►
From YouTube: Governance and Risk Meeting: Ep. 38
Description
The theme for this call will be 'Collateral Risk'.
- Rich: Securing the DAO
- Cyrus: How to think about risk
- Vishesh: Peg analysis
- Matthew Rabinowitz will present his Weekly Narrative.
We'll then spend the rest of the time in a general Q&A session.
Discussion Thread: https://redd.it/bxazng
Podcast version: https://soundcloud.com/makerdao/sets/governance-and-risk
Transcripts (Delayed by 48 hours) : https://github.com/makerdao/community/tree/master/governance/transcripts
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 1: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-38625f514101
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 2: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-fc8939f3d4e9
Foundation Proposal: https://medium.com/makerdao/foundatio...
Governance and Risk Framework - Part 3: https://medium.com/makerdao/makerdao-governance-risk-framework-part-3-7a4c620f4077
Website: https://makerdao.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/makerdao
Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/
Chat: https://chat.makerdao.com/home
Email: info@makerdao.com
A
A
We're
gonna
be
improving
governance.
The
way
the
governance
works
in
the
next
couple
weeks
or
months.
We
need
to
start
discussing
what
that
might
look
like
and,
of
course,
we
have
multi
collateral
by
coming
at
us
soon
trademark,
and
we
need
to
get
prepared
for
that.
And
that
means
we
need
to
talk
about
collateral
risk.
And
happily,
we
have
a
series
of
experts
in
the
call
today
which
are
going
to
start
setting
the
stage
for
us
and
I'll
hand
off
to
Cyrus
in
a
second.
A
A
Every
week
we
have
a
thread
in
the
thread:
there's
an
agenda
for
the
call
that
we're
having
right
now,
there's
also
a
summary
of
the
call
to
gets
posted
there
and
a
couple
hours
after
we're
finished
and
that's
where
I
would
like
people
to
continue
the
discussion
and
continue
the
debate
big
into
issues
surface
some
more
and
then
keep
the
conversation
going,
because
there
isn't
enough
time
today
to
do
all
the
things
we
need
to
do.
If
you
have
questions
that
didn't
get
addressed
in
the
call,
please
add
them
to
that
thread
next
week.
A
If
you
feel
that
there's
things
that
you
would
like
us
to
address
in
the
calls-
and
you
see
the
agenda
thread
come
up
on
reddit,
please
feel
free
to
pre-populate
voice
from
load.
Some
questions
into
these
things,
so
we
have
things
to
address,
or
we
know
it's
on
people's
radars
when
we
come
into
these
columns.
The
other
part
of
my
preamble
is
that
we
are
very,
very,
very
interested
in
having
people
in
this
call
join
into
the
discussion,
and
that
means
that
we
want
people
to
ask
questions,
offer
their
comments
for
their
insights.
A
We
also
have
some
additional
functionality
with
our
transition
to
zoom
today,
where
people
are
able
to
raise
their
hands,
there's
a
muscle,
there's
another
functionality
that
we'll
be
introducing
steering
with
breakout
rooms
and
light
voting
and
signaling
and
stuff
like
that.
But
until
then,
let's
take
it
step
by
step.
So
if
you
have
a
question,
you
can
attempt
to
raise
your
hand
in
the
participants
window
and
possibly
we'll
see
it.
A
The
theme
for
my
chat
today
is
brevity
number
one,
secondarily
its
securing
the
Dow,
and
this
is
something
that
I
would
like
to
keep
on
reinforcing,
because
we've
been
talking
about
some
issues,
around
governance
and
the
issues
that
we're
having
around
governance
are
not
crypto
issues
and
they're,
not
maker
Dow
issues.
They
are
human
nature
issues.
We
have
a
voting
system
that
we
need
people
that
participate
in.
We
need
two
people.
We
need
people
to
feel
like
they're
engaged
in
that
process.
We
need
people
to
feel
like
they
understand
how
it
is.
A
A
As
far
as
I'm
aware,
the
solutions
to
these
problems
are
just
communication
and
outreach
and
putting
the
right
tooling
in
front
of
people.
There's
no
magic
bullets
here,
potentially
crypto.
We'll
say
this
at
some
point:
I'm,
not
sure
what
that's
gonna
look
like
or
how
it's
gonna
work.
Perhaps
somebody
will
come
up
with
a
ton
gamble
and
centralization
mechanism.
Maybe
that's
what
everybody
was
waiting
for,
I'm,
not
holding
my
breath.
A
We
saw
some
great
interaction
with
the
thread
recently
and
the
maker
cup
subreddit,
offering
some
feedback
about
how
we
can
improve
things,
but
we
need
to
get
not
only
more
voters
out
to
vote.
We
need
to
get
more
maker
out
and
staked
because
we're
in
a
situation
right
now
where
the
system
is
not
as
secure
as
it
should
be.
One
of
those
examples
or
as
a
live
example
right
now.
A
If
you
look
in
the
polling
system,
you
can
see
that
8,000
maker
was
state
at
four
on
12.5%
stability
fee
and
perhaps
I
shouldn't
be
too
hasty,
perhaps
that
person
into
a
financial
genius
and
just
see
something
that
nobody
else
sees
and
that's
the
stability
of
either
should
we
should
all
be
using
right
now.
The
general
consensus
in
these
calls,
and
in
the
chats
and
in
the
graphs,
seems
to
be
that
that's
absolutely
not
the
case,
so
the
question
becomes.
Why
did
this
happen
and
well
I,
see
there's
two
questions.
A
Why
did
this
happen
and
how
do
we
secure
the
system
against
being
moved
by
people
that
are
wacky
in
their
opinions,
possibly
first
we'll
get
to
the
answer.
For
the
first
question
in
a
second
answer,
the
second
one
is
that
if
the
peg
is
stable,
that
doesn't
mean
that
makers
should
be
coming
out
of
the
government's
portal
it
or
that
voting.
Your
your
incentive
to
vote
hasn't
gone
away
and
that
the
requirement
of
having
an
act
of
voting
community
has
stopped
them.
A
The
if
we
they
were
voting,
requires
diligence
and
if
we
turn
our
back
on
the
system,
and
if
we
ignore
it
for
a
couple
weeks,
we
might
find
that
people
with
outlying
opinions
might
be
able
to
move
the
system
in
ways
that
the
centrists
are
not
expecting.
So
we
need
to
keep
an
eye
on
that
haffley
in
the
last
or
I
should
say
happily,
because
I'm
expressing
with
my
opinion,
I'd
literally,
have
no
idea
what
the
stability
should
be.
A
You're
right
yeah,
so
I'm,
not
a
financial,
whiz
I,
don't
know
what
the
race
the
ability
fee
is,
but
in
the
last
day
or
so,
some
a
larger
amount
of
maker
came
out.
It
was
a
centrist
position
which
feels
like
the
more
rational
option,
but
we
cannot
allow
ourselves
to
assume
that
other
people
are
going
to
be
driving
this
bus.
Everybody
has
to
assume
that
they're,
the
ones
that
are
driving
the
bus
and
we
can
all
drive
it
together.
