply
take
that
you
split
that
out
into
multiple
pieces.
So,
like
you,
never,
instead
of
pretending
that
we
can
expect
people
to
naturally
organize
in
something
that
isn't
a
black
box
and
and
like
volunteer
to
do
all
sorts
of
cumbersome
reporting
and
transparency
and
stuff
right,
which
even
they
actually
people
are
literally
actually
doing
that
today.
A
But
then
it
still
even
it
still
doesn't
even
work,
because
it's
still
the
information
cost
gets
too
high
right
and
instead
of
of
taking
that
approach
which
simply
doesn't
work,
we
we
go
the
other
way
and
we
completely
accept
that
we're
gonna
see
these
sort
of
black
box
behavior
right,
because
that's
the
way
like
people
want
to
work
in
a
way,
that's
convenient.
They
don't
want
to
work
in
some
kind
of
bureaucratic
nightmare
where
everything
has
to
be
properly
recorded.
A
All
the
time
anytime,
you,
whatever
you
know,
talk
to
your
colleague
or
something
like
that
right,
but
instead
what
we
focus
on
are
the
you
know.
Separation
of
powers
between
individual
coordinates,
so
basically
that
you
have
very
strong
requirements
around
how
multiple
coordinates
interact
right
so
yeah.
So
we
don't.
We
don't
eliminate
black
box
units.
A
Instead,
we
sort
of
embrace
it
and
then
what
we
do
is
we
eliminate.
You
know
like
black
box
interactions
of
sort
of
black
boxification
of
multiple
coordinates
right.
A
And
let
me
see
one
of
these:
what's
the
difference
between
gold
bonuses
and
some
of
the
metadata
discussion
here,
why
not
have
a
gold,
l2
dining
I'll,
get
to
that
in
a
second
good
point,
but
yeah
I'll
get
to
anything
this
thing
about,
but
I
mean
I
call
them
bounties.
Basically,
I
get
the
sense
of
metadata
bureaucracy
increase
order,
coordination
costs
less
transparency
yeah,
so
I
mean
so
well
so
you're
right
that
will
this
would
add
explicit
bureaucracy
and
explicit
a
complexity
right.
A
But
what
we
got
right
now
is
extreme
hidden
complexity
and
I
would
basically
say
barely
any
results
right.
I
mean
that's
sort
of
the
starting
point
for
all
this
right,
that
we've
got
the
core
of
maker-
that's
great
and
doing
great
stuff,
but
then
we
have,
you
know
a
massive
expenditure
that
is
not
really
delivering
what
I
mean
I
mean.
First
of
all,
we
don't
really
know
what
it's
delivering,
but
also
a
lot
of
the
stuff.
That's
being
done,
isn't
even
what
what
we
want?
Basically
right!
A
A
Okay,
fine,
then,
basically,
let's
give
up
on
complicated
bureaucracy
right,
let's
just
cut
down
the
the
dow
to
a
very
simple
call
where
we
simply
don't
have
a
massive
workforce
right,
but
fundamentally
I
mean
I
think
this
goes
back
to
this
concept
of
the
of
tyranny
of
structuralism
right,
where
that's
a
big
reason
why
things
are
not
going
well
today
is
because
there
are
a
lot
of
these
assumptions
around.
Oh,
if
you
just
put
them
in
a
coin
and
give
them
a
bunch
of
money,
they'll
totally
be.
A
A
You
know
so
it
acknowledges
the
issue
with
journey
of
structuralism,
and
so
it
creates
explicit
structure
that,
in
practice,
I
would
argue,
is
not
more
complicated
than
sort
of
the
informal
complexity
that
exists
today
and
even
if
it
is
then
well
should,
and
then
my
guess
is,
that
would
give
better
results,
because
you,
the
incentives,
are
there
to
give
the
better
results
right.
The
metadatas
sell
the
results,
and
if
they
fail
to
deliver
what
they're
trying
to
sell,
then
they
get
slashed
kind
of
right.
A
Then
they
actually
get
a
penalty
for
that,
whereas
that's
the
fundamental
problem
today
is
that,
like
coordinates,
have
no
consequence,
for
you
know
if
nothing
is
being
delivered,
there's
no
actual
consequence
for
the
coordinates
right
I
mean
unless,
except
for
extreme
cases
such
as
the
content,
production
right,
which
really
showcases
just
like
to
the
extent
like
how
difficult
it
is
to
deal
with
something
where
even
like
something
where
there's
basically
universal
consensus
right,
it's
still
so
hard
to
get
empireless
to
get
off
there.
A
You
know
get
out
of
their
their
seats
kind
of,
and
do
something
and
paper
says
metadata
is
supposed
to
empower
local
knowledge
with
less
need
for
direct
oversight.