A
You
now
she
fell
apart
the
end,
but
you
know
what
I'm
talking
about
so
there's
there's
securing
the
system
is
key
for
all
of
us.
Please
get
your
maker
in
there.
Please
keep
track
of.
What's
going
on
the
the
first
problem
that
I
alluded
to
and
I
skipped
over
is
how
we
solve
some
of
the
issues
that
we
have
the
in
the
government
system.
That's
been
plaguing
the
community
for
all
time
and
here's
a
rapid-fire
list
of
the
things
that
we're
already
doing.
If
we've
missed
something,
if
there's
something
the
community,
we
see.
A
This
is
the
first
of
many
places
where,
where
information
gets
dispersed
and
people
have
to
base
the
decision,
making
process
happens
over
time
through
debates
and
texts
and
chats
and
then
ultimately
happens
in
the
government's
portal,
but
we
need
more
globally
distributed
calls
and
that's
something
that
we're
working
on
right
now.
We
have
we're
building
a
solution
for
the
world
and
we
cannot
have
a
debates
in
the
most
convenient
time
for
North
American
viewers.
So
we
need
to
have
calls
in
the
the
APEC
region.
We
need
to
have
calls
in
Latin
American.
A
We
need
to
have
causing
friendlier
time
zones
in
Europe
and
those
are
adults,
aren't
locking
up
the
next
few
months.
I
think
a
month
or
two,
it's
going
back,
it's
going
to
take
a
lot
of
work
and
a
lot
of
coordination.
We
need
to
figure
out
how
these
individual
calls
sync
up
and
how
they
stay
on
the
same
page
and
continues
their
correct
narratives.
We
are
continuing
to
we're
providing
summaries
of
these
calls
for
people
that
don't
have
the
luxury
of
devoting
an
hour
and
a
half
a
week
to
make
it
out.
A
Those
summaries
are
recaps
of
the
discussions
around
governance
around
the
around
risk,
with
handy
links
into
the
YouTube
videos,
where
people
actually
want
to
see
what
was
discussed.
Those
have
turned
out
to
be
very
popular
I
think
that
the
next
step
is
to
begin,
translating
those
into
the
top
five
ten
languages
of
our
stakeholders
and
begin
having
our
community
members
rebroadcast
those
oats.
So
we
get
a
global
reach,
so
at
least
people
know
what's
happening
or
what
discussed
in
these
calls?
A
We
have
the
voting
dashboard
version
1.5,
which
we've
been
calling
it
internally
is
coming
out
soon,
which
will
provide
us
more
flexibility
when
it
comes
to
additional
polls.
So
we
can
pull
from
more
than
just
a
signal
and
stability
fee.
We
can
pull
for
a
new
cadence
on
the
votes.
We
can
pull
for
a
new
stepping
of
the
rates
that
were
word
pondering
for
the
new
stability
fees,
which
is
going
to
be
very
important.
A
We
are
constantly
iterating
on
our
analytics,
which
I
think
is
one
of
the
key
pieces
of
this
puddle
puzzle.
We
need
to
be
in
a
position
where
voters
have
very
clearly
understood
in
readily
accessible
resources
that
allowed
them
to
say
to
themselves.
Well,
it's
time
for
me
to
vote.
I
need
to
go
to
this
page
and
figure
out
what
the
state
of
the
system
is
make
up
my
mind
and
then
vote.
There
needs
to
be
a
very
clear
path
for
ya,
informing
voters
and
then
allowing
them
to
exercise
their
will.
That's
something
I'm
working
towards.
A
We
have
a
set
of
tools
that
are
coming
out
a
little
about
people
with
custodial
solutions
to
engage
in
the
voting
system
as
well,
which
we're
very
excited
about
ensuring
people
read
some
blog
posts
about
that.
Coinbase
will
be
the
first
one,
so
that's
the
what
so
we're
gonna
leave.
People
with
that
voting
is
tough.
Governance
is
tough.
The
solution
to
making
these
things
successful
is
work.
It's
not
magical,
algorithms
and.
A
Based
custody,
there's
some
blog
posts
about
that
that
people
can
enjoy
on
the
Internet's
that
explain
some
of
what
that's
going
to
look
like,
but
it's
part
of
the
solution
to
allow
larger
holders
the
ability
to
more
easily
interact
with
the
voting
system
right
so
yeah.
The
governance
is
hard.
The
solution
to
a
hard
problem
is
hard
work.
That's
not
what
people
like
to
hear,
but
that's
just
the
way
things
go.
We're
gonna
make
it
easier
for
people
to
do
that,
work
by
providing
better
tooling
for
those
and
greater
visibility.
A
That's
what's
happening,
and
these
are
things
that
are
all
rolling
out.
So
there's
some
hiccups,
I
think
right
now,
with
the
way
that
we're
doing
governance
but,
as
always
I
am
by
the
fact
that
we
iterate
so
rapidly,
and
even
the
governance
system
that
we
have
right
now
is
radically
improved
than
what
we
have
in
months
ago,
and
so
you
know
imagine
how
awesome
is
going
to
be
in
six
months,
which
is
which
is
me
leaving
things
on
a
high
note,
which
is
I
like
to
do
that.
A
B
Really
quickly,
though,
I've
got
governance,
I
think
I.
Think
one
interesting
aspect
is
that
I
was
having
a
really
high
cadence
with
polling,
helps
mitigate
any
mistakes
or
mistakes,
but
any
undesirable
outcomes
with
the
governance
process.
Right
because,
if
some
crazy,
some
crazy
vote
goes
through,
we
can
potentially
undo
it
yeah.
A
I
agree
and
I
think
that,
ultimately,
the
situation
we
have
here
is
that
we
don't
have
polling
or
a
push
solution
that
allows
us
to
communicate
with
voters
which
is
tricky,
and
this
is
something
a
larger
communication
or
a
larger
thread
that
we
need
to
sort
of
untangle
here,
but
we
need
to
be
able
to
be
in
a
position
to
alert
people,
everybody
who
is
holding
maker-
that
hey
something
weird
happened.
You
need
to
vote
on
this
thing
or
nothing,
weird
is
happening
or
we're
not
having
a
vote
this
week.
A
How
what
that
looks
like
I,
don't
know
yet,
but
with
oats.
The
regular
cadence
gives
us
an
opportunity
to
create
this
expectation.
People
need
to
check
in
every
seven
days.
They
know
that
here's
enough
window
to
deal
with
things
if
we
moved
it
to
let's
only
vote
when
things
are
important.
How
do
we
bring
people
back
when
something
important
happens,
and
these
are
the
questions
that
we
need
to
start
figuring
out?
Yeah.
B
I
mean
I
think
it's
pretty
off-topic,
but
maybe
not
that
much,
but
assuming
we
slow
down
the
cadence
too,
once
every
month
or
once
every
quarter
or
whatever
it'd
be
interesting
to
see.
If
we
could
create
some
sort
of
emergency,
Disaster
Response
situation,
aware
how
quickly
can
we
corral
enough
and
care
voters
to
pass
through
something
that
have
his
fire
alarm
exactly
and
potentially
running
even
fire
drills.
C
A
Alright,
so
yeah
thanks,
Cyrus
I
hadn't,
assumed
that
anybody
have
would
have
a
question
for
me.
If
anybody
does
have
a
question,
though,
about
its
governance
plans
for
the
future,
what
we're
thinking
about
it,
please,
let
me
know,
ask
now
type
it
in
the
chats.
Add
it
to
the
reddit
thread,
otherwise,
I'm,
sorry,
smiley,
okay,.
B
D
A
D
Okay,
so
in
terms
of
what's
been
going
on
with
dye
price,
so
coinbase
is
a
new
component
to
this
breakdown,
which
is
great.
The
spread
is,
is
kind
of
it's
drifted
below
a
bit
recently.
So
the
thing
that's
something
to
watch
for
the
past
week
or
two:
there
had
been
kind
of
a
large
spike
centered
on
a
dollar
and
then
kind
of
a
little
bit
more
normal
distribution.
D
So
this
is
kind
of
skewed
a
little
bit
now,
which
has
been
the
case
for
the
past
few
days,
so
I
think
that's
definitely
something
to
watch
Eunice,
wob
I
think
so
there.
There
is
an
interesting
discussion
about
like
slippage
on
dye
price,
so
you
know
swap,
for
example,
you'll
tend
to
see
kind
of
this
more
rectangular
distribution
across
different
price
points,
whereas,
like
Oasis
you'll,
tend
to
see
a
huge,
a
centralization
around
a
dollar
or
whatever
the
median
price
is
and
then
some
of
these
smaller
exchanges,
you'll
see
more
of
the
outlier
prices.
D
So
I
think
it's
interesting
to
see
some
of
these
trends
emerge
and
then
coinbase
is
kind
of
chunked
around
the
middle
as
well.
So
it's
interesting
to
see
sort
of
with
people
constructing
a
lot
of
cross
exchange,
trades
and
dydx
playing
more
of
a
role
and
stuff
like
that.
I
think
it's
going
to
be
interesting
to
note
just
how
people
are
trading
die
and
where
and
what
kind
of
patterns
start
to
emerge
for
what
prices
you
can
get
on
different
platforms.
D
D
The
economics
have
changed
a
little
bit
and
I
want
to
talk
about
like
some
of
the
psychology
of
this,
but
I
think
the
situation
has
changed
a
bit
now,
where,
when
dye
dips
below
a
dollar,
there
is
an
increased
likelihood
that
people
will
actually
take
that
as
an
arbitrage
opportunity
and
actually
buy
up
top.
It's
very
hard
to
say
that
for
sure,
but
I
think
given
increased
variability
of
prices
below
a
dollar,
but
still
volume
weighted
remaining
close
to
a
dollar
I.
Think
is
a
data
point
that,
like
evidences
that
case.
D
A
D
D
Theoretically,
that
kind
of
overarching
effect
would
decrease,
so
I,
don't
think
we
can
really
use
that
as
a
justification
anymore.
So
now
it's
really
interesting
to
start
to
examine
why
died
and
eath
have
actually
trapped
fairly
well
and
I
think
that
that
now
really
starts
to
get
to
more
of
a
discussion
about
derivatives
and
lending,
because
I
think
that's
a
huge
part
of
what's
going
on.
D
So
just
to
you
know
your
classic
update
on
supply,
so
the
supply
picked
up
a
little
bit
in
the
past
few
day
is
most
recent
was
around
82
million.
There
were
a
few
days
where
there
were
some
significant
draws.
There
were
also
some
significant
wipes
on
those
same
days,
but
the
draws
had
kind
of
outweighed
the
wipes,
which
is
very
interesting
to
note
so
I
do
think,
and
we
can
talk
about
the
loan
origination.
D
I
do
think
a
lot
of
the
refinancing
has
slowed
down
actually
to
where
there
are
fewer
people
that
are
removing
their
loans
from
maker
to
the
secondary
platforms.
Partly
makes
sense.
You
know,
since
the
stability
fee
has
come
down
in
the
past
few
weeks,
but
it
also
I
think
was
a
big
initial
burst,
especially
with
like
compound
v2
being
recent
released
dy/dx
starting
to
pick
up
some
steam
in
inherently
I.
Think
those
things
would
have
driven
an
initial
spike
in
refinance
thing,
but
that
would
naturally
slow
down.
D
So
the
circulation
of
debt
has
just
kind
of
consistently
followed
this
trend.
The
rate
of
change
is
definitely
slowed
down,
so
you
know
the
more
old
debt
had
been
cleared
out.
More
new
debt
had
been
drawn.
That
seems
to
have
just
kind
of
held,
steady
and
I
think
is
leveling
out
to
like
a
fairly
equilibrium
point,
but
what's
interesting
is
that
equilibrium
point
is
sitting
with
the
age,
the
average
age
of
debt
that
is
open
lower
than
the
average
age
of
debt.
That
is
closed.
D
A
Yeah
I
have
three
questions
for
you
today.
One
of
them
I
guess,
is
kind
of
an
unanswerable
question,
and
that
is
how
long
does
it
take
for
us
to
see
cause
and
effect
in
this
system.
So
we
changed
the
stability
fee.
What's
a
reasonable
amount
of
time,
we
should
be
waiting
based
on
our
the
graphs
we've
we've
seen
before.
We
change
it
again,
I
guess
it's
a
million-dollar
question
right.
Yes,.
D
I
think
that
was
my
quote:
yeah,
it's
a
it's
a
million-dollar
question
and
there's
been
a
lot
of
back
and
forth
about
this
on
the
rocket
chat
in
the
past
week,
or
so
my
short
answer,
which
I
think
is
maybe
copping
out
a
little
bit
because
it's
an
easy
answer
is
that
there's
no
defined
time
period
I
do
think.
There's
like
a
certain
minimum
level
of
resolution
that
will
never
be
able
to
act
faster
than
in
the
way
things
are
currently
structured
and
that's
probably
like
a
three
to
five
day
time.
Scale:
I,
don't
think.
D
If
you
change
the
stability
fee,
you
can
reasonably
expect
to
have
seen
stabilized
effects
of
that
change
faster
than
you
know
three
days
and
I.
Think
probably
more
reasonable
is
not
faster
than
five
days,
but
you
know
there's
a
huge,
huge
element
of
guess,
work
that
goes
into
picking
that
date
range
now.
The
bigger
thing,
I
think
is
not
what's
that
minimum
time
scale,
because
as
long
as
we're
agreed
to
you
know,
wait
like
three
days
before
making
it,
the
bigger
thing
is
actually
and
I.
Don't
think.
D
That's
super
contentious,
good
thing,
I
think
is
when
you
make
a
change
and
then
there's
a
subsequent
change
going
on
in
the
environment,
how
we
decide
to
reset
that
ago-
and
that's
that's
a
much
harder
question
right,
because
we
make
a
soluti
fee
change
and
then
tomorrow
it
drops
by
ten
percent
that
significantly
changes
the
economics
of
the
situation
and
could
potentially
override
any
signal
that
we're
seeing
from
that
stability,
peak
change
and
yet
people
might
at
the
simplest
level
thing.