A
That's
definitely
that's
true
on
one
hand,
but
it's
I
mean,
and
I
think
the
the
way
to
specifically
the
dynamic
that
creates
this.
You
know
it
doesn't
just
ask
people,
please
create
more
local
knowledge.
That
would
be
great
right,
which
is
kind
of
how
we
approach
decentralization
today.
It's
basically
something
along
the
lines
of
here's
some
money,
please
be
decentralized
right
and
in
the
metadata
paradigm.
It's
if
you
know
here's
the
money.
A
If
we
discover
that
x,
y
or
c
has
happened,
which
are
things
that
we
identify
as
being
bad
for
decentralization
right,
such
as
hidden
communication
right
or
you
know,
failure
to
you
know
sort
of
breach
of
of
expected
results
right
or
breach
of
best
practice.
Here's
what
happens
right!
You
get
this
penalty,
so
you're.
Creating
these
very
you
know
you're,
going
from
sort
of
the
kind
of
the
please
be
decentralized
to
here's,
what
happens
if
you're,
not
being
decentralized
and,
most
importantly,
it's
a
med.
A
It's
down
to
now
interaction
right,
so
it's
not
like
here's,
some
guy
who's
like
doing
his
best
and
and
something
goes
wrong,
and
then
you
got
an
entire
now
of
pissed
off
people,
somehow
trying
to
punish
you
right,
which
is
also
not
even
possible,
because
you
know
see
the
dow
can't
do
anything
in
the
real
world
anyway,
but
with
a
metadata
you've
got
a
you.
You've
got
a
dial
of
token
holders
that
are
specifically
trying
to
take
in
the
bed
that
they
can.
A
A
That's
collateralizing
these
guarantees,
so
you
know
so
you
really
you
you're,
you're,
no
longer
sort
of
right,
we're
creating
these
we're,
making
the
incentives
and
the
interactions
a
lot
more
explicit
and
I'll
get
to
even
further
on
that
and
exactly
how
like
what
exactly
means
I'll
get
to
that
in
just
a
second
once
I
walk
through
the
roles.
A
One
more
skin
in
the
game
and
time
resolves
the
conversation
and
I
think
you're
sort
of
repeating
this
thing
about
bounties
right,
which
I
completely
agree
with,
and
that's
basically
I'll
be
getting
to
that
in
a
moment
so
like,
but
basically
writing,
you're
saying
why
should
white
review
math?
Why
should
we
do
metadata?
Why
not
just
fix
coordinate
conversation,
and
basically
this
plan
involves
both.
So
not
only
should
we
fix
coordinate
conversation,
we
should
also
strongly
go
in
the
direction
of
boundaries
and
actually
even
further,
which
I'll
get
to
in
a
moment.
A
Yeah
and
mark
phillips
says
if
it's
not
what
we
want
should
maker
holders
re-delegate
to
what
the
delegate
to
delegates
that
are
doing
whatever
what
they
want.
Yeah,
absolutely
and
that's
kind
of
what
I'm
doing
right
now.
Right
I
mean,
but
and
but
a
lot
of
this,
what
I'm
talking
I
mean
the
context
of
this
is
what
I'm
presenting
here
is
something
that's
supposed
to
be
set
in
stone.
You
know,
let's
say
next
year
and
then
a
hundred
years
from
now
should
still
work
right.
A
So
a
hundred
years
from
now,
when
you've
had
a
hundred
years
of
you
know
the
same
kind
of
process,
that's
created
military,
the
military
industrial
complex
in
the
u.s
or
the
you
know
the
the
the
the
pharmaceutical
insurance.
You
know
the
medical
insurance
industry
in
the
u.s
right,
like
that
same
process,
is
going
to
apply
to
the
decentralized
workforce
in
maker.
So
we
need
to
put
these
extremely
strong.
You
know
sort
of
process
in
place
because
in
the
long
run
it's
gonna
aim.
Capitalist
or
not.
A
It's
gonna
take
a
lot
I
mean
for
me
now.
I
can
be
like
I'll
take
action,
I'm
a
huge
whale,
I'm
the
only
one
being
active
in
governance,
not
only
one
right
but
but
like,
and
I
just
have
a
sort
of
emotional
connection.
I've
got
all
sorts
of
reasons
to
go
in
and
make
some
big
changes,
but
what
I'm?
What
I
need
to
put
in
place
is
a
playing
field
that
makes
it
as
easy
as
humanly
possible
for
mql,
as
of
the
future,
to
basically
take
action
right.