Oh,
we
drop
the
stability
feat.
D
A
That
raises
two
interesting
points:
one
of
them
it
might
be
an
ass-fucking
idea
for
us
to
explore
different
in
another
form
or
at
length,
but
perhaps
the
cadence
that
we're
actually
searching
for
is
dependent
on
the
deviation
from
the
peg.
So
if
the
deviation
is
you
know
five
percent,
then
we
vote
weakly.
If
the
deviation
is
two
percent
and
we
vote
by
weakly
if
it's
one
percent,
we
don't
vote
right.
That's
an
interesting
thing
to
explore.
D
Yeah
I,
that's
one
way
of
thinking
about
it.
What
I
would
actually
suggest
is
think
about
what
are
the
overriding
signals
right?
So
what
are
the
big
bullies
in
the
room
that
push
around
the
dye
price
and
that's
primarily
the
eath
price?
So
when
they're
a
significant
movement
Smith
price,
we
know
this
there's
significant
changes
in
transaction
volume
and
I
and
we
know
that
tends
to
correlate
with
movements
and
back
price.
These.
D
Kinds
of
things
well,
if
not
a
leading
indicator
right,
because
the
leading
indicator
is
very
difficult
because
we
know
it
has
an
effect.
Do
we
know
whether
that
effect
is
positive
or
negative
at
any
given
point
in
time
it
is
actually
not
as
predictable
and
and
there
are
different
use
cases
and
different
reasons
why
it
might
switch
positive
to
a
negative
correlation,
which
is
really
that,
like
there's
an
underlying
behavior,
that's
correlated
and
that
underlying
behavior
manifests
in
the
price,
but
is
not
an
easy
one
to
one
mathematical,
linear
relationship.
D
So
what
I'm
saying
is
if
there
is
a
significant
amount
of
movement
in
eve
price?
If
there's
a
significant
amount
of
volatility,
then
you
should
have
a
decreased
degree
of
confidence
in
the
correlation
between
your
change
in
the
stability
fee
and
whatever
the
impact
is
on
guy
supplying
that
price.
That's
that's
what
I
think
it's
about
it's
about!
Discounting
your
level
of
confidence
in
the
effects
of
the
changes
you've
made.
A
That's
another
good
point
too,
because
we
need
to
keep
in
the
back
of
our
minds.
That's
the
price
that
does
trading
at
is
half
the
picture,
and
we
still
need
to
understand
inventory
levels
because
they
could
be
accumulating
or
decreasing
at
rates
that
are
not
entirely
visible
to
us.
So
it
might
look
like
everything's
fine,
but
people
could
be
accumulating
large
inventories
behind
the
scenes
and
becoming
increasingly
unhappy.
D
Yeah
and-
and
so
this
is
actually
I-
think
where
we
get
back
to
it's
good
to
stay
in
touch
with
what's
going
on
in
the
market
maker
world.
It
is
also
an
important
data
point
to
look
at
like
the
the
amount
of
dye
that
trades
above
and
below
a
dollar.
So
that's
kind
of
why
I
started
to
show
this
spread.
More
often
is
because
I
think
it's
important
to
highlight
the
difference
between
the
averages.
D
Just
kind
of
came
out
to
a
dollar
versus
more
died,
was
traded
below
a
dollar
and
and
I
think
when
Moore
dies
traded
below
a
dollar,
it's
generally
because
people
need
access
to
that
die
or
want
to
dump
that
guy
in
a
move
of
relative
desperation,
and
so
what
that
indicates
is
that
there
is
some
underlying
movement
going
on
some
changes
and
then
I
think
we
tend
to
lose
sight
of
that
when
we
just
look
at
it,
the
average
sometimes
now.
The
the
other
thing
to
note
is
collateralization
ratio.
D
I
just
want
to
make
sure
we
touch
on
this.
This
has
come
down
fairly
significantly
in
the
past.
Well,
we
keep
redefining
quite
efficiently
because
it
went
from
370
362
540,
but
it
has
now
come
down
from
like
540
to
416,
which
is
interesting
and
and
I
think
this
lines
up
in
at
least
in
one
way
of
looking
at
it
with
what's
been
going
on
with
the
dye
price
and
what's
been
going
on
in
supply
right,
so
he
the
dye
supply
is
come
up
a
bit.
D
There
were
some
significant
mints
and
the
dye
price
tag
is
I
would
say
gotten
a
little
bit
looser,
although
still
centered
around
this
a
similar
level.
What
that
says
to
me
is
that
there
has
been
some
uptick
again
in
leverage,
and
so
this
is
kind
of
this
was
expected.
It
took
a
lot
longer
than
expected,
but
I
think
as
if
price
has
come
down
to
some
extent.
People
have
seen
that
as
attractive
again
in
terms
of
levering
back
up
on
eath
and
using
dyes,
a
method
of
doing
that.
D
A
Sorry
I
have
one
final
tricky
question
here:
can
we
assume
that
all
things
being
equal
if
the
peg
appears
to
be
stable,
should
we
be
lowering
the
stability
fee
as
sort
of
a
best
practice
in
order
to
see
how
close
to
destabilization
we
can
get
that's?
It
sounds
like
a
bit
of
a
leading
question,
but
I'm
wondering
if
that
might
be
some
of
the
behavior
we're
seeing
in
the
voting
with
migamoto
holders
or
voting.
Is
that
they're
attempting
to
make
the
rate
as
as
competitive
as
possible
as
it
possibly
can
without
destabilizing
the
peg
again?
D
So
is
sometimes
difficult
to
guess
as
to
the
reasoning
that
voters
have,
but
I
do
think
that
naturally
I
would
expect
people
to
vote
down
the
stability
feat
when
they
see
the
die
price
peg
is
stable
because,
ultimately
they
don't
want
to
be
paying
that
higher
cost
to
use
maker
if
they
don't
have
to
right
and
so
I
think
it's
a
very
it's
a
first
order
level
of
thinking,
but
it's
not
necessarily
wrong
in
that.
It
is
better
for
the
system
to
be
cheaper.
As
long
as
the
system
is
functioning
properly,
I
mean.
B
A
Sorry,
it's
always
hard
to
guess
what
people
are
doing.
That
I
tend
to
ask
you
an
answerable
question
so
I'm,
mostly
looking
for
your
opinion,
I
think
Mattel.
You
have
your
finger
on
this
kind
of
pulse
with
your
die
port
right
now.
I
think
that's
there's
some
overlap
here
because,
in
my
opinion,
I'm
willing
to
be
corrected
that
maker
Dow
is
essentially
setting
the
upper
bound
for
the
die
for
right
now.
A
C
D
So
we
do
I
do
I,
do
want
to
one
of
your
questions
or
comments
actually,
so
that
supply
has
basically
stayed
flat,
but
collateral
drop
is
due
to
a
drop
in
each
value.
Well,
mathematically.
The
collateral
ratio
will
drop
when
each
price
drops,
but
what
we've
seen
is
that
you
know
at
least
within,
like
a
four
or
five
day
time
scale
after
eath
makes
it
in
price
movement.
D
People
tend
to
move
the
collateral
ratio
back
to
sort
of
what
they're
comfortable
with
suits,
and
they
do
realize
kind
of
the
the
nominal
value
of
their
eath,
and
they
do
adjust
that
accordingly.
What
I
think
is
interesting
is
that
it
is
continuing
to
come
down,
even
though
each
price
has
now
stopped
dropping.
C
D
D
D
It's
potentially
something
to
look
at
actually
you.
So
that
brings
me
to
a
good
point.
I
will
share
back
my
screen
again,
just
for
a
second
I'm
sure.
Mateo
will
enjoy
this.
So
what
I
decided
to
look
at
was
some
of
the
secondary
lending
rates,
so
I
had
pulled
in
you
know
some
UI,
DX
and
compound
information.
D
So
are
you
able
to
switch
me
yeah,
so
this
was
compound,
for
example.
So
compound
is
the
v2.
Initially,
the
rate
had
come
up
quite
a
bit
because
it
you
know,
was
just
launched
but
has
now
kind
of
stabilized
back
to
what
we
had
seen
similar
in
compound
v1,
with
a
kind
of
three
to
four
point
buffer
between
the
compound
borrow
rate
and
the
stability
fee
and
the
head.
The
second
graph
yeah
on
dy/dx
I,
want
to
use.
D
But
here
what
we've
seen
is
the
dy/dx
rate
and
even
slightly
lower
than
that
it
actually
came
down
to
around
9%
but
was
floating
around
12
to
13%,
which
is
against
a
slight
discount
off
of
the
compound
grade,
the
volume
so
again
compound
v2
because
of
the
switchover
from
v1
and
dydx,
just
from
its
natural
increase
in
popularity.
The
volumes
on
these
have
come
up
pretty
significantly
in
the
past.
D
Now,
that's
a
very
simplistic
assumption.
I
can
hear
Mateo
groaning,
but
that
is
assuming
the
rates
remain
constant,
and
so
this
is
like
a
complex
discussion.
That's
you
know.
We've
been
having
over
the
course
of
a
couple
months
is
what
is
the
nature
of
the
relationship
between
maker
stability
fee
and
the
borrower
rating
these
secondary
platforms?
D
Now
my
hypothesis
on
this,
which
I
think
is
fairly
well
supported,
is
that
there
is
this
kind
of
natural
buffer
of
three
to
four
points
that
exists
between
those
secondary
lending
rates
and
the
stability
fee,
and
they
fall
into
this
position
of
being
naturally
lower.
Now
some
folks
had
raised
the
concern
of,
should
it
be
lower.
Do
we
expect
that
this
is
a
stressed
state
and
in
the
long
run,
will
it
come
out
to
with
secondary
lending
rates
are
higher?
That
was
a
question
that
was
raised.
I
gave
a
lot
of
reasons.
D
B
Think
I
think
one
thing
to
to
note
there,
or
maybe
more
of
a
question
is
to
the
extent
that
the
introduction
of
the
DSR
will
help
lower
the
maker
stability
fees.
It
will
then
have
an
impact
on
what
the
secondary
lending
rates
are
right
now,
calm
right
now,
these
secondary
lenders
are
operating
a
bit
of
a
a
bit
of
a
vacuum,
so
I
think
one
thing
to
definitely
watch
out
for
is
how
that
evolves.
When
DSR
comes
along
I
would.
D
Actually,
take
it
one
step
further,
so
you're
saying
that
it
would
affect
the
stability
fee
and
thus
affect
the
activity
on
the
secondary
lending
platforms.
I
think
it
would
inherently
affect
the
activity.
Was
that
clear
learning
fun?
No,
because
no
secondary
lending
platforms
are
effectively
functioning
like
a
makeshift
PS
are
pulling
supply
out
of
circulation
and
and
I
say
that
and
I
know
that
there
people
are
going
to
disagree
and
save,
and
it's
not
plain
supply
out
of
circulation.
But
what
I
mean
is
it's
marginal.
A
B
C
D
C
At
the
end
of
the
day,
I
take
kind
of
a
contrarian
position.
What
you
just
said
this
well
two
comments
ago:
I
mean
to
me
this
is
an
iterative
process.
Let's
just
you
know,
we
take
the
moment
aside
to
form
a
formally
verified
smart
contract.
Just
ignore
the
contract
risk
for
a
moment,
I
mean
issuing
die
from
a
CEP
or
borrowing
died
via
somebody
else's
contract.
C
If
you
would
exclude
the
formal
verification
risk,
they're
just
substitutes,
so
it's
just
turning
it
into
that
efficient
market
where
they
compete
with
each
other
to
try
and
in
effect,
allow
somebody
who
has
debt
to
refinance
their
debt
for
a
cheaper
interest
rate.
Now,
it's
not
per
se
a
threat,
because
until
somebody
creates
another
version
of
dye
and
creates
an
entire
ecosystem,
and
has
you
know
two
years
of
functioning
system
behind
it?
It's
not
really
a
competitor.
It's
just.
C
This
is
just
competing
market
force
and
it'll
compete
with
itself
until
they
in
effect,
put
themselves
out
of
business.
Now,
when
you're
talking
about
the
fact
of
this
iterative
action
of
where,
if
somebody
had
pick
a
number,
a
million
dollars
worth
of
debt,
that
was
at
nineteen
percent,
but
now
you
can
use
another
competing
solution,
lakh
equivalent
collateral
in
a
contract
and
borrow
at
a
cheaper
rate,
you
should
pay
down
your
more
expensive
debt.
Now.
The
question
is:
why
hasn't
it
happened
more?
Why
doesn't
it
happen
faster?
C
It's
the
same
reason,
if
you
know
this,
but
you
know
on
Netflix
that
you
subscribe
and
Netflix
in
Turkey,
even
using
an
American
credit
card,
if
you
VPN
there,
it's
like
nine
dollars
a
year,
it's
20
dollars
a
year
versus
20
dollars
a
month.
It's
just
a
substitute
at
the
end
of
the
day,
even
if
you're
in
the
US
or
some
other
country,
you
get
the
same
service.
But
it's
where
you
subscribed.
It's
a
substitution.
C
It's
a
dislocation
and
awareness
right
now
now
the
DSR
I
think
when
it
comes
out
will
be
more
of
a
in
terms
of
a
sharper
tool,
because
it
won't
be
a
scenario
where
you
need
to
have
somebody
who
wants
to
refinance
their
debt
and
be
aware
of
it
know
how
to
do
it
and
actually
execute
it
rather
ly.
Anybody
who
wants
to
buy
dime
and
just
lock
it
in
a
contract,
thus
removing
the
similar
supply
to
me.
They're
just
substitutes
is
my
point
so.
D
I,
don't
I,
don't
think
I'm
necessarily
contradicting
you
and
what
I
do
want
to
stress.