A
So
this
goes
back
to
the
sort
of
core
principle
of
like
making
it
as
easy
as
possible
for
mkl's
right.
So
all
the
different
structures
all
need
to
be
built
around
making
it
as
easy
as
humanly
possible
from
guilders,
and-
and
that's
also
why
this
thing
about
bounties,
which
is
hey
yeah
boundaries,
are
freaking
amazing,
and
we
need
to
do
that,
but
we
also
need
to
do
everything
else.
We
can
do
because
there's
no
greater
goal
than
making
it
as
easy
as
possible
employers,
and
we
should
not
hold
back
on
any
single.
A
You
know
trick
in
the
sense
right,
every
single
lever.
We
can
pull
to
to
make
it
easier
and
better
for
employers.
A
Okay,
but
this
is
very
quickly
right-
we've
got
supporting,
coordinates
that
create
frameworks
and
then
monitor
these
frameworks
and
work
for
survey.
Things
like
how
to
monitor
kpis
how
to
do
a
collateral
onboarding,
how
to
do
risk
assessments.
How
to
sort
of
I
mean
conduct
in
general
how
to
budget,
how
to
report
that
and
so
on
right.
A
So
what
supporting
coin
is
they
they
all
they
do
in
a
sense
is
rea
like
they
do
sort
of
research
in
development
and
or
research
right,
and
they
output
this
this
open
source
work
and
then
they
output
open
source
public
reports
around.
This
is
what
we
see,
and
this
is
how
we
would
take
this
data
apply
this
framework
and
what
we
get
is
this
result
right,
whether
is
it
very
compliant
with
the
framework.
Is
it
very
different?
Did
we
find
out
about
some
kind
of
reason
why
it's
different?
A
Maybe
in
some
cases
they
may
even
then
conclude.
We
should
actually
change
the
framework
right.
We
suggest
changing
the
framework,
because
we
think
the
facts
support
that
right.
Then
you
have
so
supporting,
coordinates,
they're
very
far
away
from
action
in
a
sense
right,
but
they
also
then
very
high
level.
They
sort
of
set
the
rules
around.
How
should
the
action
be
done,
but
you
don't
have
the
same
people
suggesting
how
to
do
the
work
being
the
ones
that
actually
actually
do
it
right?
A
A
So
what
they
do
is
well,
first
of
all,
they
get
they're
the
ones
that
control
the
budgets
up
at
the
operational
level
right,
so
they're
sort
of
they
have
sort
of
a
you
know
the
sort
of
the
strategic
direction
and
responsibilities,
and
then
they
have
a
bunch
of
budget
and
they
use
that
to
fund
their
own
internal
sort
of
their
own
management
capabilities
in
a
sense.
A
A
Finally,
if
we
like
what
we're
seeing,
we
will
use
our
governance
privileges
to
to
you
know,
get
it
into
a
quick
executive
vote
or
something
like
that
right,
so
so
that's
administered
coin
is
similar
to
to
sort
of
the
role
of
the
role
of
the
facilitator
today,
and
one
thing
to
note
is
that
supporting
coins
and
administrative
coordinates?
A
Are
these
very
you
know,
trusted
roles
right,
so
there's
a
lot
of
trust,
there's
a
lot
of
sort
of
process
in
them
as
well
right,
so
they're
sort
of
they're
bureaucrats
almost
right,
maybe
not
exactly
the
right
word
to
use
right.
A
Many
other
ways
to
think
of
it
is
they're
like
government
officials
or
something
like
that
right,
and
so
they
are
managed
and
have
their
results
guaranteed
by
governance,
metadata,
that's
specialized,
basically,
governance
metadata,
and
then
these
metadata
that
really
are
highly
focused
on
these
sort
of
the
fundamentals
of
making
a
highly
you
know
very
high
integrity
of
the
governance
process.
Right
and
contributing
coordinates,
then
are
the
ones
that
actually
do
the
work.
A
Basically
so
they're
similar
to
the
contributors
in
coordinates
today
right
and
they
are
managed
by
the
creator
of
the
house,
because
they
need
sort
of
a
different
culture
right.
They
need
to
be
people
that
get
done
that
they
get
told
they
get
a
requirements,
they
get
budget,
they
go,
do
the
work,
they
deliver
the
work
and
they're.
You
know
they're,
not
public
officials,
they
are
developers
right
or
they
are
they're
they're
suppliers
or
something
like
right.
A
There's
the
government
suppliers
is
maybe
a
way
to
think
of
them
and
then
they're
managed
by
the
creator
that
house,
rather
than
the
government
and
staff.
So
you
have
these
like
different
metadows
keeping
each
other
in
check
right
we're.