This
I
agree
with
the
secondary
lending
platform
are
primarily
a
a
destruction
of
inefficiency
right,
so
there's
kind
of
this
oversupply
that
exists,
and
it's
basically
like
you
know
we'll
need
to
talk
about
prior
but
say
organic
command
is
270
million
died,
but
the
actual
supply
floating
out
there
is
80
million.
The
amount
that
gets
refinanced
to
secondary
lending
platforms
is
surely
the
economically
just
be
eating
in
sweat
and
million.
So
it's
just
a
marginal
makeshift
efficiency
lever
right.
D
C
B
C
C
And
I:
don't
if
you
have
a
microphone
yeah
I
know,
that's
mostly
related
to
keeping
forth
on
the
PID
on
urine
and
single
collateral
mode.
You
know
single
collateral
die
and
the
real
question
really
more
punch
back
to
you
sirens
about
how
you
manage
the
risk
and
how
you
manage
a
PID
when
you
start
putting
things
in
a
multi
collateral
died
structure.
You
know
what
wait
when
we
have
multiple
aspects
and
moments.
C
It's
basically,
if
you
think
about
it,
logically,
as
being
a
set,
a
snowflake
with
the
very
center
core
being
single
collateral
die
and
the
moment
we
start
branching
out
little
pieces
of
that
snowflake
being
a
component
of
let's
just
say,
commercial
real
estate
is
one
or
mortgage
lines
or
another
or
rap
or
some
other
token,
being
another
aspect
off
of
a
branch
of
that
snowflake.
The
question
becomes
from
a
risk
management.
How
do
we
manage
the
PID?
How
do
we
manage
the
algorithms
to
track
that
single
collateral
die?
C
B
C
B
B
Okay,
so
today,
I'm
gonna
be
talking
about
a
few
different
things.
If
we
don't
get
to
all
of
it,
then
we
can
just
I
mean
this
is
kind
of
a
running
agenda.
For
however
many
weeks
it
takes
in
general,
I
will
say
that
a
lot
of
these
discussions
take
place
on
the
rocket
chat
on
reddit
in
various
forums
and
I.
B
Think
it's
going
to
be
difficult
to
kind
of
give
a
full
overview
of
everything
related
to
collateral
risk,
as
well
as
discussions
in
these
governance
calls,
especially
given
how
they
run
as
long
as
they
do
already,
but
we
can
track
so
today.
I
want
to
give
a
little
bit
a
little
overview
on
various
aspects
of
risk
and
I
definitely
want
to
get
to
talking
about
community
involvement
and
what
you
guys
can
contribute
and
what
we
can
hope
to
expect
from
the
community.
B
And
then,
if
we
get
to
it,
we
can
talk
a
little
bit
about
challenges
for
some
of
these
risk
models.
But
as
I
said,
these
are
these
are
just
kind
of
vague
topics
to
discuss
in
the
coming
weeks
and
as
always,
any
questions
anybody
has
please
PLEASE,
interrupt
and
ask
this
is
fairly
unstructured
and
I.
Think
it's
one
thing
I've
realized
is
that
it's
difficult
to
build
a
kind
of
a
natural,
sequential
process
to
describing
collateral
risk,
it's
very
holistic
and
a
lot
of
interdependent
and
moving
parts,
so
things
can
often
seem
confusing
at
times.
B
Okay,
so
the
first
high
level
topic
is:
what
are
we
even
solving
for?
What
are
we?
What
are
we
concerned
about
and
I
think
a
good
place
to
start
is
CDP's
CDP's
are
the
building
blocks
of
the
maker
tower
protocol
and
I
think
understanding
exactly
how
CDP's
can
be
modeled
is
probably
the
most
crucial
aspect
to
the
entirety
of
collateral
risk
and
essentially
so
CDP's
are
or
what
loans
that
users
issue
to
themselves
based
off
of
their
collateral,
using
the
maker
type
protocol
right
and
there's.
B
Obviously,
some
risk
attached
to
the
CD
piece,
namely
the
liquidation,
risk
and
I,
think
the
first
step
is
kind
of
defining
exposures
who
is
exposed
to
what
kind
of
risks
and
what
do
they
have
to
be
concerned
about.
So
in
this
case,
the
the
exposure
of
the
exposure
risk
of
the
CDP
comes
down
to
this.
This
notion
of
solvency
and
liquidation
risk
of
the
CDs.
B
So
what
we
want
to
know
is
one:
what
is
the
probability
that
this
CDP
is
liquidated
or
gets
paid
back
on
time
and
10
and
additionally
kind
of
if
the
CDP
gets
liquidated?
How
bad
is
the
loss
associated
with
it?
This
is
this
is
important.
Why?
Because,
when
we
are
assessing
the
risk
of
a
giant
portfolio,
CD
piece
we
want
to,
we
want
to
have
an
overview
of
what
these
losses
could
potentially
be,
how
bad
they
can
get,
and
that
will
play
a
factor
in
determining
how
much
how
much
total
exposure
maker
Dow
can
facilitate.
B
So
essentially,
the
two.
The
two
topics
are:
what
is,
what
is
the
likelihood
of
CDP
default
or
CDP
liquidation
and
giving
that
number?
How
many?
What's
the
kind
of
upper
bound
on
exposure
or
debt
ceiling,
we
can
facilitate
Cyrus
and
your
question
because
you're
talking
about
probability
and
in
amounts
of.
B
Exactly
great
question
in
a
sense:
theoretically,
that
is
what
we
would
like
to
do
in
practice.
We're
gonna
we're
going
to
explore
kind
of
a
number
of
different
approaches,
and
basically
we
will
find
out
that
we're
gonna
need
to
come
up
with
some
pretty
clever
pragmatic
approaches
to
how
we
handle
that.
But
yeah
essentially
CDP's
have
some
sort
of
credit
exposure
in
the
sense
that
CDP's
can
be
liquidated
and
how
to
determine
what
those
exposures
look
like
is
basically
the
crux
of
this
and
okay.
B
So
when
you,
when
you
talk
about
a
CDP
as
a
loan,
it's
that
those
probabilities
kind
of
converge
down
to
the
underlying
asset,
which
is
the
collateral
and
a
CDP,
is
liquidated.
If
the
collateral
price
hits
a
certain
threshold,
what
we
call
the
liquidation
ratio
right
so
from
there,
we
can
kind
of.
We
can
kind
of
intuitively
understand
that
some
model,
regardless
of
how
we
actually
implemented
or
calculated.
B
So,
for
example,
if
a
CDP
is
liquidated,
is
it
likely
because
it
kind
of
just
dipped
a
few
bucks
below
it's
liquidation,
price
or
there's
been
some
sort
of
massive
catastrophe,
and
these
prices
has
created
entirely
and
so,
given
that
this
risk
is
kind
of
the
singular
credit
risk
to
the
CDP
we
can
we
can.
We
can
say
that
the
stability
fee
that
we
are
attaching
to
the
CP
has
to
compensate
for
this
for
this
exposure
right
stability
fees
in
this
context,
I'm
talking
about
credit,
spread
or
credit
premium
for
this
risk.
B
Typically,
our
civility
fees
have
been
more
in
the
monetary
policy
side
of
things.
Essentially,
what
has
been
the
minimum
rate
needed
to
to
keep
die
stable
right,
that's
kind
of
with
me
dealing
with
the
last
three
months.
Unfortunately,
we
have
not
actually
factored
in
any
notion
of
kind
of
additional
risks
associated
with
with
ease
that
we're
gonna
have
to
start
talking
about
right.
B
So
the
way
I
look
at
it
is
that
the
stability
fee
so
far
has
kind
of
been
a
a
a
charge
on
CDP
holders
for
kind
of
expanding
the
dye
supply
CDP
holders
they
they
issued
I
and
they
need
to
pay
a
cost
in
order
to
help
dye
remain
stable
as
it
kind
of
permeates
the
defy
economy.
But
additionally,
because
there
is
a
collateral,
specific
chant,
a
collateral
specific
component
to
the
CDP
being
liquidated.
The.
B
Okay,
so
long
story
short,
the
stability
fee
has
to
reflect
what
our
expectation
of
these
liquidations
are:
the
frequency
and
the
severity
and
how
we
go
about
doing.
That
is
a
a
couple,
different
approaches,
and
this
is
really
where
things
get
a
little
bit
difficult.
We
can
start
with
kind
of
academic
frameworks
and
then
work
our
way
down
to
the
pragmatic
solutions.
But-
and
again
this
is
probably
a
lot.
D
B
For
this
risk
of
CDP
liquidations
right,
as
we
all
know,
kind
of
the
bad
CDP
liquidations
end
up
incurring
bad
debt
for
the
maker
Dow
Protocol,
and
there
are
some
various
mechanisms
to
clean
up
that
bad
debt
right
and
that
comes
at
the
expense
of
M
care
holders
through
the
dilution.
And
if,
if
M
care
holders
are
are
bearing
that
risk,
then
you
can
think
of
that
risk
premium
on
the
collateral
as
kind
of
a
break-even
point
where.
B
C
D
B
D
B
C
C
B
Now
we
can
look
at
kind
of
previous
CDP's
and
see
that
every
CDP
that's
been
liquidated
as
far
as
not
has
not
incurred
any
bad
debt
right.
Every
CDP
has
been
an
orderly
liquidation
process
and
there
hasn't
been
any
dilution
to
path
holders
thus
far.
So
in
that
this
is
part
of
the
challenge
right,
because
if
you
were
to
just
look
at
historical
historical
performance
of
the
CDP's,
one
might
look
at
these
at
the
current
collateralization
ratio
and
say
you
know,
this
is
great.
B
We're
totally
safe
from
everything
we've
had
I,
don't
know
a
couple
hundred
liquidations
and
they've
all
been
great.
In
fact,
the
collaterals,
a
ssin
ratio
could
be
argued
to
be
too
high,
but
in
reality
we
know
that
that's
that's
not
the
case
and
we
can
foresee
potential
risks
that
don't
manifest
themselves
in
the
historical
trading
markets
again.
The
clearest
example
of
this
is
tether
right.
You
could
look
at
tether
over
the
past
seven
years
and
say
this
is
the
safest
collateral
in
the
market
today,
but
intuitively.
B
We
know
that
there's
some
looming
risk
where
it
crashes
down
to
zero.
So
if
you
were
to
look
at
if
you
look
at
a
distribution
of
CDP
liquidations
related
related
to
tether,
well,
you'd
really
see
not
very
many
liquidations
until
until
just
a
massive
surge
of
massive
surge
of
them,
where
they
all
lost
everything.
Assuming
that
there's
some
something
bad
with
each
other,
probably
shouldn't
single
them
out.
But
it's
got
the
point
so
yeah.
So
how
can
we?
So?
B
How
can
we
reason
about
these
risks
that
don't
necessarily
manifest
themselves
in
the
trading
history
or
in
the
in
the
markets
profile
of
the
collateral
asset?
And
this
is
a
big
part
of
the
qualitative
assessment
of
these
collateral
assets
right,
especially
a
quick
side
point
intuitively.
If,
if
you
could,
if
you
could
do
a
full
risk
analysis
on
a
collateral
asset
just
by
just
by
looking
at
its
price
history,
then
you
could
just
kind
of
input
that
data
set
into
maker
down
and
it
could
just
spit
out
risk
parameters
on
its
own
and
comically.
B
D
B
B
You
can
just
dump
all
of
it
right
in
that
case,
no
matter
how
risky
the
asset
is,
you
could
just
set
a
hundred
percent
collateralization
ratio
right
because
you
could
just
dump
it
as
soon
as
it
hits
the
as
soon
as
it
hits
the
threshold
right
and
the
only
the
only
the
only
remaining
risk
is
kind
of
this
jumper
a
square.
It
just
kind
of
just
shoots
over
that
threshold,
where
you
actually
can't
dump
it
right.
B
It
essentially
just
goes
straight
to
zero,
so
I
mean
that's
kind
of
like
the
extreme
edge
case,
but
what
we
care
about
for
the
credit
risk
and
the
stability
fee
is
that
is
that
it
is
that
jumper
a
square.
It
literally
just
blows
through
just
blows
through
your
thresholds
and
the
cloud
ization
ratio
is
kind
of
just
walking
back
that
edge
case
a
bit
and
saying.
Well,
there
are
these:
these
intermediary.
B
There
is
a
cost
associated
to
liquidations,
and
so
so
let's
say
you
incurred
like
let's
say,
let's
say,
for
selling
a
batch
of
collateral.
You
incurred
33%
slippage
right.
Every
time
you
tried
to
sell
thousand
d,
you
take
that
much
slippage,
then
you
might
want
to
I,
don't
know,
put
a
cloud
ization
ratio
that
is
at
one
hundred
fifteen
hundred
fifty
percent,
so
as
soon
as
it
hits
the
liquidation
price
by
the
time,
you're
finished,
selling
a
collateral,
you've
kind
of
just
broken
even
right.
B
So
the
the
claw
is
a
Shinra
sure
I
like
to
think
of
it.
As
this,
this
metric
of
expected
slippage
or
expected
liquidation
amount
during
the
during
the
auctions,
and
it's
it's
slightly
unrelated
to
kind
of
the
the
default
risk
or
the
liquidation
risk
of
the
CDP
as
a
whole.
So
the
risk
premium
is
more
concerned
about
what
is
the
likelihood
of
the
GDP
being
repaid
and
to
what
extent.
B
D
The
mindset
and
not
just
a
volatility
of
an
asset
but
kind
of
how
the
collateralization
of
that
asset
overall
response
to
those
market
risks
matters,
because
if
you
consider
eat
today
versus
eat
four
five
months
ago,
there's
a
completely
different
risk
profile
and
maker.
Because
maker
holders
like
even
though
died
supply
has
come
up,
have
continued
to
increase
the
margin
and
hold
more
collateral
per
die.
And
so
it's
almost
like
the
fundamental
behaviour
of
change
and
people
have
gotten.
Maybe
more
risk-averse
or
maybe
they've
learned
it's
hard
to
say
why
this
has
happened.
B
Right
and
and
this
this
concept
of
changing
risk
profiles
to
make
er
Dao
is
going
to
be.