Ultimately,
the
governor's
metadows
they
specialize
more
in
representing
the
interests
of
maker,
whereas
the
creator
metadatas
they
specialize
in
getting
things
done
basically
and
and
that
way
you
have
this
very
strong
checks
and
balances
right.
A
Where
today,
the
coordinate
has
this
contradiction
where
it's
like
the
coordinate
naturally
wants
to
be
a
black
box
and
like
a
single
team
and
a
single
social
group
right,
obviously,
and
that's
how
they
they
organize
ultimately,
but
the
expectation
is
that
the
facilitator
is
sort
of
representing
the
interests
of
maker
and
then
the
contributors
are
sort
of
the
counterparty.
That's
doing
the
work
right
and
that's
a
very
it's
very
contradictory
right.
A
We
think
you
should
go
with
this
other
coordinator
over
there
right,
because
the
facilitator
is
trusted
like
that
implicitly
in
a
sense
to
to
to
you
know
like
to
to
to
operate
in
that
way,
but
of
course,
in
practice,
that's
impossible
to
expect
them
to
do
because
they're
they're,
all
one
group
and
and
by
splitting
them
up,
we
basically
get
a
situation
where
the
administrative
coordinates
they're,
the
ones
that
are
sort
of
tasked
with.
A
You
need
to
do
this
on
behalf
of
maker
governance
and
then
they
can
go
out
and
they
can
actually
interact
with
with
multiple
contributing
coordinates
right
or
at
least
the
sort
of
broad
talent
pool
that's
available,
and
ultimately
you
have
then
there's
a
proper.
You
know:
separation
of
powers,
kind
of
probably
public
procurement,
kind
of
of
interaction
right
where
there's
a
transparency
around.
Why
was
this
team
chosen?
A
A
Okay
and
then
very
friendly,
we've
got
the
metadata
label
and
basically
there's
just
some
high
level.
I
mean
so,
of
course,
the
metadatas
are
going
to
be
ultimately
they're
supposed
to
experiment
with
this
stuff.
So
you
can't
say
as
much
about
how
exactly
they
should
work
because
they
could
go
towards.
You
know
the
end
they
could.
A
They
can
just
fail
and
die,
and
then
you
just
shut
them
down
and
just
make
another
one
and
so
they're
not
nearly
as
as
important
to
sort
of
get
right
and
have
as
rigid
structures,
but
they
still
basically
the
idea
so
that
they,
you
know
the
copies
of
a
simplified
version
of
of
the
of
maker
governance
and
the
roles,
but
then
they
can
sort
of
depending
on
their
size.
They
don't
have
to
actually
be.
A
You
know
actively
have
all
of
these
roles
necessarily,
but
once
they
do
get
to
a
large
size,
they
can
stand
up
the
different
roles,
and-
and
you
know
you
could
even
have
requirements
that
at
a
certain
size,
once
you
have
a
workforce
that
reaches
x
people,
then
you,
you
start
to
actually
have
an,
and
you
know
a
requirement
for
separation
of
powers
internally
in
the
coin,
in
the
meta
dials,
for
instance,
but
ultimately
the
checks
and
balances
and
metadows
need
can
be
much
less
because
metadows
are
you
know
the
big
advantage?
A
A
They
can
use
maker
goblins
for
that,
so
that
makes
them
able
to
sort
of
build
on
top
of
these
strong
systems,
but
but
not
necessarily
have
to
apply
them
super
rigidly
and
just
apply
them
in
the
ways
that
that
works
for
them
and
then
ultimately,
metadatas
are
the
ones
that
then
interact
with
these
ecosystem
actors,
as
I
call
them
right.
So
that
would
be
counterparties
that
that
you
know
are
sort
of
more.
A
You
know
something
like
a
real
asset
counterparty
or
like
other
like
other
projects
and
some
like
other
d5
project
or
sort
of
blockchain
projects
or
law
firms
or
consultants
or
security
reviewers,
or
something
like
that,
or
even
like
the
accountants
I
mean,
we've
got
a
whole
accounting
infrastructure,
probably
multiple,
even
in
in
the
decentralized
workforce
today-
and
you
know
so-
and
these
can
be
sort
of
you
know
on
one
hand,
we
can
ensure
that
we
don't
have
a
single
accounting
company,
that's
running
everything
which
I
don't
know
if
that's
a
case
today,
but
it
might
be.
A
But
that's
simply,
you
know
we
need
more
redundancy
for
that
than
that
right.
If
we
want
a
very
strong
resilient
maker
protocol
in
long
run,
right
and
and
with
metadata,
you
sort
of
you
know,
you
basically
ensure
that
there's
economies
of
scale,
because
each
metadata
can
can
you
do
the
same
thing
for
its
whole
structure.
A
A
Yeah,
what
are
failure?
Modes
with
metadatas?
That's
a
good
question,
but
I
actually
want
we're
running
out
of
time,
so
I
won't
get
into
that
other
than
it
could
be
really
anything
because
metadatas
are
highly.
You
know
they
have
this
metamorphosis
thing
right:
they
can
become
anything
they
can
experiment
with
anything
because
they
don't
run
critical
protocol
infrastructure.
The
way
maker
does
would
die
right,
so
they
can
do
all
sorts
of
pretty
crazy
experimentation
that
could
fail.
So
that
could
be
political
failure,
technical
failure,
economic
failure,
whatever
it
may
be
right,
social
failure.
A
That
run,
I
mean
in
the
metadown
in
m0
right
that
pays
for
the
development
of
the
deco
protocol
and
also
the
m0
would
earn
the
profits
from
that
and
maker
just
wouldn't
make
it
would
still
benefit.
Because
maker
has
this
sort
of
synergetic.
You
know
synergy
with
all
metadata,
so
maker
gets
some
kind
of
secondary
benefit,
but
all
the
risk
is
put
in
the
metadata
and
maker
just
gets
almost
like
free
ride
by
by
just
spending
the
energy
and
incubating
the
metadata
in
the
first
place,
and
then
just
letting
it
play
out
by
itself.
A
Okay,
but
now
what
I
really
want
to
get
to
are
these
practical
examples?
This
is
you
know
I
should
have
gone
a
little
bit
faster,
because
this
is
the
stuff
that
I
think
it's
really
interesting
and
really
start
to
make
it
more
real.
I
think
right,
so,
basically,
what
I'm
going
to
go
through
now,
I'll,
just
like
I'll
just
quickly
go
through
this.
So
this
looks
these
three
approaches
to
how
work
gets
done
in
the
long
run
maker.
A
So
this
is
like,
after
the
end
like
this,
is
post
endgame,
innocence
right,
so
there's
no
more
scope,
expansion!
Now,
there's
only
what
I
call
recurring:
expansion
work,
which
is
stuff
like
collateral,
onboarding,
deploying
a
new
synthetic
asset,
deploying
a
new
shotgun
vault
engine
to
a
new
l2
or
something
upgrading
one
of
some
existing
stuff
based
on
some
kind
of
predetermined,
upgrade
pathway.
Right
like
let's
make
something
more
secure,
making
more
gas
efficient,
making
it
whatever
right,
it
could
be
changing
risk
parameters,
but
it's
kind
of
like
you
know.
A
All
of
this
stuff
is
like
predetermined
stuff
right
that
that,
ultimately,
none
of
this
is
about
changing
what
maker
is
or
pivoting.
What
maker
is
or
something
like
that
right,
anything
like
that
of
like
inventing
and
believing
new
things
that
all
goes
to
the
metadials
and
it's
not
even
relevant
for
for
maker.
Basically,
but
first
we
got
the
classic
top-down
approach
to
recurring.
Expansion
work
right.
So
this
is.
This
is
sort
of
the
you
know.
Maker
wants
to
onboard
mole.
A
You
know
what
maker
wants
to
make
sure
that
you
have
eth.
You
know
state
well
and
especially
math
right
maker
theory,
my
own
synthetic
eth
available
as
collateral
on
as
many
blockchains
as
possible,
with
as
many
different
risk
parameter
con.
You
know
combinations
as
possible
so
make
or
might
have
some
budget
that
says
okay
every
year
we
want
to.
A
You
know
we
want
to
spend
three
million
dollars
on
just
making
math
available,
and
you
know
figure
out
what
do
users
want
and
then
implementing
that
and
so
making
sure
that
we're
the
number
one
place
to
go
to
to
you
know
to
borrow
against
eth
right
and
then
what
happens
is
there's
some
budget
available
and
then
there's
some
kind
of
prioritization
around
like
where
we
want
to
play
some
of
the
most
users
and
then
the
coordinates
are
basically
expected
to
to
follow
these
frameworks
around.
A
You
know
how
much
budget
is
available
for
that's
supposed
to
be
spent
on
this
and
how
we're
supposed
to
prioritize
it
and
how
we're
supposed
to
do
the
work
like?
How
do
you
you
know?
How
do
you
sort
of
practically
operationalize
it
right
according
to
best
practice,
and
so
the
administrative
coordinate
they
ultimately
are
the
ones
that
are
sort
of
in
charge
of
this
right.
So
they
have
the
budget
and
they
they
interpret
the
frameworks
right.
So
they
they.