Another
key
aspect
here
is
that
different
different
environments,
different
diff
asset
price
environments
for
our
collateral
portfolio,
leads
to
a
different
distribution
of
of
the
way.
Cdp's
look,
so
you
can
kind
of
define
a
CDP
as
through
the
amount
of
debt
it
has,
through
its
collateralization
ratio
and
etc,
and
different
mark
environments
lead
to
different
different
CDP
distributions,
which
will
necessarily
require
different
risk
parameters
and
risk
approaches,
depending
on
what
we're
trying
to
achieve
that
yeah.
B
B
Think
we
have
to
come
to
consensus
on
some
sort
of
generally
agreed
upon
onboarding
approach.
I
think
it
is
probably
not
a
good
idea
to
just
have
any
one
person
or
one
entity
just
kind
of
come
in
and
submit
a
bunch
of
of
collateral
types
for
review
and
say
here.
This
is
this
is
what
you
should
even
look
at
right
and
that
presents
some
interesting
challenges
in
the
same
sense
that
we
can't,
along
with
like
the
governance
polls,
in
terms
of
trying
to
come
to
consensus
on
how
to
even
run
certain
aspects
of
the
polls.
B
I,
don't
think,
there's
a
there's,
a
great
answer
for
that
today,
given
that
we
haven't
gone
through
that
process.
Yet,
but
let's,
let's
assume
we
have
you
know
a
few
different
collateral
collateral
types
to
to
evaluate
I,
think
there
should
I
think
there
needs
to
be
some
sort
of
a
priority,
prioritization
methodology
for
how
we,
how
we
order
them
and
decide
to
discuss
them.
I
think
this
can
be
weighted
by
kind
of
the
safety
of
the
the
perceived
safety
of
the
collateral
just
at
a
high
level.
B
I
probably
want
to
filter
out
kind
of
the
more
unsavory
collateral
types
and
I
think
there
should
also
be
some
some
weight
and
given
to
the
potential
of
died
being
generated
from
the
collateral
type.
Obviously,
we
want
to
go
after
high-value,
collateral
first
and
then
potentially
also
some
some
determination
of
how
uncorrelated
it
is
with
the
rest
of
our
portfolio
to
have.
C
B
B
B
B
For
the
short
term,
I
think
I
think
we
can
have
some
sort
of
just
quick
click
order.
Okay,
so
let's
assume
we've
done
that
and
we
want
to
just
work
our
way
down
the
list
and
I
think
the
okay
process
for
evaluating
collado
types
starts
with
kind
of
a
three-step
process,
first,
step
being
classification
of
the
collateral
second
step
being
kind
of
a
due
diligence
and
third
step
being
a
risk
analysis,
so
I'm
gonna
just
quickly
run
through
our
run
through
these.
C
B
It
gets
purchased
by
the
keepers
and
kind
of
the
liquidation
aspect
is
done
and
we
all
move
on,
but
potentially
with
security
tokens
or
any
sort
of
non
bearer
asset.
We
have
to
kind
of
keep
in
mind
what
the
recourse
process
behind
that
looks
like
if
we're
to
expect
kind
of
this
orderly
and
efficient
liquidation
process.
B
Yes,
I
think
I.
Think
first,
step
really
with
class
is
just
classifying
it.
What
kind
of
asset
is
it
so?
Furthermore,
bearer
assets
can
be
subdivided
into
kind
of
the
different
crypto
asset
models
that
we're
all
familiar
with:
governance,
tokens,
work,
tokens
utility
tokens
all
that
kind
of
stuff
and
then
registered
assets
or
security
tokens.
They
can
be
whatever
equity
to
equity,
tokens,
pawn
tokens
and
so
forth.
B
Okay,
so
next
step
would
be
to
do
a
due
diligence
due
diligence
requires.
You
know,
just
a
careful
examination
of
the
Claudel
asset
and
everything
that's
associated
with
it
kind
of
looking
at
the
team.
Looking
at
the
technology
looking
at
the
business
business
line
behind
it.
Looking
at
the
token
soil
distribution,
so
forth,
kind
of
all
the
nitty
girls
call
the
nitty
gritty
that
go
into.
B
Doing
a
due
diligence
report
on
on
the
collateral
asset
and
then
finally
would
be
a
risk
analysis
where
we
try
to
examine
factors
that
can
lead
to
adverse
market
conditions.
Right
I
mean
this
kind
of
goes
in
line
with
the
due
diligence.
But
essentially
our
goal
here
is
to
uncover
anything
that
might
cause
a
sudden
crash
in
collateral
asset
value,
a
simple
example
being
a
protocol
risk
or
or
kind
of
bug
exploits
and
so
forth.
B
Other
examples
of
due
diligence
revealing
certain
risk
factors
is
evaluation
frameworks
for
various
token
models,
and
this
is
something
I
hope
to
discuss
in
the
call
and
the
weeks
to
come.
But
you
know
there
there
are
various
valuation
models
behind
the
token
frameworks,
such
as
utility
tokens,
and
do
they
have
value
or
do
they
not
have
value
all
that
kind
of
stuff.
B
B
Okay,
I'm
gonna
stop
there,
because
that
was
that
was
a
lot
kind
of
the
overview.
Is
we
got
to
do
deep,
dives
into
these
collateral
assets
from
a
number
of
different
approaches
and
that
qualitative
assessment
will
work
its
way
into
the
risk
premium
by
virtue
of
trying
to
determine
the
likelihood
of
repayment
of
this
CD
piece.
C
B
Yeah
absolutely
I
think
so.
Okay,
so
let's
already
we're
already
at
the
half
hour,
so
I'm
gonna
spend
the
rest
of
time
trying
to
flesh
out
community
involvement.
A
bit
we've
definitely
discussed.
I
think
a
broad
range
of
topics
so
far
and
I
think
first
step
for
anyone
looking
to
get
involved
is
identify
kind
of
which,
which
factors
are
most
interesting
to
them.
There's
significant
amount
of
work
to
do
both
on
the
qualitative
side
of
things
and
on
the
quantitative
side,
and
just
naturally
people
have
expertise
in
various
areas.
B
So,
if
you're
looking
to
get
involved
in
the
quantitative
side
of
things,
anything
with
risk,
modeling
and
evaluating
market
trading
history
and
all
that
stuff,
it's
definitely
a
lot
to
do
there
and
then
on
the
qualitative
side
of
things.
I
think
yeah
first
step
is
definitely
just
working
on
onboarding
collateral
types.
How
we
plan
on
bringing
them
to
our
attention
and
how
we
start
talking
about
them
and
then
eventually
I
think
hoping
to
see.
B
A
A
D
A
Collateral
risk
area,
so
thanks
for
that,
Cyrus
thanks
for
your
your
grafts
as
usual,
and
thank
you,
everyone
else,
Matthew
and
everyone
else
who
jumped
in
for
discussions.
Please
continue
the
chat
in
our
subreddit
lots
to
go
over
Buster's
discuss
and
we
can
keep
the
thread
going
until
next
week.
All
right
thanks.