A
You
know
sort
of
gather
the
budget
and
says
here's
a
million
dollars,
whatever
here's
a
hundred
thousand
dollars
to
do
a
collateral
onboarding,
and
I
interpret
framework
to
say
that
we
want
to
go
and
do
it
on
optimism.
We
want
to
do
you
know:
160
percent,
liquidation
ratio,
math
onboarding
on
optimism
or
something
like
that
right
and
then
they
go
out
and
they
sort
of
do
a
you
know.
They're
readily,
like
this
procurement
process,
right
where
they
go
and
ask
a
number
of
metadatas.
A
Basically
like
creator,
dials
right
like
with
contributing
core
unit
capability
and
says:
hey
how
much
money
do
you
need
to
do
a
best
practice,
onboarding
of
math
on
optimism
with
160
like
whatever
right,
106
percent,
the
degradation
ratio,
and
then
they
get
the
best
quote
essentially,
and
they
they
make
the
decision
according
to
the
internal
framework
right
and
then
they
pay
the
money.
And
then
the
work
gets
done
by
the
contributing
coordinate.
And
then
the
contributor
courtney
delivers
the
work
and
then
the
administrative
coin
sort
of
gets
the
work
checks.
A
And
then
you
know,
there's
a
framework
somewhere
saying
that's
bad
or
something
like
that
right.
You
can't
just
hire
your
nephew.
You
need
to
hire.
Whoever
gives
the
best
you
know
who
who
basically
can
do
it
the
cheapest
and
give
the
full
the
the
full
result
right
and
then
what
they
basically
do
is
they
will
sort
of
flag
that
they
reflect
that
there's
something
wrong
here.
This
is
their
you
know.
A
First
of
all,
they
hired
the
guy
who's,
the
net,
their
nephew,
and
secondly,
there
was
another
quote
that
was
cheaper
and
they
sort
of
present
that
data
to
a
voter
committee,
and
then
the
voter
committee
might
decide
here's
a
there's,
a
violation
here.
This
is,
you
know
this
is
sort
of
violating
the
the
results
guarantee
that
says
the
metadow
is
always
supposed
to
give
us
the
best.
You
know,
make
the
best
decision
and
give
us
the
best
result.
A
If
there's
like
multiple
assaults
available,
something
like
that
right
and
so
basically,
then
the
metadas
as
long
as
they
operate,
they
sort
of
run
this
process,
and
they
they
do
it
properly.
They
get
to
earn
this
overhead
fee
from
providing
the
guarantee
from
the
running
results
guarantee,
but
the
voter
committees
also
have
this
ability
to
retroactively
step
in
right
analyze.
What
happened
in
the
past
and
then
be
like
something
happened
in
the
past
that
we
don't
like
so
we're
gonna
we're
gonna
extract
a
penalty
from
from
you,
go
to
the
metadata
and
basically
do
that.
A
And
so
one
thing
is
that
maker
has
no
risk
of
things
going
wrong
because
they
can
just
get
make
themselves
whole
by
extracting
claims
from
the
metadose
right
and
but
more
importantly,
the
incentives
are
now
so
that
metadatas
are
never
ever
gonna
ever.
Allow
work
to
happen
that
they're
responsible
for
if
they
don't
think
that
work
is
following
best
practice
right,
because
then
they're
exposing
themselves
to
the
risk
of
guarantee
claims
so
you're.
A
Creating
this
very
strong
and
very
tight
feedback
loop,
where
the
metadows
are
gonna,
be
a
lot
more
close
to
the
ground
right
on
the
ground
kind
of
in
the
trenches
and
and
basically
being
the
ones
that
absorb
the
risk.
And
then
the
way
you
make
the
sort
of
the
feedback
loop
complete.
Is
that
the
administrator,
the
coordinates?
A
They
get
metadata
tokens
as
now
right,
so
they
actually
both
get
mkr
tokens
to
align
them
with
maker,
but
they
also
get
metadata
tokens
to
then
align
them
with
this
exposure
that
the
metadata
has
to
to
to
failure.
Basically
right,
but
ultimately
the
accordion
is
actually
not
individually
responsible
right.
The
metadata
is
responsible,
so
the
metadata
has
to
basically
hire
the
right
people
and
if
it
turned
out
to
be
the
wrong
people,
the
metadata
is
a
fault
for
hiring
the
wrong
people.
A
Basically,
so
you
remove
this
human
element
to
a
certain
extent
right
where
you
end
up
blaming
humans
and
instead
it's
down
to
doubt
it's
governance
processes,
sort
of
blaming
other
government's
processes
for
not
having
worked
correctly,
which
is,
I
think,
by
sort
of
dehumanizing
it.
In
a
sense.
That
means
now
you'll
be
able
to
it'll.
Be
this
very.
A
You
know
like
professional
or
sort
of
on
emotional
interaction
right
which
it
needs
to
be,
especially
in
the
in
the
long
run
right,
because
then
that's
where
the
potential
really
is
for
a
lot
of
sort
of
politics
to
build
up
in
this
kind
of
system.
A
So
this
is
where
it
gets
a
lot
more
exciting,
because
we
can,
we
can
do
recurring
expansion
work
in
ways
that
are
a
lot
less
de-risked,
inherently
right.
So,
first
of
all,
there's
the
boundary
approach
or
bottom
up
with
revenue
share,
as
I
call
it,
which
basically
involves
the
supporting
coordinates.
Creating
these
boundary
frameworks
that
specify
revenue
share
of
doing
specific,
recurring
expansion,
work
such
as
collateral
onboarding
and
then
the
entire
sort
of
like
the
initiation,
the
risk
taking
the
the
budgeting.
A
All
that
happens
internally
in
a
coordinate.
So
these
pink
guys
here,
they're
they're
internal
workforce
of
a
coin
right,
so
you
have
a
metadata
administrative,
coordinate
being
the
one
that
makes
the
decision
and
pays
the
budget
to
a
metadata
contributing
coordinator.
That
then,
does
the
work
of
doing
a
collateral
onboarding
and
then
the
metadata
contributing
coordinate.
Does
all
this
work
and
then
goes
straight
to
a
maker
level.
Administrative
coordinate
that
works
for
a
different
metadata
right
that
works
for
governance
metadata,
because
this
is
should
be
specified
here.
A
But
this
is
this
is
a
creator
dial
that
does
this,
that
does
that
this
internal
work
so,
basically
a
and
you
know
a
maker
coordinate
that
is
managed
by
a
separate
governor
governor
metadaw
and
is
basically
presented
with
this
completely
finished
work
on
a
silver
platter.
Essentially,
if
like
we
did,
you
know
we
looked
at
the
boundary
framework,
we
decided
that
we
think
this
collateral
onboarding
is
high
potential.
It's
going
to
make
a
lot
of
money,
we
did
all
the
work
we
paid
all
the
costs
we
paid
for
security
audits.
A
We've
got
the
secured
audits
right
here,
everything's
ready
to
go,
you
get
it
sort
of
on
a
silver
platter
and
then
the
the
administrative
coordinate
simply
reviews
that
and
then,
if
it
looks
good
it
takes
it,
you
know
uses
its
communist
privilege
to
to
take
it
to
an
executive
vote
and
maker
sort
of
gets
it
for
free.
Essentially,
of
course,
then
the
catch
is
that
now
there
is
this
bounty
which,
in
the
form
of
a
large
temporary
revenue,
share
that
goes
to
the
metadata.
A
But
makers
should
be
completely
fine
with
that
right,
because
maker
got
it
completely
for
free
with
no
very
minimal
governance
overhead
and
ultimately,
the
the
revenue
share
is
temporary
right.
So
it
could
be
something
like
I
don't
know
you
get
50
of
the
profits
for
the
first
five
years
of
whatever
that
I
mean,
I
think
that's
that's
quite
a
lot
right,
but
whatever
it
is
maker,
doesn't
really
care,
because
makers
always
focus
on
the
extreme
long
run
right.
A
And
so
yeah,
so
this
is
like
you
know,
so
you
still
have
situations
where
you
could
have
an
administrative
coordinate,
approve
something
that's
unsafe
and
causing
damage
to
the
protocol
or
you
could
have.
I
could
just
have
an
administrative
coordinate,
approving
something
that
is
safe,
but
failing
to
follow
best
practice
on
how
to
properly
review
it
and
maybe
also
other
sort
of
more
complicated
edge
cases.
So
the
point
is
you
still
need
some
level
of
monitoring
and
theoretically
you
also
need
the
possibility
of
guaranteed
claims.
A
If
the
governor
now
fails
to
do
like
it
fails
to
do
its
work
correctly
or
maybe,
if
they
create
it
out,
that's
making
the
proposal
is
somehow
acting,
maliciously
borderline
badly
right.
So
you
still
have
this
theoretical
thing
about.
You
know,
frameworks
and
monitoring
the
frameworks
and
then
guarantee
claims
of
the
violation
of
those
frameworks,
but
it's
just
so
much
less
important
right,
because
the
number
one
thing
that
usually
is
always
the
key
issue,
which
is
budgeting,
isn't
in
place
here
right.
A
A
A
That
sort
of
that
can
be
configured
in
different
ways,
including
in
this
metadata
landing
configuration
where
it's
basically,
the
metadata
running
its
own
mini
maker
vault
engine,
and
that's
that
works
kind
of
you
think
about
kind
of
working
out
like
the
other
platform
or
something
about
the
protocol,
something
like
that
and
then
the
metadata
simply
uses
their
internal
capabilities
to
onboard
collateral
that
they
think
needs
to
be
onboarded
or
just
risk
parameters.
They
think
need
to
be
adjusted
and
they
use
the
same
basic
principle.
A
A
Basically
and-
and
but
all
of
that
runs
on
this
asynchronous
closed
loop
inside
the
metadata,
so
it
can
run
like
super
fast
and
it
doesn't
have
to
follow
a
lot
of
stringent
standards
necessarily
and
then
the
way
it
works
is
that
maker
simply
lands
wholesale
through
a
d3m
model
module
to
the
metadow,
and
the
metadata
then
earns
a
spread,
that's
based
on
its
its
cost
of
capital
and
then
based
on
whatever
it
can
make
money
on
lending
out.
A
It
could
be
that
it's
it's
you
know,
onboarding
a
new
vault
for
some
kind
of
new
governance,
token
or
experimental
coin
or
random
coin,
or
something
that
could
be
risky
or
whatever
that
doesn't
really
matter,
and
they
can
do
whatever
they
want
right.
They
can
do
these
very
small
collateral
types.
They
can
experiment
with
using
other
oracles
like
chain
link
or
something
to
save
money.
A
The
important
thing
is
that
they
do
credit
enhancement
right.
So
just
like
ave
having
the
security
module,
even
if
it's
kind
of
flawed.
A
With
metadata,
you
have
real
credit
enhancements,
so
metadatas
have
real
collateral.
That
maker
has
real
strong,
recalls
against
and
then
maker
can
basically,
as
synchronously,
without
directly
interfering
with
the
metadata
is
doing
the
thing
monitor
the
overall
state
of
how
they're
lending
out
money
and
and
what
kind
of
collateral
they're
doing
and
what's
their,
what
their
overall
collateralization
ratio
is
and
then
make
these.
A
Even
if
maker
doesn't
even
know
and
wants
it
right
and-
and
if
this
this
assume
you
know
this,
this
adjustment
process
of,
like
of
you,
know
changing
the
d3m
parameters
based
on
who's,
doing
who's.
Doing
well
like
as
long
as
that
process
works.
Well
then,
it
creates
this
very
strong
feedback
loop
right,
where
you
have
these
sort
of
multiple
layers
of
feedback
loops.
A
Which
also
means
that
they
can
makers
should
be
able
to
do
these
adjustments
pretty
well,
because
maker
can
do
them
very,
very
slowly
and
that's
how
maker
likes
to
to
work
in
general
right
very,
very
slowly,
very
big
decisions,
one
at
a
time
at
a
very
slow
pace
right.
So
you
can.
You
could
do
these
like
very
big
decisions
around
how
to
adjust
dead
ceilings
to
metadatas.
A
A
When
I
post
on
the
forum
and
that's
gonna,
be
a
big
part
of
it
as
well
right,
the
metadows
will
be
able
to
operate
with
this
sort
of
universal
dow
tool
that
is
made
it's
made
for
use
of
what
maker
needs
to
need
it
to
do,
but
then
it
can
also
be.
A
You
know
modified
to
also
work
for
the
metadatas
and
in
some
way,
the
way
that
a
metadow
sort
of
operationalizes
its
workforce
and
even
gets
into
existence
in
a
sense
would
be
you
just
deploy
any
of
these
dow
tools
and
then
you
actually
got
like
deploy
token
and
you
deploy
a
dart
tool
and
you
you
know
so
you
know
you,
you
distribute
out
the
token
and
you
put
someone
in
the
charge
of
of
operating
the
dial
tool
and
you
cheat.
You
know
you
get
the
community
to
to
use
it.
A
You
know,
because
maybe
parts
of
the
data
was
like
gated
by
token
holders
or
something
like
that,
and
then
you
got
a
fully
functioning
down.
That
can
start
really
do
stuff
you
and
start
to
innovate.
A
In
a
little
bit
over
time,
but-
and
we
had-
I
think
we
had
a
quick
question-
I
had
a
hand
raised
one.
He
had
a
quick
question
for
us.
I
don't
think
he
was
quick
to
be
fair,
but
I
can
just
throw
it
or
or
or
we
can
leave
it
for
the
next
talk
runner.
I
don't
I
don't
mind
that
much
yeah.
Actually
I
just
realized.
I
actually
have
to
run
so.
Yeah
gotta
run
immediately.